A century of rice improvement in Burma - IRRI books - International ...

The International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) was established in 1960 bythe Ford and Rockefeller Foundations with the help and approval of theGovernment of the Philippines. Today IRRI is one of the 13 nonprofitinternational research and training centers supported by the ConsultativeGroup on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). The CGIAR issponsored by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations,the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank),and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The CGIARconsists of 50 donor countries, international and regional organizations, andprivate foundations.IRRI receives support, through the CGIAR, from a number of donorsincluding the Asian Development Bank, the European EconomicCommunity, the Ford Foundation, the International Development ResearchCentre, the International Fund for Agricultural Development, the OPECSpecial Fund, the Rockefeller Foundation, UNDP, the World Bank, and theinternational aid agencies of the following governments: Australia, Belgium,Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, India, Iran,Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, The Netherlands, New Zealand,Norway, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UnitedKingdom, and United States.The responsibility for this publication rests with the International RiceResearch Institute.Copyright © International Rice Research Institute 1991All rights reserved. Except for quotations of short passages for thepurpose of criticism and review, no part of this publication may bereproduced, stored in retrieval systems, or transmitted in any form or by anymeans, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise,without prior permission of IRRI. This permission will not be unreasonablywithheld for use for noncommercial purposes. IRRI does not requirepayment for the noncommercial use of its published works, and hopes thatthis copyright declaration will not diminish the bona fide use of its researchfindings in agricultural research and development.The designations employed in the presentation of the material in thispublication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on thepart of IRRI concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city, or area,or of its authorities, or the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.ISBN 971-22-0024-8

ContentsForeword viiPreface ixAbbreviations and acronyms xiI. Introduction 1Soils and climate 1Rice production 2Colonization-generated forces 6Independence-generated forces 8Science-generated forces 9Rice cultivation 10Rice varieties 12Population 14Administration 14II. Rice production under the British Government 17Rice area and production 18Area 18Yield and production 19Varieties 20Seed distribution 22Fertilizer and agrochemical use 23Agricultural loans 23Draft cattle 25Support services 27Investment 27Research 27Extension 28Irrigation 28Mechanization 28Cropping intensity 28iii

Rice trading 29Rice milling 29Rice consumption 31Rice exports 32Beneficiaries of production 33Stability and sustainability 33Equity 34Impact 35111. Rice production under the Independent Burmese Government 37Rice area and production 38Area 38Yield and production 39Varieties 40Seed distribution 40Fertilizer and agrochemical use 40Agricultural loans 41Draft cattle 43Support services 44Investment 44Research 45Extension 45Irrigation 45Mechanization 46Cropping intensity 47Rice trading 48Rice milling 48Rice consumption 49Rice exports 50Beneficiaries of production 51Stability and sustainability 52Equity 52Impact 52IV. Rice production under the Socialist Republic Government 55Rice area and production 57Area 57Yield 60Production 62Varieties 63Seed distribution 66Fertilizers 67Agrochemicals 73Agricultural loans 75Draft cattle 77iv

Support services 78Investment 79Agricultural research 80Agricultural extension 83Proven new technology 86Government support and leadership 86Selectivity and concentration 87Mass participation 88Demonstration and competition 88Pilot program 89Full-scale program 93Analysis of the program 97Results of analysis 99Further analysis 100Evaluation of the program 107Multiplier effect 110Irrigation 112Mechanization 113Cropping intensity 115Rice trading 116Rice milling 121Rice consumption 123Rice exports 124Beneficiaries of production 126Stability and sustainability 126Equity 126Impact 127V. Implications for the future 129Investment alternatives 130Farmer participatory research and extension 131Selection of scientists 132Motivation of scientists 133Preprogram activities 133A detailed working program 134Farmer participatory extension 135VI. Conclusions 137References cited 139List of statistical appendices 143Conversion factors 155Index 157V

ForewordRice dominates Burma’s economy and is extensively interwoven into the socialand economic fabric of its people’s lives. Burma is a rice-surplus country, buthas a great potential for still higher production.U Khin Win has been closely involved in Burma’s agricultural developmentsince 1950, as a scientist and extension worker, and as managing directorof the Agricultural Corporation, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.One of U Khin Win’s assignments while serving as a visiting scientist atthe International Rice Research Institute from 1987 to 1989 was to documentthe history of rice improvement in Burma.He drew on almost four decades of professional work and an intimateknowledge of rice to write A century of rice improvement in Burma. U Khin Winhas analyzed patterns of rice production in Burma over the last 100 years,identifying the forces that generated its production growth, and how this hasaffected the lives of the Burmese population.This book is a comprehensive treatment of all important factors thatinfluenced Burma’s rice production growth. U Khin Win also suggests technologicalapproaches to trigger a second wave of development.Scientists and policymakers will find the book valuable for analysis ofdevelopmental processes in Southeast Asia. It should contribute to increasedrice production with the ultimate objective of improving the well-being ofpresent and future generations of rice farmers and consumers, particularlythose with low incomes.Klaus LampeDirector Generalvii

PrefaceRice is Burma’s most important crop. It dominates the agricultural sector,which is the largest and most productive part of the economy; changes in riceproduction have a direct and profound influence on the entire population.Burma’s rice output must continually increase to feed the growing populationsand boost the country’s economy.Studies of rice production over the last 100 yr have shown both periods ofrapid growth and periods of stagnation. There is growing awareness amongagricultural development workers that production is still short of its potential.Considering the complexities of agricultural development, the various forcesthat have influenced rice production need examination. An understanding oflong-term rice production trends will be useful in the formulation of futuredevelopment strategies.As a visiting scientist at the International Rice Research Institute, I wasassigned to analyze Burma’s experience in rice production. This led me tostudy the country’s long-term rice production profile and, in the process, toexamine significant aspects that contributed to various changes since 1830. Thedevelopment process that took place before World War II was well-documented.I was personally involved in the agricultural development process in the yearsafter the war (a total of 37 yr) in various capacities as a researcher, extensionworker, and administrator. This book is the outcome of my personal experiences,which have influenced the inferences I have made about availablestatistical data. The book is a comprehensive treatment of rice production inthe past 100 yr. It presents important critical issues in production and otherrelated areas.Chapter I gives background information about the country. Chapter IIdescribes rice production under the British Government, with emphasis on thevarious forces that generated growth. Chapter III presents the situation afterthe country gained independence from the British, and the problems thatprevented progress. Chapter IV details research development and technologytransfer activities, focusing on an extension strategy that dramatically increasedix

ice production in the last decade. The development, implementation, andevaluation of this extension strategy take a considerable part of this chapter. Inall these chapters, the impact of rice production on the social and economicconditions of the population is discussed. Chapter V presents the farmerparticipatory research and extension approach and proposes a methodologyfor applying it.This analysis is by no means exhaustive, but all available data related to therice industry have been collected and collated. I trust that the study bringsforth some significant aspects of rice production performances that will leadstudents of agricultural development to initiate appropriate action.I am grateful to U Kyi Win, Deputy General Manager of the AgriculturalCorporation, Burma, for the statistical analysis of data, and to U Win Pe,Director General of the Cultural Department, Burma, for reviewing the originalmanuscript.I alone am responsible for any errors and inferences drawn from the data.x

