Local policy-making mechanisms - Forest Climate Center

Case Studies on Decentralization and Forests in Indonesiacase study 14Local Policy-making MechanismsProcesses, Implementation and Impacts ofthe Decentralized Forest Management Systemin Tanjung Jabung Barat District, Jambi, SumatraSudirmanDede WiliamNely Herlina

CIFOR REPORTS ON DECENTRALIZATION AND FORESTS IN INDONESIADistrict and Provincial Case StudiesCase Study 1. McCarthy, J.F. 2001. Decentralisation, local communities and forest management in Barito SelatanDistrict, Central Kalimantan. Center for International Forestry Research, Bogor, Indonesia.Case Study 2. McCarthy, J.F. 2001. Decentralisation and forest management in Kapuas District, Central Kalimantan.Center for International Forestry Research, Bogor, Indonesia.Case Study 3. Barr, C., Wollenberg, E., Limberg, G., Anau, N., Iwan, R., Sudana, I.M., Moeliono, M., and Djogo, T.2001. The impacts of decentralisation on forests and forest-dependent communities in Malinau District, East Kalimantan.Center for International Forestry Research, Bogor, Indonesia.Case Study 4. Casson, A. 2001. Decentralisation of policies affecting forests and estate crops in Kutai Barat District,East Kalimantan. Center for International Forestry Research, Bogor, Indonesia.Case Study 5. Casson, A. 2001. Decentralisation of policymaking and administration of policies affecting forests andestate crops in Kotawaringin Timur District. Central Kalimantan. Center for International Forestry Research, Bogor,Indonesia.Case Studies 6 and 7. Potter, L. and Badcock, S. 2001. The effects of Indonesia’s decentralisation on forests andestate crops in Riau Province: Case studies of the original districts of Kampar and Indragiri Hulu. Center for InternationalForestry Research, Bogor, Indonesia.Case Study 8. Soetarto, E., Sitorus, MTF and Napiri, MY. 2001. Decentralisation of administration, policy makingand forest management in Ketapang District, West Kalimantan. Center for International Forestry Research, Bogor,Indonesia.Case Study 9. Obidzinski, K. and Barr, C. 2003. The effects of decentralisation on forests and forest Industries inBerau District, East Kalimantan. Center for International Forestry Research, Bogor, Indonesia.Case Study 10. Yasmi, Y., Anshari, G.Z., Alqadrie S., Budiarto, T., Ngusmanto, Abidin, E., Komarudin, H., McGrath, S.,Zulkifl i and Afi fudin. 2005. The Complexities of Managing Forest Resources in Post-decentralization Indonesia: A CaseStudy from Sintang District, West Kalimantan. Center for International Forestry Research, Bogor, Indonesia.Case Study 10b. Yasmi, Y., Anshari, G.Z., Alqadrie S., Budiarto, T., Ngusmanto, Abidin, E., Komarudin, H., McGrath,S., Zulkifl i and Afi fudin. 2005. Kompleksitas Pengelolaan Sumberdaya Hutan di Era Otonomi Daerah: Studi Kasus diKabupaten Sintang, Kalimantan Barat. Center for International Forestry Research, Bogor, Indonesia.Case Study 11. Ngakan, P.O., Achmad, A., Wiliam, D., Lahae, K. and Tako, A., 2005. The Dynamics of Decentralizationin the Forestry Sector in South Sulawesi: The History, Realities and Challenges of Decentralized Governance. Centerfor International Forestry Research, Bogor, Indonesia.Case Study 11b. Ngakan, P.O., Achmad, A., Wiliam, D., Lahae, K. and Tako, A., 2005. Dinamika Proses DesentralisasiSektor Kehutanan di Sulawesi Selatan: Sejarah, Realitas dan Tantangan Menuju Pemerintahan Otonomi yang Mandiri.Center for International Forestry Research, Bogor, Indonesia.Case Study 12. Samsu, Suramenggala, I., Komarudin, H., Ngau, Y., 2005. The Impacts of Forestry Decentralizationon District Finances, Local Community and Spatial planning: A Case Study in Bulungan District, East Kalimantan.Center for International Forestry Research, Bogor, Indonesia.Case Study 12b. Samsu, Suramenggala, I., Komarudin, H., Ngau, Y., 2005. Dampak Desentralisasi Kehutananterhadap Keuangan Daerah, Masyarakat Setempat dan Penataan Ruang: Studi Kasus di Kabupaten Bulungan,Kalimantan Timur. Center for International Forestry Research, Bogor, Indonesia.Case Study 13. Tokede, M.J., Wiliam, D., Widodo, Gandhi, Y., Imburi, C., Patriahadi, Marwa, J. and Yufuai, M.C.,2005. The Impacts of Special Autonomy in Papua’s Forestry Sector: Empowering Customary Cummunities (MasyarakatAdat) in Decentralized Forestry Development in Manokwari District. Center for International Forestry Research, Bogor,Indonesia.Case Study 13b. Tokede, M.J., Wiliam, D., Widodo, Gandhi, Y., Imburi, C., Patriahadi, Marwa, J. and Yufuai, M.C., 2005.Dampak Otonomi Khusus di Sektor Kehutanan Papua: Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Hukum Adat dalam PengusahaanHutan di Kabupaten Manokwari. Center for International Forestry Research, Bogor, Indonesia.Case Study 14. Sudirman, Wiliam, D. and Herlina, N., 2005. Local Policy-making Mechanisms: Processes,Implementation and Impacts of the Decentalized Forest Management System in Tanjung Jabung Barat District, Jambi.Center for International Forestry Research, Bogor, Indonesia.Case Study 14b. Sudirman, Wiliam, D. and Herlina, N., 2005. Mekanisme Pengambilan Kebijakan Daerah di BidangKehutanan: Proses, Implementasi dan Dampak Desentralisasi pada Sektor Kehutanan di Tanjung Jabung Barat, Jambi.Center for International Forestry Research, Bogor, Indonesia.

Local Policy-making MechanismsProcesses, Implementation and Impacts ofthe Decentralized Forest Management Systemin Tanjung Jabung Barat District, Jambi, SumatraSudirmanDede WiliamNely HerlinaStudy Center for Legislation and Policy on Regional Autonomy (PSHK-ODA)in cooperation with theCenter for International Forestry Research (CIFOR)

ContentsGlossaryvPrefaceviiAbstractviii1. Introduction 11.1 Background 11.2 Research Objectives and Benefi ts 21.3 Research Focus and Structure of Report 22. Methodology 42.1 The Multi-Stakeholder Policy Action Research Approach and Activities 42.2 Framework of Research Activities 42.3 Problem Analysis 42.4 Stakeholder Analysis 72.5 Profi le of Tanjabbar District 93. Legal Analysis of Tanjung Jabung Barat (Tanjabbar) District’s Forestry Regulations 113.1 Analysis of Tanjabbar District’s Authority under the New Regional Regulations 113.2 Permits for Forestry Resource Utilization in Tanjabbar 133.3 Tanjabbar Forestry Regulations: Analysis of Contents 144. Mechanisms for Formulating District Policies on Forestry 204.1 Forestry Policy Making at the District Level 204.2 Forestry Permit Issuance Process in Tanjabbar 255. Impacts of Implementing Decentralized Forestry Policies 295.1 The Problems of Vertical and Horizontal Coordination 295.2 Conflict between the Community and HPH/HTI Companies before Decentralization 305.3 Conflict between the Community and HPH/HTI Companies after Decentralization 325.4 Policy Action Research: Impacts 336. Conclusions and Recommendations 356.1 Conclusions 356.2 Recommendations 367. Endnotes 388. References 439. Annex 1. Introductory Notes of Plenary Session I of Tanjabbar Parliament 45

Tables and FiguresTablesTable 1. Distribution of Forest Land in Jambi, 1999 10Table 2. List of Permits to Use Timber from Privately Owned Forests (IPKR ) outsideState Forest Areas in Tanjabbar for 2001 12Table 3. List of Centrally Issued Permits to Utilize Timber (IPK) in Tanjabbar for 2001 14Table 4. List of IPHHKR and IPHHKT Permits Issued in Tanjabbar for 2003 15Table 5. Timber Production and Taxes collected in Tanjabbar from IPHHKR Permits,2001-2003 15Table 6. Criminal Offences in Violation of Forestry Law No. 41/1999 in Tanjabbar, 2002 18Table 7. Criminal Offences in Violation of Forestry Law No. 41/1999 in Tanjabbar, 2003 19Table 8. Schedule of Plenary Sessions to Discuss 16 Draft Regulations in Tanjabbar 23Table 9. General Observations of the Factions Regarding the IPHH and RHH Bills 24Table 10. Impacts on Livelihoods Following the Arrival of PT. DAS in PenyabunganVillage, Merlung Subdistrict 33FiguresFigure 1. Research Framework: Forestry Policy Making Mechanism in Tanjabbar 5Figure 2. Stakeholders and their Access to Forestry Benefits 8Figure 3. Stakeholders and their Access to Forestry Policy Decision Making 8Figure 4. Flow Chart of Legislative-Initiated District Regulations 21Figure 5. Flow Chart of Executive-Initiated District Regulations 21iv

GlossaryAdatAPLBappedaBPDBPNBUMDDishutbunDPRDFGDGBHDHLHPHPAHPHHPHHHPTHSAHTIIPHIPHHIPHHIIPHHKIPHHBKIPHHKRIPHHKTIPKRKUHPMuspidaNGOPADCustomaryAreal Penggunaan Lain, Non-Forestry Use AreaBadan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah, Regional Development PlanningBoardBadan Perwakilan Desa, Village Representative BodyBadan Pertanahan Nasional, National Land AgencyBadan Usaha Milik Daerah, District-owned CompanyDinas Kehutanan dan Perkebunan, Forestry and Estate Crops OfficeDewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, District ParliamentFocus Group DiscussionGaris-garis Besar Haluan Daerah, Broad Outlines for District PoliciesHutan Lindung, Protection ForestHutan Produksi, Production ForestHutan Pelestarian Alam, Preservation ForestHak Pengusahaan Hutan, Large-scale Commercial Forest ConcessionHak Pemungutan Hasil Hutan, Small-scale Commercial Forest ConcessionHutan Produksi Terbatas, Limited Production ForestHutan Suaka Alam, Nature Reserve and Conservation AreaHutan Tanaman Industri, Industrial Timber PlantationIzin Pemanfaatan Hutan, Forest Utilization PermitIzin Pemungutan Hasil Hutan, Forest Product Extraction PermitIzin Pengambilan Hasil Hutan Ikutan, Forest By-Product Collection PermitIzin Pemanfaatan Hasil Hutan Kayu, Permit to Use Timber Forest Products fromState ForestsIzin Pemanfaatan Hasil Hutan Bukan Kayu, Permit to Use Non-Timber ForestProducts from State ForestsIzin Pemungutan Hasil Hutan Kayu Rakyat, Permit to Use Timber Forest Productsfrom Privately Owned ForestsIzin Pemungutan Hasil Hutan Kayu Tanaman, Permit to Use Timber from TimberPlantationsIzin Pemanfaatan Kayu Rakyat, Permit to Use Timber from Privately OwnedForests)Kitab Undang-undang Hukum Pidana, Indonesia’s Criminal CodeMusyawarah Pimpinan Daerah, District Leadership ForumNon-governmental OrganizationPendapatan Asli Daerah, Regionally Generated Revenuesv

Pansus Panitia Khusus, Special Committee at Local ParliamentPDIP Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, Indonesian Democratic PartyPerda Peraturan Daerah, District RegulationPSDA Provisi Sumber Daya Alam, Natural Resources Rent ProvisionPSHK-ODA Pusat Studi Hukum dan Kebijakan Otonomi Daerah, Local NGO working withCIFOR in Jambi Province that focuses on the study of legislation and policy relatedto regional autonomyRestra Rencana Strategis, Strategic PlanRHH Retribusi Hasil Hutan, Forest Product TaxationRTRWP Rencana Tata Ruang Wilayah Provinsi, Provincial Spatial PlanSKSHH Surat Keterangan Sahnya Hasil Hutan, Permit to Transport Forest ProductsSPORD Surat Pendaftaran Obyek Retribusi Daerah, Letter of Application for DistrictTaxationTGHK Tata Guna Hutan Kesepakatan, Forest Land Use ConsensusTNI Tentara Nasional Indonesia, National Armed Forcesvi

PrefaceThis case study is part of a series describingthe impacts of decentralization in the forestrysector in Indonesia. Over the last two years(2002–2004), a team of researchers fromregional universities, NGOs and CIFORworked on a policy action research project:‘Can Decentralization Work for Forests and thePoor?’ intended to help inform policy decisionmaking. The research has involved workingwith multi-stakeholder networks in fiveprovinces across Indonesia (South Sulawesi,East Kalimantan, Jambi, West Kalimantan andPapua) in gathering and sharing detailed sociolegal,economic and ecological analyses of theimpacts of decentralization on forestry and thepoor.The foundations for decentralizingIndonesia’s highly centralized governancesystem were laid out in Law No. 22/1999 onRegional Governance and Law No. 25/1999on Fiscal Balancing between the Central andRegional Governments. Decentralization hasprovided district governments with considerableopportunities to reform their governance,development and public service delivery. Themost tangible manifestation of decentralizationin the forestry sector was that district headswere given authority to grant small-scale forestconcessions for the first time.The first two years of decentralization inIndonesia represented a time of transition andadjustment. Forest-rich districts celebrated thisnew freedom to gain direct economic benefitsby establishing district timber regimes. As aresult there was a boom in small-scale logging.The national government reacted with a newset of forestry policies attempting to limitforest degradation, mainly by curbing districtauthority. At about the same time, many districtgovernments and local stakeholders started torealize that their level of timber exploitationwas not sustainable. In these districts, a processof policy learning led to new, more carefullyconsidered district forestry policies. However,their potential was limited as the centralgovernment had already taken back much ofthe district’s authority for forestry.Under the New Order regime, the forestgovernance system had created an unsustainabletimber extraction regime. It has also beendescribed as a ‘poverty-creating’ model offorest management (DFID 1999) 1 . So far,decentralization in Indonesia has not magicallysolved the problems built up over decadesof over-exploitation and under-investmentin natural resource-based development.Decentralization has undoubtedly broughtshort-term economic windfalls to some forestdependentcommunities, and brought decisionmakingcloser to local stakeholders. However, ifforest and eco-system management at the locallevel is to be sustainable, all the stakeholderswho will be impacted by government policiesin this area need still greater involvement.Their input should help to ensure that finalpolicies provide them with real opportunitiesto improve their livelihoods and the naturalenvironment within a framework of sustainablenatural resource management.CIFOR gratefully acknowledges thefinancial support of ACIAR and DFID aswell as the important role played by partnersvii

in the five locations: Hasanuddin University(UNHAS), Tanjungpura University (UNTAN),State University of Papua (UNIPA), the StudyCenter for Regional Autonomy Law and Policy(PSHK-ODA), Yayasan Konservasi Borneoand Yayasan Pionir Bulungan. We would alsolike to thank the district governments, villagecommunities and other local stakeholders inthe areas where the research was conducted.Special thanks go to the Indonesian Ministryof Forestry’s Agency for Forestry Researchand Development, FORDA.Bogor, IndonesiaSiân McGrathProject Coordinatorviii

AbstractFollowing the enactment of DecentralizationLaws No. 22/1999 and No. 25/1999, and severalForestry Ministry’s decrees issued in 1999,district governments throughout Indonesiawere given a greater authority to formulatelocal regulations over forest resources. TheDistrict Government of Tanjung Jabung Baratin Jambi took this opportunity to introducethree policies regarding small-scale timberutilization and forestry revenues.This report begins with a normative legalanalysis and basic evaluation of these policies.It then explores the district’s policy-makingprocesses and mechanisms for implementingdistrict regulations and describes the functionsand roles of the relevant district institutions.The report then figures out the players in theprocess and how they influence the policyagenda and at the end provides an analysis ofthe impacts of decentralized forest policies onlocal people, focusing on small-scale timberconcession licences.This work is the result of research meant togenerate information and analysis to facilitatenegotiated recommendations for improvingforest policies and policy making processesby supporting public input to shape thedecentralized forestry policy agenda for thedistrict, and help develop a forest managementmodel oriented to increased prosperity andjustice for local people. The research calls forthe District to draft a new regulation on publicparticipation in district policy making, withthe policy objective of building consensus andsynergy amongst local stakeholders by usingappropriate public involvement mechanisms.ix

