A Jailhouse Lawyer's Manual Chapter 14 - Columbia Law School

A Jailhouse Lawyer’s
Manual
Chapter 14:
The Prison Litigation Reform Act
Columbia Human Rights Law Review
8th Edition 2009

LEGAL DISCLAIMER
A Jailhouse Lawyer’s Manual is written and updated by members of the Columbia
Human Rights Law Review. The law prohibits us from providing any legal advice to
prisoners. This information is not intended as legal advice or representation nor should you
consider or rely upon it as such. Neither the JLM nor any information contained herein is
intended to or shall constitute a contract between the JLM and any reader, and the JLM
does not guarantee the accuracy of the information contained herein. Additionally, your use
of the JLM should not be construed as creating an attorney-client relationship with the JLM
staff or anyone at Columbia Law School. Finally, while we have attempted to provide
information that is up-to-date and useful, because the law changes frequently, we cannot
guarantee that all information is current.

CHAPTER 14
The Prison Litigation Reform Act *
A. Introduction
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) changes various provisions of the United
States Code that address civil rights litigation and in forma pauperis proceedings
(proceedings where you file a lawsuit as a poor person and avoid paying many of the normal
fees and costs). Overall, the PLRA is designed to make it harder for prisoners to take their
complaints to federal court. So far, the courts have not found it unconstitutional.
The purpose of this Chapter is to inform you of the provisions of the PLRA and court
decisions applying it, to offer some practical advice, and to suggest ways to defend yourself in
pro se litigation when the PLRA is raised by prison officials. Some of this advice is tentative
and may be changed, because there are important questions about the PLRA that the courts
have not yet settled. While this Chapter emphasizes decisions of New York federal courts, it
also discusses the legal effects of the PLRA across the country.
The PLRA makes it extremely important to be sure your legal claim is well founded
before you file it. Under the PLRA, even if you proceed in forma pauperis, you have to pay
the full $350 filing fee (and another $450 if you wish to appeal the court’s decision). You also
run the risk of incurring a “strike” under the PLRA’s “three strikes” provision, which says
that if you have three cases dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or failing to state a valid legal
claim, you can no longer use the in forma pauperis procedure, and will have to pay the entire
filing fee in advance without the option of paying in installments. The PLRA also imposes a
mandatory provision for exhaustion of administrative remedies. This provision says you must
file a grievance (or other appropriate administrative remedy, such as a disciplinary appeal)
and pursue all available appeals within the prison system before you can file a suit in federal
court. You have to do this even if you are suing for money damages and the grievance system
does not provide damages. These are only a few of the obstacles and restrictions the PLRA
imposes.
Part B of this Chapter discusses the PLRA’s effect on your responsibility for paying filing
fees. Part C provides an overview of the PLRA’s “three strikes” provision. Part D explains the
new requirement that forces a court to dismiss at the start of litigation any prisoner cases
that it believes are frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim, or that seek damages
from a defendant who is immune from damage claims. Part E discusses at length one of the
most important aspects of the PLRA: its requirement that you exhaust all administrative
remedies (such as prison grievance procedures) before you will be allowed into court. Part F
describes the physical injury requirement of the PLRA, which restricts you from bringing a
federal civil action for mental or emotional injury without a prior showing of physical injury.
Parts G through L briefly discuss the PLRA provisions that (1) limit the attorneys’ fees
prisoners can recover in a successful suit; (2) allow defendants in a prisoner suit not to
respond to the prisoner’s complaint unless the court tells them to do so; (3) allow for pretrial
proceedings to be conducted by telephone or video; (4) allow the court to order the loss of
earned good-time credit if it finds that your claim was filed for a malicious or harassing
purpose; (5) require that any compensatory damages awarded to a prisoner be paid directly
to satisfy any outstanding restitution orders pending against the prisoner; and (6) revise the
manner in which injunctions can be issued and maintained. 1
* This Chapter was written by John Boston of The Legal Aid Society. If you would like to learn more or
have questions about the PLRA, you are encouraged to write to The Legal Aid Society, Prisoners’
Rights Project, 199 Water Street, New York, NY, 10038.
1. Unfortunately, many significant decisions interpreting the PLRA are unreported—that is,
they do not appear in the Federal Reporter and Federal Supplement volumes available in prison law

B. Filing Fees
The PLRA requires indigent prisoners (unlike other litigants) who are granted in forma
pauperis (“IFP”) status in federal court to pay the filing fee in full or in installments, as they
have money in their prison accounts. You may wonder why you should bother seeking IFP
status if you are going to have to pay the filing fees anyway. The reason is that if you do not
proceed with IFP, you will have to pay the entire fee up front (before you can file the case).
Also, IFP litigants are eligible to have their summons and complaints served by the U.S.
Marshals Service 2 and to be excused from payment of some costs (though not fees) on
appeal. 3 Without IFP status, you will have to take care of service and pay appeal costs
yourself. 4
Prisoners seeking IFP status must submit certified statements 5 of their prison accounts
for the preceding six months. 6 This requires prison officials’ cooperation. However, failure to
submit the information on time is not cause for dismissal if it results from prison authorities’
inaction. 7 If prison officials fail or refuse to provide a certified statement, the court can order
them to do so. 8 District courts in various states have different procedures for acquiring the
certified statements. 9 You should obtain the necessary forms and instructions from the clerk
of the court in which you intend to bring suit. 10
libraries. They are available on the Lexis and Westlaw computer services. Citations like “1999 WL
12345” are Westlaw citations. Citations like “1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 19764” are Lexis citations. Some
jurisdictions do not allow you to cite to these decisions (use them to support your legal argument). For
additional important information about unpublished cases, see Chapter 2 of the JLM, “Introduction to
Legal Research.”
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (2006).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(c) (2006).
4. See JLM, Chapter 6, “An Introduction to Legal Documents” for information on necessary
documents.
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) (2006).
6. See Spaight v. Makowski, 252 F.3d 78, 79 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that the relevant time period
on appeal is six months before filing the notice of appeal, not six months before moving for in forma
pauperis status). As a practical matter, courts have accepted information supplied by prison officials
that was a little out of date. See Jackson v. Wright, No. 99 C 1294, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3487, at *1 n.2
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 10, 1999) (unpublished) (accepting statement ending the month before the complaint
was filed in light of the small amounts involved); Lam v. Clark, No 99 C 558, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1573, at
*2–3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 10, 1999) (unpublished) (accepting account information ending three and a half
weeks before the filing of the complaint, since there is a consistent pattern for the six months covered).
7. See Lawton v. Ortiz, No. 06-1167 (FSH), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66905, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 19,
2006) (unpublished) (granting IFP status where prisoner said officials did not respond to his requests
for an account statement and other evidence showed he was indigent). In addition, delay in submitting
the financial information will not cause prisoners to miss the statute of limitations as long as the
complaint itself is submitted in time. See Garrett v. Clarke, 147 F.3d 745, 746 (8th Cir. 1998) (“For
purposes of the statute of limitations, the filing of a complaint commences a federal cause of action ... .
[T]he prisoner should be allowed to file the complaint, and then supply a prison account statement
within a reasonable time.”) (citations omitted).
8. See Stinnett v. Cook County Med. Staff, No. 99 C 1696, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4605, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 19, 1999) (unpublished) (requiring prison officials to send a certified copy of prisoner’s financial
statement to the court).
9. In the New York federal courts, for example, three of the four district courts (the Southern,
Eastern, and Northern Districts) obtain the certified statement directly from prison officials; prisoner
plaintiffs must submit a form to the court authorizing the disclosure of this information and the
payment of the fee from their prison accounts. In the Western District of New York, prisoners must
sign such an authorization and must also obtain, as part of their IFP application, certification from the
prison of their funds. The prison should include in the certification the average balances for the
preceding six months.
10. The addresses of the federal district courts (organized by Circuit) are provided in Appendix I
of the JLM.

Prisoners who are granted IFP status now must pay the entire fee for filing either a
complaint or an appeal11 in installments according to the following formula:
(b)(1) ... The court shall assess and, when funds exist, collect, as a
partial payment of any court fees required by law, an initial partial
filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of—
(A) the average monthly deposits to the prisoner’s account; or
(B) the average monthly balance in the prisoner’s account for the
6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint or
notice of appeal.
(2) After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner shall be
required to make monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding
month’s income credited to the prisoner’s account. The agency having
custody of the prisoner shall forward payments from the prisoner’s
account to the clerk of the court each time the amount in the account
exceeds $10 until the filing fees are paid. 12
Your case should not be dismissed if you cannot pay the initial fee. The statute says that
the initial fee is to be collected “when funds exist,” and it adds that prisoners shall not be
prohibited from bringing suit or appealing a judgment because they cannot pay. 13 A case
should not be dismissed for nonpayment without first determining if the prisoner has had
the opportunity to pay and has taken the steps within his own control to make the
payment. 14 However, if you intentionally do not pay, or if you fail to take the necessary steps
to pay, your case is likely to be dismissed. 15 Prisoners generally may not be prohibited from
bringing an action because they owe fees from a prior action. 16 However, one federal circuit
has held that prisoners who seek to evade payment of filing fees dishonestly or who fail to
11. The fee for filing a federal court civil complaint is $350.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (2006). For
appeals, there is a $450.00 filing fee (effective November 1, 2003). See U.S. Courts, Federal Court Fees,
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/fedcourtfees/courtappealsfee_January2007.pdf (last visited Nov. 8,
2008).
12. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(b)(1)–(2) (2006).
13. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (2006); see Taylor v. Delatoor, 281 F.3d 844, 850–51 (9th Cir. 2002) (a
prisoner who cannot pay the initial fee must be allowed to proceed with his case and not merely be
granted more time to pay).
14. Redmond v. Gill, 352 F.3d 801, 804 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that district court abused its
discretion in dismissing a case when plaintiff failed to return an authorization form for payment of fees
within 20 days, and requiring plaintiff be given more time); Hatchett v. Unknown Nettles, 201 F.3d
651, 652 (5th Cir. 2000) (“[I]t is an abuse of discretion for a district court to dismiss an action for failure
to comply with an initial partial filing fee order without making some inquiry regarding whether the
prisoner has complied with the order by submitting any required consent forms within the time allowed
for compliance.”); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 607–08 (6th Cir. 1997) (“[A] case may not be
dismissed when the payment of an assessment has been delayed by prison officials. A prisoner cannot
be penalized when prison officials fail to promptly pay an assessment.”); Beyer v. Cormier, 235 F.3d
1039, 1041 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that the court should have communicated with prison officials or
granted an extension of payment deadline). But see Cosby v. Meadors, 351 F.3d. 1324, 1332–33 (10th
Cir. 2003) (holding that a court that issued repeated orders to show cause with opportunities for
plaintiff to document that he had tried to pay had done enough and no hearing was necessary before
dismissal).
15. See Cosby v. Meadors, 351 F.3d. 1324, 1332–33 (10th Cir. 2003) (affirming dismissal of case
where plaintiff said he could not pay the fees but had spent his money on other items); Jackson v. N.P.
Dodge Realty Co., 173 F. Supp. 2d 951, 952 (D. Neb. 2001) (rejecting prisoner’s claim where he was
clearly able to pay).
16. Walp v. Scott, 115 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. 1997).

pay fees incurred because they are subject to the “three strikes” provision 17 can be denied in
forma pauperis status or barred outright from filing. 18
If you lose a case, a federal court may decide to charge you with the costs of the lawsuit. 19
Courts are not required to make awards of costs against indigent prisoners; instead, they
have discretion to assess or not assess costs against them. 20 But, if a court decides to assess
costs, you cannot appeal that decision. 21
No exceptions to the fee requirement exist, and the court has no authority to defer
payment until after your release. 22 You must pay these filing fees even if your case is
dismissed immediately, if you fail to submit the necessary financial information, 23 or if
mistakes by the lower court make an appeal necessary. 24 You cannot get the fee back by
voluntarily withdrawing the complaint or appeal. 25 Once the case is filed, you owe the fee
(though in some courts the case may not actually be filed until and unless financial
information is submitted). Prison officials must keep collecting fees if you remain within
their legal custody, even if you are transferred to another jurisdiction. 26 They are required to
prioritize these fees over other deductions. 27
Filing fee payments are to be calculated based on all money the prisoner receives (not
just prison wages), and deductions may not be made for money spent on legal copies and
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2006). See next section for further discussion.
18. Campbell v. Clarke, 481 F.3d 967, 969–70 (7th Cir. 2007); Sloan v. Lesza, 181 F.3d 857, 859
(7th Cir. 1999). However, a recent decision held that a prisoner who is subject to the “three strikes”
provision of the PLRA and who has not paid filing fees owed from prior suits cannot be barred from
filing under the “imminent danger of serious physical injury” exception to that provision. Miller v.
Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1096–97 (11th Cir. 2008). For more information on the “three strikes” provision,
see Part C of this Chapter.
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2) (2006). In one recent case, a prisoner was assessed $7989.90 in costs
and $15,750 in attorneys’ fees. See Sanders v. Seabold, No. 98-5470, 188 F.3d 509, 509, 1999 U.S. App.
LEXIS 19764, at *3 (6th Cir. Aug. 13, 1999) (unpublished).
20. Feliciano v. Selsky, 205 F.3d 568, 572 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting “the ability of a court to require,
as a matter of discretion, that the indigent prisoner pay the costs, or some part of them”).
21. Whitfield v. Scully, 241 F.3d 264, 272–73 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[T]he 1996 amendments to § 1915
have undercut the ability of prisoners to appeal an award of costs on the ground of indigency”).
22. Ippolito v. Buss, 293 F. Supp. 2d 881, 883 (N.D. Ind. 2003).
23. See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 605 (6th Cir. 1997) (warning that failure to pay
fees or to provide necessary affidavit of indigency or trust account statement may eventually result in
dismissal of case); Robbins v. Switzer, 104 F.3d 895, 897 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[W]hen a prisoner does not
adhere to the statutory system, a court may dismiss the appeal without regard to his ability (or
inability) to pay.”); Leonard v. Lacy, 88 F.3d 181, 186 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[W]e will apply the PLRA to
impose any required obligation for filing fees (subject to installment payments) upon all prisoners who
seek to appeal civil judgments without prepayment of fees. That obligation will be imposed prior to any
assessment of the frivolousness of the appeal.”).
24. Lebron v. Russo, 263 F.3d 38, 42 (2d Cir. 2001) (refusing to grant an exception to filing fee
requirement even where plaintiff had to re-file due to a judicial error in the first filing).
25. Goins v. Decaro, 241 F.3d 260, 261 (2d Cir. 2001) (“The PLRA makes no provision for return
of fees partially paid or for cancellation of the remaining indebtedness in the event that an appeal is
withdrawn.”).
26. Beese v. Liebe, 153 F. Supp. 2d 967, 970 (E.D. Wis. 2001) (holding state officials obligated “to
put into place procedures for continuing the collection of the filing fees ... . The payments do not stop,
nor are they even temporarily placed on hold, just because the Secretary has chosen to send [the
prisoners] out-of-state.”) (citation omitted). See generally Hall v. Stone, 170 F.3d 706, 708 (7th Cir.
1999) (“Custodians must remit as ordered under § 1915 without regard to the prisoner’s wishes.”).
27. Smith v. Huibregtse, 151 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1043 (E.D. Wis. 2001) (finding “funds exist within
the meaning of the PLRA whenever a prisoner has funds or receives income and prison officials must
give payment of federal court filing fees priority”).

postage. 28 The twenty percent monthly payment is to be made separately for each case. The
Second Circuit has held that only one fee and one award of costs are to be collected at a time,
so a prisoner will never be required to pay more than forty percent of his income. 29 Other
courts have held that all fees are to be collected at the same time. 30
In class actions, only the prisoners who signed the complaint or notice of appeal are
responsible for payment of fees. 31 In cases involving multiple plaintiffs, the courts have
disagreed about payment of filing fees. One federal appeals court held that “each prisoner
should be proportionally liable for any fees and costs that may be assessed. Thus, any fees
and costs that the district court ... may impose shall be equally divided among all the
prisoners.” 32 Another appeals court has held that multiple prisoners joining similar claims in
a single suit not only must each pay a filing fee, but also must each file a separate
complaint. 33 More recently, another federal appeals court has agreed that each prisoner
plaintiff must pay the full filing fee, but need not file a separate complaint. 34
28. Rutledge v. Romero, No. 99 C 3453, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9021, at *2–5 (N.D. Ill. June 3,
1999) (unpublished) (establishing that funds calculation is based on all money in account, including
money from third parties and money intended for legal communication). Courts have disagreed
whether money that is withheld from a prisoner’s income and held until release should be counted in
calculating the fees or used to pay the fees. Compare Cardew v. Gord, 26 F. App’x 48, 2001 U.S. App.
LEXIS 24268, at *3 (2d Cir. 2001) (unpublished) (upholding district court decision that “lag pay” should
not be used for filing fees), with Spence v. McCaughtrey, 46 F. Supp. 2d 861, 862–63 (E.D. Wis. 1999)
(holding prisoner’s “release account” was a “prisoner’s account” under the statute and should be used
for filing fees purposes).
29. Whitfield v. Scully, 241 F.3d 264, 278 (2d Cir. 2001) (“28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2) permits the
recoupment of up to 40 percent of a prisoner's monthly income at any given time—20 percent for filing
fees under § 1915(b) and an additional 20 percent for costs under § 1915(f).”); see also Lafauci v.
Cunningham, 139 F. Supp. 2d 144, 147 (D. Mass. 2001) (stating that simultaneous collection of fees
depriving prisoners of all resources could “raise serious constitutional concerns”).
30. Lefkowitz v. Citi-Equity Group, 146 F.3d 609, 612 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding 20% assessment
rate applies in every case); see also Miller v. Lincoln County, 171 F.3d 595, 596 (8th Cir. 1999)
(declining to reduce monthly payments for prisoner with multiple cases).
31. Talley-Bey v. Knebl, 168 F.3d 884, 887 (6th Cir. 1999) (“[I]n cases involving class actions, ...
the responsibility of paying the required fees and costs rests with the prisoner or prisoners who signed
the complaint ... . [O]n appeal, the prisoner or prisoners signing the notice of appeal are obligated to
pay all appellate fees and costs.”).
32. In re Prison Litigation Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131, 1138 (6th Cir. 1997). One lower court has
taken a different approach to dividing the filing fee, holding that “the filing fee obligation is joint and
several. If the parties pay the entire fee, they may divide it up between them as they see fit and it is of
no concern to the court. When the parties do not pay the entire fee, all are obligated for the entire
amount of the filing fee until it has been paid in full, even if the burden falls on a few of them
unequally.” Alcala v. Woodford, No. C 02-0072 TEH (pr), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9504, at *2–3 (N.D.
Cal. May 21, 2002) (unpublished).
Consistent with this view, another court held in a multi-plaintiff action that the lead plaintiff, who
had three strikes, was liable for the $350 filing fee up front, but observed that the other plaintiffs did
not file IFP applications and presumably could “pool their resources and pay the fees.” Hartsfield v.
Iowa Dep’t of Corr., No. CO6-3082-LRR, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 695, at *1 (N.D. Iowa Jan. 3, 2007)
(unpublished); see also Stewart v. Missouri Dep’t of Corr., No. 7-4080-CV-C-NKL, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 70221, at *4 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 21, 2007) (unpublished) (assessing initial fees against each of
multiple plaintiffs, noting that payment of those amounts would exceed the full amount of the filing fee,
and directing payment of the full fee within 30 days).
33. Hubbard v. Haley, 262 F.3d 1194, 1197 (11th Cir. 2001). Hubbard said that the clear
language of the PLRA requires each prisoner to bring a separate suit. We cannot find anything in the
PLRA that says that. However, a number of other courts have adopted Hubbard’s holding. See Caputo
v. Belmar Municipality & County, No. 08-1975 (MLC), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36883, at *5–6 (D.N.J.
May 2, 2008) (unpublished); Kron v. Cook, No. H-07-4054, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4687, at *1 (S.D. Tex.
Jan. 23, 2008) (unpublished); Lilly v. Ozmint, No. 2:07-1700-JFA-RSC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49153, at
*2 (D.S.C. July 11, 2007) (unpublished); Osterloth v. Hopwood, No. CV 06-152-M-JCL, 2006 U.S. Dist.

These latter two holdings appear contrary to the recent Supreme Court decision in Jones
v. Bock, 35 which held that courts should not interpret the exhaustion requirement to depart
from the usual procedural practices except to the extent that the PLRA actually says to do
so. 36 The usual practice is to allow plaintiffs to file joint complaints under Rule 20 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and to our knowledge, only one filing fee is usually required
when multiple plaintiffs join in the same complaint. 37
The joinder rules also permit plaintiffs to sue multiple defendants and bring multiple
claims in the same lawsuit, but only as long as the injuries all arise out of the same
“transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences” and when there is “any
question of law or fact common to all defendants.” 38 Those rules have sometimes been
enforced loosely. However, some courts are now heavily enforcing the joinder rules against
prisoners so they cannot pay a single filing fee to litigate claims that strictly speaking call for
separate complaints and payments. 39
Constitutional challenges to the filing fees provisions have been unsuccessful. The
provisions have been held not to violate the right of access to courts, the First Amendment,
the Equal Protection Clause, the Due Process Clause, and other constitutional provisions. 40
LEXIS 83461, at *2–3 (D. Mont. Nov. 15, 2006) (unpublished); Sharif v. Dallas County, No. 3:06-CV-
0143-K ECF, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73756, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 5, 2006) (unpublished).
34. Boriboune v. Berge, 391 F.3d 852, 854–56 (7th Cir. 2004); see Suarez v. A1, No. 06-2782
(JBS), U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93720, at *11–13 (D.N.J. Dec. 13, 2006) (unpublished) (acknowledging the
difficulties of joint litigation, but holding different plaintiffs who sought the same remedy could proceed
jointly though they each had to pay a filing fee).
35. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 127 S. Ct. 910, 166 L. Ed. 2d 798 (2007).
36. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 212, 127 S. Ct. 910, 919–20, 166 L. Ed. 2d 798, 811–12 (2007).
37 . The relevant statute says: “The clerk of each district court shall require the parties
instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in such court, whether by original process, removal or
otherwise, to pay a filing fee of $350 ... ” 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (emphasis added). That language certainly
suggests that a single filing fee is required even if there are multiple plaintiffs. The statute continues:
“The clerk shall collect from the parties such additional fees only as are prescribed by the Judicial
Conference of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1914(b) (2006). That language seems to forbid courts to
require multiple fees based on their interpretation of the PLRA.
38. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a) (joinder of defendants); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 18 (joinder of claims).
39. See George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607–08 (7th Cir. 2007); Valdez v. Dretke, No. H-04-2038,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54851, at *20–22 (S.D. Tex. July 26, 2007) (unpublished); see also Pope v. Miller,
No. CIV-07-0284-F, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61921, at *1–2 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 21, 2007) (unpublished)
(holding claims of two plaintiffs misjoined under Federal Rules where they involved distinct factual
issues as to exhaustion and merits). An example of how this works is Vasquez v. Schueler, No. 06-cv-
00743-bbc, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88193, at *5–6 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 29, 2007) (unpublished). The plaintiff
in that case raised six different claims that arose at four different times. The court said he had to
pursue them in four separate lawsuits. The only claims that could be brought in the same lawsuit were
claims of excessive force and of denial of medical or mental health care following the use of force.
40. Lefkowitz v. Citi-Equity Group, 146 F.3d 609, 612 (8th Cir. 1998) (rejecting equal protection
claim and holding filing fee provision does not unconstitutionally impede access to courts); Tucker v.
Branker, 142 F.3d 1294, 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (same); Lucien v. DeTella, 141 F.3d 773, 775–76 (7th Cir.
1998) (finding statute does not violate prisoners’ due process rights); Shabazz v. Parsons, 127 F.3d
1246, 1248 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding the provisions “pass constitutional muster”); Norton v. Dimazana,
122 F.3d 286, 291 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding provisions do not violate prisoners’ right to access courts);
Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997) (finding no equal protection violation);
Nicholas v. Tucker, 114 F.3d 17, 21 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding the provisions constitutional both on their
face and as applied to prisoner); Hampton v. Hobbs, 106 F.3d 1281, 1288 (6th Cir. 1997) (“[W]e find
that the fee provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act violate neither a prisoner's constitutional
right of access to the courts, nor his rights under the First Amendment, the Due Process Clause, the
Equal Protection Clause, or the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution.”); Roller v.
Gunn, 107 F.3d 227, 232–33 (4th Cir. 1997).

In upholding the statute, courts have emphasized the fact that it does not actually bar
anyone from bringing suit. 41
The filing fees provisions of the PLRA govern proceedings in federal court, and
presumably have no application in state court. However, we are aware of no decisions on the
issue.
The filing fees provisions only apply to civil actions. Legitimate habeas corpus and other
post-judgment proceedings generally are not considered civil actions. 42 Motions to vacate a
criminal sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 also generally are not considered civil actions. 43
Writs of mandamus (commanding a public official to perform his or her duty) and other
extraordinary writs are considered civil actions—and are thus subject to the PLRA—when
the relief sought is similar to that in a civil action but not when the writ is directed to
criminal matters. 44
Bankruptcy cases and challenges to seizures of property related to criminal proceedings
have been treated as civil actions subject to the filing fees provisions. 45 Decisions are divided
41. See, e.g., Nicholas v. Tucker, 114 F.3d 17, 21 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4)
(2006)).
42. See Skinner v. Wiley, 355 F.3d 1293, 1294 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding PLRA inapplicable to
habeas arising from prison disciplinary proceeding); Malave v. Hedrick, 271 F.3d 1139, 1140 (8th Cir.
2001) (holding PLRA does not apply to challenge a delayed parole revocation hearing); Walker v.
O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 633–36 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding proper habeas actions are not civil actions under
the PLRA, regardless of subject matter); Blair-Bey v. Quick, 151 F.3d 1036, 1039–41 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(holding PLRA does not apply to challenge to parole procedures), on reh’g, 159 F.3d 591 (D.C. Cir.
1998); Davis v. Fechtel, 150 F.3d 486, 488–90 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding that PLRA’s financial assessment
does not apply to habeas challenge to parole denial); McIntosh v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 115 F.3d 809,
811–12 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding PLRA inapplicable to parole revocation challenge); Anderson v.
Singletary, 111 F.3d 801, 805 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that the filing fee requirement of the PLRA does
not apply to in forma pauperis habeas petitions or appeals); Santana v. United States, 98 F.3d 752, 757
(3d Cir. 1996) (same). But see Kincade v. Sparkman, 117 F.3d 949, 952 (6th Cir. 1997) (prisoners may
not “cloak” civil actions in habeas/post-conviction guise).
By “legitimate” habeas proceedings, we mean those that challenge your custody in some fashion.
Most courts hold you cannot challenge prison conditions via federal habeas corpus. See, e.g., Beardslee
v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 1064, 1068–69 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1096 (2005). The main
exceptions to this rule involve confinement to segregation and disciplinary proceedings. Some courts
have held getting out of segregation, like getting out of prison entirely, may be pursued by habeas. See,
e.g., Medberry v. Crosby, 351 F.3d 1049, 1053 (11th Cir. 2003). Others have held that it cannot. See,
e.g., Montgomery v. Anderson, 262 F.3d 641, 643–44 (7th Cir. 2001). In addition, disciplinary
proceedings resulting in loss of good time instead of or in addition to placement in segregation must be
challenged via habeas corpus. Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 644, 117 S. Ct. 1584, 1587, 137 L. Ed.
2d 906, 911 (1997).
43. Kincade v. Sparkman, 117 F.3d 949, 950 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. Cole, 101 F.3d
1076, 1077 (5th Cir. 1996).
44. See Santee v. Quinlan, 115 F.3d 355, 357 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding writ of mandamus filed by
prisoner essentially civil, and therefore covered by PLRA); In re Smith, 114 F.3d 1247, 1250 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (holding writ of prohibition in question was within the scope of PLRA because it contained
“underlying claims that are civil in nature”); In re Tyler, 110 F.3d 528, 529 (8th Cir. 1997) (“[A]
mandamus petition arising from an ongoing civil rights lawsuit falls within the scope of the PLRA.”); In
re Washington, 122 F.3d 1345, 1345 (10th Cir. 1997) (determining that writs for mandamus are civil
actions under PLRA). Contra Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 76 (3d Cir. 1996) (finding “a writ of
mandamus is by its very nature outside the ambit of [PLRA]”); Martin v. United States, 96 F.3d 853,
854 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding “a petition for mandamus in a criminal proceeding is not a form of prisoner
litigation” and thus is not covered by PLRA); In re Nagy, 89 F.3d 115, 116 (2d Cir. 1996) (denying PLRA
coverage “to writs directed at judges conducting criminal trials”).
45. See United States v. Howell, 354 F.3d 693, 695–96 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that prisoners
challenging administrative forfeiture are required to abide by the limitations imposed by PLRA);
United States v. Minor, 228 F.3d 352, 354 n.2 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that an equitable challenge to a
completed forfeiture is a civil action); United States v. Jones, 215 F.3d 467, 469 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding

concerning motions made under the caption of a criminal prosecution addressing conditions
of confinement related to the prosecution. 46
The filing fees provisions apply only to “prisoners,” whom the statute defines as “any
person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for,
or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of
parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program.” 47 This includes pretrial
detainees as well as military prisoners, 48 prisoners in privately operated prisons and jails, 49
juvenile facilities, 50 and “halfway houses,” or drug treatment programs that the person is
confined in as a result of a criminal charge or conviction. 51 Persons incarcerated as a result of
civil proceedings are not prisoners under the PLRA, 52 except that such persons who are
that a motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(e) for the return of seized property is a civil
action); Lefkowitz v. Citi-Equity Group, 146 F.3d 609, 612 (8th Cir. 1998) (“[W]e conclude that, under
the plain language of [PLRA], the phrase ‘civil action or appeal’ is not limited to challenges to
conditions of confinement, and encompasses the instant commercial litigation.”); Pena v. United States,
122 F.3d 3, 4 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that a motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(e) for
the return of seized property is a “civil action” subject to the PLRA filing fee requirements).
46. In United States v. Lopez, 327 F. Supp. 2d 138, 140–42 (D.P.R. 2004), the court held that a
motion challenging placement in administrative segregation after the government decided to seek the
death penalty against the defendant was not a civil action, and granted relief. In another case raising
the same issue, the court made a similar statement but ultimately disposed of the matter by holding
that the motion was properly treated as a habeas corpus proceeding to which the PLRA is inapplicable.
United States v. Catalan-Roman, 329 F. Supp. 2d 240, 250–51 (D.P.R. 2004). In United States v.
Hashmi, No. 06 Cr. 442 (LAP), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3801, at *19–24 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2008)
(unpublished), the court held that a motion in a criminal case contesting “Special Administrative
Measures” affecting communication between the defendant and his counsel was not an “action,” a term
that it defined to mean a separate proceeding, and plaintiff need not exhaust administrative remedies.
Other decisions are to the contrary, holding that motions challenging SAMs or other pretrial jail
restrictions must be exhausted. See U.S. v. Khan, 540 F. Supp. 2d 344, 349–52 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). This
court seems to confuse PLRA and habeas exhaustion requirements. An appellate decision holds that a
motion in a long-completed criminal case challenging a prison policy forbidding prisoners from
retaining possession of pre-sentence reports should have been treated as a separate civil action and
that it required exhaustion. United States v. Antonelli, 371 F.3d 360, 361 (7th Cir. 2004).
47. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b) (2006) (requiring prisoners to pay a filing fee); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915
(h) (2006) (defining “prisoner”).
48. Marrie v. Nickels, 70 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1262 (D. Kan. 1999) (finding PLRA applies to
military prisoners).
49. See Roles v. Maddox, 439 F.3d 1016, 1017–18 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 232
(2006); Boyd v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 380 F.3d 989, 993–94 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 920
(2005); Ross v. County of Bernalillo, 365 F.3d 1181, 1184 (10th Cir. 2004); Lodholz v. Puckett, No. 03-C-
0350-C, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27493, at *4–5 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 24, 2003) (unpublished) (all holding the
PLRA exhaustion requirement applicable to persons held in private prisons).
50. Christina A. ex rel. Jennifer A. v. Bloomberg, 315 F.3d 990, 994–95 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding
attorneys’ fees provisions apply to juveniles); Alexander S. v. Boyd, 113 F.3d 1373, 1383–85 (4th Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1090 (1998) (same); Lewis v. Gagne, 281 F. Supp. 2d 429, 433 (N.D.N.Y.
2003) (holding exhaustion requirement applies to juveniles).
51. Jackson v. Johnson, 475 F.3d 261, 266–67 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that parolee in a halfway
house, which he could not leave without permission as a result of his criminal conviction was a
prisoner); Ruggiero v. County of Orange, 467 F.3d 170, 174–75 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding “drug treatment
campus” was a “jail, prison, or other correctional facility” under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), even though state
law said it was not a correctional facility, because that term “includes within its ambit all facilities in
which prisoners are held involuntarily as a result of violating the criminal law”); Witzke v. Femal, 376
F.3d 744, 752–53 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding “intensive drug rehabilitation halfway house” was an “other
correctional facility” under the PLRA).
52. See Michau v. Charleston County, S.C., 434 F.3d 725, 727–28 (4th Cir. 2006) (person civilly
detained pursuant to sexually violent predator statute); Perkins v. Hedricks, 340 F.3d 582, 583 (8th
Cir. 2003) (person civilly detained in prison Federal Medical Center); Kolocotronis v. Morgan, 247 F.3d

civilly committed in connection with criminal charges that remain pending continue to be
pretrial detainees, and are therefore prisoners subject to the PLRA. 53
Ex-prisoners, including parolees, 54 who file complaints or notices of appeal after they are
released are not considered prisoners under the PLRA and are not bound by the PLRA filing
fees provisions. 55 If indigent, they can proceed without any prepayment or installment
payment of fees, like any other poor person. However, courts have disagreed about prisoners
released after filing a complaint or notice. Some courts (including the Second Circuit) say the
obligation to pay ends on the prisoner’s release. 56 Others say a released prisoner must pay
any fees that were due before release. 57 One court has said that a released prisoner must pay
the full filing fee regardless of release, but does not explain how payments should be
assessed against a released prisoner. 58
C. The “Three Strikes” Provision
Filing fees are also addressed by the “three strikes” provision, one of the most harsh
parts of the PLRA, which provides:
In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment
in a civil action or proceeding under this section [in forma pauperis] if
the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or
detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the
United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous,
malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,
unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical
injury. 59
This provision means that if you have had three complaints or appeals dismissed as
frivolous, malicious, or failing to state a claim, you cannot proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”)
726, 728 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding person committed after finding of not guilty by reason of insanity is
not a “prisoner” under the PLRA); LaFontant v. INS, 135 F.3d 158, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (finding
immigration detainees not “prisoners” subject to fee provisions of PLRA); Ojo v. INS, 106 F.3d 680, 683
(5th Cir. 1997) (same); West v. Macht, 986 F. Supp. 1141, 1143 (W.D. Wis. 1997) (same).
53. Kalinowski v. Bond, 358 F.3d 978, 979 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that persons committed under
the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act are prisoners); Gibson v. Commissioner of Mental Health,
No. 04 Civ. 4350 (SAS), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27428, at *10–11 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2006) (unpublished)
(holding person held civilly as incompetent to stand trial was a prisoner).
54. As pointed out above, persons who are paroled to institutions they are not free to leave may
remain prisoners under the PLRA. However, the ordinary restrictions of parole do not make the parolee
a prisoner. See Bisgeier v. Michael [sic] Dep’t of Corr., No. 07-13625, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5460, at *4
(E.D. Mich. Jan. 25, 2008) (unpublished) (“While there may be certain conditions imposed upon
Plaintiff as a parolee, there can be no doubt that he is neither ‘confined,’ ‘incarcerated,’ nor ‘detained in’
any jail, prison, or other correctional facility.”); Hoffman v. Tuten, 446 F. Supp. 2d 455, 468 (D.S.C.
2006); Keel v. CDCR, No. 1:05-CV-01298-AWI-LJO, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58954, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Aug.
18, 2006) (unpublished) (holding parolee was not a prisoner).
55. Robbins v. Switzer, 104 F.3d 895, 897 (7th Cir. 1997); Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170,
1171 n.1 (10th Cir. 1997).
56. See, e.g., DeBlasio v. Gilmore, 315 F.3d 396, 398–99 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing cases) (holding
released prisoner need not pay fees due before release because “[a] released prisoner should not have to
shoulder a more difficult financial burden than the average indigent plaintiff in order to continue his
lawsuit”); McGann v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 96 F.3d 28, 29–30 (2d Cir. 1996)
57. See, e.g., In re Smith, 114 F.3d 1247, 1251–52 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Robbins v. Switzer, 104 F.3d
895, 898–99 (7th Cir. 1997).
58. See Gay v. Tex. Dep’t of Corr. State Jail Div., 117 F.3d 240, 242 (5th Cir. 1997).
59. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2000). As with the filing fees provisions discussed in the previous
Section, this provision does not apply to a person who is not a prisoner when he or she files suit. See
Kolocotronis v. Morgan, 247 F.3d 726, 728 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding provision does not apply to person
committed after finding of not guilty by reason of insanity).

unless you can show you are in imminent danger of serious injury. 60 Thus, you have to pay
the entire filing fee up front, or your case will be dismissed, 61 and you will still have to pay
the fee in installments even though you will not get anything for it. 62 If you have not paid the
fee, and the court rules that you are subject to the three strikes provision, most courts say
you should have an opportunity to pay in order to avoid dismissal. 63 One court, however, has
said that a prisoner who sought IFP status, even though he had already been found to have
three strikes, had committed “a fraud on the federal judiciary,” and so dismissed his appeal. 64
That court has also held that a litigant with three strikes can be barred from filing any
further papers in court until all previously incurred fees have been paid. 65 However, that rule
cannot be extended to bar in forma pauperis filings by prisoners whose cases satisfy the
“imminent danger of serious physical injury” exception to § 1915(g). 66
The three strikes provision makes it that much more important to be sure that in any
complaint you file, the facts that you assert amount to a violation of law. If you file lawsuits
based just on your general feeling that someone has mistreated you, you will probably be
assessed strikes and may not be able to proceed in forma pauperis in the future.
The three strikes provision, like the filing fees provisions, applies to “prisoners,” i.e.,
people who are incarcerated when they file suit. 67 It applies to civil actions or appeals,
categories that generally do not include habeas corpus or other challenges to criminal
convictions or sentences. 68 Most courts have held that the three strikes provision does not
60. One court has held that a prisoner with three strikes is barred from intervening in an
already filed civil action. Holloway v. Magness, No. 5:07CV00088 JLH/BD, 2008 WL 2367235, at *9
(E.D. Ark. June 6, 2008) (unpublished). The court does not explain how it gets from the the statutory
language, “bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding,” to intervention,
which is neither “bringing a civil action” nor “appealing a judgment.”
61. See Jones v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, No. 5:07cv158, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47775, at *3
(E.D. Tex. June 19, 2008) (unpublished) (rejecting request for a “payment plan,” since that would
amount to proceeding in forma pauperis). One decision does state that district courts have the
discretion to allow a litigant with three strikes to pay fees over time. Dudley v. United States, 61 Fed.
Cl. 685, 688, 2004 U.S. Claims LEXIS 221, at *10–11 (Fed. Cl. Aug. 12, 2004) (unpublished). In
addition, a timely notice of appeal confers appellate jurisdiction even if the filing fee is not tendered on
time. Daly v. United States, No. 03-1445, 109 F. App’x 210, 212, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 15794, at *4
(10th Cir. July 30, 2004) (unpublished) and cases cited. That may mean that if you do not have the
filing fee within the 30 days during which a notice of appeal must be filed, you will have some
additional time to pay the filing fee. This question has not to our knowledge been explored.
62. Jerelds v. Smith, No. 1:07-cv-00111-MP-AK, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21562, at *1 (N.D. Fla.
Mar. 6, 2008) (unpublished) (plaintiff whose suit was dismissed for three strikes could not get a refund
of his partial fee payment, “since by filing an action he agreed to a full payment of the filing fees”).
63. See Smith v. District of Columbia, 182 F.3d 25, 29–30 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (person barred from
filing as a poor person has 14 days to pay filing fee so his suit may proceed); Craig v. Cory, No. 98-1128,
1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 26602, at *4, 1998 Colo. J. C.A.R. 5453, 5453 (10th Cir. Oct. 20, 1998)
(unpublished) (holding PLRA does not bar prisoner with three strikes from suing, provided he pays
filing fee). But see Dupree v. Palmer, 284 F.3d 1234, 1236 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding suit must be
dismissed without prejudice and refiled, since statute says fee must be paid when suit begins).
64. Sloan v. Lesza, 181 F.3d 857, 859 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Litigants to whom [the three strikes
provision] applies take heed! An effort to bamboozle the court by seeking permission to proceed in
forma pauperis after a federal judge has held that § 1915(g) applies to a particular litigant will lead to
immediate termination of the suit. Moreover, the fee remains due ... .”).
65. Sloan v. Lesza, 181 F.3d 857, 859 (7th Cir. 1999).
66. Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1098–99 (11th Cir. 2008). Subsection C(1)(a) below discusses
that exception.
67. Jackson v. Johnson, 475 F.3d 261, 266–67 (5th Cir. 2007) (noting that persons released on
parole into the general public are not “prisoners” under the PLRA, but holding that a person confined to
a halfway house remained a prisoner subject to the three strikes provision).
68. See Jennings v. Natrona County Det. Ctr. Med. Facility, 175 F.3d 775, 779 (10th Cir. 1999)
(finding habeas corpus petitions are not “civil actions” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915); In re

apply retroactively to prohibit or revoke in forma pauperis status for complaints filed (or
appeals begun) before the provision went into effect. 69
Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure can be used to remove a strike,
although courts are unlikely to do so except in very unusual circumstances. 70
The three strikes provision of the PLRA governs proceedings in federal court, and
presumably has no application in state court, 71 so an indigent prisoner with three strikes
may prefer to file in state court if the state law in forma pauperis provisions permit.
However, some federal courts have suggested that it is inappropriate, or even sanctionable,
for prisoners to do so in cases which defendants then remove to federal court. 72 This view
seems wrong. Section 1915(g) applies only to persons with three strikes who “bring” an action
under the federal in forma pauperis statute; if Congress had wished to forbid state court
filings by such persons, it could have said so (though there would be questions about its
power to do so), and if it did not wish for such cases to be removed to federal court, it could
have amended the removal statute to say that. Prisoner plaintiffs should hardly be penalized
for the actions of defendants, or for reading statutes they way they are written, especially in
view of the Supreme Court’s warning that courts should not expand the PLRA’s
requirements according to their policy views. 73
1. What is a Strike?
The PLRA is very specific about what dismissals count as strikes: dismissals for
frivolousness, maliciousness, or failure to state a claim. Failure to state a claim means even
if all facts in your complaint are true, they still could not possibly establish a violation of law
the court could remedy. 74 A legally frivolous suit is one failing to raise an “arguable question
of law,” 75 one based on an “indisputably meritless legal theory,” 76 or one in which the
complaint itself makes clear the case is barred by a defense, like the statute of limitations or
Crittendom, 143 F.3d 919, 920 (5th Cir. 1998) (deciding the character of a writ of mandamus depends
on the underlying suit; here, because it was a civil action, the three strikes rule required prisoner to
pay filing fee first); Carson v. Johnson, 112 F.3d 818, 821 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding § 1915(g) does not
apply to habeas petitions). See also Part B of this Chapter for the definition of civil actions.
69. Gibbs v. Ryan, 160 F.3d 160, 162–64 (3d Cir. 1998); Chandler v. D.C. Dep’t of Corr., 145 F.3d
1355, 1358 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Canell v. Lightner, 143 F.3d 1210, 1212–13 (9th Cir. 1998).
70. See Dalvin v. Beshears, 943 F. Supp. 578, 579 n.3 (D. Md. 1996) (holding plaintiff’s suit to
obtain a standing order of the court was not frivolous for PLRA purposes because it was the only way
he could get it). Prisoners who have been charged with a strike for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies may wish to pursue this remedy in light of the Supreme Court’s decision that failure to
exhaust is not a failure to state a claim. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 213–15, 127 S. Ct. 910, 920–
21, 166 L. Ed. 2d 798, 812–13 (2007). For more information on exhaustion, see Part E of this Chapter.
71. See Lakes v. State, 333 S.C. 382, 387, 510 S.E.2d 228, 231 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998) (holding
prisoner could proceed IFP, since South Carolina has no analogy to PLRA’s three strikes provision).
72. Crooker v. Burns, 544 F. Supp. 2d 59, 62 (D. Mass. Apr. 10, 2008) (citing prior unpublished
opinion).
73. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 212–13, 220–24, 127 S. Ct. 910, 919–20, 924–26, 66 L. Ed. 2d
798, 810–12, 816–18 (2007); see Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1099 (11th Cir. 2008) (applying Jones
prohibition on judicial supplementation of PLRA to three strikes provision).
74. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 212–13, 127 S. Ct. 910, 920–21, 66 L. Ed. 2d 798, 812–13 (2007);
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46, 78 S. Ct. 99, 102, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80, 84 (1957) (holding a case should
not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it is “beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set
of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief”).
75. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 1833, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338, 349 (1989).
76. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 1833, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338, 348 (1989);
Sun v. Forrester, 939 F.2d 924, 925–26 (11th Cir. 1991) (“This circuit has defined a frivolous appeal
under § 1915(d) as being one ‘without arguable merit.’”) (citation omitted).

immunity. 77 A factually frivolous suit is one alleging “fantastic or delusional scenarios.” 78 A
malicious suit is one filed for an improper purpose or amounting to abuse of the legal
system. 79
A case dismissed on grounds other than frivolousness, maliciousness, or failure to state a
claim is not a strike. 80 Dismissal for suing an immune defendant is not a strike, since that
reason does not appear in § 1915(g), even though it appears in other PLRA sections
pertaining to in forma pauperis proceedings. 81 Dismissals are not strikes if they are on
grounds such as lack of prosecution, 82 lack of jurisdiction, 83 or expiration of the statute of
limitations. 84
A grant of summary judgment—which is based on the absence of material issues of fact—
on part or all of a case is generally not a strike. 85 One reason this is particularly important is
77. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327–28, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 1833, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338, 348–49
(1989); Street v. Vose, 936 F.2d 38, 39 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding dismissal of claim on grounds of
frivolousness where statute of limitations had expired to be appropriate).
78. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 1833, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338, 348 (1989).
79. See Pittman v. Moore, 980 F.2d 994, 995 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing repetitive litigation as
malicious); Spencer v. Rhodes, 656 F. Supp. 458, 464 (E.D.N.C. 1987) (holding that case filed out of
desire for vengeance and not to remedy a violation of legal rights was malicious), aff’d, 826 F.2d 1061
(4th Cir. 1987).
80. See Tafari v. Hues, 473 F.3d 440, 443 (2d Cir. 2007) (refusing to treat an appeal dismissed as
premature as a strike, stating the PLRA “was designed to stem the tide of egregiously meritless
lawsuits, not those temporarily infected with remediable procedural or jurisdictional flaws”); Andrews
v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1120 (9th Cir. 2005); Fortson v. Kern, No. 05-CV-73223-DT2005, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 38466, at *4–5 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 19, 2005) (unpublished) (holding dismissal for failure to
pay initial filing fee is not a strike); Maree-Bey v. Williams, No. 04-1759 (RCL), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
35722, at *7 (D.D.C. Aug. 1, 2005) (unpublished) (holding dismissal under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure is not a strike).
81. Searcy v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, No. 6:07-cv-3146-GRA2007, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90367, at
*12 (D.S.C. Dec. 6, 2007) (unpublished).
82. Butler v. Department of Justice, 492 F.3d 440, 443–45 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding dismissal for
lack of prosecution is not a strike); Harden v. Harden, No. 8:07CV68, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56922, at
*3 (D. Neb. Aug. 3, 2007) (unpublished) (dismissals for lack of jurisdiction or failure to prosecute are
not strikes); Green v. Dewitt, No. 8:06-0626-MBS, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26882, at *3 (D.S.C. Apr. 20,
2006) (unpublished) (declining to treat dismissal for failure to prosecute as a strike). A recent decision
holding that “[a] history of failure to prosecute is akin to the filing of a frivolous claim” and is a strike,
Gill v. Pidlypchak, No. 9:02-cv-1460 (FJS/RFT), 2006 WL 3751340, at *4 n.7 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2006)
(unpublished), appears to be wrong, since the statute does not refer to claims that are “akin” to
frivolous claims.
83. Thompson v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 492 F.3d 428, 437 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Daniels v.
Woodford, No. CV 07-6975 PA(JC), 2008 WL 2079010, at *6, 8 (C.D. Cal. May 13, 2008) (unpublished);
Ray v. Seventh Ave. Co., No. 07-C-331-C, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51096, at *4–5 (W.D. Wis. July 11,
2007) (unpublished); Harden v. Harden, No. 8:07CV68, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56922, at *3 (D. Neb.
Aug. 3, 2007) (unpublished).
84. Myles v. U.S., 416 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that dismissal based on limitations is
not a strike since it is based on an affirmative defense); Daniels v. Woodford, No. CV 07-6975 PA(JC),
2008 WL 2079010, at *6, 8 (C.D. Cal. May 13, 2008) (unpublished).
85. See Stallings v. Kempker, No. 04-1585, 109 F. App’x 832, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 1931, at *1
(8th Cir. 2004) (unpublished); Chavis v. Curlee, No. 9:06-CV-0049 (LEK/GHL), 2008 WL 508694, at *4
(N.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2008) (unpublished); Ramsey v. Goord, No. 05-CV-47A, 2007 WL 1199573, at *2
(W.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2007) (unpublished); Chappell v. Pliler, No. CIV S-04-1183 LKK DAD P, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 92538, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2006) (unpublished) (“The granting of summary judgment
on some claims precludes a determination that the case was dismissed for failure to state a claim on
which relief could be granted.”); Barela v. Variz, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1259 (S.D. Cal. 1999)
(determining grant of summary judgment in the present case did not count as a strike because court
never reached the merits); Walker v. Kidney Doctor, No. 96 Civ. 7746, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17677, at
*5–7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 1997) (unpublished) (noting earlier grant of summary judgment against plaintiff

government lawyers often improperly file motions to dismiss claims that raise disputed
factual issues. The court should treat these as summary judgment motions, even though the
government called them motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 86 If you are in this
situation, it is very important that you call the court’s attention to the fact that there is a
disputed factual issue. That way, even if you lose, you will lose by summary judgment, and
not by a dismissal for failure to state a claim that will be counted as a strike.
Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is not a failure to state a claim unless
apparent on the face of the complaint. 87 That means dismissal for non-exhaustion should
generally not be a strike. 88 Some courts have held a case dismissed for non-exhaustion is a
strike, because it seeks “relief to which [the plaintiff] is not entitled” and is therefore is
frivolous. 89 You can argue that these courts are wrong, because an unexhausted case does not
necessarily fail to raise “an arguable question of law” or rest on an “indisputably meritless
legal theory,” which as discussed above is what “frivolous” means. Further, one court
interpreting the three strikes provision has said that the PLRA “was designed to stem the
tide of egregiously meritless lawsuits, not those temporarily infected with remediable
procedural or jurisdictional flaws.” 90 Certainly, if you had an argument in an earlier case
that what you did should have satisfied the exhaustion requirement, or that no
administrative remedy was really available to you, that case should not be viewed as
frivolous and treated as a strike.
Most courts have held a partial dismissal—that is, an order throwing out some claims or
some defendants, but letting the rest of the case go forward—is not a strike, 91 nor is a case
did not count as a strike). But see Davis v. Kakani, No. 06-13704, 2007 WL 2221402, at *2 (E.D. Mich.
July 31, 2007) (unpublished) (holding summary judgment can be a strike if the decision says no claim
was stated).
86. Motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim are distinct from motions for summary
judgment as a matter of law. Compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (motion to dismiss) with Fed. R. Civ. P.
56 (summary judgment).
87. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 212–13, 127 S. Ct. 910, 920–21, 166 L. Ed. 2d 798, 812–13
(2007).
88. Before Jones v. Bock, a number of courts had already so held. See Snider v. Melindez, 199
F.3d 108, 111 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding non-exhaustion is not failure to state a claim and is not a strike);
Green v. Young, 454 F.3d 405, 408–09 (4th Cir. 2006) (same); Smith v. Duke, 296 F. Supp. 2d 965, 965–
66 (E.D. Ark. 2003); Henry v. Med. Dep’t at SCI-Dallas, 153 F. Supp. 2d 553, 556 (M.D. Pa. 2001).
One court has held that “[a] claim that fails to allege the requisite exhaustion of remedies is
equivalent to one that fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted” and so may be counted
as a strike. Rivera v. Allin, 144 F.3d 719, 731 (11th Cir. 1998). But, that holding seems to be wrong,
since Jones v. Bock holds prisoners are not required to allege exhaustion of remedies, and the statute
does not authorize strikes for things a court considers “tantamount” to failing to state a claim anyway.
The statement in Steele v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 355 F.3d 1204, 1213 (10th Cir. 2003), that dismissal
based on lack of exhaustion “may constitute a strike for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)” also seems to
be based on that court’s view that exhaustion must be pleaded in the prisoner’s complaint, which was
rejected in Jones v. Bock.
89. See, e.g., Wallmark v. Johnson, No. 2:03-CV-0060, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7088, at *4 (N.D.
Tex. Apr. 28, 2003) (unpublished).
90. Tafari v. Hues, 473 F.3d 440, 443 (2d Cir. 2007).
91. Thompson v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 492 F.3d 428, 432 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (statute does not
apply to actions “containing at least one claim falling within none of the three strike categories”); Tafari
v. Hues, 539 F. Supp. 2d 694, 701–02 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (extensive discussion and review of case law);
Maree-Bey v. Williams, No. 04-1759 (RCL), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35722, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 24, 2006)
(unpublished) (“Under the plain language of the statute, the dismissal of a claim in a pending action
cannot possibly trigger the so-called three-strikes bar.”); Barela v. Variz, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1259
(S.D. Cal. 1999) (“Since the Court in that case reached Plaintiff's claims on the merits as to some of the
defendants, this Court finds it unfair to penalize Plaintiff for including a defendant against whom he
could not state a cause of action.”); Moore v. Doan, No. 98 C 2307, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19624, at *14

where some claims are dismissed on grounds specified in Section 1915(g), but other claims
are dismissed on other grounds. 92 But, there are some recent decisions to the contrary. The
Seventh Circuit appeals court has held that if any claim is dismissed, the prisoner is charged
a strike. 93 We see no basis for this holding, since Congress’s purpose was to cut down on
“egregiously meritless lawsuits,” 94 and the Seventh Circuit rule would penalize prisoners who
file perfectly meritorious cases but make mistakes such as suing some of the wrong parties or
citing some of the wrong legal theories. Another circuit has held that if part of the case is
dismissed on “three strikes grounds” but the rest of it is dismissed for failure to exhaust, the
prisoner is charged a strike. 95
A case that is voluntarily withdrawn is not a strike. 96 An action that was never accepted
for filing cannot be a strike. 97 Only federal court dismissals count as strikes, since a state
court is not a “court of the United States” under the statute. 98 At least one court has charged
the plaintiff a strike in a case filed in state court and removed to federal court by the
defendants. 99 This appears to be wrong, since § 1915(g) applies to those who on three
occasions brought suit or filed an appeal “in a court of the United States” that was dismissed
as frivolous, malicious, or failing to state a claim.
A motion filed in an already filed case is not a strike. 100 A dismissal without prejudice is
a strike if it is on the grounds stated in the three strikes provision. 101 The courts have not yet
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 10, 1998) (unpublished) (“dismissing a claim or a party from a case is not dismissing an
‘action,’” and does not count as a strike).
92. See Juarez v. Frank, No. 05-C-738-C, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 571, at *14 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 6,
2006) (unpublished) (where state law claim was dismissed because court declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction, case was not a strike); Fortson v. Kern, No. 05-CV-73223-DT2005, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 38466, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 19, 2005) (unpublished) (holding case deemed frivolous as to
one defendant and otherwise dismissed for failure to pay filing fee was not a strike); Barela v. Variz, 36
F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1259 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (holding a case was not a strike where some claims were
dismissed for failure to state a claim and defendants were granted summary judgment in others).
93. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607–08 (7th Cir. 2007). That court has also held that in cases
involving multiple plaintiffs, every plaintiff is charged a strike if a claim involving any one of the
plaintiffs is a strike. Boriboune v. Berge, 391 F.3d 852, 855–56 (7th Cir. 2004). The court did not cite
any authority for this holding and did not engage in any substantial statutory analysis, and we think it
is wrong. However, unless the Supreme Court rules otherwise, you are stuck with these rules if you are
litigating in the Seventh Circuit.
94. Tafari v. Hues, 473 F.3d 440, 443 (2d Cir. 2007).
95. Pointer v. Wilkinson, 502 F.3d 369, 376 (6th Cir. 2007).
96. Armentrout v. Tyra, No. 98-3161, 175 F.3d 1023, 1999 U.S. App LEXIS 1769, at *1 (8th Cir.
Feb. 9, 1999) (unpublished); Daniels v. Woodford, No. CV 07-6975 PA(JC), 2008 WL 2079010, at *6, 8
(C.D. Cal. May 13, 2008) (unpublished). However, one court has held that a prisoner who receives a
magistrate judge’s recommendation for dismissal cannot avoid a strike by dismissing voluntarily. See
Johnson v. Edlow, 37 F. Supp. 2d 775, 776–78 (E.D. Va. 1999) (citing prior pattern of seeking voluntary
dismissal after court and defendants have expended substantial resources on the case; dismissing as
malicious); Sumner v. Tucker, 9 F. Supp. 2d 641, 644 (E.D. Va. 1998) (holding that an action may be
dismissed, without prejudice, by the plaintiff without order of the court at any time before service by
the adverse party of an answer or a motion for summary judgment).
97. Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 603 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding cases never filed do not count as
strikes).
98. Elliott v. Beard, 2006 WL 4404771, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2006) (unpublished) (holding
state courts are not “courts of the United States” within the statute); Freeman v. Lee, 30 F. Supp. 2d
52, 54 (D.D.C. 1998) (holding actions dismissed from state and local courts do not count for purposes of
strikes).
99. See Olmsted v. Sherman, No. 08-cv-439-bbc, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61368, at *1 (W.D. Wis.
Aug. 12, 2008) (unpublished).
100. Belton v. U.S., No. 07-C-925, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68964, at *34 (E.D. Wis. June 2, 2008)
(unpublished) (motion under Rule 60(b) is not a strike; statute “does not apply to motions, only ‘actions’
or ‘appeals’”).