Abbreviations and acronymsAC = Agricultural CorporationADB = Asian Development BankAFPTC = Agriculture and Farm ProduceTrade CorporationAMD = Agricultural Mechanization DepartmentARD = Applied Research DivisionARDC = Agricultural and Rural DevelopmentCorporationARI = Agricultural Research InstituteB Ag = Bachelor of AgricultureBSPP = Burma Socialist Program PartyDA = Department of AgricultureFAO = Food and Agriculture OrganizationFYM = farmyard manureGA = General AdministrationIRRI = International Rice Research InstituteK = Kyat, Burmese currencyLV = Local varietyMEIC = Myanma Export Import CorporationMV = Modern varietyRGUB = Revolutionary Government ofthe Union of BurmaRs = Rupees, Indian currency (used inBurma during the independent period)SAB = State Agricultural BankSAC = Security and AdministrativeCommitteeSAMB = State Agricultural MarketingBoardSRUB = Socialist Republic of the Union ofBurmaUNDP = United Nations DevelopmentProgrammeVEM = Village extension managerWB = World BankWOP = Without programWP = With programWTRPP = Whole Township Rice ProductionProgramxi

CHAPTER IIntroductionBurma is situated in Asia, lying between 10° and 28° N latitude and between92° and 101° E longitude. It occupies an area of 678,034 km 2 —slightly largerthan France and nearly double the size of Japan. It shares borders with China(2185 km in the north and northeast), Laos (235 km in the east), Thailand (2325km in the east and southeast), India (1454 km in the northwest), and Bangladesh(258 km in the west). It has a coastline of 2330 km along the Bay of Bengalon the west and the Gulf of Martaban on the south. The width of the countrymeasures 800 km from east to west, and the length spans about 1300 km fromnorth to south, with the long narrow Tenasserim coastal strip constituting 800km. The country is bounded on three sides by high mountain ranges formingvalleys where agriculture is practiced.Soils and climateThe country has a wide range of soil and climate favoring the domestication ofnumerous crop species. The climate is mainly tropical but is subtemperate-likein hills and plateaus.The rice-growing soils of Burma were classified by Soviet soil scientistsinto 18 main soil types and 7 soil groups. These soil types approximated theFAO/UNESCO nomenclature (Ye Goung et al 1978). The main rice-growingsoil groups fall under Gleysols, Fluvisols, humic Planosols, and pallic Vertisols.The country has three distinct seasons: rainy, winter, and summer. Therainy season is influenced by the southwest monsoon, which generally startsin mid-May and ends in mid-October. Precipitation under the monsoon variesgreatly with location and year. The rainy season is followed by a cooler 3-mowinter period, and then by 3 or more dry summer months. Except for someprecipitation in some parts of the country during the winter and summermonths due to northeasterly winds, Burma is dry from November to April. Thecountry may be divided into five zones with respect to annual precipitation(Table 1).

Table 1. Mean annual precipitation (mm) in different zones in Burma (AgriculturalCorporation 1977-87).Zone Rainy Winter Summer Av (1977-87)CoastalDeltaicDryNorthernHill39882007559167614993562291782292795333561782292034877259291521341981Precipitation under monsoonal influence is very erratic, and thus meanannual precipitation is often misleading. Distribution rather than mean precipitationdetermines the influence of weather on rice production. The irregularityof monsoonal rain follows five distinct patterns: early onset of monsoon,late onset of monsoon, break in monsoon, early departure of monsoon, and latedeparture of monsoon. This monsoonal behavior, which causes varyingamounts of precipitation in various parts of the country, determines riceproduction in a particular year.Other climatic factors like temperature also have some influence on cropproduction. They may be aggregated into four groups (Table 2).Agroecological zones have been specified by superimposing the soil andclimatic conditions of the country. Soils have been graded into five groups (S1-S5) and climate in terms of precipitation has been graded into three (R3, R4, andR5—following the FAO system) to form 10 important agroecological zones—R3S1, R3S3, R3S5, R3S6, R4S1, R4S5, R4S6, R5S1, R5S4, and R5S5 (Khin Win andNyi Nyi 1979). Coastal and deltaic conditions fall under R3S1 and R4S1,constituting the main rainfed rice-growing regions (Fig. 1, 2).Rice productionBurma is an agricultural country with over 10 million ha of cropped landplanted to about 60 crops. In 1983, agriculture accounted for 50% of thecountry’s gross domestic product (GDP) and 47% of its export earnings (HillTable 2. Mean temperature range a in various parts of Burma (AgriculturalCorporation, 1977-87).GroupMinimumMean temperature range (°C)MaximumLower BurmaCentral BurmaNorthern BurmaShan Plateaua Av of 10 yr, 1977-87.1612106374034302 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

1. Trends in rice area and production.and Jayasuriya 1986). The same pattern was observed in 1984 and 1985. Inearlier years, agriculture represented even a larger share of GDP and exports.Burma’s economy is clearly dependent on agriculture. Crop production is themajor agricultural activity and is largely dependent on weather. A limitedirrigation system, restricted to the dry zone of Upper Burma, offers some help,largely in the form of supplemental water.Soils and climatic conditions in many parts of Burma favor rice cultivation.Rice is the principal agricultural crop and is the staple food of the entirepopulation. Rice dominates the national economy, and any shortages insupply cause spiralling price increases in many other commodities, thuscreating political instability. A rice-surplus country, Burma has one of thehighest levels of per capita rice consumption in the world. Rice has beencultivated in Burma for domestic consumption since prehistoric times. Rice islife for the Burmese, being interwoven with the social and economic fabric ofthe people’s lives. This book examines the rice economy of Burma over the 100-yr period from 1885 to 1985.Rice production in the country increased nearly 1400% in 100 yr, butgrowth was not even. An annual rice production of a mere 1 million t in 1870rose to over 14 million t in 1985 (Fig. 3).INTRODUCTION 3

2. Rainfall distribution.4 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

3. Soil distribution.INTRODUCTION 5

Due to the involvement of a huge land area and a great majority of thepopulation in the rice industry, all governments in the time period discussedgave priority to the development of rice production. However, policy objectivesand implementation methods differed from government to government.Governmental policy determined the direction in which development tookplace. Three distinct patterns occurred in the 100-yr period and their causesand effects were the results mainly of different governmental policies.Three governments administered the country during the period: theBritish Colonial Government (1885-1948), the Burmese Independent Government(1948-62), and the Revolutionary Council followed by the SocialistRepublic of the Union of Burma (SRUB) Government (1962-85). This studycollected and collated data covering these three administrations.Rice production data reveal three distinct and significant growth trendsgenerated by various forces at different times. The first growth period occurredin 1885-1910, after the final annexation of the country by the British. The secondgrowth period came in 1955-65, a few years after the country gained independence.The third growth period took place in 1975-85, when technologydevelopment and transfer systems provided clear dividends. Forces thatgenerated rice production growth differed with the period, creating differentialimpacts on the population.Rice production, however, cannot be taken as a single aggregate factorinfluencing the population. The impact of production stability, sustainability,and equity aspects on the socioeconomic conditions of the country at differenttimes must be considered. Production stability here means spatial and temporalvariability and profit. Sustainability is reckoned in terms of the long-termmaintenance of production and profit levels. Equity applies to the distributionof benefits that result from production. This study emphasizes the agronomicfeasibility, economic viability, and social acceptability of rice production atvarying times. The long-term rice production trend is an important socioeconomicindicator.Colonization-generated forcesIn pre-British days, the Burmese King adopted a restrictive commercial policyprohibiting the export of many products, including rice (Cheng 1968). Thisrestriction on rice exports discouraged farmers from growing more than wasrequired for their own consumption. In addition, the low returns on riceoffered very little incentive for farmers to produce more than they needed forfood, seed, and taxes. The price of rice was reported to be Rs 5 for 2100 kg inthe domestic market, while the same amount of wheat sold for Rs 40 (Adas1974). The Burmeseruler imposed many duties and restrictionson the merchantswho traded in the country.The British colonized the country in three stages. The Arakan andTenasserim coastal strips were colonized in 1826, Pegu and Martaban in 1852,6 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

