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Using Data Analysis to Detect Fraud - IIA Dallas Chapter

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“There is a tendency <strong>to</strong> mistake data for wisdom, just as there has alwaysbeen a tendency <strong>to</strong> confuse logic with values, intelligence with insight.Unobstructed access <strong>to</strong> facts can produce unlimited good only if it is matchedby the desire and ability <strong>to</strong> find out what they mean and where they lead.Facts are terrible things if left sprawling and unattended. They are <strong>to</strong>o easilyregarded as evaluated certainties rather than as the rawest of raw materialscrying <strong>to</strong> be processed in<strong>to</strong> the texture of logic. It requires a very unusualmind, Whitehead said, <strong>to</strong> undertake the analysis of a fact. The computer canprovide a correct number, but it may be an irrelevant number until judgment ispronounced.”Norman Cousins (1912–1990), U.S. edi<strong>to</strong>r,author. “Freedom as Teacher,” HumanOptions: An Au<strong>to</strong>biographical Notebook,Nor<strong>to</strong>n (1981).<strong>Using</strong> <strong>Data</strong> <strong>Analysis</strong> <strong>to</strong> <strong>Detect</strong> and Deter <strong>Fraud</strong>PricewaterhouseCoopersMarch 2007Slide 3


<strong>Using</strong> <strong>Data</strong> <strong>Analysis</strong> <strong>to</strong> <strong>Detect</strong> and Deter <strong>Fraud</strong>PricewaterhouseCoopersMarch 2007Slide 5


Who detects fraud?Source:PricewaterhouseCoopers’Global Economic CrimeSurvey 2005http://www.pwc.com/extweb/insights.nsf/docid/D1A0A606149F2806852570C0006716C0<strong>Using</strong> <strong>Data</strong> <strong>Analysis</strong> <strong>to</strong> <strong>Detect</strong> and Deter <strong>Fraud</strong>March 2007PricewaterhouseCoopersSlide 6


Outline<strong>Data</strong> <strong>Analysis</strong> FrameworkAnalytic TechniquesTechnology


<strong>Data</strong> <strong>Analysis</strong> FrameworkIndustry & Company KnowledgeCompany <strong>Data</strong>PaymentsPurchasingVendorEmployeeIndustry <strong>Data</strong>Identify and Develop AnalyticsApply Analytics <strong>to</strong> <strong>Data</strong>Research LeadsRefine AnalyticsInvestigativeProceduresHigh Priorityof InterestNo ActionConsortiumAddressesReposi<strong>to</strong>ryPublic Records<strong>Using</strong> <strong>Data</strong> <strong>Analysis</strong> <strong>to</strong> <strong>Detect</strong> and Deter <strong>Fraud</strong>PricewaterhouseCoopersMarch 2007Slide 8


<strong>Using</strong> <strong>Data</strong> <strong>Analysis</strong> <strong>to</strong> <strong>Detect</strong> and Deter <strong>Fraud</strong>PricewaterhouseCoopersMarch 2007Slide 10


Analytic TechniquesCompare suppliers <strong>to</strong> employeesStandard test <strong>to</strong> show potential conflicts of interest<strong>Using</strong> <strong>Data</strong> <strong>Analysis</strong> <strong>to</strong> <strong>Detect</strong> and Deter <strong>Fraud</strong>PricewaterhouseCoopersMarch 2007Slide 11


Analytic TechniquesAnalyze vendor activityDo you see an anomaly?Sequential invoice numbersVendorNumber Vendor NameInvoiceNumber Invoice DateInvoiceAmount10034578 CPG Air Freight 3041 7/12/2006 12,72310034578 CPG Air Freight 3042 8/18/2006 11,86310034578 CPG Air Freight 3043 9/8/2006 14,77110034578 CPG Air Freight 3044 10/4/2006 14,75010034578 CPG Air Freight 3045 11/17/2006 18,99210034578 CPG Air Freight 3046 12/1/2006 18,97210034578 CPG Air Freight 3047 12/22/2006 18,990Total Invoiced: 111,061<strong>Using</strong> <strong>Data</strong> <strong>Analysis</strong> <strong>to</strong> <strong>Detect</strong> and Deter <strong>Fraud</strong>PricewaterhouseCoopersMarch 2007Slide 12