determined whether the prisoner is given a second strike if the case is re-filed (for example,
with an amended complaint designed to correct the problems that led to dismissal) and is
then dismissed again. 102
A dismissal is not a strike if it is impossible to tell what the cause for dismissal was. 103
Some decisions have held that prisoners should not be given a strike based on law that was
unclear or that changed after they filed. 104 Dismissals may be strikes even if they were not in
forma pauperis cases. 105 Cases filed or dismissed before the PLRA was enacted have been
counted as strikes. 106
A dismissal in a habeas corpus action is not a strike. 107 Courts have disagreed over
whether actions dismissed because they were mistakenly filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but
should have been filed as habeas petitions, count as strikes. 108 Similarly, a case that should
have been filed under Section 1983 but was filed as a habeas petition to avoid the three
strikes provision may be counted as a strike. 109 In the past, courts have sometimes just
treated habeas petitions that should have been filed under Section 1983 as Section 1983
cases and gone forward with them, 110 but one court has cautioned this should not
automatically be done under the PLRA; since prisoners could end up being charged a strike,
101. Day v. Maynard, 200 F.3d 665, 667 (10th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (“Moreover, a dismissal
without prejudice counts as a strike, so long as the dismissal is made because the action is frivolous,
malicious, or fails to state a claim.”).
102. Day v. Maynard, 200 F.3d 665, 667 n.1 (10th Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
103. See Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1120 (9th Cir. 2005); Freeman v. Lee, 30 F. Supp. 2d
52, 54 (D.D.C. 1998) (finding no strike when order dismissing prisoner’s action did not recite ground on
which it was based, because “[the court] is unaware of any principle that would permit [it] to presume
that the dismissal was on one of the grounds referenced in § 1915(g)”).
104. See Clemente v. Allen, 120 F.3d 703, 705 n.1 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding appeal was not a strike
in the absence of published law on the question before the court ruled); Hairston v. Falano, No. 99-C-
2750, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9027, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 28, 1999) (unpublished) (holding dismissal was
not a strike where plaintiff’s claim, valid when filed, was dismissed based on the later decision in
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 132 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1995)).
105. Duvall v. Miller, 122 F.3d 489, 490 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding dismissals that were not brought
in forma pauperis still count for strikes).
106. Welch v. Galie, 207 F.3d 130, 131 (2d Cir. 2000); Rivera v. Allin, 144 F.3d 719, 729–31 (11th
Cir. 1998); Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 603–04 (6th Cir. 1998); Keener v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole,
128 F.3d 143, 144 (3d Cir. 1997); Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1312 (9th Cir. 1997); Adepegba v.
Hammons, 103 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding strikes provision can apply retroactively); Green
v. Nottingham, 90 F.3d 415, 420 (10th Cir. 1996); Abdul-Wadood v. Nathan, 91 F.3d 1023, 1025 (7th
Cir. 1996); cf. Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 114 S. Ct. 1483, 128 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1994)
(establishing constitutional standard for retroactive application of laws).
107. Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1122–23 & n.12 (9th Cir. 2005) and cases cited.
108. See Bure v. Miami-Dade Police Dept., No. 08-20483-CV-UNGARO, 2008 WL 2374149, at *3
(S.D. Fla. June 6, 2008) (unpublished) (mistakenly filed § 1983 is a strike); Grant v. Sotelo, No. 2:98-
CV-0347, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16798, at *3–5 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 17, 1998) (unpublished) (holding § 1983
case that should have been filed under habeas corpus is frivolous; citing cases); Rogers v. Wis. Dep’t of
Corr., No. 04-C-980, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1864, at *6 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 3, 2005) (unpublished) (holding
that dismissal of a § 1983 action that should have been filed as a habeas petition is not a strike because
“dismissal ... for failure to use the proper avenue for relief” is not a ground listed in the statute.). See
also Patton v. Jefferson Corr. Ctr., 136 F.3d 458, 464 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that § 1983 actions that
should have been filed as habeas petitions but would have been frivolous as such were strikes).
109. Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1123 n.12 (9th Cir. 2005).
110. See Carson v. Johnson, 112 F.3d 818, 819 (5th Cir. 1997) (construing habeas corpus petition
as a § 1983 case).

they ought to have a chance to think it over before proceeding. 111 In a class action, only
named plaintiffs are subject to the three strikes provision. 112
One court has held that a dismissal counts as a strike even if the case was filed by an exprisoner
after release, if the plaintiff later returns to prison. 113 However, this holding would
seem contrary to the statutory language, which refers to prior actions brought “while
incarcerated or detained.” 114
Appeals count as separate strikes under Section 1915(g) only if they are “dismissed ...
[as] frivolous, malicious, or fail[ing] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 115 If
the appeals court merely affirms a district court decision that was dismissed for one of the
reasons stated in Section 1915(g), the appeal is not a separate strike. 116 An appeal that is
dismissed on grounds other than those stated in Section 1915(g) cannot be a separate strike
even if the district court decision counts as a strike. 117
Some courts have held that “[a] dismissal should not count against a petitioner until he
has exhausted or waived his appeals.” 118 Thus, if you receive a third strike in a district court
decision, you should still be able to appeal that decision in forma pauperis without being
111. Pischke v. Litscher, 178 F.3d 497, 500 (7th Cir. 1999) (dismissing habeas corpus actions and
indicating plaintiffs may re-file complaints as civil rights claims).
112. Meisberger v. Donahue, 245 F.R.D. 627, 630 (S.D. Ind. 2007).
113. See Robbins v. Switzer, 104 F.3d 895, 897 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding dismissal would count as
strike if released petitioner ever returns to prison).
114. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2000). See Arvie v. Lastrapes, 106 F.3d 1230, 1232 (5th Cir. 1997) (per
curiam) (remanding to determine whether the plaintiff was a prisoner when he filed his previous
actions).
115. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2000). See Newlin v. Helman, 123 F.3d 429, 433 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding
that frivolous appeal of a dismissed claim counts as a second strike). Compare with Andrews v. King,
398 F.3d 1113, 1120–21 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that an appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction is not
a strike).
116. Jennings v. Natrona County Det. Ctr. Med. Facility, 175 F.3d 775, 780 (10th Cir. 1999)
(“Under the plain language of the statute, only a dismissal may count as strike, not the affirmance of
an earlier decision to dismiss.”); Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 1996) (“It is
straightforward that affirmance of a district court dismissal as frivolous counts as a single ‘strike.’”);
Barela v. Variz, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1258 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (“Insofar as an affirmance is not concerned
with the merits of the appeal but is rather a finding of no error at the district court level, it should not
count as a strike.”); Freeman v. Lee, 30 F. Supp. 2d 52, 54 n.3 (D.D.C. 1998) (holding that a circuit
court’s affirmation of a § 1915(g) dismissal does not count as second strike); see also Henderson v.
Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 485 n.4 (8th Cir. 1997) (recognizing that appeals of claims found to be frivolous
are not automatically also frivolous).
Courts are not always careful in dealing with this issue. See Montanez v. DeTella, No. 97-3698,
1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 628, at *6 (7th Cir. Jan. 14, 1999) (unpublished) (stating affirmance of appeal
from dismissal is itself a second strike, without discussing contrary authority); Rice v. Christopher, No.
98-1295, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 2040, at *5–6 (10th Cir. Feb. 9, 1999) (unpublished) (“Because a
complaint dismissed under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and affirmed on appeal counts as two prior occasions for
purposes of § 1915(g), two ‘strikes’ are recorded against Mr. Rice.”). If you get a decision like this, be
sure to ask the court to reconsider charging you with the second strike.
117. Tafari v. Hues, 473 F.3d 440, 442–44 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding an appeal dismissed as
premature was not a strike); Cosby v. Knowles, No. 97-1400, 145 F.3d 1345, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS
7845, at *4–5 (10th Cir. Apr. 23, 1998) (unpublished) (noting that dismissal based on denial of in forma
pauperis status, not the merits, is not a strike even though merits were frivolous).
118. Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 1996); accord Thompson v. Drug
Enforcement Admin., 492 F.3d 428, 432 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“A contrary rule would, within those narrow
set of cases in which the third strike is appealed, effectively eliminate our appellate function. Had
Congress intended such an unusual result, we expect it would have clearly said so.”); Campbell v.
Davenport Police Dep’t, 471 F.3d 952, 953 (8th Cir. 2006). Once the time for appeal has passed, filing a
late notice of appeal will not keep the dismissal from being a strike. Smith v. District of Columbia, 182
F.3d 25, 27–28 (D.C. Cir. 1999).

arred by the three strikes provision. 119 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, however, has
made matters more complicated, holding that a prisoner cannot directly appeal a decision
that counts as a third strike. Instead, the prisoner must apply to the appeals court for in
forma pauperis status. The appeals court will then decide whether the lower court was
correct in issuing the third strike to the prisoner, or whether the lower court was incorrect
and should not have issued the third strike. In other words, the appeals court will decide the
merits of the appeal in the course of determining whether the prisoner can proceed IFP. 120 If
an appeals court finds that your claim was not frivolous, the strike will be eliminated. 121
The defendants bear the burden of producing sufficient evidence to show that a prisoner
has three strikes; if they do, the burden shifts to the prisoner to show that is not the case. 122
Defendants do not meet their burden just by showing dismissals; they must show the reasons
for the dismissals. 123 A court must, when applying the three strikes provision, clearly identify
each case on which it relied. 124
The three strikes provision cannot be applied to revoke in forma pauperis status in a case
filed before the plaintiff had three strikes, since the statute is a limit on prisoners’ ability to
“bring” suit, not on their ability to maintain suits previously brought. 125 (A case is “brought”
for these purposes when the plaintiff submits the complaint to the court, even if there is a
significant time lag caused by the in forma pauperis and merits screening before it is filed.) 126
Nor does it prevent a plaintiff from filing an amended complaint in a suit filed before he had
three strikes. 127 One federal court has held when multiple plaintiffs join in one lawsuit, each
plaintiff’s claims must be treated as a separate “action,” and each plaintiff must be charged a
strike for every plaintiff whose “action” is dismissed in its entirety. 128 This decision appears
119. Jennings v. Natrona County Det. Ctr. Med. Facility, 175 F.3d 775, 780 (10th Cir. 1999);
Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 1996).
120. Robinson v. Powell, 297 F.3d 540, 541 (7th Cir. 2002); see Boriboune v. Berge, No. 04-C-
0015C, 2005 WL 1378930, at *1 (W.D. Wis. June 9, 2005) (unpublished) (instructing plaintiff in how to
use the prescribed procedure).
121. Jennings v. Natrona County Det. Ctr. Med. Facility, 175 F.3d 775, 780 (10th Cir. 1999)
(concluding that “[i]f we reverse a district court dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the district
court dismissal does not count as a strike”); Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 1996)
(“[W]e find it plain that reversal of a dismissal as frivolous nullifies the ‘strike.’”).
122. Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 2005); accord Thompson v. Drug
Enforcement Admin., 492 F.3d 428, 435-36 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Green v. Morse, No. 00-CV-6533-CJS, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52085, at *7–9 (W.D.N.Y. May 26, 2006) (unpublished). In practice, courts often raise
three strikes on their own at initial screening.
123. Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1120; see Thompson v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 492
F.3d 428, 436; Green v. Morse, No. 00-CV-6533-CJS, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52085, at *12 (W.D.N.Y.
Oct. 11, 2006) (unpublished) (both applying Andrews holding, finding docket entries sufficient to
establish strikes).
124. See Evans v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 150 F.3d 810, 812 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[I]n the order denying
leave to proceed in forma pauperis the district court must cite specifically the case names, case docket
numbers, districts in which the actions were filed, and the dates of the orders dismissing the actions.”);
Jennings v. Dist. Ct. for Seventh Judicial Dist., No. 98-8068, 172 F.3d 879, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 2386,
at *2–3 (10th Cir. Feb. 16, 1999) (unpublished) (remanding because district court did not specify which
prior actions or appeals were frivolous).
125. Nicholas v. American Detective Agency, No. 07-2018, 254 F. App’x 116, 2007 U.S. App.
LEXIS 26185, at *1–3 (3d Cir. Nov. 9, 2007) (unpublished); Cruz v. Marcial, No. 3:01cv406, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 7307 (D. Conn. Apr. 18, 2002) (unpublished). Contra Nichols v. Rich, No. 2:01-CV-0369,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5766, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 7, 2004) (unpublished) (citing goals of the statute but
not addressing its actual language).
126. O'Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1151–52 (9th Cir. 2008).
127. Elkins v. Schrubbe, No. 04-C-85, 2005 WL 1154273, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 20, 2005)
(unpublished).
128. Boriboune v. Berge, No. 04-C-0015-C, 2005 WL 1320345, at *4–8 (W.D. Wis. June 1, 2005)
(unpublished) (declaring that several plaintiffs received three strikes from this single multi-plaintiff

contrary to the statute, which seems intended to hold prisoners responsible for their own
legal claims, but not for those of other persons. 129
(a) The “Imminent Danger of Serious Physical Injury” Exception
The three strikes provision does not bar a prisoner from proceeding in forma pauperis if
he is in “imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 130 The existence of such a danger is
assessed as of the time of filing suit or when the prisoner makes an in forma pauperis
application in the district court or on appeal. 131
Any credible allegation of imminent danger of serious physical injury meets the statutory
requirement, 132 but many allegations have been dismissed as incredible or insubstantial. 133 If
lawsuit). The court does not claim to find the basis for its holding in the statutory language; rather, it
says it is interpreting a Seventh Circuit opinion remanding the case, and expresses hope that the court
of appeals will clarify the matter. That has not happened.
129. See Swenson v. McDonald, No. CV 05-93-GF-CSO, 2006 WL 240233, at *3–4 (D. Mont. Jan.
30, 2006) (unpublished) (criticizing logic of Boriboune). Swenson points out that Boriboune’s imposition
of strikes based on the separate claims of individual plaintiffs contradicts the statute’s reference to
“action[s]” rather than claims; that its view that each prisoner litigant is responsible under Rule 11 for
statements other plaintiffs make is inconsistent with the lack of authority of pro se litigants to make
representations for anyone other than themselves and with pro se prisoners’ limited ability to
investigate the merits of others’ claims; and that the practical difficulties of multi-plaintiff prisoner
litigation does not lend itself to assuming one litigants’ responsibility for all actions and decisions in
such litigation.
130. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2000). See Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1098–99 (11th Cir. 2008)
(rejecting district court practice of barring prisoners with three strikes from filing under “imminent
danger of serious physical injury” exception if they have not paid filing fees owed from previous cases)
131. Polanco v. Hopkins, 510 F.3d 152, 156 (2d Cir. 2007) (rejecting argument that time-of-filing
rule denies court access to those who cannot get their claims in during the time they are in danger);
Ibrahim v. District of Columbia, 463 F.3d 3, 6–7 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Heimermann v. Litscher, 337 F.3d
781, 782 (7th Cir. 2003); Martin v. Shelton, 319 F.3d 1048, 1050 (8th Cir. 2003); Malik v. McGinnis, 293
F.3d 559, 562–63 (2d Cir. 2002); Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 312–16 (3d Cir. 2001) (en
banc); Ashley v. Dilworth, 147 F.3d 715, 717 (8th Cir. 1998) (all holding danger must exist at the time
of filing the complaint); see also Medberry v. Butler, 185 F.3d 1189, 1192–93 (11th Cir. 1999) (rejecting
idea that imminent danger is measured at time of incident, but not deciding whether time of filing or
IFP motion is appropriate rule); Banos v. O’Guin, 144 F.3d 883, 884–85 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam)
(holding danger must exist at time of filing or time of IFP motion).
Some courts have gone so far as to say that a danger that arose after the case was filed, and was
ongoing, did not fit the exception. Trice v. Vazquez, No. CIVA CV206-185, 2006 WL 3191175, at *2
(S.D. Ga. Nov. 1, 2006) (unpublished); see Peterson v. Perdue, No. CV 108-097, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
74948, at *1 n.1, *3 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 21, 2008) (unpublished) (magistrate judge held alleged threat of
sexual assault did not meet standard because plaintiff had not been assaulted or injured; district judge
held subsequent sexual assault did not meet standard because it occurred after filing).
132. See Ciarpiaglini v. Saini, 352 F.3d 328, 330–31 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding allegations of panic
attacks leading to heart palpitations, chest pains, labored breathing, choking sensations, and paralysis
meet the imminent danger standard; disapproving extensive inquiry into seriousness of allegations at
pleading stage); White v. Colorado, 157 F.3d 1226, 1232 (10th Cir. 1998) (rejecting claim because
plaintiff failed to raise a credible allegation of imminent danger of serious physical harm); see also
Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 2007) (“the three-strikes rule is a screening device
that does not judge the merits of prisoners’ lawsuits”); Lewis v. Sullivan, 279 F.3d 526, 531 (7th Cir.
2002) (stating that the exception applies “[w]hen a threat or prison condition is real and proximate, and
when the potential consequence is ‘serious physical injury’”).
133. See, e.g., Merriweather v. Reynolds, No. 2:07-3418-PMD-RSC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38175,
at *9 (D.S.C. May 11, 2008) (unpublished) (rejecting allegations of threats, enemies, danger from prison
gangs, etc.; “unsupported, vague, self-serving, conclusory speculation” does not establish imminent
danger); Robinson v. Mawer, No. 1:08-cv-353, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36126, at *4–6 (W.D. Mich. May 2,
2008) (unpublished) (holding claim that prisoner’s hand was broken and he couldn’t defend himself
against assault did not allege imminent danger because there was no showing that he would

serious allegations are disputed, the court may hold a hearing or rely on affidavits and
depositions to resolve the question. 134 Some courts, however, seem just to have made ad hoc
judgments about the credibility of the prisoner’s claim based on no more than the pro se
complaint’s allegations, sometimes supplemented by the prisoner’s response to an order to
show cause or objections to a magistrate judge’s report. 135 Some courts have rejected
seemingly substantial allegations of threat of injury, 136 or have conflated the imminent
danger inquiry with the merits of the prisoner’s legal claim. 137
To meet the “serious physical injury” requirement, the threatened injury need not be as
serious as to be an Eighth Amendment violation in and of itself. 138 The risk of future injury is
sufficient to invoke the imminent danger exception. 139 The “imminent danger” requirement
has been held to be satisfied by allegations that prison staff refused protective custody to a
prisoner targeted by gangs; 140 disclosed a prisoner’s history as an informant, resulting in
threats and assaults; 141 or repeatedly placed a prisoner near known enemies. 142 Courts have
also found imminent danger where the plaintiff was denied treatment for an ongoing serious
imminently be assaulted); Althouse v. Roe, 542 F. Supp. 2d 543, 546 (E.D. Tex. 2008) (holding claim
that attention deficit hyperactivity disorder might lead the plaintiff impulsively to put himself in
danger was too speculative to show imminent danger); Burghart v. Corr. Corp. of Am., No. CIV-08-62-
C, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16732, at *2–3 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 4, 2008) (unpublished) (complaints of
migraine headaches, fatigue, depression, weight gain and sleeping disorders did not meet standard);
Johnson v. Ala. Dept. Of Corr., No. 2:07-cv-0767-WKW (WO), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6669, at *2–3
(M.D. Ala. Jan. 29, 2008) (unpublished) (discontinuance of hormone treatment for gender identity
disorder, allegedly causing “excessive weight gain, complete body fat redistribution, dizzy spells,
fainting spells, headaches, hot-flashes, anxiety, severe depression, more depression than usual, ... [and]
the growth of first time facial hair,” did not meet the imminent danger standard).
134. Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83, 86 (3d Cir. 1997); see White v. Colorado, 157 F.3d 1226, 1232
(10th Cir. 1998) (refusing to credit allegations of inadequate medical care based on magistrate judge’s
examination of medical records and failure to specify the nature of the imminent injury.
135. See, e.g., Pruden v. Mayer, No. 3:CV-08-0559, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26700, at *3–4 (M.D.
Pa. Apr. 2, 2008) (unpublished) (concluding that prisoner’s medical care claims did not pose imminent
danger because they had occurred over a long period of time).
136. See, e.g., Palmer v. N.Y.S. Dep’t of Corr. Greenhaven, No. 06 Civ. 2873, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 88909, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2007) (unpublished) (finding frivolous a prisoner’s allegation of
imminent danger in that his toenails were turning black, yellow and green from an infection, and his
fingernails were becoming swollen, and he was going to lose six toenails and a fingernail as a result).
137. See, e.g., Jackson v. Jackson, No. CV508-011, 2008 WL 1924277, at *2 n.2 (S.D. Ga. May 1,
2008) (unpublished) (rejecting claim of possible consequences of untreated hernia where medical
personnel treated prisoner).
138. See Ciarpaglini v. Saini, 352 F.3d 328, 330–31 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding allegations that
termination of psychiatric medication resulted in panic attacks that caused “heart palpitations, chest
pains, labored breathing, choking sensations, and paralysis in his legs and back” met the imminent
danger standard); Gibbs v. Cross, 160 F.3d 962, 964 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding allegation that plaintiff was
subjected to “dust, lint and shower odor” via cell vent, resulting in severe headaches, change in voice,
mucus full of dust and lint, and watery eyes sufficiently alleged imminent danger of serious injury).
139. Gibbs v. Cross, 160 F.3d 962, 966–67 (3rd Cir. 1998) (relying on alleged environmental
hazards in prison); see Ibrahim v. District of Columbia, 463 F.3d 3, 6–7 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that
deterioration from lack of treatment for Hepatitis C sufficiently pled imminent danger of serious
physical injury).
140 . Cain v. Jackson, No. C-07-354, 2007 WL 2787979, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 24, 2007)
(unpublished) (alleging that plaintiff had been assaulted repeatedly by gang members and denied
protective custody).
141. See Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83, 84–86 (3d. Cir. 1997); Malik v. McGinnis, 293 F.3d 559,
562 (2d Cir. 2002).
142. See Ashley v. Dilworth, 147 F.3d 715, 717 (8th Cir. 1998).

medical problem 143 or disability, 144 or subjected to environmental conditions that caused or
aggravated such problems. 145
If a plaintiff’s allegations meet the statutory standard, the relevant claim should be
allowed to go forward without being restricted to the precise defendants and allegations
currently responsible for the danger. 146 But, a risk not related to the allegations in the
complaint does not fall within the exception. 147 A claim of imminent danger does not excuse
the prisoner from the PLRA’s administrative exhaustion requirement. 148
One court has held that self-inflicted injury cannot meet the imminent danger standard
because “[e]very prisoner would then avoid the three strikes provision by threatening
suicide.” 149 Many prison suicides and attempted suicides result directly from serious mental
illness. 150 For this reason, strong arguments can be made that this statement is extreme and
unwarranted, because it would be cruel and dangerous to prevent mentally-ill prisoners from
going to court to seek treatment for their mental illness or seek other help to reduce the
effects of their illness.
(b) Constitutional Challenges to the Three Strikes Provision
143 . See Ibrahim v. District of Columbia, 463 F.3d 3, 6–7 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that
deterioration from lack of treatment for Hepatitis C sufficiently pleaded imminent danger of serious
physical injury); Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1350 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that a prisoner who
alleged that lack of treatment was worsening his illnesses sufficiently pleaded imminent danger of
serious physical injury); McAlphin v. Toney, 281 F.3d 709, 711 (8th Cir. 2002) (prisoner’s complaint
alleging denial of treatment for medical/dental condition posed imminent danger was sufficient to
permit him to proceed in forma pauperis despite the fact that he had three strikes).
144. Fuller v. Wilcox, No. 08-3077, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 16581, at *3 (10th Cir. Aug. 4, 2008)
(unpublished) (denial of a wheelchair, meaning that plaintiff must crawl, and could not walk to the
shower or lift himself to his bed, “could result in a number of serious physical injuries”).
145. Gibbs v. Cross, 160 F.3d 962, 966–67 (3d Cir. 1998); Rankins v. Rowland, No. 05-7811, 2006
WL 1836671, at *1 n.1 (4th Cir. June 27, 2006) (unpublished) (holding that an allegation that a poor
ventilation system caused the plaintiff bodily harm and he was denied medical treatment for his
symptoms made a “colorable showing” of imminent danger); Smith v. Ozmint, No.:0:07-3644-PMD-BM,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33608, at *10–12 (D.S.C. Apr. 23, 2008) (unpublished) (finding imminent danger
standard met by allegations of use of hazardous Chinese products, 24-hour illumination in cells,
exposure to deranged behavior and unsanitary conditions from mentally ill prisoners in the segregation
unit, deprivation of sunlight, and exposure to mold).
146. See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[Q]ualifying prisoners can
file their entire complaint IFP; the exception does not operate on a claim-by-claim basis or apply to only
certain types of relief.”); Ciarpiaglini v. Saini, 352 F.3d 328, 330 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding damages claim
could go forward even though injunctive claim on which “imminent danger” allegation was based was
moot); Bond v. Aguinaldo, 228 F. Supp. 2d 918, 919 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (allowing prisoner’s allegations
against defendants responsible for medical care at prisons from which he had been transferred). But see
McAlphin v. Toney, 375 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that a complaint that satisfies the imminent
danger exception cannot be amended to include claims that do not involve imminent danger).
147. Fuller v. Johnson County Bd. of County Com’rs, No. 07-3001-SAC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12179, at *2 (D. Kan. Aug. 8, 2007) (unpublished) (complaints about the ventilation system did not
meet the imminent danger standard where the plaintiff’s claim addressed accessibility for the
disabled).
148. McAlphin v. Toney, 375 F.3d 753, 755 (8th Cir. 2004).
149. Wallace v. Cockrell, No. 3:02-CV-1807-M, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3602, at *10 (N.D. Tex.
Mar. 10, 2003) (unpublished), approved as supplemented, No. 3:02-CV-1807-M, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4897, at *1–4 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2003) (unpublished).
150. See Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 728 (7th Cir. 2001) (alleging prison officials’
failure to medicate mentally-ill prisoner resulted in prisoner’s suicide); Eng v. Smith, 849 F.2d 80 (2d
Cir. 1988) (affirming injunction based on findings that state prison’s policies for treatment of mentallyill
prisoners were insufficient for prisoners’ protection).

So far, the federal courts have upheld the provision. 151 Several district courts have held
the provision unconstitutional, but those decisions are now overruled. 152
Some prisoners’ advocates believe the three strikes provision is unconstitutional for
reasons the courts have not yet addressed. The right to court access “is part of the right of
petition protected by the First Amendment.” 153 As such, it is “generally subject to the same
constitutional analysis” as is the right to free speech. 154 Because the three strikes provision
addresses the conduct of litigation in court and not the internal operations of prisons, it is
governed by the same First Amendment standards as other “free world” free speech
claims. 155 This body of law includes a principle of narrow tailoring. 156 Applying that principle,
the Supreme Court has said public officials could not recover damages for defamation unless
the statements they sued about were knowingly false or made with reckless disregard for
their truth; the First Amendment requires “breathing space,” and a margin for error is
required for inadvertent false speech, or true speech will be deterred. 157 This principle has
been applied in antitrust 158 and labor law enforcement 159 —sanctions may not be imposed
under the relevant statutes against persons who bring litigation unless the litigation is both
objectively and subjectively baseless. 160
151. See Polanco v. Hopkins, 510 F.3d 152, 156 (2d Cir. 2007); Lewis v. Sullivan, 279 F.3d 526,
528 (7th Cir. 2002) (rejecting access to courts claim); Higgins v. Carpenter, 258 F.3d 797, 799–801 (8th
Cir. 2001) (rejecting equal protection and access to courts claims); Medberry v. Butler, 185 F.3d 1189,
1193 (11th Cir. 1999) (rejecting Ex Post Facto Clause argument); Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176,
1178–82 (9th Cir. 1999) (rejecting due process, equal protection, access to courts, Ex Post Facto Clause,
and separation of powers arguments); White v. Colorado, 157 F.3d 1226, 1233–34 (10th Cir. 1998)
(rejecting access to courts and equal protection challenges); Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 604–06
(6th Cir. 1998) (rejecting equal protection, due process, and other claims); Rivera v. Allin, 144 F.3d 719,
723–29 (11th Cir. 1998) (stating IFP status is “a privilege, not a right”; upholding provision against 1st
Amendment, access to courts, separation of powers, due process, and equal protection challenges);
Carson v. Johnson, 112 F.3d 818, 821 (5th Cir. 1997) (stating the plaintiff “still has the right to file
suits if he pays the full filing fees in advance, just like everyone else”; holding the Constitution requires
waiver of filing fees only in connection with “fundamental” interests, which court equates with the
“atypical and significant” standard of Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 132 L. Ed. 2d
418 (1995)).
152. Lewis v. Sullivan, 135 F. Supp. 2d 954, 969 (W.D. Wis. 2001) (striking statute down), rev’d,
279 F.3d 526 (7th Cir. 2001); Ayers v. Norris, 43 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1050–51 (E.D. Ark. 1999) (same),
rev’d sub nom Higgins v. Carpenter, 258 F.3d 797 (8th Cir. 2001); Lyon v. Krol, 940 F. Supp. 1433, 1439
(S.D. Iowa 1996) (same), appeal dismissed and remanded, 127 F.3d 763, 765 (8th Cir. 1997).
153. Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513, 92 S. Ct. 609, 612, 30 L.
Ed. 2d 642, 648 (1972).
154. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 610 n.11, 105 S. Ct. 1524, 1532 n.11, 84 L. Ed. 2d 547,
558 n.11 (1985). Indeed, the Supreme Court has simply stated that advocacy in litigation is speech.
Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 542–43, 121 S. Ct. 1043, 1049–50, 149 L. Ed. 2d 63, 72–
73 (2001) (holding legal representation is speech).
155. Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 403, 109 S. Ct. 1874, 1876, 104 L. Ed. 2d 459, 466
(1989) (distinguishing between regulations of material sent into prison and material sent out of prison
for purposes of 1st Amendment).
156. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438, 83 S. Ct. 328, 340, 9 L. Ed. 2d 405, 421 (1963)
(“Precision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious
freedoms.”).
157. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272, 84 S. Ct. 710, 721, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686, 701
(1964).
158. Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 511, 92 S. Ct. 609, 611, 30 L.
Ed. 2d 642, 646 (1972) (applying rule in antitrust context).
159. Bill Johnson’s Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 741, 103 S. Ct. 2161, 2169, 76 L. Ed. 2d
277, 287 (1983) (applying rule in labor context).
160. Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60–61, 113
S. Ct. 1920, 1929, 123 L. Ed. 2d 611, 624–25 (1993) (requiring both subjective and objective intent).

Applied to the three-strikes provision, the “breathing space” principle would mean that
prisoners could only be punished for knowing falsehood or intentional abuse of the judicial
system—a category far narrower than the scope of the provision. A sanction that punishes
non-lawyers proceeding pro se—and in some cases results in barring them from court—for
honest mistakes of law would have the same inhibiting effect on valid claims that an
overbroad law of defamation would have on true speech about public officials. The three
strikes provision should therefore be found unconstitutional unless it was interpreted
consistently with the “breathing space” principle, that is, by limiting its application to
malicious actions or actions that are clearly intentional abuses of the judicial system as
opposed to honest mistakes.
D. Screening and Dismissal of Prisoner Cases
The PLRA requires federal courts to screen all suits by prisoners against government
employees and all in forma pauperis (“IFP”) cases at the litigation’s outset. The court must
dismiss cases that are frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim on which relief may be
granted, or that seek damages from a defendant immune from damage claims. 161 If a court
does not immediately dismiss such claims, the court must dismiss them as soon as they come
to the court’s attention. This power of dismissal, which used to be limited to in forma
pauperis cases, now extends to all prisoner cases. 162 The courts’ ability to dismiss cases sua
sponte (without a motion by the defendant) used to be limited to frivolous and malicious
cases, but has now been extended to cases failing to state a claim and cases suing immune
defendants. 163 Such dismissals may be done without prior notice or an opportunity to
respond, 164 but the Second Circuit has cautioned this ought to be done only where “it is
unmistakably clear that the court lacks jurisdiction, or that the complaint lacks merit or is
otherwise defective.” 165
Most courts have held that under the PLRA, as under prior law, pro se litigants are
allowed an opportunity to amend deficient complaints before the court dismisses them. 166
161. There has been disagreement among courts over whether failure to exhaust administrative
remedies falls within the scope of this provision. The Supreme Court has just settled this question by
holding that administrative exhaustion is not a pleading requirement, so failure to include it in the
complaint is not a failure to state a claim. Exhaustion would only be addressed at initial screening if
the complaint itself showed that the prisoner had failed to exhaust. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199,
213–15, 127 S. Ct. 910, 920–21, 166 L. Ed. 2d 798, 812–13 (2007). For more information on Exhaustion,
see Part E of this Chapter.
162. Plunk v. Givens, 234 F.3d 1128, 1129 (10th Cir. 2000); Ray v. Evercom Systems, Inc., No.
4:05-2904-RBH, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61132, at *15–16 (D.S.C. Aug. 25, 2006) (unpublished) (holding
fee-paid prisoner case raising antitrust claims rather than prison conditions, and joining governmental
defendants, is subject to § 1915A screening).
163 . These requirements appear in three overlapping statutory provisions: 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1) (2000).
164. Plunk v. Givens, 234 F.3d 1128, 1129 (10th Cir. 2000) (upholding lower court sua sponte
dismissal where no hearing was provided); Carr v. Dvorin, 171 F.3d 115, 116 (2d Cir. 1999) (per
curiam) (“The statute clearly does not require that process be served or that the plaintiff be provided an
opportunity to respond before dismissal.”).
165. Giano v. Goord, 250 F.3d 146, 151 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Carr v. Dvorin, 171 F.3d 115, 116
(2d Cir. 1999)).
166. Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795–96 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding dismissal of a
pro se complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B) should be done with leave to amend “unless the court can rule
out any possibility, however unlikely it might be, that an amended complaint would succeed in stating
a claim”); accord Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1348–49 (11th Cir. 2004); Shane v. Fauver, 213
F.3d 113, 117 (3d Cir. 2000) (adhering to pre-PLRA practice); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1124 (9th
Cir. 2000) (en banc) (same); see also Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding
under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c) that dismissing a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim without giving

One court has held that the PLRA prohibits this practice, but that holding is probably
undermined by a recent Supreme Court decision. 167 The PLRA screening provision also does
not affect the rule that a court reviewing a complaint must accept as true all allegations of
material fact and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, or the rule that
courts must construe pro se pleadings liberally. 168
Before the PLRA, dismissal as frivolous or malicious under the IFP statutes was within
the district courts’ discretion. The PLRA has expanded the grounds for dismissal to include
failure to state a claim and seeking damages from a party who is immune from damages, and
has made dismissal mandatory rather than discretionary. The way in which appeals courts
review PLRA dismissals has not been fully settled. Some courts have held that dismissal
under the PLRA is subject to de novo review—which means that the appeals court may
decide the matter however it thinks best. 169 However, some courts have limited de novo
review to dismissals for failure to state a claim, and have held that dismissals deemed
frivolous or malicious remain subject to an “abuse of discretion” standard (which means that
the appeals court will not overrule the district court’s decision unless it thinks the district
court made a very big mistake). 170 Other courts have not fully addressed the question. 171 The
Second Circuit has held that the de novo standard applies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(2), 172 but has not addressed dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). 173
One court has held that the PLRA-dictated screening process is generally good cause for
extending the 120-day time period for serving process. 174
The screening provisions have been held not to deny due process, 175 equal protection, 176
or the right of access to the courts. 177
the plaintiff an opportunity to amend is generally error; however, it is harmless error to dismiss
without prejudice).
167. In McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 612 (6th Cir. 1997), the court said: “Under the
Prison Litigation Act, courts have no discretion in permitting a plaintiff to amend a complaint to avoid
a sua sponte dismissal.” However, the Supreme Court has just held, in connection with the PLRA’s
administrative exhaustion requirement, that the screening requirement “does not—explicitly or
implicitly—justify deviating from the usual procedural practice beyond the departures specified by the
PLRA itself.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 206, 127 S. Ct. 910, 916, 166 L. Ed. 2d 798, 807 (2007). Since
a plaintiff’s right to amend the complaint freely—and without even asking the court’s permission, if an
answer has not been filed—is part of the “usual procedural practice,” it would appear that the basis for
the Sixth Circuit’s holding has been undermined. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a).
168. See Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446 (9th Cir. 2000) (agreeing with district court’s
liberal construction of pro se pleading); Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795–96 (2d Cir.
1999) (per curiam) (noting that pro se complaints must be read liberally).
169. See Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that dismissals for
failure to state a claim are reviewed de novo); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir.
1997) (concluding that provision requires de novo review).
170. See Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1348–49 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that abuse of
discretion standard was proper for review of dismissal based on frivolity); Harper v. Showers, 174 F.3d
716, 718 n.3 (5th Cir. 1998) (disavowing contrary authority and stating that de novo review is only
appropriate for dismissals for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted).
171. See Jackson v. Ward, No. 98-7181, 185 F.3d 874, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 25909, at *1 (10th
Cir. July 15, 1999) (unpublished) (holding that dismissals under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) as frivolous or
malicious are reviewed for abuse of discretion, but the court should “consider, inter alia, whether the
plaintiff is proceeding pro se and whether the district court inappropriately resolved genuine issues of
material fact”); Mathis v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 133 F.3d 546, 547 (7th Cir. 1998) (not deciding question);
McWilliams v. Colorado, 121 F.3d 573, 574–75 (10th Cir. 1997) (stating that § 1915(e)(2) dismissals are
reviewed for abuse of discretion; case before court was frivolous).
172. Liner v. Goord, 196 F.3d 132, 134 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that “28 U.S.C. § 1915A and 42
U.S.C. § 1999e(c)(2) dismissals are subject to de novo review”).
173. Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 364 n.2 (2d Cir. 2000)
(indicating the standard of review for § 1915(e) is unsettled law).
174. Shabazz v. Franklin, 380 F. Supp. 2d 793, 799–800 (N.D. Tex. 2005).

E. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The PLRA exhaustion requirement says:
No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42
U.S.C. § 1983] ... or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in
any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted. 178
More prisoners lose their cases because of failure to exhaust administrative remedies—
that is, failure to pursue all available administrative remedies to the end—than from any
other part of the PLRA. Here is the bottom line: if something happens to you that you may
want to bring suit about,
(1) Find out what remedies are available right away, because time deadlines are often
very short. If you wait until you have firmly decided whether to sue, it may be too
late to exhaust.
(2) Always use the prison grievance system or any other available remedy, such as a
disciplinary appeal.
(3) If you think there is a reason why you should not have to exhaust your
administrative remedies, forget it. Exhaust anyway.
(4) Take all the available appeals, even if you get what you think is a good decision at an
earlier point.
(5) If you do not get an answer to a grievance, try to appeal anyway. Many grievance
systems say that if a certain amount of time passes and there’s no decision, you can
treat the non-response as a denial of the grievance, and appeal.
(6) If you’re not sure which remedy to use, try all available remedies.
(7) If prison employees tell you an issue is not grievable but you think it is, request that
they process your grievance anyway so you will have a record of it. (And, if there is a
way to appeal or grieve a decision that something is not grievable, do it!)
(8) If prison employees tell you something will be taken care of and you do not need to
file a grievance, exhaust anyway if you think there is any chance you may wish to file
suit.
(9) Follow the rules of the grievance system or other remedy as best you can.
(10) If the people running the grievance system or in charge of the remedy tell you that
you filed your grievance incorrectly and you need to do something differently to fix it,
follow the instructions and make a record of what you were told.
(11) If you make a mistake, like missing a time deadline, do not give up. File the
grievance anyway, explain the reasons, and ask that your grievance be considered
despite your mistake, and appeal as far as you can if you lose.
Always remember that once you file suit, prison officials and their lawyers will use
anything they can find to get your case thrown out of court, and they will look for any
175. Vanderberg v. Donaldson, 259 F.3d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir. 2001) (“The complained of
procedure did not deny Plaintiff due process.”); Curley v. Perry, 246 F.3d 1278, 1283–84 (10th Cir.
2001) (finding no due process violation).
176. Vanderberg v. Donaldson, 259 F.3d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[S]ection 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)
is rationally related to the government's legitimate interests in deterring meritless claims and
conserving judicial resources and, therefore, does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.”); Curley v.
Perry, 246 F.3d 1278, 1285 (10th Cir. 2001), (addressing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(ii)(B)(ii) and finding no
equal protection violation, but not addressing 18 U.S.C. § 1915A); Christiansen v. Clarke, 147 F.3d 655,
657–58 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding statute survives equal protection challenge); Hanley v. Stewart, 21 F.
Supp. 2d 1088, 1093 (D. Ariz. 1998) (same).
177 . Martin v. Scott, 156 F.3d 578, 580 n.2 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding provision does not
unconstitutionally restrict access to federal courts).
178. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2006).

possible basis to say that you filed incorrectly and should not be allowed to sue. You want to
show the court that you did everything you could to comply with the exhaustion requirement,
which requires following the prison’s rules for grievances and other complaints or appeals.
The PLRA makes exhaustion of the grievance system mandatory. 179 That is true even if
you are suing for damages and the grievance system does not provide damages. 180 If you do
not exhaust your administrative remedies, your case will be dismissed rather than stayed
(held pending exhaustion), 181 although a recent Supreme Court decision supports an
argument that that rule is not necessarily valid in every case. 182 You must exhaust before you
file suit, not afterward, or your case will be dismissed. 183 Dismissal for non-exhaustion is
supposed to be “without prejudice,” 184 meaning in theory that you can come back to court
after you pursue your grievance. In reality, your grievance will almost certainly be late by
that time, 185 and it will be up to prison officials to decide whether to allow you to pursue a
late grievance. See Part E(6) of this Chapter for more information about time limits. If the
statute of limitations (time limit) has run on your claim when it is dismissed, your case may
179. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524, 122 S. Ct. 983, 988, 152 L. Ed. 2d 12, 21 (2002)
(requiring exhaustion). Though mandatory, exhaustion is not jurisdictional. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S.
81, 101, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2392, 165 L. Ed. 2d 368, 385 (2006). That means if you didn’t exhaust and you
think you have a good enough reason, the court at least has the power to consider your argument—
though such arguments rarely succeed, as discussed throughout this Chapter.
180. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 738, 121 S. Ct. 1819, 1824, 149 L .Ed. 2d 958, 965 (2001).
181. Neal v. Goord, 267 F.3d 116, 121–23 (2d Cir. 2001); Perez v. Wis. Dep’t of Corr., 182 F.3d
532, 534–35 (7th Cir. 1999).
A few decisions have granted stays pending exhaustion under unusual circumstances. See Kennedy
v. Mendez, No. 3:CV-03-1366, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20170, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 7, 2004) (unpublished)
(stating a stay was appropriate because exhaustion was raised when the litigation was at an advanced
state); Campbell v. Chaves, 402 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1108–09 (D. Ariz. 2005) (staying litigation and
directing the prison system to consider a grievance where the prisoner had filed a tort claim rather
than a grievance at staff direction, the tort claim had been rejected for jurisdictional reasons, and
meanwhile the grievance system rules had been changed so the matter would have been grievable).
182. In Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 212–17, 127 S. Ct. 910, 919–22, 166 L. Ed. 2d 798, 810–34
(2007), the Supreme Court held that the PLRA did not overturn usual litigation practices except to the
extent it did so explicitly. The discretion to grant a stay is part of usual litigation practice. Congress did
not say anything in the PLRA about stays pending exhaustion—it just removed the prior provision
requiring a stay when a court thought exhaustion should be required—so it can be argued that courts
retain their discretion in this regard. See Cruz v. Jordan, 80 F. Supp. 2d 109, 124 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(“There is simply no evidence that Congress intended by Section 1997e(a) to remove every aspect of the
district court's traditional equity jurisdiction.”). Even if a court was persuaded by this argument, we
would expect it would only grant a stay if the prisoner had a pretty good reason for not having
exhausted before filing, as in the cases in the previous footnote.
183. Neal v. Goord, 267 F.3d 116, 121–23 (2d Cir. 2001); Jackson v. District of Columbia, 254
F.3d 262, 269 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Perez v. Wis. Dep’t of Corr., 182 F.3d 532, 534–35 (7th Cir. 1999);
Freeman v. Francis, 196 F.3d 641, 644 (6th Cir. 1999); Wendell v. Asher, 162 F.3d 887, 890 (5th Cir.
1998). But see Curry v. Scott, 249 F.3d 493, 502 (6th Cir. 2001) (stating that pre-filing exhaustion is
“the preferred practice,” but allowing exhaustion prior to filing an amended complaint in a case filed
shortly after the PLRA’s enactment that involved some pre-PLRA conduct).
184. Wendell v. Asher, 162 F.3d 887, 892 (5th Cir. 1998). Some courts have held dismissal may
be with prejudice if you clearly cannot at that point exhaust and then re-file. See, e.g., Berry v. Kerik,
366 F.3d 85, 87–88 (2d Cir. 2004). One federal appeals court has held all dismissals for non-exhaustion
should be without prejudice, since, among other things, states may allow litigants to cure failure to
exhaust, or plaintiffs may be able to proceed without exhaustion in state court, and defenses to a new
suit should be addressed in that suit. Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 401 (7th Cir. 2004).
185. Regan v. Frank, No. 06-00066 JMS-LEK, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1747, at *8–12 (D. Haw.
Jan. 9, 2007) (unpublished).

e permanently barred for that reason too. 186 So, it is very important to get exhaustion right
the first time, since you may not get a second chance.
If you do manage to exhaust after a dismissal, you may have to pay a new fee to re-file
your case, though this is not certain. 187 In addition, you may be charged a “strike,” which
may affect your ability to proceed in forma pauperis in the future. 188 (See Part C above for
more information on the PLRA’s “three strikes” provision.) One federal circuit has held
dismissal for failure to exhaust is with prejudice as to your ability to proceed in forma
pauperis—that is, you will have to pay the filing fee up front if you exhaust and re-file your
case. 189 This holding appears contrary to the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Jones v.
Bock, which stated courts cannot just make up rules under the PLRA contrary to usual
federal litigation practice. 190
The exhaustion provision of the PLRA applies to any case brought by a “a prisoner
confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility” about prison conditions under
federal law. 191 A case is “brought by a prisoner” if the plaintiff is a prisoner at the time of
filing; if not, the plaintiff need not have exhausted. 192 PLRA exhaustion does not apply to
petitions for habeas corpus, though habeas has its own slightly different exhaustion
186. There may be “tolling” provisions of state law suspending the operation of the statute of
limitations when you bring a suit, it is dismissed, and you have to re-file it. See Part E(6) of this
Chapter for more information about tolling.
187. Courts have generally said that a new case must be filed after dismissal for non-exhaustion,
rather than reopening the dismissed case. See Williams v. Ramirez, No. CIV S-06-1882 MCE DAD P,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61617, at *3–4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2006) (unpublished) (advising plaintiff that a
new post-exhaustion complaint should not bear the docket number of the dismissed action; a new in
forma pauperis application is required); Baggett v. Smith, No. 1:05-cv-804, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
44859, at *1 (W.D. Mich. June 29, 2006) (unpublished). Ordinarily this would require a new filing fee.
However, the only federal circuit actually to focus on the filing fee question held that a plaintiff need
not pay a new filing fee when re-filing a claim that was previously dismissed for non-exhaustion.
Owens v. Keeling, 461 F.3d 763, 772–74 (6th Cir. 2006). The court explained that the filing fee is
required of parties “instituting” a civil action, 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a), and that re-filing a now-exhausted
claim is not “instituting” suit but merely following the court-prescribed procedure for curing the initial
complaint’s deficiency.
188. For more information about this issue, see Part C(1) of this Chapter. As explained there, if
your complaint is dismissed because non-exhaustion is apparent on the face of the complaint, the
dismissal may be a strike. Otherwise, it should not be, but some courts have used other questionable
justifications for charging prisoners a strike for exhaustion-related dismissals.
189. Underwood v. Wilson, 151 F.3d 292, 296 (5th Cir. 1998). At least one district court has held
that this disposition is appropriate only if the whole case is not exhausted. Cantoral v. Dretke, No.
Civ.A. 6:05CV96, 2005 WL 2297222, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 19, 2005) (unpublished).
190. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 212–14, 127 S. Ct. 910, 919–20 (2007). It is also contrary to
the decision in Owens v. Keeling, which held that if you exhaust and re-file after a dismissal for nonexhaustion,
you do not have to pay a new fee at all. Owens v. Keeling, 461 F.3d 763 (6th Cir. 2006).
Courts in the Fifth Circuit seem not to have re-examined the Underwood holding in light of Jones. See
Barnes v. Brownlow, No. 6:08cv194, 2008 WL 2704868, at *3 (E.D. Tex. July 7, 2008) (unpublished);
McGrew v. Teer, No. 07-702-JVP DLD, 2008 WL 2277818, at *2 (M.D. La. June 3, 2008) (unpublished);
Johns v. Edwards, No. 06-3767, 2007 WL 1958962, at *3 (E.D. La. June 28, 2007) (unpublished) (all
following Underwood without question).
191. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2006). For more discussion of when a person is a prisoner for PLRA
purposes, see footnotes 47–58 and text accompanying them.
192 . Ahmed v. Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201, 210 n.10 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing cases); Janes v.
Hernandez, 215 F.3d 541, 543 (5th Cir. 2000); Greig v. Goord, 169 F.3d 165, 167 (2d Cir. 1999); see also
Jasperson v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 460 F. Supp. 2d 76, 87 (D.D.C. 2006) (plaintiff who filed a
challenge to restrictions on placement in halfway house before he surrendered to the Bureau of Prisons
did not have to exhaust because he was not yet confined, even if he was legally in Bureau’s custody).
The PLRA’s administrative exhaustion requirement, discussed in Part E of this Chapter, applies to
“a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility,” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2006). The
difference in phrasing does not seem to make any substantive difference.

equirement. 193 PLRA exhaustion, however, has been applied in Section 1983 actions filed in
state court, including those later removed to federal court. 194
Most courts have held there is no emergency exception to the exhaustion requirement. 195
There are a few decisions that have allowed cases to go forward without exhaustion to avoid
irreparable harm, 196 but they mostly do not provide much legal justification for disregarding
the exhaustion requirement. The strongest basis for requesting court intervention without
waiting for exhaustion is to appeal to a court’s traditional powers of discretion. 197 No one
seems to have obtained relief on that basis yet (though one court threatened to grant it, and
jail officials hastily addressed the problem), 198 but the argument may have been
strengthened by the recent Supreme Court decision holding that courts should not deviate
from the usual practices of litigation unless the PLRA explicitly says so. 199 Nevertheless, this
argument is unlikely to succeed except in extreme cases. If you are arguing for relief
“pending” exhaustion, you should have the grievance process under way when you do.
For information about the New York State prison grievance system, see JLM Chapter 15,
“Inmate Grievance Procedures.”
1. What Is Exhaustion?
Exhaustion under the PLRA means “proper exhaustion,” which is “compliance with an
agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules.” 200 Part C(5) of this Chapter discusses
this point in detail.
Exhaustion also means taking your complaint all the way to the top of the internal
prison complaint process that applies to your problem, whatever that process may be
(usually the grievance system). You must take every appeal available to you, 201 and finish
193 . United States v. McGriff, 468 F. Supp. 2d 445, 447 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (noting habeas
exhaustion requirement can be dispensed with on grounds of futility or prevention of irreparable harm,
unlike the PLRA requirement).
194. See, e.g., Johnson v. State of La. ex rel. Dep’t of Public Safety & Corr., 468 F.3d 278, 280 (5th
Cir. 2006) (“The PLRA's exhaustion requirement applies to all Section 1983 claims regardless of
whether the inmate files his claim in state or federal court.”).
195. See, e.g., Williams v. CDCR, No. CIV S-06-1373 MCE EFB P, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60701,
at *15 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2007) (unpublished) (“The presence of exigent circumstances does not relieve
a plaintiff from fulfilling this requirement.”), report and recommendation adopted, No. CIV S-06-1373
MCE EFB P, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71338 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2007) (unpublished); Bovarie v.
Giurbino, 421 F. Supp. 2d 1309, 1314 (S.D. Cal. 2006) (holding “irrelevant” prisoner’s claim that the
time constraints imposed on him by litigation did not allow for completion of grievance process
concerning law library access).
196. See Evans v. Saar, 412 F. Supp. 2d 519, 527 (D. Md. 2006) (declining to dismiss for nonexhaustion,
given “shortness of time,” where plaintiff challenged the protocol for his impending
execution and the grievance process was not complete); Howard v. Ashcroft, 248 F. Supp. 2d 518, 533–
34 (M.D. La. 2003) (holding that prisoner fighting transfer from community corrections to a prison need
not exhaust where appeal would take months and prison officials wanted to transfer her despite any
pending appeal).
197. Jackson v. District of Columbia, 254 F.3d 262, 267–68 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
198. Tvelia v. Dep’t of Corr., No. Civ. 03-537-M, 2004 WL 298100, at *2 (D.N.H. Feb. 13, 2004)
(unpublished). Several courts have rejected the idea of granting relief pending exhaustion, but they did
not seem to be aware of Jackson. See, e.g., Blain v. Bassett, No. 7:07-cv-00552, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
86167, at *6–7 (W.D. Va. Nov. 21, 2007) (refusing to direct delay of new prison rule pending plaintiff’s
exhaustion and dismissing action; Jackson not cited).
199. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 212–14, 127 S. Ct. 910, 919–20, 166 L. Ed. 798, 810–11 (2007).
The Court specifically referred to the usual practice under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Injunctions, including preliminary injunctions, are addressed in Rule 65.
200. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90–91, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2385–86, 165 L. Ed. 2d. 368, 378
(2006).
201. See Wright v. Hollingsworth, 260 F.3d 357, 358 (5th Cir. 2001); White v. McGinnis, 131 F.3d
593, 595 (6th Cir. 1997) (affirming dismissal for failing to appeal denial of grievance); Lopez v. Smiley,

the process before you file suit. 202 Once the deadline for final decision of your last appeal has
passed, you can file suit. 203 (If a prisoner files suit after the time limit for decision has
passed, and then grievance authorities issue a late decision, the prisoner has exhausted. 204 )
It is not clear how long you have to wait if the system has no deadline for deciding your final
appeal. 205 A number of decisions have said that if you do not get a response to your initial
grievance, you have exhausted. 206 However, other courts have said that if the grievance
system allows you to treat a non-response as a denial and appeal it, you must do so. 207 When
No. 3:02CV1020 (RNC), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16724, at *4 (D. Conn. Sept. 22, 2003) (unpublished)
(holding that a prisoner who appealed, but whose appeal was not received and was told it was too late
to file another, had exhausted).
202. Johnson v. Jones, 340 F.3d 624, 627–28 (8th Cir. 2003); Neal v. Goord, 267 F.3d 116, 122 (2d
Cir. 2001). Some courts have taken this idea to an extreme and have held that prisoners cannot add
additional claims by amending their complaints unless the new claims were exhausted before the
initial complaint was filed. See, e.g., Harbin-Bey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571, 580 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding
that claims post-dating the original complaint and exhausted after its filing could not be added). Most
courts, however, have said that as long as the new issues were exhausted before you try to add them to
the case, you can amend to add them. See Cannon v. Washington, 418 F.3d 714, 719–20 (7th Cir. 2005)
(rejecting defendants’ argument that new claims could not be added by amendment even if they had
been exhausted); Barnes v. Briley, 420 F.3d 673, 677–78 (7th Cir. 2005). That view is consistent with
the Supreme Court’s recent holding that the PLRA does not require deviating from ordinary federal
procedural practice except insofar as it says so explicitly. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 210–12, 127 S.
Ct. 910, 918–19, 166 L. Ed. 2d. 798, 810–11 (2007). The free amendment of complaints is part of
ordinary federal procedural practice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a).
203. Whitington v. Ortiz, 472 F.3d 804, 807–08 (10th Cir. 2007); Powe v. Ennis, 177 F.3d 393,
393 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (“A prisoner’s administrative remedies are deemed exhausted when a
valid grievance has been filed and the state’s time for responding thereto has expired.”); Mattress v.
Taylor, 487 F. Supp. 2d 665, 670–62 (D.S.C. 2007) (holding plaintiff had exhausted where the deadline
for final decision was 180 days and plaintiff had waited 11 months to file).
204. See, e.g., Magee v. Chavez, No. 1:05-cv-01563-OWW-DLB PC, 2008 WL 2283133, at *3 (E.D.
Cal. May 30, 2008) (unpublished), report and recommendaton vacated on other grounds, 2008 WL
2858198 (E.D. Cal. July 24, 2008) (unpublished). But see Sergent v. Norris, 330 F.3d 1084, 1085–86 (8th
Cir. 2003) (affirming dismissal for non-exhaustion where time for response had passed before suit was
filed, but prisoner had not made that clear to the district court).
205. See McNeal v. Cook County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 282 F. Supp. 2d 865, 868 n.3 (N.D. Ill. 2003)
(holding 11 months is long enough to wait and citing cases holding that seven months is long enough
but one month is not). However, the Seventh Circuit said, in connection with a grievance system that
called for appeal decisions within 60 days “whenever possible,” that the remedy did not become
“unavailable” and allowed the prisoner to bring suit because it took six months to get a decision. “Even
six months is prompt compared with the time often required to exhaust appellate remedies from a
conviction.” Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 400 (7th Cir. 2004).
206. See, e.g., Brengettcy v. Horton, 423 F.3d 674, 682 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding prisoner who
received no decision had exhausted where the grievance policy did not say what to do absent a
decision); Boyd v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 380 F.3d 989, 996 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that “administrative
remedies are exhausted when prison officials fail to timely respond to a properly filed grievance,”
though distinguishing a case where the prisoner could proceed without a decision); Lewis v.
Washington, 300 F.3d 829, 833 (7th Cir. 2003) (non-response made remedy unavailable).
207. See Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077, 1083–84 (11th Cir. 2008) (where prisoner alleged
that the warden tore up his grievance, he would have been obliged to file an appeal from the lack of a
decision, except that the warden also threatened him); Cox v. Mayer, 332 F.3d 422, 425 n.2 (6th Cir.
2003); Clarke v. Thornton, 515 F. Supp. 2d 435, 438–41 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Martinez v. Dr. Williams R.,
186 F. Supp 2d 353, 357 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2002) (finding that prisoner who received no response after
filing a grievance should have appealed the grievance and thus did not exhaust his administrative
remedies); Smith v. Stubblefield, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1174 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (holding that a prisoner
must pursue all appeals available within the administrative remedies to fulfill the exhaustion
requirement). The New York State grievance rules provide that issues not decided within the
prescribed time limits can be appealed unless the prisoner has consented to an extension of time. State
of New York, Department of Correctional Services, Directive No. 4040 § V(G), Inmate Grievance

in doubt, try to appeal, even if officials have failed to respond. Prison officials cannot keep
you out of court by simply ignoring your grievances, 208 but once you bring suit, they may try
to make it look as if you did not try hard enough to exhaust.
Courts have said that if you win your grievance before the final stage and do not appeal,
you have exhausted, since it makes no sense to appeal if you win. 209 You are best advised not
to rely on that proposition, sensible as it is, because courts have also held that if you do not
win all possible relief in the grievance, you have not exhausted all available remedies. 210 In
hindsight, prison officials and their lawyers will always be able to think of some relief you
could theoretically have obtained, and the court may accept their arguments. 211 Courts have
Program (1998) (as revised Aug. 22, 2003); N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 7, § 701.8 (2001). The New
York City grievance rules say essentially the same thing. See City of New York, Department of
Corrections, Directive No. 3375R § III.6, Inmate Grievance Program (1998) (as revised Mar. 4, 1985).
208. See Duke v. Hardin County, No. 3:05CV-496-S, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25701, at *4–5 (W.D.
Ky. Mar. 31, 2008) (holding prisoner exhausted where he received a response stating the matter had
been investigated and turned over to the Jailer, and the Jailer never responded); Brown v.
Koenigsmann, No. 01 Civ. 10013, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17009, at *9–11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2003)
(unpublished); John v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Corr., 183 F. Supp. 2d 619, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (rejecting
argument that after three years, prisoner must continue waiting for a decision); see Maraglia v.
Maloney, 499 F. Supp. 2d 93, 97 (D. Mass. 2007) (holding that prisoner was not required to file a
grievance about the failure to respond to a grievance absent a regulation to that effect). In Dole v.
Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 811–12 (7th Cir. 2006), the court held a prisoner had exhausted when he did
everything necessary to exhaust but his grievance simply disappeared, and he received no instructions
as to what if anything to do about it.
209. See Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 935 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding “a prisoner need not press on
to exhaust further levels of review once he has either received all ‘available’ remedies at an
intermediate level of review or been reliably informed by an administrator that no remedies are
available.”); Abney v. McGinnis, 380 F.3d 663, 669 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding a prisoner who repeatedly got
favorable decisions that later were not carried out had exhausted despite failure to appeal the favorable
decisions); Henderson v. Moore, No. C-08-036, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50726, at *14 (S.D. Tex. July 2,
2008) (unpublished) (exhaustion not required when prison officials failed to respond to previous
grievance); Lay v. Hall, No. CIV-S-05-2542 LKK EFB P, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3317, at *21 (E.D. Cal.
Jan. 17, 2007) (unpublished) (holding that a prisoner, who raised a grievance about the failure to
provide surgery and got a decision stating that a request for surgery had been as a result, exhausted all
remedies); Bolton v. U.S., 347 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1220 (N.D. Fla. 2004) (holding a prisoner exhausted
when she complained informally, the first step of the Federal Bureau of Prisons remedy, and the
offending officer resigned when confronted; stating that “[w]hen a prisoner wins in the administrative
process, he or she need not continue to appeal the favorable ruling”); Sulton v. Wright, 265 F. Supp. 2d
292, 298–99 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (prisoner not required to complain after his grievance has been addressed
but not corrected); Dixon v. Goord, 224 F. Supp. 2d 739, 749 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“The exhaustion
requirement is satisfied by resolution of the matter, i.e., an inmate is not required to continue to
complain after his grievances have been addressed.”).
210. See Ross v. County of Bernalillo, 365 F.3d 1181, 1187 (10th Cir. 2004) (“When there is no
possibility of any further relief, the prisoner’s duty to exhaust available administrative remedies is
complete.”) (emphasis added); see also Garcia v. Kirkland, No. C 05-0341 MMC (PR), 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 90878, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2006) (unpublished) (holding grievance partially granted left
prisoner with available remedies, since he could appeal); Rivera v. Pataki, No. 01 civ. 5179 (MBM),
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11266, at *27 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2005) (noting it “made sense” for a prisoner to
appeal where an intermediate decision granted some relief but did not change the challenged policy).
211. See, e.g., Braham v. Clancy, 425 F.3d 177, 182–83 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding a prisoner who
asked for a cell change informally and got it failed to exhaust because he did not go on to file a formal
grievance, which could have led to further relief like policy changes or staff discipline); accord Ruggiero
v. County of Orange, 467 F.3d 170, 178 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding prisoner who prevailed informally was
required to exhaust the grievance process because of “the larger interests at stake”). Another circuit
has rejected this idea, stating that “we do not think it [is the prisoner’s] responsibility to notify persons
higher in the chain when this notification would be solely for the benefit of the prison administration.”