and the rest of the country in 1885. Rice development was initiated by theBritish after the second colonization stage by putting the Irrawaddy deltaicarea under rice cultivation. This deltaic area offered a favorable rice environmentin terms of both weather and soil. With a view to exporting rice to Europe, theBritish government encouraged increased production in every possible way.Land, labor, and capital are the three main resources necessary for riceproduction. Favorable deltaic land was there, but labor was needed to clear theswamps and to cultivate rice. The British government introduced an immigrationscheme to induce the people of Upper Burma to move to Lower Burma.It also imported Indian workers under various immigration programs.Moreover, it improved river and rail transportation to facilitate north-southmovement between Upper Burma and the delta. There were also attractiveland tenure systems. The need for capital was fulfilled by providing loans topioneer settlers. Private moneylenders, well-protected by the law, providedthe greater share of the capital requirement.These activities, aimed at increasing rice production through the expansionof cultivated area, were organized by the government, while the wholeprocess of production was facilitated by enacting the necessary legislation andintroducing various incentives. At the same time, the government encouragedthe rice milling industry and trade, both internal and external, by helpingmany commercial firms and private enterprises. These forces spurred riceproduction growth during this era, increasing it to a remarkable level in a shorttime. Production rose sharply between 1885 and 1910.The rice-sown area of 1.5 million ha in 1885 increased to 4 million ha in1910. While the yield remained almost the same, the rapid area expansionincreased production from 2 million to 6 million t. As a result, rice exports alsorose from a few hundred thousand to 1.5 million t.Such remarkable and rapid growth in the country’s rice industry wasmade possible by a multitude of factors, five of which are considered mostsignificant: 1) availability of vast areas of deltaic land favorable for ricecultivation, 2) provision of various incentives and inducements by the government,3) lifting of the ban on rice exports, 4) great demand for rice by theexpanding rice and allied industries in Europe, and 5) development of thesteam-powered ship engine and the opening of the Suez Canal, which shortenedthe distance between Europe and Burma.Production stability during the period was striking, in spite of the fact thatrice cultivation relied totally on the weather. No serious flood or droughtadversely affected production. The trend followed a linear pattern. The priceof the crop did not fluctuate much—from Rs 95 in 1885 to Rs 110 for 100 baskets(or 2100 kg) of unhusked rice.Production sustainability was also remarkable, since ricelands had beenrecently cleared for cultivation. This provided high inherent fertility thatassured continued production. The use of cow dung also helped sustainproduction.INTRODUCTION 7

The equity of production, however, was not so encouraging. While landwas cleared by the pioneer settlers, ownership slowly changed from tillers tomoneylenders because of the farmers’ inability to repay loans at the stipulatedtime. This resulted in landlord and tenant classes in Burmese society. Themoneylenders continued to play the role of landlord cum moneylender. Theoriginal owners of resources for rice production then became the beneficiaries.Small farmers who grew rice spent 84% of their output as paid-out costs,leaving them only 16%. Land rent and high interest rates took up a large shareof their output. As a result, unequal distribution of production output createdeconomic and consequently social inequality. And there were no effectivemeasures to reduce these economic and social inequalities.The colonial government that induced rapid rice production through theexpansion of area finally created political instability. The relationship betweenlandlords and tenants deteriorated to such an extent that the country experiencedracial conflict and political uprisings resulting from the agrarian crisis.The impact of higher rice production ended in the frustration of farmers as aresult of land alienation. World War II ended these regrettable events.Independence-generated forcesThe second rice production growth period occurred between 1955 and 1965. Itstarted when the country gained independence from the British. The peoplehad great hopes that, once freed from colonial domination, the country wouldbecome prosperous. The newly independent government implemented theLand Nationalization Act to ensure equitable distribution of land. Governmentalaction on remission of debt, low-interest loans, security of land tenure,and other incentives once more increased rice production.The new government drew and implemented an agricultural sector planthat placed emphasis on elimination of landlordism, application of scientificmethods to agriculture, and raising rice exports to prewar levels. The governmentplanned to use the rice areas abandoned during the war. But manyfactors prevented implementation of the plan, and it took 15 yr to recover therice area and restore production to prewar levels. The government did notfully achieve its objective, but it pushed rice production growth upward fromthe low level brought about by the war.The rice-sown area increased from 4 million to 5 million ha, raisingproduction from 6 million to 8 million t. Again, the rice production trendfollowed a linear pattern. The price of rice did not change much during thisperiod. The cost of 100 baskets (2100 kg) of unhusked rice was about 300 kyats(about $38). There was a slight increase in yield due to the use of improvedvarieties and a small amout of chemical fertilizer. Agrarian problems werelessened to some extent, and there was noticeable improvement in the plightof farmers. Rice exports rose to nearly 2 million t but still fell short of the prewarlevel.8 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

Rice production growth during this period was also brought about by theexpansion of area, along with a slight increase in yield. But stability andsustainability of production were less impressive. The country experiencedpoor weather conditions in 1957 and 1961, significantly reducing rice production.Political strife forced some of the experienced farmers to move to thecities, leaving behind their lands in the hands of unskilled workers. Furthermore,unstable rural conditions prevented the farmers from fully attending totheir lands. Lack of skilled personnel was caused by the departure of foreignconsultants, leaving behind untrained nationals who could not fill the void.This applied to all work spheres-technical, administrative, and social. Theadministrative structure was simply not appropriate for the implementationof development plans.In this period, the equity of production improved considerably. Farmersneeded to spend 57% of their output as paid-out costs, which comparedfavorably with the first growth period. Reduction in land rent was mainlyresponsible for this improvement. However, farmers still had to rely on privatemoneylenders for their credit needs.The impact of rice production growth during this period was less thanexpected. After World War II, shortages of food in many countries offeredgood opportunities for the rice export trade. But in time, as the major customersmanaged to raise their own food under self-sufficiency programs, Burmafound it difficult to dispose of its rice surplus. Reduced trade caused storageproblems, along with disputes regarding quality, shipment, and payment, andother aspects common to a buyer’s market. Finally, the rice surplus wasdisposed of at lower prices and through barter. The reduction of exportearnings necessitated the abandonment of some development plans, whichconstrained rice production growth.Independence-generated forces propelled rice production and marked asecond distinct growth period, but internal security and a weak internationalmarket retarded growth and put an end to the hopes anxiously entertained bythe population.Science-generated forcesThe third period of growth, which occurred between 1975 and 1985, wasgenerated by science. The time was most appropriate for practicing scientificmethods. Skilled manpower became increasingly available to implementagricultural development plans. Internal security conditions had also improved,and an international organization stood ready to assist the governmentin the implementation of development plans.The International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) in Los Baños, Philippines,released dwarf, early-maturing, fertilizer-responsive, high-yielding varietiesand promoted modern agronomic techniques. The environment was conduciveto development, but acceptance of the new varieties and modern technol-INTRODUCTION 9