1INTRODUCTION1.1 BackgroundIndonesia’s decentralization laws, enacted in1999, took effect in January 2001. These newlaws decentralized authority to the districtsand re-balanced revenue sharing betweenthe district, provincial and central levels ofgovernment. Law No. 22/1999 on RegionalGovernment and Law 25/1999 on FiscalBalancing were devised as part of a collectiveeffort to restructure state governance andrevenue sharing. Central government wasdriven primarily by pressures from districtand provincial governments to create a systemof governance that would be more fair anddemocratic, and promote regional prosperity.The new decentralization measures werebrought in as an effort to maintain the unity ofthis diverse nation.The new laws represent a quantum leap inthe history of governance in Indonesia. Districtshave been granted much wider autonomy thanever before 2 . However, many commentatorsfelt that the agenda for decentralization shouldnot only have set out the transfer of governmentauthority from the centre to the regions: itshould have gone further to improve levelsof participation at all levels of society, as anintegral part of the new Indonesian governancesystem, after the collapse of the dictatorial NewOrder regime in 1998 (Haris 2003, p2). In thespirit of improving public access to decisionmaking,it is important that all stakeholders havean opportunity to provide critical responses tothe impacts, whether positive or negative, ofthe new system of governance.The positive impact of decentralization hasbeen that the bargaining position of districtgovernments has strengthened. The new policieshave also provided district governments withmore space to present locally relevant needsand aspirations 3 . Likewise, decentralizationhas provided districts with the opportunity tomanage their own resources independently,with greatly reduced control by centralgovernment.That said, giving greater authority to thedistricts has not been free from problems inbalancing the new responsibilities betweenthe different levels of government. The mostnotable difficulty has involved the introductionof district regulations (Perda) that have ledto double taxation 4 . Industry has been hitby tax bills from both central and districtadministrations for the same activity. Thissituation has been criticized as it has limitedpotential investment in the districts becauseof the higher cost of doing business underdecentralization. The other problem faced byprovincial-level governments is the difficulttask of trying to coordinate province-widegovernance activities 5 between district heads(Bupati). This is especially problematic as thenew laws have been interpreted as conferringmore authority and political control on districtheads than on provincial governors.However, local people have complainedabout the low level of commitment by districtand provincial governments (Nurhasim 2001).For many, the most important part of theequation has yet to be delivered in full. Many1

Local Policy-making Mechanismslocal people have yet to enjoy higher levelsof justice and prosperity or the improvedservices that had been promised underdecentralization 6 .Meanwhile, non-governmental organizations(NGOs) working on forestry sector issueshave also questioned the district governments’commitment to preserving and conserving localforest ecosystems. Their doubts have beenraised by the clear impression given by somedistrict governments that they are continuingto use the central model of forest management:in short, they have continued to treat forestryas a prime source of income, albeit now fordistrict budgets (regionally generated revenues– PAD) 7 . The NGOs argue that this resourceshould be managed for its long-term social,cultural, financial and ecological values, andnot just for its immediate economic potential.The implementation problems outlinedabove are also the result of a lack of preparationby central government, which did not provideadequate tools, guidance or support to thedistricts before enacting the decentralizationlaws. At the district level, difficulties arose as aresult of the inconsistencies and ambiguities innational regulations, problems which were alsovery evident in the new district regulations.At the district level, local people have notyet been fully involved in decision-makingmechanisms.1.2 Research Objectives andBenefitsThe aim of this research project was to generateinformation and analysis to facilitate negotiatedrecommendations for improving local policiesand processes by supporting public input toshaping the decentralized forestry policy agendafor Tanjung Jabung Barat District (Tanjabbar),in Jambi Province, Sumatra. It is hoped thatthese research findings may be useful for theDistrict Government of Tanjabbar: they maysupport the district government in its efforts torevise its forest policies to create more inclusivedecision-making processes and to help developa forest resource management model orientedto increased prosperity and justice for localpeople as well as to promote forest conservationin the region. Furthermore, we hope that thisstudy will stimulate the Tanjabbar DistrictGovernment to draft a new regulation on publicparticipation in district policy making 8 , withthe policy objective of building consensus andsynergy amongst local stakeholders by usingappropriate public involvement mechanisms.1.3 Research Focus andStructure of ReportThis report begins with an analysis of thethree main district forestry policies introducedby the District Government of Tanjabbar. Weprovide a normative legal analysis and a basicevaluation of these policies as a basis for futurepolicy reform; this includes an evaluationof the weaknesses and distortions behindthe assumptions, premises and theoreticalperspectives that formed the basis of TanjabbarDistrict’s three major district forestryregulations.The second part of this report provides aclear outline of the district’s policy-makingprocesses and mechanisms for implementingdistrict regulations, together with an accountof how the District Head reaches his decisionsregarding District Head’s decrees (over whichhe has final and sole authority). The reportdescribes the functions and roles of the differentdistrict institutions responsible for initiatingand drafting new policies, time frames andprocesses for policy deliberation by the DistrictParliament (DPRD). Finally, we outline theplayers in this process and how they influencethe policy agenda. This section closes withan evaluation of the weaknesses and differentperceptions of the inception process for forestdecentralization policies.The third part of this research report outlinesthe different impacts of forestry decentralizationpolicies on local people. This analysis is basedon statistical data and findings from the field.Besides looking at how new, small-scaleconcession permit licences are granted and theimpact they have had on village communities,the report investigates the views and hopesof local community members regarding the2

Sudirman, Dede Wiliam and Nely Herlinanew permit system and decentralization inthe forestry sector. We also outline examplesof conflict or contradictions between differentpolicies, difficulties with law enforcement andweak legal institutions. Finally, we considerthe impact of illegal practices in the forestrysector.Before presenting some conclusions andrecommendations on possible options forimproving the three regional regulationsstudied here, we present information andrelevant research notes detailing with theimpacts of the research activities of the StudyCenter for Legislation and Policy on RegionalAutonomy (PSHK-ODA) and the Center forInternational Forestry Research (CIFOR) inJambi, especially in the District of Tanjabbar.3

2METHODOLOGY2.1 The Multi-StakeholderPolicy Action ResearchApproach and ActivitiesWe used a policy action research approach,whereby all concerned stakeholders were givenan opportunity to take part in the study throughinformation sharing, public consultation,public meetings and focus group discussions(FGDs). Given the varied interests in forestpolicy impacts, our project was conducted incooperation with the provincial and districtgovernments as well as the local legislaturein the District of Tanjung Jabung Barat(Tanjabbar), the universities, the press andlocal non-governmental organizations (NGOs),who provided inputs and information (mostlysecondary data) for this study.At the village level we were helped by theclose cooperation of village heads and theirstaff, community leaders, the head and membersof the Village Representative Bodies (BPD), aswell as local community members. In particular,local villagers provided information and viewsabout the implementation and impacts of thenew forestry regulations governing the smallconcessions in their areas.2.2 Framework of ResearchActivitiesThe study was guided by two clear linesof enquiry. These are illustrated in Figure1. The first took the form of a legal reviewof policy-making processes in TanjabbarDistrict, and the second involved a rigorousstudy of the mechanisms and opportunities forcitizens’ involvement in the creation of districtregulations.2.3 Problem AnalysisThe conclusions and recommendationspresented at the end of this report are based onlegal, process and impact analyses of forestrysector policies in Tanjabbar District. Ourresearch team used three methods of analysis,outlined below.2.3.1 Legal analysisThis section makes a legal analysis of the threemain district regulations (Perda) issued inTanjabbar, together with the relevant guidelineson their implementation.i) District Regulation No. 21/2001 on ForestBy-Product Collection Permits (IzinPengambilan Hasil Hutan Ikutan), knownlocally as Perda IPHHI;ii) District Regulation No. 13/2002 onForest Product Extraction Permits (IzinPemungutan Hasil Hutan), known locallyas Perda IPHH; andiii) District Regulation No. 15/2002 on ForestProduct Taxation (Retribusi Hasil Hutan),known locally as Perda RHH.The legal analysis was based on currentpublic debate in the district regarding thebasis and purpose of these district forestryregulations, as well as the policy content andimpacts of these regulations in regard to forestsustainability and local livelihoods. The legalenquiry that formed part of this study asked thefollowing questions:1. Does the content of these districtregulations lie within the legal jurisdictionof the District of Tanjabbar? If yes, to whatextent?4

Sudirman, Dede Wiliam and Nely HerlinaFigure 1. Research Framework: Forestry Policy-making Mechanism in TanjabbarNational LawsGOAL1. Research results:- Legal analysis- Policy mechanisms- Policy impacts2. Academic draft:- academic draft- participatory draftDistrictRegulationGovernor’sDecreeDistrict Head’sDecreePolicy and processanalysesPermit processLegislatureExecutiveLegislatureSurveysVillage FGDPeople’sperceptions2001 to 2004Inter- villageFGDPolicyDialoguesStakeholderMeetingsConsiderationsDraft report, Draftacademic paper/District regulationsLocal AdvisoryGroup Meeting(Policy Making)Stakeholderworkshops atdistrict & provincelevels- Implementation of permitpolicy- Impact of permit policy- Local people’s expectations- Impacts and benefi t indistrict- Benefi ts for other districts- Final drafts, negotiatedpolicy briefs and fi nal casestudy report- Background- Legal foundations- Substance- Sanctions, etc.- Who initiates?- Time and money needed?- How many people needed?- Involvement of other stakeholders?What mechanisms are used?- Who deliberates?- For how long?- Time and money needed?- What mechanisms are used?- Other stakeholders? etc.- How many?- What is the application process?- Locations?- Fees paid? etc.5

Local Policy-making Mechanisms2. Is the legal content of the districtregulations consistent vertically (e.g., inline with relevant provincial and nationalpolicies) and/or horizontally (e.g., in linewith other district-level policies). If thereare contradictions, what are they, and whatare their impacts?3. How were these district regulationsformulated and how were local stakeholdersinvolved?4. Have these district regulations been draftedand implemented in line with policymakingprocedures as prescribed by law?These questions were used to determinethe extent to which the District Governmentof Tanjabbar acted within the bounds ofthe legal authority granted to it by the newdecentralization laws. If the government hasacted within its legal vires, the legitimacy of itspolicies and activities cannot be questioned.However, if it has exceeded the authoritygranted to it under the new decentralizedsystem for forest management we can concludethat the new regulations may be subject toannulment by higher authorities (e.g., theMinistry of Forestry) or by judicial review. Forall three studies we analyzed the provisions forimplementation and enforcement and the legalprotection granted to permit holders.We also considered how these policiesconformed with other national/local laws andpolicies. In addition we analyzed the processand techniques used for drafting these legalinstruments in the context of the national lawsand regulations governing policy formulationat the district level.2.3.2 Analysis of the processOur analysis of the mechanisms used and thelegal processes followed in drafting theseforestry regulations was based on the insightsoffered during in-depth interviews with keystakeholders involved in the drafting process,including members of the District Parliament(DPRD) of Tanjabbar, namely its Chair andSecretary. We also met with key officials fromthe provincial and district-level executivebranch of government, including the Governorof Jambi, Head of the Provincial ForestryOffice, District Head of Tanjabbar, Head of theDistrict Planning Board (Bappeda), Head of theDistrict Forestry and Estate Crops Office, Headof the National Land Agency (BPN), and Headof the Legal Bureau (bagian hukum) of theSecretariat of Tanjabbar District Government.2.3.3 Impact Analysis: ResearchLocations, Data Collection andMulti Stakeholder InvolvementSite selection was based on routine discussionsbetween the Study Center for Legislation andPolicy on Regional Autonomy (PSHK-ODA)and the Center for International ForestryResearch (CIFOR) with inputs from WalhiNGO, the Heads of the District Forestry andEstate Crops Office and Bappeda; TanjabbarDistrict was eventually selected. Of thefive subdistricts in Tanjabbar (Tungkal Ulu,Merlung, Tungkal Ilir, Betara and Pengabuan)we decided to focus on two (Merlung andTungkal Ulu) for this study, because thesesubdistricts have the largest forest areas inTanjabbar. From these two subdistricts, fourrepresentative villages were selected (LubukKambing, Lubuk Bernai, Penyabungan andSuban).Four key criteria were used for designatingthese villages as research locations, asfollows:a. Small-scale concession permits issuedby the District Government of Tanjabbar,using its new decentralized authority, werein operation on forest land around thesevillages.b. These villages all experienced directimpacts from the new forestry regulationsgoverning the concessions operating intheir areas.c. There is great potential for conflict overforest resource allocation via the newpermit system in these villages (legal,social, economic etc.).To guide our research activities and ensurethat our findings were locally relevant we6

Sudirman, Dede Wiliam and Nely Herlinaconvened a Local Advisory Group (LAG)with policy makers including the Governor ofJambi, District Head of Tanjabbar, Head of theProvincial Forestry Office, Head of the DistrictForestry Office, Head of the Bappeda Tanjabbar,Legal Bureau of the Tanjabbar GovernmentSecretariat, District Revenue Office (Dispenda)and members of the district parliament. We heldregular meetings with our LAG, and conductedseparate one-to-one qualitative interviews withmembers and other relevant stakeholders. Inaddition to these activities we held FGDs onissues related to forestry and decentralizationwith academics, NGOs, the press and otherrelevant stakeholders (every two months in2003), Walhi and Media Jambi (Daily News)and at the Provincial Forestry Office.Using advice and access to informationgenerated by these regular contacts, secondarydata on impacts was collected from relevantgovernment records and literary reviews ofrelevant documents including legal reviews,academic papers and articles in the broadcastand print media.More importantly, our analysis of theimpacts of these policies was also basedon local participant observation, FGDs andqualitative interviews with local communitiesin the four selected villages i.e., Penyabungan,Lubuk Kambing, Lubuk Bernai and Suban,to understand the interests and needs of localpeople in relation to the new small-scale forestconcession permit system.We gathered primary data from stakeholdersat the village level to see how the policies playedout on the ground in relation to operations,permit applications and the process for grantingand allocating permits. FGDs were used as astrategy to encourage discussion and debateand flush out the different views and opinionswithin local communities. Three FGDs withvillage members took place in March and June2003. These were followed by facilitated policydialogues with village members in February,April and May 2004.Finally, we held two workshops, one atprovincial level and one at district level, in2004. The purpose of these workshops was todisseminate the results of the research and tofacilitate multi-stakeholder negotiations basedon further inputs and feedback. We hope thatthis approach will help increase policy makers’awareness and acknowledgement of localopinions on the impacts of the new policies.2.4 Stakeholder AnalysisDuring the initial stage of this research (2002–2003), we conducted a stakeholder analysisto identify the relationships and dynamicsbetween different groups.The stakeholder analysis also helped toidentify future possibilities for improvingthe local communities’ access to benefits anddecision making related to forestry in their area.A diagram was produced illustrating differentstakeholders and their forestry-based interests(Figures 2 and 3).From this stakeholder analysis we are ableto see the relative level of access to forestrybenefits enjoyed by each stakeholder; these aresummarized from highest to lowest below:- Highest, central government, forestrysector business owners, plantation sectorbusiness owners and holders of Permits toUse Timber Forest Products in PrivatelyOwned Forests (IPHHKR permit issuedby district government);- Second, district and provincialgovernments, district and provincialparliaments and local NGOs, for exampleJIC (Joint Investigation Committee)Justice, an NGO in Jambi that is influentialwith decision makers;- Third, the village administration (thevillage head), security personnel and themilitary;- Fourth, Subdistrict officials, the BPD,environmental NGOs (e.g. Walhi) anduniversities;- Lowest, village members and adat(customary) representatives, who arethe group with the least access to forestresource benefits.As for access to forestry policy making,our stakeholder map for Tanjabbar shows7

Local Policy-making MechanismsFigure 2. Stakeholders and their Access to Forestry Benefi tsPOLICYMILITARYADATCOUNCILVILLAGEMEMBERSFORESTRYCOMPANIESPLANTATIONCOMPANIESVILLAGEADMINISTRATIONDISTRICTGOVERNMENTVILLAGELEADERACCESSTOBENEFITSNGO JICCENTRALGOVERNMENTSUBDISTRICTGOVERNMENTDISTRICTPARLIAMENTPROVINCIALGOVERNMENTPROVINCIALPARLIAMENTWALHIUNIVERSITIESFigure 3. Stakeholders and their Access to Forestry Policy Decision MakingPOLICEMILITARYBBBBWCENTRALGOVERNMENTWFORESTRYCOMPANIESBBBPLANTATIONCOMPANIESBPROVINCIALPARLIAMENTWPROVINCIALGOVERNMENTACCESSTODECISIONMAKINGDISTRICTGOVERNMENTWWSUBDISTRICTGOVERNMENTVILLAGEADMINISTRATIONADATCOUNCILUNIVERSITIESWDPRDREGIONKBPDKNote :K = ConsultationB = Business RelationshipW= Distribution of AuthorityPSHK-ODAandOther NGOsKVILLAGECOMMUNITY8