held that if you have been “reliably informed by an administrator that no remedies are
available,” you are not required to pursue the process any further. 212 If you do not have such
an assurance, and you want to bring suit, it may be advisable to appeal any decision all the
way up, no matter what. If you have to explain why you are appealing in these
circumstances, you could say something like “to exhaust my administrative remedies by
calling this problem to the attention of high-level officials so they can take whatever action is
necessary to make sure it never happens again.” 213
Exhaustion generally means using whatever formal complaint procedure is available
(usually a grievance system or administrative appeal). “Proper exhaustion” is required—that
is, you must follow the rules of the prison procedure. 214 If you do that, courts cannot require
you to do more. 215 Letters and other informal means of complaint, such as cooperating in an
internal affairs or inspector general investigation, generally will not suffice to exhaust 216
unless the prison rules identify them as an alternative means of complaint, 217 or unless there
Thornton v. Snyder, 428 F.3d 690, 696–97 (7th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2862, 165 L. Ed. 2d
896 (2006).
212. Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 935 (9th Cir. 2005); Hendon v. Ramsey, No. 06CV1060 J
(NLS), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27658, at *9–15 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2007) (unpublished) (holding plaintiff
did not need to name all defendants in complaint, nor did he have to name all the dates on which the
harm occurred); Cahill v. Arpaio, No. CV 05-0741-PHX-MHM (JCG), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80772, at
*7–8 (D. Ariz. Nov. 2, 2006) (unpublished) (holding plaintiff reasonably relied on grievance hearing
officer telling him that “(1) the matter was under investigation and he would not be notified of the
results, (2) he could not appeal and would not be given a form, and (3) he should proceed to federal
court,” notwithstanding that the preprinted decision form said it could be appealed); Candler v.
Woodford, No. C 05-5453 MMC (PR), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83988, at *26 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2007)
(unpublished) (holding that failure to exhaust does not apply when plaintiff was told he could not
appeal decision).
Similarly, courts have held that if a prisoner’s grievance is rejected on the ground that the prisoner
has already received the relief sought, he has exhausted. Elkins v. Schrubbe, No. 04-C-85, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 43157, at *154–55 (E.D. Wis. June 15, 2006) (unpublished) (holding prisoner had no
remaining “available” remedy where grievances were rejected as moot because the issue had already
been resolved in his favor in that he received the requested relief).
213. See Ruggiero v. County of Orange, 467 F.3d 170, 177 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding prisoner who
obtained what he wanted informally was still required to exhaust because a grievance “still would have
allowed prison officials to reconsider their policies and discipline any officer who had failed to follow
existing policies”).
214. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 106, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2394, 165 L. Ed. 2d 368, 387 (2006)
(“[T]he Court conludes that the ‘PLRA exhaustion requirement requires proper exhaustion.’”) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
215. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 217–19, 127 S. Ct. 910, 922–23, 166 L. Ed. 2d 798, 815 (2007)
(“Compliance with prison grievance procedures ... is all that is required by the PLRA to ‘properly
exhaust.’”)
216. See Ruggiero v. County of Orange, 467 F.3d 170, 177 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that talking
with Sheriff’s Department investigators rather than filing a jail grievance did not satisfy the
exhaustion requirement); Panaro v. City of North Las Vegas, 432 F.3d 949, 953 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding
that participation in an internal affairs investigation did not exhaust because it did not provide a
remedy for the prisoner, even though the officer was disciplined); Yousef v. Reno, 254 F.3d 1214, 1221–
22 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that a letter to the Attorney General was insufficient to exhaust as to
actions that had been authorized by the Attorney General, despite the government’s lack of clarity as to
what authority the administrative remedy procedure might have over the Attorney General’s
decisions); Chelette v. Harris, 229 F.3d 684, 688 (8th Cir. 2000) (telling the warden about the problem
did not exhaust even though the warden said he would “take care” of it); Freeman v. Francis, 196 F.3d
641, 644 (6th Cir. 1999) (prompting a use of force investigation did not substitute for filing a grievance);
Scott v. Gardner. 287 F. Supp. 2d 477, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (letters of complaint are not part of the
grievance process and do not exhaust).
217. In Pavey v. Conley, 170 F. App’x 4, 8, (7th Cir. 2006), the plaintiff alleged that prison staff
had broken his arm and he couldn’t write, and the grievance rules said that prisoners who couldn’t

are “special circumstances” justifying your failure to exhaust properly. 218 In a few cases,
courts have held that non-grievance complaints that were in fact reviewed at the highest
levels of the agency satisfied the exhaustion requirement in the particular circumstances of
those cases, 219 though it is not clear whether these cases are good law after the Woodford
“proper exhaustion” holding.
The Second Circuit has issued contradictory decisions concerning informal remedies. It
first held a prisoner who resolved his complaint successfully through informal channels met
the exhaustion requirement because the New York State grievance procedure states it is
“intended to supplement, not replace, existing formal or informal channels of problem
resolution.” 220 Under that ruling, using informal channels will not meet the exhaustion
requirement unless your problem is actually resolved through them, 221 so you will need to file
a formal grievance or appeal. In later decisions, however, the Second Circuit called the idea
of informal exhaustion into question. It held a prisoner who got what he asked for in an
informal process should have filed a formal grievance anyway because that process could
write could be assisted by staff. The court held that any memorialization of his complaint by
investigating prison staff might qualify as a grievance—and even if they did not write it down, he
might have “reasonably believed that he had done all that was necessary to comply with” the policy. See
also Carter v. Symmes, No. 06-10273-PBS, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7680, at *8 (D. Mass. Feb. 4, 2008)
(unpublished) (timely letter from counsel served to exhaust where grievance rules did not specify use of
a form; letter considered as part of prisoners’ grievance raising other issues); Rand v. Simonds, 422 F.
Supp. 2d 318, 326 (D.N.H. 2006) (holding that a policy stating prisoners have the “right and
opportunity” to file grievances “did not fairly suggest that the grievance procedure was the only way, or
even the correct way, for inmates to complain about their treatment”); Carter v. Klaus, No. 1:CV-05-
1995, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93031, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2006) (unpublished) (noting that prison
policy allowed physical abuse complaints to be pursued as grievances or as complaints to the Office of
Professional Responsibility); Shaheed-Muhammad v. Dipaolo, 393 F. Supp. 2d 80, 96–97 (D. Mass.
2005) (concluding that letters to officials are considered grievances under state law).
218. For information about what counts as a “special circumstance,” see Part E(5) of this
Chapter, “What if You Make a Mistake Trying to Exhaust?”
219. See Camp v. Brennan, 219 F.3d 279, 280 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that use of force allegation
reportedly investigated and rejected by Secretary of Correction’s office needed no further exhaustion);
Noguera v. Hasty, No. 99 Civ. 8786 (KMW) (AJP), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2458, at *11–12 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 12, 2001) (unpublished) (exhaustion requirement satisfied in unusual case where the prisoner’s
informal complaint of rape resulted in an Internal Affairs investigation); Roland v. Murphy, 289 F.
Supp. 2d 321, 324 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (complaints to Sheriff’s Department Internal Affairs unit and
District Attorney’s office gave “ample opportunity” to address complaint internally.)
These cases are unusual and you should not bypass the grievance system and count on getting such
a decision. But, if you are in the position where you must argue that another kind of complaint meets
the exhaustion requirement, be sure to remind the court that the Supreme Court, in discussing
Congress’ purpose in requiring exhaustion, said that “Congress afforded corrections officials time and
opportunity to address complaints internally before allowing the initiation of a federal case.” Porter v.
Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 525, 122 S. Ct. 983, 988, L. Ed. 2d. 12, 22 (2002). You can then argue that if
prison officials actually reviewed your complaint, they had the opportunity to address the complaint
internally, and the exhaustion requirement was therefore satisfied. The likelihood of success of this
argument is not high. See, e.g., Macias v. Zenk, 495 F.3d 37, 43–44 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding “after
Woodford, notice alone is insufficient”; the PLRA requires both “substantive exhaustion” (notice to
officials) and “procedural exhaustion” (following the rules)).
220. Marvin v. Goord, 255 F.3d 40, 43 n.3 (2d Cir. 2001); see Gibson v. Brooks, 335 F. Supp. 2d
325, 328–29 (D. Conn. Sept. 16, 2004) (holding that a prisoner who said he complained informally about
an assault he had warned prison staff about, and who had received an apology, had sufficiently alleged
a favorable resolution).
221. See, e.g., Thomas v. Cassleberry, 315 F. Supp. 2d 301, 304 (W.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding a
complaint to the Inspector General exhausts informally only if resolution is favorable); Rivera v. Goord,
253 F. Supp. 2d 735, 751 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2003) (holding a prisoner who began an investigation of his
claim, but did not show he got a favorable resolution informally or sought administrative review of an
unfavorable decision, had not exhausted informally).

have provided other relief, like changes in policy or discipline of staff. 222 So, if you solve your
problem informally but still want to bring suit about what happened, you should file a
grievance and pursue it all the way to the top. In this grievance, you could say, for example,
you want “prison officials to reconsider their policies and discipline any officer who had failed
to follow existing policies.” 223
The Second Circuit has held if a prisoner uses the wrong remedy through a reasonable
misunderstanding of the rules, the prisoner is justified in failing to exhaust correctly; if the
correct administrative remedy is still available, the prisoner must try to use it, but if it is no
longer available, the prisoner’s case may go forward without exhaustion. 224 A prisoner may
also be justified in failing to exhaust the correct procedures because of threats or
intimidation by prison staff. 225 These rules appear to still be good law after the Woodford
“proper exhaustion” ruling, since they address fact situations different than those before the
Supreme Court in Woodford. But the Second Circuit has not ruled on that question yet. 226
The exhaustion requirement refers only to administrative remedies; you do not have to
exhaust judicial remedies (i.e., go to state court) before you go to federal court. 227 That means
you do not have to appeal to the judiciary from administrative decisions in states that have
such procedures. 228 The administrative remedies Congress had in mind when it passed the
PLRA are internal prison grievance procedures. 229 A prisoner is not required to exhaust state
222. Braham v. Clancy, 425 F.3d 177, 183 (2d Cir. 2005); see also Ruggiero v. County of Orange,
467 F.3d 170, 177 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding prisoner beaten in jail, who talked to Sheriff’s Department
investigators and then was transferred, did not exhaust). Ruggiero says that Marvin v. Goord “does not
imply that a prisoner has exhausted his administrative remedies every time he receives his desired
relief through informal channels.”
223. Ruggiero v. County of Orange, 467 F.3d 170, 177 (2d Cir. 2006).
224. Giano v. Goord, 380 F.3d 670, 678–80 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that prisoner who used a
disciplinary appeal rather than a grievance for his issues did so reasonably); see also Hemphill v. New
York, 380 F.3d 680, 689–90 (2d Cir. 2004) (agreeing with Giano v. Goord, 380 F.3d 670 (2d Cir. 2004));
Warren v. Purcell, No. 03 Civ. 8736 (GEL), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17792, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3,
2004) (unpublished) (holding that a “baffling” grievance response that left the prisoner with no clue
what to do next was a special circumstance justifying failure to exhaust).
225. Hemphill v. New York, 380 F.3d 680, 688, 690 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting that a prisoner afraid
to file an internal grievance but not to appeal “directly to individuals in positions of greater authority
within the prison system, or to external structures of authority such as state or federal courts” might
have been justified in failing to exhaust).
226. Other courts have endorsed the Hemphill holding after the decision in Woodford. See Kaba
v. Stepp, 458 F.3d 678, 684–85 (7th Cir. 2006) (adopting Hemphill analysis); Stanley v. Rich, No. CV
605-075, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35916, at *5 (S.D. Ga. June 1, 2006) (unpublished) (stating “threats of
violent reprisal may, in some circumstances, render administrative remedies ‘unavailable’ or otherwise
justify an inmate’s failure to pursue them”).
227. By contrast, you must exhaust state judicial remedies before you can bring a case in federal
court challenging a decision affecting your release from incarceration, like a disciplinary proceeding at
which you lost good-time credits. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 647–49, 117 S. Ct. 1584, 1588–
89, 137 L. Ed. 2d 906, 914–15 (1997) (holding that a state prisoner’s claim for damages for violation of
his due process rights cannot be recognized in federal court if a verdict in his favor would imply the
invalidity of his sentence, unless that sentence has already been invalidated). This rule has nothing to
do with the PLRA.
228. See Jenkins v. Morton, 148 F.3d 257, 259–60 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding prisoner not required to
exhaust his state judicial remedies prior to bringing an action covered by PLRA); Mullins v. Smith, 14
F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1012 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (court dismissed plaintiff’s claim as frivolous, but noted that
plaintiff had exhausted his administrative remedies). New York does not have that kind of judicial
review procedure. Instead, New York permits review of administrative decisions by Article 78
proceedings. For more information on Article 78 proceedings, see JLM Chapter 22.
229. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 217–19, 127 S. Ct. 910, 922–23, 166 L. Ed. 2d 798, 815
(2007) (“Compliance with prison grievance procedures, therefore, is all that is required by the PLRA to
‘properly exhaust.’”) (emphasis added); Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524–25, 122 S. Ct. 983, 988, 152

or federal tort claim procedures, unless the prisoner wishes to sue under the tort claims
system. 230 (For information on tort claims generally, see Chapter 17 of the JLM, “The State’s
Duty to Protect You and Your Property: Tort Actions.”) Several New York federal courts have
held that prisoners making disability-related complaints must exhaust the U.S. Department
of Justice’s disability complaint procedure in addition to the prison grievance procedure. 231
Others have disagreed. 232 The state prison system has rejected that argument, 233 though
other state agencies continue to support it. 234 We think it is wrong, since, as noted, Congress
was concerned about internal prison procedures.
2. What Are Prison Conditions?
The exhaustion requirement applies to cases filed by prisoners about “prison conditions.”
The Supreme Court has said the phrase applies “to all inmate suits about prison life,
whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege
excessive force or some other wrong.” 235 In other words, if it happened to you in prison, it is
probably covered by the exhaustion requirement. 236 Prior decisions holding use of force cases
L. Ed. 2d 12, 21 (2002) (stating the exhaustion requirement was intended to give corrections officials
the opportunity to solve problems before suit was filed). See also O’Guinn v. Lovelock Corr. Ctr., 502
F.3d 1056, 1062–63 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding use of Department of Justice disability complaint process
did not satisfy PLRA exhaustion requirement); Massey v. Helman, 196 F.3d 727, 733–34 (7th Cir. 1999)
(holding PLRA requires exhaustion of internal prison remedies); Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321,
1326 (11th Cir. 1998) (same); Aiello v. Litscher, 104 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1074 (W.D. Wis. 2000) (prisoners
who had exhausted the grievance system were not required also to exhaust a procedure providing for
declaratory rulings by agencies).
230. See Macias v. Zenk, 495 F.3d 37, 42–44 (2d Cir. 2007); Garrett v. Hawk, 127 F.3d 1263,
1266 (10th Cir. 1997); Blas v. Endicott, 31 F. Supp. 2d 1131, 1132–34 (E.D. Wis. 1999).
231. William G. v. Pataki, No. 03 Civ. 8331 (RCC), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16716, at *20
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2005) (unpublished); Burgess v. Garvin, No. 01 Civ. 10994 (GEL), 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14419, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2003) (unpublished), on reconsideration, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4122 (S.D.N.Y. March 16, 2004) (unpublished).
232. Veloz v. State of New York, 2004 339 F. Supp. 2d 505, 517 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2004), aff’d,
No. 05-0272-pr, 178 F. App’x 39, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 10533 (2d Cir. Apr. 24, 2006) (unpublished);
Shariff v. Artuz, No. 99 Civ. 0321 (DC), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12248 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2000)
(unpublished); see O’Guinn v. Lovelock Corr. Ctr., 502 F.3d 1056, 1062–63 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding use
of Department of Justice disability complaint process did not satisfy PLRA exhaustion requirement).
233. Rosario v. Goord, 400 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
234. William G. v. Pataki, No. 03 Civ. 8331 (RCC), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16716 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
12, 2005) (unpublished) (accepting argument in action defended by state Division of Parole and Office of
Mental Health).
235. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532, 122 S. Ct. 983, 992, 152 L. Ed. 2d 12, 26 (2002).
236. See Krilich v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 346 F.3d 157, 159 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that
intrusions on attorney-client correspondence and telephone conversations are prison conditions
notwithstanding argument that attorney-client relationship “transcends the conditions of time and
place”); United States v. Carmichael, 343 F.3d 756, 762 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that statutorily
required DNA collection is a prison condition); Castano v. Neb. Dep’t of Corr., 201 F.3d 1023, 1024 (8th
Cir. 2000) (failure to provide interpreters for Spanish-speaking prisoners is a prison condition); Brewer
v. Philson, No. 06-1013, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2036, at *6 (W.D. Ark. Jan. 10, 2007) (unpublished)
(holding that excessive force on arrest does not require exhaustion, but excessive force after arrest in a
jail holding cell does); Ray v. Evercom Sys., Inc., No. 4:05-2904-RBH, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61132, at
*19 (D.S.C. Aug. 25, 2006) (unpublished) (holding antitrust suit about telephone service charges was
about prison conditions).
A rare exception to this rule of thumb is Ayyad v. Gonzales, No. 05-cv-02342-WYD-MJW, 2008 WL
203420, at *3 (D. Colo. Jan. 17, 2008) (unpublished), vacated on reconsideration on other grounds, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62863 (D. Colo. July 31, 2008) (unpublished), which holds that denial of a prisoner’s
ability to meet with clinical law students was not a matter of prison conditions, in part because the
administrative dictates were made by the Attorney General, and the Bureau of Prisons had no
authority to remove or amend them.

are not about “prison conditions” and need not be exhausted are no longer good law. This is
not an issue in use-of-force cases arising in the New York City jails, since you cannot bring
“complaints pertaining to an alleged assault” under that system’s grievance procedure, and
therefore you do not need to exhaust use-of-force or prisoner assault claims. 237 But, you
would need to exhaust other claims arising out of those incidents, like prison staff preventing
you from receiving medical care for injuries.
Actions of persons or agencies outside the prison system are generally not prison
conditions. 238 Occurrences or conditions in police custody are generally not prison
conditions. 239 The same should be true of medical facilities outside the prison. 240 Disputes
over whether you should be in prison at all are not about prison conditions. 241 Courts have
237. City of New York, Department of Corrections, Directive No. 3375R § II.B, Inmate Grievance
Program (1998) (as revised Mar. 4, 1985). This directive has recently been revised but the substance of
this point is unchanged: “Inmate allegations of assault or harassment by either staff or inmates are not
grievable under the grievance mechanism.” City of New York, Department of Corrections, Directive
3375R-A, Inmate Grievance Resolution Program at § II.C.2 (March 13, 2008), available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/doc/downloads/pdf/3375R-A.pdf. If a complaint is not grievable, and there is no
other administrative remedy that is applicable to a problem, then there is no exhaustion requirement.
238. For example, one court held that the Department of Homeland Security’s placement of a
prisoner on a “watch list” was not a prison condition requiring exhaustion; however, the prison’s actions
in placing him in segregation or depriving him of telephone privileges required exhaustion. Almahdi v.
Ridge, No. 04-3120, 201 F. App’x 865, 868, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 26938, at *6 (3d Cir. Oct. 27, 2006)
(unpublished). Another has held that a prisoner’s claim that prosecutors and investigators conspired to
harm him in jail because he had information about official corruption was not a prison condition claim,
even though it had an impact on prison conditions, and the exhaustion requirement did not apply.
Johnson v. Quinn, No. 96 C 6598, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2434, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 1999)
(unpublished). Holtz v. Monsanto, Inc., No. 05-070-GPM, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36893, at *1 (S.D. Ill.
June 6, 2006) (unpublished) (holding prisoner’s claim of “negligence, strict products liability, ‘deceit and
misrepresentation,’ and breach of express or implied warranties arising out of Defendants’ involvement
with the product Aspartame,” was not about prison conditions). Compare Reid v. Fed. Bureau of
Prisons, No. 04-1845 (ESH), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15138, at *10 (D.D.C. July 20, 2005) (unpublished)
(holding Privacy Act claim about inaccuracy in prison records affecting classification was about prison
conditions), with Lee v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 235 F.R.D. 274, 290 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2006) (holding
alleged violation of Privacy Act resulting in plaintiff’s and his agents’ being unable to access his outside
bank accounts for a year “did not related to prison life” and need not be exhausted).
239. See Brewer v. Philson, No. 06-1013, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2036, at *6 (W.D. Ark. Jan. 10,
2007) (unpublished); Bowers v. City of Philadelphia, No. 06-CV-3229, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5804, at
*116, n.40 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 25, 2007) (unpublished) (holding police holding cells were not prisons for
purpose of prisoner release provisions of PLRA).
240. In Borges v. Adm’r for Strong Mem. Hosp., No. 99-CV-6351Fe, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18596, at *11 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2002) (unpublished), the court expressed doubt that a claim made by
prisoners injured by dentists at an outside hospital involved prison conditions, since the grievance
system probably could not take any action against defendants. The court reached the opposite
conclusion in Abdur-Raqiyb v. Erie County Med. Ctr., 536 F. Supp. 2d 299, 304 (W.D.N.Y. 2008), on the
grounds that the statute is supposed to be read broadly and the plaintiff was clearly a prisoner.
241. White v. Thompson, No. 406CV207, 2007 WL 628121, at *2 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 26, 2007)
(unpublished) (holding false imprisonment claims are about prison conditions); Bost v. Adams, No.
1:04-0446, 2006 WL 1674485, at *5 (S.D. W.Va. June 12, 2006) (unpublished) (holding a challenge to a
restriction on the time a prisoner could serve in a community corrections center was not about prison
conditions); Fuller v. Kansas, No. 04-2457-CM, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18977, at *5 (D. Kan. Aug. 8,
2005) (unpublished) (holding claims of false arrest and imprisonment are not prison conditions claims
under the statute), aff’d, 175 F. App’x 234 (10th Cir. 2006); Wishom v. Hill, No. 02-2291-KHV, 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2171, at *33 (D. Kan. Feb. 13, 2004) (unpublished) (holding detention without
probable cause not a prison condition); Monahan v. Winn, 276 F. Supp. 2d 196, 204 (D. Mass. 2003)
(holding a Bureau of Prisons rule revision abolishing its discretion to designate some offenders to
community confinement facilities did not involve conditions).

eached differing decisions on matters related to parole release or revocation. 242 Complaints
that arise in halfway houses or residential treatment programs are likely to be considered as
being about prison conditions as long as you are there because of a criminal conviction or
charge and you are not free to leave. 243 But, courts have held issues about placement in or
removal from such programs are not about prison conditions. 244 One court has held a claim
that prisoners with mental illness were discharged without receiving psychiatric medication
and referrals is not about prison conditions. 245
3. What Are “Available” Remedies?
The PLRA says you must exhaust “available” remedies. A remedy is “available” if it has
any “authority to provide any relief or to take any action whatsoever in response to a
complaint.” 246 You may believe that the grievance system in your prison is unfair, futile, and
a waste of time, but you have to exhaust anyway. 247 The requirement of pre-PLRA law that
remedies be “plain, speedy and effective” has been repealed.
242. Compare L.H. v. Schwarzenegger, 519 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1081 n.9 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2007)
(holding parole violation procedures are not prison conditions); Valdivia v. Davis, 206 F. Supp. 2d 1068,
1074 n.12 (E.D. Cal. 2002) (holding a challenge to parole revocation procedures was not a “civil action
with respect to prison conditions” under 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(2)) with Morgan v. Messenger, No. 02-319-
M, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14892, at *8 (D.N.H. Aug. 27, 2003) (unpublished) (holding sex offender
treatment director’s disclosure of private information from plaintiff’s treatment file to parole
authorities and prosecutor involved prison conditions, since the director was a prison employee and the
action affected the duration of his prison confinement); Salaam v. Consovoy, No. 99-5692 (JEI), 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19971, at *10–11 (D.N.J. May 31, 2000) (unpublished) (holding failure to provide
proper parole release hearings is a prison condition). Salaam may be distinguishable from Valdivia on
the ground that parole release hearings involve a process commenced in prison, while parole revocation
proceedings are commenced and are based on events outside prison. See also Farnworth v. Craven, No.
CV05-493-S-MHW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19412, at *14 (D. Idaho Mar. 14, 2007) (unpublished)
(holding demand for new parole hearing was about “prison conditions” because it need not be pursued
via habeas corpus, but grievance system was not available because it had no authority over the Parole
Commission).
243. Ruggiero v. County of Orange, 467 F.3d 170, 174–75 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding “drug treatment
campus” was a “jail, prison, or other correctional facility;” that term “includes within its ambit all
facilities in which prisoners are held involuntarily as a result of violating the criminal law”); Witzke v.
Femal, 376 F.3d 744, 753 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating that an “intensive drug rehabilitation halfway house”
comes within the meaning of the term “any jail, prison, or other correctional facility”); William G. v.
Pataki, No. 03 Civ. 8331 (RCC), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16716, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2005)
(unpublished) (holding that question whether persons incarcerated pending parole revocation
proceedings were entitled to be placed in less restrictive residential treatment programs for mental
illness and chemical addition involved prison conditions).
244. See Bost v. Adams, No. 1:04-0446, 2006 WL 1674485, at *5 (S.D. W.Va. June 12, 2006)
(unpublished) (holding challenge to a restriction on the time a prisoner could serve in a community
corrections center was not about prison conditions); Belk v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 07-C-301-C,
2004 WL 5352260, at *14 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 15, 2004) (unpublished) (challenge to transfer from prison
camp to halfway house involved a “quantum change” in level of custody and was not about prison
conditions); Monahan v. Winn, 276 F. Supp. 2d 196, 204 (D. Mass. 2003) (holding that a Bureau of
Prisons rule revision that abolished its discretion to designate certain offenders to community
confinement facilities did not involve prison conditions).
245. Bolden v. Stroger, No. 03 C 5617, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7473, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 1, 2005)
(unpublished). But, the court held a claim of exclusion of persons with mental illness from pre-release
programs was about conditions.
246. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 736, 121 S. Ct. 1819, 1822, 149 L. Ed. 2d 958, 963 (2001).
247. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 740 n.6, 121 S. Ct. 1819, 1825 n.6, 149 L. Ed. 2d 958, 967
n.6 (2001) (“[W]e will not read futility or other exceptions into statutory exhaustion requirements
where Congress has provided otherwise.”) (citation omitted); see Boyd v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 380 F.3d
989, 998 (6th Cir. 2004) and cases cited (holding that prisoners’ subjective belief that the process will be
unresponsive does not excuse non-exhaustion), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 920 (2005); Alexander v. Tippah

The “available” remedy you must exhaust will usually be the prison grievance
procedure. 248 But, if an issue is not “grievable” under grievance rules, you should not be
required to exhaust the grievance system because it is not available for your issue. 249 For
example, the New York State grievance directive states
(1) An individual decision or disposition of any current or subsequent
program or procedure having a written appeal mechanism which
extends review to outside the facility shall be considered nongrievable.
(2) An individual decision or disposition of the temporary release
committee, time allowance committee, family reunion program or
media review committee is not grievable. Likewise, an individual
decision or disposition resulting from a disciplinary proceeding,
inmate property claim (of any amount), central monitoring case
review or records review (freedom of information request, expunction)
is not grievable.
(3) The policies, rules, and procedures of any program or procedure,
including those above, are grievable. 250
So, for example, your complaint about the denial of temporary release would not be
grievable, but your complaint that the Temporary Release Committee used unfair procedures
would be grievable.
The New York City jail grievance directive lists the following “non-grievable issues:”
(1) matters under investigation by the Inspector General;
County, 351 F.3d 626, 630 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that allegations of the grievance system’s
inadequacy did not excuse failure to exhaust).
This means, for example, that if another prisoner has just grieved the same issue and lost, you still
need to grieve it yourself, even though you are certain that it is futile because you will get the same
ruling. See Hattie v. Hallock, 8 F. Supp. 2d 685, 689 (N.D. Ohio May 11, 1997) (stating that “vicarious”
exhaustion is not permitted, except in class actions), amended by 16 F. Supp. 2d 834 (N.D. Ohio June
23, 1998) (dismissing prisoner’s action without prejudice because he had not exhausted his remedies
before filing).
248. The prisoner must use the administrative procedure of the institution or system where his
or her problem arose. Acosta v. United States Marshals Serv., 445 F.3d 509, 512–13 (1st Cir. 2006)
(holding that a prisoner who was placed by the Marshals Service in several county jails and two federal
prisons, but only used the Marshals’ complaint system, failed to exhaust either as to the jails or as to
the Bureau of Prisons institutions).
249. See Owens v. Keeling, 461 F.3d 763, 769 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding grievance system was not
an available remedy for classification complaint where prison required use of a separate classification
appeal procedure); Mojias v. Johnson, 351 F.3d 606, 610 (2d Cir. 2003) (courts must establish that the
prisoner’s claim does not fall into an exception to the administrative remedy); Snider v. Melindez, 199
F.3d 108, 114 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[T]he provision clearly does not require a prisoner to exhaust
administrative remedies that do not address the subject matter of his complaint.”); Mitchell v. Caruso,
No. 1:07-cv-92, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65954, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 28, 2008) (unpublished) (noting
grievance policy made “the content of a policy” non-grievable); McGrath v. Johnson, 67 F. Supp. 2d 499,
510–11 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (holding prisoner not required to file a grievance on a matter the inmate
grievance procedure would not address).
One court has recently stated that exhaustion is required “even if a prisoner ‘understood that the
claims put forth in [his] complaint were “non-grievable” under prison policy.’” Steele v. Fed. Bureau of
Prisons, 355 F.3d 1204, 1214 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting Beaudry v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 331 F.3d 1164,
1166 (10th Cir. 2003)). The court referred to situations where a prisoner thought a claim was nongrievable
but was wrong. If there is any question whether your claim is grievable, you should still
exhaust.
250. State of New York, Department of Correctional Services, Directive No. 4040 § 701.3(e),
Inmate Grievance Program (2003) (as revised July 1, 2006). The state regulations say the same thing.
See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 7, § 701.3 (2006).

(2) complaints pertaining to an alleged assault or verbal harassment;
(3) complaints pertaining to matters in litigation;
(4) complaints where there is already an existing appeal mechanism within the
Department of Correction (that is, determinations of disciplinary hearings and
classification);
(5) matters outside the jurisdiction of the Department of Correction; and
(6) complaints that do not directly affect the prisoner. 251
Courts have held issues over which the grievance system has no actual authority need
not be exhausted, even if they are not listed as non-grievable. 252 Also, an issue may be
grievable on paper but non-grievable in fact because of how the grievance system operates. 253
For example, there have been allegations that New York City prisoners are told at
orientation “a grievance cannot be brought against Officers or Staff”; if these allegations are
true, they would excuse the prisoner from exhaustion. 254
Often, there is a separate, specialized remedy for a non-grievable issue. If so, you must
use it. 255 This is most often an issue with disciplinary proceedings and issues related to them:
251. City of New York, Department of Corrections, Directive No. 3375R § II(B) Inmate Grievance
Program (1998) (as revised Mar. 4, 1985). This directive has recently been revised, but the list of nongrievable
issues remains substantially the same. See New York City, Deparment of Corrections,
Directive 3375R-A, Inmate Grievance Resolution Program at § II.C. (March 13, 2008), available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/doc/downloads/pdf/3375R-A.pdf.
252. See Nooner v. Norris, No. 5:06CV00110 SWW, 2006 WL 4958988, at *3 (E.D. Ark. June 19,
2006) (unpublished) (holding that prisoner challenging lethal injection protocol need not exhaust the
grievance process because it had no authority, since state law placed the subject entirely in the
Director’s authority); Farnworth v. Craven, No. CV05-493-S-MHW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19412, at
*14 (D.Idaho Mar. 14, 2007) (unpublished) (holding prisoner seeking a new parole hearing need not
exhaust the grievance system because it had no authority over the Parole Commission); Stevens v.
Goord, 99 Civ. 11669(LMM), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10118, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2003)
(unpublished) (private prison medical provider failed to show that the prison grievance procedure
would actually have authority over claims against it); Handberry v. Thompson, 92 F. Supp. 2d 244,
247–48 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that prisoners need not grieve failure to deliver educational services
because the issues were out of the control of the Department of Corrections). But see Arsberry v.
Illinois, 244 F.3d 558, 562 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[P]laintiffs say they have no such remedies against
exorbitant phone bills, but the cases we have cited reject a ‘futility’ exception to the requirement of
exhaustion.”) The Arsberry court overlooked the distinction between an allegedly futile remedy and one
that is not available, and in any case did not have the benefit of Booth’s holding, with which it appears
inconsistent.
253. See Marshall v. Knight, No. 3:03-CV-460 RM, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84040, at *7 (N.D. Ind.
Nov. 17, 2006) (unpublished) (holding that instructions to grievance personnel to respond to grievances
about law library hours only by sending prisoners a copy of a memo deprived grievance staff of
authority to act on those grievances and made the remedy unavailable); Wigfall v. Duval, No. 00-12274-
DPW, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57836, at *25 (D. Mass. Aug. 15, 2006) (unpublished) (citing evidence that
use of force claims were not treated as grievances); Scott v. Gardner, 287 F. Supp. 2d 477, 491 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (holding that allegations that grievance staff refused to process and file grievances about
occurrences at other prisons, claiming they were not grievable, sufficiently alleged lack of an available
remedy); Livingston v. Piskor, 215 F.R.D. 84, 86–87 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that evidence that
grievance personnel refused to process grievances where a disciplinary report had been filed covering
the same events created a factual issue precluding summary judgment); see Marr v. Fields, No. 1:07-cv-
494, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24993, at *1 (W.D.Mich. Mar. 27, 2008) (unpublished) (evidence that
hearing officers interpreted grievance policy broadly to exclude all grievances with any relationship to a
disciplinary charges could excuse failure to exhaust).
254. Davis v. Frazier, No. 98 Civ. 2658(HB), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5911, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. June
15, 1999) (unpublished).
255. See Owens v. Keeling, 461 F.3d 763, 769–72 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding prisoner who filed
classification appeal exhausted, notwithstanding failure to complete inapplicable grievance procedure);
Jenkins v. Haubert, 179 F.3d 19, 23 n.1 (2d Cir. 1999) (appeal of disciplinary conviction satisfied the
exhaustion requirement); Timley v. Nelson, No. 99-3038-JWL, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *4–5 (D. Kan.

to satisfy the "proper exhaustion" requirement, 256 you must choose correctly between
appealing a disciplinary action and filing a separate grievance—and sometimes you may
need to do both. Generally, a suit that attacks the conduct of the disciplinary hearing itself is
exhausted by a disciplinary appeal. 257 A suit about the incident that led to disciplinary
charges (e.g., an allegation that staff used excessive force in an incident for which a prisoner
was charged) will generally not be exhausted by a disciplinary appeal and will require a
separate grievance. 258 However, in all cases it is the prison's rules governing grievances and
appeals that will determine which remedy is the correct one. 259 This issue will most often
Feb. 16, 2001) (unpublished) (prisoner’s failure to pursue “religious accommodation” exception
procedure meant that administrative remedies were not exhausted); Mullins v. Smith, 14 F. Supp. 2d
1009, 1012 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (prisoner exhausted state administrative remedies by submitting a
request for a rehearing).
256. This rule is discussed in Part E(5), "What If You Make a Mistake Trying To Exhaust?"
257. Jenkins v. Haubert, 179 F.3d 19, 23 n.1 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that disciplinary appeals
exhausted plaintiff’s challenge to the resulting disciplinary sanctions); Portley-El v. Steinbeck, No. 06cv-02096-MSK-MJW,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20236, at *2 (D. Colo. Mar. 14, 2008) (unpublished)
(holding that a disciplinary appeal exhausted due process claims under rule stating that grievance
procedure may not be used to seek review of disciplinary convictions; rejecting defendants’ argument
that constitutional claims could be grieved); Rivera v. Goord, 253 F. Supp. 2d 735, 749 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(holding that a claim of hearing officer misconduct was exhausted by a disciplinary appeal);
Muhammad v. Pico, No. 02 Civ. 1052, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13402, at *31 n.22 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2003)
(unpublished) (holding due process claims exhausted by disciplinary appeal); Sweet v. Wende Corr.
Facility, 253 F. Supp. 2d 492, 496 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding an appeal from a disciplinary hearing may
exhaust if it raises the same issues as the subsequent federal complaint). But see Rivera v. Nelson, No.
05-cv-00300-WDM-MEH, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52586, at *3 (D. Colo. July 17, 2006) (unpublished)
(holding that disciplinary appeals exclusively addressed only “the conviction that resulted from the
disciplinary hearing and the placement that resulted from the administrative segregation hearing,” and
due process claims should have been the subject of separate grievances); accord Ross v. Gibson, No. 06cv-00064-WYD-MEH,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65577, at *6–7 (D. Colo. Aug. 8, 2006) (unpublished).
258. See Terrase v. Cain, No. 03-599-C, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20783, at *1 (M.D. La. Mar. 17,
2008) (unpublished) (a disciplinary appeal did not exhaust a claim of failure to protect, since it did not
give officials adequate notice of that claim); Chavis v. Goord, No. 9:00-CV-01418 (LEK/DEP), 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 73210, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2007) (unpublished) (holding disciplinary appeal did not
exhaust plaintiff’s claim for retaliation and interference with religious exercise; noting case is “readily
distinguishable” from due process challenges to hearing); Webster v. Kurtz, No. 04-cv-02663-EWN-
MEH, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19354, at *5 (D. Colo. Mar. 31, 2006) (unpublished) (holding that
successful disciplinary appeal did not exhaust claims of subsequent retaliation and refusal to reinstate
visiting privileges; these should have been grieved notwithstanding rule prohibiting grieving
disciplinary convictions); Belton v. Robinson, No. 04-5105 (GEB), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3472, at *9–10
(D.N.J. Jan. 30, 2006) (unpublished) (holding that an appeal of a disciplinary conviction did not exhaust
a claim that the officer injured the plaintiff during the incident); Rodney v. Goord, 00 Civ. 3724 (WK),
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8176, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2003) (unpublished) (holding an allegation of false
disciplinary charges had to be grieved in addition to appealing the disciplinary conviction); Tookes v.
Artuz, 00 Civ. 4969 (RCC) (HBP), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12540, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 2002)
(unpublished) (holding that appeal of disciplinary conviction did not exhaust as to claim against officer
who allegedly wrote a false disciplinary report). But see Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 531 (3d Cir.
2003) (holding that a prisoner who claimed retaliatory discipline exhausted by appealing the
disciplinary decision to the highest level); Samuels v. Selsky, 01 Civ. 8235 (AGS), 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17089, at *26–27 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2002) (holding that propriety of confiscation of religious
materials had been exhausted via a disciplinary appeal from the resulting contraband and
“demonstration” charges; “issues directly tied to the disciplinary hearing which have been directly
appealed need not be appealed again collaterally through the Inmate Grievance Program”).
259. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2385, 165 L. Ed. 2d 368, 378 (2006); see
Keal v. Washington, No. C05-5737RJB, 2007 WL 1977155, at *2 (W.D. Wash. July 3, 2007)
(unpublished) (noting disciplinary appeal must be used to challenge infraction or sanction for
infraction, but staff misconduct grievance was the remedy for use-of-force complaint).

arise in connection with issues that are directly related to the disciplinary hearing or charges
but do not challenge the conduct of the hearing itself. The problem is that prison rules are
often unclear to the point where even prison officials cannot keep them straight. For
example, in one New York State case, the defendants argued that a prisoner who alleged
that evidence used against him at a disciplinary hearing was a retaliatory fabrication should
have filed a separate grievance and not a disciplinary appeal to exhaust that issue. The
Second Circuit held that the prisoner was justified by special circumstances 260 in filing only a
disciplinary appeal because the rule was unclear and he had a reasonable belief that his
complaint could only be pursued in an appeal. 261 New York not only failed to clarify the
rule, 262 but also in a later case made exactly the opposite argument: the prisoner had filed a
If the designated remedy is a disciplinary appeal, but the prisoner cannot appeal because he pled
guilty to the offense, the remedy is not available. Marr v. Fields, No. 1:07-cv-494, 2008 WL 828788, at
*5–7 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 27, 2008) (unpublished).
260. In the Second Circuit, such a finding means the prisoner is not deemed to have exhausted
but must seek to exhaust remedies if they remain available; if not, the prisoner may proceed with the
litigation. Giano v. Goord, 380 F.3d 670, 680 (2d Cir. 2004); Hemphill v. New York, 380 F.3d 680, 690–
91 (2d Cir. 2004).
261. Giano v. Goord, 380 F.3d 670, 679 (2d Cir. 2004) (stating that even if the plaintiff was
wrong, “his interpretation was hardly unreasonable;” the regulations “do not differentiate clearly
between grievable matters relating to disciplinary proceedings, and non-grievable issues concerning the
‘decisions or dispositions’ of such proceedings”); accord Johnson v. Testman, 380 F.3d 691, 696–97 (2d
Cir. 2004) (remanding claim that “because under BOP regulations the appellate process for disciplinary
rulings and for grievances was one and the same, [plaintiff] reasonably believed that raising his
complaints during his disciplinary appeal sufficed to exhaust his available administrative remedies,”
since it “cannot be dismissed out of hand, especially since the district court has not had the opportunity
to examine it”); Cahill v. Arpaio, No. CV 05-0741-PHX-MHM (JCG), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80772, at *6
(D. Ariz. Nov. 2, 2006) (unpublished) (stating jail rules concerning what aspects of a disciplinary
incident can be grieved are “sufficiently confusing such that Plaintiff’s interpretation that he could not
grieve his excessive force claim is reasonable”); Harper v. Harmonn, No. CIV S-04-0339 FCD JFM P,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61975, at *7–11 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2006) (unpublished) (holding plaintiff
exhausted where he raised his claim of falsified disciplinary charges in a disciplinary appeal and the
conviction was thrown out); Parish v. Lee, No. 02-2655 SECTION "R" (4), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7056,
at *28 (E.D. La. Apr. 22, 2004) (unpublished) (“The inmates must be given the benefit of the doubt
based on what appears to be the written policy to which they are bound.”); see Vasquez v. Hilbert, No.
07-cv-00723-bbc, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42011, at *10 (W.D. Wis. May 28, 2008) (unpublished)
(declining to dismiss where plaintiff exhausted his medical claim late because medical treatment was
mentioned in a disciplinary report and the rules said a grievance raising “any issue related to the
conduct report” must await completion of the disciplinary process; plaintiff acted reasonably in
waiting).
In Braham v. Clancy, 425 F.3d 177, 183 (2d Cir. 2005), the court directed the district court on
remand to consider whether the prisoner’s informal requests, his argument about prison officials’
unresponsiveness presented in his disciplinary appeal, or some combination of the two, gave prison
officials sufficient notice to allow them to take responsive measures, “thereby satisfying the exhaustion
of administrative remedies requirement.” To the extent Braham suggested that the disciplinary appeal
might satisfy the exhaustion requirement, as opposed to merely justifying the failure to exhaust, the
Second Circuit has now held it overruled by the “proper exhaustion” rule of Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S.
81 (2006), discussed in Part E(7)–(8), below. This holding appears to undermine subsequent district
court decisions assuming that a disciplinary appeal can satisfy the exhaustion requirement with
respect to issues other than the disciplinary proceeding itself as long as the appeal gives sufficient
notice of those other issues.
262. New York has, seemingly, attempted to shift the cost of unclear rules to the prisoners. The
most recent revision to its grievance policy states: “Note: If an inmate is unsure whether an issue is
grievable, he/she should file a grievance and the question will be decided through the grievance process
in accordance with section 701.5, below.” Appendix D, New York State, Department of Correctional
Services, Directive 4040, Inmate Grievance Program at § 701.3(e) (July 1, 2006). This provision,

grievance about retaliatory false discipline, and the defendants argued he should have
pursued a disciplinary appeal. 263 In some cases, prison personnel appear to have stretched
the rules to reject grievances that were related to disciplinary proceedings even though the
rules did not actually require such rejection. 264 In some prison systems, the rules do bar
grievances that have any relationship to a disciplinary incident. 265 The bottom line is that
you must read the rules very carefully to determine whether a particular issue (the actions of
the hearing officer, the bringing of charges or the evidence behind them, or the underlying
incident) calls for a grievance or a disciplinary appeal. In some cases both will be required if
you wish to raise multiple issues. 266 If the rules are not absolutely clear, it may be wise to file
both to protect yourself from an argument later that whatever you did was wrong. If prison
officials reject your use of a particular remedy, it is harder for them to argue later that you
should have used it.
A remedy may not be available because of circumstances peculiar to a particular case.
For example, a prisoner may be unable to file a grievance because of a medical condition. 267
however, does not deal with the situation addressed in Giano where the prisoner reasonably believes
the issue is not grievable.
263. Larkins v. Selsky, No. 04 Civ. 5900 (RMB) (DF), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89057, at *24
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2006) (unpublished) (stating that Giano “nearly mirrors this case”).
264 . Woods v. Lozer, No. 3:05-1080, 2007 WL 173704, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 18, 2007)
(unpublished) (holding a prisoner exhausted when he appealed a decision that his use of force claim
was not grievable because it was mistakenly said to seek review of disciplinary procedures and
punishments); Livingston v. Piskor, 215 F.R.D. 84, 86–87 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that evidence of
grievance personnel refusal to process grievances where a disciplinary report had been filed covering
the same events created a factual issue preventing summary judgment).
The above cited cases involved misapplication of prison policy or staff’s making up an unauthorized
rule. In some prison systems, it is in fact the rule that any overlap with a disciplinary proceeding
makes the matter non-grievable or not immediately grievable.
265. See Vasquez v. Hilbert, No. 07-cv-00723-bbc, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42011, at *9 (W.D. Wis.
May 28, 2008) (unpublished) (citing rule that a grievance raising “any issue related to the conduct
report” must await completion of the disciplinary process); James v. McCall, No. 9:06-1897-DCN-GCK,
2007 WL 752161, at *5 (D.S.C. Mar. 8, 2007) (unpublished) (citing rule stating “[w]hen an inmate is
involved in an incident that results in a disciplinary [proceeding], that issue/complaint becomes nongrievable”);
Lindell v. O’Donnell, No. 05-C-04-C, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24767, at *76, 86 (W.D. Wis.
Oct. 21, 2005) (unpublished) (rejecting argument that plaintiff should have filed an inmate complaint
where the relevant policy forbade using inmate complaints for “any issue related to a conduct report”).
266. For example, in some prison systems, appealing a disciplinary conviction and challenging
the rule under which you were convicted require, respectively, a disciplinary appeal and a separate
grievance. See Singh v. Goord, 520 F. Supp. 2d 487, 497–98 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (holding successful
disciplinary appeal challenging discipline for refusing work contrary to religious beliefs did not exhaust
plaintiff’s challenge to the underlying disciplinary rule; a separate grievance was required); Hattie v.
Hallock, 8 F. Supp. 2d 685, 689 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (holding that to challenge a prison rule, the prisoner
must both appeal from the disciplinary conviction for breaking it and also grieve the rule’s validity),
judgment amended, 16 F. Supp. 2d 834 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (ruling in favor of prison official’s claim to
dismiss prisoner’s action).
267. Days v. Johnson, 322 F.3d 863, 867 (5th Cir. 2003) (noting that “one’s personal ability to
access the grievance system could render the system unavailable”); Macahilas v. Taylor, No. No. CIV S-
06-0502 GEB KJM P, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5652, at *11 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2008) (unpublished)
(denying summary judgment to defendants where prisoner said “his mind was too clouded” by a
physical illness to grieve timely), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:06-cv-0502-GEB-KJM-P,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13314 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2008) (unpublished); Ricketts v. AW of Unicor, No.
1:CV-07-0049, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37058, at *5–6 (M.D. Pa. May 6, 2008) (unpublished) (denying
dismissal for non-exhaustion where prisoner said he was in the hospital paralyzed throughout the
period for filing a grievance); Holcomb v. Dir. of Corr., No. C-03-02765 RMW, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
85683, at *19 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2006) (unpublished) (holding a prisoner rendered quadriplegic and
never returned to prison after his injury did not have an opportunity to file in a timely way). But see

Courts have made a number of decisions concerning mental illness or retardation, some
favoring prisoners 268 and some favoring prison officials, 269 without settling on any clear
standard for such cases. Courts have also not taken any consistent position concerning
prisoners who may be unable to use the grievance system properly because of other
Ferrington v. La. Dep’t of Corr., 315 F.3d 529, 532 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding plaintiff’s near blindness did
not exempt him from exhausting, since he had managed to file the lawsuit).
268. See Cole v. Sobina, No. No. 04-99J, 2007 WL 4460617, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 19, 2007)
(unpublished) (refusing to dismiss for non-exhaustion where plaintiff alleged mental disabilities that
could account for his noncompliance with grievance procedures); Whitington v. Sokol, 491 F. Supp. 2d
1012, 1019 (D. Colo. 2007) (refusing to dismiss for non-exhaustion where plaintiff alleged he had no
remedies because he was mentally incapacitated and was transferred to a mental institution shortly
after the incident he sued about); Petty v. Goord, No. 00 CIV 803 JSR, 2007 WL 724648, at *8 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 5, 2007) (unpublished) (refusing to dismiss for non-exhaustion where prisoner was transferred to
a mental hospital after filing a grievance and missed the final deadline; the court notes there is no
evidence before it of his mental state at the time, and holds two months plus in a mental hospital
constituted special circumstances); LaMarche v. Bell, No. 04-cv-69-SM, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27203,
at *7 (D.N.H. Nov. 8, 2005) (unpublished) (acknowledging that evidence of mental illness might support
argument that late grievance should be deemed effective); Ullrich v. Idaho, No. CV-04-352-S-BLW,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37850, at *8 (D. Idaho Feb. 6, 2006) (unpublished) (dismissing for nonexhaustion,
but directing prison officials to appoint someone to assist the plaintiff, who alleged mental
illness and denial of psychiatric treatment); see also Macahilas v. Taylor, No. CIV S-06-0502 GEB KJM
P, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5652, at *11 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2008) (unpublished) (denying summary
judgment to defendants based on alleged psychological effects of a serious physical illness), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 2:06-cv-0502-GEB-KJM-P, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13314 (E.D. Cal. Feb.
22, 2008) (unpublished). In Johnson-Ester v. Elyea, No. 07 C 4190, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75912, at *4
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 10, 2007) (unpublished), the mother of a mentally incompetent prisoner said she had
made repeated complaints about his medical care without success; the court rejected defendants’
argument that the case should be dismissed for non-exhaustion, citing the mother’s assertions that “she
did what she could do” to solve the problem administratively, but it did not clarify what it thought the
PLRA requires or permits in this sort of situation.
269. See Rigsby v. Schriro, No. CV 07-0916-PHX-EHC (ECV), 2008 WL 2705376, at *3 (D. Ariz.
July 9, 2008) (unpublished) (dismissing for non-exhaustion where plaintiff said that in 2007 he had
been the victim of assaults in 2004 that resulted in brain swelling, partial memory loss, depression, and
PTSD; plaintiff “provides no specific information about how these injuries prevented him from
initiating, much less completing, the inmate grievance process”); Fleming v. Dettloff, No. 07-12511,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48258, at *4–5 (E.D. Mich. June 24, 2008) (unpublished) (dismissing for nonexhaustion
despite plaintiff’s allegation of mental incompetence and his participation in the prison
Mental Health Program, since he presented “no evidence of mental incompetency beyond allegations
and conclusory statements in the pleadings”); Lawson v. Davis, No. 7:08-cv-00288, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 34730, at *5 (W.D. Va. Apr. 28, 2008) (unpublished) (dismissing challenge to 90-day waiting
period for psychiatric medications since the plaintiff did not allege facts indicating his mental problems
prevented him from understanding or using the grievance procedures), aff’d, No. 08-6766, 285 F. App’x
77 (4th Cir. 2008) (unpublished); Saggese v. Corrente, No. 07-4867 (SDW), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11546, at *14–15 (D.N.J. Feb. 15, 2008) (unpublished) (rejecting prisoner’s claim that he was mentally
ill and “in a blur” since his claims of overmedication and injury only cover two weeks, and he could have
exhausted after that); Williams v. Pettiford, No. 9:07-0946-RBH, 2007 WL 3119548, at *2–3 (D.S.C.
Oct. 22, 2007) (unpublished) (rejecting argument that prisoner who was dyslexic and mentally ill was
not required to exhaust), aff’d, 272 F. App’x 311 (4th Cir. 2008) (unpublished); Evans v. McWilliams,
No. CV 05-3711-PHX-SMM (MHB), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63165 at*5–6 (D. Ariz. Aug. 21, 2007)
(unpublished) (refusing to exempt prisoner from exhaustion requirement based on claim of mental
illness since there is no “extenuating circumstances” exception, he provided no evidence of his illness,
and he had made complaints to authorities), subsequent determination, No. CIV 05-3711-PHX-SMM
(MHB), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77680 (D. Ariz. Oct. 10, 2007) (unpublished); Bester v. Dixion, No. 9:03-
CV-1041, 2007 U.S. Dist LEXIS 21714, at *12–13 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2007) (unpublished) (noting initial
concern that prisoner had been transferred to a psychiatric hospital because of a mental condition, but
dismissing since he had written complaints and spoken to investigators).