ogy was slow and unenthusiastic in the beginning. The application of a“selective concentrative extension strategy,” which took advantage of theconducive conditions at the time, changed the whole situation. The intensiveuse of high-yielding varieties, together with the greater use of chemicalfertilizers in selected areas, increased yield. The area devoted to rice remainedconstant during this period, with slight variations due to weather abnormalities.Sown areas remained at 5 million ha, but production rose from 9 million to 14million t, brought about mainly by dramatic increases in yield. The rate ofgrowth was very impressive in the beginning but slowed down with time.Stability and sustainability of production were comparatively less encouragingduring this growth period. Technology brought good results up toa certain point, after which new factors came into play and impeded furthergrowth. The use of modern technology demanded more and more inputs as itscoverage expanded. Procurement, storage, transportation, marketing, anddistribution of inputs became limiting factors beyond a certain magnitude. Thecountry’s resources simply could not cope with the increasing demand. Theexpansion of high-yielding rice varieties beyond favorable environmentsneeded newer varieties that would suit the adverse environments. The changingtimes and changing needs required a new extension strategy appropriateto the situation. New forces became imperative to maintain the growthmomentum and push it further upward.Regarding equity of production, higher rice production during this periodbenefited both the individual farmer and the country. The new technologyrequired more expenditures than did traditional practices, but the return wasproportionately larger. The farmers needed to pay only 30% of their output aspaid-out costs, a significant improvement compared with 84 and 57% in thefirst and second growth periods, respectively. The price of rice remainedconstant at 900 kyats (about $113) for 100 baskets. However, the price of riceon the international market went down drastically. Extension services andsubsidies on chemical fertilizers helped maintain, to a certain extent, thestability, sustainability, and equity of rice production. Science-generatedforces that powered rice production influenced a third growth period butcalled for new factors to push the growth further upward.Rice cultivationBurmese agriculture originated from subsistence agriculture. Being the majorstaple food, rice is cultivated in every part of the country, irrespective ofagroecological suitability. However, rice-growing areas are grouped based onhydrological environment: rainfed lowland rice (R3S1, R4S1, R3S5, and R3S4);winter rice (R3S1 and R3S5); deepwater rice (R3S1 and R3S4); upland rice(R3S3 and R4S5); and irrigated rice (R5S4 and R5S1).Rice cultivation follows traditional methods using simple implements(Fig. 4, 5). It is labor-intensive, and cattle are the main source of animal power.10 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

4. Rice threshing with cattle.5. Rice winnowing.Generally, rice cultivation starts with tillage operations in the nursery plot(usually one-tenth of the transplanted area). After the seedlings are planted, 1mo remains to carry out tillage operations in the fields to be transplanted (Fig.6). Transplanting is done in July-August, solely by women (Fig. 7). In areaswhere soil fertility is poor, labor is scarce, seedlings are insufficient, and watercontrol is lacking, broadcasting instead of transplanting is also practiced.There is a slack period after transplanting until harvest in October or Novem-INTRODUCTION 11

6. Tillage using a wooden spike-harrow.ber depending on the growth duration of the variety. Rice is manuallyharvested by sickle and left in ihe field for 3 d for sun drying. The panicles arethen bundled and carried to homesteads for threshing, which is done byallowing cattle to walk on the bundles (Fig. 4). The threshed rice is winnowedin January or February, when most days are windy (Fig. 5).Rice varietiesThe usual practice for obtaining the next season’s seed is to separately harvestand thresh the best panicles. They are then dried and stored for future use.There are many rice varieties; some are named with respect to locality, somefor their growth duration, some for the size and color of their grain, some fortheir aroma, and some for their appearance.Many local names of rice varieties are undoubtedly synonymous. Differentnames are given to the same variety in different localities. Some 2000varieties have been recorded in the country. A multitude of varieties posed noproblem in the days of subsistence farming systems. But once they enteredmarket-oriented agriculture, mixed varieties that differ in shape, size, andhardness of grain caused inefficient milling and produced inferior products.12 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

7. Transplanting.Farmers classify rice in many different ways, some of which are widelyaccepted. The three best known classifications use time of sowing, waterregime, and growth duration as criteria.With respect to classification based on time of sowing, four types havebeen denoted: premonsoon rice, monsoon rice, late monsoon rice, and ”mayinrice” or winter rice. Premonsoon rice sown with irrigation in March andharvested in July constitutes nearly 2% of the total rice area. It is planted in thecentral part of the country. Generally, premonsoon rice is followed by monsoonrice. Although premonsoon rice covers a small area, it carries considerablesignificance in the region, where there is rice shortage. It is harvested at a timewhen the rice stock in the area has been almost exhausted. Monsoon riceoccupies the largest portion of the rice area: 81%. It is sown in mid-June,transplanted in mid-July, and harvested in October or November. This type isplanted in all states and divisions of the country. Late monsoon rice, sown inAugust, is transplanted in favorable places in September and harvested inJanuary. It is planted in low-lying delta areas as floodwater subsides in thelatter part of the rainy season. It also covers about 2% of the total rice area.Mayin rice is sown in November, transplanted in December, and harvested inMarch. It covers 15% of the total rice area and is commonly planted along rivervalleys and deltas.INTRODUCTION 13

Classification based on water regime includes three situations—irrigated,upland, and rainfed. Irrigated rice, covering 17% of the total area is restrictedmainly to the central part of the country, where irrigated water is available. Butthere are many small patches in every part of the country having irrigationfrom ponds or small rivers, some privately owned, others village-owned.Another situation is upland rice, covering about 4% of the total area, dominatingthe central part of the country and the hilly regions, where irrigation water isnot available. The rest of the area is rainfed, covering 79% of the rice area in thecountry. This includes saline conditions in coastal areas (3%) and deepwaterconditions in deltaic areas (8%).Classification according to growth duration consists of three groupsshort-durationrice (140-145 d seed to seed)) that matures in October is called“kaukyin,” medium-duration rice (150-170 d) that ripens in November isknown as “kauklat,” and late-duration rice (170-200 d) that ripens in Decemberis called “kaukkyi.”PopulationThe population of the country was recorded as 4 million in 1824 (Harvey 1946)and grew to 37 million in 1985, with an annual growth rate of 1.99% (Ministryof Planning and Finance 1987). The agricultural sector employs 63% of thepopulation. According to age group, 36.7% are under 14 years of age; 56.6% arebetween ages 15 and 59; and 6.7% are above 60. Males and females are almostequal.Burma can thus be reckoned as a country of mainly young and middleagedpeople. The population density is 55 persons/km 2 , with highest densitiesin the deltas. The population is concentrated mostly in the river valleys and flatplains, where agriculture can be easily developed. The Burmese are a cheerfuland cooperative people. Their literacy rate is high due to the widespreadtraditional monastic education system.AdministrationFor administrative purposes, the country is divided into seven states andseven divisions under the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma Government(Fig. 8). Irrawaddy, Pegu, and Rangoon Divisions constitute the delta,where 50% of rice is cultivated. There are four levels of administration: thecentral level in Rangoon, the capital of the country; the state or divisional levelin the capital cities of the divisions and states; the township level in the capitalcities of the townships; and the village tract level. These levels are administeredby council members, who are elected every 4 yr.The country thus witnessed three distinct and significant rice productiongrowth periods during 1885-1985 with varying impacts on the population.14 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