Sudirman, Dede Wiliam and Nely Herlinarelative access levels from highest to lowest asfollows:- Highest, central government Executive,the provincial and District GovernmentExecutives and the respective parliamentsat all levels of government;- Second, universities, business owners,subdistrict governments;- Lowest, NGOs working closely with thecommunity, i.e., Walhi, JIC Justice Jambi,the village government, BPD, adat leadersand village communities who live closeto resources, and the police and military(TNI) who have the power to implementthe permit system in the field.In Tanjabbar, the government (central,provincial and district) and the legislaturehave the most influence over decision makingunder decentralization. However, the businesscommunity also exerts great influence overpolicy making. This group has very closeties with the policy makers, as is clear fromthe fact that the authority to issue small-scaleconcessions lies in the hands of the districtgovernment. PSHK-ODA, as an NGO focusingon policy making, also has significant access tothe processes in Tanjabbar and has close tieswith the executive and legislative branches, aswell as the village institutions and other NGOs,in its effort to advocate for positive reforms2.5 Profile of Tanjabbar DistrictTanjung Jabung District was divided into twonew administrative districts, Tanjabbar andTanjabtim (Tanjung Jabung Barat, or WestTanjung Jabung, and Tanjung Jabung Timur,or East Tanjung Jabung) on 4 October 1999 9 .Kuala Tungkal was designated as the capitalcity of the new District of Tanjabbar, whichwas sub-divided into five new subdistricts(Tungkal Ulu, Merlung, Tungkal Ilir, Betaraand Pengabuan) 10 . The new district has apopulation of approximately 221 671 andcovers a total area of 5 503.5 km 2 .Despite extensive deforestation under theNew Order government, Tanjabbar still has oneof the largest remaining areas of forest in Jambi.The most extensive forest cover is found in thesubdistrict of Tungkal Ulu, which provides awatershed for the Pengabuan River, whichflows into Kuala Tungkal. Based on Tanjabbar’s‘Strategic Plan for Forest Development’ 11 the257 344 ha of forest land in Tanjabbar Districtare officially classified as follows:a. Protected forest/Protected peat forestb. National Park (BukitTigapuluh National Park)21 494 ha9 900 hac. Limited Production Forest 45 650 had. Production Forest 177 300 hae. Community Forest Park(Taman Hutan Rakyat)3 000 haHowever, these official classifications arequite different from the data held by JambiProvincial Forestry Office (1999) 12 , whichstates that the forest area in Tanjabbar Districtis approximately 210 291.16 ha in area. Basedon this provincial data, forests in Jambi areclassified differently as: Nature Reserve andConservation Areas (Hutan Suaka Alam/HSA),Preservation Forests (Hutan Pelestarian Alam/HPA), Protected Forests (Hutan Lindung/HL),Limited Production Forests (Hutan ProduksiTeratas/HPT) and Production Forests (HutanProduksi Tetap/HP), as can be seen in Table 1,below.The difference in the official data heldby Jambi Provincial Forestry Office andTanjabbar District Forestry and EstateCrops Offices is difficult to understand. It istechnically impossible that the forest coverin Tanjabbar actually increased between 1999and 2002 (from 210 291.16 ha to 257 344 ha).This would be possible only if the TanjabbarDistrict Government had not allowed anyforest exploitation and at the same carried outextensive reforestation. In reality, accordingto the annual report of Tanjung Jabung BaratDistrict Forestry and Estate Crops Office(Tanjung Jabung Barat District Forestry and9

Local Policy-making MechanismsEstate Crops Office 2002), several companiesoperated active forestry and timber plantationconcessions 13 . Another clear indication fromofficial records that extensive exploitationtook place is provided in the district’s financialreports, which show that Tanjabbar receivedlarge contributions from the forestry sector(Anonymous 2002d).Although official records held by theProvincial Forestry Office indicate that theforest area in Jambi is 2 179 440 ha – or 42.73%of the total land area of Jambi – the total forestarea is far below that figure (Moeryanto 2003,p4). Forest cover had, in fact, been disappearingat a rapid pace for over a decade in thisdistrict, and has continued to disappear sincedecentralization was introduced. For the last 20years, Tanjabbar’s forest resources have beenlogged out and forest land has been converted,steadily adding to the vast plantation area, nowtotalling some 42 125 ha of oil palm plantation(Badan Pusat Statistik 2002). Between 2000and 2002, there is an increase in the area of oilpalm plantation of around 1658 ha or 2% peryear 14 .Table 1. Distribution of Forest Land in Jambi, 1999No. District HSA (ha) HPA (ha) HL (ha) HPT (ha) HP (ha) Total (ha)1. Kota Jambi 0 0 0 0 0 02. Batanghari 12 145.37 15 840.00 0 74 202.42 144 101.82 246 289.613. Muaro Jambi 0 41 042.00 40 500.00 64 446.12 21 695.00 167 665.124. Tanjabbar 0 12 480.00 21 473.00 42 426.71 133 911.45 210 291.165. Tanjabtim 3 829.00 126 136.00 23 657.00 0 56 692.68 210 314.686. Bungo 0 28 800.00 13 075.06 0 100 709.51 142 584.577. Tebo 2 400.00 22 110.00 6 657.08 30 551.15 221 953.61 283 671.848. Sarolangun 12 025.63 0 65 887.59 90 903.70 124 477.40 293 294.329. Merangin 0 151 500.00 19 880.27 38 169.90 134 458.53 344 008.7010. Kerinci 0 250 830.00 0 0 0 281 320.00TOTAL 30 400.00 648 720.00 191 130.00 340 700.00 938 000.00 2 179 440.00Source: Anonymous (1999)10

3LEGAL ANALYSIS OF TANJUNG JABUNG BARAT(TANJABBAR) DISTRICT’S FORESTRY REGULATIONS3.1 Analysis of TanjabbarDistrict’s Authorityunder the New RegionalRegulationsThe introductory considerations of the DistrictRegulations (Perda) on IPHHI (No. 21/2000on Forest By-Products Collection Permits)and RHH (No 15/2002 on Forest ProductTaxation) state that the basis upon which theyhave been created is consistent with nationalregulations 15 .The District Regulation on IPHHI clearlystates that the taxation of by-products fromforestry operations is to be regulated by thedistrict 16 . Legally, policies setting out thedistrict’s authority to collect fees should beprovided with Penjelasan Umum or a generalelaboration that provides a detailed legal basisfor the authorities. However, none of the threedistrict regulations under study provide such anelaboration. In the absence of this legislationin Tanjabbar, there is technically no legalbasis for the authority implied in its three newregulations on forestry. This indicates that thesedistrict regulations were formulated withoutdue understanding of the need for a firm legalbasis for drafting new policies.Furthermore, to implement DistrictRegulation IPHH No. 13/2002, the TanjabbarDistrict Government issued District Head’sDecree No. 189/2003 on 22 April 2003. Thedecree provides guidelines on the processesfor applying for small-scale concessions 17 .This means that whilst the forestry districtregulations were approved by the districtparliament and publicized in the district gazette,the regulations cannot be implemented withoutthe District Head’s decree as the operationalbasis for their implementation.In the hierarchy of national laws, a DistrictHead’s decree is positioned below a districtregulation 18 . A district regulation is legallybinding as it is passed by the parliamentand publicized in the district gazette 19 . TheDistrict Head’s decree should rely on a districtregulation 20 before it can be implemented, andnot vice versa.In the meantime, of the three regulationsconcerning forestry activities in Tanjabbar(District Regulations on IPHHI, IPHH andRHH), only District Regulation IPHH No.13/2002 has been officially implemented, asit is supported by District Head Decree No.189/2003. The two other district regulationswere passed three years ago, but technicallythey cannot be implemented as District Headdecrees have yet to be formulated to guide theirimplementation.In addition to identifying the absence ofappropriate legal references and supportingpolicies for each of the new forestry policies,our analysis highlighted the following formalweaknesses in the drafting of the new policies:a. District Regulations No. 21 IPHHI and No.15 RHH refer to higher, central regulationsas the basis upon which they have beenformulated. However, these higher legalregulations are no longer in force. Forexample, the introductory considerationslisted in the new district regulations citethe Minister for Home Affairs’ DecreeNo. 119/1998, which has been superseded11

Local Policy-making MechanismsTable 2. List of Permits to Use Timber from Privately Owned Forests (IPKR) outside StateForest Areas in Tanjabbar for 2001No.Applicant1. Swakarsa Kp. BaruCooperative, TungkalUlu2. Penga-buan JayaFarmer Group, ParitPudin, Pengabuan3. Pancuran GadingCooperative, Suban,Tungkal Ulu4. Pancuran GadingCooperative, Suban,Tungkal Ulu5. Beringin Jaya Pel.Dagang FarmerGroup, Tungkal Ulu6. Sungai RambaiCooperative,Pengabuan7. Bujang Timol Suban,Tungkal Ulu8. Khairul UmamFoundation, Suban,Tungkal Ulu9. Binjai GroupCooperative, TamanRaja, Tungkal Ulu10. Binjai GroupCooperative, TamanRaja, Tungkal Ulu11. Mandasakti LB.Bernai Cooperative,Tungkal Ulu12. Compartment Kp.Baru, Tungkal Ulu13. Compartment Kp.Baru, Tungkal Ulu14. Swakarsa Kp. BaruCooperative, TungkalUlu15. Bernai Jaya LB.Farmer Group,Bernai, Tungkal Ulu16. Keruing Indah LB.Farmer Group,Bernai, Tungkal Ulu17. Gagak Sakti FarmerGroup, Taman Raja,Tungkal UluLand area(ha)APL100 haAPL100 haAPL100 haAPL100 HaAPL100 haLahanMasy100 haAPL100 haLahanMasy100 haAPL100 haAPL100 haAPL100 haAPL100 haAPL100 haAPL100 haAPL100 haAPL100 haAPL100 haDistrict Head’spermit518/755/Eko29 March 2001518/1236/Eko12 May 2001518/1812/Eko2 July 2001518/1813/Eko2 July 2001518/1816/Eko2 July 2001518/1933/Eko12 July 2001518/1955/Eko14 July 2001518/2095/Eko26 July 2001518/2119/Eko30 July 2001518/2119/Eko30 July 2001518/2064/Eko25 July 2001518/2536/Eko14 Sept. 2001518/2537/Eko14 Sept. 2001518/2554/Eko14 Sept. 2001518/2555/Eko14 Sept. 2001518/2556/Eko14 Sept. 2001518/2557/Eko14 Sept. 2001Productiontarget (m 3 )Source: Tanjung Jabung Barat District Forestry and Estate Crops Offi ce (2002)Notes1 300.00 IPKR No. 150/2000,6 July 2000.2 588.00 IPKR No. 321/2000,7 September 2000.6 380.50 IPKR No. 400/2000,18 November 20006 108.58 IPKR No. 401/2000,18 November 20003 173.39 IPKR No. 522.21.D/3796/Dinhut/2001/1416/Dinhut/2001 year 20003 921.63 IPKR No. 522.21. D/3796/Dinhut/2001/ Dinhut/2001year 20004 410.18 IPKR No. 522.21. D/3796/Dinhut/2001/Tahun 2000,6 July 200016 845.00 IPKR No. 403/2000,20 November 200015 987.32 IPPKR No. 402/2000,20 November 200014 271.63 IPKR No. 159/2000,10 July 20002 573.94 IPKR No. 324/2000,21 Sept 20008 705.49 IPKR No. 286/2000,23 August 20003 881.22 IPKR No. 287/2000,23 August 20007 743.35 IPKR No. 150/2000,6 July 20003 518.81 IPKR No. 183/2000,24 July 20003 945.58 IPKR No. 392/2000,13 November 20007 540.40 IPKR No. 52221/D/2534/Dinhut/200012

Sudirman, Dede Wiliam and Nely Herlinaby the enactment of Law No. 32/2000 21 .Likewise, these district regulations bothcite Government Regulation No. 68/1998 22as a legal basis, but this regulation wassuperseded by the enactment of the newForestry Law 41/1999. The use of aninappropriate legal basis for these districtregulations has critical implications, notleast that there is enough of a legal draftingerror to warrant their annulment.b. District Regulation No. 15 RHH, in itsintroductory considerations, states thatresponsibility for forest product taxationand forest management falls under theauthority of the district government Thelegal implication of this statement isthat central government no longer hasany authority over the forestry sector inTanjabbar. This provision is inconsistentwith Government Regulation No. 25/2000:this national regulation stipulates that ‘thedetermination of criteria and standards forforest utilization permit subscription fees,Forest Resource Rent Provision (PSDH),the Reforestation Fund and investmentfunds shall become the authority of centralgovernment’ 23 . There are also no fewer thanthree national laws and one regulation thatconfirm that this authority lies with centralgovernment and not with the districts 24 .However, the central government’sauthority is undermined by Law 22 onDecentralization, which stipulates in verygeneral terms that responsibility for naturalresource management is devolved to thedistrict level. If, however, the TanjabbarDistrict Government were to follow thelarger number of laws that more clearlyallocate responsibility for forestry sectortaxation to central government, it wouldmean that the district government had nolegal basis for levying fees on forestryactivities, and this would lead to illegaldouble taxation.c. Based on the same argument outlinedin paragraph b., Tanjabbar DistrictGovernment has also annulled theprovincial government’s authority inrespect of forest management. Thiscontradicts a national regulation thatclearly sets out 18 different authoritiesfor forest management at the provinciallevel 25 . This regulation stipulates that ‘theprovince has the authority to issue permitsregarding forest product utilization, animaland plant use, plantation activities andforest product management’ 26 .3.2 Permits for ForestryResource Utilization inTanjabbarBased on District Head’s Decree No. 76/2000on Permits to Use Timber from PrivatelyOwned Forests 27 (IPKR) and another decreeon natural resource rent provision, 28 some 17IPKR (Permits to Use Timber from PrivatelyOwned Forests) have been issued since2001. The IPKR permits are to be granted tocooperatives, farmer groups or foundations inareas outside state forest (kawasan hutan), i.e.,100 ha of Non-Forestry Use Areas (APL) or onprivately owned land (Table 2) in accordancewith the technical recommendations of theDistrict Forestry and Estate Crops Office.During the same year, PT. Inhutani V (a stateownedcompany) held two Timber UtilizationPermits (centrally issued IPK) for an area of885 ha (Table 3).In 2002, through the implementationof IPHH policy (Forest Product ExtractionPermits), the Tanjabbar District Governmentalso issued 55 Permits to Use Timber ForestProducts from Privately Owned Forests(IPHHKR) and 13 Permits to Use Timber fromTimber Plantations (IPHHKT) for an area of 1017 ha in 2003 (Table 4).Tanjabbar District Government issued 74IPHHKR permits for 2002–2004, 55 of whichwere issued in 2002, 13 in 2003 and 6 in 2004.The permit areas were located in varioussubdistricts of Merlung and Tungkal Ulu. Table5 shows timber production and fees collectedfrom active IPHHKR permits in Tanjabbar in2001–2003.13

Local Policy-making MechanismsTable 3. List of Centrally Issued Permits to Utilize Timber (IPK) in Tanjabbar for 2001No. IPK issued Area (ha) Validity Location Permit holder1. 61/Kpts/Kwl-1/2001 28February 2002685 28 February2001 to 28February 2002Plantation area of BukitKausar BDPNP/APLEks HPH PT. HTII,Tungkal UluPT. Inhutani V2. 62/Kpts/Kwl-1/2001 28February 2002200 28 February2001 to 28February 2002Plantation area ofPradira MahajanaBDPNP/APL Eks HPHPT. HTII, Tungkal UluPT. Inhutani VSource: Tanjung Jabung Barat District Forestry and Estate Crops Offi ce (2002).3.3 Tanjabbar ForestryRegulations: Analysis ofContents3.3.1 Objectives behind theformulation of the newregulationsIn the introductory considerations of the threedistrict regulations (IPHHI, IPHH and RHH) itis clear that Tanjabbar District Government istrying to facilitate an easy process for acquiringpermits for forest uses without explicitly statingthe purpose of or background to the creation ofthe regulations. This lack of clarity about theobjectives behind the new policies may resultin legal and social conflicts in the future.Based on our extensive consultations withlocal stakeholders about their aspirations andneeds in relation to forestry policy making, itis clear that there are at least two fundamentalobjectives that should underpin any newforestry regulations. First, to improve lawand order in managing forests in a moreaspirational and participatory manner thatwill provide equal justice and democratize themanagement of forest resources 29 ; Second,to provide greater opportunities for the localpeople living in or around the forests to gainmost benefit from those forests. In practicalterms, district regulations based on these twoobjectives should ideally include the followingprovisions:1. Provisions for a more inclusive andtransparent system for issuing permitsfor forest use. District regulations mustemphasize the need to publicize permitapplications before they are approved. Itis crucial that the public is made awareof submitted permit applications as thiswill give local people the opportunity toassess and file complaints or give theirinput to support the process of decidingwhich applications to pass. To date, nondisclosureof information about permitapplications has sown the seeds for muchof the conflict between permit holdersand local people. Disclosure is essential,not only to democratize forest resourcemanagement but also to minimize potentialconflicts.2. In line with provisions in Law 22 onDecentralization, all permit holders mustbe subject to requirements that protectand acknowledge local culture, practicesand wisdom. District regulations shouldcontain a stipulation that permits cannotbe granted without the prior knowledge,consent and full involvement of the localcustomary community or the villageauthorities (Village RepresentativeBody (BPD) and the village head) in theproposed activities 30 .3. District regulations must includeclarification of the local cooperatives’rights to acquire permits. Are therequirements for cooperatives the same asthose for large private companies? Whoare eligible members? Is the cooperativerepresentative and inclusive of the wholecommunity? How was the cooperativeestablished? Can permits be given to theadat community without establishing a14