Analytic TechniquesGhost employeesDo you see the anomaly?Direct deposit numbers are identical forthree employees in three geographiesEmployeeID Employee Name LoctionDirect DepositAccountDepositAmount10078 William Kayak Buffalo, NY 000756227 3,24311265 Edward Cook Miami, FL 000756227 5,53813655 Nancy Wright Chicago, IL 000756227 2,236Total Paid: 11,017<strong>Using</strong> <strong>Data</strong> <strong>Analysis</strong> <strong>to</strong> <strong>Detect</strong> and Deter <strong>Fraud</strong>PricewaterhouseCoopersMarch 2007Slide 13


Analytic TechniquesUnrecorded paymentsGaps in Check Numbers by issuing bank<strong>Using</strong> <strong>Data</strong> <strong>Analysis</strong> <strong>to</strong> <strong>Detect</strong> and Deter <strong>Fraud</strong>PricewaterhouseCoopersMarch 2007Slide 14


Analytic TechniquesBenford’s LawUtilizes digit and numberpatterns <strong>to</strong> detect fraud,errors, biases, andirregularities. Significantdifferences between a dataset’s digit distribution and thedigit distribution of Benford’sLaw serve as a flag formanufactured or manipulateddata and suggest that furtheranalysis may be necessary.Areas for furtheranalysis<strong>Using</strong> <strong>Data</strong> <strong>Analysis</strong> <strong>to</strong> <strong>Detect</strong> and Deter <strong>Fraud</strong>PricewaterhouseCoopersMarch 2007Slide 15


Analytic TechniquesWho can pronounce this word?INVIGILATION:Keep an eye on, watch over, observe, followCompare “fraud free” locations <strong>to</strong> other locationsHQBranchABranchBBranchGBranchDBranchCBranchEBranchF<strong>Using</strong> <strong>Data</strong> <strong>Analysis</strong> <strong>to</strong> <strong>Detect</strong> and Deter <strong>Fraud</strong>PricewaterhouseCoopersMarch 2007Slide 16


Analytic TechniquesHow do you analyze 100 million transactions?a. One at a timeb. Run a queryc. Grouping and sequencing170 s<strong>to</strong>res8,500 employees80,000 suppliers100 million<strong>Using</strong> <strong>Data</strong> <strong>Analysis</strong> <strong>to</strong> <strong>Detect</strong> and Deter <strong>Fraud</strong>PricewaterhouseCoopers1,150,000 cus<strong>to</strong>mersMarch 2007Slide 17


Analytic TechniquesCombining several sources of dataOrdersInven<strong>to</strong>ryMovementsShippingDisbursementsFreight BillsOrders Inven<strong>to</strong>ry Shipping Freight Disbursements BillingCashReceipts10101010 10101010 10101010 10101010 10101010 10101010 1010101001010101 01010101 01010101 01010101 01010101 01010101 0101010110101010 10101010 10101010 10101010 10101010 10101010 1010101001010101 01010101 01010101 01010101 01010101 01010101 01010101Cash ReceiptsCus<strong>to</strong>merBilling<strong>Using</strong> <strong>Data</strong> <strong>Analysis</strong> <strong>to</strong> <strong>Detect</strong> and Deter <strong>Fraud</strong>PricewaterhouseCoopersMarch 2007Slide 18


Analytic TechniquesTesting across combined attributesOrders Inven<strong>to</strong>ry Shipping Freight Disbursements BillingCashReceipts10101010 10101010 10101010 10101010 10101010 10101010 1010101001010101 01010101 01010101 01010101 01010101 01010101 0101010110101010 10101010 10101010 10101010 10101010 10101010 1010101001010101 01010101 01010101 01010101 01010101 01010101 01010101A B C D E F Count TotalY Y Y Y Y Y 894 470,356Y Y Y Y Y N 273 (21,754)Y Y Y Y N N 122 (9,274)Y Y N N Y Y 165 (11,666)Y Y N N N N 65 (7,249)Y N N N N N 13 (3,254)N N N N N N 43 (64,089)<strong>Using</strong> <strong>Data</strong> <strong>Analysis</strong> <strong>to</strong> <strong>Detect</strong> and Deter <strong>Fraud</strong>PricewaterhouseCoopersMarch 2007Slide 19