8. States and Divisions (1-7 are divisions, 8-14 are states).These impacts may be designated as a period of “frustration” during the firstperiod, a period of “hope” during the second period, and a period of “progress”during the third period. Long-term analysis suggests some future actionconsistent with the country’s conditions. The in-depth analysis of relevantfactors accompanying rice production growth reveals important insights thatwill be useful in the development of future strategies.INTRODUCTION 15

these favorable conditions, the highest possible yield could be expected there.The high variation in yield in Upper Burma was due to the fact that some areashad irrigation while others received scanty rainfall.The Department of Settlement and Land Records (DSLR), through seasonand crop reports, started recording national average yield data in 1913. Theyield data in these reports were estimated from a very small sample plot (onethousandth of an acre or 0.40 ha) and from crop information provided byvillage elders. The annual yield during the era averaged 1.6 t/ha, slightlylower than estimates made in the 19th century.The national average yield in 1913 was 1.8 t/ha, while it was 1.6 t/ha in1940 (Table 5). Rice yield tended to go down with the years for two reasons: a)with time, yield estimates covered wider areas representing different types ofsoil and climate; and b) the fertility of the land had reached its minimum, andno further decline was likely to occur. The nutrients absorbed by the rice cropbecame almost equal to natural replenishment.Although yield tended to decline, rice production during this periodincreased at a remarkable pace due to the rapid expansion in area. The rate ofproduction increase was more distinct and significant at the close of the lastcentury and at the beginning of this century. It began to stabilize afterward.Table 6 indicates the rice production trend from 1830 to 1940. It was only44,000 t in 1830, increasing to 2 million t in 1880. After this take-off period,production rose rapidly, especially at the close of the 19th century. It was wellover 5 million t in 1900, rising to 6.5 million t in 1910, after which the rate ofgrowth slowed down. (For annual rice production data, see Appendix I).During this era, rice production growth was remarkable, but growthbetween 1885 and 1910 was most distinct and significant. Such a rapid rise inproduction growth was the result of many factors having differential impacts—some beneficial and some detrimental-on the various segments of thepopulation.VarietiesThere were many rice varieties in the country, many of them identical althoughcalled by different names in different localities. Many varieties posed noproblems in a subsistence system; but as the rice industry developed, mixingTable 5. Rice yield In selected years, 1913-40 (DSLR, various years).YearYield(kg/ha) aYearYield(kg/ha) a191319201925176915281511193019351940155015601640a Converted from baskets per acre.20 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

Table 11. Rice mills, 1894-1934 (DA 1958).Year Rice mills (no.) Year Rice mills (no.)1894190419145411726319241924508508These rice mills were steam-driven using rice husks as fuel. They varied insize and capacity. Generally, large mills were owned and operated by Britishfirms; medium mills, by Indians, Chinese, and Burmese; and small mills, byBurmese.The rice milling industry needed a considerable amount of labor, and therewas stiff competition among Burmese and Indian laborers. Unemploymentproblems arose as a result of population growth without a proportionateexpansion of cultivated area during the latter part of the period. This wascompounded by the restrictive tenancy situation. There was a rapid shifting ofland ownership from the owner-cultivators to the landlords due to the growingproblems of indebtedness. Many landless laborers got into rice cultivation ashired laborers. The growing number of Indian immigrants competed fortransplanting and reaping jobs, where more labor was required. This wasespecially true in areas close to towns or where holdings were large enough towarrant more laborers than the locality could supply. Except in some specialcases, Burmese laborers precluded the Indian laborers in rice cultivation. Acensus report in 1931 showed that the Burmese accounted for 96% of the laborforce in agriculture; the Indians contributed 4% (Cheng 1968).The Burmese also competed with the Indians for the labor requirements ofthe expanding rice milling industry. Rice millers preferred Indians to Burmesebecause they charged less and were more disciplined. Rice mills operated byforeigners hired Indian laborers exclusively. Burmese-owned mills had mixedlaborers, but a great majority were Burmese.Most of the rice mills were situated in Lower Burma, on the river banks, oralong the railway lines. About one-fifth were located in Upper Burma. TheEuropean domination of the rice milling industry was more prominent inearlier days, but due to the rapid growth of small mills in Upper and LowerBurma (which were mostly owned by Asians), the monopoly went to theAsians at the close of the century.Generally, large mills concentrated on export trade, while small mills tookcare of internal trade. Rice bran, a major product of the rice milling industry,was also exported, mainly to the United Kingdom and Malaysia as animal feed(Cheng 1968). About 80-90% of the bran produced in Burma entered the exportchannels, while the remaining amount served as cattle or livestock feed forareas surrounding the rice mills.30 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

CHAPTER IllRice production under theindependent BurmeseGovernmentThe Imperial Japanese Army invaded Burma in 1942. The British then evacuatedthe country, in the process destroying railways, bridges, ports, and powerstations. In 1945, the allied forces liberated Burma. The war inflicted greatdamage and produced considerable demographic changes in the country.Urban dwellers moved to rural areas to avoid the hostilities. Later, rural folkswent to urban areas to secure jobs.Burma gained independence from the British in 1948 and the peopleentertained great hopes for rebuilding the country. Two reconstruction planswere prepared. The first plan was drawn up by the British Government andsome officials who had fled the country during the war. Popularly known asthe “Simla Plan” (having been finalized at Simla, India) or the “White PaperPlan,” it aimed to bring rice production and exportation to prewar levels.British firms that engaged in rice trading before the war were asked toparticipate. But, sensing that the country was about to gain independence,these firms were not that enthusiastic to join the program.The second plan, designated as the “Two-Year Economic Plan,” wasdrafted by Burmese political leaders and addressed the problems of landtenure, low rice yield, and inadequate rice export. This plan stressed the needto raise the standard of living of the people to free them from exploitation.After independence, the political leaders promptly put their Two-YearEconomic Plan into action. Unfortunately, implementation was unsatisfactorybecause personnel lacked the necessary management skills.Then came the “Pyidawtha Plan,” literally “happy land,” which maintainedthe original objectives of the previous 2-yr plan. Implementation was set for 8yr, from 1952 to 1960. One of the components was the agricultural sector plan(called the Agricultural and Rural Development Five-Year Plan), which aimedto raise agricultural output to prewar levels in 5 yr. Under this plan, abandonedland was reclaimed, cropping intensity was raised, and scientific methodswere applied. The government exerted every effort to explain the plan to thepeople to gain their support and participation. But the plan did not quiteachieve all its objectives because of political rivalries.