Sudirman, Dede Wiliam and Nely HerlinaTable 4. List of IPHHKR and IPHHKT Permits Issued in Tanjabbar for 2003No.Name of permit holderPermit number (#)and date of issueArea(ha)Note1. Damai Sejahtera Cooperative,Desa Teluk Nilau2. Binjai Group Cooperative,Desa Taman Raja#347 Year 200329 May 2003#381 Year 20036 June 2003100 IPHHKR100 IPHHKR3. Mitra Dasal Cooperative #529 Year 200329 July 2003100 IPHHKR4. Merlung Cooperative,Desa Sungai Rotan5. Pelabian Jaya Farmer Group,Desa Lubuk Bernai6. Wirakarya Sakti LimitedCompany,Tungkal Ulu7. Wirakarya Sakti LimitedCompany,Tungkal Ulu8. Wirakarya Sakti LimitedCompany,Tungkal Ulu9. Wirakarya Sakti LimitedCompany,Tungkal Ulu10. Insan Cita Cooperative,Desa Lubuk Kambing#273 Year 200313 May 2003#336 Year 200327 May 2003#225 Year 200330 April 2003#223 Year 200330 April 2003#224 Year 200330 April 2003#226 Year 200330 April 2003#643 Year 200329 October 2003100 IPHHKR100 IPHHKR11.30 IPHHKT57.16 IPHHKT83.10 IPHHKT13.40 IPHHKT100 IPHHKR11. Serumpun Jaya I Farmer Group #620 Year 20038 October 200312. Serumpun Jaya II Farmer Group #619 Year 20038 October 200313. Serumpun Jaya II Farmer Group #618 Year 20038 October 200353 IPHHKR100 IPHHKR100 IPHHKRNote : IPHHKR: Permit to Use Timber Forest Products from Privately Owned ForestsIPHHKT : Permit to Use Timber from Timber PlantationsSource : Tanjabbar District Forestry and Estate Crops Offi ce, April 2004 (unpublished and raw data)Table 5. Timber Production and Fees collected in Tanjabbar from IPHHKR Permits, 2001–2003No. YearTimber production (m 3 )TotalØ 30 cm up (Rp.) Ø 20–29 (Rp.) Ø 10–19 (Rp.) (Rp.)1 2001 33 716.76 2 023 005 600 23 108.37 693 251 100 102 108.86 1 531 632 90 4 247 889 6002 2002 26 024.79 1 561 487 400 54 062.52 1 621 875 600 341 326.74 5 119 901 100 8 303 264 1003 2003 45 435.00 2 726 100 000 36 958.58 1 108 757 400 137 190.21 2 057 853 150 5 892 710 550Total 105 176.65 6 310 593 114 129.47 3 423 884 100 580 625.81 8 709 387 150 18 443 864 250Note : Ø = DiameterIPHHKR : Permit to Use Timber Forest Products on Privately Owned ForestsSource : Tanjabbar District Forestry and Estate Crops Offi ce, April 2004 (unpublished and raw data)15

Local Policy-making Mechanismscooperative? These questions must beduly considered in order to establish theappropriate norms in the regulations, aswell as to facilitate their implementation.4. District regulations must clarify the districtgovernment’s responsibility to invest localrevenues from forestry for the benefitsof villagers and local communities wholive in the area where the forest has beenexploited 31 . This emphasis will helpto ensure equitable distribution of thebenefits of locally-managed concessionsand to increase the welfare of the localcommunity.3.3.2 Areas and locations of the newsmall-scale IPHH concessionpermitsDistrict Regulation No. 13 IPHH states thatIPHHs can be issued to cooperatives as wellas to small and medium-scale businesses inpartnership with cooperatives in IndustrialTimber Plantation (HTI) areas withinproduction forests 32 . This district regulationalso states that a maximum of 100 ha will beprovided for cooperatives and a maximumof 20 ha for ‘individual’ permit applicants.These stipulations are unclear, leading to thefollowing uncertainties when it comes toimplementation:1. Uncertainty over the extent of a district’sauthority to issue permits.There is legal uncertainty about what shouldhappen if a permit application covers anarea located within two or more districts.The IPHH policy makes no provision forcases such as these, despite the fact thatnational legislation clearly states that ifa district permit application covers anarea located in more than one district,the authority for granting the permit lieswith the provincial government, namelyby giving authority to the provincialgovernor 33 . District regulations shouldset out clear rules to govern cross-districtpermit applications. This uncertainty hasthe potential to cause conflicts of authoritybetween the District of Tanjabbar and theprovincial government or neighbouringdistricts.2. The location assignment for IPHHcontradicts other regulations. Based ona decree from the Minister of Forestry inJakarta, small-scale concession permitsshould not be issued for areas alreadycovered by any other forestry permit.However, Tanjabbar’s concession policyallows IPHH concessions to be issuedon HTIs. This contradiction may lead tooverlaps and poor spatial planning as wellas to conflicts over which land-use permitsare considered legitimate on the ground.3.3.3 Enforcing district regulations(RHH, IPHH and IPHHI)The quality of legal drafting in TanjabbarDistrict’s regulations seriously limits the districtgovernment’s ability to enforce the provisionsin its own policies. In the first instance,these regulations do not clearly outline thesanctions that will be imposed or the actionsthat constitute violations of the law. Secondly,some of the sanctions defined in these policiesexceed the maximum punishments allowedunder prevailing national law. Finally, failure touse clearly defined legal terms and referencesmakes it difficult to interpret or establish howvarious sanctions should be applied or bywhom.Article 12 of District Regulation No. 13on IPHH stipulates that IPHH permit holdersare obliged to prevent forest fires withintheir IPHH concessions. Theoretically, theseobligations must be followed by ‘sanctions’when there is failure to prevent fires. However,the district regulation fails to define these‘sanctions’. Likewise, the regulation states thatpermits will be revoked if ‘a violation of lawsoccurs’ or if ‘the obligations are not fulfilledby the permit holders’, without defining permitholders’ obligations or specifying either thelaws or the type of violation that will lead tothe cancellation of a permit.Where sanctions are clearly defined, theyoften contradict national rules and regulations.For example District Regulation No. 15 on RHH16

Sudirman, Dede Wiliam and Nely Herlina(Article 12) stipulates that the fine imposed fornon-payment of tax will amount to a maximumof ten times the tax owed, while Article 39 ofLaw 34/2000 limits the maximum fine payableto four times the amount owed.The administrative sanctions that can beimposed on permit holders for non-complianceinclude warnings and cancellation of permit 34 .Our research with local stakeholders identifiedthe fact that, ideally, other types of administrativesanctions should also be included, as moreeffective ways to ensure policy-compliance.These included discontinuing administrativeservices such as the issuance of timbertransport passes, freezing logging permits fora certain period, reducing the targeted timberproduction allowed under the permit andimposing administrative fines.Another policy weakness that limits lawenforcement potential is Article 16 of DistrictRegulation No. 13 on IPHH which states that‘violations of the IPHH policy may result inimposition of criminal sanctions, fines oradministrative sanctions as prescribed byForestry Law No. 41/1999 and other nationallaws.’ However, no distinction is madebetween criminal and administrative sanctions.Normally, an administrative sanction fallsunder the authority of the government and maybe imposed without any court ruling, whereascriminal sanctions can be imposed only via acourt ruling. Fines are then imposed throughcivil court rulings, separately conducted orafter criminal court procedures finish and adecision for criminal punishment has alreadybeen made.The principles of criminal justice requirethat criminal activities and related sanctionsshould be clear and easy to understand 35 . Thereare currently too many areas of uncertainty overwhat constitutes a clear case of breaking thelaw. Where sanctions are more clearly defined,none of the forestry regulations indicate whichagency or government officials are responsiblefor imposing them. The district regulations donot provide enough guidance on exactly whatcounts as a violation that will lead to sanctions,what these sanctions will involve, or who isresponsible for imposing them.3.3.4 Implementation and legalenforcementDuring 2002–2003 12 criminal cases relatedto the forestry sector were brought beforeTanjabbar District Court in the district capital,Kuala Tungkal. These mostly concerned illegallogging activities (Tables 6 and 7) 36 . What isinteresting to note about these cases is that thecourt’s judgement was not based on districtregulations but on the central administration’sForestry Law No. 41/1999.Basing law enforcement measures onnational legislation without any reference toprovisions in the district’s own legislationmakes it impossible to impose sanctionsdevised by the district to regulate its concessionsystem. For example, the District Regulation onIPHH clearly outlines the legal responsibilities(orders and restrictions) of all district permitholders 37 . It also outlines several sanctionsfor non-compliance 38 . However, as the districtcourt still refers only to central Forestry LawNo. 41/1999 39 , which carries no provisionsfor imposing sanctions or punishing noncompliancewith district forestry policies, theprovisions in the district regulations are notenforceable in the district court. This situationseriously hinders the legal enforcement ofdistrict policies. This fact underlines the notionof how the central policies still dominatelaw enforcement in the face of the numerouscriminal activities evident in the forestry sectorin Tanjabbar.Whilst the district courts might rule againstthe defendant in illegal logging cases, and orderprison sentences and fines as a punishment, thetables below clearly show that once the caseproceeds to appeal at the Supreme Court thedefendant is invariably found not guilty or thesentence and fine are radically cut.17

Local Policy-making MechanismsTable 6. Criminal Offences in Violation of Forestry Law No. 41/1999 in Tanjabbar, 2002No.CasefileName ofAccusedArticlesviolated(BFL No.41/1999)Date ofDistrictCourtdecisionDistrict CourtdecisionIllegalharvestJambiAppellateCourtdecisionSupremeCourtdecision1. 03/Pid.B/2002/PN.KTLBayhadiBinSafarudinArticle 50(3) pointh; Art. 78(7)28February20022 years’prison, Rp.500 000 fi neand 1 month’sdetention7 logs 1 year 6months’prison5 months’prison2. 04/Pid.B/2002/PN.KTLUwarAlias UdarBin A.WahabArt. 50(3)h; Art.78 (7)28February20022 years’prison, Rp.50 000 fi neand 1 month’sdetention13 logs 1 year 6months’prison-3. 05/Pid.B/2002/PN.KTLRamli BinArifi nArt. 50(3)h; Art.78 (7)28February20026 months’prison, Rp.500 000 fi neand 1 month’sdetention7 logs 1 year 6months’prisonOverturned4. 06/Pid.B/2002/PN.KTLKusnadiAlias EdiBin ZainArt. 50(3)h; Art.78 (7)28February20021 year’sprison, Rp.500 000 fi neand 1 month’sdetention13 logs 4 years’prison-5. 07/Pid.B/2002/PN.KTLAbd.RasyidBinLaupekArt. 50(3)h; Art.78 (7)28February20021 year’sprison, Rp.500 000 fi neand 1 month’sdetention7 logs 4 years’prison-6. 11/Pid.B/2002/PN.KTLAbd.Gani BinEndek,andothersArt. 50(3)h; Art.78 (7)28 March2002Prisonsentence,respectively:Accused 1(A1). elevenmonthsA2. 8 yearsA3. 8 yearsA4. 8 yearsA5. 6 yearsA6. 8 yearsRp. 500000 fi ne;1 month’sdetention7 logs, 3type-40kelekatwoodlogs, 4type-30punakwoodlogs4 years’prisoneachOverturnedSource: Tanjabbar District Forestry and Estate Crops Offi ce, April 2004 (unpublished and raw data)18

Sudirman, Dede Wiliam and Nely HerlinaTable 7. Criminal Offences in Violation of Forestry Law No. 41/1999 in Tanjabbar, 2003No.Case file Name ofaccusedArticlesviolatedKualaTungkalCourtdecisionDecisionIllegalharvestJambiAppellateCourtdecisionSupremeCourtdecision1. 67/Pid.B/2003/PN.KTLArdiyantoAlias YantoArt. 50(3)h; Art.78 (7)5 August20031 year’sprison, Rp.500 000fi ne and1 month’sdetention453 logs Appeal -2. 149/Pid.B/2003/PN.KTLHeri MuktiAliasHeri BinIskandarArt. 50(3)h; Art.78 (7) and(15)Currently inprocessLogs - -3. 152/Pid.B/2003/PN.KTLPadli AliasAli BinBasarudinArt. 50(3)h; Art.78 (7)5 December20031 year’sprison, Rp.500 000fi ne and1 month’sdetentionLogs Appeal -4. 155/Pid.B/2003/PN.KTLNgadenanBinSugiartoArt. 50(3)h; Art.78 (7) and(15)Currently inprocessLogs - -5. 156/Pid.B/2003/PN.KTLSuyoto BinKasimArt. 50(3)h; Art.78 (7) and(15)Currently inprocessLogs - -6. 170/Pid.B/2003/PN.KTLAsril AliasUyun BinAgusArt. 50(3)h; Art.78 (7)9 December20038 months’prisonLogs Appeal -Source: Tanjabbar District Forestry and Estate Crops Offi ce, April 2004 (unpublished and raw data)19

4MECHANISMS FOR FORMULATING DISTRICTPOLICIES ON FORESTRY4.1 Forestry Policy Making atthe District LevelIn practice, at both central and district levels ofgovernment there are very limited opportunitiesfor public involvement in decision makingconcerning the forestry sector. The processesdo not involve those stakeholders who maybe directly or indirectly affected by policyoutcomes. Universities, NGOs, civil societygroups and the business community are still notconsidered an important source of informationand views to guide policy making. Remotecommunities who are dependent on forests fortheir entire livelihoods are almost completelyexcluded. To date, neither central governmentnor the Tanjung Jabung Barat (Tanjabbar)District Government has issued a regulationsetting out standards and mechanisms forpublic involvement in policy making at thedistrict level.Generally, there are two processes for localpolicy making in Jambi Province. The firstoption is that members of parliament proposea draft regulation, which is then debated inparliament (Figure 4). This process is governedunder the standing orders of the respectivedistrict parliaments 40 . This route is possibleonly if members of parliament actually havethe expertise and experience required to initiatea draft regulation.The second option allows local executivebodies to initiate the process. They prepareand submit a draft regulation to the districtparliament, with an introductory note writtenby the District Head (Figure 5).With generally poorly qualified localmembers of parliament, all policy making inTanjabbar follows the second method. Local staffwithin executive offices generally know moreabout sectoral issues and hold responsibilityfor implementing final regulations.The mechanisms used are based on oldLocal Government Decrees issued in 1992and 1993 41 : they refer to a law introduced inthe 1970s (Law No.5/1974), and largely followthe process set out in this law, apart from somesmall (partial) adjustments 42 .The second method comprises four phases.During the policy drafting phase, governmentoffices initiate the first draft of the policy. Aspecific institution takes the lead in preparinga draft and convening a series of internalmeetings to deliberate on the draft and submitit to the Legal Section under the DistrictSecretariat. The initiator further discusses thedraft during the synchronization phase with alegally qualified person from the latter office.Issues related to legal norms and principles,potential stakeholders to be invited during thedeliberation and other strategies for submittingthe draft to the parliament are discussed duringthis phase. Once the draft is submitted toparliament, the next phase, the pre-hearingsession, begins. The local parliamentarycommittee sets and publicly announces anagenda for deliberating the draft. During thisphase, the committee also disseminates the draftto interested parties for comments and input.A final hearing, the last phase, comprises fiveplenary sessions in which the District Head and20

Sudirman, Dede Wiliam and Nely HerlinaFigure 4. Flow Chart of Legislative-Initiated District RegulationsLEGISLATIVEPARLIAMENT SECRETARYPARLIAMENT CHAIRCOMMITTEECOMMISSIONFACTIONASSEMBLYDECISIONDraft submitted for approval andpromulgation throughthe Parliament SecretaryFigure 5. Flow Chart of Executive-Initiated District RegulationsEXECUTIVELEGISLATIVEDISTRICT HEADIntroductoryNote of billHEAD OFPARLIAMENTCENTRALGOVERNMENTDISTRICTSECRETARYDELIBERATIONCOMMITTEENEIGHBOURINGDISTRICTSLEGAL DIVISION/BUREAUCOMMISSIONFACTIONREAL CONDITIONIN LOCALCOMMUNITIESRELATED TECHNICALAGENCIES AT DISTRICTLEVELPLENARY SESSION IPLENARY SESSION IIPLENARY SESSION IIIPLENARY SESSION IVPLENARY SESSION VFINAL DECISION21