Analytic TechniquesClusteringGrouping of matched entities by property typeA=B, B=C; therefore, A=B=C- A = Bob Jones- B = Trucking Inc (Attn: Robert Jones)- C = NY Trucking IncBob JonesName, AddressTrucking Inc(Attn Robert Jones)Trucking Inc(Attn Robert Jones)NameNY Trucking Inc<strong>Using</strong> <strong>Data</strong> <strong>Analysis</strong> <strong>to</strong> <strong>Detect</strong> and Deter <strong>Fraud</strong>PricewaterhouseCoopersMarch 2007Slide 20


<strong>Data</strong> Quality ChallengesNo uniquekeyNo consistentnaming conventionSpellingErrors<strong>Data</strong> EntryErrorsMissingValuesFreeFormTextID# Name Address City State Zip Note5154155 LaneM. Hitchcock 91017 th Street NW Washin<strong>to</strong>n DC 20006A1617 LaneHitchcock, M., 910SeventeenthStreet NW DX 20006 021115146261 MyronStucky 110EyeSt. N.W. Washing<strong>to</strong>n DC 20005 CHKID87121 Stucky, Myron 110I Street 1 st floor DC FRAlert87458 Fisher &SmithInc 3197 th St. S.E. Washing<strong>to</strong>n DC 20003CompanyNamesBuriedInformation<strong>Data</strong> inWrong Field<strong>Using</strong> <strong>Data</strong> <strong>Analysis</strong> <strong>to</strong> <strong>Detect</strong> and Deter <strong>Fraud</strong>PricewaterhouseCoopersMarch 2007Slide 21


<strong>Data</strong> Quality Challenges – Transliteration of NamesWest AfricaHage Imhemed OtmaneAbderaqibLevantineMuhamad UsmanAbdel RaqeebIraqHajj Mohamed Uthman AbdAl RagibEast AfricaHag Muhammad OsmanAbdurra’ibPersian GulfPersian GulfHaj Mohd OthmanAbdul Rajeeb<strong>Using</strong> <strong>Data</strong> <strong>Analysis</strong> <strong>to</strong> <strong>Detect</strong> and Deter <strong>Fraud</strong>PricewaterhouseCoopersMarch 2007Slide 22


<strong>Data</strong> Quality Challenges – Transliteration of NamesZhang QiusuChang Ch’iu-SuMyanmar(Burma)ChinaTaiwanLaosHong KongMacauThailandPhilippinesCambodiaVietnamMalaysiaSingaporeChiusu Sae ChangCheung Yiau SoCheung Yau SoIndonesia<strong>Using</strong> <strong>Data</strong> <strong>Analysis</strong> <strong>to</strong> <strong>Detect</strong> and Deter <strong>Fraud</strong>PricewaterhouseCoopersMarch 2007Slide 23


<strong>Data</strong> CleansingPersonal Name Cleanse:Organization Name Cleanse:Address Cleanse:<strong>Using</strong> <strong>Data</strong> <strong>Analysis</strong> <strong>to</strong> <strong>Detect</strong> and Deter <strong>Fraud</strong>PricewaterhouseCoopersMarch 2007Slide 24


Outline<strong>Data</strong> <strong>Analysis</strong> FrameworkAnalytic TechniquesTechnology


TechnologyA sampling of technology<strong>Data</strong> Cleansing• <strong>Data</strong> Flux• FirstLogic• LAS• USPS• SSN• Addresses• OFAC• World Check• World Compliance<strong>Using</strong> <strong>Data</strong> <strong>Analysis</strong> <strong>to</strong> <strong>Detect</strong> and Deter <strong>Fraud</strong>PricewaterhouseCoopersMarch 2007Slide 26


TechnologyA sampling of technologyContinuous Moni<strong>to</strong>ring• ACL Continuous Controls Moni<strong>to</strong>ring (“CCM”)• Oversight Systems• PwC General Ledger Tool• PwC Transaction Risk Identification & <strong>Analysis</strong> (“TRIA”)<strong>Using</strong> <strong>Data</strong> <strong>Analysis</strong> <strong>to</strong> <strong>Detect</strong> and Deter <strong>Fraud</strong>PricewaterhouseCoopersMarch 2007Slide 27


TechnologyAbout Transaction Risk Identification & <strong>Analysis</strong> (“TRIA”)TRIA provides analysis of data at the sub-ledger level. The depthof the TRIA has been expanded <strong>to</strong> contain approximately 180reports related <strong>to</strong> the following business cycles:• Accounts payable• Revenue• Inven<strong>to</strong>ry• Payroll•Fixed assets<strong>Using</strong> <strong>Data</strong> <strong>Analysis</strong> <strong>to</strong> <strong>Detect</strong> and Deter <strong>Fraud</strong>PricewaterhouseCoopersMarch 2007Slide 28


