A Jailhouse Lawyer's Manual Chapter 14 - Columbia Law School

concerning motions made under the caption of a criminal prosecution addressing conditions
of confinement related to the prosecution. 46
The filing fees provisions apply only to “prisoners,” whom the statute defines as “any
person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for,
or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of
parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program.” 47 This includes pretrial
detainees as well as military prisoners, 48 prisoners in privately operated prisons and jails, 49
juvenile facilities, 50 and “halfway houses,” or drug treatment programs that the person is
confined in as a result of a criminal charge or conviction. 51 Persons incarcerated as a result of
civil proceedings are not prisoners under the PLRA, 52 except that such persons who are
that a motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(e) for the return of seized property is a civil
action); Lefkowitz v. Citi-Equity Group, 146 F.3d 609, 612 (8th Cir. 1998) (“[W]e conclude that, under
the plain language of [PLRA], the phrase ‘civil action or appeal’ is not limited to challenges to
conditions of confinement, and encompasses the instant commercial litigation.”); Pena v. United States,
122 F.3d 3, 4 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that a motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(e) for
the return of seized property is a “civil action” subject to the PLRA filing fee requirements).
46. In United States v. Lopez, 327 F. Supp. 2d 138, 140–42 (D.P.R. 2004), the court held that a
motion challenging placement in administrative segregation after the government decided to seek the
death penalty against the defendant was not a civil action, and granted relief. In another case raising
the same issue, the court made a similar statement but ultimately disposed of the matter by holding
that the motion was properly treated as a habeas corpus proceeding to which the PLRA is inapplicable.
United States v. Catalan-Roman, 329 F. Supp. 2d 240, 250–51 (D.P.R. 2004). In United States v.
Hashmi, No. 06 Cr. 442 (LAP), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3801, at *19–24 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2008)
(unpublished), the court held that a motion in a criminal case contesting “Special Administrative
Measures” affecting communication between the defendant and his counsel was not an “action,” a term
that it defined to mean a separate proceeding, and plaintiff need not exhaust administrative remedies.
Other decisions are to the contrary, holding that motions challenging SAMs or other pretrial jail
restrictions must be exhausted. See U.S. v. Khan, 540 F. Supp. 2d 344, 349–52 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). This
court seems to confuse PLRA and habeas exhaustion requirements. An appellate decision holds that a
motion in a long-completed criminal case challenging a prison policy forbidding prisoners from
retaining possession of pre-sentence reports should have been treated as a separate civil action and
that it required exhaustion. United States v. Antonelli, 371 F.3d 360, 361 (7th Cir. 2004).
47. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b) (2006) (requiring prisoners to pay a filing fee); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915
(h) (2006) (defining “prisoner”).
48. Marrie v. Nickels, 70 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1262 (D. Kan. 1999) (finding PLRA applies to
military prisoners).
49. See Roles v. Maddox, 439 F.3d 1016, 1017–18 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 232
(2006); Boyd v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 380 F.3d 989, 993–94 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 920
(2005); Ross v. County of Bernalillo, 365 F.3d 1181, 1184 (10th Cir. 2004); Lodholz v. Puckett, No. 03-C-
0350-C, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27493, at *4–5 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 24, 2003) (unpublished) (all holding the
PLRA exhaustion requirement applicable to persons held in private prisons).
50. Christina A. ex rel. Jennifer A. v. Bloomberg, 315 F.3d 990, 994–95 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding
attorneys’ fees provisions apply to juveniles); Alexander S. v. Boyd, 113 F.3d 1373, 1383–85 (4th Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1090 (1998) (same); Lewis v. Gagne, 281 F. Supp. 2d 429, 433 (N.D.N.Y.
2003) (holding exhaustion requirement applies to juveniles).
51. Jackson v. Johnson, 475 F.3d 261, 266–67 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that parolee in a halfway
house, which he could not leave without permission as a result of his criminal conviction was a
prisoner); Ruggiero v. County of Orange, 467 F.3d 170, 174–75 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding “drug treatment
campus” was a “jail, prison, or other correctional facility” under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), even though state
law said it was not a correctional facility, because that term “includes within its ambit all facilities in
which prisoners are held involuntarily as a result of violating the criminal law”); Witzke v. Femal, 376
F.3d 744, 752–53 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding “intensive drug rehabilitation halfway house” was an “other
correctional facility” under the PLRA).
52. See Michau v. Charleston County, S.C., 434 F.3d 725, 727–28 (4th Cir. 2006) (person civilly
detained pursuant to sexually violent predator statute); Perkins v. Hedricks, 340 F.3d 582, 583 (8th
Cir. 2003) (person civilly detained in prison Federal Medical Center); Kolocotronis v. Morgan, 247 F.3d