Rice area and productionAlthough the plan tried to raise rice production levels using both extensive andintensive methods, the increase was brought about mainly by reclaiming ricesownareas abandoned during the war. Increase in yield was slight.AreaNearly half the rice area was abandoned during the war. Table 14 shows thearea planted to rice in different years. Riceland dwindled from 5 million ha toa little more than 2.5 million ha during the war. There were about 3.5 millionha in 1950, but this figure still fell short of the target. The plan achieved a littlemore than 80% of the target despite labor shortages and the lack of capital andwork animals.People from the rural areas moved to the cities. Some went voluntarily,while others had been forced by the Japanese army to help in war supportactivities. These migrants were employed in the government (which was thenin the process of reorganization), a number of them joining the army or police.Still others earned their living as petty traders, transport sector workers, orcontractual laborers. The rural folks, at first, were uncomfortable with city lifebut after some adjustment, they began to settle permanently in the cities. Thistrend caused a shortage of labor for rice production and made recovery of riceareas more difficult.Credit was limited after the Chettyars left. Local moneylenders werereluctant to give loans because of the unstable political situation. GovernmentTable 14. Rice area In Burma, 1940-60 (DA, DSLR, various years).Year Target area Sown area(million ha)(million ha)% achievement a1940194119451948194919501951195219531954195519561957195819591960-5.07-4.99-2.63-3.97-3.654.35 b3.704.65 b3.834.85 c4.024.18 c4.034.36 c3.984.53 c4.054.70 c4.084.85 c3.994.97 c4.095.10 c4.205.23 c 4.22-----8582839791898782828281a Sown area as % of target area.b Two year plan target (Government of Burma 1948).c Pyidawthaplan target (MI 1952).38 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

intervention, in the form of agricultural loans, did not completely solve theproblem. The indiscriminate slaughter of cattle during the war caused ashortage of work animals.Under these circumstances, the target set in the plan proved to be veryambitious. The target for sown area was reset in the Agricultural and RuralDevelopment Five-Year Plan, but recovery of the area followed the same slowpace, indicating that the same problems persisted.Yield and productionDuring the war years, yield declined appreciably, but it recovered slowly andreached the prewar level in 1958. The decline in yield was due to the unstablepolitical conditions in the rural areas. Farmers could not tend their fields asoften as necessary. They usually started late in the morning and trooped backto the village before dark. The average annual yield during that period was 1.5t/ha, slightly lower than that of the previous period.Table 15 shows the average annual yield from 1940 to 1960. The yield wentdown to about 1 t/ha during the war years, but this increased slowly afterindependence in 1948 (Table 15). Although the agricultural sector plan stressedthe need to apply scientific methods to agriculture, the period did not witnessany substantial adoption of modern techniques. Farmers spent less timeworking in the fields because of security reasons. Repair and improvement ofembankments and drainage somehow helped raise the yield.The slow increase in rice area and the low yield meant slow productiongains. Rice production was a function of harvested area—generally 95% of thesown area—and yield.Table 16 shows rice production in Burma in selected years. The area sownin 1960 was only 83% of that sown in 1940, but production was slightly higherbecause of the slight increase in yield. Production, however, still fell short bya quarter million tons compared with the level attained in 1930. The bad peaceand order situation in the rural areas contributed to poor performance.Table 15. Rice yield in selected years, 1940-60 (DSLR, various years).Rice Rice RiceYear yield a Year yield a Year yield a(t/ha) (t/ha) (t/ha)1940194219451948194919501.61.41.11.41.31.5195119521953195419551.51.51.41.51.5195619571958195919601.61.41.71.71.7a Converted from basket/acre to kg/ha.RICE PRODUCTION UNDER THE INDEPENDENT BURMESE GOVERNMENT 39

Table 16. Rice production in selected years, 1940-60.RiceRiceRiceYear production Year production Year production(million t) a (million t) a (million t) a1940194219451948194919506.8945.7522.6775.1644.5815.403195119521953195419555.6015.8425.5795.6516.025195619571958195919606.0256.2825.4237.1837.085a 1940-54 figures were taken from Yearly seasons and crops reports (DSLR, various years); 195560 data came from Agricultural statistics 1964-65 and 1965-66 (RGUB 1966).VarietiesMany rice varieties bred at the experimental stations were lost during the war.The DA reestablished these facilities after the war, concentrating on thecollection and reselection of lost breeding lines. Security at these stations wasnot adequate, and many of the breeding lines recovered were brought toRangoon for reselection. But even Rangoon could not offer the right atmospherefor reselection work. This paved the way for the establishment of the AgriculturalResearch Institute (ARI) in 1954. Though mandated to initiate and expandagricultural research activities, the new institute at that time preoccupied itselfwith staff recruitment, procurement of equipment, and construction of fieldand laboratory facilities and, therefore, did not contribute much to agriculturaldevelopment.Seed distributionSeed multiplication and distribution activities during the period were notsignificant. The DA distributed 2800 t pure seeds every year, sufficient to plant50,000 ha. Distribution of seeds (mostly of A and C varieties) was restricted toareas without security problems.Fertilizer and agrochemical useFertilizer and agrochemical use remained low. The agricultural sector planpressed for greater use through more demonstrations and intensified extensionservices. In 1957, farmers began using small amounts of fertilizers (in theform of ammonium sulfate and ammonium phosphate) in rice cultivation.Farmers, at first, strongly resisted the use of fertilizers, because they thoughtthat fertilizers spoil the soil and affect crop quality.Table 17 indicates annual fertilizer consumption (reported as urea andtriple superphosphate) and the average rate of NP application. The use offertilizers increased at approximately the rate of 1000 t/yr, with averageapplication amounting to only 0.25 kg NP/ha. During the promotion period,fertilizers were given away free or on credit. Agrochemical use was negligible.Farmers felt no need to protect indigenous varieties in monocultural systems.40 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