Local Policy-making Mechanismsmembers of parliament consecutively presentintroductory notes, perspectives, commentsand responses from the first three sessions. Thelast two plenary sessions are devoted to thepresentation by a special committee of agreedamendments to the draft and the making of afinal decision.What follows is our analysis of how thedistrict’s regulation formulation process tookplace, partly from the point of view of publicparticipation:1. Policy DraftingWe found that, in reality, when the threeregulations were drafted the District Forestryand Estate Crops Office (Dinas Kehutanandan Perkebunan, dishutbun) simply adoptedregulations from the neighbouring districts ofBatanghari and Tebo 43 . The wholesale adoptionof local regulations from other districtsprovided little opportunity for Tanjabbarstakeholders to take part in articulating theiraspirations, commenting on and informing thepolicy process from an early stage. The firstdraft reflected the conditions and aspirations inanother district, which may entirely differentfrom local communities’ needs in Tanjabbar.Three officials from the District Forestryand Estate Crops Office met on three occasionsto discuss the draft. There was no considerationduring these meetings of the substance or howto implement the draft regulation. Havingadopted a neighbouring district’s policy, it ispossible these officials considered it legallysound and practicable to implement. In theevent they made only slight adjustments – tonames, places and tariffs.There is no budget allocated to legal draftingfor District Forestry and Estate Crops Officestaff, nor are there any initiatives to providetraining in legal drafting. This lack of supportand training was another reason why localstakeholders felt that the consultation processhad never been optimal. Likewise, since thedistrict legislation programme, or ProgramLegislasi Daerah, has not begun, the processof formulating draft regulations did not accordwith any of the directions set out in the BroadOutlines for District Policies (GBHD), thedistrict development programme (Propeda),or the guidelines for the District Strategic Plan(Renstra).2. Policy SynchronizationDuring the policy synchronization phase stafffrom the District Forestry and Estate CropsOffice held discussions with staff from theLegal Bureau (biro hukum) of the districtgovernment secretariat. These discussions weregenerally limited to wording and legal normswithin the bill. This stage did not establishthe legal background, purposes and principlesthat should have formed the basis of the draftregulation. The Legal Bureau determined whoshould be invited to these meetings, and theywere not always attended by officials with anyprofessional expertise in the policy area underdiscussion. This phase provided little or noroom for public consultation.To date, only university experts have beeninvited to these discussions. Communityrepresentatives who will be directly affected bythe policy outcomes have never been involved.The forestry drafts were then passed forwardto the District Head, who submitted them tothe district parliament for deliberation. TheExecutives submitted between 16 and 39 draftdistrict regulations to the parliament, each withan introductory note from the District Head.As the parliament received district regulationsin ‘packages’ like this, it limited the qualityand quantity of time they could invest indeliberating each regulation.3. The Pre-Hearing SessionA local parliamentary committee (Pansus)now sets the agenda for deliberating the draftdistrict regulations. This phase should haveprovided the first opportunity for the public toparticipate. However, large numbers of draftswere submitted together and there was noclear time allocation for discussing each draft,therefore it was difficult for members of thepublic to have their say on any particular draft.Copies of the draft regulations were sent out tomembers only after the committee had already22

Sudirman, Dede Wiliam and Nely Herlinaset the agenda. This made it difficult for anymember of parliament outside the committeeto review the drafts, and even more difficult formembers of the public to review them or evenknow when an issue might be discussed inparliament. Table 8 shows the time allocationset by the committee for discussing andadopting 16 draft regulations.It is hard to see how all 16 draft regulationscould be deliberated and passed in such atight schedule. Do individual members havethe right to reject the committee’s decision todeliberate all draft regulations as one package?Can they appeal for additional time to considerimportant regulations? These questions relateto the role of the district parliament membersas representatives of the local communityat large. As local people’s representatives,they should be entitled to raise objectionsconcerning decisions that do not take accountof the people’s aspirations.4. The HearingThe final hearing took place in the localparliament. The draft of District Regulationson IPHH and RHH 44 were deliberated andadopted simultaneously with 14 other draftregulations 45 . The final hearing comprised fiveplenary sessions:a. Plenary Session IThe District Head submits introductory notesfor each proposed draft regulation. Ideally,the introductory note should include thebackground, purpose, scope and principlesof each draft. This is beneficial for severalreasons: (1) it demonstrates that the policiesput forward have gone through serious studyand investigation; (2) parliamentary members,or factions, can immediately make generalobservations (support, questions or rejections)regarding the substance of the regulation; and(3) it avoids the impression that the process ofdeliberating a draft regulation is nothing morethan a formality. However, the District Headdid not include any detailed information in theintroductory notes (see Annex 1). This madeit difficult for local parliamentary members tounderstand the main ideas behind the proposeddrafts.The first plenary session, on 16 October 2002(see Table 8 above), was chaired by TanjabbarDistrict Parliament Chair and attended by:i) 32 out of the 40 members of parliament;ii) members of the Tanjabbar LeadershipForum (Muspida) 46 ;iii) the heads of the district governmentoffices/agencies;iv) heads of Tanjabbar Government SecretariatBureaux;v) directors of district-owned companies(BUMD) in Tanjabbar 47 .According to the notes of the plenarysession, no village representatives or localcommunity members from forested areas werepresent at these sessions, although they werethe stakeholders most relevant to the issuebeing discussed.No one who attended the plenary sessionreceived copies of the proposed drafts prior tothe meeting. From a democratic perspective,the people present at these sessions shouldreceive at least basic information concerningTable 8. Schedule of Plenary Sessions to Discuss 16 Draft Regulations in TanjabbarStage Date Time ActivityPlenary Session I Monday, 16.10.2002 09:00 Submission of introductory notePlenary Session II Monday, 21.10.2002 09:00 General observations by the factionsPlenary Session III Thursday, 24.10.2002 09:00 Response of the District Head to the generalobservationsPlenary Session IV Thursday, 28.11.2002 09:00 Presentation of the report of the special committeePlenary Session V Thursday, 2.12.2002 09:00 Final general observations, adoption of the 16district regulations, closing remarks from the DistrictHead23

Local Policy-making Mechanismsthe drafts under discussion. Information aboutthe proposed drafts should also be made widelyavailable to the public to raise awareness andgive local people the opportunity to review theproposals.b. Plenary Session IIDuring the second plenary session theparliamentary factions share their generalperspectives. For the District Regulationson RHH and IPHH, the second Plenary washeld five days after the first. Like the firstit was attended by government executives,members of parliament and directors of staterunenterprises. No community representativeswere invited and no record of the discussion wasdistributed to the public. During this session, sixfactions presented their general observationsabout drafts of District Regulations on IPHHand RHH, as shown in Table 9.There was no debate over the substantialissues raised by the drafts, no discussion oftheir potential impacts, and no questions abouthow they would actually be enforced.c. Plenary Session IIIDuring the third session the Executive andthe District Head respond to the generalobservations made by the factions in theprevious session. The District Head makes asummary response to all the observations; hedoes not provide detailed explanations for eachquestion. Likewise, the Executive provides asummary response on general topics rather thanresponding to specific issues or questions.d. Plenary Session IVThe fourth session, or special committeemeeting (Rapat Pansus), gives a SpecialCommittee 48 an opportunity to discuss draftswith the relevant technical agency. Based onthese discussions, the Special Committeeproduces a final report. The presentations ofthe 16 drafts simply outlined the amendmentsto the drafts. Any articles in the draft that hadnot been amended were considered to havebeen approved, and were thus not mentionedin the report. The Special Committee’s taskis challenging because the members have noexperience of reviewing legal documents; theirreports are rudimentary. For example, theywere limited to recording that an article hasbeen ‘amended’, with little if any descriptionof the amendment.e. Plenary Session VIn the final session, all factions sum up theirfinal perspectives (Stemotivering) and the draftTable 9. General Observations of the Factions Regarding the IPHH and RHH BillsNo Spokes person Basic Argument of the Faction’s General Observation1 Bambang Krisna(PDIP)*2 Williyah Sudirman(Partai Golkar)*3 Ahmad Syirali, SH(Reformasi)*No comments regarding the IPHH and RHH drafts proposed by theDistrict Government.No comments regarding the two drafts proposed by the DistrictGovernment. Notes that RHH policy should not burden society.No comments.4 M. Fadli (Kebangsaan)* Sanctions included in both are vague.5 Burhanuddin (PPP)* The drafts are consistent with the needs of Tanjabbar District. Thefaction refuses to make many comments and entrusts the draft to aSpecial Committee for further deliberation.6 Dentjik Hariyanto (TNI/Police)*There should be a dissemination period before the drafts are adopted*Political parties:PDIP Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, Indonesian Democratic PartyGolkar Golongan Karya, Functional Group - a political party that initially served the New Order GovernmentPPP Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, an Islamic PartyTNI Tentara Nasional Indonesia, National Armed Forces24

Sudirman, Dede Wiliam and Nely Herlinaregulation is approved and adopted as a districtregulation. It is very rare for a draft not to bepassed at this stage. For example, the districtforestry regulations were passed automaticallyon 2 December 2002. All 16 drafts consideredthat day were approved under a single DistrictParliament Decree, No. 10/2002 on theApproval of 16 Draft Regulations.Session notes or minutes from theseplenary sessions have never been publicized ordistributed to other stakeholders. Publicationis important and beneficial because: (1) localpeople are privy to the historic processes oflocal decision making; (2) it becomes a sharedlearning experience, as parliamentary memberscan learn from previous experience and publicinputs; and (3) the public can read and assessthe performance of their representatives inparliament.Methods for district policy making inTanjabbar leave very little room for publicparticipation. As very few amendments are evermade to proposed drafts, this means that theinitiators’ interests heavily influence the finalregulation. Little attention is paid to substance,or to whether the regulation is consistent withregulations for other sectors, therefore newregulations are needed allowing active publicparticipation at all stages, from policy initiationto implementation.Ideally, a more comprehensive processmight allow inputs from the public about onthe-groundissues such as how deforestationcontributes to chronic flooding problems, ashortage of village firewood and future buildingmaterials, and less land for smallholderagriculture as forest areas are converted toother uses.4.2 Forestry Permit IssuanceProcess in Tanjabbar4.2.1 Application procedures forobtaining IPHHKR and IPHHKTpermitsThe formal and informal procedures forobtaining Permits to Use Timber Forest Productsfrom Privately Owned Forests (IPHHKR) andPermits to Use Timber from Privately OwnedTimber Plantations (IPHHKT) are outlinedbelow.a. The formal procedureFollowing the formal procedure, applicantsmust fulfil several requirements 49 and gothrough a long, complicated procedure lasting1–3 months or more. Those who follow theformal procedure are usually new to the timberbusiness, and are applying for the first time.They have to follow 16 steps:1. A request must be submitted to the DistrictHead through the Economic SectionHead 50 of the District Secretariat with acopy to the Head of the District Forestryand Estate Crops Office;2. The Economic Section (Bagian Ekonomi)forwards the request to the District Head’sAssistant II;3. The District Head’s Assistant II forwardsthe request to the District Secretary;4. The District Secretary forwards the requestto the District Head;5. The District Head recommends that theDistrict Forestry Office conduct a fieldcheck;6. The results of the field check are reportedto the District Head with recommendationson whether to approve the permit. Fieldchecks observe the following:a) Status of the location: whether or notit is inside an area covered by otherpermits. If the proposed locationis inside an area covered by otherpermits, the permit application willbe rejected.b) The timber production inventory, itsdensity and potential harvests.c) The distance to the permit location.The applicant must pay the districtforestry official for transport andaccommodation costs incurred duringthe site check. The relevant section ofthe District Head’s Decree 51 does notclearly specify the amount that shouldbe paid for field checks. This opens25

Local Policy-making Mechanismsthe way for corruption and misuse ofpower by the forestry officials in thefield.d) Area mapping.7. Based on recommendations from theDistrict Forestry and Estate Crops Office,the District Head approves or rejects thepermit application. If it is approved, theapplication is forwarded to the EconomicSection.8. The Economic Section forwards theapproval to the Legal Section (BiroHukum).9. The Legal Section then has to formulatea District Head’s Decree for PermitIssuance.10. The draft decree is forwarded to theDistrict Head’s Assistant II.11. The Assistant II forwards the draft decreeto the District Secretary.12. The District Secretary forwards the draftdecree to the District Head.13. The District Head signs the decree.14. The decree is returned to the Legal Sectionto be given a file number.15. The Legal Section forwards the decree tothe Economic Section.16. The applicant obtains the approved permitfrom the Economic Section.In reality, permit applicants rarely followthis lengthy formal procedure, which is besetby numerous delays as the application makesits way to and from various offices. It is noteasy to follow all the steps, particularly forfarmers or small cooperatives from villages.For example, the applicants are required tosubmit a map of the proposed permit location(scale 1: 10 000). This should be approved bythe Head of the District Forestry and EstateCrops Office. Cooperatives also need to submita financial report covering the last two years ofoperation. Applicants need an expert check andlegal verification for these documents. Again,this takes time, connections and money.As a result, some new permit applicants usea ‘service agent’ (locally known as a makelarijin), who is very familiar with informalprocedures. The local officials referred to theseservice agents as ‘old players’ (pemain lama)in the timber business.b. Informal ProcedureInformal procedures save time by bypassing thenormal bureaucratic processes. Applicants whotake this route are usually people with a gooddeal of experience of applying for permits, orthey are permit service agents. They are able toconclude a permit application in less than twoweeks. They take the following steps:1. Before submitting a written request to theDistrict Forestry and Estate Crops Office,the applicant first asks a field officerto check the proposed location for thepermit.2. The field officer checks the location todetermine whether or not the proposedlocation lies within a forest area coveredby other permits.3. If it does not lie within a forest area coveredby other permits, the formal request issent directly to the Head of the DistrictForestry and Estate Crops Office, whocharges a handling fee of around Rp. 15million (US$ 1667 at 1 US$ = Rp. 9000)or less if the applicant is well known to theofficials.4. The Head of the District Forestry andEstate Crops Office recommends theDistrict Head to approve the applicationbased on the prior field observations.5. The District Head issues a Decreeapproving the application; the permit canbe collected from the District Forestry andEstate Crops Office4.2.2 Implementation of ForestProduct Utilization PermitsOur focus group discussions with members ofthe four villages studied revealed that they havevery limited access to information about theprocedures for acquiring small-scale loggingpermits (IPHHKR/IPHHKT). In interviews,farmers from the four villages told us thatlocal community members who live next to theIPHHKR concession areas do not own permits.26

Sudirman, Dede Wiliam and Nely HerlinaLocal communities living closest to theseconcessions have not seen a share of benefitsfrom logging under these permits. The VillageHead of Lubuk Bernai in Merlung Subdistrictcomplained about how difficult and confusingit is to obtain an IPHHKR permit.Local people are turned into merespectators; it is outsiders (mostly affluentpeople or officials from the district capital oreven from other cities) who exploit the richesof their forests. The IPHH policy has facilitatedthe exploitation of the remaining local naturalforest outside the production forest area inTanjabbar, but the largest benefits are enjoyedby certain powerful and educated players.The right to issue small-scale concessionswas devolved to local governments with theexplicit intention of giving local communitiesa share of the benefits from logging in theirareas. This has not happened in the fourvillages we studied in Tanjabbar. One reasonfor this elite capture of the benefits is that thepermit allocation system is centralized at thedistrict level. Village authorities (village heador Village Representative Body, BPD) are notinvolved in any decision-making processes,either in formulating district policies orreviewing permit applications. The villageauthorities are left out of the loop and thereforehave no power. They are not involved inmonitoring applications, and have no role inmonitoring operations. For example, the headsof two villages (Lubuk Kambing and LubukBernai) indicated that some permit holdersoperate beyond the designated area, but theyare powerless to do anything about it.4.2.3 Public participation in districtpolicy makingPublic participation in policy making was highon the decentralization agenda, enshrined inseveral national laws and regulations 52 . Intheory this means that the law should guaranteepublic participation. Positive results shouldinclude:1. Local regulations are strongly basedon local people’s interests and needs.The regulations will be more suited toconditions on the ground, and more likelyto meet local needs and expectations.2. Local people are encouraged to be morelaw-abiding and socially responsible.Local stakeholders are more likely tocomply with regulations if they haveactively participated in creating them.3. Local governments are empowered todemocratize the policy-making process,and become more accountable to theirconstituents. Open consultation withstakeholders, such as universities, NGOs,the general public and local communities,allows ‘checks and balances’ to come intoplay.Our research with local stakeholdersindicated that public participation in Tanjabbarcould be improved in the following ways:1. A regulation should be developed thatwill standardize and legalize mechanismsfor public participation. It can be used toguide local government in making localregulations and will also strengthen publictrust and compliance.2. Sufficient human and financial resourcesshould be provided. It is also importantthat the regional government supportsthe ‘public participation fund’ (DanaPartisipasi Masyarakat, DPM) from theregional budget, based the district’s existingplan for formulating local regulations.Public participation could be achievedthrough:1. Policy research and formal academicrecommendations (naskah akademik);2. Open discussions such as seminars andworkshops;3. Policy memos or policy briefs – developedwith local stakeholders and widelydistributed;4. Publication of local policies in print andelectronic media;5. Public hearings in local parliament; and6. Distribution of draft regulations to variousstakeholders, asking for and using feedbackto formulate final regulations.27

