Penn Philosophical Perspectives - University of Pennsylvania

fends his line of reasoning based upon his understanding of theDiscourse byasserting that “the most widely accepted and meaningful notionwe have of God is expressed well enough in these words,-was so prevalent during his time. He holds that “there are severalentirely different perfections in nature, that God possessall of them together, and that each of them belongs to him inan all-knowing, all-powerful, unchanging, and perfectly goodGod, and He retains all of these attributes at the same time andthroughout all of history. The perfections of God, according toture. -different variations, in its most basic form it asserts the notiontied to his understanding of the perfection of God, and we mustGod’s existence, including His acts of creation, must follow thehold the idea that God must act perfectly in all He does. Thereason God chooses to do some things and not others is becauseHe must choose perfectly, in accordance with His nature. It isthe best of all possible worlds. our experiences in our bodies. His notion of the world includesthe entire universe, past, present, and future. His idea of theworld also includes his notion of both our lives here on earthand the idea of the after-life. Death does not end our experiencethesis that we live in the best of all possible worlds by appeal-be a reason why God created this world and not another world.nature. He must create the best of all possible worlds, because,have is to act imperfectly” (185). God cannot act imperfectly,so to act perfectly in His act of creation is to create the best ofall possible worlds. of all possible worlds comes out of the fact that evil exists inholds strong to his assertion that we live in the best of all possibleworlds. He believes that the existence of evil must be inJanuary 2010Penn Philosophical Perspectivesaccord with God’s creation of the best of all possible worlds.-best of all possible worlds. reason holds for God’s choosing to engage in an act of creation.tionthroughout all of time, including the time before the cre-be necessitated to engage in any act of creation. work Theodicy. In the Theodicycalnecessity is a thing in which the opposite thing or choice isto create is free: God is prompted to all good; the good, eventhe best, inclines him to act; but it does not compel him, forhis choice creates no impossibility in that which is distinct forthe best; it causes no implication of contradiction in that whichit is not metaphysically necessary for God to create becausethat God was morally necessitated to engage in acts of creation.He believes that “it is a moral necessity that the wisest shouldbe bound to choose the best” (270). In accordance with Hisargues that refraining from creating would reveal a lack of wis-possible worlds would not be in accordance with God’s wisdomand perfection. moral necessity is a very important one. If something is metaphysicallynecessitated, then the notion of choice does not evenenter into the picture, whereas if something is morally neces-God’s choice here is morally, but not metaphysically, neces-and wisdom. This argument employs the same line of reasoningmust involve choosing what is best, and choosing to create thebest of all possible worlds is clearly what is best. So God must,create. In order for God to remain praiseworthy, God must actationis this: that to refrain from creating would not be in linewith God’s perfection, especially in terms of His wisdom andgoodness.8