Table 17. Fertilizer consumption of rice, 1956-60.Urea Triple NYear equivalent superphosphate (kg/ha)in tonsequivalent in tons195719581959196083519331862229040252011607680.160.260.300.36Source: Department reports, Department of Agriculture and Agricultural and Rural DevelopmentCorporation (various years).Agricultural loansExpansion of rice area required capital. The government tried to satisfy thecredit needs of farmers at reasonable interest rates. It revived the old systemof issuing agricultural loans (commonly known as General Administration[GA] loans) through township officers.However, farmer-borrowers complained about too much red tape inobtaining loans. Most township officers did not understand the plight offarmers; they were more concerned with maintenance of law and order andcollection of revenues than with agricultural development in their area.Another type of loan, geared especially for land reclamation, was providedunder the Land Improvement Act. It was able to bring back to rice cultivationmore than 153,780 ha of land in 1952 (Walinsky 1962). But the money involvedin this program was not as substantial as the GA loans.In 1953, the government established the State Agricultural Bank (SAB),which formed village agricultural banks. The SAB charged the village banksan interest of 6% per annum, while the village banks charged the farmers 12%.The system was designed to enable village banks to accumulate their owncapital, continue lending their own resources, and carry out developmentalactivities in their communities. The SAB reduced the volume of loans channeledthrough GA, where disbursement and repayment performance was reportedto be poor. It likewise issued loans to village cooperatives under the supervisionof the Cooperatives Department. Members of village cooperatives availed ofthis service, thereby satisfying their credit needs to some extent.Other credit channels performed the same function differently. The Agriculturaland Rural Development Corporation (ARDC) provided specificcrop loans to farmers. These were for economically important crops (e.g., riceand rubber), or new crops that needed special attention (e.g., cotton and jute).In spite of these many channels, the farmers’ financial problems remainedunsolved. This was because the amount provided by the government wasinsufficient and the agencies involved in the lending operation were inefficient.Private moneylenders, while operating illegally and charging an interest rateRICE PRODUCTION UNDER THE INDEPENDENT BURMESE GOVERNMENT 41

Tenants of State Agricultural BankAgriculturists' Land Improve- Government CooperativeYear Loans Act ment Act Estates loans Cooperatives Village banks TotalLoans Returns Loans Returns Loans Returns Loans Returns Loans Returns Loans Returns Loans ReturnsSource: L. J. Walinsky, Economic Development in Burma 1951-1950 - The Twentieth Century New York (1962), p. 292. na = means not available.Table 18. Government loans (million kyats), 1952-60 (Walinsky 1962).1952-531953-541954-551955-561956-571957-581958591959-6040.434.026.916.118.122.726.94.226.120.516.511.211.716.68.9...0.1...0.00.1...0.0......0.1...0.00.1...0.0......0.71.00.90.30.30.40.0na0.11.00.70.80.00.40.2na13.914.011.913.311.00.6......12.611.710.79.87.40.4......Nil4.08.79.4.10.410.6NilNilNil3.97.48.410.19.9NilNilNil1.33.85.68.511.929.042.7Nil1.33.55.18.511.827.936.555.154.352.244.848.346.255.946.938.938.438.835.437.739.137.036.5

of 100-400% per annum, still played a significant role. Farmers still relied onprivate moneylenders to make up for their deficit, and the attachment wassuch that they could not afford to ruin their credit standing with the moneylenders.Table 18 shows the amount of agricultural credit provided by governmentthrough various channels. In 1952-54, a large share of the loan was GA loans,but the SAB took a larger share in later years. (For yearly loans, see AppendixII.) The discrepancy between the loan figures in Table 15 and those inAppendix II for 1952-60 is due to the various sources of data used.The SAB reported 70-80% repayment; the GA collected a lower percentage,especially in later years. Poor repayment was attributed to unstable peaceand order conditions and to political interference. Loans came from a varietyof sources but the amount still fell short of what was required. Some estimatedthe credit requirement for agriculture to be 200 million kyats; the governmentloans amounted to only one quarter of this requirement. This allowed privatemoneylenders, with their higher interest rates, to do business with the farmers.The yearly average agricultural loans totaled 50 million kyats as comparedwith 2-3 million rupees in the previous period. (Rupees and kyats wereequivalent during the period.) Nonetheless, credit for all crops, with rice as themajor crop, enjoyed the largest share.Draft cattleThe shortage of draft cattle created by indiscriminate slaughter of animalsduring the war had a noticeable impact on rice area expansion. Before the war,the country had 3 million head of cattle. This number declined seriouslyduring the war. Moreover, the absence of breeding programs lowered thecattle population further.The population level of draft cattle during the period is shown in Table 19.In 1953, there were 2.8 million head of draft cattle. This increased to 3.3 millionTable 19. Draft cattle population, 1940-60 (DSLR, various years).GrossNumber ofYear sown area draft cattle(000 ha) (000 head)Load(ha/pair)1940195319541955195619571958195919607568654164226550652364566676688169533148281429042939297430213089318532844.814.654.424.464.394.324.324.324.23RICE PRODUCTION UNDER THE INDEPENDENT BURMESE GOVERNMENT 43

in 1960, representing a 17% increase in 7 yr. During that time, gross sown arearose by only 6%, indicating some improvement on the load factor of draftcattle. A pair of cattle had a workload of 4.65 in 1953; this was reduced to 4.23in 1960. Cattle population (or the load factor of a pair of cattle) appeared todetermine area sown—the load of 4 ha had been generally accepted as areasonable workload for a pair of cattle. The government ban on the slaughterof cattle helped increase the animal population. The Burmese dislike for beeflikewise helped raise the cattle population for agriculture. But veterinary careand breeding programs for cattle were still absent during the period.Support servicesThe reconstruction of the war-torn economy needed strong support servicesfrom all sectors. Progress was slow in the agricultural sector because of the lackof trained personnel, equipment, and laboratory facilities. Time was needed toprovide these resources.The DA expanded its agricultural research and extension activities tosupport implementation of the plan, but being understaffed, its performancewas below par. The government again established the Land and Rural DevelopmentCorporation (later transformed to ARDC and set out to implementthe agricultural sector plan based on sound business principles. ARDC wasgiven a more flexible financial and administrative authority, unlike the rigidrules and regulations that restricted the DA.The government enacted the Land Nationalization Act in 1948 and againin 1953. This empowered the State, as ultimate owner of all lands, to effectequitable distribution among the landless farmers. It also provided measuresfor debt remission and easy access to loans at reasonable interest rates.The government established agricultural high schools to supply theneeded manpower. One agricultural institute offered a Diploma in Agriculture;the University of Rangoon likewise offered a Bachelor of Science degreein Agriculture. Many outstanding students were sent abroad for furtherstudies.InvestmentThe objectives of the five-year plan were to be achieved with the aid ofirrigation, land reclamation, fertilizer and mechanization programs, complementedwith a land nationalization and distribution program. Two schools ofthought with regard to investment existed. One believed that highest priorityshould be given to agriculture inasmuch as the economy of the country mainlydepended on it. The other school advocated rapid industrialization to bringthe country to speedy economic recovery.During this period, approximately 9% of public investment was spent inthe agricultural sector, amounting to an annual expenditure of 30-50 million44 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

