1962: The Eve of the Left Turn in China's Foreign Policy - Claude Arpi

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Committee members convened several meetings, confirming the spirit of the JanuaryMeeting, and discussing concrete forms for its implementation. Guided by this newprinciple, pragmatism reemerged in Chinese diplomacy.First, in terms of Sino-Soviet relations, the leadership was determined not only toavoid a split, but also to strive to “reach unity based on new foundations,” even “tomake [reach] unity with him [Khrushchev] and not split shamelessly.” 22 This is whyeven after several months of quarrels with the Soviet Union, including the poignantclash at the Romanian Workers Party Congress in Bucharest in June 1960 and thewithdrawal of all Soviet experts from China, the Chinese still reached anunderstanding with their Soviet ally at the Moscow Conference of 81 Communist andWorkers’ Parties in December 1960, where they agreed “to confer together on anythingthat may come up so as to avoid conflict.” 23 Bilateral relations further improved afterChairman Liu Shaoqi made a follow-up state visit to the Soviet Union. By 1961Moscow had again decided to transfer to China advanced military technology, such asequipment for producing the MiG 21 fighter jets. 24One of the key adjustments in Chinese foreign policy was the effort to defusetensions along the Sino-Indian border. With the rebellion in Tibet and the rise of borderskirmishes, Sino-Indian relations had deteriorated dramatically during 1959. Indianpolicy, Chinese leaders believed, had severely weakened China’s security and thatNew Delhi was using the border conflicts to coordinate its policy with the West’s“anti-China tide.” Operating under these assumptions, Beijing decided to strike backfirmly. However, after August border clash, the PRC leadership did not want itsrelations with India to deteriorate further, nor did it allow the Sino-Indian borderconflict to become the focal point of the policy agenda. The Politburo decided on 8September to try to resolve the conflict through negotiation. 25Two days before the 8 September Politburo meeting, Beijing briefed Moscow on22 Ibid., p. 241.23 “huigu yu sikao—yu zhongsu guanxi qinlizhe de duihua” (Retrospect and Reflection: A Dialogue with Witnessesof Sino-Soviet Relations), in Beijing yu mosike: cong lianmeng zouxiang duikang (Beijing and Moscow: fromAlliance to Antagonism), p. 474.24 Zhou Enlai nianpu (A Chronology of Zhou Enlai), Vol. 2, pp. 389-390.25 Shinian lunzhan (A Decade of Polemics), Vol. 1, pp. 210-12.10
the Sino-Indian border conflict. However, the day after the Politburo meeting, theSoviet news agency TASS issued a statement declaring that Moscow did not approveof the Beijing’s policy. Chinese leaders were startled by this action and concluded thatit was an effort by Moscow to “present Eisenhower a gift” and “to please Americanimperialism.” 26 As a result, Mao Zedong decided to stop public discussion of theborder issues with India, and directed the media to cease any related reports. 27At its meeting in January 1960, the Standing Committee of the Politburo adoptedguidelines for the peaceful resolution of the dispute with India and proposed that thePRC reach a compromise through “mutual understanding and mutual concession”(huliang hurang). The Politburo also decided that Zhou Enlai would visit New Delhi tonegotiate in person. 28 Meanwhile, Chinese troops stationed along the Sino-Indianborder were ordered to adopt policies designed to avoid armed clashes, such as notopening fire, patrolling, hunting, military exercises, and explosions or chasing rebelswithin twenty kilometers of the effective line of control on the Chinese side. 29In preparation for the visit to India, Zhou Enlai worked out The ProposalConcerning the Border Issue Meeting between the Premiers of China and India (Draft).Zhou anticipated that the visit to India would not solve the problems completely, butthat the negotiations would not break down. The most likely result would be a limitedagreement of some kind. Zhou suggested that the PRC try to defuse the tensions whilenot being afraid of a delayed resolution. China, Zhou continued, should also set as thegoal of the visit to further ease bilateral relations and prepare the conditions forcontinued meetings and a peaceful resolution of the border issues in the future. 30 Otherparty leaders agreed with Zhou Enlai’s suggestions. His visit to India 19 to 26 Aprilproved that Beijing’s assessments were basically correct. Sino-Indian relationstemporarily improved, and the tension along the border eased.26 “sugong lindao tong women fenqi de youlai yu fazhan” (The Origins and Development of the Differencesbetween the Soviet Leaders and Us), September 6, 1963, in Guanyu gongchan zhuyi yundong zongluxian delunzhan (The Polemics Concerning the General Guidelines of the International Communist Movement), Beijing:Renmin chubanshe, 1965, p. 71.27 Shinian lunzhan (A Decade of Polemics), Vol. 1, p. 215.28 Inbid., p. 248.29 Lei Yingfu and Chen Xianyi. Tongshuaibu canmou de zhuihuai (The Reminiscence of a Staff Member of theCommander Office) (Nanjing: Jiangsu wenyi chubanshe, 1994): 219.30 Zhou Enlai nianpu (A Chronology of Zhou Enla), Vol.2, p. 302.11
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1962: The Eve of the Left Turn in China's Foreign Policy - Claude Arpi

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