Private Equity Minority Investments - Universität St.Gallen

Chapter IV: Voice3.3.1.7 Assessment of Legal ToolFrom the PEMI’s perspective, voting shares are a suitable legal tool toenhance its voting power in general meeting decision making. Votingshares can eliminate the controlling shareholder’s absolute voting power atclosely held firms’ general meetings with stable majorities, which can leadto more balanced power sharing. 827 However, a number of caveats must beconsidered. Firstly, voting shares can complicate a target company’s capitalstructure. In the case of various share classes, the capital structure canbecome opaque, which can be negative in view of a targeted IPO. 828Secondly, voting shares may fall into undesirable hands if transferred tothird parties who may use their voting privileges to exercise querulousinfluence and destabilize the company. Thirdly, the voting privilegeassociated with voting shares is generally effective across a broad range ofdecisions and less suitable as an instrument to enhance the PEMI’s voiceconcerning particular general meeting decisions only. For these reasons,before creating voting shares, their effects must carefully be examined, alsofrom the perspective following the PEMI’s exit.To mitigate these drawbacks, the voting privileges may be limited in termsof content. For example, voting privileges can be fully or partly suspendedwith regard to resolutions to be defined by stipulating majority voterequirements based purely on capital or based on both votes and capital. 829Voting privileges can also be made subject to time limits. 830 In view of thePEMI’s exit plans, an undesirable distribution of votes ex post can beavoided by inserting appropriate restrictions on the transferability of sharesin the articles of association or by granting the non-transferring share-827For this reason, the proposal that some legal voices have made to abolish voting shares isrejected by this author. Equally arguing against abolishing voting shares, BÖCKLI/HUGUENIN/DESSEMONTET, p. 157; HOFSTETTER, Corporate Governance Report, p. 27 (“The marketsuccess of heterogeneous capital structures gives strong reason to suspect that the differentvoting rights for capital investors may be an efficient solution.”); BURKHALTER, Einheitsaktien,p. 42 et seq. (“Es würde schlicht dem liberalen Geist der von einer hohenprivatautonomen Dispositionsfreiheit geprägten Grundordnung des schweizerischen Aktienrechtswidersprechen, wollte man den Spielraum der Titelstrukturgestaltung mit einemsolchen Erfordernis derart massiv beschränken.”); RUFFNER, Grundlagen, p. 538 (“Die in derPraxis zu findende Vielfalt legt vielmehr den Schluss nahe, dass optimale Kapital- undStimmrechtsstrukturen von den spezifischen Charakteristiken der einzelnen Gesellschaftabhängig sind.”); RUFFNER, Aktive Grossaktionäre, p. 269. In favor of abolishing de legeferenda is AMSTUTZ, Macht und Ohnmacht, p. 95. The abolition of voting shares is currentlynot part of the ongoing revision of corporate law.828Cf. also WEBER, Rechtsprobleme, p. 56.829See GERSTER, p. 165 et seq.830See in detail GERSTER, p. 14 et seq., 165 et seq.141