Local Policy-making MechanismsPublic participation is important in orderto avoid passing regulations that benefitonly certain individuals or groups. A clearmechanism is necessary to allow local peopleto voice their opinions and aspirations and beactively involved in local policy making andimplementation.4.2.4 Reforming the permit allocationsystem in TanjabbarIn relation to the permit allocation proceduresin Tanjabbar, our research suggested thefollowing key points for policy reform:1. The District Regulation on IPHH andDistrict Head Decree No. 189/2003 do notclearly state the official fee for acquiringIPHHKR or IPHHKT permits. Thisloophole opens a window of opportunity forofficials to gain improper profits. To clarifythe legal position and improve transparencyin forestry sector contributions to districtrevenue, the official fees and taxes must beclearly stated in the District Head’s decree.If this is not done, significant amounts ofmoney will not go into the district revenuebut into the personal accounts of certainoffi cials.2. There is a lack of information forlocal communities regarding to permitallocations, thus disseminating basicinformation about policies and permitapplication procedures is an importantfactor in providing greater opportunitiesfor local communities to benefit from localforest resources.3. Weak systems for controlling andmonitoring how concessions are operatedresult in over-exploitation and unsustainablemanagement of local forest resources.Examples include logging outside thedesignated IPHHKR area or felling treesbelow the minimum permitted diameter.These illegal practices are nothing new:they were common under the centralizedlarge-scale commercial concession andindustrial timber plantation systems (HPH/HTI). Central government at that time wasnot able to control the activities carried outby the companies, and this has resulted indevastating forest degradation. Similarimpacts will apply in the implementation ofIPHH policy if the District Government ofTanjabbar does not improve the monitoringsystem through active local stakeholderparticipation. As the groups closest tothese resources, local communities couldplay an important role in an effectivesystem for monitoring IPHH operationsin the field. The district government couldinvolve village authorities as well aslocal communities (e.g., adat institutions,community organizations or informalleaders) more closely in policy making,including planning, implementation andevaluation processes.The adoption of these key points is highlyrecommended to avoid formulating andimplementing defective district policies andlaws that act against local people’s interestsand result in the permanent loss of valuableforestry resources.28

5IMPACTS OF IMPLEMENTING DECENTRALIZEDFORESTRY POLICIES5.1 The Problems of Verticaland Horizontal CoordinationAs part of its effort to increase regionallygenerated revenues (PAD), the TanjabbarDistrict Government has introduced localforestry fees 53 . It has established a LocalForestry Fees Collection Centre (TempatPenarikan Retribusi Kehutanan, TPR) anda Forest Protection and Conservation Post,known locally as P3H (Pos Pengamanan danPelestarian Hutan) in Tanjabbar. According tothe District Head, the purpose of the P3H is notonly to protect regional revenue sources butalso to halt illegal logging, which is rampant inthe district. The District Head hopes that P3Hwill decrease the transport of illegal timber toand from Tanjabbar. However, in practice theTPR and P3H have brought their own, newproblems:a. Dispute over authority between thedistrict and provincial governmentsThe authority to collect forest product feesstill lies with the provincial government.The application of a similar fee by TanjabbarDistrict Government effectively leads todouble taxation for permit holders (Syam 2003p.45). To resolve these coordination problems,on 15 April 2002 the provincial and districtgovernments in Jambi made an agreementconcerning Fee Collection and RevenueAllocation generated from the forestry,plantation and farming sectors. The agreementincluded uniform standards for different typesof permits and forestry fees in each district, asfollows:• Locally Issued Forest Product ExtractionPermits (IPHH) should be regulated bydistrict policies; they may be allocated on amaximum area of 100 ha inside or outsidethe official state forest, and are valid forsix months to one year. Only individuals(for privately owned land), cooperatives,district-owned companies, small/middlescaleprivate enterprises, state owned/privately owned companies in partnershipswith cooperatives/local farmers groups areeligible for these permits, and a local fee ispayable to the district government.• The fee payable was fixed according tothe type and size of trees logged, and thelocation of the permit site.This ranged between Rp. 5000/m 3 and Rp.60 000/m 3 , with the most mature treesfrom natural forests attracting the highesttariffs.• The agreement also set out exactly whichfees the district is authorized to collect 54 .The agreement also covered the distributionof local forest product (RHH) fee revenues.Producer districts have to deposit 40% oflocal fees collected in a special account heldby the provincial government, which willlater redistribute them to the other districts/municipalities: producer districts receive 60%,the provincial government receives 25% andnon-procedur districts/municipalities receive15%.This agreement was initiated by theGovernor of Jambi to reduce conflicts between29

Local Policy-making Mechanismsdistrict governments and between the provincialand district governments.Two years later, however, this agreementhad not yet to come into force (Jambi ProvincialForestry Office personal communication).Some districts have yet to revise their forestryregulations (District Regulations on IPHH andRHH) to comply with the agreement, and haveyet to make their first payment to the provincefrom their forest sector revenues.b. Revenue lossAround 2000–3000 m 3 of illegal timber hasbeen transported out of Tanjabbar. The districtgovernment is estimated to have suffered a lossof Rp. 220 million 55 in revenues as a result ofillegal logging and timber transportation.In practice, the establishment of a TPR inTanjabbar has simply created more opportunitiesfor corruption at the district level. According tothe Deputy District Head of Tanjabbar, somelocal officials have been caught in dealingswith truck drivers transporting timber not farfrom these posts. Officials manning these postsalso falsify records, recording far less timberthan the trucks are actually carrying.Companies require an official Permit toTransport Forest Products (SKSHH). If theytry to pass a TPR without an SKSHH they haveto pay a fine of Rp. 90 000/m 3 56 . However,local people told us that transport trucks passthrough for a fee of Rp. 180 000 per trip, orthey can pay Rp. 90 000/m 3 for an SKSHH.The income from these fines alone issignificant; however, this provision effectivelylegalizes illegal logging 57 . It is very difficultto halt illegal logging activities when nondocumentedtimber can be transported onpayment of a fine. It is also impossible to knowhow many fines are actually paid at these posts,and what the district account should really bereceiving. This practice is regulated under aJoint Decree 58 , issued by the District Heads ofMuaro Jambi and Tanjabbar.c. Forest DegradationThe joint decree of the District Heads of MuaroJambi and Tanjabbar has given logging operatorsa legal mechanism to transport logs takenillegally from inside Bukit Tigapuluh NationalPark; the park is increasingly threatened withdestruction as a result of this policy. The districtgovernment’s failure to draft regulations basedon local people’s interests and needs has alsocontributed to this loss. Local livelihoodsissues and social or ecological interests havebeen sidelined in favour of an exclusive policymakingsystem.Another factor endangering Bukit TigapuluhNational Park is confusion and conflictsover the location of the park boundaries. Thevillagers of Suban claim that they do not knowwhere the boundaries lie. Forest delineation isunder central government authority: it does notinvolve any of the local people living in andaround forest areas. It is therefore not surprisingthat the community is unaware of the boundariesThe national park is adjacent to the villagers’farmland, but as they played no part in settingthe boundaries local communities do not feela strong responsibility for implementing thedistant policies emanating from the central ordistrict governments.One important point that should be madeis that the forest management policies, both inthe centralized and decentralized periods, havetended to classify forests as a resource to beexploited solely for economic purposes. Littleconsideration has been given to preservingand maintaining the non-economic or localsubsistence functions of forests. Likewise,little attention has been paid to the questionof regeneration. These issues have notbeen prioritized during the formulation offorest management policies at any level ofgovernment.5.2 Conflict between theCommunity and HPH/HTI Companies beforeDecentralizationResearch in the Subdistricts of Tungkal Uluand Merlung showed conflicts between localcommunities and logging companies, forexample:30

Sudirman, Dede Wiliam and Nely Herlina5.2.1 Forced land occupation, permitmanipulation and pollution byPT. Inti Indo Sawit Subur (PT.IIS)PT. IIS is one of seven CPO (Crude Palm Oil)companies in the province of Jambi; thesecompanies make a significant contribution tothe PAD in Tanjabbar. PT. IIS, a large company,received a centrally issued business permit(Hak Guna Usaha, HGU) 59 in 1990 to openan oil palm plantation and processing businesscovering an area of 3500.3 ha in TanjabbarDistrict. PT. IIS occupied land that had beenmanaged traditionally by local communitiesfor generations. It occupied the land by force:PT. IIS employed the military and the police toopen its plantation area. It evicted local peopleon the basis that the land was company property.It also claimed that the land was ‘abandoned’.An oil palm plantation area used by PT. IIS inthe Subdistrict of Merlung also extended 1000ha beyond the area original designated to it bycentral government. This fuelled the conflictbetween the community and the company. Atthat time, the villages in the Tungkal Ulu areawere living in very poor conditions due to thelack of available agricultural land. Severalvillages, including Penyabungan, LubukTerap, Rantau Badak, Pulau Pauh, Merlungand Tanjung Paku, lost their land during theforced occupation.In 1998, with the fall of the New Orderregime and the rise of the reformasi movement,people in most villages began to reclaim theircustomary (adat) lands. By mobilizing themasses, they boycotted the activities of PT.IIS and demanded their land back. Followingdecentralization, the district governmentfacilitated talks between the community andthe company. The people demanded the returnof the adat land and a reassessment of the sizeof their land. Finally, an area of 0.83 ha wasreturned to each household in the villagesof Merlung, Lubuk Terap, Penyabungan,Rantau Badak and Pulau Pauh, with a furtheragreement that the government would continuethe re-assessment process.5.2.2 Forestland occupation anddeforestation by PT. DasaAnugerah Sejati (PT. DAS)In 1991, PT. DAS obtained an HGU to establisha crude palm oil plantation and processingplant. This permit was allocated for agriculturalland and a forest area covering 9077 ha in theSubdistrict of Tungkal Ulu 60 . No fewer thannine villages were located in this area.Farming areas in the new concession hadbeen managed traditionally for generations, andunder customary law it was recognized as beingcollectively owned for the benefit of the localcommunities. However, the company took overthe land without giving proper compensation.Some villagers received compensation for thevalue of the crops growing on their land (rubber,durian, etc.) at the time, but they received nocompensation for the long-term loss of theirland. Many villagers were forced to becomehired labourers, working for the company onwhat had previously been their own farmland.The local people’s poverty worsenedbecause PT. DAS preferred not to employlocals; instead, it brought in skilled labour fromJava and other islands. The company justifiedthis by claiming that the local people were notskilled in factory or plantation management.Local people were hired only as daily labourers(buruh harian lepas, BHL) on a daily wage ofRp. 11 000 or US$ 1.20 (US$ 1 = Rp. 9000).As casual labourers, they have no clear contractand can be laid off without compensation ornotice.Central government in Jakarta gavelocal people no opportunity to question theallocation of their lands to a private companyor to demand – at the very least – employmentfrom the company. To date, not one single localperson is employed under contract as either afactory or plantation labourer.To establish its plantations, PT. DAS clearedthe primary forests around the local people’sfarmland. The forests had been a source ofincome for local people, and had maintained thewater supplies for their farms. With its permitfrom central government in hand, the companyturned the natural forest into rubber and oil31

Local Policy-making Mechanismspalm plantations. The resulting deforestationcaused a massive flood, which devastated thevillage of Tungkal Ulu in January 2002.PT. DAS used the slash-and-burn method toclear the natural forests. This method is highrisk, but it is also fast and cheap. Local peopletold us that the company had intentionallyallowed the fires to spread over an area of 15000 ha. It established its plantation over thisentire area, although its permit was originallyfor only 9007 ha 61 .Table 10 below shows the livelihoodsimpacts, which were hardest on local women,after the arrival of the plantation company, PT.DAS, in Penyabungan village in the Subdistrictof Merlung.5.3 Conflict between theCommunity and HPH/HTI Companies afterDecentralizationFollowing decentralization, as the promisesof land re-assessment failed to materialize, in2000 the people of Merlung village protestedagain. The 0.83 ha of land returned to themby PT. IIS was seen as no more than a ploy tosilence their demands. The people of Merlungpushed Tanjabbar District Government and theprovincial government to reassess their landimmediately.Three hundred people occupied a PT. IISoffice on the plantation area. They ransackedthe office and then burnt it down, becauseno one from the company responded to theirdemands. They also harvested the crops on theplantation. As a result the police arrested thevillagers for theft. Local community memberswent to the district parliament to demand therelease of those held under arrest. In the end,the company and the local government invitedthe community to negotiate with them, andall those who had been arrested were laterreleased.PT. IIS discharges the waste from crudepalm oil processing into the Beranak River. Thecompany offloads once a week when the waterlevel in the river is at its highest. During thedry season the villages are filled with the stenchof the waste. Villagers in Merlung complainthat they can no longer bathe in the river (PakFauzi personal communication). The people ofPenyabungan village told us that they can nolonger fish in the river because it is too polluted(Pak Zainal personal communication).Meanwhile, the conflict between theresidents of Penyabungan village and PT. DASis yet to be resolved. The company has takenover a further 1100 ha of farmland from theresidents of Penyabungan village to establish arubber and oil palm plantation area. The localpeople have made numerous efforts to stop this.They have tried to negotiate with the company,they have asked the local government tomediate, and, finally, they have demonstratedin the rubber plantations. To date, none of theseefforts have had positive results.The company is also engaged in ongoingconflicts with other villages (such as PematangPauh, where 300 ha of community land hasbeen taken over). However, in these cases thecompany has been able to influence key villageleaders by putting them on the payroll andpromising them a share of the land. As a result,the wider community has been afraid to protestbecause it would then have to face establishedand powerful farmer groups such as KOTALU(Kelompok Tani Tungkal Ulu).Our review of the impact of forestry policiesissued by the central and district governments,both during the centralized period (beforereformasi) and after decentralization,demonstrates that the implementation of all ofthese polices has led to conflict and undesirableeffects for the communities living near or in theforest. The main difference lies in the partieswho are involved in the conflict. During thecentralized period, conflicts usually involvedvillagers struggling with plantation companies,the military or the police.Since decentralization, villagers have beenable to protest and voice their anger more freely.As a result, there has been a wider variety ofconflicts. Villagers fighting their cases havecome into conflict with the local governmentor the companies, although such conflicts donot usually escalate into open conflict. The32

Sudirman, Dede Wiliam and Nely HerlinaTable 10. Impacts on Livelihoods Following the Arrival of PT. DAS in Penyabungan Village,Merlung SubdistrictBefore arrival of PT. DASThe villagers tried to meet the basic family needsby planting vegetables/nutmeg.The villagers spent a great deal of time with theirfamilies because their gardens/farms were closeto home.There is a tradition of cooperation amongwomen, e.g., during festivities women workedtogether to prepare the food and help each otherwith harvests.Since arrival of PT. DASThe villagers can no longer plant vegetables asthere is no access to land.The villagers do not spend enough time with theirfamilies because they must work as labourersor fi nd rough work (collecting sand and rocks) tomeet the needs of the family.Cooperation still exists, but it has reduced asthe women have to work independently to earnenough for their families.district government has come into conflictwith the provincial government and with theplantation companies. There have been fewerincidents involving violent or open conflictsince decentralization.The residents of Merlung village have askedthe Center for International Forestry Research(CIFOR)/ Study Center for Legislation andPolicy on Regional Autonomy (PSHK-ODA)research team to facilitate discussions with localdecision makers in Tanjabbar regarding landuse in their area. The local communities hopethat they can cultivate the land abandoned byPT. IPA (an oil palm plantation company). Thecommunity would like to forge a partnershipwith PT. IPA or Tanjabbar District Government(or even work alone) to make use of the unusedarea.Although there has been no formal approvalfrom the district government or PT. IPA, around60 local households have begun to make useof the area by cultivating quick-harvest crops,such as corn, beans, etc. With or withoutapproval, they have begun to cultivate the areabecause their livelihoods depend on it. Theresidents of Merlung told us that they were tiredof watching others exploit land that was oncetheirs. We hope that the district governmentwill use these discussions as an opportunity tolearn and formulate a local policy to resolveland disputes and provide fairer distribution ofnatural resources to local communities.5.4 Policy Action Research:ImpactsAs a result of the 2-year research projectconducted by PSHK-ODA Jambi and CIFOR,there have been some positive changes in theregional policy-making process in Tanjabbar.1. The District Forestry and Estate CropsOffice has asked the research team toconduct a critical analysis of its 2004‘Draft District Regulation on Inspectionand Forest Product Measurement Services’and its subsequent implementation decree(PSHK-ODA is currently reviewing thesepolicies). All the District Forestry andEstate Crops Offices in Jambi Provincehave already approved the draft.2. The District Forestry and Estate CropsOffice of Tanjabbar has requested PSHK-ODA to formulate an alternative draftregulation to the one proposed above.Tanjabbar District Government believesthat by consulting PSHK-ODA andreceiving input from a wider range ofstakeholders this draft – if approved – willbe the first to have undergone publicconsultation.3. The Legal Division at the DistrictSecretariat has asked the research team towork with it to revise and evaluate severalproblematic district regulations (bothforestry and non-forestry).4. The Head of the Regional DevelopmentPlanning Board (Bappeda) of Tanjabbar33