disabilities, 270 illiteracy or lack of education, 271 inability to speak or write English, 272 or
youth. 273
A remedy may be unavailable because the prisoner has been transferred out of the
particular prison or jail system, 274 unless the system provides a way to pursue grievances
270. Kuhajda v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., No. 05-CV-3263, 2006 WL 1662941, at *1 (C.D. Ill. June 8,
2006) (unpublished) (holding that a prisoner who is hearing-impaired and has limited ability to read
and write, and who did not have the assistance of a sign language interpreter, raised a factual issue
concerning availability of remedies); see Elliott v. Monroe Corr. Complex, No. C06-0474RSL, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 5242, at *10–11 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 23, 2007) (unpublished) (dismissing for non-exhaustion
where plaintiff with cerebral palsy was provided with assistance and had filed numerous grievances,
though he had not actually exhausted any).
271. Langford v. Ifediora, No. 5:05CV00216WRW/HLJ, 2007 WL 1427423, at *3–4 (E.D. Ark.
May 11, 2007) (unpublished) (holding plaintiff’s age, deteriorating health, and lack of general
education, combined with failure to provide him assistance in preparing grievances, raised a factual
issue concerning the availability of the remedy to him); Kuhajda v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., No. 05-CV-3263,
2006 WL 1662941, at *1 (C.D. Ill. June 8, 2006) (unpublished) (stating hearing-impaired prisoner’s
limited ability to read and write, and lack of a sign language interpreter, raised a factual issue
concerning availability of remedies). In the unreported decision Davis v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 131 F.
App’x 127, 128–29, (10th Cir. Apr. 18, 2005) (unpublished), the court rejected the argument that the
plaintiff’s educational deficiencies (he said he was a “slow learner and thinker” still working to obtain a
G.E.D.) should excuse his failure to exhaust, noting that his papers “did not describe insurmountable
barriers to his filing of grievances and did not show that prison officials had effectively foreclosed his
efforts.” See also Ramos v. Smith, No. 05-5278, 187 F. App’x 152, 154 (3d Cir. June 2, 2006)
(unpublished) (rejecting claim of illiteracy, since federal regulations require assistance to illiterate
prisoners, and he did not allege that he asked for such assistance); Georgacarakos v. Watts, 147 F.
App’x 12, 14–15 (10th Cir. Aug. 18, 2005) (unpublished) (ignoring litigant’s plea to appoint counsel if
his exhaustion presentation was inadequate, in light of his lack of “means and sophistication”).
272. Several courts have denied summary judgment to prison officials where a monolingual
Spanish-speaking plaintiff alleged he could not understand or follow the grievance procedures because
he could not get them, or get help with them, in Spanish. See Abel v. Pierson, No. 05-264-GPM, 2008
WL 509466, at *4 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 13, 2008) (unpublished); Ramos v. Rosevthal, No. 4:06cv3158, 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37360, at *3 n.1 (D. Neb. May 17, 2007) (unpublished); Gonzalez v. Lantz, No. 3:03-cv-
2264 (SRU)(WIG), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14702, at *8–10 (D. Conn. July 20, 2005) (unpublished).
273. One appeals court has rejected the argument that a juvenile prisoner complaining of
excessive force should be excused from failure to use the grievance process in part because he was a
juvenile. Brock v. Kenyon County, Ky., No. 02-5442, 2004 WL 603929, at *4 (6th Cir. Mar. 23, 2004)
(unpublished); see also Minix v. Pazera, No. 1:04-CV-447 RM, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44824, at *12–13
(N.D. Ind. July 27, 2005) (holding that a juvenile’s mother’s repeated complaints to numerous officials
did not exhaust her son’s complaint of being beaten and raped). By contrast, in Lewis v. Gagne, 281 F.
Supp. 2d 429, 433–35 (N.D.N.Y. 2003), the court held that a juvenile detainee’s mother, who had
complained to facility staff and contacted an attorney, family court, and the state Child Abuse and
Maltreatment Register, and whose complaints were known to the facility director and agency counsel,
had made sufficient “reasonable efforts” to exhaust, without explicitly commenting on the juvenile
detainee’s own status or capacity to follow administrative procedures.
274. Rodriguez v. Westchester County Jail Corr. Dep’t, 372 F.3d 485, 488 (2d Cir. 2004);
Ammouri v. Adappt House, Inc., No. 05-3867, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47129, at *10–12 (E.D. Pa. June
12, 2008) (unpublished) (noting that plaintiff was repeatedly told he could not grieve matters from his
previous institution); Davis v. Kirk, No. H-06-2381, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91024, at *24–25 (S.D. Tex.
Dec. 11, 2007) (unpublished) (holding prisoner’s grievance appeal was moot on transfer); Thomas v.
Maricopa County Bd. of Supervisors, No. CV 07-0258-PHX-DGC (DKD), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79334,
at *9–10 (D. Ariz. Oct. 12, 2007) (unpublished) (declining to dismiss where the prisoner did not have
knowledge of the violation until after his release and the grievance policy did not provide for grievances
after release); Bradley v. Washington, 441 F. Supp. 2d 97, 102–03 (D.D.C. Aug. 2, 2006) (unpublished)
(holding D.C. remedies became unavailable upon prisoner’s transfer to federal medical facility, since
D.C. procedures say they apply to facilities under authority, jurisdiction, or contract with D.C.);
Barnard v. District of Columbia, 223 F. Supp. 2d 211, 214 (D.D.C. 2002) (unpublished) (holding that a
prisoner who was first hospitalized, then involved in hearings, then transferred during the 15 days he

after transfer. 275 Also, if a prisoner had time to file a grievance before transfer and failed to
do so, he or she will probably be considered to not have exhausted this option. 276 Be careful
with this issue. Courts sometimes assume that a remedy remains available after transfer
whether or not there is any evidence to that effect. 277 If you get transferred before you can
file a grievance, or while a grievance is pending, you should do your best to pursue the
grievance. Maybe you will succeed, and if you do not, you will be able to demonstrate that the
remedy was not available to you. In any case you will need to show the court good reasons
why you couldn’t exhaust after a transfer. 278
A remedy may be made unavailable by the acts or omissions of prison personnel. The
Second Circuit, along with other courts, has held that threats or assaults directed at
preventing prisoners from complaining may make remedies unavailable in fact, even if they
are nominally available. The governing standard is the same as that applied to allegations of
had to file a grievance may not have had a grievance remedy available); Mitchell v. Angelone, 82 F.
Supp. 2d 485, 490 (E.D. Va. 1999) (excusing exhaustion by prisoner who had been transferred so
frequently he had never had time to exhaust); see Miller v. Norris, 247 F.3d 736, 740 (8th Cir. 2001)
(holding that a transferred prisoner who alleged he could not get grievance forms for the transferring
prison system sufficiently alleged exhaustion of available remedies).
275. In re Bayside Prison Litig., No. 97-5127 (RBK), 2008 WL 2387324, at *5 (D.N.J. May 19,
2008) (unpublished) (prisoner transferred within New Jersey prison system could still use the
grievance system); Jackson v. Walker, No. 6:07-230-DCR, 2007 WL 2344938, at *5 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 14,
2007) (unpublished) (holding transfer did not excuse non-exhaustion because the process can be
completed by mail), amended on reconsideration in part, 2007 WL 2702325 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 12, 2007)
(unpublished), amended in part, 2007 WL 3145957 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 25, 2007) (unpublished); Lawrence v.
Washington, No. 03-2557 (JDB), 2006 WL 1071510, at *2 (D.D.C. Apr. 21, 2006) (unpublished) (holding
transfer within system did not excuse failure to exhaust where regulations permit grievances after
transfer); Soto v. Belcher, 339 F. Supp. 2d 592, 595 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding transfer did not excuse
exhaustion since regulations permit grievances after transfer).
In Brownell v. Krom, 446 F.3d 305, 312–13 (2d Cir. 2006), the court found special circumstances
justifying the plaintiff’s failure to exhaust correctly where grievance regulations did prescribe the
handling of grievances following a transfer, but prison staff did not follow their own rules.
276. James v. Williams, No. 1:04CV69-1-MU, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10076, at *6 (W.D.N.C. May
24, 2005) (unpublished) (noting prisoner had 11 days to file a new grievance after his first was rejected
and under the grievance policy he could have filed it at the new prison too); Timmons v. Pereiro, No. 00
Civ. 1278(LAP), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 996, at *5–6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2003) (unpublished) (holding
transfer out of state did not excuse failure to exhaust where there was time to file before the plaintiff
was moved and the system permits grievances to be pursued after transfer), affirmed in part, vacated
in part, and remanded, 88 F. App’x 447, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 2649 (2d Cir. 2004).
277. Blakey v. Beckstrom, No. 06-163-HRW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5181, at *4 (E.D. Ky. Jan.
24, 2007) (unpublished) (holding that transfer did not make grievance procedures unavailable if the
plaintiff did not take advantage of the administrative remedies); Mills v. United States, No. CV-02-5597
SJF LB, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82903, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2006) (holding transfer “does not relieve
[prisoner] of the obligation to pursue the grievance procedures available in the facility where the
conduct occurred”); Hemingway v. Lantz, No. 06-cv-110-JD, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30235, at *4–6
(D.N.H. May 5, 2006) (unpublished) (holding that prisoner who said he did not exhaust for fear of
retaliation should have filed a grievance after his transfer to the “safety” of another state, without
inquiring whether an out-of-state grievance would have been processed); Crump v. May, No. 04-329-
SLR, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10092, at *11-12 (D. Del. Mar. 14, 2006) (unpublished) (asserting that a
prisoner who was transferred after an incident still had five days of the seven-day time limit when he
arrived at the new prison, without inquiring whether he could have filed a grievance at the new prison
about events at the old prison).
278. See Mellender v. Dane County, No. 06-C-298-C, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80103, at *7–12
(W.D. Wis. Oct. 27, 2006) (unpublished) (noting that after transfer, plaintiff tried to mail a grievance
from prison to the jail and then to use the prison’s grievance system to complain about the jail).

etaliation for First Amendment-protected activity: “[whether] ‘a similarly situated
individual of ordinary firmness’ [would] have deemed [the remedy] available.” 279
Remedies may be made unavailable by other forms of obstruction by prison staff,
purposeful 280 or otherwise. 281 For example, a rule denying postage to indigents to mail a
279. Hemphill v. New York, 380 F.3d 680, 688 (2d Cir. 2004) (stating that it is possible for the
threat of retaliation to make administrative remedies unavailable); accord Turner v. Burnside, 541
F.3d 1077, 1084 (11th Cir. 2008) (“Remedies that rational inmates cannot be expected to use are not
capable of accomplishing their purposes, and so are not available”; following Hemphill and Kaba); Kaba
v. Stepp, 458 F.3d 678, 684–85 (7th Cir. 2006) (adopting Hemphill analysis and stating that if
administrative remedies are not "available" to a prisoner, then the prisoner cannot be required to
exhaust); Baker v. Schriro, No. CV 07-0353-PHX-SMM (JRI), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19892, at *19–23
(D.Ariz., Mar. 4, 2008) (unpublished) (holding plaintiffs’ allegations of threats by staff and of practice of
requiring grievances to be screened by gang members satisfied “ordinary firmness” standard), review
denied, No. CV 07-0353-PHX-SMM (JRI), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40341 (D. Ariz., May 8, 2008);
Mitchell v. Adams, No. CIV S-06-2321 GEB GGH P, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8014, at *26–45 (E.D. Cal.
Feb. 1, 2008) (unpublished) (citing course of threatening conduct affecting multiple grievances), report
and recommendation adopted, No. 2:06-cv-2321-GEB-GGH-P, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16202 (E.D. Cal.
Mar. 3, 2008); Harcum v. Shaffer, Civil Action No. 06-5326, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86089, at *14–15
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2007) (unpublished) (holding that threats causing the prisoner to withdraw his
grievance “removed the availability of further administrative remedies”); Stanley v. Rich, No. CV 605-
075, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35916, at *5 (S.D. Ga. June 1, 2006) (unpublished) (stating “threats of
violent reprisal may, in some circumstances, render administrative remedies ‘unavailable’ or otherwise
justify a prisoner’s failure to pursue them” (citing Hemphill); Larry v. Byno, No. 9:01-cv-1574, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28920, at *9–12 (N.D.N.Y. May 11, 2006) (unpublished) (applying Hemphill and
stating that the present circumstances are similar to the special circumstances in Hemphill).
Hemphill noted that threats or intimidation “may well deter a prisoner of ‘ordinary firmness’ from
filing an internal grievance, but not from appealing directly to individuals in positions of greater
authority within the prison system, or to external structures of authority such as state or federal
courts.” Accord Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077, 1084–85 (11th Cir. 2008). Thus, the fact that a
prisoner has, for example, written a letter of complaint to the Superintendent (as in Hemphill) does not
establish that he was not deterred from filing an ordinary grievance. A few lower courts have rejected
the notion that threats or fear can excuse non-exhaustion. See, e.g., Ware v. Tappin, No. 06-0869, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91685, at *15–17 (W.D. La. Nov. 3, 2006) (unpublished) (holding fear of retaliation is
“no valid defense for failing to exhaust”); Broom v. Engler, No. 4:05-cv-123, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
36824, at *8–9 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 16, 2005) (unpublished) (stating “[t]he PLRA does not excuse
exhaustion for a prisoner ... who is afraid to complain”).
280. Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809, 812 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Prison officials may not take
unfair advantage of the exhaustion requirement, ... and a remedy becomes ‘unavailable’ if prison
employees do not respond to a properly filed grievance or otherwise use affirmative misconduct to
prevent a prisoner from exhausting”; prisoner whose properly filed grievance simply vanished, and who
received no instructions what to do about it, did “all that was reasonable to exhaust”); Miller v. Norris,
247 F.3d 736, 740 (8th Cir. 2001) (“We believe that a remedy that prison officials prevent a prisoner
from ‘utiliz[ing]’ is not an ‘available’ remedy under § 1997e(a) ...”); Ponton v. Bailey, No. 02-138J, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87561, at *10 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 4, 2006) (unpublished) (same as Dole v. Chandler;
finding the prisoner sufficiently pursued his administrative remedie, as the prisoner received no
response to his initial grievance ); Alwood v. Randt, No. 3:05-CV-619 RM, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65115,
at *6–10 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 12, 2006) (unpublished) (denying summary judgment where prisoner’s sworn
statement said a prison official came to his cell and “ripped up his grievance, thereby refusing to allow
it to be processed”); Labounty v. Johnson, 253 F. Supp. 2d 496, 502–04 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding
grievance supervisor’s alleged failure to follow procedures, preventing plaintiff’s appeal, barred
summary judgment for non-exhaustion); Johnson v. True, 125 F. Supp. 2d 186, 188–89 (W.D. Va. 2000)
(holding allegation that efforts to exhaust were frustrated by officials raised an issue of material fact
whether plaintiff exhausted “available” remedies), appeal dismissed, 32 F. App’x 692 (4th Cir. 2002);
Bullock v. Horn, No. 3:CV-99-1402, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20212, at *6–7 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 31, 2000)
(unpublished) (holding allegation that prison officials returned grievances unprocessed, without
grievance numbers, making appeal impossible was sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss).

grievance appeal may make the appeal unavailable, 282 as may deprivation of writing
materials or documentation to prisoners in a segregation unit. 283 Sometimes prisoners in a
particular status or situation are simply excluded from using the grievance system. 284 Rules
specifically designed to limit prisoners’ use of the grievance system may make the remedy
unavailable for some prisoners, depending on the severity of the limit. 285 A system of
281. Frost v. McCaughtry, No. 99-2061, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 14702, at *2–4 (7th Cir. June 12,
2000) (unpublished) (holding allegation that no grievance appeal was available to plaintiff because of
ongoing administrative changes during the relevant time period raised a factual question as to
availability); Brookins v. Vogel, No. 1:05-CV-0413-0WW-DLB-P, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86252, at *7–9
(E.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2006) (unpublished) (holding that a prisoner who filed a grievance, got no response,
and was told it had never been received, and whose subsequent attempts were rejected as untimely,
had exhausted); Cahill v. Arpaio, No. CV 05-0741-PHX-MHM (JCG), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80772, at
*7–9 (D. Ariz. Nov. 2, 2006) (unpublished) (holding grievance process became unavailable when hearing
officer stated the matter was under investigation and the plaintiff would not be informed of the results,
he could not appeal and he would not be given a form, and he should proceed to federal court); Bennett
v. Douglas County, No. 8:04cv285, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48774, at *5–8 (D. Neb. June 30, 2006)
(declining to dismiss for failure to appeal to the Chief Deputy of the jail where there was no Chief
Deputy); Howard v. City of New York, No. 02-CV-1731 (KMK), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63426, at *21–24
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2006) (unpublished) (holding allegations that plaintiff asked to see the grievance
officer but was never called, and when transferred was told he could not grieve a matter from the
previous facility, did not support dismissal of the complaint); Labounty v. Johnson, 253 F. Supp. 2d
496, 504–06 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that prisoner’s factually supported claim that his grievance was
consolidated with another prisoner’s, and the decision did not mention the issue he was concerned
about, presented a factual issue whether it was “reasonable for plaintiff to be confused under such
circumstances”).
282. Bey v. Caruso, No. 06-14909, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72462, at *2–3 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 28,
2007) (unpublished) (noting that denial of “postal loan” was based on plaintiff’s using his religious
name suffix on the relevant form, contrary to the policy he was trying to challenge; “the procedural
question of exhaustion is inextricably intertwined with the merits of this case”); Cordova v. Frank, No.
07-C-172-C, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54789, at *15–16 (W.D. Wis. July 26, 2007) (unpublished) (noting
that “insofar as defendants have devised a grievance system that prevents indigent prisoners from
filing appeals of their inmate grievances, they have made the grievance process unavailable to those
inmates”); Kaufman v. Schneiter, 474 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1032 (W.D. Wis. 2007) (unpublished) (stating
in dictum that “If, by reason of indigence, petitioner was unable to post his grievance appeal and
respondents did not provide an alternative means of appealing, it is difficult to see how the appeal
process would be "available" to him”).
283. Weighall v. Pea, No. C06-5663 RBL/KLS, 2007 WL 4111376, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 16,
2007) (unpublished); Woods v. Carey, No. CIV S-04-1225 LKK GGH P, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69832, at
*1–2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2007) (unpublished) (vacating recommendation for exhaustion dismissal
pending inquiry into plaintiff’s access to his legal property, which he said impeded his timely appeal).
284. Daker v. Ferrero, No. 1:03-CV-2526-RWS, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30591, at *6–7 (N.D. Ga.
Nov. 24, 2004) (unpublished) (prisoner placed in “sleeper” status, meaning he remained officially
assigned to another prison and was not allowed to file grievances where he was actually located, lacked
an available remedy); see Sease v. Phillips, No. 06 Civ. 3663 (PKC), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60994, at
*25 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2008) (unpublished) (summary judgment denied where prisoner in “transient
status” was told his grievance could not be processed, and when he filed one it was never processed);
Muhammad v. U.S. Marshall Serv., No. 1:07-cv-00027, 2008 WL 2367302, at *5 (W.D. Pa. June 10,
2008) (unpublished) (refusing to dismiss where plaintiff alleged that because of his status as a federal
detainee, the jail grievance system was not made known to him).
If the available remedy is a disciplinary appeal, but the prisoner cannot appeal because he pled
guilty to the offense, the remedy is not available. Marr v. Fields, No. 1:07-cv-4942008, U.S. Dist. LEXIS
24993, at *5–7 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 27, 2008) (unpublished).
285 . Rules limiting prisoners to a certain number of grievances may make the remedy
unavailable for prisoners who are over the limit. Rhodan v. Schofield, No. 1:04-CV-2158-TWT, 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44593, at *19–20 (N.D. Ga. June 19, 2007) (unpublished) (holding prisoner who said
he was told he could not have two grievances pending at once raised a factual issue as to availability of
remedies); Wood v. Idaho Dep’t of Corr., No. CV-04-99-C-BLW, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14711, at *20–21

“modified grievance access,” which requires prior permission to file a grievance, makes the
remedy unavailable if permission is not granted. 286 Remedies may also be made available by
actions by supervisors or grievance staff with respect to particular grievances or grievants, 287
purposeful misconduct, 288 neglect or accident, 289 or events that are merely unexplained. 290
(D. Idaho Mar. 16, 2006) (unpublished) (holding that a prisoner whose grievance was returned because
he was only allowed to have three pending at one time had exhausted, since he had done what he could
do to exhaust). But see Moore v. Bennette, 517 F.3d 717, 729–30 (4th Cir. 2008) (where rules allowed
only one grievance at a time except for emergencies, and plaintiff labelled his second grievance an
emergency but it did not meet the criteria in the grievance rules for an emergency and was dismissed,
plaintiff’s failure to resubmit it when his first grievance was decided was a failure to exhaust).
286. Dawson v. Norwood, No. 1:06-cv-914, 2007 WL 3302102, at *9 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 6, 2007)
(unpublished) (“If a prisoner has been placed on modified access to the grievance procedure and
attempts to file a grievance which is deemed to be non-meritorious, he has exhausted his ‘available’
administrative remedies as required by § 1997e(a).”) (citation omitted); Hahn v. Tarnow, No. 5:06CV74,
2006 WL 1705128, at *2 n.4 (W.D. Mich. June 16, 2006) (unpublished) (holding that a plaintiff on
“modified grievance restriction” who was denied grievance forms did not have an available remedy). A
rule requiring prisoners on modified grievance status to submit a notarized affidavit with a grievance
may make the remedy unavailable if the prisoner cannot get access to a notary. Thomas v. Guffy, No.
CIV-07-823-W, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56901, at *7 (W.D. Okla. July 25, 2008) (unpublished).
287. Howard v. Hill, 156 F. App’x 886, 886 (9th Cir. Nov. 21, 2005) (unpublished) (holding that a
prisoner who had been told he would not receive responses to his grievances had no remedy available);
Woods v. Carey, No. CIV S-04-1225 LKK GGH P, 2008 WL 447553 (E.D. Cal. Feb 15, 2008)
(unpublished) (where grievance official directed plaintiff to the medical appeals analyst, but that
person said plaintiff’s grievance must first be processed by the grievance office, plaintiff had exhausted;
court refers to “runaround”); Bradley v. McVay, No. 1:04-cv-06128-AWI DLB PC, 2008 WL 495732, at
*3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2008) (unpublished) (if prison officials required plaintiff to go to an interview
room for an investigation, and he could not do so without the cane he had been deprived of, the
grievance process would not be available to him), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:04-cv-
6128-AWI-DLB-P, 2008 WL 669858 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2008) (unpublished); Baylis v. Taylor, 475 F.
Supp. 2d 484, 488 (D. Del. 2007) (holding officials’ withdrawal of plaintiff’s grievances because of
litigation meant that he had exhausted, since no further remedies were available). But see Howard v.
Smith, No. CV606-062, 2008 WL 816685, (S.D. Ga. Feb. 28, 2008) (unpublished), report and
recommendation rejected in pertinent part, No. 606CV062, 2008 WL 816684 (S.D. Ga. Mar 26, 2008)
(unpublished), on reconsideration on other grounds, No. 6:06CV062, 2008 WL 2316718 (S.D. Ga. June 4,
2008) (unpublished). In Howard, the prison system introduced a rule newly requiring an additional
“informal” step in the grievance process, and plaintiff’s pending grievances were all canceled; the
magistrate judge said he was deemed to have exhausted his claims, but the district judge rejected that
conclusion without explanation.
288. Allen v. City of Saint Louis, No. 4:06-CV-00810 SNL, 2008 WL 695393, at *4–5 (E.D. Mo.
Mar. 12, 2008) (unpublished) (finding remedies unavailable where plaintiff’s requests for forms and
information about how to file were ignored, denied, or “pacified with promises” of an investigation, and
he was improperly segregated to prevent access to the grievance procedure and third parties); Miller v.
Berkebile, No. 3:07-CV-0712-B ECF, 2008 WL 635552, at *7–9 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 2008) (unpublished)
(where official refused to process first-stage grievances contrary to policy, remedy was unavailable;
prisoners need not take steps not prescribed in the policy to get around him; PLRA law applied in §
2241 case); Smith v. Westchester County Dep’t of Corr., No. 07 Civ. 1803(SAS), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11049, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2008) (unpublished) (remedies were unavailable if supervisors refused
to accept plaintiff’s grievance); Collins v. Goord, 438 F. Supp. 2d 399, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding
allegations that facility personnel invented a screening procedure and did not allow him to file his
grievance raised a material issue under “an exception to the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement where
prison authorities actively obstruct an inmate’s ability to ‘properly’ file a prison grievance”); Carter v.
Newland, 441 F. Supp. 2d 208, 211 (D. Mass. 2006) (declining to dismiss for non-exhaustion in view of
allegations that a prison counselor tore up the plaintiff’s grievances).
289. Pavey v. Conley, 170 F. App’x 4, 9 (7th Cir. Mar. 3, 2006) (unpublished) (holding that
isolating and failing to assist a prisoner who couldn’t write could render the remedy unavailable);
Monroe v. Beard, No. 05-04937, 2007 WL 2359833, at *12–13 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 16, 2007) (unpublished)
(holding the grievance process unavailable where prisoners were told to object to certain searches

However, courts are unlikely to be persuaded by vague claims of obstruction, unless clearly
supported by facts. 291 Many courts have found that an allegation that there was a denial of
necessary grievance forms is sufficient to ensure that a case is not dismissed because of nonexhaustion
of remedies. 292 Still, courts are suspicious of such claims, especially if the claim is
through an Unacceptable Correspondence Form, and they would be notified of the results of an
investigation and then could file a grievance, but were not so notified), aff’d, 536 F.3d 198, 204 n.6 (3d
Cir. 2008) (unpublished); Warren v. Purcell, No. 03 Civ. 8736(GEL), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17792, at
*20 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2004) (unpublished) (holding “baffling” grievance response that left prisoner with
no clue what to do next estopped defendants from claiming the defense and constituted special
circumstances justifying failure to exhaust).
290. Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809, 812 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding prisoner whose properly
filed grievance simply vanished, and who received no instructions what to do about it, did “all that was
reasonable to exhaust”); Johnson v. Tedford, No. 04-CV-632 (GLS/DEP), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85074,
at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2007) (unpublished) (holding a prisoner whose grievance is not recorded or
given a grievance number, so the lack of response cannot be appealed, may have exhausted).
291. See, e.g., Stine v. Wiley, No. CIVA 06CV-02105-BNB, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2113, at *1–2
(D. Colo. Jan. 10, 2007) (unpublished); Djukic v. Arpaio, No. CV 05-4042-PHX-MHM (MEA), 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 72239, at *6–7 (D. Ariz. Sept. 26, 2006) (unpublished).
292. Dale v. Lappin, 376 F.3d 652, 654–56 (7th Cir. 2004) (per curiam); Mitchell v. Horn, 318
F.3d 523, 529 (3d Cir. 2003); Miller v. Norris, 247 F.3d 736, 740 (8th Cir. 2001); Bertres v. Byers, No.
1:CV-06-1623, 2007 WL 4224389, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 28, 2007) (unpublished) (“[P]laintiff's statements
under penalty of perjury in his complaint that he was not provided a grievance form are adequate to
establish that it is in dispute whether he was reasonably able to exhaust.”); Chatham v. Adcock, No.
3:05-CV-0127-JTC, 2007 WL 2904117, at *14 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 28, 2007) (unpublished) (“It would be an
anomalous result, indeed, if prison officials could foreclose prison inmates from filing civil rights
lawsuits in federal court simply by depriving them of the means to fulfill a mandatory prerequisite to
doing so.”); Hedgespeth v. Hendricks, No. 06-3883 (AET), 2007 WL 2769627, at *5 (D.N.J. Sept. 21,
2007) (unpublished) (refusing to dismiss where plaintiff alleged that he was told by housing officers
there were no grievance forms, and inmate handbook said housing officers were the source of forms);
Cody v. White, No. 3:06-cv-18, 2007 WL 1726583, at *2 (D.N.D. June 13, 2007) (unpublished) (denying
summary judgment where segregation prisoner said he couldn’t get forms from staff and rules did not
seem to allow him to go to grievance office); Tabarez v. Butler, No. CIV S-04-0360 LKK EFB P, 2007
WL 988040, at *2–3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2007) (unpublished) (holding defendants’ claim that prisoners
“customarily” have access to grievance forms did not mean this plaintiff did, especially since he said
only those who were “on good terms” with the guards could get forms), report and recommendation
adopted, No. CIV S-04-0360 LKK EFB P, 2007 WL 1804968 (E.D. Cal. June 21, 2007) (unpublished);
Bowers v. City of Philadelphia, No. 06-CV-3229, 2007 WL 219651, at *16 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 25, 2007)
(unpublished) (holding grievance process unavailable where forms were not provided in police custody
or jail intake area); Allen v. McMorris, No. 4:06-cv-810 SNL, 2007 WL 172564, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 19,
2007) (unpublished) (holding allegation that prisoner could not get grievance policy or forms barred
summary judgment for defendants); Enigwe v. Zenk, No. 03-CV-854 (CBA), 2006 WL 2654985, at *4
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2006) (unpublished) (denying summary judgment to defendants where plaintiff
asserted his repeated efforts to obtain forms were fruitless).

not supported by facts, if there is no evidence that the prisoner tried to get the forms, 293 or if
the prisoner filed other grievances around the same time. 294
Remedies are unavailable if officials failed to tell prisoners that certain remedies 295 or
rules, 296 existed. If a prisoner is misinformed about the availability or operation of a remedy,
that may make them unavailable as well. 297 Some courts have not dismissed for non-
293. See, e.g., Lomas v. U.S., No. CIV-06-869-C, 2008 WL 819459, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 25,
2008) (unpublished) (citing plaintiff’s failure to state “to whom or when the requests were made or to
explain his access to certain forms and not others”); Dye v. Bartow, No. 06-C-0634, 2007 WL 3306771,
at *6 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 6, 2007) (unpublished) (citing plaintiff’s failure to identify the forms he requested
and the date of request, to supply a copy of his request, or to submit evidence detailing officials’
response to his requests), aff’d, No. 07-3836, 2008 WL 2420991 (7th Cir. 2008) (unpublished); Beasley v.
Kontek, No. 3:05CV7262, 2007 WL 3306637, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 5, 2007) (unpublished) (“A prisoner
may not be excused from exhausting internal remedies if his failure resulted from a form not being
provided to him, unless he alleges that there was no other source for the form or that he can prove that
he made other attempts to ‘obtain a form or file a grievance.’”), quoting Jones v. Smith, 266 F.3d 399,
400 (6th Cir.2001).
294. See, e.g., Guel v. Larkin, No. 06-5091, 2008 WL 1994942, at *5–6 (W.D. Ark. May 6, 2008)
(unpublished).
295. Goebert v. Lee County, 510 F.3d 1312, 1322–23 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that an appeal
procedure not described in the inmate handbook but only in the operating procedures the inmates did
not have access to, was not an available remedy); Westefer v. Snyder, 422 F.3d 570, 580 (7th Cir. 2005)
(holding that defendants did not show remedies were available where there was no “clear route” for
challenging certain decisions); Sadler v. Rowland, No. 3:01CV1786(CFD)(WIG), 2004 WL 2061518, at
*7 (D. Conn. Sept. 13, 2004) (unpublished) (refusing to dismiss claim of Connecticut prisoner
transferred to Virginia who attempted to grieve in Virginia and was not told to file separate grievances
in Connecticut); Burgess v. Garvin, No. 01 Civ. 10994(GEL), 2004 WL 527053, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16,
2004) (unpublished) (holding that “procedural channels ... not made known to prisoners ... are not an
‘available’ remedy in any meaningful sense... . [Congress] cannot have meant that prisoners would be
expected to exhaust remedies of which they were kept entirely ignorant.”); Arnold v. Goetz, 245 F.
Supp. 2d 527, 537 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2003) (holding defendants required to make a “reasonable, good
faith effort to make the grievance procedure available to inmates”); Alvarez v. United States, No. 98
Civ. 3179, 2000 WL 557328, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2000) (unpublished) (stating that a showing that
prisoner was not “meaningfully informed” about administrative remedies could establish that they
were not available), on reconsideration, No. 98 CIV. 3179(WK), 2000 WL 679009 (S.D.N.Y. May 24,
2000) (unpublished).
In Davis v. Milwaukee County, 225 F. Supp. 2d 967, 975–76 (E.D. Wis. 2002), the court held that
the plaintiff had been denied access to courts by defendants’ hindering his ability to exhaust by failing
to make available materials concerning the grievance procedure.
296. Jackson v. Ivens, 244 F. App’x 508, 514 (3d Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (“We will not condition
exhaustion on unwritten or ‘implied’ requirements.”), citing Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 234 (3d Cir.
2004); Sims v. Rewerts, No. 07-12646, 2008 WL 2224132, at *5–6 (E.D. Mich. May 29, 2008)
(unpublished) (declining to dismiss where plaintiff failed to comply with a time limit that had been
changed without notice); Cabrera v. LeVierge, No. 07-cv-40-SM, 2008 WL 215720, at *6 (D.N.H. Jan.
24, 2008) (unpublished) (“inmates cannot be expected to meet procedural requirements that are
undisclosed”); Lampkins v. Roberts, No. 1:06-cv-639-DFH-TAB, 2007 WL 924746, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Mar.
27, 2007) (unpublished) (refusing to dismiss for missing a five-day time deadline which was not made
known in the materials made available to prisoners).
297. Pavey v. Conley, 170 F. App’x 4, 8–9, 2006 WL 509447, at *4–5 (7th Cir. Mar. 3, 2006)
(unpublished) (stating that “inmates may rely on the assurances of prison officials when they are led to
believe that satisfactory steps have been taken to exhaust administrative remedies ... . [P]rison officials
will be bound by their oral representations to inmates concerning compliance with the grievance
process”; plaintiff, who could not write, could reasonably rely on assurances that his oral complaint
would be investigated); Brown v. Croak, 312 F.3d 109, 112–13 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that if security
officials told the plaintiff to wait for completion of an investigation before grieving, and then never
informed him of its completion, the grievance system was unavailable to him); Miller v. Tanner, 196
F.3d 1190 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that grievance decision that stated it was non-appealable need not
have been appealed); Chinnici v. Edwards, No. 1:07-cv-229, 2008 WL 3851294, at *5 (D. Vt. Aug. 12,

exhaustion of remedies if a prisoner had relied on prison personnel’s statement that their
issue was not a grievance. 298 If a prisoner had some notice of the remedy, like in an inmate
2008) (unpublished) (supervisor’s statement that sex abuse complaint did not require completing the
grievance process could constitute estoppel or special circumstances excusing non-exhaustion); Spinney
v. U.S., No. 06-309 Erie, 2008 WL 1859810, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 2008) (unpublished) (if plaintiff
delayed one grievance on advice of counselor, remedy may not have been available to him); Tinsley v.
Giorla, No. 05-2777, 2008 WL 901697, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 1, 2008) (unpublished) (if a prison official
told a prisoner a decision could not be appealed, contrary to written grievance policy, the grievance
procedure could be found unavailable); Flory v. Claussen, No. C06-1046-RSL-JPD, 2006 WL 3404779,
at *3 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 21, 2006) (unpublished) (holding prisoner who followed officials’ instruction to
file an “appeal” to the Facility Risk Management Team about removal from his job, rather than a
grievance, exhausted); Wheeler v. Goord, No. Civ.A.03CV0787(NAM/D, 2005 WL 2180451, at *6
(N.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2005) (unpublished) (holding prisoner who was erroneously told to “write to
Sergeant Coffee” to grieve raised an issue whether remedies were available); Willis v. Smith, No. C04-
4012-MWB, 2005 WL 550528, at *13 (N.D. Iowa Feb. 28, 2005) (unpublished) (declining to dismiss
where plaintiff relied on the statement of a prison official that the written grievance policy was
unavailable); Croswell v. McCoy, No. Civ.9:01-CV-00547, 2003 WL 962534, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 11,
2003) (unpublished) (holding that a prisoner who relies on prison officials’ representations as to correct
procedure has exhausted); O’Connor v. Featherston, No. 01 Civ. 3251(HB), 2003 WL 554752, at *2–3
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2003) (unpublished) (holding allegation that prison Superintendent told a prisoner to
complain via the Inspector General rather than the grievance procedure presented triable factual
issues).
In Davis v. Milwaukee County, 225 F. Supp. 2d 967, 976 (E.D. Wis. 2002), the court held that the
plaintiff had been denied access to courts by defendants’ hindering his ability to exhaust by telling him
that his complaint was “not a grievable situation.”
298. Marr v. Fields, No. 1:07-cv-494, 2008 WL 828788, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 27, 2008)
(unpublished) (denying dismissal for non-exhaustion where prisoner was told by staff his disciplinary
retaliation claim could not be grieved); Greene v. C.D.C., No. CIV S-05-0330 GEB JFM P, 2008 WL
413750, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2008) (unpublished) (finding that plaintiff exhausted without
completing the grievance process where the response to his grievance said it was an abuse of the
process and plaintiff should instead use a form for requesting an interview instead), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 2:05-cv-0330-GEB-JFM-P, 2008 WL 683551 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2008)
(unpublished); Smith v. Westchester County Dep’t of Corr., No. 07 Civ. 1803(SAS), 2008 WL 361130, at
*3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2008) (unpublished) (finding that plaintiff reasonably believed his claim was not
grievable where a Sergeant told him so); Lewis v. Cunningham, No. 05 Civ. 9243(GBD), 2007 WL
2412258, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2007) (unpublished) (holding prisoner who was told by grievance
official that his medical complaint should go to the Chief Medical Officer rather than the grievance
system showed special circumstances excusing lack of proper exhaustion); Lane v. Doan, 287 F. Supp.
2d 210, 212 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that exhaustion is excused where the plaintiff is led to believe the
complaint is not a grievance matter or would otherwise be investigated, or that administrative
remedies are unavailable); Simpson v. Gallant, 231 F. Supp. 2d 341, 350 (D. Me. 2002) (holding a
prisoner who had been told the issue was not grievable had sufficiently exhausted). But see Gibson v.
Weber, 431 F.3d 339, 341 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that general allegation that prison personnel “made
it clear” they should make medical complaints informally did not excuse prisoners from using a
grievance procedure they admitted having been informed of); Singh v. Goord, 520 F. Supp. 2d 487, 496
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2007) (officials’ designating a particular staff member to deal with plaintiff’s concerns
did not excuse non-exhaustion where he was not instructed not to file grievances); Fuentes-Ramos v.
Arpaio, No. CV 06-2803-PHX-SMM (JRI), 2007 WL 1670142, at *2 (D. Ariz. June 8, 2007)
(unpublished) (refusing to credit “generalized allegations” that officers told plaintiff his issues were
non-grievable); Herron v. Elkins, No. 4:06CV627 CDP, 2006 WL 3803946, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 7, 2006)
(unpublished) (dismissing where staff told plaintiff his claim was not grievable; his “subjective belief”
based on those statements did not excuse non-exhaustion); Overton v. Davis, 460 F. Supp. 2d 1008,
1010–11 (S.D. Iowa 2006) (holding prisoner failed to exhaust where he said he was told his property
confiscation was non-grievable but the written policy said it was and also that written notice is given
when a complaint is non-grievable).

handbook, a prisoner cannot claim he did not know it existed. 299 Prison officials’ statements
that do not directly misrepresent the operation of the grievance system generally are not
held to excuse the failure to exhaust, even if a prisoner relies on them. 300 But, actions that
intimidate or mislead a prisoner into not exhausting, or not exhausting correctly, may be
deemed to estop (that is, prevent) prison personnel from claiming non-exhaustion, in addition
to or instead of making the remedy unavailable. 301
299. Gibson v. Weber, 431 F.3d 339, 341 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that prisoners who admitted
receiving guide that explained the grievance procedure were not excused from using it by their
allegations that prison personnel had “made it clear” that they should instead voice complaints
informally to medical personnel); Boyd v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 380 F.3d 989 (6th Cir. 2004); Edwards v.
Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 81 F. Supp. 2d 1242, 1256–57 (M.D. Ala. 2000); Rizzuto v. City of New York, No. 00
Civ. 6044(DLC), 2003 WL 1212758, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2003) (unpublished) (refusing to credit
prisoner’s claim that he never received information about the grievance system in light of signed
receipt for rule book).
300. Lyon v. Vande Krol, 305 F.3d 806, 809 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that warden’s statement that
a decision about religious matters rested in the hands of “Jewish experts” did not excuse nonexhaustion,
but was at most a prediction that the plaintiff would lose; courts will not consider
prisoners’ subjective beliefs in determining whether procedures are “available”); Jackson v. District of
Columbia, 254 F.3d 262, 269–70 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that a plaintiff who complained to three
prison officials and was told by the warden to “file it in the court” had not exhausted); Yousef v. Reno,
254 F.3d 1214, 1221–22 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that plaintiff who was confused by prison officials’
erroneous representations about the powers of the grievance system was still required to exhaust);
Chelette v. Harris, 229 F.3d 684, 688 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that a plaintiff who complained to the
warden and was told the warden would take care of his problem, was not excused from exhausting the
grievance system); Thomas v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., No. 00 Civ. 7163(NRB), 2003 WL
22671540, at *3–*4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 2003) (unpublished) (dismissing case where prison staff told the
prisoner a grievance was not necessary; this was “bad advice, not prevention or obstruction,” and the
prisoner did not make sufficient efforts to exhaust).
301. See Hemphill v. New York, 380 F.3d 680, 688–89 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding allegations of
verbal and physical threats and fear of further assault could support a finding of equitable estoppel);
Ziemba v. Wezner, 366 F.3d 161, 162–63 (2d Cir. 2004) (similar to Hemphill); Messa v. LeClaire, No.
03-CV-1385 (TJM/DRH), 2007 WL 2292975, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2007) (unpublished) (holding
threats by unidentified prison staff could estop the named defendants), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 9:03-CV-1385, 2007 WL 2288106 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2007); Snyder v. Goord, No. 9: 05-CV-
01284, 2007 WL 957530, at *10 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2007) (unpublished) (holding grievance supervisor’s
advice that if a problem had been brought “to some administration’s attention” it need not be grieved
might estop the defendants); Lawyer v. Gatto, No. 03 Civ. 7577 RPP, 2007 WL 549440, at *7 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 21, 2007) (unpublished) (holding defendants estopped from arguing plaintiff should have refiled
his grievance citing mitigating circumstances for its lateness where the grievance supervisor had
already rejected his mitigating circumstances); Gay v. Corr. Med. Serv., No. 1:04 CV 289, 2007 WL
495241, at *3 (D.Vt. Feb. 9, 2007) (unpublished) (holding officer’s admission that she received and
signed the plaintiff’s grievance but then returned it to him rather than forwarding it as required may
estop the defendants); Warren v. Purcell, No. 03 Civ. 8736(GEL), 2004 WL 1970642, at *6 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 3, 2004) (unpublished) (holding “baffling” grievance response that left prisoner with no clue what
to do next estopped the defendants from claiming non-exhaustion); Rivera v. Goord, No. 99 Civ.
1683(DC), 2003 WL 1700518, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2003) (unpublished) (stating that prison officials
may not assert non-exhaustion where a prisoner has been told by officials that his complaint is not a
“grievance matter” and is being otherwise investigated); Heath v. Saddlemire, No. 9:96-CV-1998
(FJS/RF, 2002 WL 31242204, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2002) (unpublished) (holding that prison officials
cannot present the defense that a prisoner has not exhausted when the prisoner did not exhaust in
reliance on what prison officials to him); Simpson v. Gallant, 223 F. Supp. 2d 286, 292 (D. Me. 2002)
aff’d, 62 F. App’x 368 (1st Cir. 2003) (holding prison officials who said the plaintiff’s problem was not
grievable could not claim that the prisoner failed to exhaust). But see Kaba v. Stepp, 458 F.3d 678, 687
(7th Cir. 2006) (declining to decide whether estoppel applied in Hemphill-type situation); Lewis v.
Washington, 300 F.3d 829, 834–35 (7th Cir. 2002) (declining to apply estoppel where the defendants did
not affirmatively mislead the plaintiff but merely failed to respond to grievances); Berry v. City of New
York, No. 00 CIV. 2834 RMBJCF, 2002 WL 31045943, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2002) (unpublished)

If there is some reason outside your control that you cannot exhaust in a timely and
procedurally correct manner, you might think this means that the remedy is not available to
you and you do not have to exhaust. Do not assume this. A number of courts have held, for
example, that if prisoners are prevented from filing grievances at the correct time, they must
file them whenever they can, even if the grievances will be denied for not being on time. 302
This makes no sense under the “proper exhaustion” rule, but courts do it anyway, so do not
fall into the trap. Some courts have held that if your grievance or appeal just “disappears,”
it’s not enough just to say that when you go to court; you must take some action to follow up
on the grievance that has gone missing. 303 One federal appeals court has recently held that if
the failure to exhaust was “innocent,” the prisoner “must be given another chance to exhaust
(provided that there exist remedies that he will be permitted by the prison authorities to
exhaust, so that he’s not just being given a runaround).” 304
Courts will be very skeptical of claims that you have exhausted your remedies when
there is no record of it, 305 or claims that you were not informed or misinformed about the
grievance process. You are therefore best advised to do everything you can to exhaust even if
you know the effort is going to fail—and keep records so you can prove you tried. 306 For
example, if prison staff refuses to provide you with grievance forms, write your grievance on
a sheet of paper, explain that you cannot get the forms, and appeal if they reject the
grievance for not being on the right form. 307 If prison staff tells you that you do not need to
file a grievance, file a grievance anyway; if they tell you that the issue is not “grievable”—
that is, if the grievance system is not available to you for that issue—file the grievance
(declining to credit estoppel claim where the plaintiff had used the grievance system successfully on
other occasions).
302. For more information about time limits, see Part E(6) of this Chapter.
303. Boyer v. Farlin, No. 04-1042, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88940, at *10–12 (C.D. Ill. Dec. 8, 2006)
(holding prisoner didn’t exhaust because he failed to explain why he didn’t take any action for two
months when he didn’t receive a notice that his appeal had been received). The Seventh Circuit has
held that a remedy becomes “unavailable” if prison employees try to take unfair advantage of the
exhaustion requirement by not responding to a grievance or otherwise preventing a prisoner from
exhausting. In that case, Dole v. Chandler, the court ruled that a prisoner whose properly filed
grievance had simply vanished did “all that was reasonable to exhaust”). Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d
804, 809, 812 (7th Cir. 2006).
304. Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 742 (7th Cir. 2008).
305. See Gaughan v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, No. 02 C 0740, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23297, at *3
(N.D. Ill. Dec 30, 2003) (unpublished) (rejecting claim that prisoner had exhausted but defendants had
not made a record of it); Thomas v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Serv., No. 00 Civ. 7163 (NRB), 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 20286, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 2003) (unpublished) (dismissing case where prison staff
told the prisoner a grievance was not necessary for failure to exhaust).
306. See Plasencia v. California, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1148 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (finding that
prisoner “knew of the grievance procedures and that it was possible for him to initiate a grievance
under those procedures”); Russo v. Palmer, 990 F. Supp. 1047, 1049 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (“[Plaintiff inmate]
filed grievances in the past and the grievance process is explained on the form that stated his initial
complaint ... . Thus, any failure to file the grievance ... cannot be attributed to ignorance of the
grievance process.”).
307. Kendall v. Kittles, No. 03 Civ. 628 (GEL), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16129, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 15, 2003) (unpublished) (declining to dismiss where prisoner said he could not get grievance
forms; the fact that he filed grievances at other times showed only that forms were available on the
dates those grievances were filed, and not that such forms were always available). This is not an issue
in the New York State grievance system. The directive states that if forms are not available, the
grievance can be submitted on plain paper. See State of New York, Department of Correctional
Services, Directive No. 4040 § 701.5(a)(1), Inmate Grievance Program (2003) (as revised July 1, 2006);
N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 7, § 701.5(a)(1) (2008). The New York City grievance directive does
not address the issue.

anyway, so that you will get a decision in writing telling you that it isn’t grievable. 308 If they
refuse to accept your grievance, write to the Warden or Superintendent, tell him or her that
you were not allowed to file your grievance, and ask that it either be investigated as a nongrievance
complaint or treated as a grievance in case you were misinformed by the lowerlevel
staff. It may also be worthwhile to file a grievance about the refusal to accept your
grievance. It is crucial to keep copies of everything.
4. What Must You Put in Your Grievance or Administrative Appeal?
Exhausting requires you to raise administratively all of the issues that you intend to
raise in a lawsuit. Issues you do not include in your grievance or appeal cannot be
litigated. 309 Sometimes you have to use more than one remedy to exhaust all your issues. 310
How specific and detailed must you be in a grievance or appeal to satisfy the exhaustion
requirement? The Supreme Court recently ruled on one part of this question, holding that
courts could not require prisoners to have named in their grievances all the defendants that
they later named in their court complaints if the grievance system itself did not have such a
requirement. 311 The Court said: “The level of detail necessary in a grievance to comply with
the grievance procedures will vary from system to system and claim to claim, but it is the
prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper
exhaustion.” 312 So if the prison does require you to name the responsible employees in a
grievance, you have to do it to the extent you have the information. Some prison systems
have recently added this and other requirements, 313 and it is likely others will follow suit.
At present, most grievance systems do not have such specific requirements. Either they
say nothing about the level of detail required in grievances, or the requirement is very
308. Some courts have refused to accept prisoners’ statements that some unidentified person told
them that their issues were not grievable. See, e.g., Perez v. Arpaio, No. CV 06-0038-PHX-SMM (ECV),
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 866559, at *5 (D. Ariz. Nov. 21, 2006) (unpublished).
309. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218–19, 127 S. Ct. 910, 923, 166 L. Ed. 2d 798, 816 (2007); see
Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 517–19 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding a prisoner who complained of sexual
assault and referred to his sexual orientation in his grievance, but said nothing about his race, did not
exhaust his racial discrimination claim); Black v. Goord, No. 03-CV-6155 CJS, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
77781, at *12–14 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2007) (unpublished) (holding grievances about length of time the
plaintiff was held in full restraints did not exhaust his complaint about pain and inability to exercise or
about lack of due process in renewing restraint orders); Lilly v. Smith, No. 05-1383, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 45683, at *5 (C.D. Ill. June 25, 2007) (unpublished) (dismissing claim about placement in
restraint chair not mentioned in plaintiff’s use-of-force grievance); Malik v. Sabree, C.A. No. 8:06-319-
RBH, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18899, at *2 (D.S.C., Mar. 13, 2007) (unpublished) (holding grievance
about Muslim feasts did not exhaust claim about Muslim fasts); Beltran v. O'Mara, 405 F. Supp. 2d
140, 152 (D.N.H. 2005) (holding complaints about specific segregation conditions, like lack of toilet
paper, did not exhaust as to conditions generally or conditions not mentioned in the grievances), on
reconsideration, No. 04-cv-071-JD, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6277 (D.N.H. Jan. 31, 2006) (unpublished);
Page v. Breslin, No. 02-CV-6030 (SJF)(LB), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25056, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 29,
2004) (unpublished) (holding a grievance about harassing conduct exhausted only as to incidents
mentioned in the grievance); Cooper v. Garcia, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1094–95 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (finding
plaintiff exhausted for his claim regarding his status as a sex offender but not regarding his 8th
Amendment claim); Jenkins v. Toombs, 32 F. Supp. 2d 955, 959 (W.D. Mich. 1999) (holding a court can
prevent a plaintiff from bringing a claim by limiting action to claims that have been exhausted).
310. This is most often the case in connection with disciplinary proceedings.
311. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 217–19, 127 S. Ct. 910, 922–23, 166 L. Ed. 2d 798, 815 (2007).
312. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218–19, 127 S. Ct. 910, 923, 166 L. Ed. 798, 815 (2007).
313. Michigan has changed its policy, which formerly required prisoners only to “be as specific as
possible” but to “[b]e brief and concise,” to require inclusion of “[d]ates, times, places and names of all
those involved in the issue being grieved.” State of Michigan, Department of Corrections, Policy Dir.
No. 03.02.130 (December 19, 2003), available at
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/corrections/03_02_130_200872_7.pdf.

general. 314 One court has said that if the policy does not have more specific requirements, a
“grievance suffices if it alerts the prison to the nature of the wrong for which redress is
sought. As in a notice pleading system, the grievant need not lay out the facts, articulate
legal theories, or demand particular relief. All the grievance need do is object intelligibly to
some asserted shortcoming.” 315 This court and others adopted that standard because the
purpose of the PLRA exhaustion requirement is to give prison officials time and opportunity
to resolve problems before they turn into lawsuits; because a federal court complaint is
required only to give the defendants notice of the nature of the plaintiff’s claims so they can
defend against them; and because it would make no sense to require prisoners to satisfy a
more demanding standard at the administrative stage without assistance of counsel. 316 An
example of a grievance that meets the “object intelligibly” standard (though just barely) is
one in a sexual assault case where the prisoner said only: “[T]he administration do not do
there job. [A sexual assault] should’ve never happen again,” and requested that the assailant
be criminally prosecuted. 317
Even courts that do not cite the “object intelligibly” standard have generally not required
a great deal of specificity and detail in grievances 318 and have not accepted prison officials’
314. For example, the New York State grievance system requires only that prisoners include a
“concise, specific description of the problem and the action requested and indicate what actions the
grievant has taken to resolve the complaint, i.e., specific persons/areas contacted and responses
received.” State of New York, Department of Correctional Services, Directive No. 4040, at § 701.5(a)(2)
(July 1, 2006); N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 7, § 701.5(a)(2) (2008).
315. Strong v. David, 297 F.3d 646, 650 (7th Cir. 2002); accord Kikumura v. Osagie, 461 F.3d
1269, 1283 (10th Cir. 2006); Johnson v. Testman, 380 F.3d 691, 697 (2d Cir. 2004); Milan v. Chen, No.
CV 05-1878 VBF(JC), 2008 WL 2229215, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2008), report and recommendation
adopted, 2008 WL 2116930 (C.D. Cal. May 14, 2008) and 2008 WL 2116959 (C.D. Cal. May 14, 2008);
see Jones ’El v. Berge, 172 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1134 (W.D. Wis. 2001) (holding that once a claim is
exhausted, “[a]ny claim for relief that is within the scope of the pleadings” may be litigated without
further exhaustion).
316. Johnson v. Testman, 380 F.3d 691, 697.
317. Riccardo v. Rausch, 375 F.3d 521, 524 (7th Cir. 2004); see Westefer v. Snyder, 422 F.3d 570,
580–81 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that plaintiffs sufficiently exhausted complaints about transfers to a
high-security prison by listing “Transfer from Tamms” as a requested remedy, or by expressing concern
about not being given a reason for the transfer, in grievances about the conditions at that prison);
Barnes v. Briley, 420 F.3d 673, 678–79 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding a grievance “in regards to a request for
[sic] for medical test and treatment. I have requested several times to be tested for Tuberculosis, H.I.V.,
Hepatitis, etc. for the past few years” exhausted as to the past failure to respond to such requests by a
doctor not named in the grievance and no longer employed at the prison).
318. See, e.g., McAlphin v. Toney, 375 F.3d 753, 755 (8th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (treating claim
that two defendants failed to treat plaintiff’s dental grievances as emergency matters and others
refused to escort him to the infirmary for emergency treatment were both part of a single exhausted
claim of denial of emergency dental treatment); Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 956 (10th Cir. 2001)
(holding complaint sufficient to meet the exhaustion requirement where the plaintiff complained that
he was denied Christian pastoral visits, though the defendants said his claim should be dismissed
because he had not stated in the grievance process that his religious beliefs include elements of both
the Buddhist and Christian religions); Carter v. Symmes, No. 06-10273-PBS, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7680, at *9 (D.Mass. Feb. 4, 2008) (unpublished) (adopting administrative law rule that “claims not
enumerated in an initial grievance are allowed notwithstanding the exhaustion requirement if they ‘are
like or reasonably related to the substance of charges timely brought before [the agency]’”); Crawford v.
Dretke, No. C-04-335, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3696, at *22 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2007) (unpublished)
(holding that a generalized statement sufficed to exhaust where the alleged violations were repetitive
and involved the same defendants); Grant v. Cathel, No. 05-3956 (MLC), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1854,
at *13–14 (D.N.J. Jan. 10, 2007) (unpublished) (holding that a prisoner's complaint that he was not
receiving prescribed cancer treatment and medication and was in great pain sufficiently exhausted a
claim that defendants failed to provide an escort to get him to his medical appointments and
defendants failed to supervise his medical care; plaintiff's grievance “discuss[ed] the primary grievance
underlying his claims, his allegedly inadequate medical treatment”); Underwood v. Mendez, No. 3:04-

hypertechnical arguments that grievances were inadequate. 319 They have held grievances
inadequate, at least in part, when they were so vague that prison officials could not
reasonably have been expected to understand what the prisoner was complaining about. 320
There are exceptions. Some courts have required much greater detail and specificity in
grievances even if the policy did not require it. For example, one recent decision said it was
not sufficient for the prisoner to have grieved the claim that he had been denied treatment
for his injured finger at every prison he had been at; the court said he should have told them
CV-1624, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20351, at *13–14 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2006) (unpublished) (holding that
a prisoner who complained of a retaliatory transfer need not also have mentioned in his grievance a
falsified progress report and a conspiracy, since these were just factual allegations supporting his
retaliation claim); Mester v. Kim, No. CV-F-04-6580 REC SMS P, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35178, at *7
(E.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2005) (unpublished) (holding that a grievance asserting that the plaintiff had a
hernia and had not received necessary surgery sufficiently fulfilled exhaustion requirement without
detailing the acts or omissions of individual defendants), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:04cv-06580-REC-SMS-P,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5877 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2006) (unpublished); Pineda-
Morales v. De Rosa, No. 03-4297 (JBS), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37179, at *20–21 (D.N.J. July 6, 2005)
(unpublished) (holding that a Plaintiff seeking increased accommodation for his religion, and stating
that it could not be accommodated by existing Protestant services and that their doctrines were
incompatible, sufficiently exhausted his claim for official recognition of his Apostolic sect even though it
did not mention the Religious Freedom Restoration Act or specifically request recognition); Lyerly v.
Phillips, No. 04 Civ. 3904 (PKC), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15602, at *6–7 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2005)
(unpublished) (holding that complaint of exposure to second-hand smoke sufficiently exhausted without
detail of the plaintiff’s medical condition, the relief sought, or the names of the culprits); Davis v.
Stanford, 382 F. Supp. 2d 814, 819 (E.D. Va. 2004) (holding a claim of inadequate medical care,
“liberally construed,” was encompassed by a grievance concerning inadequate treatment for the
resulting pain), aff’d, 127 F. App’x 680 (4th Cir. 2005) (unpublished); Cassels v. Stalder, 342 F. Supp.
2d 555, 560 (M.D. La. 2004) (holding that disciplinary appeal from conviction for “spreading rumors,” in
which the prisoner stated that he had placed an advertisement “in seek of legal help” and was “being
retaliated against,” sufficiently exhausted his claims of denial of access to courts and the right to seek
counsel, retaliation, and vagueness and overbreadth of the disciplinary rule).
319. See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 517–18 (5th Cir. 2004) (agreeing legal theories
need not be presented in grievances. A prisoner who complained of sexual assault, repeatedly
referenced his sexual orientation, and said nothing about his race had exhausted his sexual orientation
discrimination claim but not his racial discrimination claim); Burton v. Jones, 321 F.3d 569, 575 (6th
Cir. 2003) (holding grievance need not “allege a specific legal theory or facts that correspond to all the
required elements of a particular legal theory”); Tillis v. Lamarque, No. C 04-3763 SI, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14624, at *19 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2006) (unpublished) (“In determining whether a claim has been
exhausted, a court must consider whether a reasonable investigation of the complaint would have
uncovered the allegations now before it.”); Williams v. Wilkinson, 122 F. Supp. 2d 894, 899 (S.D. Ohio
2000) (rejecting defendants’ argument that “each claim at each stage [of the grievance process] must
parallel each and every claim in the federal complaint”).
320. See, e.g., Thompson v. Stalder, No. 06-659-JJB-CN, 2008 WL 874138, at *4 (M.D. La. Apr. 1,
2008) (unpublished) (holding a general statement that plaintiff was “unable to practice [his] religious
beliefs” did not exhaust his specific claims to a meat-free diet and Rastafarian services and literature; it
did not provide a fair opportunity to address the claims later asserted in his suit); Beltran v. O'Mara,
405 F. Supp. 2d 140, 152 (D.N.H. 2005) (holding that allegations the plaintiff was “being punished for
no reason” and isolated from other prisoners were “too vague” to allow officials to make any response),
on reconsideration, No. 04-cv-071-JD, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6277 (D.N.H. Jan. 31, 2006)
(unpublished); Aguirre v. Feinerman, No. 3:02 cv 60 JPG, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45520, at *20 (S.D. Ill.
May 10, 2005) (unpublished) (holding that a grievance that specifically mentioned physical therapy, but
mentioned other medical care only generally, did not exhaust as to the failure to diagnose the plaintiff’s
congestive heart failure; “While specifically identifying the ailment would not be required, there must
be some indication as to what medical issues the plaintiff was complaining about.”); Ball v.
McCaughtry, No. 04-C-205-C, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8039, at *6–7 (W.D. Wis. May 6, 2004)
(unpublished) (holding that a prisoner who complained about seized papers that he identified only as
“gay materials,” even when asked for more information, was insufficiently specific to satisfy a grievance
policy calling for sufficient facts to allow an examiner to investigate the complaint).

he was denied access to an orthopedic surgeon around a particular date, then transferred two
months later and denied medical care. 321 In particular, a number of courts have held
grievances inadequate when failing specifically to mention claims of denial of First
Amendment rights, 322 unlawful retaliation, 323 discrimination contrary to the Equal
Protection Clause, 324 or conspiracy that they later asserted in their lawsuits, even if they
stated the underlying facts in their grievances. 325 These decisions seem contrary to other
decisions (sometimes from the same courts) saying prisoners do not have to plead legal
theories in their grievances.
If the grievance system actually investigates and addresses your complaint on the
merits, rather than throwing it out for not being specific or detailed enough, you should be
deemed to have exhausted, even if the defendants’ lawyers later claim that you should have
said more in the grievance. 326
321. Davis v. Knowles, No. CIV S-04-0821 LKK KJM P, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6159, at *7–8
(E.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2007) (unpublished).
322. See Dye v. Kingston, 130 F. App’x 52, 56 (7th Cir. 2005) (unpublished) (holding that a
prisoner who complained in his grievance of missing property items, including his Bibles, failed to
exhaust his 1st Amendment claim by failing to state that the Bibles’ loss was “infringing on his
religious practice”).
323. Griffin v. Miner, No. 1:06 CV 1889, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79764, at *1–2 (N.D. Ohio Oct.
31, 2006) (unpublished) (plaintiff, who did not mention his retaliation theory in his grievance, did not
exhaust with respect to retaliation); Robins v. Atchue, No. 1:01-CV-6396-REC-SMS-P, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 27967, at *4 (E.D. Cal. May 10, 2006) (unpublished) (holding disciplinary appeal that did not
mention retaliation could not exhaust a retaliation claim), report and recommendation adopted, No.
1:01-cv-06396-AWI-SMS-P, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46229 (E.D. Cal. July 7, 2006) (unpublished); Lindell
v. Casperson, 360 F. Supp. 2d 932, 949 (W.D. Wis. 2005), aff’d, 169 F. App’x 999 (7th Cir. Mar. 13,
2006) (unpublished), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 183 (2006). Contra Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 531 (3d
Cir. 2003) (holding that a prisoner who claimed retaliatory discipline exhausted by appealing the
disciplinary decision to the highest level).
324. Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 518 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that a prisoner who
complained of sexual assault, made repeated reference to his sexual orientation, but said nothing about
his race had exhausted his sexual orientation discrimination claim but not his racial discrimination
claim); Goldsmith v. White, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1336, 1338–41 (N.D. Fla. 2005); Young v. Goord, No. 01-
CV-0626 (JG), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17715, at *12–14 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2002) (unpublished) (holding
that a prisoner who alleged in his grievance only that he had been disciplined for conduct that did not
violate the rules could not litigate an equal protection claim that he was disciplined for discriminatory
reasons), aff’d in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 67 F. App’x 638 (unpublished) (2d Cir. 2003).
325. Brownell v. Krom, 446 F.3d 305, 310–11 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding grievance inadequate for
failing to mention allegation that loss of property was intentional); Lindell v. Frank, Slip Op., No. 05-C-
003-C, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21300 (W.D. Wis. Sep 23, 2005) (unpublished) (holding failure to mention
conspiracy allegations in grievance appeal meant that claim was not exhausted). But see Kitchen-Bey v.
Hoskins, No. 2:06-cv-251, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84090, at *4 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 20, 2006) (unpublished)
(declining to dismiss because plaintiff had not mentioned conspiracy in his grievance); Underwood v.
Mendez, No. 3:04-CV-1624, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20351, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2006) (unpublished)
(holding a prisoner who complained of a retaliatory transfer need not also have mentioned in his
grievance a falsified progress report and a conspiracy, since these were just factual allegations
supporting his retaliation claim).
326. Monger v. Tilton, No. CIV S-07-1353 GEB DAD P, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72638, at *4–5
(E.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2008) (unpublished) (statements made by plaintiff during grievance interviews and
acknowledged in the response to his grievance helped show what was grieved); Freeman v. Salopek, No.
2:06-cv-496-FtM-34SPC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21452, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 19, 2008) (unpublished)
(rejecting claim that grievance was “undated, unclear, and vague” where final decisionmaker gave
response addressing the precise issue raised in the grievance); Carter v. Symmes, No. 06-10273-PBS,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7680, at *5 (D. Mass. Feb. 4, 2008) (unpublished) (issue not raised in the
grievance, but spelled out in a timely letter from counsel, and actually investigated by defendants, was
exhausted); Holley v. Cal. Dep’t. of Corr., No. CIV S-04-2006 MCE EFB P, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12683, at *6–8 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2007) (unpublished) (holding prisoner who complained about being

