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Penn Philosophical Perspectivesnot always push us to vengeance, but they tend in that directionby desiring the harm of the perpetrator, in effect asserting moralcommon expression of equality-based self-respect, it is not anappropriate one. perpetrator’s repentance rather than his suffering. If the perpetratorrepents, he acknowledges that his prior assertion of moralsuperiority was mistaken, and admits that he and the victim aremoral equals (at the very least). This in effect removes the fac-a claim of moral inequality can be caused by inanimate objectsor animals without engendering any sort of resentment that onefeelings miss the point, unless the purpose in causing harm tothe perpetrator is to secure his repentance, to “make him sorry.”This is only one variety of vindictiveness (we are often vindictivewithout regard to the perpetrator’s repentance), and even sorepentance-oriented vindictiveness ought to be just one weaponin one’s repentance-oriented arsenal, which for example oughtalso to include moral instruction to allow the perpetrator to seethe error of his ways. Indeed, moral instruction would seemto be a more effective tool than punishment because punishmentcreates an external incentive to repent (namely, wantingthe punishment to stop) that may weaken the purity and sincer--then, should be at most a second option to moral instruction if itis motivated by equality-based self-respect.January 2010 ness,though, we must make sure that equality-based self-respecthave any obvious, serious negative consequences, so it wouldappear not to be a vice, meaning that vindictiveness based uponthat either equality-based self-respect or vindictiveness basedon it are virtuous, since this brand of self-respect may fall intothe neutral category of feelings and passions, worthy of neithercensure nor praise. I contend that it is at best minimallypraiseworthy, and certainly not the most praiseworthy form ofself-respect.For a disposition such as equality-based self-respect to bepraiseworthy, it must tend to push one toward laudable outlooksor behaviors. This it does in general terms; a respect for oneselfas the moral equal of others goes hand-in-hand with a respectfor others as the moral equals of oneself, which is a preconditionfor ethical behavior toward others. However, thinkingof one’s own moral agency in comparison with that of othersmuch of an autonomous moral agent as those around me, I willalso assume that what is morally right for others is also morallyright for me (since we are moral equals, with equal responsibilities).I will thus take very seriously the moral reasoning ofothers in deciding how I should act myself. I will not imitateothers whom I believe to be acting immorally, of course, butif I see broad patterns of behavior among those around me Imay assume that those patterns of behavior are typical of moralI am concerned that this sort of reasoning may lead one to adoptothers’ moral codes without seriously considering whether theymatch one’s own instincts. The idea that we are moral equalstoo quickly becomes the idea that, as moral equals, there is onemoral system that works for all of us. Thinking of oneself as themoral equal of others can thus dull the impetus to make deci-esand errors become easily entrenched, and the full complexityof moral dilemmas is often obscured by the dominance of aenceof one’s own moral instincts insidiously undermines one’sown moral autonomy. tonomy,rather than on how that autonomy compares with themoral decision-making of others, is therefore a more virtu-maturation developed by the psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg,as described by Carol Gilligan in In a Different Voice-etalvalues and constructs moral principles that are universalown moral instincts take precedence over the moral reasoningingdecisions in the same way, what matters about this sort ofdecision-making is its independence, rather than its equalitywith others. If one’s autonomy is limited, one ought merely torespond in a way that preserves and maintains one’s autonomy,without concern for the moral autonomy or authority claimedown moral instinct, then it does not particularly matter whetherershurts this sort of self-respect because it shows that one’smoral instincts do not always govern the decisions that decideone’s fate, and indeed sometimes are powerless to govern them.Thus, autonomy-based self-respect also induces an emo- should be directed at establishing one’s own moral autonomyrather than equating it to that of others. Sarah, a woman interviewedby Gilligan who faces a complicated abortion decision,vidualworth:I am suddenly beginning to realize that the thingsI like to do, the things I am interested in, and thethings that I believe and the kind of person I am,are not so bad that I have to constantly be sittingon the shelf and letting it gather dust. I am a lot17 18
more worthwhile than my past actions have ledothers to believe. (quoted in Gilligan 93; emphasisadded)Sarah’s sense of the importance of her own beliefs andinstincts is independent of how others regard her, and indeedis developed in contrast to it. She thinks of herself as more ofan autonomous moral agent, more worthwhile than others thinkof her, and it seems not to concern her that others do not seeher as she sees herself. Sarah’s self-respect thus derives fromthe knowledge that she has taken responsibility for acting accordingto her own moral instincts, and so behavior undertakenwith this knowledge, rather than vengeance per se, will have theeffect of reinforcing her self-worth. Thus Sarah ends a dehu-her own moral autonomy, but she does so according to her own -ingwith her lover’s needs ‘as best I can without compromisingmy own.’” (Gilligan 95) Sarah sees this as acting in a “decent,because she considers it the moral thing to do, because beingvindictive breakup from a bad lover is twice over an assertionof her moral autonomy.This suggests that we can develop autonomy-based selfrespectsimply by placing an emphasis on morality in our livesand taking responsibility for the morality of our actions. If so,then it is hard to imagine autonomy-based self-respect hav- it is quite likely that I will want others to be autonomous aswell. This ensures that I will treat others as my equals in moral respect without the drawbacks, autonomy-based self-respectthe equality-based version more strongly, I think, but this onlymeans we should work to cultivate the autonomy-based version. may arise from this sort of self-respect when harming the perpetratoris seen as the morally right thing to do. For example,if Sarah had been committed to a retributivist morality insteadlover in as painful a way as possible. This then would be oneform of vindictiveness arising out of respect for the moral order,the other option for grounding virtuous vindictiveness identi-or for other reasons) to a vision of the moral order that calls forthe punishment of its violators, then one will feel urges to punishviolators. a vision of the moral order that includes vengeance. I haveshown that vindictiveness based on equality-based self-respect,January 2010Penn Philosophical Perspectivesreasoning unless it is aimed at securing repentance, and eventhen equality-based self-respect is not in itself virtuous. Rely-assumes that it is part of the moral order, so some further basisvideany reason to consider vindictiveness moral, but there maybe reasons I have not considered underlying the moral instinctsof those who do consider vindictiveness moral. In the absenceof these reasons, though, I cannot allow that there is any trulymoral outlook which vindictiveness supports, and therefore, inmy view, vindictiveness (which in the abstract tends to causeharm) ought not be a part of our moral decision-making.However, equality-based self-respect and the vindictivenessthat derives from it are effectively facts of human nature.the other hand, if we are interested in becoming more moral,we should work to develop an autonomy-based sense of selfrespect,which in all likelihood will reduce our vindictive desires(unless our moral instincts are strongly retributivist). It isingit as such may lead to the cheap forgiveness that concernsrespect or sense of morality because it is given without regardfor either oneself or one’s morals. Rather, when one has developeda healthy and proper sense of self-respect that does notdepend upon the moral lives of others, vindictive urges will inall likelihood vanish on their own.Works CitedGilligan, Carol. In a Different VoiceHarvard UP, 1982.Getting Eventice.jpgFor details on submissions,how to get involved, oradvertising, please visit:www.ppperspectives.org18
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