Local Policy-making Mechanismshas requested the research team to workwith his office to provide training forTanjabbar District Parliament’s newlyelected members on ‘Legal Drafting ofDistrict Regulations and District BudgetFormulation’. The Head of Bappeda hasallocated funds from his agency’s 2004additional budget.5. The District Head of Tanjabbar hassupported the research team with severalactivities including policy research andefforts to strengthen village authoritiesand institutions by providing training inmethods of participation and formulatinglocal regulations – ‘the local regulationformulation technique’ – to support thedistrict government in protecting andpreserving the forests.6. The Governor of Jambi Province hasalso supported steps taken by PSHK-ODA to strengthen village institutions byproviding training in the ‘local regulationformulation technique’ to promote theestablishment of self-sufficient villagesand support the district governmentin developing participatory policies toprotect and conserve remaining forests.Training is scheduled for 2004–2005 andwill be fully funded by the governor andthe provincial government.34

6CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS6.1 ConclusionsBased on a review of the District of TanjungJabung Barat (Tanjabbar)’s forestry regulations(Perda), our research highlighted the followingfundamental issues:• Policy-making mechanisms need tobe reformed because they have basicprocedural weaknesses, unclear contentand inapplicable policies, makingimplementation difficult on the ground.Therefore Tanjabbar District Governmentshould conduct a judicial review,overview and evaluation of all its forestrylaws and involve a wide range of localstakeholders.• District regulations should not contradicthigher regulations. A local policy iscontradictory if it regulates an area thatdoes not lie within the remit of the districtgovernment, if its technical or proceduralaspects and content are not consistent withhigher regulations, or if it refers to nowdefuncthigher regulations.• National and district regulations shouldbe consistent with recognized indigenouslaws and norms. The existence of local(village or customary (adat)) laws isimplicitly recognized in the nationaldecentralization law and regulations 62 ;these reintroduced the acknowledgementof customary peoples and their autonomy,which was omitted from Act No. 5/1979under the New Order regime.• Local regulations should not contradictbasic principles of good governance, forexample:- There must be formal rules, to ensureaccuracy (clarity of the subject,content and meaning) and fair playand to avoid procedural malpractice;- Philosophical, judicial andsociological aspects and formal legalcertainties must be considered;- Principles concerning formal legalcertainty, trust, emerging expectations,equity, accuracy, balance, misuse ofpower and arbitrary prohibition mustbe included in the content.• Self-reliance in this period ofdecentralization does not mean that thedistricts may create regulations thatcontradict the national legal system andneglect the public good on a wider scale.The interests of the local community area very important concern, but the nationallegal framework should ensure that districtpolicies also accommodate the interests ofthe other districts, therefore the review ofthe authority prescribed by Law 22/1999must be oriented towards maintainingcommon standards, law and order in forestmanagement and preservation. Districtregulations must therefore be viewedfrom a regional and national perspectiveand not simply as an exercise in territorialjurisdiction. Local regulations should nothave negative ecological, environmentalor economic impacts, either locally or forneighbouring regions.• The role of the public (as relevantstakeholders) will be an importantcomponent in the formulation of policy as35

Local Policy-making Mechanismsit is essential to prevent local regulationsfrom benefiting well-connected andwealthy individuals or groups, whichwould fuel public resentment, and couldlead to serious local conflicts. Thereneeds to be a clear mechanism for localpeople and the wider public to voicetheir aspirations and actively take partin the policy-making process, thus it isalso important to formulate a regulationregarding public consultation mechanismsto clarify how the public may be involvedin the process, execution and monitoringof the regulations.6.2 Recommendations6.2.1 Recommendations for policyformulation mechanismsBased on the results of the study of TanjabbarDistrict forestry regulations, the study team hasformulated the following recommendations:1. The District Government of Tanjabbarshould conduct a judicial review and anin-depth evaluation/revision of the threeforestry regulations.2. National regulations also need to bereviewed and reformulated to allowdistricts to issue policies based onlegitimate local needs and aspirations,provided that they do not contradict widelyaccepted national principles. Districts oftenimplement divergent policies becausehigher regulations do not reflect districtrealities, or because districts see themas serving powerful interests in centralgovernment. A process of legal draftingat central government level involving theaffected districts would ensure that higherregulations were applicable, equitable andrelevant to local stakeholders’ needs. Thiswould help ensure district compliance.3. The District Government of Tanjabbarmust involve local villagers and villageauthorities, alongside universities, NGOs,the executive branch, legislative branch,the press, the private sector and the militaryand police in a multi-stakeholder forum.This forum could act as an arbitrationbody to resolve problems and conflictsarising from the implementation of theforestry policies in Tanjabbar. This stepmust be taken in order to anticipate andresolve the conflicts and continually adaptand improve district forestry policies andmethods of implementation.4. An allocation of human and financialresources is needed to support publicparticipation processes. The regionalbudget must include a provision forCommunity Participation Funds/DanaPartisipasi Masyarakat (DPM).5. The District Government of Tanjabbar,along with the universities and NGOs,must support local village institutions tostrengthen village autonomy, particularlyin the forestry sector, through trainingactivities for village officials, VillageRepresentative Bodies (BPD) and adatcommunity members. This step will becritical if the district government is tosupport self-reliance in the villages.6. To give local regulations greaterlegitimacy with constituents and promotetheir involvement in policy making, aregulation is needed to set out mechanismsfor formulating participatory districtregulations. The reasons for this need inTanjabbar are as follows:a. There is no clear mechanism for localpeople to voice their aspirations and toparticipate actively in the formulationof regulations.b. There are still substantial flaws in theregulations that have already beenformulated.c. Properly formulated regulations maybe used by the local government andlocal parliament as guidelines forformulating local regulations that fulfilthe principles of good governance;they would also demonstrate an effortto rebuild public trust and improvelocal democracy.36

Sudirman, Dede Wiliam and Nely Herlina7. There are several mechanisms to supportpublic participation in formulatingpolicies:a. Policy action research and/or academicpapers;b. Open discussions such as seminars,workshops, etc.;c. Publication of policy memos, policynewsletters or announcements in theprint media;d. Interactive dialogue in electronic andbroadcast media (radio, TV, E-mail,fax) etc.;e. Hearings with the local parliament;f. Requesting stakeholders’ inputs bysending them draft regulations andrelevant information regarding drafts.6.2.2 Recommendations for permitgrantingmechanisms1. An official and transparent mechanismis needed for permit applications.This mechanism should be easilyunderstandable and accessible to all. Itcould be initiated through the revision ofthe district regulations and decrees.2. Fees should be set for acquiring permits, toprevent funds from entering the accountsof certain officials rather than the accountof the District Government.3. The time limit for approval/rejection ofapplications must be clearly set.4. The permit application must be announcedto the public (especially in the locationwhere the permit has been applied for)to ensure that local people have anopportunity to influence the application,and that the permit is not used outside thedesignated location.5. Close monitoring and control by theDistrict Forestry and Estate Crops Officeand local community institutions arerequired to prevent illegal logging in BukitTigapuluh National Park.6. A regulation is needed that clearlystipulates how revenues generated fromthe forestry sector will be shared betweenthe district and local communities (villageor adat institutions).7. Local regulations should be publicly,regionally and nationally oriented towardssustainable use of local forest resources.8. The national government should workwith district governments to establisha framework for developing districtregulations capable of meeting local needsin line with commonly accepted nationalstandards.37

7ENDNOTES1DFID, 1999. Indonesia: TowardsSustainable Forest Management, Final Reportof the Senior Management Advisory Teamand the Provincial Level Forest ManagementProject, 2 Vols., Departement for InternationalDevelopment (UK) and Departement ofForestry, Jakarta.2Explicitly, Article 7 (1) of Law 22/1999states that the authority of the districtgovernment covers all aspects of governmentexcept with regard to national security anddefence, the judiciary, national fiscal andmonetary policies and religious affairs.3For example, some districts in theProvince of Jambi have made complaints aboutGovernment Regulation No. 34/2002 on ForestAllocation, Forest Management Planning,Forest Extraction and Forest Area Use (see alsoMinister of Forestry Decree No. 171/Menhut-II/03 dated 24 March 2003, which is addressedto all the governors and district heads). TheDistrict Heads of Tanjung Jabung Timur andMuaro Jambi have openly and categoricallyrefused to implement this regulation in theirdistricts. These two districts have not revisedtheir local forestry regulations, which they claimhave been formulated according to MPR DecreeNo. III/2000, Law No. 22/1999 and Law No.41/1999 (details can be found in ‘Report fromBusiness and Production Division of the JambiProvincial Forestry Office: Response from theDistrict Secretary of Tanjung Jabung Timur toGovernment Regulation No. 34/2002’. See alsoletter from the District Head of Muaro JambiNo. 503/053/Dishutbun, dated 23 January2003, addressed to the Director General ofProduction, Department of Forestry).4The Chair of the Indonesian Chamber ofCommerce (Kadin), Aburizal Bakrie, has hintedthat more than 1000 regional regulations havehindered investment in the regions becausebusiness owners are now forced to pay variousdistrict taxes in addition to their central taxliabilities (for more detail see Haris 2003, p4).5During informal discussions with PSHK-ODA at his residence and at his office (22March and 25 June 2003 respectively), theGovernor of Jambi, Zulkifli Nurdin, describedhow coordination between the province andthe district heads has weakened followingdecentralization. This can be seen throughthe joint agreement between the provincialgovernment (and provincial parliament) andthe Tanjabbar District Government (and districtparliament) on Regionally Generated RevenueAllocations in the Forestry, Plantation andFisheries Sector, signed on 25 April 2002. Atthat time, all the district governments agreedto cancel their district regulations on ForestUtilisation Permits (IPH) and revise theirregulations on Forest Product Taxation (RHH).In practice, some districts (such as Batanghari,Muaro Jambi, Tebo, Bungo and Sarolangun)are still implementing IPH policy. However,Tanjabbar District Government did not issueIPH regulations.6Zainal, a well known community leaderin Penyabungan village, Merlung, Tanjabbar,stated that the community had not experiencedsignificant economic change and justice in38

Sudirman, Dede Wiliam and Nely Herlinathis era. A similar statement was made by theTungkal Ulu Farmer Group/Kelompok TaniTungkal Ulu (Kotalu), Merlung Subdistrict, ina Focus Group Discussion.7From the draft regulation introductorynote presented by the District Head of Tanjabbarto the District Parliament on 16 October 2002and from the introductory considerations ofTanjabbar forestry regulations, we can see thatthe Tanjabbar District Government is persistentin trying to increase its regional income throughthe forestry sector by providing facilitation inacquiring permits. As a consequence, permitapplications can be approved without havingto go through strict procedures.8Clarification of Article 53 of theDraft Law on Legislation approved by theParliament on 6 June 2004 provides room forpublic participation, either in written or verbalform, in the deliberations of draft regulationsin accordance with the Parliament’s StandingOrders.9The creation of this new administrativearea was regulated by Law No. 54/1999 on theFormation of the Districts of Sarolangun, Tebo,Muaro Jambi, and Tanjabtim; see also Law No.14/ 2000 on the amendment of Law No. 54/1999on the Formation of the Districts of Sarolangun,Tebo, Muaro Jambi and Tanjabtim.10See Article 5 of Law No. 54/1999.11See Tanjung Jabung Barat DistrictForestry and Estate Crops Office (2002 p: 4)12Anonymous (1999)13Active concession holders are recordedas HPH PT. Hatma Hutani, HPH PT. RimbaHutani, HTI PT. Wirakarya Sakti and HTI PT.Wana Teladan.14In 2000 oil palm plantations covered40 467 ha of land, increasing to 42 125 ha by2002.15See the Minister of Home Affairs DecreeNo. 119/1998 on Types and Coverage of LocalTaxation for the Provincial Level and the DistrictLevel, Government Regulation No. 62/1998 onthe Transfer of Central Government Authorityon Forestry to the Regional Governments,and Government Regulation No. 25/2000on Provincial Authority as an AutonomousRegion.16In its introductory consideration this lawstipulates that: ‘through the enactment of theMinister for Home Affairs Decree No. 119/1998 on Types and Coverage of Local Taxationfor the Provincial Level and the DistrictLevel, the taxation of by-products from forestutilization is considered as district taxation’.17The implementation of district regulationsdepends on the decree of the District Head: thishas been stated by the District Forestry andEstate Crops Office and clarified by the LegalBureau at the District Secretariat. Accordingto the Head of the Legal Division, DistrictRegulation on IPHHI and RHH cannot beimplemented because they contradict other,higher level regulations such as the MinisterialDecree No. 05.1/Kpts-II/2000 and GovernmentRegulation No. 34/2002 (Hidayat personalcommunication).18As prescribed by MPR Decree No. III/MPR/2000.19According to the explanation of Article73 (1) of Law 22/1999.20See Article 72 of Law 22/1999.21Law No. 32/2000: on the Amendment ofLaw No. 18/1997 on Regional Taxation.22This regulation implements Forestry LawNo. 5/1967.23See Article 2 (3) point 4g of GovernmentRegulation No. 25/2000.24The central government’s authority isupheld under the following laws: (1) Law No.20/1997 on Non-Tax State Revenue; (2) LawNo. 25/1999 on Fiscal Balancing; (3) LawNo. 41/1999 on Forestry; and (4) GovernmentRegulation No. 22/1999 on the Types andDeposit of Non-Tax State Revenue.25Based on Government RegulationNo. 25/2000, the authority of the provincialgovernment in the forestry sector includes 18authorities that cover the establishment of forestareas, permit issuance, forest preservation, etc.26See Article 3 (5) point 4j of GovernmentRegulation No. 25/2000.27See District Head’s Decree No. 77/2000on the Natural Resources Rent Provision(Provisi Sumber Daya Alam, PSDA) on Timber39

Local Policy-making MechanismsProduction Originating from Privately OwnedLand.28A provision that burdens the communitywith taxation and sanctions must be based on ajoint decision by the District Head and districtparliament in the form of a district regulation,not a decree. For that reason, decisions madeunilaterally through a District Head’s decreealone cannot be justified.29See and compare with Article 3 of ForestryLaw No. 41/1999, which elaborates the purposeof forest management in Indonesia includingincreasing public welfare by: (a) ensuring theexistence of the forests; (b) optimizing thevarious functions of the forest (environment,socio-cultural and economic); (c) increasingsupport for rivers; (d) developing capacity andcommunity empowerment; and (e) ensuringfair and sustainable distribution of benefits.30As prescribed by Article 110 of Law No.22/1999, which states, ‘The district governmentor third parties that plan to develop the villagearea into an area for settlement, industry orother services are obliged to involve the villageauthorities and BPD in planning, execution andmonitoring’.31As prescribed by Article 18 (4,5) of LawNo. 34/2000.32Article 3 (1b) and Article 4 (1 and 2) ofDistrict Regulation on IPHH.33See Article 3 (4i) of GovernmentRegulation No. 25/2000 and the Minister forForestry’s Decree No. 10/Kpts-II/2000 onGuidelines for Granting Industrial TimberPlantation Permits (HTI), which states: ‘inthe event that the proposed area for IPHH(and location for timber plantation) is locatedin between or among more than one district/municipality, then the permit application mustbe addressed to the Governor’.34Articles 14 (3), 15 and 16 of DistrictRegulation IPHH.35Law 34/2000 and Law 18/1997.36Illegal logging is prohibited by Article 50(3) of Basic Forestry Law No. 41/1999.37District Regulation No. 13/2002 onIPHH: Article 10 (1), Art. 11 (4), Art. 12, Art.14 (3), Art. 15 (1) and (2)).38Article 16 of the District Regulationon IPHH states that violations of theseresponsibilities may be punished throughcriminal, civil (compensation), andadministrative sanctions.39It is prohibited to: (a) illegally claimforest areas; (b) clear forest areas; (c) conductlogging activities within a radius of 500 m ofthe edge of a dam or lake, 200 m from the edgeof water sources or rivers in swamp areas, 100m from river banks, 50 m from the edge ofstreams, twice the height of cliffs; 130 times thedifference between the high water mark and thelow water mark from the edge of a beach. It is arealso prohibited to: (a) burn the forests; (b) cut,harvest or extract forest products without legalpermits; (c) accept, buy or sell, trade in, store orown forest products that are supposedly knownto have originated from illegal activities; (d)conduct general investigations, or explorationor exploitation of minerals in the forest areaswithout permission; (e) transport, control orown forest products that do not carry legaldocumentation; (f) graze animals in the forestarea without permission; (g) transport heavymachinery or other tools that may be used totransport timber without permission; (h) carrytools that may be used to cut down trees in theforest without permission; (i) throw away itemsthat may cause fire and damage the forest, alsoendangering the existence of the forest; and(j) transport vegetation and unprotected wildanimals from the forest without permission.40Article 26 of Tanjabbar District ParliamentDecision No. 2/2002 on the Standing Ordersof the District Parliament of Tanjabbar. TheStanding Orders stipulate that in order topropose a draft regulation: (1) at least fivemembers of the district parliament must proposea draft regulation to the Parliament Speaker;(2) in the plenary session, the initiators aregiven the chance to explain their proposal; (3)the parliament will decide either to accept orreject the proposal; (4) pending the decision toaccept or reject the proposal, the initiators maymake revisions; (5) after being accepted bythe assembly, the proposal officially becomesan assembly proposal and follows the same40