You can expect prison officials to take every opportunity to attack your grievance as
inadequate. Here are some things you can do to protect yourself. If your grievance system
requires you to name all the individuals involved, you will not necessarily know who they all
are. Make that clear in your grievance. For example, if you were beaten by several officers
while others looked on and did not intervene, you might write that your grievance was
against “Officers Smith and Jones, who beat me, along with the other officers present who
beat me or who stood by and did not intervene to stop the beating, and whose names I do not
know.” If you think there is a practice of beating prisoners that higher-ups in the prison are
responsible for, you might add something like: “Sergeant Black, Lieutenant White, Deputy
Superintendent Green and Superintendent Redd, and any other supervisors unknown to me
who fail to train and supervise the security staff and keep them from using excessive and
unnecessary force.” If you are denied a book you have ordered by the mail room officer who
tells you only “it’s not allowed,” your grievance might say it was against “Officer Jones in the
mail room, and any other person unknown to me who made the decision or policy (if any)
resulting in this book being denied to me, or if there is no such policy, the supervisor of the
mail room operation, unknown to me, who allows mail room staff to deny books to prisoners
in the absence of a policy permitting such denial.”
Even if your prison’s grievance policy does not require the naming of all involved
individuals, you are well advised to think about the different events and policies that are or
might be involved in the problem you are grieving, and mention them. For instance, in the
use of force example above, if the grievance policy requires only a “concise, specific statement
of the problem,” you might say: “I was beaten without justification by Officers Smith and
Jones and others, while other officers stood by and did not intervene, and I am also
complaining about the lack of training and supervision that allows security staff to use
excessive and unnecessary force and get away with it.” 327 In the book seizure example, you
might say: “I was denied the book A Time to Die about the 1971 Attica disturbance, and I am
also complaining about the policies and practices that allow the denial to prisoners of books
without good reason and without clear written criteria and procedures.” (Or, if they do have
clear criteria and procedures that you may wish to challenge, mention those in the grievance
too.)
Similarly, if you get more information about a problem after you have filed a grievance
about it (or more information about the people responsible, if the system requires that), you
should consider filing a separate grievance reflecting the new information. 328 If it is past the
required to cut his hair, asserting religious discrimination at the first stage and gender discrimination
at the last, and received a decision on the merits, exhausted), report and recommendation adopted, No.
2:04-cv-2006-MCE-EFB-P, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20289 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2007) (unpublished);
Ambriz v. Kernan, No. CIV S-05-1298 DFL EFB P, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5329, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Jan.
25, 2007) (unpublished) (noting that the “responses of the reviewers flesh out the circumstances of
which plaintiff was complaining,” finding exhaustion), report and recommendation adopted, No. CIV S-
05-1298 DFL EFB P, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20066 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2007) (unpublished); Baskerville
v. Blot, 224 F. Supp. 2d 723, 730 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that where the plaintiff’s issues were actually
investigated as a result of his grievance, the purposes of the exhaustion requirement had been served
and the plaintiff had therefore exhausted). This is related to the more general principle that if the
administrative system decides the merits of your complaint rather than throwing it out for procedural
defects, those procedural defects are waived, and the defendants cannot rely on them in court; see J.P.
v. Taft, 439 F. Supp. 2d 793, 826 (S.D. Ohio 2006) (holding defendants who said they “consistently
tried” to satisfy the juvenile plaintiff’s request for an attorney could not be heard to claim they were not
sufficiently on notice from his grievance of his request for an attorney and that ”[d]efendants cannot
have it both ways.”).
327. See Kozohorsky v. Harmon, 332 F.3d 1141, 1143 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding a grievance
complaining of excessive force by line staff did not exhaust plaintiff’s claim that a supervisor failed to
supervise and take action against them).
328. If the grievance system contains a “name all responsible persons” rule, courts might require
new grievances reflecting newly identified defendants or other information. In Brownell v. Krom, 446

grievance deadline, explain that you couldn’t file it within the deadline because you didn’t
have the information. For example, if you file a grievance stating that you have been denied
certain medical care by the prison’s medical director, and then later on you learn that your
care was denied by a “utilization review” process in the prison system’s central office, you
might wish to file and exhaust a new grievance about the utilization review decision. Courts
have disagreed about whether such grievances are effective to exhaust, but filing them is the
best way to protect yourself when you learn new information after an initial grievance. 329
Prison officials and their lawyers have strong incentives to try to get cases thrown out for
non-exhaustion rather than have to face the merits, and judges may be receptive to their
arguments. So, you should do your best to make your grievance reflect all aspects of the
problem that you may wish to bring suit about, so the judge will see that you did your best to
bring everything to prison officials’ attention in compliance with the grievance system’s rules
before suing.
5. What If You Make a Mistake Trying to Exhaust?
Prisoners not only must exhaust, they must do it right. The Supreme Court has held that
“the PLRA exhaustion requirement requires proper exhaustion,” 330 which “demands
compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules because no
adjudicative system can function effectively without imposing some orderly structure on the
course of its proceedings.” 331 If your administrative complaint is rejected because you did not
follow the procedures, your lawsuit will be barred for non-exhaustion. 332
This does not mean that if you fail to follow a procedural rule, you should just give up.
You should pursue your grievance, request that your error be excused or that you be
permitted to re-file your grievance and start over, and explain any circumstances that might
have caused you to make a mistake. Sometimes grievance systems allow correction and refiling
(in fact, sometimes they instruct prisoners to do so 333 ). Also, sometimes grievance
systems simply overlook procedural mistakes, and courts have held that if prison officials
decide the merits of a grievance rather than reject it for procedural noncompliance, they
F.3d 305, 312 (2d Cir. 2006), the court rejected the argument that the plaintiff should have filed a new
grievance reflecting new information, but only because the system did not seem to provide for
supplementing or re-filing existing grievances to reflect new information.
329. Compare Sullivan v. Caruso, No. 1:07cv367, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9090 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 7,
2008) (unpublished) (holding defendants improperly rejected a grievance as duplicative where it named
a defendant not named in a previous grievance) with Laster v. Pramstaller, No. 06-13508, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 11435 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 15, 2008) (unpublished) (holding a grievance naming a defendant
that is dismissed as duplicative of an earlier grievance not naming that defendant fails to exhaust).
In Dunbar v. Jones, No. 1:05-CV-1594, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49278, at *21–22 (M.D. Pa. July 9,
2007) (unpublished), the court rejected the argument that the plaintiff should have amended his
grievance to name a defendant whose identity he did not initially know, since the rules did not provide
for such amended grievances, but dismissed the claim against that defendant because the plaintiff
didn’t add her name in his grievance appeals—without citing anything in the grievance policy that
permits adding new material in grievance appeals. Another district court accepted the argument that
the plaintiff was obliged to file a late and duplicative grievance upon learning who was responsible for
the action he complained of, without any discussion of whether the rules provided for such a grievance.
Fulgham v. Snyder, No. 2:07-CV-88, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22590 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 21, 2008)
(unpublished).
330. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 106, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2394, 165 L. Ed. 2d 368, 387 (2006).
331. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90–91, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2386, 165 L. Ed. 2d 368, 387 (2006);
see also Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 217–19, 127 S. Ct. 910, 922–23, 166 L. Ed. 2d 798, 815 (2007)
(“Compliance with prison grievance procedures ... is all that is required by the PLRA to properly
exhaust.”).
332. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 165 L. Ed. 2d 368 (2006); Pozo v.
McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1023–24 (7th Cir. 2002).
333. If they do, you should follow the directions even if you disagree with them.

cannot later claim non-exhaustion based on a procedural flaw that they let go earlier. 334
Courts have disagreed over whether a grievance exhausts if it is rejected both on the merits
and for procedural reasons. 335 If the purpose of the “proper exhaustion” rule is to preserve the
system’s ability to “function effectively,” 336 it would seem that a decision on the merits is a
good indication that the system has functioned effectively, and dismissal serves no useful
purpose—as you should argue if the issue arises in your case. In any case, the harder you
have tried to exhaust, the more likely the court is to rule in your favor in a close case.
There is also a potential trap in the proper exhaustion rule. Sometimes prisoners are not
able to follow the rules for reasons outside their control—for example, they miss a deadline
because they are out of the institution and have no access to the grievance process. One
would think that such circumstances mean that the administrative remedy was not available
for the affected prisoner. However, a number of courts have held that prisoners who are
prevented from exhausting properly must try to exhaust improperly—for example, if they
cannot file a timely grievance, they should file a late grievance when they can, or else their
cases may be dismissed for non-exhaustion. This does not make any sense, but courts do it,
so you should act to protect yourself against such a dismissal by filing and pursuing the late
or otherwise improper grievance.
It is unclear how absolute this proper exhaustion rule is. 337 The Court said it was not
ruling on the possibility that prisons might “create procedural requirements for the purpose
of tripping up all but the most skillful prisoners,” since the case did not present that
situation. 338 Several post-Woodford decisions have cited that statement in holding that
334. See, e.g., Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 323, 331 n.6 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting that the plaintiff sent
a form to the Commissioner rather than the Legal Adjudicator but defendants did not reject it for
noncompliance; in addition, the grievance was submitted by the prisoner’s lawyer and not by the
prisoner, as the rules specify); Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 234 (3d Cir. 2004); Ross v. County of
Bernalillo, 365 F.3d 1181, 1186 (10th Cir. 2004) (overruled in part by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 127
S. Ct. 910, 166 L. Ed. 2d 798, (2007)); Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002).
335. Compare Cobb v. Berghuis, No. 1:06-CV-773, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93890, at *3–4 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 21, 2007) (unpublished) (holding that a grievance rejected for both reasons does not exhaust)
(unpublished) with McCarroll v. Sigman, No. 1:07-cv-513, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17254, at *10 (W.D.
Mich. Mar. 6, 2008) (unpublished) (finding exhaustion on those facts), reconsideration granted on other
grounds, No. 1:07-CV-513, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38710 (W.D. Mich. May 13, 2008) (unpublished).
336. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2386, 165 L. Ed. 2d 368, 387 (2006).
337. One court’s proclamation that “[i]n Ngo, the Supreme Court was emphatic that the PLRA
requires punctiliously proper exhaustion of administrative remedies,” Andrade v. Maloney, No. 02-
10613-DPW, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57827, at *24 (D. Mass. Aug. 16, 2006) (unpublished), pushes
Woodford’s language a bit too far.
338. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 102, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2392, 165 L. Ed. 2d 368, 385 (2006).
This is a concern that has been expressed by numerous courts. See, e.g., Hooks v. Rich, No. CV 605-065,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12951, at *18–19 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 17, 2006) (unpublished) (“The exhaustion
requirement is a gatekeeper, not a ‘gotcha’ meant to trap unsophisticated prisoners who must navigate
the administrative process pro se.”); Ouellette v. Maine State Prison, No. 05-139-B-W, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2380, at *10 n.2 (D. Me. Jan. 23, 2006) (unpublished) (noting that once suit is filed, “the
defendants in hindsight can use any deviation by the prisoner to argue that he or she has not complied
with 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) responsibilities”), aff’d, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6344 (D. Me. Feb. 14, 2006)
(unpublished); Campbell v. Chaves, 402 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1106 n.3 (D. Ariz. 2005) (noting danger that
grievance systems might become “a series of stalling tactics, and dead-ends without resolution”);
LaFauci v. N.H. Dep’t of Corr., No. 99-597-PB, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2756, at *50 (D.N.H. Feb. 23,
2005) (unpublished) (“While proper compliance with the grievance system makes sound administrative
sense, the procedures themselves, and the directions given to inmates seeking to follow those
procedures, should not be traps designed to hamstring legitimate grievances.”); Rhames v. Fed. Bureau
of Prisons, No. 4338 (AKH), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10133, at *13–14 (S.D.N.Y. June 6, 2002)
(unpublished) (“While it is important that prisoners comply with administrative procedures designed
by the Bureau of Prisons, rather than using any they might think sufficient, ... it is equally important

prisoners who didn’t fully comply with procedural requirements, but who were arguably
“tripped up” by them, should not have their cases dismissed for non-exhaustion. 339 The
Woodford Court also said that it was relying on exhaustion law from administrative law and
habeas corpus. In response, Justice Breyer, in a separate opinion, observed that
administrative law “contains well established exceptions to exhaustion” (citing exceptions for
constitutional claims, futility of exhaustion, and hardship), and so does habeas corpus (citing
exceptions for procedural rules that are “not firmly established and regularly followed,” cases
where the petitioner shows “cause and prejudice” to overcome a procedural default, and cases
where a “miscarriage of justice” would result from enforcing the procedural default). 340
Several decisions have cited these observations in allowing claims to go forward despite
failures to exhaust in complete compliance with grievance rules. 341
that form not create a snare of forfeiture for a prisoner seeking redress for perceived violations of his
constitutional rights.”).
339. Timberlake v. Buss, No. 1:06-cv-1859-RLY-WTL, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32306, at *8 (S.D.
Ind. May 1, 2007) (unpublished) (declining to dismiss challenge to execution protocols where they were
not disclosed to plaintiff and he had no reason to have known about them), vacated as moot, No. 07-
1086, No. 07-3228, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 28412 (7th Cir. 2007) (unpublished); Lampkins v. Roberts,
No. 1:06-cv-639-DFH-TAB, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22695, at *7 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 27, 2007) (unpublished)
(declining to dismiss for missing a five-day deadline that was not shown to have been made known to
prisoners); Brookins v. Vogel, No. 1:05-CV-0413-OWW-DLB-P, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86252, at *9
(E.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2006) (unpublished) (holding that a prisoner who filed a grievance, got no response,
and was told it had never been received, and whose subsequent attempts were rejected as untimely,
had exhausted under the pre-Woodford rule that exhaustion occurs when prison officials fail to respond
to a grievance within the policy time limits; stating prisoner asserted without contradiction that he was
“prevented from complying with the exhaustion requirement”); Parker v. Robinson, No. 04-214-B-W,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64107, at *33–34 (D. Me. Oct. 10, 2006) (unpublished) (refusing to dismiss
where the prisoner sent his appeal to the Commissioner who was supposed to decide it, not the person
who was supposed to forward it to the Commissioner under the rules); Thomas v. Hickman, No. CV F
06-0215 AWI SMS, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72988, at *26–27 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2006) (unpublished)
(declining to dismiss where the prisoner’s grievance was untimely but the prisoner did not know about
the violation until long after the deadline had passed).
340. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 103–104, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2393, 165 L. Ed. 2d 368, 386 (2006)
(Breyer, J., concurring in judgment). Justice Breyer’s assertions are contrary at least in part to the
Court’s earlier observation in Booth v. Churner that the PLRA rendered inapplicable “traditional
doctrines of administrative exhaustion, under which a litigant need not apply to an agency that has ‘no
power to decree ... relief,’ or need not exhaust where doing so would otherwise be futile.” Booth v.
Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 n.6, 121 S. Ct. 1819, 1825 n.6, 149 L. Ed. 2d 958, 967 n.6 (2001); see Ngo v.
Woodford, 539 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating after Supreme Court decision: "It is unclear
whether we can read exceptions into the PLRA's exhaustion requirement."); Wigfall v. Duval, No. 00-
12274-DPW, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57836, at *8–9 (D. Mass. Aug. 15, 2006) (unpublished)
(acknowledging tension between the Breyer opinion and Booth, indicating its view that estoppel is
applicable notwithstanding Woodford). On the other hand, the Woodford majority’s assertion that
exhaustion means the same thing under the PLRA that it does in administrative law appears equally
inconsistent with the Booth observation.
341. Brookins v. Vogel, No. 1:05-CV-0413-OWW-DLB-P, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86252, at *9
(E.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2006) (unpublished) (holding that a prisoner who filed a grievance, got no response,
and was told it had never been received, and whose subsequent attempts were rejected as untimely,
had exhausted under the pre-Woodford rule that exhaustion occurs when prison officials fail to respond
to a grievance within the policy time limits; stating prisoner asserted without contradiction that he was
“prevented from complying with the exhaustion requirement”); Parker v. Robinson, No. 04-214-B-W,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64107, at *33–34 (D. Me. Oct. 10, 2006) (unpublished) (refusing to dismiss
where the prisoner sent his appeal to the Commissioner who was supposed to decide it, not the person
who was supposed to forward it to the Commissioner under the rules); Thomas v. Hickman, No. CV F
06-0215 AWI SMS, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72988, at *26–27 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2006) (unpublished)
(declining to dismiss where the prisoner’s grievance was untimely but the prisoner did not know about
the violation until long after the deadline had passed); Collins v. Goord, 438 F. Supp. 2d 399, 411 n.13

Before Woodford, the Second Circuit had set out circumstances under which failure to
exhaust according to prison procedures would not bar litigation:
First, the court must ask: whether administrative remedies were in
fact “available” to the prisoner. [Second], [t]he court should also
inquire ... whether the defendants' own actions inhibiting the
inmate’s exhaustion of remedies may estop one or more of the
defendants from raising the plaintiff’s failure to exhaust as a defense.
[Third], [i]f the court finds that administrative remedies were
available to the plaintiff, and that the defendants are not estopped
and have not forfeited their non-exhaustion defense, but that the
plaintiff nevertheless did not exhaust available remedies, the court
should consider whether special circumstances have been plausibly
alleged that justify the prisoner’s failure to comply with
administrative procedural requirements ... .
... What constitutes justification in the PLRA context “must be
determined by looking at the circumstances which might
understandably lead usually uncounselled prisoners to fail to grieve
in the normally required way.” 342
The initial post-Woodford decisions indicate that the Second Circuit analysis remains
good law. The first district court to address the question stated that Woodford “appears to
leave open the question of whether exhaustion applies in situations such as those identified
in Hemphill and its companion cases where, for example, administrative remedies are not
‘available’ to the prisoner at the time of the grievable incident or where prison authorities
actively interfere with an inmate’s ability to invoke such remedies,” though Woodford may
not be compatible with the results of all the cases applying Hemphill. 343 Other courts have,
after Woodford, adopted the Hemphill framework for determining when prison officials’
threats or intimidation make remedies “unavailable.” 344 Another recent New York decision
applying the Second Circuit “special circumstances” rule also distinguished Woodford on the
ground that the prisoner before it, unlike the Woodford plaintiff, had not “bypass[ed] prison
grievance procedures” or “attempt[ed] to circumvent the exhaustion requirements.” 345
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (unpublished) (applying Breyer’s Woodford concurrence to state that district courts
should consider “‘any challenges that [the prisoner’ may have concerning whether his case falls into a
traditional exception that the [PLRA] implicitly incorporates’”) (quoting Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81,
104, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2393, 165 L. Ed. 2d 368, 386 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment).
342. Brownell v. Krom, 446 F.3d 305, 311 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Hemphill v. New York, 380
F.3d 680, 686 (2d Cir. 2004).
343. Collins v. Goord, 438 F. Supp. 2d 399, 411 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Bester v. Dixion, No. 9:03-
CV-1041, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21714, at *10–11 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2007) (unpublished) (considering
whether prisoner was relieved of exhaustion requirements under a Hemphill analysis; Hairston v.
LaMarche, No. 6642 (KMW) (AJP), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55436, at *22 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2006)
(noting that the Second Circuit has not addressed the effect of Woodford on the Hemphill analysis). The
Collins court specifically noted that Justice Breyer cited with approval Giano v. Goord, 380 F.3d 670,
677–78, which held that exhaustion is “mandatory” but subject to the “caveats” outlined in Hemphill.
Justice Breyer urged district courts to continue to consider “any challenges that [the prisoner] may
have concerning whether his case falls into a traditional exception that the [PLRA] implicitly
incorporates.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 104, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2393, 165 L. Ed. 2d 368, 386 (Breyer,
J., concurring in judgment). See James v. Davis, No. 9:05-2733-DCN-GCK, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
53224, at *16–17 (D.S.C. July 31, 2006) (applying Hemphill analysis after Woodford); Hernandez v.
Coffey, No. 11615 (WHP), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52066, at *7–8 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2006) (same).
344. Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077, 1084–85 (11th Cir. 2008); Kaba v. Stepp, 458 F.3d 678,
684–86 (7th Cir. 2006).
345. Hairston v. LaMarche, No. 05 Civ. 6642 (KMW) (AJP), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55436, at *30,
40 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2006) (unpublished); see Parker v. Robinson, No. 04-214-B-W, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 64107, at *34 (D. Me. Oct. 10, 2006) (unpublished) (not dimissing for non-exhaustion where

Rather, he had tried hard and in multiple ways to bring his complaint to the attention of
responsible officials. “[A]lthough each of his efforts, alone, may not have fully complied,
together his efforts sufficiently informed prison officials of his grievance and led to a
thorough investigation of the grievance as to satisfy the purpose of the PLRA or to constitute
‘special circumstances’ [to] justify any failure to fully comply with DOCS’ exhaustion
requirements.” 346
The Second Circuit has yet to decide these post-Woodford questions, 347 but it has held that
after Woodford, it is not enough that a prisoner’s informal complaints gave prison officials
enough notice to investigate a problem. It stated that the PLRA requires both “substantive
exhaustion” (notice to officials) and “procedural exhaustion” (following the rules), and that
“after Woodford notice alone is insufficient.” 348 The court did not address its earlier holding
that a prisoner’s reasonable interpretation of confusing grievance rules may justify the
failure to follow procedural rules correctly. 349
More specific questions remaining after Woodford include the following
(1) What if procedural requirements are not clear? The Second Circuit had held before Woodford that
a prisoner who acted reasonably when the rules were not clear presented special circumstances
justifying his failure to exhaust properly, even if he turned out to be wrong, 350 and other courts
plaintiff sent his appeal directly to the Commissioner, rather than sending it to the Grievance Review
Officer to forward to the Commissioner); Rainge-El v. Moschetti, No. 05-cv-01831-PSF-CBS, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 47305, at *3 (D. Colo. July 12, 2006) (unpublished) (questioning Woodford’s applicability
where the plaintiff “did not entirely ignore the prison’s administrative grievance machinery”).
346. Hairston v. LaMarche, No. 05 Civ. 6642 (KMW) (AJP), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55436, at *30,
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2006) (unpublished). Hairston, who complained of excessive force, did not file a
grievance within the proper time frame. However, he had been placed in segregated housing, and
stated that contrary to prison policy, he was unaware of any grievance staff who were making rounds in
the SHU. He argued that this created a factual question of whether the remedy was actually available
to him or whether defendants should be estopped from relying on non-exhaustion. His wife wrote to the
superintendent and requested an investigation within the prescribed time period for grievances. While
such a letter does not suffice to exhaust by itself, if it results in an Inspector General’s investigation, it
may constitute “special circumstances” satisfying the PLRA’s purposes, and cause the same result as
invoking the prison system’s expedited grievance procedure. Since the plaintiff never received notice of
any decision on his complaint (he received the results of the Inspector General’s investigation only in
discovery after filing suit), he had no opportunity to appeal it. Meanwhile, Mr. Hairston received a
disciplinary hearing, and attempted to raise his claim of assault, but was not allowed to do so there. He
raised his claim in his disciplinary appeal as well. Once he was released from SHU and advised by
another prisoner to do so, he filed a grievance, which the superintendent rejected on its merits and
deemed untimely (which means it was not filed when it should have been). He did not appeal because
he thought he could not appeal an untimely grievance, which the court found reasonable.
347. See Reynoso v. Swezey, 238 F. App’x 660, 662 (2d Cir. June 25, 2007) (unpublished), cert.
denied, 128 S. Ct. 1278 (2008); Boddie v. Bradley, 228 F. App’x 5, 6–7 (2d Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (both
declining to consider effect of Woodford on circuit precedent where plaintiff could not prevail under that
precedent anyway).
348. Macias v. Zenk, 495 F.3d 37, 43–44 (2d Cir. 2007). In saying this, it overruled its own pre-
Woodford statements in Braham v. Clancy, 425 F.3d 177, 183 (2d Cir. 2004), that suggested notice
might be sufficient by itself to satisfy the exhaustion requirement.
349. Macias v. Zenk, 495 F.3d 37, 43 n.1 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Hemphill v. New York, 380 F.3d
680, 690 (2d Cir. 2004)).
350. Giano v. Goord, 380 F.3d 670, 679 (2d Cir. 2004). The Giano court said that prison rules “do
not differentiate clearly between grievable matters relating to disciplinary proceedings, and
non-grievable issues concerning the ‘decisions or dispositions’ of such proceedings,” and that a “learned”
district judge had recently interpreted the prison administrative rules in the same way as the plaintiff;
accord Brownell v. Krom, 446 F.3d 305, 312 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding prisoner who was given erroneous
advice as to which prison to complain to about property lost in transfer, which resulted in a failure to
investigate, and who was given incorrect advice by staff to abandon the property claim and pursue a
grievance instead, showed special circumstances excusing his failure to exhaust correctly); Abney v.
McGinnis, 380 F.3d 663, 668–69 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting the lack of instruction in the grievance rules for

agreed. 351 Since Woodford, courts have continued to hold that prisoners’ cases cannot be
dismissed for non-exhaustion where it was unclear what they had to do to exhaust, either because
the rules were not clear, 352 or because the actions or instructions of officials (often in violation of
their own rules) created confusion in a particular case, 353 or both 354 (though some courts have
instances where a favorable grievance decision is not carried out); Johnson v. Testman, 380 F.3d 691,
696–97 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that a federal prisoner’s argument that he adequately raised his
prisoner-prisoner assault claim through an appeal of the disciplinary proceeding that arose from the
incident should be considered by the district court); Hemphill v. New York, 380 F.3d 680, 689–90 (2d
Cir. 2004) (holding that plaintiff’s arguments that lack of clarity in grievance regulations supported the
reasonableness of his belief that he could exhaust by writing directly to the Superintendent); Roque v.
Armstrong, 392 F. Supp. 2d 382, 391 (D. Conn. 2005) (denying summary judgment to defendants where
it appeared that neither the prisoner nor the grievance system entirely followed the rules but the
prisoner had received a response from the Commissioner, the final grievance authority).
351. See Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 811–12 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding a prisoner had
exhausted when he did everything necessary to exhaust but his grievance simply disappeared, and he
received no instructions as to what if anything to do about it); Westefer v. Snyder, 422 F.3d 570, 580
(7th Cir. 2005) (holding prison officials did not establish a failure to exhaust available remedies where
their policies did not “clearly identif[y]” the proper remedy and there was no “clear route” for prisoners
to challenge certain decisions); Shaheed-Muhammad v. Dipaolo, 393 F. Supp. 2d 80, 97 (D. Mass. 2005)
(“Having failed to abide by the strictures of their own regulations, defendants should not be allowed to
claim plaintiff's noncompliance as a bar.”).
352. Bellamy v. Mount Vernon Hosp., No. 07 Civ. 1801 (SAS), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59098, at
*19–20 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2008) (unpublished) (where allowance for late grievances was limited to 45
days after an “alleged occurrence,” and the plaintiff thought the “occurrence” was his surgery and not
his knowledge of its side-effects, he reasonably believed no remedy remained available to him); Vasquez
v. Hilbert, No. 07-cv-00723-bbc, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42011, at *10 (W.D. Wis. May 28, 2008)
(unpublished) (holding plaintiff exhausted when he grieved his medical claim late because medical
treatment was mentioned in a disciplinary report, and the rules said a grievance raising “any issue
related to the conduct report” must await completion of the disciplinary process; plaintiff acted
reasonably in waiting. “... [W]hen prison officials fail to ‘clearly identif[y]’ the proper route for
exhaustion, they cannot later fault the prisoner for failing to predict the correct choice ... . The burden
is on the Department of Corrections to make grievance procedures clear and easy to follow.” (quoting
Westefer v. Snyder, 422 F.3d 570, 580 (7th Cir. 2005))); Wilson v. Budgeon, No. 3:05-2101, 2007 WL
464700, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 13, 2007) (unpublished) (declining to dismiss for non-exhaustion where
rules did not clearly instruct the prisoner whether to raise his retaliation claim in a disciplinary appeal
or a grievance), appeal dismissed, 248 F. App’x 348 (3d Cir. 2007).
353. Monroe v. Beard, No. 05-04937, 2007 WL 2359833, at *12–13 (E.D.Pa. Aug. 16, 2007)
(unpublished) (holding the grievance process unavailable where prisoners were told to object to certain
searches through an Unacceptable Correspondence Form, and they would be notified of the results of
an investigation and then could file a grievance, but were not so notified), aff’d, 536 F.3d 198, 205 n.6
(3d Cir. 2008); Lawyer v. Gatto, No. 03 Civ. 7577 (RPP), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15406, at *25 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 21, 2007) (unpublished) (holding prisoner whose grievance was referred to the Inspector General’s
office was not obliged to wait until the IG’s investigation was concluded since the rules did not say
otherwise; it was the prison system’s responsibility to make such a requirement clear); Partee v. Grood,
No. 06 Civ. 15528 (SAS), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54752, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2007) (unpublished)
(declining to dismiss where prisoner was told his issue was “beyond the purview” of the grievance
program; analogizing to the unclear rule in Giano); Cooper v. Beard, No. 3:CV-07-0620, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 47681, at *14–15 (M.D. Pa. July 2, 2007) (unpublished) (where Request for Religious
Accommodation was a prerequisite for a grievance, and plaintiff did not get a timely response and had
moved on to the grievance process by the time he received a late response, court excuses plaintiff’s
procedural non-compliance in light of defendants’ noncompliance); Ray v. Jones, No. CIV-06-319-C,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7590, at *5–6 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 1, 2007) (unpublished) (holding plaintiff
exhausted where in response to his complaint he was repeatedly told that the matter had been turned
over to Internal Affairs and incorrectly advised that an internal affairs investigation was a substitute
for the completion of grievance procedures); Martinez v. Weir, No. 3:00CV1140 (DJS), 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 76407, at *15 (D. Conn. Oct. 10, 2006) (unpublished) (refusing to dismiss, noting that the
plaintiff had exhausted twice in the face of a disappearing grievance and prison officials’ own

uled against prisoners in situations where they simply guessed wrong in a confusing situation). 355
There are situations where the prisoner lacks sufficient knowledge of the facts to comply with the
grievance rules. 356 In some cases an unsettled legal situation concerning the exhaustion
requirement itself has been held to constitute special circumstances justifying failure to exhaust
correctly. 357
procedural mistakes); Scott v. Cal. Supreme Court, No. CIV S-04-2586 LKK GGH P, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 59573, at *19–20 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2006) (holding that a prisoner who had relied on officials’
misinformation and sought relief in state court had exhausted, notwithstanding officials’ subsequent
issuance of an untimely decision which he did not appeal; “Prison officials cannot effectively thwart an
inmate’s attempt to exhaust a claim by failing to follow their own regulations and then later require
him to begin the exhaustion process again once they decide to follow the regulations.”); Fuller v. Cal.
Dep’t of Corr., No. CIV S-04-1276 FCD PAN P, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58531, at *6–7 (E.D. Cal. Aug.
17, 2006) (holding that a prisoner whose intermediate appeal was rejected for “excessive verbiage” and
failure to complete documents correctly was not shown to have further available remedies because
officials did not instruct him whether to resubmit a corrected appeal or appeal to the next level if he
wished to pursue the matter).
354. Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077, 1083–84 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding a prisoner whose
grievance was torn up by the warden was not required to file another one or grieve the warden’s action;
“[n]othing in [the rules] requires an inmate to grieve a breakdown in the grievance process”); Miller v.
Berkebile, No. 3:07-CV-0712-B ECF, 2008 WL 635552, at *7–9 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 2008) (unjustified
refusal to process initial grievances made remedy unavailable; court rejected argument that prisoners
should have taken other steps not specified in the policy to get around the grievance officer’s
misconduct; PLRA law applied in § 2241 case).
355. Thus, in Marshall v. Knight, a prisoner who alleged that he had been retaliated against in
classification and disciplinary matters did not file a grievance because classification and disciplinary
matters are excluded from the grievance system. The court held that he had failed to exhaust because
retaliation claims might be grievable. Marshall v. Knight, No. 3:03-CV-460 RM, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
90478, at *1–3 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 14, 2006) (unpublished). The decision gave no consideration to the
reasonableness of Mr. Marshall’s interpretation of the rules. Similarly, in Williams v. McGrath, the
court held that a prisoner whose grievance was rejected for failure to provide necessary documentation,
and who was then denied access to the documentation, should have resubmitted his appeal without the
documentation, or should have filed a new grievance, despite the prisoner’s concerns that his grievance
had already been rejected once for lack of the documentation and that if he filed a second grievance he
would be in violation of the rule against duplicative grievances. Williams v. McGrath, No. C 04-5069
MMC (PR), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79056, at *14–16 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2007).
356. Thomas v. Hickman, No. CV F 06-0215 AWI SMS, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72988, at *26
(E.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2006) (declining to dismiss where the prisoner’s grievance was untimely but the
prisoner did not know about the violation until long after the deadline had passed); Borges v.
Piatkowski, 337 F. Supp. 2d 424, 427 n.3 (W.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that a prisoner who did not have
reason to know he had a medical care claim until he had been transferred to another prison and the 14day
deadline had long expired was justified by special circumstances in not exhausting); see Brownell v.
Krom, 446 F.3d 305, 312 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing system’s lack of provision for supplementing or re-filing
existing grievances to reflect new information).
357. In Rodriguez v. Westchester County Jail Corr. Dep’t, 372 F.3d 485, 487 (2d Cir. 2004), the
court held that the plaintiff’s belief that he did not have to exhaust an excessive force claim was
reasonable, since the court had adopted the same view until reversed by the Supreme Court in Porter v.
Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (2002). Accord Wilkinson v. Banks, No. 02-CV-361, 2007 WL 2693636, at *6
(W.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2007) (holding that a grievance filed a few weeks after Booth v. Churner held that
damages claims must be exhausted satisfied the requirement); Barad v. Comstock, No. 03CV736
(CONSENT), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38418, at *21 (W.D.N.Y. June 30, 2005) (“the question here for
special circumstances is not the actual state of the law (or the retroactive application of new decisional
law ...), but the inmate’s belief of what the law was when he should have grieved the matter and
whether that belief is reasonable.”); Rivera v. Pataki, No. 04 Civ. 1286 (MBM), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2747, at *41–42 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2005) (“Rivera did the best he could to follow DOCS regulations while
responding to an evolving legal framework”; noting he had filed at a time when it appeared that his
claim need not be exhausted, and had tried to exhaust after dismissal for non-exhaustion mandated by
a subsequent Supreme Court decision).

You could argue that Woodford v. Ngo does not address situations where the
rules are not characterized by “relative simplicity,” and that the Second Circuit’s
“special circumstances” rule remains valid in such cases, 358 as do similar holdings
from other courts. Further, to the extent that lack of clarity in the grievance rules or
their application makes the remedy unavailable, Woodford has no effect, since it did
not say anything about the statutory term “available.”
Frequently the actual practice in prison grievance systems diverges from the
formal written procedure. The Seventh Circuit has held that a prisoner who complies
with the informal practice has satisfied the exhaustion requirement. 359 Since that
court already adhered to the “proper exhaustion” rule adopted in Woodford, that
holding remains valid after Woodford. The Third Circuit has refused to enforce
compliance with supposed grievance rules that do not appear in the written policy. 360
(2) What if you are misled or prison officials obstruct your exhaustion efforts? Numerous
cases hold that non-exhaustion caused by such actions by prison staff do not bar the
prisoner from proceeding with a subsequent lawsuit. No such fact pattern was before
the Court in Woodford, and it did not purport to address the question. This body of
law is therefore undisturbed by Woodford, especially since many of the cases hold
that under the circumstances, administrative remedies were not “available,” a
statutory term Woodford did not address.
(3) What if you are threatened or intimidated by prison staff into not following the
grievance procedure? The Second Circuit has held that threats or other intimidating
conduct may make administrative remedies in general, or the usual grievance
remedy in particular, unavailable to a prisoner; may estop the defendants from
asserting the exhaustion defense; or may constitute justification for not exhausting
or not exhausting consistently with the grievance rules. 361 The court specifically
observed that threats or other intimidation might deter prisoners from filing an
358. In Hairston v. LaMarche, 05 Civ. 6642 (KMW) (AJP), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55436, at *36
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2006), as part of its post-Woodford discussion of special circumstances, the court
noted the unclarity of New York State administrative appeal procedures in cases where a
Superintendent has referred a complaint to the Inspector General for investigation.
359. Curtis v. Timberlake, 436 F.3d 709, 712 (7th Cir. 2005); see Marr v. Fields, No. 1:07-cv-494,
2008 WL 828788, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 27, 2008) (if policy requiring administrative appeals rather
than grievances in disciplinary cases was applied broadly in practice to related matters such as claims
of retaliatory discipline, grievance process was not an available remedy for such complaints).
360. Jackson v. Ivens, 244 F. App’x 508, No. 04-1977, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 18826, at *14 (3d
Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (“We will not condition exhaustion on unwritten or ‘implied’ requirements.”),
citing Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 234 (3d Cir. 2004); see Goebert v. Lee County, 510 F.3d 1312,
1322-23 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding grievance appeal was not an available remedy where prisoners were
not informed of its existence and had no way to find out); Sims v. Rewerts, No. 07-12646, U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 42395, at *1–2 (E.D. Mich. May 29, 2008) (unpublished) (declining to dismiss where plaintiff
failed to comply with a time limit that had been changed without notice); Cabrera v. LeVierge, No. 07cv-40-SM,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5134, at *15 (D.N.H. Jan. 24, 2008) (unpublished) (refusing to hold
prisoners to rules and procedures not described in inmate handbook); Lampkins v. Roberts, No. 1:06-cv-
639-DFH-TAB, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22695, at *7 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 27, 2007) (unpublished) (refusing to
dismiss for missing a five-day time deadline which was not made known in the materials made
available to prisoners). Cf. Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077, 11–12 (11th Cir. 2008) (where warden
tore up prisoner’s grievance, he was not required to re-file his grievance or grieve the warden’s action,
neither of which were prescribed by grievance rules); Miller v. Berkebile, No. 3:07-CV-0712-B ECF,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18154, at *1–2 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 2008) (unpublished) (where official refused to
process grievances contrary to policy, prisoners were not required to take steps not prescribed in the
policy to get around him; PLRA law applied in § 2241 case); Crawford v. Berkebile, No. 3:07-CV-0791-B
ECF, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8674, at *1–2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2008) (unpublished) (same) .
361. Hemphill v. New York, 380 F.3d 680, 686–90 (2d Cir. 2004). In Hemphill, the plaintiff, who
alleged he was threatened and physically assaulted to prevent him from complaining, wrote a letter to
the Superintendent rather than filing a grievance.

internal grievance but not from appealing directly to persons in higher authority in
the prison system or to external authority such as state or federal courts.
Consequently the grievance remedy might be unavailable, or failure to use it
justifiable on a particular set of facts. 362 Since no such claim was presented in
Woodford, this body of law should be viewed as unaffected by it. Other courts have
adopted the Second Circuit’s approach to such circumstances after Woodford. 363
(4) Is there any limit to the procedural rules that can be enforced by a “proper
exhaustion” rule? The Seventh Circuit, the first circuit to adopt a proper exhaustion
rule, stated:
The only constraint is that no prison system may establish a
requirement inconsistent with the federal policy underlying
Section 1983 and Section 1997e(a) ... . Thus, for example, no
administrative system may demand that the prisoner specify each
remedy later sought in litigation—for Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S.
731 (2001), holds that [§] 1997e(a) requires each prisoner to
exhaust a process and not a remedy. 364
Woodford itself states that “[p]roper exhaustion demands compliance with an
agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules,” 365 implying that there are
some procedural rules that are not “critical” and whose violation does not threaten
the system’s functioning. 366 This view is consistent with the earlier holding of the
Third Circuit that, even under a proper exhaustion rule, compliance need only be
“substantial,” 367 which it said meant the same as its later statement that “procedural
requirements must ... not be imposed in a way that offends the Federal Constitution
or the federal policy embodied in Section 1997e(a).” 368 The risk posed by Woodford’’s
holding is that prison officials will reject prisoners’ grievances for the most trivial of
rules violations, 369 or will promulgate rules designed to trip prisoners up, 370 or having
362. Hemphill v. New York, 380 F.3d 680, 688, 690 (2d Cir. 2004); see Ziemba v. Wezner, 366
F.3d 161, 164 (2d Cir. 2003) (directing district court to consider whether a complaint to the FBI and
subsequent investigation could amount to exhaustion by a plaintiff subjected within the prison to
threats, beatings, and denial of writing implements and grievance forms).
363. Kaba v. Stepp, 458 F.3d 678, 684–86 (7th Cir. 2006).
364. Strong v. David, 297 F.3d 646, 649–50 (7th Cir. 2002).
365. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90–91, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2386 (2006).
366. The Court does not suggest what these might be or how a lower court is to determine what
is “critical.” So far there is little development of this issue in the lower courts. One district court has
said that a policy as to what issues were suitable for the grievance system must not be critical, since
the determination of non-grievability is itself appealable. However, in that case the prisoner was
following the rules as written, and prison officials seemed to be misinterpreting their own rules or
using unwritten rules at variance from those the prisoners relied on. See Woods v. Lozer, No. 3:05-1080,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4923, at *1–2 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 18, 2007). Another court, without using the word
“critical,”excused a prisoner’s sending of his appeal directly to the appellate decision-maker rather than
sending it via the designated recipient, noting that the latter received the appeal and had an
opportunity to address the problem; the court mentions in the discussion officials’ belief that they have
discretion in how strictly to apply their own time deadlines. Parker v. Robinson, No. 04-214-B-W, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74031, at *1–2 (D. Me. Oct. 10, 2006). One district court has suggested that if the
administrative body reaches the merits despite the violation of a procedural rule, it must not have been
critical. Jones v. Stewart, 457 F. Supp. 2d 1131, 1136 (D. Nev. 2006).
367. Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 77–78 (3d Cir. 2000).
368. Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 232 (3d Cir. 2004).
369. There is no lack of recent examples of prisoners tripped up by trivial rules violations. See
Whitener v. Buss, 268 F. App’x 477, 478 (7th Cir. Mar. 13, 2008) (unpublished) (dismissing claim of
prisoner who missed a 48-hour grievance deadline because he needed the relevant officers’ names and
it took a week to get them, and he didn’t ask for waiver of the time limit); Whitney v. Simonson, No.
CIV S-06-1488 FCD GGH P, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81995, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2007) (unpublished)

that effect. 371 Another risk, little explored by the courts, is that grievance rules may
make it impossible for prisoners to frame the claims they wish to litigate. 372
(dismissing because plaintiff filed a new grievance rather than seeking reinstatement of his existing
grievance; court admitted defendants’ approach is “hyper-technical” but held Woodford requires
dismissal), report and recommendation adopted, No. CIV S-06-1488 FCD GGH P, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 94910 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2007) (unpublished); Cadogan v. Vittitow, No. 06-CV-15235, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 72999, at *5–9 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 30, 2007) (unpublished) (dismissing where grievance was
rejected for “including extraneous information, going beyond the scope of the issue being grieved”—by
attaching seven pages of information relating to requests for dental care, medical information, and
dental care standards, apparently relevant to claim); Cordova v. Frank, No. 07-C-172-C, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 54789, at *17–18 (W.D. Wis. July 26, 2007) (unpublished) (holding that a prisoner who clearly
had good cause for his late grievance failed to exhaust because he didn’t explain the reason so officials
could consider whether to excuse his lateness); Chatman v. Johnson, No. CIV S-06-0578 MCE EFB P,
2007 U.S. Dist, LEXIS 50172, at *20–21 (E.D. Cal. July 11, 2007) (unpublished) (prisoner re-submitted
his appeal to Inmate Appeals Branch rather than to the appeals coordinator as directed), report and
recommendation adopted, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70940 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2007) (unpublished);
Scarborough v. Cohen, No. 4:06cv152-RH/WCS, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21286, at *2–3 (N.D. Fla. Mar.
26, 2007) (unpublished) (dismissing for non-exhaustion where plaintiff had filed an “inmate request
form” rather than an “informal grievance” before formally grieving); McNeal v. Cabana, No. 4:04cv258-
GHD-EMB, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74149, at *3–6 (N.D. Miss. Jan. 23, 2006) (unpublished) (dismissing
for non-exhaustion because the plaintiff mailed his appeal directly to the appeal body rather than using
a request for services form); see Ramsey v. McGee, No. CIV 06-313-RAW-SPS, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
69747, at *3–5 (E.D. Okla. Sept. 19, 2007) (unpublished) (noting grievances denied because one was not
signed, one was written in pink ink when blue or black was required, and one was partly written in
pencil; dismissing on merits and not ruling on adequacy of exhaustion); see also Rollings-Pleasant v.
Deuel Vocational Ins., No. CIV S-03-0228 MCE EFB P, 2007 U.S. Dist LEXIS 54578, at *14–15 (E.D.
Cal. July 27, 2007) (unpublished) (dismissing for non-exhaustion where grievance was “cancelled” for
non-cooperation with investigation after prisoner argued about needing to make a phone call and asked
about a different grievance; no finding that he refused to answer questions about the grievance at
issue), report and recommendation adopted, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72687 (E.D.Cal. Sept. 28, 2007)
(unpublished). Cf. Love v. Pullman, 404 U.S. 522, 526, 92 S. Ct. 616, 618, 30 L. Ed. 2d 679, 684 (1972)
(stating “technicalities are particularly inappropriate in a statutory scheme in which laymen,
unassisted by trained lawyers, initiate the process”).
370. See Thomas v. Woolum, 337 F.3d 720, 732 n.4 (6th Cir. 2003) (suggesting that time
deadlines will become shorter). The Woodford Court said that no such instance was before it. Woodford
v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 102–03, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2392–93, 165 L. Ed. 2d 368, 385–86 (2006). A recent
example of a rule that appears designed to trip prisoners up is Oklahoma’s rule that prisoners on
“grievance restriction” must list in any grievance all their other grievances within the preceding
calendar year, by grievance number, date, description, and disposition at each level. One prisoner’s
complaint that he did not have that information and officials refused to provide him a copy of the
grievance log so he could obtain it was brushed off by the court. Tigert v. Jones, No. CIV-07-791-M,
2008 WL 2853625, at *7–8 (W.D. Okla. July 21, 2008) (unpublished).
371. A recent decision upheld the application of the Bureau of Prisons’ regulation defining a
grievance appeal as filed when it is logged as received, holding that even if the plaintiff’s assertion that
he mailed his appeal and it never arrived was true, the “prison mailbox” rule is inapplicable and he
failed to exhaust. Williams v. Burgos, No. CV206-104, 2007 WL 2331794, at *3 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 13, 2007)
(unpublished). Contra Crum v. U.S., No. 06-250 Erie, 2008 WL 744727, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Mar 18, 2008)
(unpublished) (where plaintiff showed that he submitted his appeal for mailing six weeks before it was
received, there was a genuine issue of material fact whether plaintiff was prevented from filing a timely
appeal so as to excuse failure to exhaust).
372. In Moore v. Bennette, 517 F.3d 717, 722, 730 (4th Cir. 2008), the court held that the plaintiff
had properly exhausted, even though his grievance was rejected for including “more than one issue,”
because his complaint was about “being punished in various ways for conduct he had never been
informed of or charged with. Under these circumstances, requiring Moore to grieve each of the alleged
components of his punishment separately would have prevented him from fairly presenting his claim in
its entirety.” The court upheld the dismissal of other claims for which his grievance was dismissed for
including more than one issue, despite the plaintiff’s claim that both issues were examples of a pattern

The most thoughtful discussion of this problem is in a recent district court
decision that links the question whether excessively technical grievance rules make
the administrative remedy unavailable with the Supreme Court’s long-ago statement
that “the creation of an additional procedural technicality ... [is] particularly
inappropriate in a statutory scheme in which laymen, unassisted by trained lawyers,
initiate the process.” 373 It then went on to analyze the issue before it—the rejection of
plaintiff’s grievances under a rule prohibiting “multiple issues” in a single
grievance—under the rule requiring restrictions on prisoners’ constitutional rights to
be reasonably related to legitimate penological purposes. 374 Though it upheld the
grievance rule at issue, 375 the decision lays a foundation for striking down grievance
rules that cause great difficulties in complying without serving a useful and
legitimate purpose.
Before Woodford, courts applying a procedural default rule held that if prison
officials decide the merits of a grievance rather than rejecting it for procedural
noncompliance, they cannot rely on that noncompliance to seek dismissal of future
litigation for non-exhaustion. 376 Nothing in Woodford contradicts those holdings, and
of inadequate medical care. Moore v. Bennette, 517 F.3d 717, 729 (4th Cir. 2008). “No multiple issues”
rules are especially subject to manipulation, since what constitutes an “issue” may be a matter of
interpretation. See Starks v. Lewis, No. CIV-06-512-M, 2008 WL 2570960, at *5 (W.D. Okla. June 24,
2008) (unpublished) (plaintiff said he raised one issue, “Mr. Lewis calling me a snitch, placing my life in
danger”; grievance staff said issues raised included “fired from OCI; inmate typing responses and
inmates read response, placing life in danger,” even though plaintiff disclaimed any request to get his
job back; dismissed for non-exhaustion). But see Lafountain v. Martin, No. 1:07-cv-076, 2008 WL
1923262, at *19 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 28, 2008) (unpublished) (upholding application of multiple issues
prohibition).
373. Lafountain v. Martin, No. 1:07-cv-076, 2008 WL 1923262, at *15 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 28, 2008)
(unpublished), quoting Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 526–27 (1972).
374. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S. Ct. 2254, 96 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1987). Lafountain v.
Martin, No. 1:07-cv-076, 2008 WL 1923262, at *15 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 28, 2008) (unpublished), said:
Rubber-stamping unlimited administrative restrictions would permit state prisons to
adopt grievance procedures solely for the purpose of requiring impossible compliance
in order to terminate prisoners' access to the courts, in violation of the first prong of
the Turner test. Id. at 90 (requiring the governmental objective to be both legitimate
and neutral). Such uncritical acceptance of prison restrictions also would permit
prisons to effectively eliminate all means for prisoners to exercise their rights to
challenge prison conditions, in violation of the second prong of Turner. Id. (requiring
that prison limitations on constitutional rights leave “alternative means of exercising
the right [ ] open to prison inmates”).
375. The court held that the “no multiple issues” rule was not unconstitutional as applied to the
plaintiff’s grievance, which combined incidents occurring over a six-month time period; he had ample
opportunity to grieve each of the incidents separately, and the rule served a useful purpose in
simplifying the claims addressed in any given grievance proceeding. Lafountain v. Martin, No. 1:07-cv-
076, 2008 WL 1923262, at *15 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 28, 2008) (unpublished) (“[T]he requirements that
grievances be submitted timely, raising one issue in sufficient detail, and not duplicate issues
previously grieved are rationally related to legitimate penological interests.”). However, a “no multiple
issues” rule can be applied so as to make remedies unavailable.
376. Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 323, 331 n.6 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting that the plaintiff sent a form to
the Commissioner rather than the Legal Adjudicator but defendants did not reject it for noncompliance;
in addition, the grievance was submitted by the prisoner’s lawyer and not by the prisoner, as the rules
specify); Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 234 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that prisoner did fail to follow the
prison procedures for grievances when the prison policy had nothing about putting money damages in
the grievance.); Ross v. County of Bernalillo, 365 F.3d 1181, 1186 (10th Cir. 2004) (stating that the
PLRA contains a procedural default rule within its exhaustion requirement); Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286
F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002) (rejecting the position that an untimely appeal can be treated as a
successful exhaustion), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 949 (2002); see Barnes v. Briley, 420 F.3d 673, 679 (7th
Cir. 2005) (holding claim was not procedurally defaulted where an initial grievance was rejected as

they remain good law. 377 After all, if the administrative process dealt with the merits
of the prisoner’s complaint, presumably the procedural errors were not “critical” and
the system was able to “function effectively.” 378 Courts have disagreed over whether a
untimely but plaintiff later “restarted” the grievance process and received a decision on the merits);
Gregory v. Ayers, No. CIV S-04-2523 DFL PAN P, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8319, at *5–7 (E.D. Cal. Mar.
3, 2006) (unpublished) (holding that matters not initially exhausted which were addressed in a later
grievance about threats arising from the first grievance were exhausted by the later grievance), report
and recommendation adopted, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15125 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2006) (unpublished);
Simpson v. Nickel, No. CV 05-2990-PHX-MHM (BPV), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22266, at *6–9 (W.D.
Wis. Sept. 29, 2005) (unpublished) (holding that state law stating “a prisoner’s failure to raise an issue
at an initial disciplinary hearing constitutes waiver of the issue on appeal” did not govern the federal
question of compliance with § 1997e(a)); Shaheen v. Hollins, No. 03-CV-17 (GLS/DRH), 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 32318, at *7–11 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2005) (unpublished) (declining to dismiss where prisoner was
told his complaint was non-grievable, appealed, and had his complaint referred to the correct decisionmaker
on appeal), report and recommendation adopted, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44554 (N.D.N.Y. Sept.
23, 2005) (unpublished).
377. Subil v. U.S. Marshal, No. 2:04-CV-0257 PS, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23813, at *13 (N.D. Ind.
Mar. 24, 2008) (unpublished) (declining to dismiss for non-exhaustion where grievance was not filed in
the normal channels, but the final reviewing authority accepted and responded to it); Broder v. Corr.
Med. Servs., Inc., No. 03-75106, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19949, at *4–6 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 14, 2008)
(unpublished) (finding that because the Michigan Department of Corrections decided the merits of the
grievance, without rejecting them as untimely, the grievances cannot be considered unexhausted);
Pierce v. Hillsborough County Dep’t of Corr. No. 06-cv-422-SM, 2008 DNH 16, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
5132, at *16–17 (D.N.H. Jan. 24, 2008) (unpublished) (stating that the defendant did not meet his
burden of showing that the grievance was not property exhausted, since the defendant accepted,
processed, and responded to the grievance, thereby showing his accepatance of the grievance as
“procedurally sound” at the time the plaintiff filed it); Furnace v. Evans, No.C06-4229MMC(PR), 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6501, at *10–11 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2008) (unpublished) (finding that the plaintiff
exhausted his grievance as the defendant did not explicitly reject it on procedural grounds during the
review of the grievance); Trenton v. Ariz. Dep’t of Corr., No. CV 04-2548-PHX-MHM (DKD), 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 6990, at *10–12 (D. Ariz. Jan. 14, 2008) (unpublished) (holding that the plaintiff has
exhausted his remedies when he received the Assistant Deputy Warden’s response informing the
plaintiff that he had no further available remedies); Baker v. Vanderark, No. 1:07-cv-004, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 81101, at *18–28 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 1, 2007) (unpublished) (citing Woodford, “proper
exhaustion” requires officials to raise procedural defects in a timely manner); Riley v. Haw. Dep’t of
Public Safety, No. 06-00563 JMS/KSC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77273, at *11–18 (D. Haw. Oct. 17, 2007)
(unpublished) (holding prisoners complaining of sexual assault who completed the emergency grievance
procedure as instructed, and whose complaints were processed through it, had exhausted despite not
additionally completing the standard grievance process); Ellis v. Albonico, No. CIV S-04-1483-LKK-
CMK-P, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18244, at *9–13 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2007) (unpublished) (where
defendants could not locate plaintiff’s alleged first level grievance, but the warden replied to the
plaintiff that the investigation would be conducted, grievance was exhausted), report and
recommendation adopted, No. CIV S-04-1483-LKK-CMK-P, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22914 (E.D. Cal.
Mar. 29, 2007) (unpublished); Strope v. Collins, No. 06-3150-JWL, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85544, at *8–
10 (D. Kan. Nov. 22, 2006) (unpublished) (finding that the plaintiff exhausted his remedies because the
final arbiter accepted the plaintiff’s grievance); Jones v. Stewart, 457 F. Supp. 2d 1131, 1134–37 (D.
Nev. 2006) (arguing that the Woodford opinion sets out a “merits test” (did the agency address the
merits up to the highest level?) and a “compliance test” (did the plaintiff follow the rules?), and “proper
exhaustion” is satisfied by compliance with either); Kretchmar v. Beard, No. 05-6108, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 49530, at *13–14 (E.D. Pa. July 18, 2006) (unpublished) (“When the merits of a prisoner’s claim
have been fully examined and ruled upon by the ultimate administrative authority, prison officials can
no longer assert the defense of failure to exhaust, even if the inmate did not follow proper
administrative procedure.”).
378. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90–91, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2386, 165 L. Ed. 2d 368, 378 (2006).
See Jones v. Stewart, 457 F. Supp. 2d 1131, 1136 (D. Nev. 2006) (suggesting that the administrative
body’s reaching the merits despite a procedural violation means that the violation must not have been
critical). The rule is further supported by Woodford’s endorsement of the habeas corpus procedural

grievance exhausts if it is rejected both on the merits and for procedural reasons. 379 If
the purpose of the “proper exhaustion” rule is to preserve the system’s ability to
“function effectively,” 380 it would seem that a decision on the merits is a good
indication that the system has functioned effectively, and dismissal serves no useful
purpose.
(5) Can federal courts overrule a grievance system’s procedural rejection of a grievance?
Some courts have said that they are without power to re-examine prison officials’
decisions rejecting grievances for procedural reasons, an approach which has led to
extreme and unconscionable results. 381 Other federal courts have assumed that they
do have the power to review such conclusions, both before and after Woodford. 382 One
default requirement as “substantively similar” to administrative law exhaustion rules applied to PLRA
exhaustion. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2388, 165 L. Ed. 2d 368, 379 (2006). One
of the considerations in assessing procedural default in habeas is whether the last state court to rule on
the claim “actually enforced the state procedural rule so as to bar that claim.” Lafountain v. Martin,
No. 1:07-cv-076, 2008 WL 1923262, at *16 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 28, 2008).
379. Compare Grear v. Gelabert No. 1:07-CV-203, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11669, at *4 n.1 (W.D.
Mich. Feb. 15, 2008) (unpublished); Cobb v. Berghuis, No. 1:06-CV-773, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93890,
at *2–4 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 21, 2007) (unpublished) (holding that a grievance rejected for both reasons
does not exhaust). See Harris v. West, No. 2:06-cv-268, 2008 WL 695404, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 11,
2008) (finding exhaustion where prisoner’s step II grievance was rejected as untimely but his final
appeal was addressed on the merits). Contra Scott v. Ambani, No. 07-10459, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15436, at *5–7 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 29, 2008) (unpublished) (finding non-exhaustion where intermediate
appeal reached the merits but final appeal did not).
380. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2385, 165 L. Ed. 2d 368, 378 (2006).
381. In Lindell v. O'Donnell, No. 05-C-04-C, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24767, at *50–51, 62–63, 73
(W.D. Wis. Oct. 21, 2005) (unpublished) (the plaintiff alleged that he had not received notice that a
letter had been confiscated until almost a year afterward; when he tried to grieve, his grievance was
dismissed as time-barred, even though it was impossible for him to file in a timely manner because of
the lack of notice. The court said that it could not review the administrative determination, and found
additional claims defaulted. The appeals court for that circuit has subsequently stated, in an
unpublished opinion: “As long as the state’s application of its own procedural rules is not arbitrary or
capricious, we will not substitute our judgment for the state’s.” Hoeft v. Wisher, 181 F. App’x 549, 550
(7th Cir. May 8, 2006) (unpublished)). See Starks v. Lewis, 2008 WL 2570960, at *5 (W.D. Okla. June
24, 2008) (“Even when prison authorities are incorrect about the existence of the perceived deficiency,
the inmate must follow the prescribed steps to cure it ... . An inmate's disagreement with prison
officials as to the appropriateness of a particular procedure under the circumstances, or his belief that
he should not have to correct a procedural deficiency does not excuse his obligation to comply with the
available process ... .”); Williams v. Burgos, 2007 WL 2331794, at *3 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 13, 2007)
(unpublished) (holding Bureau of Prisons regulation defining an appeal as filed only when it is logged
as received would apply even if plaintiff’s assertion that he mailed his appeal was true).
382. In Moore v. Bennette, 517 F.3d 717, 722, 729, 730 (4th Cir. 2008), the court approved
dismissal of some claims for non-exhaustion because the prisoner violated a rule against complaining
about more than one incident in a grievance, but reversed dismissal of another claim where it said that
requiring him to grieve each of multiple incidents separately “would have prevented him from fairly
presenting his claim in its entirety.” Similarly, in Muniz v. Kaspar, No. 07-cv-01914-MSK-MJW, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64567, at *5–17 (D. Colo. Aug. 12, 2008) (unpublished), the first-step appeal resulted
in a decision on the merits, but the second-level appeal was rejected on the ground that the first-step
appeal was defective in that it did not state the relief requested. The plaintiff was seeking to exhaust
his remedies so he could seek damages, but damages were not provided by the grievance system. The
court rejected these “spurious procedural grounds,” but warned: “Only where the ‘procedural’ defect
cited by the prison is so transparently without merit as to be arbitrary and capricious on its face,
coupled with a grievance procedure that does not provide a reasonable opportunity for refiling of a
procedurally-compliant grievance in the event of a procedural denial, will the Court consider whether
the grievance procedure has been rendered unavailable.” Muniz v. Kaspar, No. 07-cv-01914-MSK-MJW,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64567, at *16–17 n.5 (D. Colo. Aug. 12, 2008) (unpublished).

