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Résumés du XXXIIIe Congrès International de droit et de santé ...

Résumés du XXXIIIe Congrès International de droit et de santé ...

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Criminal Responsibility and Ethics: The Relevance of Susan Wolf’s Account ofSanityGerben Meynen, Tilburg University (g.meynen@utv.nl)Different jurisdictions may have different legal approaches to the insanity <strong>de</strong>fense, y<strong>et</strong> they allreflect the same <strong>et</strong>hical intuition that mental disor<strong>de</strong>rs may excuse a person for a crime. And, asit appears, they all have their advantages as well as disadvantages. In this presentation I willconsi<strong>de</strong>r the possibility of a m<strong>et</strong>a<strong>et</strong>hics-based approach to legal insanity. The philosopher SusanWolf has argued that people can only be consi<strong>de</strong>red fully responsible for their actions when theyare sane. In this presentation I explore the relevance of Wolf’s account of (in)sanity forpsychiatric assessments of criminal responsibility (Meynen, 2012). I argue that, although somerevisions of her account are required, it could be helpful to forensic psychiatric practice. I alsodiscuss some limitations of such a m<strong>et</strong>a<strong>et</strong>hics-based approach to insanity.Delusions and Criminal ResponsibilitySusanna Radovic, University of Gothenburg (susanna@filosofi.gu.se)How and when should a false perception of reality exempt someone from legal responsibility?According to most criminal laws, a person can have criminal intent, but if he has a false view ofthe world, he may still not be held accountable for his <strong>de</strong>eds. An example from a new Swedishgovernmental report (SOU 2012:17) is that a person who believes he is in war (but is in fact not)and kills someone (a real person) should not be punished.However, this concept of false beliefs is not capricious; most jurisdictions (including theSwedish proposed law) use the criteria that the false perception of reality should be <strong>du</strong>e to amental disor<strong>de</strong>r. This presupposes that there is an important difference b<strong>et</strong>ween false beliefs in apsychiatric context and “non-psychiatric” false beliefs. The standard <strong>de</strong>finition from the DSM-IVis that a <strong>de</strong>lusion is a false belief that is held with unusual conviction and that is not ordinarilyaccepted by other members of the person's culture or subculture. This <strong>de</strong>finition raises severaldifficulties. There are examples of <strong>de</strong>lusions that do not me<strong>et</strong> all of these criteria (e.g., <strong>de</strong>lusionsneed not be false, and they can be shared by several people). There are also kinds of i<strong>de</strong>as that dome<strong>et</strong> these criteria, but are not normally viewed as <strong>de</strong>lusions (e.g., some i<strong>de</strong>as that aremaintained by religious or cultural subgroups).Here, I will present different ways of <strong>de</strong>fining <strong>de</strong>lusions in the psychiatric sense, and discusstheir usefulness when it comes to assessing accountability in a legal context.The Principle of Responsibility in Healthcare Prioritizations23

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