TRIA HighlightsTRIA applies machine intelligence <strong>to</strong> solve matching and pattern detectionproblems.Key features of TRIA:• Combines machine intelligence with human intelligence- Computer matching + Manual review process• Utilizes USPS Address Standard and Firstlogic*• Interacts with outside database and third party software resources (e.g. knownfraudulent names/addresses, validity checks)- World Compliance** - World Check** - Mail Box etc. list- Name Variations* - SSN* * - DUNS Number*• Flexible Design- User configurable clustering engine- Matching and pattern detection algorithms can be cus<strong>to</strong>mized• Provides an online environment <strong>to</strong> review matches• Provides multi-year analysis across application/ERP boundaries• Ability <strong>to</strong> dynamically design ad-hoc reports/analysis (ORACLE DBMS)<strong>Using</strong> <strong>Data</strong> <strong>Analysis</strong> <strong>to</strong> <strong>Detect</strong> and Deter <strong>Fraud</strong>PricewaterhouseCoopersMarch 2007Slide 29


Analytic TechniquesTRIA HighlightVendors with addresses on the “common hotlist”Entity Type Full Name 1No. ofPaymentsTotalPayment AmountABC Vendor UNITED WAY OF SCIOTO CO INC 249 $10,963.60Common Hotlist CASH FOR NOWABC Vendor FORT WAYNE, CITY OF 82 $4,441,645.28ABC Vendor CITY UTILITIES 217 $212,582.76ABC Vendor CRICK, PATRICIA J RECORDER 34 $5,608.00Common Hotlist ALLEN COUNTY JAILABC Vendor PROCESS SOLUTIONS 129 $486,981.48ABC Vendor PROCESS SOLUTIONS INC 6 $136,176.18Common Hotlist HAMILTON COUNTY COLLECTIONHotlist DescriptionCHECK CASHING SERVICECOUNTY GOVT-CORRECTIONALINSTITUTIONSCOLLECTION AGENCIES<strong>Using</strong> <strong>Data</strong> <strong>Analysis</strong> <strong>to</strong> <strong>Detect</strong> and Deter <strong>Fraud</strong>PricewaterhouseCoopersMarch 2007Slide 30


TRIA HighlightDisbursements within $500 of $10,000 approval limit<strong>Using</strong> <strong>Data</strong> <strong>Analysis</strong> <strong>to</strong> <strong>Detect</strong> and Deter <strong>Fraud</strong>PricewaterhouseCoopersMarch 2007Slide 31


TechnologyTRIA Demo<strong>Using</strong> <strong>Data</strong> <strong>Analysis</strong> <strong>to</strong> <strong>Detect</strong> and Deter <strong>Fraud</strong>PricewaterhouseCoopersMarch 2007Slide 32


Questions© 2007 PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. All rights reserved. "PricewaterhouseCoopers" refers <strong>to</strong>PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (a Delaware limited liability partnership) or, as the context requires, other memberfirms of PricewaterhouseCoopers International Ltd., each of which is a separate and independent legal entity.*connectedthinking is a trademark of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP.


AppendixReport List


Accounts Payable1. Vendor Invoices With No Corresponding Purchase Order2. Unique General Ledger Entries3. Manual Checks4. Disbursements Paid <strong>to</strong> Vendors With No Corresponding Invoice5. Payments <strong>to</strong> Vendors not Listed in the Vendor Master File6. Vendors With No Tax ID Information in the Vendor Master File7. Disbursements within a Specified Range and Approval Limit8. Round dollar disbursements9. Sequential Invoice Numbers (by Vendor)10.Disbursements <strong>to</strong> Payees Labeled as “Cash”, “Do Not Use”, or isBlank11.Voided Checks12.Duplicate on Vendor Number and Payment Amount<strong>Using</strong> <strong>Data</strong> <strong>Analysis</strong> <strong>to</strong> <strong>Detect</strong> and Deter <strong>Fraud</strong>PricewaterhouseCoopers13.Receipt of Inven<strong>to</strong>ry Coded as ObsoleteMarch 2007Slide 35