ecent district court decision has taken a more thoughtful approach. First, it noted
Woodford’’s acknowledgment of the habeas corpus doctrine of procedural default, and
suggested that that doctrine can be helpful in analyzing proper exhaustion questions.
Specifically, it said that “the contours of the procedural default doctrine would
require the Court to consider whether the last administrative decisionmaker relied
on an established procedural rule and whether a reasonable reviewer could have
determined that the prisoner actually violated the established rule.” 383 Clearly an
independent judgment by the court is contemplated. The court further observed that
instructions by grievance officials that are contrary to the relevant state regulations
may make the remedy unavailable. 384 Several decisions have refused to dismiss for
non-exhaustion where a prisoner’s grievance had been rejected because it duplicated
an earlier grievance. 385
For other decisions refusing to honor procedural rejections of grievances, see Price v. Kozak, 569 F.
Supp. 2d 398, 406–07 (D. Del. July 28, 2008) (holding plaintiff’s grievances timely despite the defendant
rejecting them as late); Moton v. Cowart, No. 8:06-CV-2163-T-30EAJ, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40419, at
*15–18 (M.D. Fla. May 19, 2008) (unpublished) (rejecting decision that plaintiff’s complaint was not
grievable, and an appeal decision that it must be re-commenced at the facility, as contrary to prison
system’s own policy); Shoucair v. Warren, No. 07-12964, 2008 WL 2033714, at *7–8 (E.D. Mich. May 9,
2008) (unpublished) (rejecting decision that grievance failed to identify a policy violation, since the
grievance rules did not require it, and that decision was vague, since it set forth basic facts and
defendants failed to follow their rules requiring investigation of such complaints); Johnson v.
Correctional Medical Services, Inc., No. 4:06-cv-137, 2008 WL 878767, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 3, 2008)
(unpublished) (rejecting officials’ decision that grievance was duplicative); George v. Smith, No. 05-C-
0403-C, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92290, at *12–18 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 12, 2006) (unpublished) (holding that
timeliness of grievance appeals must be assessed based on when they were sent, not when they arrived,
despite grievance body’s contrary interpretation of its own rule), aff’d, 507 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 2007);
Thomas v. Hickman, No. CV F 06-0215 AWI SMS, No. CV F 06-0215 AWI SMS, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
72988, at *23–27 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2006) (unpublished) (allowing case to go forward even though
grievance was untimely, since the prisoner did not know of her injury until long after the grievance
deadline had passed); O'Connor v. Featherston, No. 01 Civ. 3251 (HB), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7570, at
*7–8 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2002) (unpublished) (refusing to be bound by rejection of request to file a late
grievance where the plaintiff had been kept in medical restriction for the 14 days in which he was
required to file a timely grievance); Graham v. Perez, 121 F. Supp. 2d 317, 322 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(holding that the court will independently determine whether a prisoner has presented “mitigating
circumstances” under grievance rules for late grievance).
In Vasquez v. Hilbert, No. 07-cv-00723-bbc, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42011, at *6-8 (W.D. Wis. May
27, 2008) (unpublished) (the defendants agreed that grievance officials had interpreted their own rules
erroneously, but argued that the plaintiff failed to exhaust because he should have done a better job of
showing the officials that they were wrong. The court didn’t buy it, holding argument “unreasonable,
unfair and inconsistent with circuit precedent”).
383. Lafountain v. Martin, No. 1:07-cv-076, 2008 WL 1923262, at *16 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 28, 2008).
384. Lafountain v. Martin, No. 1:07-cv-076, 2008 WL 1923262, at *16 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 28, 2008).
385. There are several variations on this theme. Some decisions have held that dismissal of a
grievance as duplicative did not mean that the plaintiff had not exhausted, but suggested that he
exhausted in an earlier grievance. Neal v. Butts, No. 07-15137, 2008 WL 2704663, at *5 (E.D. Mich.
July 9, 2008) (unpublished); Broyles v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., No. 1:07-CV-690, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
30214, at *7 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 14, 2008) (unpublished); Houston v. Riley, No. 2:07-cv-63, 2008 WL
762114, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 25, 2008) (unpublished); Doyle v. Jones, No. 1:06-cv-628, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 84570, at *8 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 15, 2007) (unpublished). In Gabby v. Luy, No. 05-C-0188, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4167, at *11 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 23, 2006) (unpublished), the prisoner had filed one
grievance and failed to appeal, then filed a second grievance which was rejected on the ground that the
issue had been raised in the previous grievance. The court found exhaustion, implicitly rejecting
defendant’s argument that if a prisoner tries to exhaust an issue and makes a procedural mistake, he is
barred from trying again and doing it right even if the later grievance is otherwise proper. In Sullivan
v. Caruso, No. 1:07cv367, 2008 WL 356878, at *10 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 7, 2008) (unpublished), the court
held that defendants improperly rejected a grievance as duplicative where it named a defendant not

(6) What if the prisoner fails to comply with directions from prison staff with respect to a
particular grievance? Numerous decisions have held that a prisoner who disregards
instructions by grievance personnel as to how to proceed fails to exhaust. 386 However,
some courts have refused to find non-exhaustion where the instructions or the
grievance body’s dismissal were not supported by the written grievance policy 387 or
named in the previous grievance on the subject. Contra Laster v. Pramstaller, No. 06-13508, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 11435, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 15, 2008) (unpublished) (a grievance naming a defendant
that is dismissed as duplicative of an earlier grievance not naming that defendant fails to exhaust). In
these cases, the issue is the prisoner’s attempt to comply with the state’s “name the defendant” rule
where he or she did not know all the necessary names at the time of the first grievance. In Gatlin v.
Nichols, No. CIV S-06-2465 WBS GGH P, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87749, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2007),
(unpublished) report and recommendation adopted, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87749 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 23,
2008) (unpublished), the court simply found that grievance officials were wrong in finding plaintiff’s
grievance duplicative, and held that the plaintiff exhausted.
386. See Cannon v. Washington, 418 F.3d 713, 718 (7th Cir. 2005); Carroll v. Yates, 362 F.3d 984, 985 (7th
Cir. 2004); Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 397 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Just as courts may dismiss suits for failure to
cooperate, so administrative bodies may dismiss grievances for lack of cooperation; in either case this procedural
default blocks later attempts to litigate the merits.”); Jernigan v. Stuchell, 304 F.3d 1030, 1032–33 (10th Cir. 2002)
(holding that a prisoner who received no response to a grievance and refused the appeals body’s direction to try to get
one had failed to exhaust); Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone, No. CIV-05-1211-W, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26815, at *10 (W.D.
Okla. Apr. 2, 2008) (unpublished) (holding prisoner failed to exhaust when he did not comply with demand to
supplement his grievance with information about additional grievances he had filed after the one in question, despite
his belief that the demand was unreasonable); Skipper v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr, No. 4:05-3024-HFF-TER, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16616, at *2 (D.S.C. Mar. 4, 2008) (unpublished); Keeton v. Forsythe, No. CIV S-04-0758 GEB EFB P, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11130, at *12 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2008) (unpublished) (plaintiff failed to exhaust when he did not
comply with instruction to resubmit his grievance because his writing was too small to read), report and
recommendation adopted, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22114 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2008) (unpublished); Whitney v.
Simonson, No. CIV S-06-1488 FCD GGH P, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81995, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2007)
(unpublished) (dismissing claim of prisoner who filed a new grievance rather than trying to reinstate the old one as
instructed; court concedes this approach is “hyper-technical” but required by Woodford v. Ngo), report and
recommendation adopted, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94910 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2007) (unpublished); Richardson v.
Llamas, No. 1:04-cv-05394-LJO DLB PC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60920, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2007)
(unpublished) (holding plaintiff did not exhaust where he failed to cooperate with an interview concerning his
complaint of sexual abuse), report and recommendation adopted, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73158 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 1,
2007) (unpublished); Cyrus v. Shepard, No. 3:06-CV-01665, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54301, at *2 (M.D. Pa. July 26,
2007) (unpublished) (holding a plaintiff who used a “sensitive grievance” procedure, was told to use the regular
procedure, and didn’t, failed to exhaust); Walton v. Ayon, No. 1:07-cv-00246-OWW-SMS PC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
44299, at *2 (E.D. Cal. June 19, 2007) (unpublished), report and recommendation adopted, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
79618 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2007) (unpublished); Fleming v. Geo Group, Inc., No. CIV-05-1502-T, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3843, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 18, 2007) (unpublished) (dismissing for non-exhaustion where prisoner ignored
instructions to submit a legible copy of his grievance and appealed twice instead); Faysom v. Timm, No. 04 C 8312,
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27860, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 9, 2005) (unpublished) (holding plaintiff who did not respond to
Administrative Review Board’s request for more information and clarification failed to exhaust); Jones v. Doty, No.
1:05cv491, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29983, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 28, 2005) (unpublished) (holding a prisoner who used
the “sensitive grievance” procedure and was told he should use the regular grievance procedure, but did not, failed to
exhaust, even though he appealed the denial of the “sensitive grievance”); Robinson v. Shannon, No. 3:CV-04-2777,
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45832, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2005) (unpublished) (holding that prisoner who was instructed
on appeal to attach the Superintendent’s response did not exhaust where he failed to respond and say there was no
response); Hazleton v. Alameida, 358 F. Supp. 2d 926, 935 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (holding prisoner who failed to follow
instructions did not exhaust).
387. See Young v. Hightower, 395 F. Supp. 2d 583, 586–87 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (holding plaintiff’s
alleged failure to supply requested documents was not a failure to exhaust where the grievance policy
said grievances should not be denied for failure to provide documentation); Vega v. Alameida, No.
S021977MCEKJMPC, 2005 WL 1501531, at *1 (E.D. Cal. June 20, 2005) (unpublished) (declining to
dismiss where a prisoner’s grievance and appeal were “cancelled” because he was “incorporative,” citing
defendants’ failure to provide facts supporting the cancellation of the grievance); Griffen v. Cook, No.
Civ. 02-717-AS, 2005 WL 1113830, at *7–8 (D. Or. May 10, 2005) (unpublished) (declining to dismiss
for non-exhaustion where plaintiff’s grievances were returned unprocessed with instructions, but the

where the grievance body reached the merits of the grievance despite the prisoner’s
failure to follow instructions. 388 But, some courts have refused to find non-exhaustion
where the instructions or the grievance body’s dismissal were not supported by the
written grievance policy 389 —though one decision insists that it is the prisoner’s
obligation to follow erroneous instructions. 390 In this situation, as in others, the
procedural defect is waived where the grievance body reached the grievance’s merits
anyway. 391
(7) How does the proper exhaustion/procedural default rule interact with the statutory
requirement that remedies be “available”? The rulings of a number of courts have
created a procedural trap in addition to the procedural default requirement. If a
prisoner is unable to exhaust timely and properly for some legitimate reason (for
example, missing a deadline because of absence from the prison and no access to the
grievance process), one would think the remedy is not available to that prisoner,
since a late grievance does not exhaust under Woodford. However, a number of courts
have held that prisoners who are prevented from exhausting properly must try to
exhaust improperly, notwithstanding the Woodford “proper exhaustion” requirement.
Therefore, if they cannot file a timely grievance, they should file a late grievance
when they can, or the court might not even consider their arguments explaining why
they couldn’t file in a timely manner. 392
6. What If You Miss a Time Limit?
The Supreme Court’s ruling requiring “proper exhaustion” requires compliance with time
limits. 393 The Court was aware of the very short deadlines of most prison grievance systems
grievance policy made no provision for returning grievances unprocessed), report and recommendation
adopted as modified, 2005 WL 2314124 (D. Or. Sept. 21, 2005) (unpublished).
388. Richardson v. Sullivan, No. 104CVF5394RECDLBP, 2005 WL 2465936, at *3 (E.D. Cal.
Jan. 5, 2005) (unpublished) (holding that prisoner’s refusal to be interviewed and subsequent
cancellation of his grievance did not constitute non-exhaustion where the grievance process had
addressed the merits of his complaint).
389. See Young v. Hightower, 395 F. Supp. 2d 583, 588 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (holding plaintiff’s
alleged failure to supply requested documents was not a failure to exhaust where the grievance policy
said grievances should not be denied for failure to provide documentation); Vega v. Alameida, No.
S021977MCEKJMPC, 2005 WL 1501531 (E.D. Cal. June 20, 2005) (unpublished) (declining to dismiss
where a prisoner’s grievance and appeal were “cancelled” because he was “incorporative,” citing
defendants’ failure to provide facts supporting the cancellation of the grievance); Griffen v. Cook, No.
Civ. 02-717-AS, 2005 WL 1113830, at *7–8 (D. Or. May 10, 2005) (unpublished) (declining to dismiss
for non-exhaustion where plaintiff’s grievances were returned unprocessed with instructions, but the
grievance policy made no provision for returning grievances unprocessed), report and recommendation
adopted as modified, 2005 WL 2314124 (D.Or. Sept. 21, 2005) (unpublished).
390. Starks v. Lewis, No. CIV-06-512-M, 2008 WL 2570960, at *5 (W.D. Okla. June 24, 2008)
(“Even when prison authorities are incorrect about the existence of the perceived deficiency, the inmate
must follow the prescribed steps to cure it. ... An inmate's disagreement with prison officials as to the
appropriateness of a particular procedure under the circumstances, or his belief that he should not
have to correct a procedural deficiency does not excuse his obligation to comply with the available
process ... .”). Contra Lafountain v. Martin, No. 1:07-cv-076, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34456, at *17 (W.D.
Mich. Apr. 28, 2008) (unpublished) (suggesting that instructions by grievance personnel contrary to
state regulations may make the remedy unavailable).
391. Richardson v. Sullivan, No. 104CVF5394RECDLBP, 2005 WL 2465936, at *3 (E.D. Cal.
Jan. 5, 2005) (unpublished) (holding that prisoner’s refusal to be interviewed and subsequent
cancellation of his grievance did not constitute non-exhaustion where the grievance process had
addressed the merits of his complaint).
392. See cases cited in footnote 416, below.
393. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90–91, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2389, 165 L. Ed. 2d 368, 381–82
(2006). Cf. Hopkins v. Coplan, No. 06-cv-96-JD, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57527, at *12–13 (D.N.H. Aug.
6, 2007) (unpublished) (holding that where there was no time limit when the plaintiff’s claim arose, but

ut didn’t try to address this concern. 394 It is not clear how absolute and inflexible the
Woodford holding is with respect to time limits, 395 nor is it clear if federal courts are free to
re-examine the untimeliness of administrative determinations. 396
Before continuing with the legal discussion, here is some practical advice. Obviously,
learn the rules and be sure you meet the deadlines. But if you miss a grievance deadline, do
not give up. Proceed with your grievance as quickly as you can. Name any provision in the
grievance system for late grievances, explain why you were late, and take all the available
appeals if the grievance officials reject your grievance for lateness anyway. If they deal with
the merits of your grievance, then its lateness will not matter. If they do not, you will still be
in a position to argue in court either that you were justified in failing to file a grievance on
time, that circumstances prevented you from filing on time and the remedy was therefore
unavailable, or that your lateness does not matter because prison officials had the
opportunity to address your problem even if they chose not to do so. You should not assume
that if prison officials’ actions or other circumstances beyond your control keep you from
exhausting in a timely manner, you can just argue that the remedy was not “available” and
you are excused from exhausting. A number of courts have said that under those
circumstances, you must file a grievance when you are no longer subject to whatever obstacle
that kept you from exhausting, 397 though some courts have disagreed. 398
one was instituted later, the plaintiff was obliged to comply with that time limit as measured from the
date it was promulgated).
394. The plaintiff in Woodford had missed a 15-day deadline, and the Court noted that such
deadlines are typically 14 to 30 days according to the United States and even shorter according to the
plaintiff. 548 U.S. 81, 95–96, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2388–89, 165 L. Ed. 2d 368, 381 (2006).
395. See preceding Section for discussion of possible exceptions and limits to the “proper
exhaustion” rule.
396 . For examples of decisions where courts refused to re-examine questionable prison
timeliness decisions, see Wall v. Holt, No. 1:CV-06-0194, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94573, at *9–10 (M.D.
Pa. Jan. 9, 2007) (unpublished) (holding timeliness is measured by when grievance appeal arrives
under Bureau of Prisons’ regulation, notwithstanding “prison mailbox” rule and claim that the appeal
was mailed in plenty of time); Lindell v. O’Donnell, No. 05-C-04-C, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24767, at
*49–52 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 21, 2005) (unpublished) (holding that the court could not review an
administrative finding of untimeliness even though the plaintiff alleged that he had not received notice
that a letter had been confiscated until almost a year afterward, and it was impossible for him to file in
a timely way because of the lack of notice). For decisions where courts exercised independent judgment
about timeliness, see Price v. Kozak, 569 F. Supp. 2d 398, 406–07 (D. Del. July 28, 2008) (holding
plaintiff’s grievances timely despite their inexplicable rejection as late); Ashker v. Schwarzenegger, No.
C 05-03286 CW (PR), 2007 U.S. Dist LEXIS 45234, at *15–6 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2007) (unpublished)
(denying summary judgment where defendants said plaintiff’s grievance was untimely but plaintiff
said it was timely measured from his receipt of the decision at issue), amended on reconsideration on
other grounds, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73761 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2007) (unpublished); Thomas v.
Hickman, No. CV F 06-0215 AWI SMS, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72988, at *20–27 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2006)
(unpublished) (holding that a prisoner had no available remedy where she did not know of the wrong
within the 15-day time limit and officials dismissed her grievances as untimely).
One court has held that a grievance rule stating that a prisoner “should” file within 15 days—not
that he “must” file within 15 days—is not a mandatory rule, and failing to meet it does not render a
grievance untimely. Edwards v. Dwyer, No. 1:06-CV-1 CAS, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5767, at *25 (E.D.
Mo. Jan. 25, 2008) (unpublished). You should do what the grievance policy says, rather than relying on
this holding, because there is considerable risk that other courts will not follow it.
397. Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368, 1373 (11th Cir. June 20, 2007) (holding prisoner who said he
didn’t grieve for fear of assault should have exhausted after transfer); Green v. McBride, No. 5:04-cv-
01181, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71189, at *7–9 (S.D. W.Va. Sept. 25, 2007) (unpublished) (holding
prisoner who was kept on suicide watch without necessary materials until past the grievance deadline
should have filed a late grievance); Stephens v. Howerton, No. CV 105-171, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
45075, at *13 (S.D. Ga. June 21, 2007) (unpublished) (holding injured prisoner should have filed a
grievance when he was able to write), aff’d, 270 F. App’x 750 (11th Cir. 2008) (unpublished); Bradley v.

The Second Circuit has addressed compliance with time limits like other issues of
complying with grievance rules, holding that failure to exhaust or to exhaust properly can be
justified under “circumstances which might understandably lead usually uncounselled
prisoners to fail to grieve in the normally required way.” 399 This includes prisoners’
misunderstanding of the exhaustion requirement 400 or of the relevant prison regulations, 401
though courts have noted that those were not necessarily the only circumstances to justify
Washington, 441 F. Supp. 2d 97, 101 (D.D.C. 2006) (holding a week’s deprivation of writing materials
did not make remedies unavailable where the plaintiff had 15 days to file a grievance); Stanley v. Rich,
No. CV 605-075, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35916, at *8–10 (S.D. Ga. June 1, 2006) (unpublished) (holding
a prisoner who complained of threats of retaliation should have filed a grievance when conditions
changed, i.e., the administration was replaced and several officers were suspended and eventually
terminated); Haroon v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. and Rehab., No. CIV S-06-0450 DFL DAD P, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 23476, at *7–8 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2006) (unpublished) (holding that a prisoner who was in a
coma during the usual time limit should have filed afterwards), report and recommendation adopted,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39405 (E.D. Cal. June 9, 2006) (unpublished); Isaac v. Nix, No. 2:04-CV-172-
RWS, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19606, at *13–4 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 30, 2006) (unpublished) (holding prisoner
who said he couldn’t get grievance forms within a five-day time limit should have filed a grievance
within five days of getting the forms); Goldenberg v. St. Barnabas Hosp., No. 01 Civ. 7435 (GBD), 2005
U.S. Dist LEXIS 2730, at *15–16 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2005) (unpublished) (stating prisoner who was
physically and mentally incapable of filing a grievance after the challenged conduct failed to explain
why he didn’t exhaust later); Patterson v. Goord, No. 02 Civ. 759 (JSM), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22482,
at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2002) (unpublished) (holding allegations of staff threats insufficient to
justify late grievance where prisoner failed to submit grievance promptly upon transfer from prison
where he was being threatened).
398. See Cotton-Schrichte v. Peate, No. 07-4052-CV-C-NKL, 2008 WL 3200775, at *4 (W.D. Mo.
Aug. 5, 2008) (prisoner who was raped by a staff member and threatened into silence “was not required
to file a grievance after the threats were removed and outside of the time allowed for filing it, on the
hope that an administrator would exercise discretion and process the grievance. For the court to
dismiss a case for failure to exhaust under these circumstances would be inherently unjust”); Bellamy
v. Mount Vernon Hosp., No. 07 Civ. 1801 (SAS), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59098, at *12–14 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
5, 2008) (unpublished) (declining to dismiss where prisoner reasonably believed his claim was timebarred
before he had an opportunity to grieve).
399. Williams v. Comstock, 425 F.3d 175, 176 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (holding that absent an
explanation for more than a small part of the plaintiff’s two-year delay, “the failure to timely file the
grievance in accordance with IGP rules amounted to a failure to exhaust administrative remedies in
this case”).
400. Williams v. Comstock, 425 F.3d 175, 177 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Rodriguez v. Westchester
County Jail Corr. Dep’t, 372 F.3d 485 (2d Cir. 2004)).
401. Williams v. Comstock, 425 F.3d 175, 177 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Giano v Goord, 380 F.3d 670,
677 (2d Cir. 2004)); Cotton-Schrichte v. Peate, No. 07-4052-CV-C-NKL, 2008 WL 3200775, at *4 (W.D.
Mo. Aug. 5, 2008) (prisoner who was raped by a staff member and threatened into silence “was not
required to file a grievance after the threats were removed and outside of the time allowed for filing it,
on the hope that an administrator would exercise discretion and process the grievance. For the court to
dismiss a case for failure to exhaust under these circumstances would be inherently unjust”); Bellamy
v. Mount Vernon Hosp., No. 07 Civ. 1801 (SAS), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59098, at *12–14 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
5, 2008) (unpublished) (declining to dismiss where prisoner reasonably believed his claim was timebarred
before he had an opportunity to grieve); Williams v. Hurley, No. 2:05cv1022, 2007 U.S. Dist
LEXIS 29733, at *15–16 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 23, 2007) (unpublished) (holding that a prisoner whose cancer
was not diagnosed until long after the 14-day grievance deadline had passed had no available remedy;
no reference to any provision for filing untimely).
A reasonable if mistaken appreciation of the facts may also justify lack of timely exhaustion or
result in a holding that the remedy was unavailable. In Borges v. Piatkowski, 337 F. Supp. 2d 424, 427
& n.3 (W.D.N.Y. 2004), the prisoner missed the 14-day grievance deadline because he had no reason to
know he had a medical problem until after it had expired and he had been transferred to another
prison. The court did not dismiss his suit for lack of timely exhaustion; it held that he had no available
remedy, or alternatively was justified by special circumstances in not exhausting.

failure to exhaust. 402 As noted in Section 5 above, this approach still appears valid after
Woodford, since the kinds of fact patterns addressed in Second Circuit law were not before
the Court in Woodford. In addition, circumstances that prevent a prisoner from filing in a
timely manner would mean that the grievance system was not an “available” remedy for
purposes of the exhaustion rule; 403 Woodford did not address the meaning of the statutory
term “available.” Nor did Woodford disturb the holdings of lower courts, including the Second
Circuit, that under some circumstances prison officials may be estopped from raising a
defense of non-exhaustion. 404
Some grievance systems build in discretion to waive time limits. For example, the New
York State grievance system permits late grievances for “mitigating circumstances,” 405 which
include “attempts to resolve informally by the inmate.” 406 In order to take advantage of such
a provision, you have to ask for it—you cannot just argue later in court that your grievance
was not untimely because they could have given you an extension. 407 The next question is
402. Williams v. Comstock, 425 F.3d 175, 176 (2d Cir. 2005). One of the court’s other decisions
holds that a prisoner who was deterred from exhausting timely by threats or other coercion by prison
staff might also be justified in having failed to exhaust, or the court might find that remedies were
unavailable to that prisoner, depending on the severity of the circumstances. Hemphill v. New York,
380 F.3d 680, 690–91 (2d Cir. 2004). Following Hemphill, recent district court decisions have held that
prisoners who did not exhaust because of assaults and/or threats until after they had been transferred
were justified in failing to exhaust timely. Lunney v. Brureton, No. 04 Civ. 2438(LAK)(GWG), 2007 WL
1544629, at *9–10 (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2007), objections overruled, 2007 WL 2050301 (S.D.N.Y. July 18,
2007); Thomas v. Cassleberry, No. 03-CV-6394L, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30129, at *4–6 (W.D.N.Y. Apr.
24, 2007) (unpublished).
403. Days v. Johnson, 322 F.3d 863, 867–68 (5th Cir. 2003); Thorns v. Ryan, No. 07-CV-0218 H
(AJB), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14215, at *7–12 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2008) (unpublished) (refusing to
dismiss where grievance appeal was untimely because of delay in receiving the decision; appeal was
timely measured from when plaintiff received it); Macahilas v. Taylor, No. CIV S-06-0502 GEB KJM P,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5652, at *5–9 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2008) (unpublished) (denying summary
judgment where prisoner said “his mind was too clouded” by illness even to know he had a claim within
the time limit), report and recommendation adopted, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13314 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 22,
2008) (unpublished); Cordova v. Frank, No. 07-C-172-C, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54789, at *14–7 (W.D.
Wis. July 26, 2007) (unpublished) (holding remedy unavailable where a prisoner’s appeal was late
because he was indigent and prison rules forbade advancing him the postage to mail it); Cruz v.
Jordan, 80 F. Supp. 2d 109, 124 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding remedies were not available to a prisoner who
was unconscious and hospitalized during the time period for filing a grievance, where prison officials
had said his grievance was time-barred).
Some courts hold that this does not mean that if you are prevented from complying with a
grievance deadline, you do not have to exhaust. It means that when you exhaust late, the lateness may
be excused if it was for reasons beyond your control. See Part D, Section 6, below.
404. See above Part D, footnote 301.
405. Graham v. Perez, 121 F. Supp. 2d 317, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (quoting N.Y. Comp. Codes R. &
Regs. tit. 7, § 701.7(a)(1) (2001)).
406. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 7, § 701.7(a)(1), at § 701.6(g)(1)(i)(a) (2001). The current
version of this provision is in N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 7, § 701.6(a)(1), at § 701.6(g)(1)(i)(a)
(2008); State of New York, Department of Correctional Services, Directive No. 4040 § 701.6(a), Inmate
Grievance Program (2003) (as revised July 1, 2006). It now provides: “An exception to the time limit
may not be granted if the request was made more than 45 days after an alleged occurrence.”
407. Patel v. Fleming, 415 F.3d 1105, 1110–11 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that the existence of
provisions for time extensions did not save the untimely grievance of a prisoner who never sought one);
Harper v. Jenkin, 179 F.3d 1311, 1312 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that a prisoner whose grievance was
dismissed as untimely was obliged to appeal, since the system provided for waiver of time limits for
“good cause”); Cordova v. Frank, No. 07-C-172-C, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54789, at *14–17 (W.D. Wis.
July 26, 2007) (unpublished) (holding that a prisoner who clearly had good cause for his late grievance
failed to exhaust because he didn’t explain the reason so officials could consider whether to excuse his
lateness); Soto v. Belcher, 339 F. Supp. 2d 592, 596 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that a prisoner who
learned of his problem after the deadline passed should have sought to file a late grievance); Kaiser v.

whether the court is bound by prison personnel’s disposition of such a request. As we have
noted, courts are divided on the question whether they can overrule grievance officials’
decisions about whether prisoners have complied with the rules. One New York district court
has held that since exhaustion is not jurisdictional, the court will decide whether late
exhaustion is excused by mitigating circumstances such as transfer to another facility or the
unavailability of grievance representatives to prisoners in a segregated unit. 408 When a claim
is dismissed for non-exhaustion—whether for simple failure to exhaust at all, an error in
using the procedures, or reliance on law that has subsequently changed—the deadline for
administrative proceedings will almost always have passed. The Second Circuit has held that
where a failure to exhaust or to exhaust correctly was justified by special circumstances, the
claim should be dismissed without prejudice if remedies remain available, but if not, the case
should go forward (and if the case is dismissed and then remedies prove unavailable, it
should be reinstated). 409 In other words, if the system will not entertain the plaintiff’s late
grievance, the plaintiff need not exhaust. (Whether this rule was disturbed by Woodford v.
Ngo is unclear.) It is also unclear how readily prison systems will accept post-dismissal
grievances under discretionary provisions for late filings. 410 Some decisions, however, have
Bailey, No. 01-6151 (JEI), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11103, at *15–16 (D.N.J. July 1, 2003) (unpublished)
(holding that a prisoner who did not follow instructions to obtain verification that untimeliness was not
his fault failed to exhaust). See Whitener v. Buss, 268 F. App’x 477, 478–79 (7th Cir. 2008) (dismissing
claim of prisoner who missed a 48-hour grievance deadline because he needed the relevant officers’
names and it took a week to get them, and he didn’t ask for waiver of the time limit).
408. Graham v. Perez, 121 F. Supp. 2d 317, 322 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). That approach is consistent
with the Second Circuit’s observation, in finding a prisoner’s explanation for his late grievance
inadequate, that “[w]e therefore do not find Williams’ justification persuasive.” Williams v. Comstock,
425 F.3d 175, 176 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (emphasis added) (noting that the plaintiff’s grievance
was two years late, and his explanation addressed only a short part of that time). See O'Connor v.
Featherston, No. 01 Civ. 3251 (HB), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7570, at *4–8 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2002)
(unpublished) (refusing to be bound by rejection of request to file a late grievance where the plaintiff
had been kept in medical restriction for the 14 days in which he was required to file a timely
grievance); Cardona v. Winn, 170 F. Supp. 2d 131 (D. Mass. 2001) (holding that the grievance appeal
deadline should be extended because the prisoner may have missed it out of “excusable confusion”); see
also Lawyer v. Gatto, No. 03 Civ. 7577 (RPP), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15406, at *20–23 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
21, 2007) (unpublished) (holding that the grievance appeal deadline should be extended because the
prisoner may have missed it out of “excusable confusion”); Moore v. La. Dep’t of Public Safety and
Corr., No. CIV.A. 99-1108, 2002 WL 1791996, at *4 (E.D. La. Aug. 5, 2002) (unpublished) (declining to
enforce 30-day time limit; declaring 30-day delay in filing complaint “not unreasonable” given that the
plaintiff was a juvenile in state custody). But see Cole v. Miraflor, No. 02 Civ. 9981(RWS), 2006 WL
457817, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2006) (unpublished) (stating that prison officials’ determination
regarding mitigating circumstances “is conclusive on the issue of exhaustion”); Patterson v. Goord, No.
02 Civ. 759 (JSM), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22482, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2002) (unpublished)
(refusing to disturb finding of no mitigating circumstances where prisoner had waited six months after
dismissal for non-exhaustion before filing a grievance).
409. Brownell v. Krom, 446 F.3d 305, 313 (2d Cir. 2006); Giano v. Goord, 380 F.3d 670, 679–80
(2d Cir. 2004); Hemphill v. New York, 380 F.3d 680, 690–91 (2d Cir. 2004). The Seventh Circuit has
recently held similarly. Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 742 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that if failure to
exhaust was “innocent,” the prisoner “must be given another chance to exhaust (provided that there
exist remedies that he will be permitted by the prison authorities to exhaust, so that he’s not just being
given a runaround)”).
410. In Brownell v. Krom, 446 F.3d 305, 310–13 (2d Cir. 2006), a prisoner attempted to exhaust
his claim after dismissal for non-exhaustion in the district court, but his grievance was dismissed as
untimely, despite facts that led the Second Circuit to find special circumstances justifying his initial
failure to exhaust correctly.

directed that grievance officials consider grievances on their merits after dismissal for nonexhaustion.
411
The doctrine of equitable tolling, 412 which is usually applied to statutes of limitations, 413
may excuse late grievance filings under some circumstances. In Gambina v. Dever, 414 a
prisoner had filed a grievance and been told that it had been referred to “the appropriate
investigative authority,” at a time when his claim was not required to be grieved under that
Circuit’s law. After the law changed in response to the Supreme Court decision in Booth v.
Churner, and his case was dismissed for non-exhaustion, he promptly filed a new grievance,
which was dismissed as untimely. The court held that the plaintiff, who “promptly and
consistently made good faith efforts” to pursue his claims and was victimized by
extraordinary circumstances, should have the benefit of equitable tolling, with the deadline
for filing a grievance extended to twenty days (the grievance time limit) after he received the
court’s decision dismissing his case. 415
Untimely filing can also be waived by prison officials in the administrative process: a late
grievance that they decide on the merits anyway satisfies the exhaustion requirement. 416
Time limits that are not made known to the prisoners cannot be enforced to bar their suits. 417
411. George v. Morrison-Warden, No. 06 Civ. 3188 (SAS), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42640, at *19
(S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2007) (unpublished) (dismissing the plaintiff’s case for failure to appeal but holding
plaintiff’s efforts had “earned him a response,” directing officials to treat a renewed appeal as timely
and respond to it); Hill v. Chalanor, 419 F. Supp. 2d 255, 259 (N.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding appeal was
“technically available,” failure to appeal resulted from “confusion or mis-communication” and not
official misconduct, directing that plaintiff’s renewed grievance appeal “shall be deemed timely” and
directing prison officials to make sure it reached its destination); Burgess v. Morse, 259 F. Supp. 2d
240, 247 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) (directing “that the IGRC Supervisor consider referral from this Court as a
mitigating circumstance” for the plaintiff’s untimely filing); see Coronado v. Goord, No. 99 Civ. 1674
(RWS), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 472, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2000) (unpublished) (dismissing case,
suggesting that a time extension for the grievance should be granted and permitting the plaintiff to
seek one).
412. For more information about the doctrine of equitable tolling, see footnotes 463–66 of this
Chapter.
413. One court has held that it should not be applied to PLRA exhaustion. Diaz v. Rutter, No.
2:05-cv-239, 2007 WL 2683532, at *7 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 7, 2007) (holding equitable tolling applies to
statutes of limitations but not grievance proceedings). Others disagree, as cited in this section.
414. Gambina v. Dever, No. 03-cv-00118-REB-BNB, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19371, at *5–6 (D.
Colo. Mar. 31, 2006) (unpublished).
415. Gambina v. Dever, No. 03-cv-00118-REB-BNB, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1937, at *9–10 (D.
Colo. Mar. 31, 2006) (unpublished); see Anthony v. Gilman, No. 1:05-cv-426, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2011, at *4–7 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 10, 2008) (unpublished) (applying equitable tolling to grievance
deadline, but ruling against prisoner on the merits). A similar equitable approach was taken by one
New York court in a case where the law at first did not seem to require exhaustion. Then the law
changed and the defendants, who had not previously raised exhaustion, sought to have the case
dismissed. The court said that the defendants had waived the exhaustion defense, and it would only let
them assert it based on the change in law if they gave the prisoner a chance to exhaust. Rivera v.
Goord, 253 F. Supp. 2d 735, 753 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“In other words, DOCS cannot have it both ways.”).
After dismissal, Mr. Rivera sought to exhaust, but his grievances were rejected as untimely. The court
held that defendants were estopped from raising exhaustion under those circumstances and that the
plaintiff showed special circumstances justifying his failure to exhaust. Rivera v. Pataki, No. 04 Civ.
1286 (MBM), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2747, at *41–42 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2005) (unpublished) (noting that
“Rivera did the best he could to follow DOCS regulations while responding to an evolving legal
framework.”).
416. Harris v. Aidala, No. 03CV467, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63443, at *5–6 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 6,
2006) (unpublished) (finding that “Even though the grievance was filed outside the stated time
parameters for the filing of grievances, it appears that the grievance was processed and denied based
upon the merits,” and therefore, the plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies); Griswold v.
Morgan, 317 F. Supp. 2d 226, 229–30 (W.D.N.Y. 2004) (finding that the untimeliness of the grievance
did not mean that the plaintiff failed to exhaust, since the defendants reached a decision primarily

If a grievance system has no time limit, delay in filing cannot bar a prisoner’s claim for
non-exhaustion; 418 an unexhausted claim should be dismissed without prejudice, and the
litigant will have the opportunity to seek to exhaust. 419
7. “Total Exhaustion”
Some courts adopted the “total exhaustion” rule, which said that if a prisoner includes
any unexhausted claims in a complaint, the whole case has to be dismissed. 420 However, that
rule is history; in January 2007 the Supreme Court held that it is not required by the
PLRA. 421 If part of your case is not exhausted, then only that part should be dismissed for
non-exhaustion.
8. Dealing with Exhaustion in Your Lawsuit
Exhaustion is an “affirmative defense,” so you do not have to put it in your complaint—
the defendants must raise it. 422 If you have in fact properly exhausted, it may be good
because of the merits of the case); see Barnes v. Briley, 420 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding claim
was not procedurally defaulted where an initial grievance was rejected as untimely but plaintiff later
“restarted” the grievance process and received a decision on the merits); Conyers v. Abitz, 416 F.3d 580,
585 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding claim exhausted where grievance was “principally rejected on the merits
with an ambiguous secondary observation that it was untimely”). In Conyers, the court in dictum said
that a claim “may” be procedurally barred if the grievance was rejected both on the merits and for
untimeliness. But see Scott v. Ambani, No. 07-10459, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15436, at *6–7 (E.D. Mich.
Feb. 29, 2008) (unpublished) (untimeliness was not waived where the merits were decided only at
intermediate stages); Cole v. Litscher, 343 F. Supp. 2d 733, 741 (W.D. Wis. 2004) (holding that a
grievance rejected on both grounds suffices to exhaust, since when the grievance process rules on an
issue, the purpose of the exhaustion requirement is satisfied; the habeas rule is different because the
purpose of habeas exhaustion is different), reconsideration denied, No. 04-C-116-C, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1955 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 1, 2005) (unpublished).
417. See Sims v. Rewerts, No. 07-12646, 2008 WL 2224132, at *5–6 (E.D. Mich. May 29, 2008)
(unpublished) (not dismissing where plaintiff failed to comply with time limit that had been changed
without notice); Lampkins v. Roberts, No. 1:06-cv-639-DFH-TAB, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22695, at *7
(S.D. Ind. Mar. 27, 2007) (unpublished) (refusing to dismiss for missing a five-day time deadline which
was not made known in the materials made available to prisoners).
418. Schonarth v. Robinson, No. 06-cv-151-JM, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13596, at *8–12 (D.N.H.,
Feb. 22, 2008) (unpublished) (finding that a grievance that was filed two years after the jail was
demolished, but otherwise in compliance with grievance rules, was exhausted).
419. Alexander v. Dickerson, No. 6:07cv423, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32866, at *17 (E.D. Tex. Apr.
22, 2008) (unpublished) (indicating that when no deadline for filing grievances exists in the jail’s policy,
the lawsuit does not have to be dismissed with prejudice, and therefore, dismissing the plaintiff’s case
without prejudice for failing to exhaust and allowing the plaintiff to refile the suit once he exhausts his
administrative remedies).
420. See, e.g., Ross v. County of Bernalillo, 365 F.3d 1181, 1188–90 (10th Cir. 2004) (requiring
dismissal of the entire action if the action contained a single unexhausted claim), overruled by Jones v.
Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218–24, 127 S. Ct. 910, 923–26, 166 L. Ed. 2d 798, 815–18 (2007) (finding
unpersuasive the arguments in favor of dimissing the entire action because it contains even one
unexhausted claim).
421. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 219–24, 127 S. Ct. 910, 923–26, 166 L. Ed. 2d 798, 815–18
(2007). Before this case, the Ninth Circuit had held that when claims were “closely related and difficult
to untangle,” the presence of unexhausted claims among them supported dismissal of the entire
complaint, but otherwise rejected total exhaustion. Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1175–76 (9th Cir.
2005). Some district courts have continued to use that analysis. See Taylor v. Calipatria, No. 04-cv-1897
DMS (CAB), 2007 WL 2712225, at *6 n.4 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2007) (stating “Lira is consistent with
Jones, although Lira provides more detailed analysis.”). You can argue that there is no basis for
preserving the Lira exception in Jones v. Bock, which rejected the total exhaustion rule entirely.
422. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211–17, 127 S. Ct. 910, 919–22, 166 L. Ed. 2d 798, 811–13
(2007). This could change. The Court suggested there might be reasons to amend the Federal Rules of

practice to put it in the complaint anyway. Then, if the defendants make a motion to dismiss,
you can simply refer to the relevant paragraph of your complaint in response, since the court
must assume that the facts you allege in your complaint are true for purposes of such a
motion. 423 If you did not properly exhaust, but you think you have a good argument that
administrative remedies were not available to you, or that there are special circumstances
that justify your failure to exhaust, it is not a good idea to put that in the complaint, since
the court may dismiss your complaint on the ground that it shows failure to exhaust on its
face. 424 In that case you are best advised to leave exhaustion out of the complaint and let the
defendants raise it. At that point you will have the opportunity to provide a fuller
explanation than is appropriate for a complaint. (Here’s the rule of thumb: if you can
truthfully write in your complaint, “Plaintiff has exhausted all available administrative
remedies for his claims,” you may as well do it. If it’s more complicated than that, leave it
out.)
Since exhaustion is not a pleading requirement, it cannot be addressed at initial
screening or by motion under 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss for failure to
state a claim, except in those cases where non-exhaustion is clear on the face of the
complaint. Motions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction are equally inappropriate, since failure to exhaust is not jurisdictional. 425
In most courts, defendants who claim you didn’t exhaust will generally have to raise that
claim in a motion for summary judgment, which requires them to submit admissible factual
evidence showing that you didn’t exhaust. 426 Sometimes defendants say they are moving to
dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure but include
factual materials like documents or affidavits, which cannot be considered on a motion to
dismiss. The court may then convert the motion to one for summary judgment. 427 Either way,
if you are faced with a summary judgment motion, you will have to respond to defendants’
factual presentation with your own admissible evidence. This evidence can consist of your
declaration or sworn affidavit 428 (not just a statement in a brief or a letter) establishing that
you exhausted, or were unable to exhaust for some legitimate reason, and/or documentary
evidence such as a final grievance decision showing you exhausted. You should also look
Civil Procedure to make exhaustion a pleading requirement, so be sure you check the current rules (the
pleading rule is Rule 8 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
423. See Amaker v. Goord, No. 98 Civ. 3634(JGK), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10905, at *12–16
(S.D.N.Y. July 15, 1999) (unpublished) (holding that a general assertion of exhaustion in response to a
motion to dismiss in the absence of a record was sufficient in defeating the defendants’ motion to
dismiss); Wright v. Dee, 54 F. Supp. 2d 199, 206 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding assertion of exhaustion made
in response to the defendants’ motion to dismiss was sufficient to survive the motion); see also Robinson
v. Dep’t of Corr., No. 96 Civ. 8290(MBM), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19600, at *11–12 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17,
1998) (unpublished) (holding allegation of lack of remedies was sufficient and alleging facts about his
assault at screening stage).
424. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 213–15, 127 S. Ct. 910, 920–21, 166 L. Ed. 2d 798, 812–13
(2007).
425. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 101, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2392 (2006).
426. See Rule 56, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Most federal courts routinely addressed
exhaustion disputes under the summary judgment rule. See, e.g., Brownell v. Krom, 446 F.3d 305, 310
(2d Cir. 2006); Brown v. Croak, 312 F.3d 109, 111–12 (3d Cir. 2002); Fields v. Oklahoma State
Penitentiary, 511 F.3d 1109, 1111–12 (10th Cir. 2007).
427 . McCoy v. Goord, 255 F. Supp. 2d 233, 251 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (discussing why such a
conversion may not fit the goals of exhaustion). Courts are not required to convert such motions to
summary judgment motions. See, e.g., Perez v. Westchester County Dep’t of Corr., No. 05 Civ.
8120(RMB), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32638, at *10 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2007) (citing Friedl v. City of
New York, 210 F. 3d 79, 83 (2d Cir. 2000), where in a question of exhaustion, the court decided the
12(b)(6) motion on the complaint alone). We are not sure why more courts do not just deny the motions
to dismiss and leave it to the defendants to make a proper summary judgment motion.
428. See Chapter 6, “An Introduction to Legal Documents,” for more information on affidavits.

critically at the defendants’ evidence and, if it does not really show that you failed to
exhaust, explain why to the court. If the defendants do not show that it is undisputed that
you have failed to exhaust and you do not have an adequate excuse or explanation, summary
judgment will be denied. That usually means that the issue of exhaustion will be determined
at trial, by the jury if it is a jury trial. 429
Some courts have taken different approaches to litigating exhaustion. Some have simply
held evidentiary hearings to determine factual disputes about exhaustion, without much
discussion of why it is appropriate to proceed in that way. 430 The Ninth Circuit has held that
failure to exhaust is “a matter in abatement, which is subject to an unenumerated Rule 12(b)
motion, rather than a motion for summary judgment.” 431 The difference that makes is that
courts (not juries) can decide disputed factual issues based on documents, without holding a
hearing, under this procedure. 432 Recently, the Eleventh Circuit adopted this approach too. 433
If you are faced with such a motion in a district court in the Ninth or Eleventh Circuit, you
should respond to it the same way you would respond to a summary judgment motion, with
declarations or sworn affidavits stating relevant facts within your knowledge, and with
documents showing relevant facts, such as the prison grievance policy, grievances you filed,
decisions or other documents you received in response, etc.
The Seventh Circuit, by contrast, has rejected the matter in abatement approach and has
held that whenever exhaustion “is contested,” the district court should conduct a hearing on
exhaustion, allowing discovery limited to exhaustion, and decide the exhaustion question;
only if the court finds the plaintiff has exhausted will the case proceed to discovery on the
merits. 434 The court did not explain whether “contested” means raised as a defense in the
answer, raised by motion, or turning on a material issue of fact and therefore not susceptible
to summary judgment. The court’s expressed concern was to avoid presentation of exhaustion
to the jury; it stated that “juries do not decide what forum a dispute is to be resolved in. ...
429. Cain v. Dretke, No. C-04-364, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42885, at *3 (S.D. Tex. June 13, 2006)
(unpublished) (holding a factual dispute over exhaustion “must be resolved at trial”); Donahue v.
Bennett, No. 02-CV-6430 CJS, 2004 WL 1875019, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2004); Kendall v. Kittles,
No. 03 Civ. 628 (GEL), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15145, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2004) (unpublished)
(holding credibility issues about access to grievance forms and whether the plaintiff was told his claim
was nongrievable “are properly for a jury.”); Branch v. Brown, No. 01 Civ. 8295 (DC), 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13218, at *33 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2003) (unpublished) (holding that “defendants must show that
no reasonable jury could fail to find in their favor on this issue” to obtain dismissal for non-exhaustion),
judgment granted on other grounds, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19170 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2003)
(unpublished); Williams v. MacNamara, No. C 00-040 SI (pr), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6936, at *7 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 17, 2002) (unpublished); see also Foulk v. Charrier, 262 F.3d 687, 697–98 (8th Cir. 2001)
(resolving exhaustion claim on appeal based on trial evidence); Moody v. Pickles, No. 9:03-CV-850
(DEP), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69148, at *18 n.15 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2006) (unpublished) (resolving
exhaustion claim after judgment based on trial evidence).
430. Peterson v. Roe, No. 05-cv-055-PB, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7847, at *4 (D.N.H. Feb. 2, 2007)
(unpublished) (finding officials credible as to failing to receive appeal, plaintiff credible as to mailing it
and as to the unreliability of the internal mail); Parker v. Robinson, No. 04-214-B-W, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 64107, at *3–4 (D.Me., Sept. 6, 2006) (unpublished) (noting plaintiff had objected to hearing in
light of finding that factual disputes precluded summary judgment); see also Johnson v. Garraghty, 57
F. Supp. 2d 321, 329 (E.D. Va. 1999) (holding that disputed claim that defendants obstructed
exhaustion merits an evidentiary hearing). But see Mitchell v. Adams, No. CIV S-06-2321 GEB GGH P,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8014, at *45–46 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2008) (unpublished) (reserving factual dispute
for trial because the court lacks time and resources for an evidentiary hearing), report and
recommendation adopted, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16202 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2008) (unpublished).
431. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003).
432. Ritz v. Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, 837 F.2d 365, 369 (9th Cir. 1988)
(per curiam), cited in Wyatt, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119–20 (9th Cir. 2003).
433. Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368 (11th Cir. 2008).
434. Pavey v. Conley, 528 F.3d 494, 497 (7th Cir. 2008).

Until the issue of exhaustion is resolved, the court cannot know whether it is to decide the
case or the prison authorities are to.” 435
The Seventh Circuit approach seems to us contrary to Jones v. Bock, 436 which held that
the PLRA exhaustion requirement does not alter usual litigation practices governed by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or general practice, and that what the exhaustion
requirement actually says may not be expanded based on judges’ policy views. 437 A rule
permitting only exhaustion-related discovery until exhaustion is resolved is not consistent
with the Federal Rules’ discovery procedures. 438 Further, the court invents a seemingly
unprecedented (at least it cites no precedent) means of addressing facts that are essential to
the exhaustion decision but are also relevant to the merits of the plaintiff’s claim: the jury
will find the facts “without being bound by (or even informed of)” the district court’s
determinations. 439 This notion of having a court make factual findings, and then ignoring
them in the remainder of the case, does not seem like a usual litigation practice to us. Of
course, if you are in a court in the Seventh Circuit, you will be bound by these rules. In other
courts, the arguments in this section may help persuade a court not to adopt the Seventh
Circuit approach.
These procedural issues will eventually have to be resolved by the Supreme Court.
Whatever the outcome, since exhaustion is an affirmative defense, the defendants will have
the burden of proving non-exhaustion as well as pleading it. 440 That means they have to show
three things:
435. Pavey v. Conley, 528 F.3d 494, 497 (7th Cir. 2008).
436. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 127 S. Ct. 910, 166 L. Ed. 2d 798 (2007).
437. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 213, 127 S. Ct. 910, 919–20, 166 L. Ed. 2d 798, 811 (2007).
438. The court qualified this holding by saying “in the ordinary case” discovery on the merits
should be put off until exhaustion is resolved, but “there may be exceptional cases in which expeditious
resolution of the litigation” calls for some merits-related discovery before exhaustion is decided. Pavey
v. Conley, 528 F.3d 494, 497 (7th Cir. 2008).
439. Pavey v. Conley, 528 F.3d 494, 498 (7th Cir. 2008).
440. Roberts v. Barreras, 484 F.3d 1236, 1240–41 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing established rules that
the burden of proving affirmative defenses is on the defendant and that burden of proof follows burden
of pleading).

