<strong>Local</strong> Policy-<strong>making</strong> Mechanismsdistrict governments and between the provincialand district governments.Two years later, however, this agreementhad not yet to come into force (Jambi Provincial<strong>Forest</strong>ry Office personal communication).Some districts have yet to revise their forestryregulations (District Regulations on IPHH andRHH) to comply with the agreement, and haveyet to make their first payment to the provincefrom their forest sector revenues.b. Revenue lossAround 2000–3000 m 3 of illegal timber hasbeen transported out of Tanjabbar. The districtgovernment is estimated to have suffered a lossof Rp. 220 million 55 in revenues as a result ofillegal logging and timber transportation.In practice, the establishment of a TPR inTanjabbar has simply created more opportunitiesfor corruption at the district level. According tothe Deputy District Head of Tanjabbar, somelocal officials have been caught in dealingswith truck drivers transporting timber not farfrom these posts. Officials manning these postsalso falsify records, recording far less timberthan the trucks are actually carrying.Companies require an official Permit toTransport <strong>Forest</strong> Products (SKSHH). If theytry to pass a TPR without an SKSHH they haveto pay a fine of Rp. 90 000/m 3 56 . However,local people told us that transport trucks passthrough for a fee of Rp. 180 000 per trip, orthey can pay Rp. 90 000/m 3 for an SKSHH.The income from these fines alone issignificant; however, this provision effectivelylegalizes illegal logging 57 . It is very difficultto halt illegal logging activities when nondocumentedtimber can be transported onpayment of a fine. It is also impossible to knowhow many fines are actually paid at these posts,and what the district account should really bereceiving. This practice is regulated under aJoint Decree 58 , issued by the District Heads ofMuaro Jambi and Tanjabbar.c. <strong>Forest</strong> DegradationThe joint decree of the District Heads of MuaroJambi and Tanjabbar has given logging operatorsa legal mechanism to transport logs takenillegally from inside Bukit Tigapuluh NationalPark; the park is increasingly threatened withdestruction as a result of this <strong>policy</strong>. The districtgovernment’s failure to draft regulations basedon local people’s interests and needs has alsocontributed to this loss. <strong>Local</strong> livelihoodsissues and social or ecological interests havebeen sidelined in favour of an exclusive <strong>policy</strong><strong>making</strong>system.Another factor endangering Bukit TigapuluhNational Park is confusion and conflictsover the location of the park boundaries. Thevillagers of Suban claim that they do not knowwhere the boundaries lie. <strong>Forest</strong> delineation isunder central government authority: it does notinvolve any of the local people living in andaround forest areas. It is therefore not surprisingthat the community is unaware of the boundariesThe national park is adjacent to the villagers’farmland, but as they played no part in settingthe boundaries local communities do not feela strong responsibility for implementing thedistant policies emanating from the central ordistrict governments.One important point that should be madeis that the forest management policies, both inthe centralized and decentralized periods, havetended to classify forests as a resource to beexploited solely for economic purposes. Littleconsideration has been given to preservingand maintaining the non-economic or localsubsistence functions of forests. Likewise,little attention has been paid to the questionof regeneration. These issues have notbeen prioritized during the formulation offorest management policies at any level ofgovernment.5.2 Conflict between theCommunity and HPH/HTI Companies beforeDecentralizationResearch in the Subdistricts of Tungkal Uluand Merlung showed conflicts between localcommunities and logging companies, forexample:30
Sudirman, Dede Wiliam and Nely Herlina5.2.1 Forced land occupation, permitmanipulation and pollution byPT. Inti Indo Sawit Subur (PT.IIS)PT. IIS is one of seven CPO (Crude Palm Oil)companies in the province of Jambi; thesecompanies make a significant contribution tothe PAD in Tanjabbar. PT. IIS, a large company,received a centrally issued business permit(Hak Guna Usaha, HGU) 59 in 1990 to openan oil palm plantation and processing businesscovering an area of 3500.3 ha in TanjabbarDistrict. PT. IIS occupied land that had beenmanaged traditionally by local communitiesfor generations. It occupied the land by force:PT. IIS employed the military and the police toopen its plantation area. It evicted local peopleon the basis that the land was company property.It also claimed that the land was ‘abandoned’.An oil palm plantation area used by PT. IIS inthe Subdistrict of Merlung also extended 1000ha beyond the area original designated to it bycentral government. This fuelled the conflictbetween the community and the company. Atthat time, the villages in the Tungkal Ulu areawere living in very poor conditions due to thelack of available agricultural land. Severalvillages, including Penyabungan, LubukTerap, Rantau Badak, Pulau Pauh, Merlungand Tanjung Paku, lost their land during theforced occupation.In 1998, with the fall of the New Orderregime and the rise of the reformasi movement,people in most villages began to reclaim theircustomary (adat) lands. By mobilizing themasses, they boycotted the activities of PT.IIS and demanded their land back. Followingdecentralization, the district governmentfacilitated talks between the community andthe company. The people demanded the returnof the adat land and a reassessment of the sizeof their land. Finally, an area of 0.83 ha wasreturned to each household in the villagesof Merlung, Lubuk Terap, Penyabungan,Rantau Badak and Pulau Pauh, with a furtheragreement that the government would continuethe re-assessment process.5.2.2 <strong>Forest</strong>land occupation anddeforestation by PT. DasaAnugerah Sejati (PT. DAS)In 1991, PT. DAS obtained an HGU to establisha crude palm oil plantation and processingplant. This permit was allocated for agriculturalland and a forest area covering 9077 ha in theSubdistrict of Tungkal Ulu 60 . No fewer thannine villages were located in this area.Farming areas in the new concession hadbeen managed traditionally for generations, andunder customary law it was recognized as beingcollectively owned for the benefit of the localcommunities. However, the company took overthe land without giving proper compensation.Some villagers received compensation for thevalue of the crops growing on their land (rubber,durian, etc.) at the time, but they received nocompensation for the long-term loss of theirland. Many villagers were forced to becomehired labourers, working for the company onwhat had previously been their own farmland.The local people’s poverty worsenedbecause PT. DAS preferred not to employlocals; instead, it brought in skilled labour fromJava and other islands. The company justifiedthis by claiming that the local people were notskilled in factory or plantation management.<strong>Local</strong> people were hired only as daily labourers(buruh harian lepas, BHL) on a daily wage ofRp. 11 000 or US$ 1.20 (US$ 1 = Rp. 9000).As casual labourers, they have no clear contractand can be laid off without compensation ornotice.Central government in Jakarta gavelocal people no opportunity to question theallocation of their lands to a private companyor to demand – at the very least – employmentfrom the company. To date, not one single localperson is employed under contract as either afactory or plantation labourer.To establish its plantations, PT. DAS clearedthe primary forests around the local people’sfarmland. The forests had been a source ofincome for local people, and had maintained thewater supplies for their farms. With its permitfrom central government in hand, the companyturned the natural forest into rubber and oil31
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