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1962: The Eve of the Left Turn in China's Foreign Policy - Claude Arpi

1962: The Eve of the Left Turn in China's Foreign Policy - Claude Arpi

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developed <strong>in</strong> early <strong>1962</strong>. Those border <strong>in</strong>cidents were not <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong> causes that forcedMao Zedong to shift foreign policy.In June <strong>1962</strong>, <strong>the</strong> Kennedy Adm<strong>in</strong>istration, through <strong>the</strong> ambassadorial talks <strong>in</strong>Warsaw, <strong>in</strong>dicated to <strong>the</strong> Ch<strong>in</strong>ese side that <strong>the</strong> U.S. did not <strong>in</strong>tend to support <strong>the</strong>Taiwan government <strong>in</strong> attempt<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>in</strong>vade <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>land. 86 Without support from <strong>the</strong>U.S., Taipei’s military actions could only be very limited. <strong>The</strong> Yili Incident <strong>in</strong> X<strong>in</strong>jiangwas ma<strong>in</strong>ly resolved through diplomatic channels, and at least before November <strong>of</strong>that year, did not lead to a dramatic deterioration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> situation along <strong>the</strong> border with<strong>the</strong> Soviet Union, nor was it a major factor for <strong>the</strong> later deterioration <strong>in</strong> relationsbetween <strong>the</strong> two countries. 87Ch<strong>in</strong>ese leaders came to acknowledge that besides <strong>the</strong> provocations from <strong>the</strong>Soviet side, certa<strong>in</strong> policies <strong>of</strong> Ch<strong>in</strong>a should be reviewed and improved. 88 Generallyspeak<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong> American military <strong>in</strong>tervention <strong>in</strong> Indoch<strong>in</strong>a was seen as an <strong>in</strong>directthreat to Ch<strong>in</strong>ese security, though it became much more severe later. In July <strong>1962</strong>Ch<strong>in</strong>a and <strong>the</strong> U.S. even reached an agreement to peacefully resolve <strong>the</strong> Laotian issue.<strong>Eve</strong>n <strong>the</strong> border dispute with <strong>the</strong> Indians, which escalated <strong>in</strong>to a large-scale militaryconflict <strong>in</strong> October <strong>1962</strong>, was <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> eyes <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Ch<strong>in</strong>ese leaders limited andmanageable. “<strong>The</strong> Propaganda Outl<strong>in</strong>e Concern<strong>in</strong>g <strong>The</strong> End <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> S<strong>in</strong>o-Indian BorderConflict and <strong>the</strong> Issue <strong>of</strong> S<strong>in</strong>o-Indian Relations” (Guanyu jiesu zhongy<strong>in</strong> bianjiechongtu he zhongy<strong>in</strong> guanxi wenti de xuanchuan tigang), which was distributed by <strong>the</strong>CCP Central Committee when <strong>the</strong> military conflict with India ended, showed thatCh<strong>in</strong>ese decision-makers believed that <strong>the</strong> crisis had passed and <strong>the</strong>y could seekopportunities to reopen peace talks with <strong>the</strong> Indians, as well as cont<strong>in</strong>ue to pushforward various k<strong>in</strong>ds <strong>of</strong> domestic efforts. 89If <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>cidents that happened dur<strong>in</strong>g this period had any impact on Ch<strong>in</strong>eseforeign policy, it was ma<strong>in</strong>ly to create a political atmosphere <strong>in</strong> Ch<strong>in</strong>a that made <strong>the</strong>86 Kenneth T. Young, Negotiat<strong>in</strong>g with <strong>the</strong> Ch<strong>in</strong>ese Communists (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968): 250-51.87 For a detailed <strong>in</strong>troduction to <strong>the</strong> negotiations concern<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>cident, see Wang Taip<strong>in</strong>g, ed., Zhonghua renm<strong>in</strong>gongheguo waijiaoshi (<strong>The</strong> Diplomatic History <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> People’s Republic <strong>of</strong> Ch<strong>in</strong>a), Vol. 2 (Beij<strong>in</strong>g: Shijie zhishi,1998): 247-48.88 Zhou Enlai nianpu, Vol.2, p. 475.89 Zhonghua renm<strong>in</strong> gongheguo shilu, Vol.2, pp. 770-71.30

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