(1) That there actually was an available administrative remedy for your problem. 441 The
Second Circuit has held that prisoner complaints should not be dismissed for nonexhaustion
without the court having “establish[ed] the availability of an
administrative remedy from a legally sufficient source.” 442 To do that, the court must
examine whether the remedy actually will address the kind of claim the prisoner
raises, and must look at exceptions to the remedy to be sure the claim does not fall
into one of them. 443 Defendants must also show what prisoners were required to do to
exhaust. 444
441. See Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 940 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Establishing, as an affirmative
defense, the existence of further ‘available’ administrative remedies requires evidence, not
imagination.”); Fernandez v. Morris, No. 08-CV-0601 H (PCL), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54298, at *9 (S.D.
Cal. July 16, 2008) (unpublished) (defendants who failed to show availability of remedies in segregation
were not entitled to dismissal for non-exhaustion); Ayala v. C.M.S., No. 05-5184 (RMB), 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 50692, at *7 (D.N.J. July 2, 2008) (unpublished) (defendants who failed to specify what
procedures were available were not entitled to dismissal for non-exhaustion); Ammouri v. Adappt
House, Inc., No. 05-3867, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47129, at *8–9 (E.D. Pa. June 12, 2008) (unpublished)
(defendants who provided only “minimal explanation or proof” concerning the relevant grievance
procedures did not establish non-exhaustion); Bryant v. Sacramento County Jail, No. CIV S-06-0688
GEB EFB P, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10273, at *13 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2008) (unpublished) (defendants
who showed there was a grievance system and plaintiff didn’t use it, but failed to show the plaintiff was
notified of the grievance system, did not meet their burden on summary judgment); Martino v.
Westchester County Dep’t of Corr., No. 06 Civ. 9900 (PKC), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2830, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2008) (unpublished) (defendants who failed to identify available remedies or show
that they were available to the plaintiff did not establish non-exhaustion); McCray v. Peachey, No. 06-
2794, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82444, at *16 (E.D. La. Nov. 6, 2007) (unpublished) (holding defendants
failed to show that the grievance policy they relied on was in effect at the relevant time and the
plaintiff was advised of it); Farrell v. Hunter, No. 2:06-cv-454-FtM-99SPC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
78402, at *10 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 27, 2006) (unpublished) (holding defendants who failed to place their
administrative procedures in the record had not met their burden of showing lack of exhaustion);
Rahim v. Sheahan, No. 99 C 0395, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17214, at *22 n.3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 19, 2001)
(unpublished) (holding defendants have the burden of “proving that there is an administrative process
that would be able to take action in response to [the specific] complaints—action, that is, other than
saying, ‘Sorry, we can’t do anything about it’”); Raines v. Pickman, 103 F. Supp. 2d 552, 555 (N.D.N.Y.
2000) (holding “it is [defendants’] burden to come forward to show that an administrative remedy exists
for plaintiff to pursue in reference to his claims of excessive force”).
442. Haggenmiller v. Klang, No. 06-641 DSD/AJB, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77445, at *3 (D. Minn.
Oct. 11, 2006) (noting “the defendant has not established that an administrative complaint procedure
exists”); Baker v. Allen, No. 03-2600, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27525, at *27–28 (D.N.J. Apr. 24, 2006)
(denying motion to dismiss because medical provider failed to describe grievance procedures existed for
its program); Monroe v. Fletcher, No. 7:05-cv-00288, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38664, at *5 (W.D. Va. June
12, 2006) (holding defendants did not show the existence of a “specific, available remedy” against the
U.S. Marshals Service); Jordan v. Linn County Jail, No. C04-0135-MWB, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11778,
at *5 (N.D. Iowa Mar. 10, 2006) (rejecting defendants’ argument that the plaintiff failed to appeal on
the ground that the record did not establish the existence of an appeals process) Clavier v. Goodson,
No. 4:05CV863 CDP, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30462, at *6 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 30, 2005) (holding that
defendants seeking summary judgment must submit evidence establishing what grievance procedure
was available).
443. Mojias v. Johnson, 351 F.3d 606, 610 (2d Cir. 2003); accord Anderson v. XYZ Correctional
Health Services, 407 F.3d 674, 683 n.5 (4th Cir. 2005).
In Mojias, the court criticized the lower court for relying on check marks and questionnaire
answers on a form complaint to determine exhaustion. Mojias v. Johnson, 351 F.3d 606, 609–10 (2d Cir.
2003). That harmful practice persists in some jurisdictions. See Winfield v. Soloman, No. CIV S-08-0875
WBS DAD P, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46880, at *3 (E.D. Cal. May 23, 2008) (unpublished). In Randolph
v. City of New York Dep’t of Corr., No. 05 Civ. 8820 (GEL)(MHD), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68104, at *15–
16 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2007) (unpublished), the court points out that reading such brief and ambiguous
information to show non-exhaustion is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in Jones v. Bock

(2) That you were a prisoner and therefore required to exhaust when you filed your
complaint. 445
(3) That you didn’t exhaust. Several courts have found prison officials’ affidavits and
documentation asserting a prisoner didn’t exhaust to be insufficient or even
inadmissible into evidence because they were completely conclusory (proved
nothing), 446 failed to set out how records were searched, 447 rested on hearsay, 448 or
otherwise failed to establish a failure to exhaust. 449 In several cases, plaintiffs have
produced documentation of grievances that prison officials claimed did not exist. 450
that exhaustion is an affirmative defense, as well as with the “case-specific” Second Circuit analysis of
exhaustion questions, which requires a factual record.
444. Ayala v. C.M.S., No. 05-5184 (RMB), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50692, at *7 (D.N.J. July 2,
2008) (unpublished) (where plaintiff said he was unable to pursue administrative remedies, defendants’
failure to establish their policy’s requirements made it impossible for the court to assess plaintiff’s
claim).
445. Abner v. County of Saginaw County, 496 F. Supp. 2d 810, 823 (E.D. Mich. 2007).
446. See Ray v. Kertes, 130 F. App’x 541, 543 (3d Cir. 2005) (unpublished) (holding “conclusory
statement” that “does not constitute a factual report describing the steps Ray did or did not take to
exhaust his grievances” did not meet defendants’ burden); Owens v. Campbell, No. 0:06-427-HFF-BM,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56059, at *13 n.3 (D.S.C. Mar. 26, 2007) (unpublished) (where plaintiff alleged
he never received a response to his grievance, defendants failed to meet their burden when they
provided no evidence about their procedure or what happened to his grievance), report and
recommendation adopted in part, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53946 (D.S.C. July 25, 2007) (unpublished);
Laws v. Walsh, No. 02-CV-6016, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12600, at *10 n.3 (W.D.N.Y. June 27, 2003)
(unpublished) (holding conclusory affidavit about records search and lack of appeals inadmissible).
447. Livingston v. Piskor, 215 F.R.D. 84, 85–86 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding defendants’ affidavits
that they had no record of grievances and appeals by the plaintiff were inadequate where they did not
respond to his allegations that his grievances were not processed as policy required and gave no detail
as to “the nature of the searches ..., their offices’ record retention policies, or other facts indicating just
how reliable or conclusive the results of those searches are”).
448. Donahue v. Bennett, No. 02-CV-6430, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12601, at *10 (W.D.N.Y. June
23, 2003) (unpublished) (holding counsel’s hearsay affirmation about a telephone call with grievance
officials did not properly support their motion); see Mandeville v. Anderson, No. 05-cv-92-JD, 2007 WL
4287724, at *3–4 (D.N.H. Dec. 4, 2007) (unpublished) (declining to dismiss based on a prison official’s
characterization of plaintiff’s complaints where the actual complaints were not submitted to court).
In Collins v. McCaughtry, No. 04-C147-C, 2005 WL 503818, at *2 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 28, 2005)
(unpublished), the court held that a declaration summarizing the contents of the plaintiff’s complaints
(or grievances) was admissible under Federal Rules of Evidence 1006 (Fed. R. Evid. 1006), which allows
admission of summaries of voluminous writings, etc., that cannot conveniently be examined in court.
The plaintiff disputed defendants’ claim that he had failed to exhaust and stated that certain of his
grievances did raise the issues he was suing about. The court held that his declaration was not
sufficient to establish the content of his grievances, but since the defendants had the burden of proof,
they would have to submit copies of the disputed grievances. See also Zarco v. Burt, 355 F. Supp. 2d
1168, 1174 (S.D. Cal. 2004) (holding grievance records summary admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 803(7)
and 901).
449. See Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1120 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that defendants’ affidavit
does not state whether the plaintiff exhausted his appeals and that the defendants had thus failed to
meet their burden of proving that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies);
Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., No. 1:07-cv-200, 2008 WL 1820926, at *1–2 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 4, 2008)
(unpublished) (unauthenticated documents could not be considered on a summary judgment motion);
Deemer v. Stalder, No. CV06-1775-A, 2007 WL 4589799, at *2 (W.D. La. Nov. 27, 2007) (unpublished)
(declining to dismiss where defendants’ affidavit failed to explain source of much information);
DeFranco v. Wolfe, No. 04-0230 Erie, 2007 WL 1704770, at *4–5 (W.D. Pa. June 12, 2007)
(unpublished) (holding declaration that showed only that the declarant had searched records in her
own office did not show that plaintiff had failed to file a grievance), reconsideration denied on other
grounds, 2007 WL 1810722 (W.D.Pa. June 21, 2007) (unpublished), vacated on other grounds, 2007 WL
1830770 (W.D.Pa. June 22, 2007) (unpublished); Thixton v. Berge, No. 05-C-620-C, 2006 WL 3761342,

Since exhaustion is an affirmative defense, it can be waived by failure of the defendants
to raise it, or to do so in a timely way. 451 Your claim that defendants have waived exhaustion
at *3 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 19, 2006) (unpublished) (noting that the absence of an appeal about lack of a
working toilet and sink did not establish non-exhaustion, since if he prevailed at the first stage he
would have exhausted without an appeal, and he might have filed an appeal about conditions in
general including the sink and toilet issue); Ortiz v. Kilquist, No. 03-11-DRH-PMF, 2006 WL 2583714,
at *2 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 3, 2006) (unpublished) (noting that while defendants said they had no record of
plaintiff’s grievances, his medical records indicated he was seen because of a grievance); Wigfall v.
Duval, No. 00-12274-DPW, 2006 WL 2381285 (D. Mass. Aug. 15, 2006) (unpublished) (citing
“unacceptable lack of candor and completeness” in defendants’ presentation of evidence regarding
exhaustion; they claimed to log all grievances, but evidence suggested use of force claims were not
considered grievances); Montgomery v. Johnson, No. 7:05cv00131, 2006 WL 2403305, at *11 (W.D. Va.
Aug. 18, 2006) (unpublished) (crediting evidence that policies and practices were not followed and
remedies were not in fact available to the plaintiff during the relevant time period); Blount v. Fleming,
No. 7:04cv00429, 2006 WL 1805853, at *2–4 (W.D. Va. June 29, 2006) (unpublished) (finding that
officials’ representation concerning non-exhaustion of certain claims was false); Woods v. Arpaio, No.
CV-04-3067-PHX-SRB, 2006 WL 197149, at *3 (D. Ariz. Jan. 24, 2006) (unpublished) (noting that
affidavit concerning search of grievance records showed that affiant (person swearing out an affidavit)
had searched under the wrong inmate number).
450. Baker v. Schriro, No. CV 07-0353-PHX-SMM (JRI), 2008 WL 3877973, at *5 (D. Ariz. Aug.
20, 2008); Menteer v. Applebee, No. 04-3054-MLB, 2008 WL 2649504, at *6 (D. Kan. June 27, 2008)
(unpublished) (finding material issue of fact where defendants said plaintiff filed no grievances but
plaintiff produced copies of grievances and decisions on them); Marlin v. Dube-Gilley, No. 2:07CV00052
BSM/HDY, 2008 WL 2952072, at *2 (E.D. Ark. June 24, 2008) (unpublished) (plaintiff produced
grievance form defendants said they could not find); King v. Caruso, No. 2:07-CV-39, 2008 WL 725032,
at *3 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 17, 2008) (unpublished) (declining to dismiss for non-exhaustion where
defendants claimed no record of his appeals but plaintiff produced defendants’ responses to them);
Hattrick v. FMC-Devens Staff, No. 06-40238-RWZ, 2008 WL 687410, at *5 (D. Mass. Mar. 5, 2008)
(unpublished) (not dismissing where defendants said they had no record of plaintiff’s grievance but he
produced other grievances not listed in their database).
451 . See Handberry v. Thompson, 446 F.3d 335, 342–43 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding waiver);
Anderson v. XYZ Correctional Health Services, Inc., 407 F.3d 674, 679–80 (4th Cir. 2005); Johnson v.
Testman, 380 F.3d 691, 695–96 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding the defense was waived by failure to assert it in
the district court); Randolph v. Rodgers, 253 F.3d 342, 348 n.11 (8th Cir. 2001) (finding defendants
“waived [PLRA exhaustion] argument on appeal” because it was not raised in the District Court);
Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 647 n.3 (3d Cir. 2002); Dalluge v. Coates, No. CV-06-319-RHW, 2008
WL 678647, at *3 (E.D. Wash. Mar. 7, 2008) (unpublished) (answer’s admission that “the grievance
process is completed” waived the defense); Mendez v. Kham, No. 04-CV-1030S, 2008 WL 821968, at *4
(W.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2008) (unpublished) (omission from answer waived exhaustion defense); Becker v.
Ind. State Prison/Ind. Dep’t of Corr., No. 3:04-CV-543 RM, 2007 WL 2710474, at *3–4 (N.D. Ind. Sept.
12, 2007) (unpublished) (denying defendants’ request to amend answer to assert non-exhaustion
because it was not filed until summary judgment motion was fully briefed); Brown v. Kirk, No. 9:06-
2532-JFA-GCK, 2007 WL 1377650, at *8 (D.S.C. May 8, 2007) (unpublished) (holding failure to plead
exhaustion in answer waived the defense); Webb v. Fox, No. 9:06-1780-PMD, 2007 WL 1219402, at *4
(D.S.C. Apr. 24, 2007) (unpublished) (holding failure to plead exhaustion or argue it in their summary
judgment motion waived it); Walton v. Breeyear, No. 9:05-CV-0194 (LEK/DEP), 2007 WL 446010, at *8
(N.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2007) (unpublished) (finding waiver based on failure to plead); Ludy v. Sherman, No.
06-74 Erie, 2007 WL 320831, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 2007) (unpublished) (holding that court “is
compelled to address the merits” of a claim as to which defendants disavowed an exhaustion defense);
Holland v. Goord, No. 05-CV-6295, 2006 WL 1983382, at *4 n.2 (W.D.N.Y. July 13, 2006) (unpublished)
(“Defendants have not raised [exhaustion] by way of a motion to dismiss, or in their answer, or by the
summary judgment motion now before the Court. Thus, the Court finds defendants have waived the
exhaustion requirement.”); Wright v. Goord, No. 9:03CV-0743, 2006 WL 839532, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Mar.
27, 2006) (unpublished) (holding otherwise well-taken non-exhaustion defense, raised on a summary
judgment motion, was waived by failure to plead it or raise it by motion to dismiss).
One federal court had held that exhaustion cannot be waived, and concluded it must be a pleading
requirement and not an affirmative defense. Steele v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 355 F.3d 1204, 1209

will be much stronger if you can show that their failure to raise it on time has prejudiced you
in some way. 452 The exhaustion defense, once technically waived, may be revived
procedurally 453 or in the exercise of the court’s discretion. 454 But, in one case where the
defendants sought relief from waiver because the law had changed to bring the claim within
the exhaustion requirement, the court conditioned the relief on prison officials’ permitting
the prisoner to exhaust late, since the prisoner, too, had relied on prior law. 455
(10th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 925 (2004). This decision is overruled by Jones v. Bock, which, as
discussed earlier, holds that non-exhaustion is an affirmative defense.
452. See Handberry v. Thompson, 446 F.3d 335, 343 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that plaintiffs could
have timely exhausted and returned to court had the defense been timely raised); Bonilla v. Janovick,
2005 WL 61505, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2005) (holding defense waived where it was not asserted for two
years and eight months, plaintiff would have to expend additional resources and his long-pending case
would be delayed, and further discovery and additional dispositions would be needed to determine
whether special circumstances excusing failure to exhaust were present); Thomas v. Keyser, No. 01 Civ.
5615(PKC), 2004 WL 1594865, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2004) (unpublished) (declining to allow
assertion of non-exhaustion after 21 months of delay, where plaintiff would be prejudiced by having to
re-file after investing time and effort in completing discovery); Hightower v. Nassau County Sheriff’s
Dep’t, 325 F. Supp. 2d 199, 205 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding defense waived where raised only after trial,
after 23 months’ delay and plaintiffs’ loss of opportunity to take discovery), vacated in part on other
grounds, 343 F. Supp. 2d 191 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2004). Some courts require a showing of prejudice for
waiver. See Curtis v. Timberlake, 463 F.3d 709, 711 (7th Cir. 2005); Panaro v. City of North Las Vegas,
432 F.3d 949, 952 (9th Cir. 2005).
453. See Jackson v. District of Columbia, 254 F.3d 262, 267 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding it was not
an abuse of discretion to construe a “notice” by one party that it would rely on another party’s
exhaustion defense as an amended answer properly raising the defense); Massey v. Helman, 196 F.3d
727 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that the filing of an amended complaint revives defendants’ right to raise
exhaustion and other defenses); Howard v. City of New York, No. 02-CV-1731 (KMK), 2006 WL
2597857, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2006) (unpublished) (same as Massey).
454 . See Stephenson v. Dunford, 320 F. Supp. 2d 44, 48–49 (W.D.N.Y. 2004) (allowing
amendment of answer to assert exhaustion 22 months after Supreme Court decision showed the
defense was available), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 2005 WL 1692703 (2d Cir. July 13,
2005) (unpublished); Stevens v. Goord, No. 99 Civ. 11669(LMM), 2003 WL 21396665, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
June 16, 2003) (unpublished) (allowing revival of waived exhaustion defense), on reargument, 2003 WL
22052978 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2003) (unpublished). But see Mendez v. Barlow, No. 04-CV-1030S(F), 2008
WL 2039499, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. May 12, 2008) (unpublished) (where the court has set a cut-off date for
such motions, the liberal standard for amendment of pleadings is inapplicable; waiver enforced based
on “undue delay”); Abdullah v. Washington, 530 F. Supp. 2d 112, 115 (D.D.C. 2008) (denying
amendment to answer asserting exhaustion defense five years after filing; plaintiff would be prejudiced
because discovery was closed and plaintiff might have formulated discovery differently if exhaustion
had been asserted); Thomas v. Keyser, No. 01 Civ. 5615(PKC), 2004 WL 1594865, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July
16, 2004) (unpublished) (declining to allow revival of defense); Hightower v. Nassau County Sheriff’s
Dep’t, 325 F. Supp. 2d 199, 205 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (same), vacated in part on other grounds, 343 F. Supp.
2d 191 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2004).
In Panaro v. City of North Las Vegas, 423 F.3d 949, 952 (9th Cir. 2005), the court held that
exhaustion can be raised at the summary judgment stage, even if not pled, as long as the adverse party
is not prejudiced. Accord Tyner v. Donald, No. 1:04-CV-156 (WLS), 2007 WL 842131, at *2 n.1 (M.D.
Ga. Mar. 16, 2007) (unpublished) (holding defense may be raised at a “pragmatically sufficient” time if
there is no prejudice to the plaintiff). Contra Wright v. Goord, No. 9:03CV-0743, 2006 WL 839532, at *5
(N.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2006) (unpublished); Mayoral v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., No. 98 C 50246, 2002 WL
31324070, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 17, 2002) (unpublished).
455. Rivera v. Goord, No. 99 Civ. 1683(DC), 2003 WL 1700518, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2003)
(unpublished) (stating “In other words, DOCS cannot have it both ways”). The change in law was the
Supreme Court’s decision in Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 122 S. Ct. 983, 152 L. Ed. 2d 12 (2002),
reversing the Second Circuit’s holding that use-of-force claims were not subject to the exhaustion
requirement.
Rivera’s holding has been overtaken by the broader one in Rodriguez v. Westchester County Jail
Corr. Dep’t, 372 F.3d 485, 487 (2d Cir. 2004), which held that a prisoner had acted reasonably in failing

If a court refuses to dismiss your case for non-exhaustion, prison officials cannot appeal
immediately; they have to wait until the end of the case. 456 One court has recently allowed
the defendants an immediate appeal on the question of whether discovery must be stayed
until any dispute over exhaustion is resolved. 457
9. Exhaustion and Statutes of Limitations
Most courts have held that the statute of limitations is tolled (suspended) while you are
exhausting administrative remedies, 458 meaning the time does not start to run until you get
a final administrative decision. However, not every court may accept this idea; plan on
getting your complaint in within the usual time limitation if you can.
If your case is dismissed for non-exhaustion and you want to try to exhaust and re-file
it, 459 the statute of limitations may have run by then. Ordinarily your case would be timebarred.
However, some states have statutes that toll the statute of limitations for various
reasons, including dismissals for reasons not involving the merits of the case. (State tolling
rules are applied by federal courts in civil rights actions. 460 ) For example, a New York statute
says that in an action that was timely commenced but was “terminated in any other manner
than by a voluntary discontinuance, a failure to obtain personal jurisdiction over the
defendant, a dismissal of the complaint for neglect to prosecute the action, or a final
judgment on the merits,” the plaintiff has six months to file a new lawsuit about the subject
matter of the dismissed lawsuit. 461 New York state law also appears to toll the statute of
to exhaust, and could therefore proceed without exhaustion if remedies were no longer available,
because his actions were consistent with the erroneous legal position that the Second Circuit itself had
adopted. But see Robertson v. Vandt, No. 1:03-cv-06070-LJO-GSA PC, 2008 WL 752589, at *8 (E.D. Cal.
Mar. 19, 2008) (unpublished) (dismissing for non-exhaustion in situation like Rivera where prisoner’s
grievance filed after change in law was dismissed as untimely).
456. Davis v. Streekstra, 227 F.3d 759, 762–63 (7th Cir. 2000).
457. Pavey v. Conley, No. 3:03-CV-662 RM, 2006 WL 3715019, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 14, 2006)
(unpublished), rev’d, 544 F.3d 739, (7th Cir. 2008).
458. Roberts v. Barreras, 484 F.3d 1236, 1240 (10th Cir. 2007); Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926,
943 (9th Cir. 2005); Johnson v. Rivera, 272 F.3d 519, 521 (7th Cir. 2001); Brown v. Morgan, 209 F.3d
595, 596 (6th Cir. 2000); Harris v. Hegmann, 198 F.3d 153, 157 (5th Cir. 1999). Some courts have said
or assumed that this question is determined by state tolling law. See, e.g., Harris v. Hegmann, 198 F.3d
153, 157 (5th Cir. 1999); Leal v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 254 F.3d 1276, 1280 (11th Cir. 2001); Wisenbaker v.
Farwell, 341 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (D. Nev. 2004). Others have said that the PLRA itself dictates tolling
during exhaustion. Bourguignon v. Armstrong, No. 3:06CV0259(WIG), 2007 WL 2495230, at *2–4 (D.
Conn. Aug. 28, 2007) (unpublished) and cases cited; Wright v. O’Hara, No. Civ.A. 00-1557, 2004 WL
1793018, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2004) (unpublished).
459. You may not be allowed to do this because your grievance, too, may be time-barred, unless
you persuade prison officials there is a reason to hear your late grievance. See Part E(5) of this Chapter
for more information.
460. Bd. of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483–86, 100 S. Ct. 1790, 1794–96, 64 L. Ed. 2d 440
(1980).
461. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 205(a) (1999); see Villante v. Vandyke, No. 03-0044, 2004 WL 605290, at *2
(2d Cir. Mar. 29, 2004) (noting prison officials’ statement that the statute applied to dismissal for nonexhaustion);
Rivera v. Pataki, No. 01 Civ.5179 MBM, 2003 WL 21511939, at *9 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. July 1,
2003); Richardson v. Romano, No. 00-CV-1076 (LEK/DEP), 2003 WL 1877955, at *2 n.1 (N.D.N.Y. Mar.
31, 2003). That statute also requires that service of process be completed within the six-month period.
However, courts have held that this service requirement is not binding in federal court, since state law
governing the method or timing of service of process is not borrowed along with the statute of
limitations for federal claims. Allaway v. McGinnis, 362 F. Supp. 2d 390, 395 (W.D.N.Y. 2005); Gashi v.
County of Westchester, 02 Civ. 6934 (GBD), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1215, at *27–30 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27,
2005) (unpublished).
Tolling statutes vary from state to state and may not always be helpful. For example, the Indiana
statute applies only if the case is dismissed for reasons other than negligence in prosecuting it. One
court has held that failure to exhaust constitutes negligence under the Indiana statute. The statute

limitations during exhaustion of administrative remedies. 462 In addition, some courts have
applied the doctrine of equitable tolling so that any time you spend going through an action
that is dismissed for non-exhaustion, and any further time spent in exhausting
administrative remedies after the dismissal, will not count against the statute of
limitations. 463
A second approach is to hold the statute of limitations equitably tolled during the
pendency of the dismissed action and any subsequent state administrative proceedings, as
one appeals court has done. 464 That holding was made in a case where the plaintiff had been
victimized by a change in law overruling several circuits’ holdings that damage claims need
not be exhausted where grievance systems did not provide for damages, 465 but others have
held or suggested that equitable tolling may be applicable more generally. 466
An alternative approach is for the court to decline to dismiss a case that would be timebarred
and instead to grant a stay pending exhaustion. That option may be foreclosed by case
law holding that stays are no longer permitted under the PLRA and that unexhausted claims
must be dismissed. 467 However, courts have not explicitly addressed the question of whether
there may be an exception to the dismissal rule in order to save the meritorious claim of a
plaintiff who unfairly experienced a change in the law. 468 Since a stay pending exhaustion is
not much different in practical effect from dismissal without prejudice and subsequent
reinstatement of suit, a limited exception to the dismissal rule will not do serious harm to
the PLRA’s policies, unless one assumes that Congress intended to encourage forfeitures of
meritorious cases by creating a new source of statute of limitations problems. 469
was not tolled and the claim was time-barred in that case. Thomas v. Timko, 428 F. Supp. 2d 855, 857
(N.D. Ind. 2006).
462. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 204(a) (1999) (“Where the commencement of an action has been stayed by a
court or by statutory prohibition, the duration of the stay is not a part of the time within which the
action must be commenced”). The PLRA exhaustion requirement that says you cannot file suit until
you have exhausted would appear to be a “statutory prohibition” by the New York statute’ s standards.
463. Wright v. Hollingsworth, 260 F.3d 357, 359 (5th Cir. 2001); Clifford v. Gibbs, 298 F.3d 328,
333 (5th Cir. 2002); McCoy v. Goord, 255 F. Supp. 2d 233, 253 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). Courts are more likely
to apply equitable tolling if there is some reason it would be unfair to dismiss your case as time-barred,
such as your having made a technical mistake the first time you tried to exhaust. But see Crump v.
Darling, No. 1:06-cv-20, 2007 U.S. Dist LEXIS 20000, at *45–47 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 21, 2007)
(unpublished) (denying equitable tolling to prisoner whose case was dismissed for non-exhaustion).
464. Wright v. Hollingsworth, 260 F.3d 357, 359 (5th Cir. 2001); see also Clifford v. Gibbs, 298
F.3d 328, 333 (5th Cir. 2002). See footnotes 463–66, below, for more on equitable tolling.
465. See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 121 S. Ct. 1819, 149 L. Ed. 2d 958 (2001).
466. See Wisenbaker v. Farwell, 341 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1166–68 (D. Nev. 2004) (applying
equitable tolling where prisoner’s first suit was filed before he finished exhausting; citing his diligence
in pursuing his claim, his pro se status, and his probable lack of understanding of exhaustion law);
McCoy v. Goord, 255 F. Supp. 2d 233, 253 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Courts may combine a dismissal without
prejudice with equitable tolling (when a judicial stay is not available) to extend the statute of
limitations ‘as a matter of fairness where a plaintiff has ... asserted his rights in the wrong forum.’”;
suggesting in dictum that time spent in federal court may also be tolled) (citation omitted).
467. See Neal v. Goord, 267 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2001).
468. See Cruz v. Jordan, 80 F. Supp. 2d 109, 124 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (“There is simply no evidence
that Congress intended by section 1997e(a) to remove every aspect of the district court’s traditional
equity jurisdiction” to grant stays). But see McCoy v. Goord, 255 F. Supp. 2d 233, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(holding that the PLRA removed courts’ authority to grant stays even to avoid limitations problems).
469. Compare Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 230 (3d Cir. 2004) (“Congress wanted to erect any
barrier it could to suits by prisoners in federal court, and a procedural default rule surely reduces
caseloads (even though it may be a blunt instrument for doing so.)”) (emphasis supplied), with Kane v.
Winn, 319 F. Supp. 2d 162, 220–21 (D. Mass. 2004) (“There is nothing in the PLRA’s legislative history
to suggest that Congress intended to keep meritorious claims out of court. ... Courts cannot lightly
presume that Congress has an intent hostile to our legal system’s firmly embedded commitments to

A fourth approach is for the plaintiff, after dismissal and subsequent exhaustion, to file a
motion for relief from the judgment of dismissal under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, rather than to file a new complaint. That Rule permits relief based, among
other things, upon “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect,” an argument that
it “is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application,” or “any
other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” 470 This rule has been used
as a procedural vehicle in a variety of circumstances to permit litigants who timely filed and
diligently pursued their cases to revive suits that had become time-barred after dismissal.
These circumstances include cases in which the plaintiff was unfairly affected by a change or
ambiguity in the law 471 as well as cases where the plaintiff made an error of law. 472 The fact
that a case has not yet been heard on the merits weighs heavily in favor of granting such
relief. 473 Although several courts have held that Rule 60(b) cannot be used to reinstate cases
after a dismissal for non-exhaustion, these courts have not addressed this limitations
issue. 474
It also would seem logical that a prisoner who has filed an action that will likely be
dismissed for failure to exhaust or to exhaust properly should file a second action after nonexhaustion
is cured but before the limitations period has run. After doing so, the prisoner can
move to voluntarily dismiss the first action. 475
providing access to the courts to vindicate valid human rights claims, and interpreting the PLRA as a
deliberate attempt to thwart such claims would obviously raise serious constitutional questions.”).
470. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1),(5),(6).
471. See North Carolina Alliance for Transp. Reform, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 104 F. Supp.
2d 599, 605–06 (M.D.N.C. 2000) (granting relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) “catchall” provision
so a plaintiff could file a timely attorneys’ fees motion after being misled by local rules about the time
limit; in the alternative, equitably tolling the statutory limitations period); Allen v. Shalala, 835 F.
Supp. 462, 464–65 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (granting relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) to permit timely
filing of fees motion rendered untimely by a change in the law); see also Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank,
N.A., 132 F. Supp. 2d 297, 300–01, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (granting relief under Rule 60(b)(6) to reinstate
claims of litigant whose foreign judgment on the same subject matter was ruled unenforceable;
equitable tolling applied; stating “[e]quitable tolling permits a party to sue after the passing of the
statute of limitations if the party has acted with reasonable care and diligence”).
472. See Scott v. U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, 185 F.R.D. 202, 204–06 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (relieving
plaintiff from voluntary dismissal based on erroneous belief that she could pursue her Federal Tort
Claims Act claim with other claims in state court; citing excusable neglect provision of rule),
reconsideration denied, No. 97-6529, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8240, at *1 (E.D. Pa. June 2, 1999)
(unpublished); Balik v. Apfel, 37 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1010 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (unpublished) (granting relief
under excusable neglect and “catchall” provisions to re-enter judgment so plaintiff with mental
impairment could appeal timely), aff’d, 210 F.3d 371 (6th Cir. 2000) (unpublished).
473. See Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, N.A., 132 F. Supp. 2d at 301; Scott v. U.S. Envtl.
Protection Agency, 185 F.R.D. at 206.
474. Strope v. McKune, No. 05-3344, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 2750, at *3–5 (10th Cir. Feb. 2,
2006) (unpublished) (declining to allow submission of additional evidence of exhaustion), cert. granted,
judgment vacated, 27 S. Ct. 1215 (Feb. 20, 2007); Baggett v. Smith, No. 1:05-cv-804, 2006 U.S. Dist
LEXIS 44859, at *1–3 (W.D.Mich. June 29, 2006) (unpublished); Okoro v. Krueger, No. 05-70269, 2006
WL 1494637, at *2 (E.D. Mich. May 30, 2006) (unpublished) (refusing to reinstate action after dismissal
for non-exhaustion once exhaustion was completed). Contra Siddiq v. Champion, No. 2:04-CV-89, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18062, at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 10, 2006) (unpublished) (allowing supplementation of
grievance documentation).
475. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a) concerning voluntary dismissals. While it would be preferable from
the prisoner’s point of view to file an amended or supplemental complaint after exhaustion, most courts
have held that exhaustion must be completed before the initial complaint is filed, see Johnson v. Jones,
340 F.3d 624, 627–28 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing cases, overruling prior authority), and some have explicitly
held that an initial failure to exhaust cannot be cured by filing a new complaint in the same case after
exhaustion. See Cox v. Mayer, 332 F.3d 422, 428 (6th Cir. 2003).

One court has held that courts may consider claims to be exhausted even if the
exhaustion occurred outside the limitations period. 476 This holding can only apply if the
prisoner is challenging a continuing wrong that persists into the limitations period; if the
wrong itself happened and was completed outside the limitations period, the claim is timebarred.
F. Mental or Emotional Injury
The PLRA provides:
No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a
jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional
injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical
injury. 477
A similar requirement was added by the PLRA to the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”):
No person convicted of a felony who is incarcerated while awaiting
sentencing or while serving a sentence may bring a civil action
against the United States or an agency, officer, or employee of the
Government, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody
without a prior showing of physical injury. 478
Note that this FTCA section applies only to convicted felons and not to detainees or
misdemeanants, unlike 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). So far, the courts have upheld the
constitutionality of the mental/emotional injury provision, at least as limited to damage
claims. 479
The statute refers to actions “brought by a prisoner confined in a jail,” etc., and most
courts say it does not apply to cases filed by persons who sue after they are released from
prison. 480 However, a few have disagreed. 481 Courts are divided over whether the provision
continues to apply to a person who sues while in prison and then is released. 482 If a case is
476. Harrison v. Stalder, No. 06-2825, 2006 WL 3524315, at *4 (E.D. La. Dec. 5, 2006) (holding
that the court could consider exhaustion completed more than a year earlier where the statute of
limitations was a year).
477. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (2006).
478. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(2) (2006).
479. See Davis v. District of Columbia, 158 F.3d 1342, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that giving
less damage remedies does not “directly and substantially” interfere with the constitutional right the
plaintiff seeks to enforce and survives rational basis equal protection scrutiny); Zehner v. Trigg, 133
F.3d 459, 461–63 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that the existence of immunity doctrines shows that
restrictions on damage remedies are constitutional). But see Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 747 n.20 (5th
Cir. 2002) (noting “difficult” constitutional question whether Congress can eliminate small and punitive
damages for mental or emotional injury).
480. Harris v. Garner, 216 F.3d 970, 976–80 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Kerr v. Puckett, 138 F.3d
321, 323 (7th Cir. 1998); Rose v. Saginaw County, 232 F.R.D. 267, 277 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 21, 2005)
(unpublished); Black v. Franklin County, Kentucky, No. 3:05-18-JMH, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26362, at
*12–17 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 16, 2005) (unpublished); Dill v. Oslick, No. CIV A 97-6753, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 10746, at *13–14 (E.D. Pa. July 19, 1999) (unpublished); Harris v. Zappan, No. CIV A 97-4957,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8404, at *5-6 (E.D. Pa. May 28, 1999) (unpublished).
481. Cox v. Malone, 199 F. Supp. 2d 135, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d, 56 F. App’x 43 (2d Cir. 2002)
(unpublished); Lipton v. County of Orange, NY, 315 F. Supp. 2d 434, 456–57 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). Several
recent decisions have rejected the reasoning of Cox v. Malone. See Kelsey v. County of Schoharie, No.
04-CV-299 (LEK/DRH), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17057, at *1–10 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2005) (unpublished);
Rose v. Saginaw County, 232 F. Supp. 2d 267, 277 (E.D. Mich. 2005). The appellate decision in Cox is
unpublished and non-precedential.
482. Compare Harris v. Garner, 216 F.3d 970, 973–76 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (holding that
released plaintiffs remain prisoners for purposes of § 1997e(e) as long as they brought the lawsuit at
the time they were still imprisoned), with Prendergast v. Janecka, No. 00-CV-3099, 2001 U.S. Dist.

dismissed because of this statute, dismissal should be without prejudice for refiling once the
prisoner is no longer in jail. 483
One circuit has held that the statute applies to a claim that arose before, and was
unrelated to, the plaintiff’s present incarceration. 484 The same circuit has held that in a case
removed from state court, § 1997e(e) does not apply to claims based solely on state law–
implying, but not actually holding, that federal claims filed in state court are governed by the
statute. 485 We think that is wrong. The statute says that “no Federal civil action may be
brought” 486 for mental or emotional injury without physical injury. In determining whether
the statute is retroactive, courts have held that the phrase “may be brought” ties the
statute’s applicability to the time when the case is filed. 487 If that is the case, a suit filed in
state court is not a “Federal civil action” when brought, so § 1997e(e) should not be applicable
to it under any circumstances–and certainly not when the case’s presence in federal court is
achieved by the adverse party. However, the statute has been applied to state law claims
filed in federal courts under their supplemental jurisdiction. 488
1. What Does the Statute Do?
Section 1997e(e) prohibits “action[s] ... for mental or emotional injury,” but courts have
not interpreted it as a ban on entire actions. If you have one claim for mental or emotional
injury, and another claim for something else entirely, like loss or damage to property, the
second claim can go forward. 489 Also, courts have interpreted the statute to prohibit only
awards of damages for mental or emotional injury, and most courts have held it is only a
prohibition on compensatory damages. That means you could still get nominal or punitive
LEXIS 9689, at *2–3 (E.D. Pa. July 10, 2001) (unpublished) (holding that the provision ceases to apply
when a post-release amended complaint is filed).
483. Douglas v. Yates, 535 F.3d 1316, 1320 (11th Cir. 2008), citing Harris v. Garner, 216 F.3d
970, 985 (11th Cir.2000) (en banc). As explained in the next section, dismissal of the entire action may
not be appropriate, since some courts hold that the statute restricts only compensatory damages.
484. Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 532–34 (11th Cir. 2002), rehearing denied, 331 F.3d 1189
(11th Cir. 2003). This interpretation sharply divided both the panel and the court as a whole and
produced vigorous dissents. Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 534–37 (11th Cir. 2002) (Propst, J.,
dissenting); 331 F.3d 1189, 1190–96 (11th Cir. 2003) (Barkett, J, dissenting).
485. Mitchell v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 294 F.3d 1309, 1315 (11th Cir. 2002).
486. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (emphasis supplied) (2006).
487. See Craig v. Eberly, 164 F.3d 490, 494-95 (10th Cir. 1998); Swan v. Banks, 160 F.3d 1258,
1259 (9th Cir. 1998).
488. See Hines v. Oklahoma, No. CIV-07-197-R, 2007 WL 3046458, at *6 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 17,
2007) (unpublished).
489. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 222, 127 S. Ct. 910, 925, 166 L. Ed. 2d 798, 814 (2007);
Robinson v. Page, 170 F.3d 747, 749 (7th Cir. 1999).

damages, or an injunction, for mental or emotional injury. 490 (A minority of courts has said
you cannot get punitive damages for such injury either.) 491
The applicability and effect of the statute is typically addressed on motions to dismiss
and for summary judgment. One district court has refused to decide it on motion, holding,
“The amount of damages Plaintiff may be entitled to recover is a determination reserved for
the trier of fact, not the Court on a summary judgment motion.” 492 The first circuit-level
decision to address the question explicitly held that the provision creates an affirmative
defense rather than a jurisdictional requirement, by analogy with the administrative
exhaustion requirement of the PLRA. 493 If the statute creates an affirmative defense, you do
not have to plead the existence of a physical injury in your complaint, but the district court is
free to dismiss if the complaint on its face shows that the plaintiff is a prisoner seeking
damages for mental or emotional injury without physical injury. 494 However, again by
analogy to the exhaustion requirement, courts should not be able to dismiss where the
plaintiff simply fails to plead a physical injury without otherwise characterizing his injury.
2. What Is Mental or Emotional Injury?
The courts have not completely worked out the meaning of “mental or emotional injury.”
Some courts have interpreted it narrowly; one court said, for example, “The term ‘mental or
emotional injury’ has a well understood meaning as referring to such things as stress, fear,
and depression, and other psychological impacts.” 495 Courts have also recognized a variety of
490. Hutchins v. McDaniels, 512 F.3d 193, 196–98 (5th Cir. 2007); Thompson v. Carter, 284 F.3d
411, 418 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing cases); Royal v. Kautzky, 375 F.3d 720, 723 (8th Cir. 2004); Calhoun v.
DeTella, 319 F.3d 936, 941 (7th Cir. 2003); Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 533 (3d Cir. 2003); Searles v.
Van Bebber, 251 F.3d 869, 879–81 (10th Cir. 2001); Allah v. Al-Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247, 252 (3d Cir.
2000); see Calhoun v. DeTella, 319 F.3d at 942 (noting that nominal damages “are awarded to vindicate
rights, not to compensate for resulting injuries,” and that punitive damages “are designed to punish
and deter wrongdoers for deprivations of constitutional rights, they are not compensation for emotional
and mental injury”).
One circuit has held the statute would be an unconstitutional limitation on judicial remedies for
constitutional violations if it did not allow for injunctive relief and contempt sanctions. Zehner v. Trigg,
133 F.3d 459, 461–63 (7th Cir. 1997). Other courts have held injunctive and declaratory relief remain
available without addressing the constitutional question so explicitly. See Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d
1279, 1288–89 (11th Cir. 1999), reinstated in pertinent part, 216 F.3d 970, 972 (11th Cir. 2000) (en
banc); Davis v. District of Columbia, 158 F.3d 1342, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
491. See Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 1271–72 (11th Cir. 2007) (stating that punitive damages
are precluded by PLRA because the plaintiff does not bring up physical harm); Davis v. District of
Columbia, 158 F.3d 1342, 1348 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (arguing that “much if not all of Congress's evident
intent would be thwarted if prisoners could surmount § 1997e(e) simply by adding a claim for punitive
damages and an assertion that the defendant acted maliciously,” though no physical injury occurred);
Page v. Kirby, 314 F. Supp. 2d 619, 622 (N.D. W.Va. 2004) (finding that when the plaintiff calls for
punitive damages for emotional or mental injuries only, such damages are barred by § 1997e(e)).
492. Thomas v. Thomas, No. CV506-072, 2007 WL 2177066, at *6 (S.D. Ga. July 25, 2007)
(unpublished); accord Johnson v. Raemisch, 557 F. Supp. 2d 964, 975 (W.D. Wis. May 23, 2008)
(unpublished) (stating that question of damages for censorship of newspaper was for trial, questioning
whether substantial damages could be shown); Thompson v. Caruso, No. 2:04-CV-204, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14725, at *3–5 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 27, 2008) (unpublished) (plaintiff in 1st Amendment case would
be allowed to present proof and argue for recovery of nominal, compensatory, and punitive damages for
all injuries except mental and emotional ones).
493. Douglas v. Yates, 535 F.3d 1316, 1320 (11th Cir. 2008).
494. Douglas v. Yates, 535 F.3d 1316, 1320 (11th Cir. 2008).
495. Amaker v. Haponik, No. 98 Civ. 2663 (JGK), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1568, at *22–23
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 1999) (unpublished) (also noting that requiring physical injury in all cases would
make the term “mental or emotional injury” superfluous); Robinson v. Page, 170 F.3d 747, 748 (7th Cir.
1999) (restricting the domain of the statute to suits in which mental or emotional injury is claimed.)

constitutional injuries that are neither physical nor mental or emotional, and therefore are
not affected by the statute. 496
Other courts, however, seem to assume that any violation of constitutional rights that
does not result in physical injury or loss or damage to property amounts only to mental or
emotional injury. 497 For example, in Allah v. Al-Hafeez, 498 the prisoner complained that
prison policies prevented him from attending services of his religion, and the court said he
couldn’t pursue compensatory damages because the injury for which he sought compensation
was a mental or emotional one. 499 Is not being able to go to church a mental or emotional
injury? It seems to us that freedom of religion is an issue of liberty, not just a matter of
mental or emotional injury. Many courts have similarly assumed that other sorts of
deprivations of liberty inflict only mental or emotional injury, including claims of unlawful
arrest and confinement, 500 racial discrimination, 501 and many others. 502
496. Courts have acknowledged that § 1997e(e) does not bar compensatory damages for loss of
property. Thompson v. Carter, 284 F.3d 411, 418 (2d Cir. 2002); Robinson v. Page, 170 F.3d 747, 748
(7th Cir. 1999). Other such interests that at least some courts have acknowledged are neither physical
nor emotional in nature include 1st Amendment rights, and a claim of exclusion from an alcohol
treatment program in violation of the disability statutes, see Parker v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., No.
4:01CV11, 2001 WL 1736637, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 9, 2001) (unpublished); 4th Amendment bodily
privacy claim and 8th Amendment conditions of confinement and medical care claims, see Waters v.
Andrews, No. 97-CV-407, 2000 WL 1611126, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2000) (unpublished); and freedom
from racial discrimination, see Mason v. Schriro, 45 F. Supp. 2d 709, 716–20 (W.D. Mo. 1999). See also
Lewis v. Sheahan, 35 F. Supp. 2d 633, 637 n.3 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (acknowledging right to access the
courts); Friedland v. Fauver, 6 F. Supp. 2d 292, 310 (D.N.J. 1998) (acknowledging plaintiff’s claim of
right to access the courts is not barred by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e)).
497. Worse, there is a persistent tendency in some courts simply to declare, for example: “[A] a
prisoner may not maintain an action for monetary damages against state officials based on an alleged
constitutional violation absent some showing of a physical injury.” Charles v. Nance, 186 F. App’x 494,
495 (5th Cir. 2006) (unpublished); accord, e.g., Nelis v. Kingston, No. 06-C-1220, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
86036, at *18 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 20, 2007) (unpublished) (“under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA),
recovery in prisoner lawsuits is limited where, as here, there is no showing of physical injury”); Wimble
v. Cotton, No. 1:05-CV-156, 2007 WL 756597, at *3 (D.Vt. Mar. 8, 2007) (unpublished) (“It is well
established that a prisoner may not collect compensatory damages for a constitutional violation without
showing that he has suffered a physical injury.”); Bownes v. MDOC Employees, No. 4:06CV194-P-D,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89911, at *3 (N.D. Miss. Dec. 12, 2006) (unpublished) (stating “the Plaintiff has
not alleged the requisite physical injury that must accompany any § 1983 claim for damages”).
498. Allah v. al-Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247, 247–250 (3d Cir. 2000).
499. Allah v. al-Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247, 250 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Allah seeks substantial damages for the harm he
suffered as a result of defendants' alleged violation of his 1st Amendment right to free exercise of religion. As we read
his complaint, the only actual injury that could form the basis for the award he seeks would be mental and/or emotional
injury.”) At this point, there is a very long list of decisions holding deprivations of religious rights amount only to
mental or emotional injury. See, e.g., Mayfield v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 529 F.3d 599, 605–06 (5th Cir. 2008)
(applying § 1997e(e) to claims of restricted religious exercise); Sisney v. Reisch, 533 F. Supp. 2d 952, 973–74 (D.S.D.
2008) (applying § 1997e(e) to various religious deprivations); Gill v. Hoadley, No. 9:01-CV-323 (FJS/DEP), 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 33122, at *10–12 (N.D.N.Y. May 4, 2007) (unpublished) (applying § 1997e(e) to deprivation of religious
exercise).
500. Brown v. Sudduth, 255 F. App’x 803, 808 (5th Cir. 2007) (applying § 1997e(e) to claim of
false arrest; plaintiff “sought compensatory damages for the sole alleged injury of liberty deprivation.
Having not alleged a physical injury, the district court correctly concluded that Brown’s claim for
compensatory damages must fail”); Scott v. Denzer, No. 06-5202, 2008 WL 694717, at *8 (W.D. Ark.
Mar. 12, 2008) (claim of wrongful detention before delayed initial court appearance); Brumett v. Santa
Rosa County, No. 3:07cv448/LAC/EMT, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89061, at *4–6 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 4, 2007)
(unpublished) (claim of six months’ illegal detention was not sufficient for relief because it failed to
demonstrate a physical injury); Watts v. Smith, No. 5:07cv128/MCR/EMT, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
57016, at *10–14 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 6, 2007) (unpublished) (false arrest), subsequent determination, No.
5:07cv128/MCR/EMT, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63262, at *7–9 (N.D. Fla. Aug 28, 2007); Campbell v.
Johnson, No. 3:06cv365/RV/EMT, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72146, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 3, 2006) (refusal
to accept paperwork and collateral for release on bond).

Some courts have also held that complaints of exposure to unconstitutional prison living
conditions—that is, living conditions that deny the “minimal civilized measure of life’s
necessities” 503 —are claims of mental or emotional injury barred by Section 1997e(e) unless
there are also allegations of physical injury. 504 These holdings seem inconsistent with the
Supreme Court’s statements that it is the objective seriousness of the conditions, and not
their effect on the prisoner, that determines whether they are lawful or not. 505 It is
questionable whether a claim alleging conditions that are objectively intolerable is an “action
for mental or emotional injury,” even if the conditions also (not surprisingly) lead to such an
injury. 506
501. Jones v. Pancake, No. 3:06CV-P188-H, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84309, at *6–8 (W.D. Ky.
Aug. 17, 2007) (unpublished) (allowing plaintiff to amend a racial discrimination claim to include relief
for nominal and punitive damages).
502. Jordan v. Corr. Corp. of Am., No. 4:08-CV-05 (CDL), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61846, at *3
(M.D. Ga. Mar. 11, 2008) (unpublished) (confiscation of mail); Johnson v. Georgia, Nos. 6:06-CV-49
(WLS), 7:07-cv-119(WLS), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66312, at *2–3 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 7, 2007) (unpublished)
(violation of attorney-client privilege); Charest v. Montgomery, No. 04-00687-BH-M, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 51788, at *6 n.6 (S.D. Ala. July 17, 2007) (unpublished) (strip search in presence of an opposite
sex prisoner); Robinson v. Dep’t of Corr., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50817, at *10 (N.D. Fla. July 13, 2007)
(unpublished) (stopping of mail and delaying filing of lawsuits as well as deprivation of religious
materials), report and recommendation adopted, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75961 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 12, 2007);
Ivy v. New Albany City Police Dep’t, No. 3:06CV112-P-A, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79882 (N.D. Miss. Oct.
31, 2006) (unpublished) (being held naked in an isolation cell); Caudell v. Rose, Nos. 7:04CV00557,
7:04CV00558, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10251, at *8 (W.D. Va. May 27, 2005) (unpublished) (seizure of
legal papers), report and recommendation adopted, 378 F. Supp. 2d 725 (W.D. Va. 2005); Ashann Ra v.
Virginia, 112 F. Supp. 2d 559, 566 (E.D. Va. 2000) (holding that a complaint that a prisoner was
routinely viewed in the nude by opposite-sex staff stated a constitutional claim sufficiently clearly
established to defeat qualified immunity, but was not actionable because of the mental/emotional injury
provision).
503. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S. Ct. 2392, 2399, 69 L. Ed. 2d 59, 68 (1981).
504. See, e.g., Harden-Bey v. Rutter, 524 F.3d 789, 796 (6th Cir. 2008) (barring damages for
three years in segregation); Harper v. Showers, 174 F.3d 716, 719–20 (5th Cir. 1999) (barring damage
claims for placement in filthy cells formerly occupied by psychiatric patients and for exposure to
deranged behavior of those patients); Stainbrook v. Houston, No. 4:07CV3196, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
81195, at *3 (D. Neb. Nov. 1, 2007) (unpublished) (deaf prisoner’s complaint of lack of visual alarm
system and assistive communications devices); Meyers v. Arpaio, No. CV 04-2087-PHX-JAT (HCE),
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32967, at *5 (D. Ariz. May 3, 2007) (unpublished) (crowding and resulting
violent conditions, where plaintiff was not himself injured); Lloyd v. Briley, No. 05 C 1499, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 21247, at *14 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 23, 2007) (unpublished) (confinement in strip cell with no
light and no running water); Gibson v. Ramsey, No. 99 C 5315, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1128 (N.D. Ill.
Jan. 29, 2004) (unpublished) (holding allegations of crowding, noise, bad water and lack of ventilation,
unsupported by evidence of physical injury, not to meet the requirements of the mental/emotional
injury provision); see Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 758 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that an allegation of
placement in segregation without due process might be saved from the mental/emotional injury bar by
allegations of inadequate medical care in the segregation unit).
505. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2326, 115 L. Ed. 2d 271, 282 (1991); see
Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35–37, 113 S. Ct. 2475, 2481, 125 L. Ed. 2d 22, 33–34 (1993)
(instructing as to objective assessment of environmental tobacco smoke exposure); see also Fields v.
Ruiz, No. 1:03-CV-6364-OWW DLB-P, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45981, at *20 (E.D. Cal. June 25, 2007)
(unpublished) (for 8th Amendment claims, “the issue is the nature of the deprivation, not the injury”),
report and recommendation adopted, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66671 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2007);
Armstrong v. Drahos, No. 01 C 2697, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1838, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 6, 2002)
(unpublished) (“Because the Eighth Amendment is understood to protect not only the individual, but
the standards of society, the Eighth Amendment can be violated even when no pain is inflicted, if the
punishment offends basic standards of human dignity.”).
506. A few decisions make this sort of distinction. In Nelson v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., No. C 02-5476
SI (pr), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4521, at *21 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2004) (unpublished), aff’d, 131 F. App’x

We think the right approach is that of the courts who say that “the violation of a
constitutional right is an independent injury that is immediately cognizable and outside the
purview of Section 1997e(e),” 507 completely separate from any mental or emotional injury.
Some courts have said the same thing—that “damages resulting from constitutional
violations” are “separate categories of damages” from physical or mental injuries—in cases
about unconstitutional conditions of confinement or restrictive confinement without due
process. 508
549 (9th Cir. 2005), the plaintiff complained of being provided only boxer shorts and a T-shirt for
outdoor exercise in cold weather. The court said: “Even if Nelson’s complaint does include a request for
damages for mental and emotional injury, it also includes a claim for an Eighth Amendment violation
as to which the § 1997e(e) requirement does not apply. In other words, damages would be available for
a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights without regard to his ability to show physical injury.” See
Pippin v. Frank, No. 04-C-582-C, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5576, at *4 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 30, 2005)
(unpublished) (stating that § 1997e(e) precludes claims for mental or emotional injury but not a claim
that plaintiff was “falsely confined” in segregation as a result of constitutional violations); see also
Aldridge v. 4 John Does, No. 5:00-CV-17-J, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22113, at *10 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 30,
2005) (unpublished) (stating generally that “damages resulting from constitutional violations” are
“separate categories of damages” from physical or mental injuries in case where plaintiff alleged
medical deprivations, protracted segregation, and denial of access to courts).
507. Shaheed-Muhammad v. Dipaolo, 393 F. Supp. 2d 80, 108 (D. Mass. 2005); accord Rowe v.
Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 781–82 (7th Cir. 1999) (“A prisoner is entitled to judicial relief for a violation of
his First Amendment rights aside from any physical, mental, or emotional injury he may have
sustained.”); Carr v. Whittenburg, 462 F. Supp. 2d 925, 928 (S.D. Ill. 2006) (stating that specific 1st
Amendment violations may be compensable through “general damages” or “presumed damages” even
without proof of injury, though damages cannot be recovered based on the abstract value or importance
of the right); Lipton v. County of Orange, NY, 315 F. Supp. 2d 434, 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Although §
1997e(e) applies to plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claim, a First Amendment deprivation
presents a cognizable injury standing alone and the PLRA ‘does not bar a separate award of damages to
compensate the plaintiff for the 1st Amendment violation in and of itself.’”) (quoting Ford v. McGinnis,
198 F. Supp. 2d 363, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)); Cancel v. Mazzuca, 205 F. Supp. 2d 128, 138 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(noting that plaintiff A brought this action for alleged violations of his First Amendment rights, rather
than ‘for mental or emotional injury’”).
508. Aldridge v. 4 John Does, No. 5:00-CV-17-J, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22113, at *10 (W.D. Ky.
Sept. 30, 2005) (ruling in case involving medical deprivations, protracted segregation, and denial of
access to courts); accord Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 534 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating that requests for
damages for loss of “status, custody level and any chance at commutation” resulting from a disciplinary
hearing were “unrelated to mental injury” and “not affected by § 1997e(e)'s requirements.”); Benge v.
Scalzo, No. CV 04-1687-PHX-DGC (CRP), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40782, at *28 (D. Ariz. May 21, 2008)
(allegation of psychiatric neglect were not subject to § 1997e(e)); Wittkamper v. Arpaio, No. CV 05-
2073-PHX-MHM-MHB, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37475, at *5 (D. Ariz. May 6, 2008) (allegations of
unsanitary conditions were not subject to § 1997e(e)); Davis v. Arpaio, No. CV 07-0424-PHX-DGC
(MEA), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35288, at *6–7 (D. Ariz. Apr. 23, 2008) (holding allegations of denial of
rights with respect to clothing, hygiene, legal calls, recreation, library access, medical problems, sleep
deprivation, etc., were not subject to § 1997e(e)); Cockcroft v. Kirkland, No. C 05-1080 MHP (pr), 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29465, at *19 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2008) (“the violation of a constitutional right has a
compensatory value regardless of what the physical/emotional injuries are;” plaintiff alleged exposure
to waste from back-flushing toilet); Fields v. Ruiz, No. 1:03-CV-6364-OWW DLB-P, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 45981, at *20 (E.D. Cal. June 25, 2007) (holding prisoner alleging he was confined in a cell with
an overflowing toilet for 28 days was not “seeking compensatory damages for mental or emotional
injuries;” for 8th Amendment claims, “the issue is the nature of the deprivation, not the injury”), report
and recommendation adopted, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66671 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2007); Pippin v. Frank,
No. 04-C-582-C, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5576, at *4 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 30, 2005) (stating that § 1997e(e)
precludes claims for mental or emotional injury but not a claim that plaintiff was “falsely confined” in
segregation as a result of constitutional violations); Nelson v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., No. C 02-5476 SI (pr),
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4521, at *21 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2004), aff’d, 131 F. App’x 549 (9th Cir. 2005)
(stating, in case involving inadequate clothing for outdoor exercise in cold weather: “Even if Nelson's
complaint does include a request for damages for mental and emotional injury, it also includes a claim

That approach is consistent with tort law, which is supposed to be the basis of the law of
damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 509 but which courts seem mostly to have ignored in PLRA
cases. Historically, tort law divided damages into six categories: injury to property, physical
injuries, mental injuries, injuries to family relations, injuries to personal liberty, and injuries
to reputation. 510 Under that categorization, deprivation of religious freedom or placement in
segregation without due process would injure personal liberty. They might inflict mental or
emotional injury too, but that injury would be separate and in addition to the deprivation of
liberty.
A good example of the proper distinction between mental or emotional injury and
deprivation of personal liberty is the Second Circuit decision in Kerman v. City of New
York, 511 in which the plaintiff, who had been involuntarily placed in a mental hospital,
alleged both that he had been seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment and that he had
been subjected to the tort of false imprisonment. The court treated mental and emotional
injury as a completely separate category of injury from loss of liberty, stating: “The damages
recoverable for loss of liberty for the period spent in a wrongful confinement are separable
from damages recoverable for such injuries as physical harm, embarrassment, or emotional
suffering; even absent such other injuries, an award of several thousand dollars may be
appropriate simply for several hours’ loss of liberty.” 512 This approach is illustrated in a pre-
PLRA prison case in which the plaintiff had been unconstitutionally placed in segregation as
a form of punishment, and claimed “distress flowing from the fact of punitive segregation.”
However, she didn’t submit any evidence of distress. The court therefore awarded only one
dollar for distress, but it separately awarded damages of fifty dollars a day for the
confinement itself. 513
You may not be able to get a court to look at your case this way. Some courts have
rejected this approach outright. 514 Others, however, do not seem to have recognized the issue.
If you are bringing a case about something that did not cause you physical injury, you should
make it very clear that you are seeking damages for something other than mental or
emotional injury. For example, if you are suing for being placed in segregation without due
process for a long period, and you were not physically injured as a result, do not write in your
complaint that “plaintiff seeks damages for mental anguish and psychological torture.” You
are better off with something like this:
Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages for the loss of privileges and
quality of life in his prison living conditions, and loss of the limited
for an Eighth Amendment violation as to which the § 1997e(e) requirement does not apply. In other
words, damages would be available for a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights without regard to
his ability to show physical injury”).
509. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 34, 103 S. Ct. 1625, 1629, 75 L. Ed. 2d 632, 638 (1983); Carey v.
Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257–58, 98 S. Ct. 1042, 1049, 55 L. Ed. 2d 252, 260–61 (1978).
510. Arthur G. Sedgwick & Joseph H. Beale, Jr., 1 Sedgwick’s Treatise on Damages 50–51 (8th
ed. 1891).
511. Kerman v. City of New York, 374 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2004).
512. Kerman v. City of New York, 374 F.3d 93, 125 (2d Cir. 2004).
513. Soto v. Lord, 693 F. Supp. 8, 22–23 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
514. Pearson v. Welborn, 471 F.3d 732, 744–45 (7th Cir. 2006); Royal v. Kautzky, 375 F.3d 720,
724 (8th Cir. 2004) (declining to award a prisoner who spent 60 days in segregation “some indescribable
and indefinite damage allegedly arising from a violation of his constitutional rights”). The Seventh
Circuit had held before the PLRA was enacted that “[t]he loss of amenities within prison is a
recoverable item of damages,” which can be proven by testimony concerning differences in physical
conditions, daily routine, etc.; Ustrak v. Fairman, 781 F.2d 573, 578 (7th Cir. 1986). That seemed to
suggest being subjected to restrictive or unlawful prison conditions is not merely a mental or emotional
injury, and is consistent with the argument we are suggesting. However, when this point was raised
after the PLRA, the same court said that Ustrak did not support that argument. Pearson v. Welborn,
471 F.3d 732, 744–45 (7th Cir. 2006).

liberty enjoyed by prisoners, resulting from his segregated
confinement, in that he was confined for 23 hours a day in a cell
roughly 60 feet square, and deprived of most of his personal property
as well as the ability to work, attend educational and vocational
programs, watch television, associate with other prisoners, attend
outdoor recreation in a congregate setting with the ability to engage
in sports and other congregate recreational activities, attend meals
with other prisoners, attend religious services [and whatever other
privileges you may have lost].
Plaintiff does not seek compensatory damages for mental or
emotional distress.
Plaintiff seeks punitive damages against defendant(s) [state names]
for their willful and malicious conduct in confining the plaintiff to
segregation after a hearing in which he was denied basic rights to due
process of law.
If you did suffer some physical injury from being in segregation, you should still protect
yourself (in case the court does not find your injury serious enough to satisfy the statute)
with a damages demand similar to the above that distinguishes mental and emotional injury
from other injury. After stating you sought damages for your physical injury, you would use
the same kind of damages demand as above. Just substitute “Plaintiff in addition seeks
compensatory damages for the mental or emotional distress resulting from his prolonged
confinement in segregation without due process of law” for the second paragraph in the
above example.
You would take a similar approach in demanding damages for any other kind of
constitutional violation that didn’t inflict physical injury, like deprivations of religious
freedom, freedom of speech, placement in filthy and disgusting physical conditions, etc.
There will still be some violations—for example, the denial of psychiatric treatment not
resulting in suicide or self-mutilation515 —that you will not be able to describe as deprivations
of personal liberty or of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,” 516 because they
really are about mental or emotional injury.
There is no guarantee of success if you take the above advice. Additionally, even apart
from the PLRA, intangible constitutional rights are very hard to place a dollar value on
(meaning that courts will often give up and just award nominal damages 517 ), and the
Supreme Court has cautioned that damage awards cannot be based on the “abstract
‘importance’ of a constitutional right.” 518 However, courts have made compensatory awards
for violations of First Amendment and other intangible rights based on their particular
circumstances and without reference to mental or emotional injury, 519 and you should call
515. See, e.g., Hunnicutt v. Armstrong, 305 F. Supp. 2d 175, 186 (D. Conn. 2004), affirmed in
part, vacated in part, remanded by, Hunnicutt v. Armstrong 152 F. App’x 34 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding the
district court had improperly dismissed plaintiff’s right to privacy claims due to plaintiff’s failure to
specifically mention the 9th Amendment in his complaint).
516. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S. Ct. 2392, 2399, 69 L. Ed. 2d 59 (1981).
517. Williams v. Kaufman County, 352 F.3d 994, 1012 (5th Cir. 2003) (noting frequency of
nominal awards under § 1983); see also Carlo v. City of Chino, 105 F.3d 493 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting
nominal award for denial of phone access to overnight detainee); Sockwell v. Phelps, 20 F.3d 187 (5th
Cir. 1994) (noting nominal award for racial segregation).
518. Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 310, 106 S. Ct. 2537, 2545, 91 L. Ed.
2d 249, 261 (1986).
519. See, e.g., Sallier v. Brooks, 343 F.3d 868, 880 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming jury award of $750
in compensatory damages for each instance of unlawful opening of legal mail); Goff v. Burton, 91 F.3d
1188, 1192 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1209, 114 S. Ct. 2684, 129 L. Ed. 2d 817 (2004)

this fact to the court’s attention if prison officials argue that you can only recover nominal
damages.
3. What is Physical Injury?
Prisoners must show physical injury in order to recover damages for mental or emotional
injury, but courts have not fully explained what it takes to satisfy that requirement. They
have said that an injury “must be more than de minimis, but need not be significant.” 520
However, courts disagree over where the de minimis line is drawn. One appeals court has
said that injury need not be observable or diagnosable, or require treatment by a medical
care professional, to meet the § 1997e(e) standard. 521 But a much-cited district court decision
holds that, under § 1997e(e):
A physical injury is an observable or diagnosable medical condition
requiring treatment by a medical care professional. It is not a sore
muscle, an aching back, a scratch, an abrasion, a bruise, etc., which
lasts even up to two or three weeks. … [It is] more than the types and
kinds of bruises and abrasions about which the Plaintiff complains.
Injuries treatable at home and with over-the-counter drugs, heating
pads, rest, etc., do not fall within the parameters of 1997e(e). 522
Not surprisingly, several courts have dismissed identifiable traumatic injuries as de
minimis. 523 Others have held relatively superficial traumatic injuries are actionable under §
1997e(e). 524
(affirming $2250 award at $10 a day for lost privileges resulting from a retaliatory transfer to a higher
security prison); Lowrance v. Coughlin, 862 F. Supp. 1090, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (awarding significant
damages for repeated retaliatory prison transfers, segregation, cell searches); Vanscoy v. Hicks, 691 F.
Supp. 1336 (M.D. Ala. 1988) (awarding $50 for pretextual exclusion from religious service, without
evidence of mental anguish or suffering); see also Carr v. Whittenburg, No. 3:01-cv-625-DGW, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 24565, at *7–8 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 28, 2006) (unpublished) (stating that specific 1st Amendment
violations may be compensable through “general damages” or “presumed damages” even without proof
of injury, though damages cannot be recovered based on the abstract value or importance of the right).
520. Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1997).
521. Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 628 (9th Cir. 2002); accord Mansoori v. Shaw, No. 99 C 6155,
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11670, at *11 (N.D. Ill. June 28, 2002) (stating that injury need not be shown by
objective evidence). Another court has rejected an effort to read “long-term” into the physical injury
requirement. Glenn v. Copeland, No. 5:02cv158-RS/WCS, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38466, at *11 (N.D.
Fla. June 9, 2006) (unpublished) (“Presumably ... any physical injury, even if short-term, is sufficient”
to meet the statutory threshold). But see Brown v. Simmons, No. V-03-122, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13290, at *16 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2007) (holding burns on face that “healed well” and “had no lasting
effect” did not satisfy the statute).
522. Luong v. Hatt, 979 F. Supp. 481, 485–86 (N.D. Tex. 1997). But see Pierce v. County of
Orange, 526 F.3d 1190, 1224 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Our court has rejected as overly restrictive the standard
for de minimis injuries espoused by the Northern District of Texas in Luong v. Hatt ... .”; noting that
bedsores and bladder infections resulting from inadequate accommodation of paraplegic’s disabilities
met Luong standard).
523. See, e.g., Griggs v. Horton, No. 7:05-CV-220-R, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24888, at *2–3 (N.D.
Tex. Mar. 28, 2008) (unpublished) (wrist abrasion, tenderness to rib cage were de minimis); Diggs v.
Emfinger,
No. 07-1807 SECTION P, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19140, at *9 (W.D. La. Jan. 10, 2008) (unpublished)
(allegation of an “open wound” causing “severe pain” was de minimis); Lyons v. Leonhardt, No. 3:05-
CV-400 JCM (VPC), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72919, at *1–3 (D. Nev. Sept. 27, 2007) (unpublished)
(holding loss of circulation in hands, brief pain in shoulder, and three-day pain in pelvis from use of
force was de minimis); Green v. McBride, No. 8:06-0967-CMC-B, 2007 WL 295592, at *4 (D.S.C. Jan.
29, 2007) (unpublished) (holding plaintiff who alleged he was punched in the face and thrown on his
face on the floor and sustained a bruised, swollen, and scraped cheek had de minimis injuries).