Accounts Payable (Continued)16. Cash Disbursement - Invoice Age17. Vendor master file controls and maintenance18. Working Capital <strong>Analysis</strong> - Days Payable Outstanding (DPO)19. Vendors With No Phone Number Listed20. Vendors With No Terms Listed21. Vendors With No Addresses Listed22. Segregation of Duties - Disbursement and Vendor Master File23. Duplicate on Invoice Number, Invoice Date and Payment Amount24. Duplicate on Vendor Number, Invoice Date and Invoice Number25. Payments Stratified by Transparency International Corruption Indexand Country26. Payments <strong>to</strong> government owned entities27. Payments <strong>to</strong> agents<strong>Using</strong> <strong>Data</strong> <strong>Analysis</strong> <strong>to</strong> <strong>Detect</strong> and Deter <strong>Fraud</strong>PricewaterhouseCoopers28. Payments <strong>to</strong> Agents with the Same AddressMarch 2007Slide 36


Accounts Payable (Continued)31. Payments Made <strong>to</strong> Foreign Bank Accounts32. Zero Dollar and Negative Disbursements33. Duplicates on Vendor Number and Check Date34. Duplicates on Vendor Number, Invoice Number, and PaymentAmount35. Comparison of Sales Versus Expenses by Country36. Compare Vendors with Government Entity List / Politically ExposedPeople37. Actual Vendor List38. Vendors on UN Oil for Food Report39. Vendors with Domestic Address and Foreign Bank40. Vendors with Only One Payment41. Vendor Accounts with a Debit Balance<strong>Using</strong> <strong>Data</strong> <strong>Analysis</strong> <strong>to</strong> <strong>Detect</strong> and Deter <strong>Fraud</strong>PricewaterhouseCoopers42. Inven<strong>to</strong>ry Received in Excess of InvoicedMarch 2007Slide 37


Accounts Payable (Continued)46. Aggregate Payments in Alphabetical Order47. Aggregate Payments in Descending $ Order48. Cancelled Checks49. Check Amounts Sum of Invoice Amount50. Check Number Gaps51. Check Register Vendor Vendor List52. Checks with Multiple Names or Vendor Numbers53. Compare vendors address with cus<strong>to</strong>mer address54. Compare vendors with common hotlist that have same address55. Compare vendors with project hotlist that have same name or sameaddress56. Duplicate Check Amounts57. Duplicate Check Numbers<strong>Using</strong> <strong>Data</strong> <strong>Analysis</strong> <strong>to</strong> <strong>Detect</strong> and Deter <strong>Fraud</strong>PricewaterhouseCoopers58. Entities with same addressMarch 2007Slide 38


Accounts Payable (Continued)61. Entities with same tax id62. First Digit of Check Amount63. First Digit of Invoice Amount64. Min/Max Check Amounts and Dates65. Payment Frequencies in Alphabetical Order66. Payment Frequencies in Descending $ Order67. Vendors with same address68. Vendors with same address and different name69. Vendors with same name70. Vendors with same name and different address71. Vendors with same phone number72. Vendors with same tax id73. Voided Checks<strong>Using</strong> <strong>Data</strong> <strong>Analysis</strong> <strong>to</strong> <strong>Detect</strong> and Deter <strong>Fraud</strong>PricewaterhouseCoopers74. Whole Dollar Amount ChecksMarch 2007Slide 39


Revenue76.Segregation of Duties - Sales Orders and Cus<strong>to</strong>mer Master File77.Duplicate Invoice Amounts <strong>to</strong> Cus<strong>to</strong>mers78.Cus<strong>to</strong>mers With No Phone Number Listed79.Unique General Ledger Entries80.Cus<strong>to</strong>mers with an Address Match on the Common Hotlist81.Quantity of Products Invoiced Exceeds the Quantity of ProductsShipped82.Invoice Dollar Amount Exceeds Purchase Order Dollar Amount83.Round Dollar Cus<strong>to</strong>mer Invoices84.Percentage of Cus<strong>to</strong>mer Returns Compared <strong>to</strong> Cus<strong>to</strong>mer Sales (byCus<strong>to</strong>mer)85.Unusual Cus<strong>to</strong>mer Trends (Based on Sales and Return Amounts)86.Discount Applied Differs from what is Stated in the Credit Terms87.Unauthorized Ship <strong>to</strong> Address<strong>Using</strong> <strong>Data</strong> <strong>Analysis</strong> <strong>to</strong> <strong>Detect</strong> and Deter <strong>Fraud</strong>PricewaterhouseCoopersInvoice Date Prior To Ship DateMarch 2007Slide 40