Sudirman, Dede Wiliam and Nely Herlinaprocedures as draft regulations proposed by theDistrict Head.41See also papers written by Fauzi Syam,PSHK-ODA entitled: Partisipasi publik terhadapkebijakan publik di propinsi Jambi (Publicparticipation in public policies in Jambi) (2002);Demokratisasi pembuatan peraturan daerah dipropinsi Jambi: upaya mewujudkan hukumyang aspiratif dan berwibawa (Democraticformulation of regional regulations in Jambi)(2000); ‘Increasing public participation in localpolicymaking (2000) and other relevant paperspresented to seminars and workshops in JambiProvince.42Partial adjustment meansuninstitutionalized adjustment (not formulatedin the district regulations). In practice, this typeof adjustment can be seen through the additionof expert staff in the District Legal Bureau(e.g., in Jambi and Tanjabbar), consultationwith the legal division from the Department ofHome Affairs, additional stakeholders in thedeliberations at the parliament, and involvingparliament members in the formulation withthe legal division. These adjustments areincidental depending on the draft regulationbeing deliberated; it is unclear whether theyshould be formulated under a new DistrictHead’s decree or still be based on a decreeissued during 1993–1994. In reality theseadjustments develop through practice.43The adoption of district regulationsformulated in other districts is a newphenomenon in Jambi. At the Executive level,official visits are made to other districts inorder to collect copies of regulations. TheDistrict Parliament, on the other hand, conductscomparative studies. The visits, however,usually neglect the issue of legal protectionto the community and are detrimental to thedevelopment of local laws as the regulationsformulated by other districts might not beappropriate to the situation in Tanjabbar.44Deliberations for the bill on IPHHI hadbeen conducted earlier, with 38 other draftsthat were finalized on 26 May 2001.45See Annex 1 for a full list of the other 14drafts deliberated at this time.46Muspida is a forum to discuss problemsand issues in the district. It usually consistsof representatives of the security agencies,senior civil servants, the leadership of thedistrict parliament and representatives of socialorganizations.47Those absent from this session accordingto the list of invitations: four district officeheads, one division head, seven districtcompany directors, and three district forummembers.48The Special Committee of the DistrictParliament was established under the DistrictParliament Leader Decree No. 12/2002 and iscomposed of 22 members.49As prescribed in District RegulationIPHH Article 5 as well as Articles 2 and 3 ofDistrict Head’s Decree No. 189/2003.50Applying through the Economic Section atthe District Head’s Office prolongs the process.This mechanism opens up the opportunity forsome district officials to increase the ‘servicefees’ and for applicants to make use of serviceagents.51District Head’s Decree No. 189/2003,Article 3 (2).52As mandated by Law No. 22/1999, LawNo. 41/1999, Law No. 34/2000 and Law No.18/1997.53See also Anonymous (2002a).54The district is authorized to collecta local fee (RHH) for small-scale permits(IPHHKR/IPHHKT/IPHH), Forest ResourceRent Provision (PSDH) and RHH on smallscalepermits inside the state forest area, andon Industrial Timber Plantations/HTI.55See also Anonymous (2002b).56In accordance with Jambi Governor’sDecree No. 522.12/5100/Dinhut, dated 3September 2002.57See also Anonymous (2002c).58From a legal perspective, the Joint Decreeof the two District Heads cannot be justified.Any policies that may burden the communitythrough taxation must be formulated by thelocal government and local parliament.59Issued by the National Land Agency(BPN).41

Local Policy-making Mechanisms60The permit covered the villages ofPenyabungan, Lubuk Terap, Badang, PematangPauh, Taman Raja, Kampung Baru, PelabuhanDagang and Lubuk Bernai.61This change was also observed inGovernment Document No. 560-778, wherethe original 9077 ha has been increased to 15000 ha.62Recognition of the diversity ofIndonesia’s villages is reflected on theexplanation of Article 93 (1) of Law No.22/1999. Government Regulation No. 76/2001concerning Generic Guidelines with Regardto Village Settings further emphasizes theoperational regulations.42

8REFERENCESAnonymous 1999 Surat Keputusan GubernurKepala Daerah Tingkat I Jambi No.108/1999 tentang Penetapan LuasKawasan Hutan di Propinsi Jambiberdasarkan Peta Paduserasi Tata GunaHutan Kesepakatan (TGHK) dan RencanaTata Ruang Wilayah (RTRW) PropinsiJambi, 7 April 1999. (Jambi Governor’sDecree No. 108/1999 on the Designationof Forest Areas in Jambi Province based onagreed Land Use and Spatial Plan Maps).Jambi Provincial Government, Jambi.Anonymous 2002a Untuk PAD, EfektifkanRetribusi Kehutanan (To generateregional revenue, implement forestry feescollection). Jambi Ekspres, 24 August2002.Anonymous 2002b Kayu Illegal Dikirim keluar Jambi. (Illegal timber transported outof Jambi). Jambi Independen, 18 October2002.Anonymous 2002c Pos P3H Tanjabar, SahkanKayu Kayu Illegal? (Tanjabbar P3H PostLegalized Illegal Timber?) Jambi Ekspres,3 September 2002.Anonymous 2002d. Produk Domestik RegionalBruto Kabupaten Tanjung Jabung BaratMenurut Lapangan Usaha Tahun 2002(2002 Gross Regional Domestic Product ofTanjung Jabung Barat District by Sector).Badan Pusat Statistik Kabupaten TanjungJabung Barat, Kuala Tungkal.Badan Pusat Statistik 2002 Tanjung JabungBarat dalam Angka 2002 (StatisticalYearbook of West Tanjung JabungRegency). Central Office of Statistics,West Tanjung Jabung Regency, KualaTungkal, Jambi.Haris, S. (ed.) 2003 Desentralisasi danOtonomi Daerah, Naskah Akademik danRUU Usulan LIPI. (Decentralization andRegional Autonomy, Academic Paper andDraft Regulation by LIPI). Research Centerfor Politics of the Indonesian Instituteof Sciences (LIPI) in collaboration withPartnership for Governance Reform inIndonesia (PGRI), Jakarta.Moeryanto, G. 2003 Menuju DesentralisasiPengelolaan Hutan Berbasis Masyarakat diProvinsi Jambi (Towards Decentralizationof Community-based Forest Managementin Jambi Province). Paper presented atWorkshop on Strengthening CollaborativeLearning Networks to PromoteCommunity-based Forestry Management.Jambi, 7 April 2003.Nurhasim, M. (ed.) 2001 KualitasKeterwakilan legislatif: Kasus Sumbar,Jateng, Jatim, dan Sulsel (The Quality ofElected Representatives: Cases in WestSumatra, Central Java, East Java andSouth Sulawesi). Research Report P2P,Indonesian Institute of Sciences, Jakarta.Syam, F. (ed.) 2003 Otonomi Daerah BukanSengketa, Peran Arbitrase SengketaOtonomi Daerah Jambi DalamPenyelesaian Sengketa ImplementasiOtonomi Daerah di Kabupaten, Kota danProvinsi Jambi (Regional Autonomy isnot in dispute: the Role of an ArbitrationBody for Dispute Resolution on theImplementation of Regional Autonomy43

Local Policy-making Mechanismsin Districts and Cities in Jambi Province.Study Center for Legislation and Policyon Regional Autonomy (PSHK-ODA) ,Jambi.Tanjung Jabung Barat District Forestry andEstate Crops Office 2002 PerencanaanStrategis Pembangunan KehutananKabupaten Tanjung Jabung Barat Tahun2001-2005 (Strategic Development Planof Forestry in Tanjung Jabung BaratDisctrict 2001-2005). Tanjung JabungBarat District Forestry and Estate CropsOffice, Kuala Tungkal, Jambi.44

9ANNEX 1. INTRODUCTORY NOTES OF PLENARYSESSION I OF TANJABBAR PARLIAMENTIntroductory Speech from the District Head of Tanjabbar regarding16 (sixteen) Draft District Regulations in Tanjabbar on the Occasionof the First Plenary Session of the Tanjabbar District Parliament, 16October 2002Assalamualaikum Wr. Wb.GreetingsThe Hons. Parliament Speaker, Deputy Speakers and members of the Tanjabbar DistrictParliament,Fellow Muspida of Tanjabbar Members,Head of the Kuala Tungkal CourtDeputy District Head and District SecretaryAssistants, Head of Offices/District Technical Support and Division Heads of the TanjabbarSecretariat and to all present here today.Let us praise Allah SWT, God Almighty, for without His blessing we would not be given thestrength to convene here today on the occasion of the plenary sessions of the District Parliamentof Tanjabbar in this new building. On this occasion I would like to present the draft regulationswhich we have formulated to the legislative, which consist of:1. The Draft Regulation on the Establishment of District Company ‘PD Jabung Barat SaktiHolding Company’2. The Draft Regulation on the Amendment of Regional Regulation No. 11 Year 1997 on theEstablishment of PD BPR Tanjung Jabung (Establishment PD BPR Tanggo Rajo)3. The Draft Regulation on the Amendment of Regional Regulation No. 4 Year 2001 onthe Organizational Structure of the Local Apparatus and Tanjabbar District ParliamentSecretariat4. The Draft Regulation on the Organizational Structure of Kuala Tungkal General Hospital5. The Draft Regulation on the Guidelines to Establish the Community EmpowermentInstitution6. The Draft Regulation on the Financial Structure of the District Head and Deputy DistrictHead7. The Draft Regulation on Forest Product Fees (RHH)8. The Draft Regulation on Forest Product Extraction Permits (IPHH)9. The Draft Regulation on Business Permits in the Areas of Industry and Trade10. The Draft Regulation on Fees for Company and Warehouse Registration11. The Draft Regulation on Construction Permits (SIUJK)45

Local Policy-making Mechanisms12. The Draft Regulation on Fees Regarding Personal Identification Cards, Family Certificatesand Civil Registry Certificates13. The Draft Regulation on Taxation on the Sale of Products from District Businesses14. The Draft Regulation on Commercial Permits15. The Draft Regulation on Fees Payable to Government Entities16. The Draft Regulation on the Amendment of Regional Regulation No. 23 on BuildingsMr Speaker,As mentioned there are 16 draft regulations that we as the Executive have proposed for yourapproval. This reflects our consistency, as mandated by your institution, to conduct significantefforts to improve the livelihood for the people living in the District of Tanjabbar. To achieve suchgoals, there need to be legal foundations in the form of regional regulations in order to conductour activities. These regulations play a significant role as they are a manifestation of the policiesthat are to be put in place. We are aware that these efforts to formulate public policy must fallunder the guidelines of the Strategic Plan set by Regional Regulation No.1 Year 2001.As the Head of the Executive branch, I am aware that without your support and cooperation,there is not much that I can perform. I hope that you will support these policies that I haveproposed without looking into any other interest but that of the public good.Mr Speaker,In this occasion let me briefly summarize some of the draft regulations that we have put forwardtoday. In this era of regional autonomy, we are asked to look for breakthroughs and opportunitiesto increase our local income, through methods of diversifying taxation or increasing these taxesand most importantly transforming the district government to become entrepreneurs themselves.As an entrepreneur, the district government must form or develop companies to conduct businessactivities.As we know, we have our own local company, ‘Jabung Barat Sakti’, however, the unfortunateexperiences of that company have shown us the importance of the certainty of law. District-ownedcompanies up to this point have only been established under District Head decrees. For this reason,we would like to propose the draft regulation on the establishment of a company with the samename, ‘Jabung Barat Sakti’. This will be a holding company which consists of several subsidiarycompanies which operate in different fields of business. It is hoped that this company will be ableto gradually expand, however profit orientation should always be the main goal. I hope that theparliament will allow this company to first reach its break-even point before demanding a portionfor the regional income. Your support is needed in order to facilitate BUMD PD Jabung BaratSakti in conducting its mission as the economic spearhead of the district of Tanjabbar.Mr Speaker,Today we would also like to propose the draft regulation on the taxation on the sale of locallyproduced goods. This will be the foundation for the District Government to sell goods producedby the District Government’s businesses, for example the programme to sell one million ducksthat we are currently engaged in. Duck eggs or ducks produced by the Farming Office can besold to the farming community or to the general public, and I encourage our Division Heads tocontinue this sprit of entrepreneurship.46

Sudirman, Dede Wiliam and Nely HerlinaMr Speaker,During our last encounter, I have already raised the issue of establishing a district funding agency,PD-BPT Tanggo Rajo. The establishment of PD-BPT Tanggo Rajo has been done through theAmendment of Regional Regulation No. 11 Year 1997 on the Establishment of PD-BPT TanjungJabung, which has already been passed. However, due to banking deregulation policies and theeconomic crisis which hit the country, we were unable to operate PD-BPT. The establishment ofPD-BPT through the amendment of an existing draft is meant to speed up the process of permitapplication at the Central Bank, if approved by the District Parliament, then PD-BPT TanggoRajo will be able to operate in early 2003. PD-BPT Tanggo Rajo is established with a mission topromote locally based economy. This is in line with the development strategy to provide a financialagency that is close to the community/production source. Therefore this agency will be able toprovide service to the economically disadvantaged, small-scale businesses and cooperatives atthe villages or towns. As primary capital I will mobilize all my staff to become account holdersin PD-BPT.Mr Speaker,We also plan to conduct a diversification of local taxes. New taxes will be able to revive existingtaxes that have already supported our regionally generated revenues. I am certain and optimisticthat diversification and intensification of local taxes as well as the entrepreneurship of the DistrictGovernment will result in an income of Rp. 12 billion, however we must work together to achievethis goal. My assessment is that we have conducted the necessary actions to develop the Districtof Tanjabbar, and although we have not yet grown out of the economic crisis the yearly economicgrowth of Tanjabbar has increased. Our growth in 2001 is even higher than that of the Provinceof Jambi, which is 3.93% or 1.9% excluding revenues from oil and gas, whereas Tanjabbar hasshown a growth of 6.76% or 4.23% excluding oil and gas revenues.Although the economic growth in Tanjabbar for 2001 is in part due to the oil and gas sector,the mining, industry, agriculture, trade, hotel and restaurant, and service sectors have provided alarge contribution to the Tanjabbar economy. The future of the economy in Tanjabbar will surelydepend on our efforts to implement policies and programmes that we have established.Mr Speaker,The policies that we have formulated to propel our economy will be meaningless if they are notfully supported by an effective district government apparatus: one that will implement the policiesand the programmes and also provide the best service to the community. It has been approximatelya year since we implemented governance according to Regional Regulation No. 4 Year 2001 onthe Organizational Structure of the Local Apparatus and Tanjabbar District Parliament Secretariat.Recent developments, however, force us to reorganize our district government apparatus.Several divisions or offices are no longer considered appropriate to exist independently,therefore they need to be dissolved. Other divisions or offices, however, need to be introducedto take into account the current situation and conditions. What I would like to stress here isthe addition of new assistants for the District Head Office. Currently there is only one assistantwho must work in three different sectors. The District of Tanjabbar is the only district in thecountry with only one assistant. This reorganizing has gone through long stages of preparation bya team set up under District Head Order No. 061/020/ORG, dated 14 January 2002, and based therecommendation of the District Parliament No.14/2001, dated 26 May 2002, which provides theopportunity for the executive to review the organization of the local apparatus after the adoptionof Regional Regulation No. 4 Year 2001.47

Local Policy-making MechanismsThe team which I have appointed has conducted its duties thoroughly by observing the performanceof the District Government apparatus, gathering various input, and conducting comparative studiesof neighbouring districts and districts outside the province.Mr Speaker,In this opportunity we would also like to propose the draft regulation on Organizational Structureof the District General Hospital. Regional Regulation No. 4/2001 has been implemented for moreor less a year, however, the district hospital is still operating based on Regional Regulation No.2/1997. With the issuance of Decree of Minister for Home Affairs Decree No. 40 Year 2002 on theGuidelines for the Organization and Management of District Hospitals, there must be a separatedistrict regulation.At this juncture I would like to give the opportunity for the District Parliament to provide thename for this hospital. Should it be named after a national hero? I want this hospital to be namedafter a person who has committed him/herself to the District of Tanjabbar.Mr Speaker,I would like to conclude by asking your understanding over the concerns that we have broughtforward to you today. Although we have not elaborated each and every draft regulation, theformulation of each draft regulation had been based on the relevant rules and procedures. As theExecutive we hope that these draft regulations will be deliberated effectively according to theagenda set forward.Finally I would like to convey my gratitude for your kind attention.May Allah SWT provide His blessings to all of us, Amen.Wassalamualaikum Wr. Wb.Kuala Tungkal, 16 October 2002District Head of Tanjung Jabung BaratDrs. H. Usman Ermulan48

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