Several courts have held that the physical manifestations of emotional distress are not
physical injuries for purposes of this provision, 525 which seems contrary to the statutory
language, as the language implies that mental or emotional injury with physical injury
should be actionable. Decisions are split on the question of whether the risk of future injury
meets the Section 1997e(e) standard, 526 and also over how closely physical injury must be
connected to mental or emotional injury for the latter to be actionable. 527
524. See, e.g., Jackson v. Armstrong, No. 1:05cv798, 2008 WL 3876604, at *5–6 (S.D. Ohio Aug.
20, 2008) (unpublished) (edema of forearm and pain from repeated baton blows were “palpable physical
injury” satisfying § 1997e(e)); Sanders v. Day, No. 5:06-CV-280(HL), 2008 WL 748170, at *2 (M.D. Ga.
Mar. 19, 2008) (unpublished) (holding allegation of kicking and using pepper spray on a handcuffed
suspect was not de minimis); Lathon v. Washbourne, No. 06-5133, 2007 WL 2710429, at *8 (W.D. Ark.
Sept. 13, 2007) (unpublished) (holding a bleeding leg, swollen testicles, and injuries to back and neck
satisfied the physical injury requirement); Edwards v. Miller, No. 06-cv-00933-MSK-MEH, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 22639, at *4 (D. Colo. Mar. 28, 2007) (unpublished) (allegation of being punched in the face
and bitten on the arm over a 10-minute period, causing damage to forehead and facial injuries, and
leaving a lasting effect in the form of severe headaches, is more than de minimis); Cotney v. Bowers,
No. 2:03-cv-1181-WKW (WO), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69523, at *25 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 26, 2006)
(unpublished) (holding bruised ribs that took weeks to heal could be found not de minimis).
525. Davis v. District of Columbia, 158 F.3d 1342, 1349 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Darvie v. Countryman,
No. 9:08-CV-0715 (GLS/GHL), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52797, at *23 (N.D.N.Y. July 10, 2008)
(unpublished) (characterizing “anxiety, depression, stress, nausea, hyperventilation, headaches,
insomnia, dizziness, appetite loss, weight loss, etc.,” as “essentially emotional in nature”); McCloud
Minifield v. Butikofer, 298 F. Supp. 2d 900, 905 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (“Physical symptoms that are not
sufficiently distinct from a plaintiff's allegations of emotional distress do not qualify as a prior showing
of physical injury.”); Todd v. Graves, 217 F. Supp. 2d 958, 960 (S.D. Iowa 2002) (holding that
allegations of stress-related aggravation of hypertension, dizziness, insomnia and loss of appetite were
not actionable); McGrath v. Johnson, 67 F. Supp. 2d 499, 508 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (finding that a preexisting
skin condition, which was aggravated by emotional trauama, was not an actionable physical injury).
But see Montemayor v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 02-1283 (GK), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18039, at *17
(D.D.C. Aug. 25, 2005) (unpublished) (holding that a heart attack resulting from physical and
emotional stress caused by treatment in prison would meet the physical injury requirement); Perkins v.
Ark. Dep’t of Corr., 165 F.3d 803, 807–08 (8th Cir. 1999) (remanding question of whether an allegation
of mental anguish so severe that it caused physical deterioration and would shorten plaintiff's life was
sufficient under § 1997e(e).)
526. Compare Zehner v. Trigg, 133 F.3d 459 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding exposure to asbestos
without claim of damages for physical injury is not actionable); Kutch v. Valdez, No. 3-06-CV-1092-H,
2006 WL 3487657, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 4, 2006) (holding potential future complications of untreated
high blood pressure are not physical injury under statute); Henderson v. Sheahan, 196 F.3d 839, 847
(7th Cir. 1999) (prisoner suing over second-hand tobacco smoke); see also Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S.
25, 35, 113 S. Ct. 2475, 2481, 125 L. Ed. 2d 22, 33 (1993) (recognizing the possibility of an 8th
Amendment claim based on future serious health problems because of a prison smoking policy); Pack v.
Artuz, 348 F. Supp. 2d 63, 74 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding proof of asbestos exposure posing a serious
risk of harm would establish an 8th Amendment violation entitling the plaintiff to nominal damages
regardless of present injury); see also Robinson v. Page, 170 F.3d 747, 749 (7th Cir. 1999) (leaving open
question of whether required physical injury “must be a palpable, current injury (such as lead
poisoning) or a present condition not injurious in itself but likely to ripen eventually into a palpable
physical injury”).
527. Compare Phillips v. Steinbeck, No. 06-cv-02569-WDM-KLM, 2008 WL 821789, at *21 (D.
Colo. Mar. 26, 2008) (unpublished) (plaintiff who alleged he was labelled an informant by staff and
assaulted by prisoners in retaliation for complaints about staff could seek damages for both 8th
Amendment and access to courts claims based on injuries from assault), and Noguera v. Hasty, No. 99
Civ. 8786 (KMW)(AJP), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2458, at *14–15 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2001) (unpublished)
(holding that allegations of retaliation for reporting a rape by an officer were closely enough related to
the rape that a separate physical injury need not be shown), with Purvis v. Johnson, 78 F. App’x 377,
380 (5th Cir. 2003) (unpublished) (holding that a prisoner alleging assault by a staff member could not
also pursue a claim for obstruction of the post-assault investigation); Johnson v. Dallas County Sheriff
Dep’t, No. 3:08-CV-0423-G, 2008 WL 2378269, at *3 (N.D. Tex. June 6, 2008) (unpublished) (alleged

A variety of injuries short of visible damage to body parts have been held to satisfy
Section 1997e(e). Most courts, but not all, have held that sexual assault is a physical
injury. 528 Other injuries that at least some courts have held satisfy the physical injury
requirement include loss of consciousness; 529 bodily disturbances resulting from medication
withdrawal, overdose or error; 530 the consequences of failure to treat illness or injury, both
immediate 531 and longer-term or prospective; 532 denial of adequate food; 533 food
sexual assault was a physical injury, but conduct of officials after the assault did not inflict injury and
was not actionable); Slusher v. Samu, No. 04-cv-02187-PSF-BNB, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84765, at *37
(D. Colo. Nov. 21, 2006) (unpublished) (holding that a prisoner with multiple claims could only recover
damages for the one claim as to which he alleged physical injury).
528. See Liner v. Goord, 196 F.3d 132, 135 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that “alleged sexual assaults,”
also described as “intrusive body searches,” “qualify as physical injuries as a matter of common sense”
and “would constitute more than de minimis injury”); Duncan v. Magelessen, No. 07-cv-01979-MSK-
MEH, 2008 WL 2783487, at *2 (D. Colo. July 15, 2008) (unpublished) (“unwanted sexual contact, alone,
is a physical injury for which there may be compensation”); Kemner v. Hemphill, 199 F. Supp. 2d 1264,
1270 (N.D. Fla. 2002) (holding that sexual assault, “even if considered to be de minimis from a purely
physical perspective, is plainly ‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind.’ Surely Congress intended the
concept of ‘physical injury’ in § 1997e(e) to cover such a repugnant use of physical force.”). But see Jones
v. Gudmundson, No. 06-3838 PJS/FLN, 2008 WL 651994, at *3 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2008) (unpublished)
(holding male prisoner’s complaint of sexual relationship with female employee was precluded absent
physical injury; nothing indicates the relationship was nonconsensual or the plaintiff suffered any nonphysical
harm); Hancock v. Payne, No. 1:03cv671-JMR-JMR,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1648, at *3, 7 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 4, 2006) (unpublished) (holding prisoners who
alleged they were “sexually battered ... by sodomy” did not satisfy § 1997e(e)). Non-physical sexual
harassment is, of course, not physical injury. Gillespie v. Smith, No. C07-3033-LRR, 2007 WL 2002724,
at *1, 4 (N.D. Iowa July 3, 2007) (unpublished).
529. Waggoner v. Comanche County Detention Ctr., No. CIV-06-700-C, 2007 WL 2068661, at *4
(W.D. Okla. July 17, 2007) (holding plaintiff rendered unconscious by a shock shield after being peppersprayed,
shaken, and punched sufficiently supported a showing of physical injury).
530. Scarver v. Litscher, 371 F. Supp. 2d 986, 997–98 (W.D. Wis. 2005) (citing self-inflicted
overdose of Thorazine as well as self-inflicted razor cut in holding prisoner with mental illness had
alleged physical injury), aff’d, 434 F.3d 972 (7th Cir. 2006); Ziemba v. Armstrong, No.
3:02CV2185(DJS), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 432, at *7 (D. Conn. Jan. 14, 2004) (unpublished) (holding
that allegation of withdrawal, panic attacks, pain similar to a heart attack, difficulty breathing and
profuse sweating, resulting from withdrawal of psychiatric medication, met the physical injury
requirement). But see Johnson v. Rawers, No. CV F 03 6241 AWI SMS P, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21534,
at *12–13 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2008) (unpublished) (claim that medications were administered in a
crushed form, causing plaintiff to feel depressed, anxious, nauseous, and paranoid, did not satisfy the
statute), report and recommendation adopted, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44769 (E.D. Cal. May 27, 2008)
(unpublished); Chatham v. Adcock, No. 3:05-CV-0127-JTC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72523, at *48–49
(N.D. Ga. Sept. 28, 2007) (unpublished) (holding hallucinations, anxiety, and nightmares resulting from
denial of Xanax did not meet physical injury requirement).
531. See Munn v. Toney, 433 F.3d 1087, 1089 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding claim of headaches,
cramps, nosebleeds, and dizziness resulting from deprivation of blood pressure medication “does not fail
... for lack of physical injury”); DeRoche v. Funkhouse, No. CV 06-1428-PHX-MHM (MEA), 2008 U.S.
Dist LEXIS 31166, at *17–19 (D. Ariz. Mar. 28, 2008) (unpublished) (further liver damage and daily
pain, swelling, nausea and hypertension from lack of treatment for Hepatitis C satisfied the physical
injury requirement); Boles v. Dansdill, No. 05-cv-01661-PSF-CBS, 2007 WL 2770473, at *21 (D. Colo.
Sept. 20, 2007) (holding allegation that denial of medical care made plaintiff “physically ill” satisfied
physical injury standard at pleading stage); Clifton v. Eubank, 418 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1248 (D. Colo.
2006) (addressing “prolonged” pain attendant upon labor and stillbirth), on reconsideration on other
grounds, 2006 WL 893600 (D. Colo. Apr. 5, 2006) (unpublished); Fleming v. Clarke, No. 4:03CV3307,
2005 WL 2170093, at *2 (D. Neb. Sept. 6, 2005) (unpublished) (holding swelling, pain, and deterioration
resulting from denial of prescribed knee brace met physical injury requirement). But see Perez v. U.S.,
No. 1:04-CV-1944, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42906, at *5–7 (M.D. Pa. May 30, 2008) (unpublished)
(holding that temporary dizziness, headaches, weakness, back pain, and nausea resulting from an
asthma attack, which did not require medical attention, were de minimis); Tuft v. Chaney, No. H-06-

contamination or poisoning; 534 denial of exercise; 535 exposure to harmful substances; 536
infliction of pain or illness through extreme conditions of confinement, 537 physical abuse, 538 or
2529, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83817, at *7–8 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 9, 2007) (unpublished) (holding complaints
of “generalized ‘fatigue’ and ‘stress’” resulting from MRSA and Hepatitis C were not physical injuries);
Giddings v. Valdez, No. 3:06-CV-2384-G, 2007 WL 1201577, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 24, 2007)
(unpublished) (holding pain from two months’ lack of treatment for a degenerative joint disease did not
satisfy the physical injury requirement).
532. Young v. Beard, No. 06-160, 2007 WL 1549453, at *4 (W.D. Pa. May 22, 2007) (unpublished)
(holding allegation that plaintiff sought damages for present and future injury from denial of
cholesterol medication, and of testing of blood pressure, diabetes, and cholesterol more often than every
six months, sufficed at the pleading stage), vacated on other grounds, 2007 WL 2012604 (W.D. Pa. July
3, 2007) (unpublished); Mejia v. Goord, No. 9:03-CV-124, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32394, at *16–17
(N.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2005) (unpublished) (denying summary judgment where prisoner was denied a lowfat
diet for potentially debilitating coronary condition). But see Cotter v. Dallas County Sheriff, No.
3:05-CV-2225-H, 2006 WL 1652714, at *3–4 (N.D. Tex. June 15, 2006) (holding staphylococcus exposure
and a “dormant” staph infection were de minimis).
533. Williams v. Humphreys, No. CIV A CV504-053, 2005 WL 4905109, at *7 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 13,
2005) (unpublished) (holding allegation of 12-pound weight loss, abdominal pain, and nausea resulting
from denial of pork substitute at meals sufficiently alleged physical injury). But see Davis v. District of
Columbia, 158 F.3d 1342, 1394 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding weight loss resulting from disclosure of HIVpositive
status did not meet the physical injury standard); Linehan v. Crosby, No. 4:06-cv-00225-MP-
WCS, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63738, at *5 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 20, 2008) (unpublished) (weight loss from
denial of a kosher diet did not meet requirement); Green v. Padula, No. 9:07-0028-CMC-GCK, 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87038, at *5–9 (D.S.C., Sept. 25, 2007) (unpublished) (holding three-day denial of food
and several hours’ restraint during strip cell placement did not meet the physical injury requirement),
report and recommendation rejected in part on other grounds, No. 9:07-0028-CMC-GMK, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 85370 (D.S.C., Nov. 19, 2007) (unpublished).
534 . Bond v. Rhodes, No. 2:05CV241, 2006 WL 1617892, at *3 (W.D. Pa. June 8, 2006)
(unpublished) (holding allegation of serious diarrhea resulting from food tampering satisfied the
requirement at the pleading stage); Gil v. U.S., No. 5:03-cv-198-Oc-10GRJ, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8155,
at *8 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 17, 2006) (unpublished) (awarding “intangible damages for pain and suffering,
inconvenience, and loss of capacity for enjoyment of life” to prisoner who suffered food poisoning from
tainted food). But see Mayes v. Travis State Jail, No. A-06-CA-709-SS, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47317, at
*11–12 (W.D. Tex. June 29, 2007) (unpublished) (holding diarrhea allegedly caused by spoiled food was
de minimis).
535. Williams v. Goord, 111 F. Supp. 2d. 280, 291 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding allegation of 28day
denial of exercise sufficiently alleged physical injury).
536. Smith v. Leonard, No. 06-41290, 244 F. App’x 583, 584 (5th Cir. 2007) (unpublished)
(stating headaches, sinus problems, trouble breathing, blurred vision, irritated eyes, and fatigue,
allegedly from exposure to toxic mold, might satisfy § 1997e(e) standard); Enigwe v. Zenk, No. 03-CV-
854 (CBA), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66022, at *15–20 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2006) (unpublished) (declining
to dismiss emotional injury claims in light of allegation of exposure to environmental tobacco smoke
resulting in dizziness, uncontrollable coughing, lack of appetite, runny eyes and high blood pressure).
But see Thompson v. Joyner, No. 5:06-CT-3013-FL, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96515, at *14–15 (E.D.N.C.
May 29, 2007) (unpublished) (pepper spraying was de minimis), aff’d, 251 F. App’x 826 (4th Cir. 2007);
Hogg v. Johnson, No. 2:04-CV-0024, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 851, at *3, 7 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 21, 2005)
(unpublished) (dismissing allegation that plaintiff was “gassed three times for asking for a mattress
and standing up for his rights” for lack of physical injury).
537. Rinehart v. Alford, No. 3:02-CV-1565-R, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1789, at *4–5 (N.D. Tex.
Mar. 3, 2003) (unpublished) (holding that severe headaches and back pain, attributed by the jail nurse
to bright 24-hour illumination and sleeping on a narrow bench, sufficiently alleged physical injury);
Perez G. v. Lambert, No. Civ. 01-107-HU, 2001 WL 34736218, at *3 (D. Or. Sept. 7, 2001) (holding that
allegation of cramps, vomiting, constipation, compacted bowels and anal bleeding, resulting from
confinement in conditions so filthy the plaintiff could not eat and his subsequent denial of bathroom
breaks while in restraints met the physical injury standard).
538. Payne v. Parnell, No. 05-20687, 246 F. App’x 884, 887–88 (5th Cir. 2007) (unpublished)
(holding that being jabbed with a cattle prod is not de minimis); Lawson v. Hall, No. 2:07-00334, 2008

denial of medical care; 539 and stillbirth or miscarriage. 540 However, there are plenty of cases
that seem to involve similar or equally serious conditions but come out the other way, and
often it is hard to see why. 541 Some courts have stated explicitly that the alleged infliction of
severe physical pain does not satisfy the statute. 542 It is conceivable that outright torture
may not be compensable as long as it is inflicted with sufficient care to leave no marks. 543 In
addition, some courts have dismissed visible bodily injuries as de minimis. 544
WL 793635, at *5–7 (S.D. W.Va. Mar. 24, 2008) (unpublished) (declining to apply § 1997e(e) to
allegation of “severe pain” from being kneed); Zamboroski v. Karr, No. 04-73194, 2007 WL 541921, at
*5 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 16, 2007) (unpublished) (holding severe pain resulting from lack of mobility during
nine months in restraints, along with rashes and scarring on his arms and inability to raise his arms
over his head when released, were not de minimis). But see Dixon v. Toole, 225 F. App’x 797, 799 (11th
Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (unpublished) (holding “mere bruising” from 17.5 hours in restraints was de
minimis; prisoner actually complained of “welts”).
539. Clifton v. Eubank, 418 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1248 (D. Colo. 2006) (addressing “prolonged” pain
attendant upon labor and stillbirth), on reconsideration on other grounds, No. 00-CV-2555-JLK, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19378 (D. Colo. Apr. 5, 2006) (unpublished).
540. Clifton v. Eubank, 418 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1245–51 (D. Colo. 2006) (holding that losing one’s
child and the pain attendant upon labor and stillbirth both separately meet the physical injury
standard).
541. See Darvie v. Countryman, No. 9:08-CV-0715, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52797, at *23–24
(N.D.N.Y. July 10, 2008) (unpublished) (characterizing “anxiety, depression, stress, nausea,
hyperventilation, headaches, insomnia, dizziness, appetite loss, weight loss, etc.,” as “essentially
emotional in nature”); Trevino v. Johnson, No. 9:05cv171, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40438, at *13–14
(E.D. Tex. Dec. 8, 2005) (unpublished) (holding a prisoner who was struck twice in the face and had his
fingers pulled back had de minimis injury where he sustained only an abrasion to the forehead); Abney
v. Valdez, No. 3-05-CV-1645-M, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44390, at *6–7 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 27, 2005)
(unpublished) (holding more frequent urination, near-daily migraine headaches, and itchiness and
watery eyes did not meet the physical injury requirement); Mitchell v. Horn, No. 98-4742, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 8139, at *3–4 (E.D. Pa. May 5, 2005) (unpublished) (dismissing complaint of “severe
stomach aches, severe headaches, severe dehydration, loss of weight, severe itching, due to the inability
to take his prescribed medication, nausea, physical weakness and blurred vision,” stating that such
“transitory” injuries were not contemplated by the PLRA).
542. Calderon v. Foster, No. 5:05-cv-00696, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24505, at *27 (S.D. W.Va.
Mar. 30, 2007) (unpublished) (pain, standing alone, is de minimis), aff’d, 264 F. App’x 286 (4th Cir.
2008) (unpublished); Ladd v. Dietz, No. 4:06cv3265, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3782, at *1–4 (D. Neb. Jan.
17, 2007) (unpublished) (holding pain resulting from placing ear medication in plaintiff’s eye was “not
enough” to constitute physical injury); Clifton v. Eubank, 418 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1246 (D. Colo. 2006);
Olivas v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 408 F. Supp. 2d 251, 254, 259 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (dismissing as de minimis
pain reported as 10 on a scale of 1 to 10, resulting from delay in treatment of broken teeth with exposed
nerve).
543. For example, in Jarriett v. Wilson, 14 F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 2005), a prisoner complained that
he was forced to stand in a two-and-a-half-foot square cage for about 13 hours, naked for the first eight
to 10 hours, unable to sit for more than 30 or 40 minutes of the total time, in acute pain, with clear,
visible swelling in a portion of his leg that had previously been injured in a motorcycle accident, during
which time he repeatedly asked to see a doctor. Jarriett v. Wilson, 14 F.3d 634, 644 (6th Cir. 2005)
(dissenting opinion). The appeals court affirmed the dismissal of his claim as de minimis on the ground
that the plaintiff did not complain about his leg upon release or shortly thereafter when he saw medical
staff. Jarriett v. Wilson, 14 F.3d 634, 643. The decision was initially published, but Westlaw has
removed the opinion from its original citation and replaced it with a note stating that it was
“erroneously published.” Jarriett v. Wilson, 414 F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 2005).
Jarriett contrasts with Payne v. Parnell, No. 05-20687, 246 F. App’x 884 (5th Cir. 2007)
(unpublished), in which the court, referring both to § 1997e(e) and the 8th Amendment, held that being
jabbed with a cattle prod was not de minimis, despite the lack of long-term damage, in part because it
was “calculated to produce real physical harm.” Payne v. Parnell, No. 05-20687, 246 F. App’x 884, 889
(5th Cir. 2007).
544. See, e.g,, Gibson v. Galaza, No. CVF00 5381 AWI WMW P, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21679, at
*27–28 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2006) (unpublished) (holding multiple abrasions, a small cut on lip, and a

The problem with most of these decisions is they make no attempt to say generally what
“physical injury” means, other than “more than de minimis.” One exception is a district court
decision that cited dictionary definitions of “physical” as “of or relating to the body,” and of
“injury” as “an act that damages, harms, or hurts; an unjust or undeserved infliction of
suffering or harm; wrong,” and held that a reasonable jury could find that the statute was
satisfied by exposure to noxious odors, including those of human wastes, and “dreadful”
conditions of confinement (including inability to keep clean while menstruating, denial of
clothing except for a paper gown, and exposure to ogling (staring) by male prison staff and
construction workers). 545 This case stretches the language of the statute pretty far, but other
courts have so far failed to put forward any alternative approach that is helpful in assessing
cases of physiological disturbances, disease processes, infliction of pain without visible
trauma, etc.
There is an approach to this problem that has been overlooked. A federal statute makes
it a crime for someone acting under color of state law to deprive another person of federal
civil rights and requires a showing of “bodily injury” before someone who violates the statute
can be sentenced to more than one year in prison. 546 Bodily injury is not defined in the
statute. But, several other federal criminal statutes define that term as meaning “(A) a cut,
abrasion, bruise, burn, or disfigurement; (B) physical pain; (C) illness; (D) impairment of a
function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty; or (E) any other injury to the body, no
matter how temporary.” 547 Several circuits have adopted that definition for purposes of
Section 242, 548 and there is no reason why it should not be applied under Section 1997e(a) as
well. 549 As far as we know, no court has yet considered this idea. If you are faced with an
claim that your injury isn’t severe enough to satisfy the PLRA, but it falls within the
bruised right knee are de minimis); Wallace v. Brazil, No. 7:04-CV-187-R, 2005 WL 4813518, at *1
(N.D. Tex. Oct. 10, 2005) (holding a knot on the head allegedly inflicted by an officer with an iron bar
was de minimis). Contra Cotney v. Bowers, No. 2:03-cv-1181-WKW (WO), 2006 U.S. Dist LEXIS 69523,
at *25 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 26, 2006) (unpublished) (holding bruised ribs that took weeks to heal could be
found not de minimis); Hardin v. Fullenkamp, No. 4-99-CV-80723, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22335, at
*19–21 (S.D. Iowa June 22, 2001) (unpublished) (holding evidence prisoner was cut and bruised and
other prisoners’ affidavits that they saw him beaten and later limping met the standard).
545. Waters v. Andrews, No. 97-CV-407, 2000 WL 1611126, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2000)
(unpublished). But see Alexander v. Tippah County, Miss., 351 F.3d 626, 631 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding
that prisoner who vomited as a result of exposure to noxious odors in a filthy holding cell full of raw
sewage suffered only a de minimis injury, if any); Jennings v. Weberg, No. 2:06-CV-235, 2007 WL
80875, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 8, 2007) (unpublished) (holding a prisoner who was routinely spat upon
and had urine thrown on him by an HIV-positive prisoner alleged only mental or emotional injury);
Parter v. Valone, No. 06-10561, 2006 WL 3086900, at *2–3 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 30, 2006) (unpublished)
(holding a prisoner who was denied the use of a bathroom and urinated on himself suffered only mental
or emotional injury). Cf. Glaspy v. Malicoat, 134 F. Supp. 2d 890, 894–95 (W.D. Mich. 2001) (treating
denial of toilet access to a non-prisoner, with predictable results, as a deprivation of liberty).
546. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2006) (providing “if bodily injury results from the acts committed in
violation of this section ... [the defendant] shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
ten years, or both”).
547. 18 U.S.C. § 831(f)(5) (2006); accord 18 U.S.C. § 1365(g)(4) (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 1515(a)(5)
(2006); 18 U.S.C. § 1864(d)(2) (2006).
548. See the following cases that have applied the definition of bodily injury set out in Section
242: United States v. Gonzales, 436 F.3d 560, 575 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Bailey, 405 F.3d
102, 111 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v. Myers, 972 F.2d 1566, 1572 (11th Cir. 1992).
Gonzales excludes use of force cases from this holding because of other 5th Circuit principles concerning
such cases.
549. “When Congress uses, but does not define a particular word, it is presumed to have adopted
that word's established meaning.” United States v. Myers, 972 F.2d 1566, 1572 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing
Davis v. Mich. Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 806, 109 S. Ct. 1500, 1503, 103 L. Ed. 2d 891, 899
(1989)). Although § 1997e(e) uses the word “physical” rather than “bodily,” it is hard to see what real
difference that makes.

statutory definition of bodily injury, you should point these statutes out to the court and
argue there cannot be much difference between “bodily” and “physical” injury.
G. Attorneys’ Fees
The PLRA limits the attorneys’ fees prisoners can recover compared to other civil rights
litigants. Most of the limitations do not affect prisoners directly, since prisoners proceeding
pro se cannot recover attorneys’ fees, but they will affect the ability of prisoners to get
lawyers to represent them.
Fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 550 are barred in “any action brought by a prisoner” 551 except
when the fees are “directly and reasonably incurred in proving an actual violation of the
plaintiff’s rights” under a statute that allows fees to be awarded. 552 It is unclear whether this
provision bars fee awards in cases that are settled, rather than cases that go to trial. Several
courts have held injunctive proceedings that are settled may support an award of fees if
there are findings of legal violation or a record that supports such findings. 553 Fees may also
be awarded if they are “directly and reasonably incurred in enforcing the relief ordered for
the violation.” 554 The statute says that fees must be “proportionately related to the court
ordered relief for the violation.” 555 It does not say in what proportion. However, defendants
may be required to pay fee awards of up to 150 percent of any damages awarded—but no
more. 556
550. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 is the statute that authorizes attorneys’ fees in actions under 42 U.S.C. §
1983. In cases where fees are based on some other law, the PLRA fees restrictions do not apply. See,
e.g., Armstrong v. Davis, 318 F.3d 965, 973–74 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that fees in Americans with
Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act suits are not governed by the PLRA fees limitations).
551. For purposes of these provisions, ex-prisoners are not prisoners, and a case filed after the
plaintiff’s release is not governed by the PLRA fees provisions. Greig v. Goord, 169 F.3d 165, 167 (2d
Cir. 1999); Doe By and Through Doe v. Washington County, 150 F.3d 920, 924 (8th Cir. 1998) (PLRA
provisions about attorney’s fees do not apply to a plaintiff who was not a prisoner at the time of filing
his suit). The attorneys’ fees provisions are not limited to cases about prison conditions. Robbins v.
Chronister, 435 F.3d 1238, 1241–44 (10th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (applying PLRA attorney’s fees
restrictions to a case about events before prisoner’s incarceration); Jackson v. State Bd. of Pardons and
Paroles, 331 F.3d 790, 794–95 (11th Cir. 2003) (applying PLRA restrictions to case about parole
eligibility hearings and the length of his confinement, and not about prison conditions).
552. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1)(A) (2006).
553. See Laube v. Allen, 506 F. Supp. 2d 969, 979–80 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 31, 2007) (holding that fees
may be awarded for injunctive settlements to the extent they satisfy the PLRA’s “need-narrownessintrusiveness”
requirement and the fees were “directly and reasonably incurred” in obtaining it); Watts
v. Dir. of Corr., No. CV F-03-5365 OWW DLB P, 2007 WL 1100611, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2007)
(unpublished) (awarding fees for “proving an actual violation” notwithstanding that case was settled),
amended on reconsideration on other grounds, 2007 WL 1752519 (E.D. Cal. June 15, 2007)
(unpublished); Lozeau v. Lake County, Mont., 98 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1168 n.1, 1170 (D. Mont. 2000)
(“Defendants cannot settle a case, promise reform or continued compliance, admit the previous
existence of illegal conditions, admit that Plaintiffs’ legal action actually brought the illegal conditions
to the attention of those in a position to change them and subsequently allege a failure of proof.”); Ilick
v. Miller, 68 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1173 n. 1 (D. Nev. 1999) (stating that there was sufficient evidence to
demonstrate that the post-PLRA fees were “directly and reasonably” incurred in establishing the
violation of the prisoner’s rights).
554. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1)(B)(ii) (2006); see West v. Manson, 163 F. Supp. 2d 116, 120 (D. Conn.
2001) (holding fees are recoverable for post-judgment monitoring).
555. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1)(B)(i) (2006).
556. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(2) (2006); see Pearson v. Welborn, 471 F.3d 732, 742–44 (7th Cir. 2006)
(holding fees limited to $1.50 where plaintiff recovered only $1.00 in nominal damages); Boivin v.
Black, 225 F.3d 36, 40–46 (1st Cir. 2000) (going through an extensive analysis of the constitutional
basis for the fee cap and arriving at the same conclusion, that fees are limited to 150% of recovered
nominal damages); Clark v. Phillips, 965 F. Supp. 331, 334 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding fees of $7921.96 to
be proportionately related to $10,000 damage award). This 150% limit does not apply to cases in which

Hourly rates for lawyers are limited to 150 percent of the Criminal Justice Act (“CJA”)
rates for criminal defense representation set in 18 U.S.C. § 3006A. 557 Courts have disagreed
whether this means 150 percent of the rates authorized by the federal Judicial Conference or
the actual, lower rates paid in the district based on how much money Congress actually
provides. 558 Both rates are much lower than the market rates that lawyers usually charge
and that are awarded in non-prisoner cases, and they will probably discourage many lawyers
from taking prisoners’ cases. (Although the hourly rate is higher than the Criminal Justice
Act rates, lawyers defending clients under the CJA get paid for their time whether they win
or lose.)
Prisoners are more directly affected by the provision that says that “up to” twenty-five
percent of a damage judgment is to be applied to the fee award. If the fee award is not
greater than 150 percent of the judgment, defendants must pay the rest. 559 Most courts have
held that the term “up to” allows the courts some discretion in determining how much of a
winning prisoner-plaintiff’s damage award must be applied to attorneys’ fees, 560 several
courts have mistakenly assumed that the twenty-five percent figure is mandatory, or have
applied it without discussing the question. 561
The Supreme Court has held that the PLRA fee restrictions apply to work done after the
PLRA’s enactment but not to pre-PLRA work. 562 However, that decision may be limited to
the work done by an attorney in his or her role as a monitor of court judgments.
A majority of courts have rejected arguments that attorneys’ fees restrictions deny equal
protection. 563
the plaintiff seeks and receives an injunction as well as damages. Walker v. Bain, 257 F.3d 660, 667 n.2
(6th Cir. 2001) (stating that §1997e(d)(2) does not apply if non-monetary relief is granted); Carbonell v.
Acrish, 154 F. Supp. 2d 552, 566 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding that the 150% cap of the fee would not be
needed in cases where the plaintiff received both monetary and injunctive relief).
557. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(3) (2006).
558 . Compare Hadix v. Johnson, 398 F.3d 863, 867–68 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding Judicial
Conference rates apply), with Hernandez v. Kalinowski, 146 F.3d 196, 201 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that
150% of the rates established by 18 U.S.C.S. § 3006A(d)(1) apply); see also Johnson v. Daley, 339 F.3d
582, 58–84 (7th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (stating that 150% of the rates set out by Criminal Justice Act
apply).
559. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(2) (2006); see Torres v. Walker, 356 F.3d 238, 243 (2d Cir. 2004)
(holding that a case resolved by “so ordered” stipulation was not governed by the 150% limit, since
there was no “money judgment”).
560 . See Boesing v. Hunter, 540 F.3d 886, 892 (8th Cir. 2008) (affirming district court’s
application of 1% of $25,000 recovery); Siggers-El v. Barlow, 433 F. Supp. 2d 811, 822–23 (E.D. Mich.
2006) (applying $1.00 of the recovery to attorneys’ fees, noting that the jury found that defendants had
lied about their conduct and awarded significant damages as punishment and deterrent); Morrison v.
Davis, 88 F. Supp. 2d 799, 811–13 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (applying only $1.00 of judgment against recovery).
561. See Jackson v. Austin, 267 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1071 (D. Kan. 2003) (holding that “the Court
must automatically apply plaintiff's fee award against his damages to the extent that it does not exceed
25 per cent of the damages”); Beckford v. Irvin, 60 F. Supp. 2d 85, 89–90 (W.D.N.Y. 1999) (applying
25% without discussion).
562. See Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343, 361–62, 119 S. Ct. 1998, 2008, 144 L. Ed. 2d 347, 362
(1999) (holding that § 803(d)(3) limits attorney’s fees for post-judgment monitoring services performed
after the PLRA’s effective date, but does not limit fees for monitoring performed before that date).
563. Johnson v. Daley, 339 F.3d 582, 597–98 (7th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (finding no constitutional
violation of equal protection); Jackson v. State Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 331 F.3d 790, 796–98 (11th
Cir. 2003) (holding that §1997e(d) passed the rational basis test and was therefore constitutional);
Foulk v. Charrier, 262 F.3d 687, 704 (8th Cir. 2001) (upholding cap of 150% of damages); Hadix v.
Johnson, 230 F.3d 840, 847 (6th Cir. 2000) (upholding limit on hourly rates and claiming that this limit
survives rational basis review); Boivin v. Black, 225 F.3d 36, 40, 43 (1st Cir. 2000) (finding that the
plaintiff’s claim survived the rational basis equal protection review); Carbonell v. Acrish, 154 F. Supp.
2d 552, 561–66 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (upholding 150% limit as a rational means to achieve the Congress’s
end). But see Johnson v. Daley, 117 F. Supp. 2d 889 (W.D. Wis. 2000) reversed on these grounds by

H. Waiver of Reply
The PLRA provides:
(g) Waiver of Reply.
(1) Any defendant may waive the right to reply to any action brought
by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility
under [42 U.S.C. § 1983] ... or any other Federal law.
Notwithstanding any other law or rule of procedure, such waiver
shall not constitute an admission of the allegations contained in the
complaint. No relief shall be granted to the plaintiff unless a reply
has been filed.
(2) The court may require any defendant to reply to a complaint
brought under this section if it finds that the plaintiff has a
reasonable opportunity to prevail on the merits. 564
This provision says that in prisoners’ suits, the defendants do not have to answer the
complaint unless the court tells them to do so. Courts can only do this if the plaintiff has a
“reasonable opportunity to prevail on the merits.” In practice, courts generally direct
defendants to answer if the case survives initial screening or a motion to dismiss, which
means that the complaint states a claim for which relief can be granted. 565
If you amend the complaint to add parties after the initial screening, the court might not
direct the defendants to answer. When you move to amend a complaint, always ask the court
to direct the defendants to answer and grant your motion to amend. If you amend the
complaint as a matter of course (when no motion is required), and if the defendants do not
answer , you may need to move to direct them to answer. 566
The provision that “[n]o relief shall be granted to the plaintiff unless a reply has been
filed” raises a question about default judgments, which ordinarily are granted if a defendant
fails to respond to the complaint. 567 One could read this provision as saying courts cannot
grant default judgments if defendants refuse to reply. We are not aware of decisions
addressing this point, and courts continue to grant default judgments in prison cases. 568 If
the defendants in your case do not respond, and the court thinks it cannot enter a default
judgment, try moving to hold the defendants in contempt of the order to reply to the
complaint, and ask the court for contempt damages equal to what you would get if the case
went forward. 569
I. Hearings by Telecommunication and at Prisons
The PLRA added a new section to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act
(“CRIPA”):
Johnson v. Daley, 339 F.3d 582 (7th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (holding that limit on hourly rates and limit to
150% of damages deny equal protection).
564. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g) (2006).
565. See Daniel v. Power, No. 04-CV-789-DRH, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17235, at *6 (S.D. Ill. July
20, 2005) (unpublished) (after initial screening, “ [d]efendants are ORDERED to timely file an
appropriate responsive pleading to the Amended Complaint, and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).”); Proctor v. Vadlamudi, 992 F. Supp. 156, 159 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (magistrate’s
recommendation that if case is not dismissed, defendants should be declared from now on to have
waived reply and should be directed to answer within 30 days).
566. Amendment by motion and as a matter of course are discussed in Fed. R. Civ. P. 15.
567. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55.
568. See Cameron v. Myers, 569 F. Supp. 2d 762 (N.D. Ind. 2008).
569. Concerning contempt damages, see Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 691 (1978); Benjamin v.
Sielaff, 752 F. Supp. 140, 148–49 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Morales Feliciano v. Hernandez Colon, 704 F. Supp.
16, 20 (D.P.R. 1988).

(f) Hearings.
(1) To the extent practicable, in any action brought with respect to
prison conditions in Federal court pursuant to section 1979 of the
Revised Statutes of the United States (42 U.S.C. § 1983), or any other
Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other
correctional facility, pretrial proceedings in which the prisoner’s
participation is required or permitted shall be conducted by
telephone, video conference, or other telecommunications technology
without removing the prisoner from the facility in which the prisoner
is confined.
(2) Subject to the agreement of the official of the Federal, State, or
local unit of government with custody over the prisoner, hearings
may be conducted at the facility in which the prisoner is confined. To
the extent practicable, the court shall allow counsel to participate by
telephone, video conference, or other communications technology in
any hearing held at the facility. 570
For years, many federal courts have been using telephones and videos in court
proceedings and holding proceedings at prisons. 571 But, the provision concerning hearings at
the prison raises legal and practical problems. The statute refers to counsel’s participation
“[t]o the extent practicable” by telephone, video, etc. If a prisoner has an attorney, there
seems to be no reason the attorney cannot attend the proceeding in person. If the prison is at
such a remote location that neither counsel’s presence nor her participation by
telecommunication is practicable, it is questionable whether the proceeding should be held at
the prison. It will generally be fairer to a prisoner to have pretrial proceedings at a location
counsel can attend.
The statute refers to holding “hearings” but not “trials” at the prison, leaving it unclear
whether evidentiary proceedings are included. 572 Conducting a trial or evidentiary
proceeding by video conferencing raises large questions of fairness, particularly in jury trials.
In United States v. Baker, 573 a non-PLRA case, the court upheld the constitutionality of
holding prisoners’ psychiatric commitment hearings by video, but was careful to note that
such decisions are generally based on expert testimony and do not depend either on the
demeanor of the witnesses or the “impression” made by the person being committed, and that
the proceeding does not involve fact-finding in the usual sense. That description does not fit
most evidentiary proceedings in prisoner cases, and courts have traditionally expressed a
strong preference for having prisoner plaintiffs physically present in court for trial. 574
570. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(f) (2000); see Moss v. Gomez, 162 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding
district court should have considered teleconferencing as an alternative to producing prisoner witness
who was a security risk).
571. See, e.g., Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1109 (10th Cir. 1991) (noting use of telephone
evidentiary hearing to assess frivolousness of claim); Am. Inmate Paralegal Ass’n v. Cline, 859 F.2d 59,
62 (8th Cir. 1988) (upholding constitutionality of a pretrial conference by two-way audio-video
connection between prison and courthouse).
572. But see Bickham v. Blair, No. Civ.A. 98-881, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12773, at *1 (E.D. La.
Aug. 16, 1999) (unpublished) (noting that an evidentiary hearing was held by telephone); Edwards v.
Logan, 38 F. Supp. 2d 463, 466–67 (W.D. Va. 1999) (authorizing video jury trial for Virginia prisoner
held in New Mexico; analogizing to PLRA’s provisions concerning pretrial proceedings).
573. United States v. Baker, 45 F.3d 837 (4th Cir. 1994).
574. Hernandez v. Whiting, 881 F.2d 768, 770–72 (9th Cir. 1989); Muhammad v. Warden, Balt.
City Jail, 849 F.2d 107, 113 (4th Cir. 1988); Poole v. Lambert, 819 F.2d 1025, 1029 (11th Cir. 1987).

If the court does hold a hearing by telephone or video in your case, it is your
responsibility to subpoena any witnesses you wish to present or cross-examine, just as in a
live hearing in the courtroom. 575
J. Revocation of Earned Release Credit
The PLRA adds a new section concerning earned release credit:
§ 1932. Revocation of earned release credit
In any civil action brought by an adult convicted of a crime and
confined in a Federal correctional facility, the court may order the
revocation of such earned good time credit under section 3624(b) of
title 18, United States Code, that has not yet vested, if, on its own
motion or the motion of any party, the court finds that:
(1) the claim was filed for a malicious purpose;
(2) the claim was filed solely to harass the party against which it
was filed; or
(3) the claimant testifies falsely or otherwise knowingly presents
false evidence or information to the court. 576
This provision, which applies only to federal prisoners, takes away good time based on
what a court thinks about a prisoner’s litigation activities. Though it raises substantial
questions about due process of law, the statute sets out no procedural protections. It is not
clear what due process requirements would govern. The only reported decisions applying this
provision do not discuss due process. 577
The revocation of earned release credit provision of the PLRA governs proceedings in
federal court, and presumably applies in state court. There appear to be no decisions yet on
this issue, however.
K. Diversion of Damage Awards
The PLRA includes two provisions about awarding damages in a successful suit brought
by a prisoner:
Any compensatory damages awarded to a prisoner in connection with
a civil action brought against any Federal, State, or local jail, prison,
or correctional facility or against any official or agent of such jail,
prison, or correctional facility, shall be paid directly to satisfy any
outstanding restitution orders pending against the prisoner. The
remainder of any such award after full payment of all pending
restitution orders shall be forwarded to the prisoner. 578
Prior to payment of any compensatory damages awarded to a prisoner
in connection with a civil action brought against any Federal, State,
or local jail, prison, or correctional facility or against any official or
agent of such jail, prison, or correctional facility, reasonable efforts
shall be made to notify the victims of the crime for which the prisoner
575. See Bickham v. Blair, No. Civ.A. 98-881, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12773, at *1 (E.D. La. Aug.
16, 1999) (unpublished).
576. 28 U.S.C. § 1932 (2006). Note that there is another statute with the same Section number—
entitled Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation—but this citation is correct.
577. See Rice v. Nat’l Sec. Council, 244 F. Supp. 2d 594, 597, 605 (D.S.C. 2001) (citing cases),
aff’d, 46 F. App’x 212 (4th Cir. 2002).
578. Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104–134, § 807, 110 Stat. 1321–66, 1321–
76 (1996). This provision is not codified, and appears after 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (2000).

was convicted and incarcerated concerning the pending payment of
any such compensatory damages. 579
There is very little case law about these statutes. 580 One important question is whether
the phrase “compensatory damages awarded” includes settlement of damage claims. As a
matter of plain English, it would seem not, and that is the holding of the only relevant
decision of which we are aware. 581
L. Injunctions
The PLRA contains a number of provisions restricting courts’ abilities to enter and to
maintain “prospective relief” (mostly injunctions, or court orders) 582 in prison cases.
1. Entry of Prospective Relief
Under the PLRA, courts may not enter prospective relief in prison cases “unless the court
finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the
violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the
violation of the Federal right. The court shall give substantial weight to any adverse impact
on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief.” 583 This
standard is not very different from the law in effect before the PLRA, 584 though the
579. Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104–134, § 808, 110 Stat. 1321–66, 1321–
76 (1996). This provision is not codified, and appears after 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (2000).
580. See Loucony v. Kupec, No. 3:98 CV 61(JGM), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6620, at *1 (D. Conn.
Feb. 17, 2000) (unpublished) (holding a person sued after release from prison was not a “prisoner” and
the statute did not apply to him).
581. Dodd v. Robinson, Civil Action No. 03-F-571-N, Order at *1 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 26, 2004). In
that case, the court held that a damages settlement was not subject to the requirement of direct
payment of restitution orders because the parties had reached a private settlement agreement.
582. One federal appeals court has held that under the PLRA’s language, punitive damages are
“prospective relief” subject to the PLRA’s limitations. Johnson v. Breeden, 280 F.3d 1308, 1325 (11th
Cir. 2002); see Hudson v. Singleton, No. CV602-137, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17800, at *3 (S.D. Ga. Mar.
27, 2006) (unpublished) (upholding a punitive award under Breeden). Other courts have mostly ignored
this decision. We think it is wrong, because the prospective relief provisions are clearly written to deal
with injunctions and make very little sense applied to punitive damages. See Tate v. Dragovich, No. 96-
4495, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14353, at *20 n.7 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 2003) (“At first blush, it seems that
one can neither ‘narrowly draw’ punitive damages, not adjust them to better ‘correct’ a violation of
rights, nor render them any more or less ‘intrusive.’”). One court has gone further and has held that the
PLRA has abolished punitive damages entirely. Margo v. Bedford County, No. 3:04-cv-147-KAP-KRG,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25625, at *7 (W.D.Pa. Mar. 31, 2008). We see no basis for this conclusion.
583. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a) (2006); see Morales Feliciano v. Rullan, 378 F.3d 42, 54–56 (1st Cir.
2004) (finding remedy of privatization of medical care appropriate in light of failure of less intrusive
measures; “[d]rastic times call for drastic measures”); Benjamin v. Fraser, 156 F. Supp. 2d 333, 344,
350 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d in part, vacated and remanded in part, 343 F.3d 35, 53–57 (2d Cir. 2003)
(applying PLRA standards in jail conditions litigation); Gomez v. Vernon, 255 F.3d 1118, 1130 (9th Cir.
2001) (affirming injunction benefiting named individuals; though an unconstitutional policy had been
found, it had been directed at those persons); Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648, 661 (4th Cir. 2001)
(affirming injunction prohibiting refusing the plaintiff a religious exemption from property restrictions
solely based on his non-membership in the “Native American race”).
584. See Gilmore v. California, 220 F.3d 987, 1006 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that courts are
required to “give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a
criminal justice system caused by the relief ... limiting the courts’ power to grant preliminary injunctive
relief”); Smith v. Ark. Dep’t of Corr., 103 F.3d 637, 647 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding PLRA “merely codifies
existing law and does not change the standards for determining whether to grant an injunction”);
Williams v. Edwards, 87 F.3d 126, 133 n.21 (5th Cir. 1996) (PLRA “codifies the standards governing a
district court’s grant of prospective relief in prison reform litigation”); see also Toussaint v. McCarthy,
801 F.2d 1080, 1086–87 (9th Cir. 1986) (pre-PLRA cases applying similar standard); Duran v. Elrod,

equirement of specific court findings is new. The statute also bars injunctive relief requiring
state or local officials to exceed their local authority unless federal law requires such relief,
such relief is necessary to fix a federal law violation, and no other relief will correct the
violation. 585 This provision also appears consistent with prior law. 586 The PLRA does limit
federal court prospective relief to correcting violations of “Federal rights,” which means a
court cannot enter an injunction based on a violation of state or local law. 587
2. Preliminary Injunctions
Preliminary injunctions must meet the same standards as for other prospective relief,
and automatically expire after ninety days unless the court makes the order final. 588 But, a
court may grant a new preliminary injunction after the first has expired if the plaintiff shows
conditions justifying the injunction still exist. 589
3. Prisoner Release Orders
The PLRA contains special rules for “prisoner release orders,” which it defines as “any
order ... that has the purpose or effect of reducing or limiting the prison population, or that
directs the release from or non-admission of prisoners to a prison.” 590 Such orders are
permitted only if previous, less intrusive relief has failed to remedy the federal law violation
in a reasonable time. 591 A release order must be supported by clear and convincing evidence
that “crowding is the primary cause of the violation of a Federal right” and no other relief
will remedy the violation. 592 One court has held that the limits on prisoner release orders do
not apply to motions to modify pre-PLRA prisoner release orders, citing the statutory
language that “no court shall enter a prisoner release order” without complying with the
PLRA requirements. 593
The PLRA requires three-judge courts to issue prisoner release orders, which either the
moving party or the district court may request. 594 This requirement may give rise to
760 F.2d 756, 760–61 (7th Cir. 1985) (weighing public safety and criminal justice system concerns in
enforcing jail crowding order).
585. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(B) (2006); see Perez v. Hickman, No. 05-05241, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
44432, at *7–10, 16–17 (N.D. Cal. June 12, 2007) (ordering increase in salaries paid to prison dentists,
contrary to state law, and finding PLRA standards met).
586. See, e.g., Stone v. City & County of San Francisco, 968 F.2d 850, 861–65 (9th Cir. 1992)
(holding, pre-PLRA, that provisions of consent decree that overrode state law were not the least
intrusive option available and were thus prohibited). See also LaShawn A. v. Barry, 144 F.3d 847, 854
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (stating, pre-PLRA, that “[d]isregarding local law ... is a grave step and should not be
taken unless absolutely necessary”).
587. Handberry v. Thompson, 446 F.3d 335, 344–46 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that in prison cases
the PLRA overrides federal courts’ “supplemental jurisdiction” to enforce state law).
588. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2) (2006).
589. Mayweathers v. Newland, 258 F.3d 930, 936 (9th Cir. 2001).
590. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(4) (2006); see Berwanger v. Cottey, 178 F.3d 834, 836 (7th Cir. 1999)
(noting that a maximum population provision is a prisoner release order). But see Inmates of Suffolk
County Jail v. Sheriff of Suffolk County, 952 F. Supp. 869, 883 (D. Mass.) (holding that a population
cap is not a prisoner release order in the absence of an order to release), aff’d as modified and
remanded on other grounds, 129 F.3d 649 (1st Cir. 1997).
591. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(A) (2006). Some courts had adopted that view before the enactment of
the PLRA. See Inmates of Occoquan v. Barry, 844 F.2d 828, 842–43 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that
population limit is a last resort remedy, not a first step).
592. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3626(a)(3)(E)(i)–(ii) (2006).
593. Berwanger v. Cottey, 178 F.3d 834, 836 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(A)
(2006)).
594. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3626(a)(3)(B)–(D) (2006).

procedural tangles in cases involving different kinds of relief. 595 One court refused to convene
a three-judge court to consider an individual prisoner’s “[m]otion for [his own] Prisoner
Release” that failed to allege, except in conclusory terms, how overcrowding violated his
constitutional rights. 596 The prisoner release order procedure is rarely used . 597
The PLRA permits state and local officials to intervene to oppose prisoner release
orders. 598
4. Termination of Judgments
The PLRA provides that court orders in prison litigation, including consent judgments,
may be terminated after two years unless the court finds that there is a “current and ongoing
violation” of federal law. After this two-year period, orders may be challenged every year. 599
An order may be challenged at any time if it was entered without findings by the court that it
“is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal
right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal
right.” 600 Such an order may be terminated immediately unless a current and ongoing federal
law violation is shown. A “violation of the Federal right” means a violation of the federal
Constitution, statutes, or regulations. Violation of the court order itself is not enough. 601
Under this provision, numerous court orders that benefited prisoners—but that were
entered before the PLRA and did not contain the findings required by the PLRA—have been
terminated. Constitutional challenges asserting that the provision violates the separation of
powers, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Due Process Clause have been unsuccessful. 602
5. Automatic Stay
The PLRA provides that courts must promptly rule on motions to terminate prospective
relief, and that such prospective relief is automatically stayed on the thirtieth day after such
595. See Tyler v. Murphy, 135 F.3d 594, 598 (8th Cir. 1998) (unclear under PLRA whether
“findings that will avoid termination of an existing injunction must in all cases be made by a threejudge
court if the injunction includes a prisoner release order”).
596. Pangburn v. Goord, No. 98-CV-0309E(H), 1999 WL 222553, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 1999)
(unpublished).
597. See Roberts v. County of Mahoning, Ohio, 495 F. Supp. 2d 784, 786 (N.D. Ohio 2007) (noting
appointment of three-judge court and entry of prisoner release order by consent); see also Plata v.
Schwarzenegger, No. C01-1351, 2007 WL 2122657 (N.D. Cal. July 23, 2007) (requesting the Ninth
Circuit to appoint a three-judge court to consider a population limit on the California prison system),
appeal dismissed, 2007 WL 2669591 (9th Cir. Sept. 11, 2007).
598. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(F) (2000); see Ruiz v. Estelle, 161 F.3d 814, 818–21 (5th Cir. 1998)
(holding that PLRA grants individual legislators the right to intervene in prison litigation).
599. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(1)(3) (2000).
600. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(2) (2000); see Tyler v. Murphy, 135 F.3d 594, 597 (8th Cir. 1998) (noting
that absent the required findings, immediate termination provision rather than two-year provision
applies).
601. Plyler v. Moore, 100 F.3d 365, 370 (4th Cir. 1996); Harvey v. Schoen, 51 F. Supp. 2d 1001,
1005 (D. Minn. 1999); Imprisoned Citizens Union v. Sharp, 11 F. Supp. 2d 586, 608–09 (E.D. Pa. 1998),
aff’d, 169 F.3d 178 (3d Cir. 1999).
602. Court of appeals decisions and district court decisions upholding the statute include
Berwanger v. Cottey, 178 F.3d 834 (7th Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Hopper, 173 F.3d 820 (11th Cir. 1999);
Benjamin v. Jacobson, 172 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 1999); Imprisoned Citizens Union v. Ridge, 169 F.3d 178
(3d Cir. 1999); Hadix v. Johnson, 133 F.3d 940 (6th Cir. 1998); Dougan v. Singletary, 129 F.3d 1424
(11th Cir. 1997); Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Rouse, 129 F.3d 649 (1st Cir. 1997); Gavin v.
Branstad, 122 F.3d 1081 (8th Cir. 1997); Plyler v. Moore, 100 F.3d 365 (4th Cir. 1996); Vazquez v.
Carver, 18 F. Supp. 2d 503 (E.D. Pa. 1998), aff’d, 181 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 1999). One circuit initially struck
the provision down on separation of powers grounds; on rehearing, the court did not decide the
constitutional issue. Taylor v. United States, 143 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 1998), superseded, 181 F.3d 1017
(9th Cir. 1999) (en banc).

a motion is made. The thirty days can be extended to sixty days for good cause shown. 603 The
Supreme Court has held that this provision does not violate the principle of separation of
powers. 604
6. Settlements
The PLRA provides that settlements that include prospective relief must meet the same
requirements that the PLRA establishes for other court orders. 605 The court must find that
these settlements are narrowly drawn, necessary to correct federal law violations, and the
least intrusive way of doing so. (In practice, parties who are settling agree to these findings,
and the court approves them.) It is no longer the case that parties can agree to a federal
court settlement on whatever terms they choose. Parties can enter into “private settlement
agreements” that do not meet the PLRA standards, but these agreements cannot be enforced
in federal court. 606 In effect, they must be contracts enforceable in state court. The PLRA
does not restrict settlements not involving prospective relief (i.e., settlements involving
damages, not other relief).
M. Conclusion
By passing the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Congress has made it harder than ever for
you to have your claims heard in federal court. Though you may feel, after reading this
Chapter, that many of the provisions of the PLRA are unfair, you cannot disregard its strict
requirements. To give yourself the best possible chance of getting your claim into federal
court and having it resolved favorably, you will have to familiarize yourself with all the
portions of the PLRA that are relevant for your case.
In going back through this Chapter, you should pay attention to the “three strikes”
provisions of the PLRA (see Part C) and to the new administrative procedure exhaustion
requirements (see Part E). The three strikes rules should encourage you to consider your
decision whether to bring suit very carefully, since if a court decides you have brought a
frivolous suit, your ability to bring future suits may be jeopardized. You must also be certain
you understand the exhaustion requirements, since courts will not allow your suit to proceed
unless you have made every effort to resolve your grievance through administrative
procedures.
603. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(3) (2006).
604. Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 120 S. Ct. 2246, 147 L. Ed. 2d 326 (2000).
605. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(c)(1) (2006).
606. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(c)(2) (2006).