Revenue91. Cus<strong>to</strong>mer Ship Address Same as Employee Address92. Shipping Address is on the Common Hotlist93. Sales <strong>to</strong> Cus<strong>to</strong>mers Not In Cus<strong>to</strong>mer Master File94. Cash Receipts and Credit Memo <strong>Analysis</strong> by Cus<strong>to</strong>mer95. Top Cus<strong>to</strong>mer Case Receipts/Payments <strong>Analysis</strong> (80/20 Rule)96. Sales Invoice/Cash Receipts Stratification97. Working Capital <strong>Analysis</strong> on Cus<strong>to</strong>mer Receipts98. Days Sale Outstanding by Terms and Working Capital <strong>Analysis</strong>99. Cus<strong>to</strong>mer master file controls and maintenance100.Deviation of invoice terms from master file101.Credit memo analysis - cus<strong>to</strong>mer102.Unauthorized price changes103.Credit Memo <strong>Analysis</strong> by Crea<strong>to</strong>r<strong>Using</strong> <strong>Data</strong> <strong>Analysis</strong> <strong>to</strong> <strong>Detect</strong> and Deter <strong>Fraud</strong>PricewaterhouseCoopers104.Credit memo analysis - reason codeMarch 2007Slide 41


Revenue106.Cus<strong>to</strong>mers With No Terms Listed107.Cus<strong>to</strong>mer Invoices With No Corresponding Sales Order108.Sales Stratified by Transparency International Corruption Index andCountry109.Sales <strong>to</strong> Government Owned Entities110.Actual Cus<strong>to</strong>mer List111.Cus<strong>to</strong>mers Matching Government Entities or Politically ExposedPeople112.Cus<strong>to</strong>mer Accounts with a Credit Balance113.Sales by Country114.Sales <strong>to</strong> Country Different from Ship <strong>to</strong> Country115.Fixed Asset Additions <strong>Analysis</strong>116.Compare cus<strong>to</strong>mers with common hotlist that have same address<strong>Using</strong> <strong>Data</strong> <strong>Analysis</strong> <strong>to</strong> <strong>Detect</strong> and Deter <strong>Fraud</strong>PricewaterhouseCoopers117.Compare cus<strong>to</strong>mers with project hotlist that have same name orsame addressMarch 2007Slide 42


Revenue121.Cus<strong>to</strong>mers with same tax id122.Entities with same address123.Entities with same name124.Entities with same phone number125.Entities with same tax id<strong>Using</strong> <strong>Data</strong> <strong>Analysis</strong> <strong>to</strong> <strong>Detect</strong> and Deter <strong>Fraud</strong>PricewaterhouseCoopersMarch 2007Slide 43


Payroll126. Compare employees with common hotlist that have same address127. Compare employees with project hotlist that have same name orsame address128. Employees with same address129. Employees with same address and different name130. Employees with same banking information131. Employees with same DOB132. Employees with same name133. Employees with same name and different address134. Employees with same phone number135. Employees with same tax id136. Entities with same address137. Entities with same name<strong>Using</strong> <strong>Data</strong> <strong>Analysis</strong> <strong>to</strong> <strong>Detect</strong> and Deter <strong>Fraud</strong>PricewaterhouseCoopers138. Entities with same phone numberMarch 2007Slide 44


Inven<strong>to</strong>ry140.Unique General Ledger Entries141.Shipping Address is on the Common Hotlist142.Receipt of Inven<strong>to</strong>ry Coded as Obsolete143.Inven<strong>to</strong>ry Adjustment <strong>Analysis</strong>144.Inven<strong>to</strong>ry Received in Excess of Invoiced145.Item Classification146.Inven<strong>to</strong>ry Cycle Count Program - Last Count <strong>Analysis</strong>147.Inven<strong>to</strong>ry Cycle Count Program - Location <strong>Analysis</strong><strong>Using</strong> <strong>Data</strong> <strong>Analysis</strong> <strong>to</strong> <strong>Detect</strong> and Deter <strong>Fraud</strong>PricewaterhouseCoopersMarch 2007Slide 45


Fixed Assets148.Unique General Ledger Entries149.Fixed Asset Additions <strong>Analysis</strong><strong>Using</strong> <strong>Data</strong> <strong>Analysis</strong> <strong>to</strong> <strong>Detect</strong> and Deter <strong>Fraud</strong>PricewaterhouseCoopersMarch 2007Slide 46

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