kyats (Walinsky 1962). Investments in the agricultural sector were channeledto agriculture, irrigation, and forestry. Livestock farming got an insignificantamount. This small investment in agriculture was unfortunate, consideringthe country’s great needs and opportunities for agricultural development.Of the limited investment for agricultural development, irrigation andcrop improvement and expansion programs took the largest share. Expendituresin irrigation included those used to reconstruct old dams, sluice gates andcanals, and to build two new dams (in Upper Burma) and embankments (inLower Burma) for flood control. The crop improvement and expansion programconcentrated on rice and other crops like jute, cotton, groundnut,sugarcane, tobacco, rubber, and coconut. The implementation scheme emphasizedland improvement, seed and fertilizer distribution, and applicationof modern techniques. Other substantial expenditures were for the procurementof tractors, the rehabilitation of experimental stations and seed farms,and the establishment of ARI.ResearchIn 1954, ARI was established by the DA at Gyogon. It had five disciplinarydivisions: Agronomy, Soils, Botany, Plant Pathology, and Entomology. Theinstitute had adequate laboratory facilities and equipment, with a farm area of34 ha. As previously mentioned, ARI activities focused on staff recruitmentand equipment procurement only; no substantial research activities werereported.The DA experimental stations had also been rehabilitated, but the peaceand order conditions limited their contributions to productivity. A few postgraduatedegree holders joined the DA after returning from their studiesabroad. ARI hired agriculture graduates as research assistants.ExtensionExtension activities were handled by the staff of the DA and ARDC. The DApeople put up demonstration programs, particularly on fertilizer use, in placeswhere the peace and order situation was stable, while the ARDC personnelcarried out extension activities on the basis of selected crops. ARDC’s dynamicstaff and more flexible management style effectively contributed to these cropprojects. Sustainability, however, was lacking. Table 20 summarizes theseextension activities in selected years.IrrigationThe war damaged irrigation facilities, and thus production targets at prewarlevels were not attained. Since rice enjoyed the largest share of irrigation, itsuffered the most.Table 21 shows irrigated areas for rice and other crops during the period.The war destroyed 15-20% of the irrigation facilities. At this time, the irrigatedRICE PRODUCTION UNDER THE INDEPENDENT BURMESE GOVERNMENT 45

Table 20. Summary of extension activities, 1958.Item Number of plots %Varietal demonstrationFarm implement demonstrationCultural method demonstrationFertilizer use demonstrationManure storage demonstrationManure preparation demonstrationTotal7491,1901,737100,27651510104,3770.721.141.6796.070.40Sources: Department reports, Department of Agriculture (1960).area of the country averaged 635,000 ha; this further decreased to 574,000 in1953, and 522,000 in 1954, before it increased (by only 19,000 ha) in 1960. Theshare of rice in irrigation in prewar days was 92%; it declined to 86% in 1958but rose a little to 87% at the close of the period. The construction of the newTaungpulu and Alaungsithu Dams in Upper Burma contributed, to a smallextent, to this increase. However, no substantial improvement in irrigationfacilities was done. Variation in irrigated areas in different years was mostlycaused by fluctuation in annual rainfall. Irrigated water was fed from diversionweirs whose capacities vary slightly with annual rainfall.MechanizationThe DA introduced the crawler- and tire-type tractors to Burmese agriculturewith a view to applying modern techniques. Tire-type tractors were fitted withlug wheels to avoid slippage in wet ricefields. Table 22 shows the number oftractors, both crawler- and tire-types, used during the period.Though the DA's new Mechanization Division, with its small fleet oftractors, did not create an impact on the agricultural sector, its activitiesprovided a starting point for future programs. Support services improvedTable 21. Rice areas under irrigation, 1953-60 (RGUB 1964). aIrrigated area Irrigated area % ofYear all crops rice rice in(million ha) (million ha) irrigation1936-40 (av)195319541955195619571958195919600.6350.5740.5220.5490.5690.5490.5270.5760.5410.5870.5140.4610.4870.5080.4820.4530.5050.469929088898988868887a Original area in acre converted to ha.46 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

Rice tradingAt the end of World War II, food shortages in many countries gave Burma anopportunity to export rice. It had good prospects—it had a ready surplus stockof rice resulting from the annual harvests and the accumulation of stocksduring the war years. But the rice industry, as a whole, was still plagued withmany war-related problems that affected cultivation, production, procurement,milling, and transportation.The British government took steps to revive the rice industry immediatelyafter they reoccupied the country. In accordance with the Simla Plan, theAgricultural Project Board was formed in 1945 to organize and supervise riceproduction, processing, and marketing activities. In 1947, the AgriculturalProject Board was renamed the State Agricultural Marketing Board (SAMB).After the country gained independence, the new government allowed theSAMB to continue to reactivate the rice trade. As in the previous period, the"old" rice traders, representing both the local and foreign firms and the ricemillers, began to procure rice in the villages. Rice procurement through thesetraders amounted to 80% in the 3-yr period after reoccupation; SAMB procured20%. After 1948, the rice millers procured 60%, while SAMB acquired around30%. The business volume handled by rice millers was even larger, around90%, in the years immediately after independence.Table 24 shows rice procurement by different agencies during the period.Because of inexperienced staff, the SAMB procurement share remained lowuntil 1953-54. The rice millers took the major share in rice procurement, 34-94%. The SAMB got a bigger share in 1953-55, after which rice millers againcontrolled the majority. The SAMB paid 300 kyats for 2100 kg of unhusked ricebut traders and millers paid 10-30% more, depending on the time of purchase.At harvest, when every farmer would dispose of his stock, the price offered bytraders and millers was less than that offered by SAMB. (For yearly averageprice during the period, see Appendix V.)Rice millingMany rice mills were destroyed during the war, and these needed replacementand repair. The SAMB issued loans to renovate the rice mills but credit wasdiverted to other uses. Only a few millers used the loans for their intendedpurpose. These loans, together with their rice procurement activities, made therice millers prosperous, leading many to conclude that this period favoredthem the most.The SAMB constructed modern mills in Rangoon, with capacities rangingfrom 35 to 160 t/day. Construction of small mills in the countryside waslikewise encouraged. There were 994 rice mills at the time, with a total dailycapacity of 42,000 t.48 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

Table 24. Rice procurement by different agencies, 1946-60 (SAMB, various years).Year1946-471947-481948-491949-501950-511951-521952-531953-541954-551955-561956-571957-581958-591959-60Percentage of procurementRepresentatives Millers SAMB79.3087.0876.44------------0-94.1989.2684.1161.7739.7533.8244.7564.1267.0243.8769.9920.7012.9223.565.8110.7415.8938.2360.2566.1855.2535.8832.9656.1330.01Interest in the small mills was overwhelming because they required onlya small investment, they could be constructed near the source of supply(millers could procure rice by themselves rather than through representativesand thus reduce cost) and they could ensure minimal mixing of different ricevarieties and thus achieve a higher head rice yield. With respect to rice yieldand transportation, less wastage occurred in small mills than in large mills.Most of the rice was procured and milled in the open season, and a largevolume was exported before the rains came in June. But in 1953, when theinternational rice market trade slowed down, the rice stock began to accumulateand posed serious storage problems. The SAMB built storage facilities andagain provided loans to rice millers to enable them to build warehouses in theircompounds. The earning capacity of millers was consequently increased.Rice consumptionThe average per capita consumption of rice amounted to 64 kg/yr in 1940,increasing to 107 kg/yr in 1960. However, Steinberg (1981) estimated thisfigure to be 137 kg/yr. The increase in consumption was apparently the effectof restricted rice exports during the time. The price of rice did not fluctuatemuch and was placed at around 350 kyats. The quality-conscious Burmesewere heavy rice consumers-they ate rice three times a day and they tendedto consume more even when other cereals were available. Nevertheless,consumption of wheat in the urban areas increased after the war. Per capita riceconsumption was still considered low.Per capita rice production averaged 434 kg/yr in 1940, decreasing to 204kg/yr in 1960. The increase in production was not proportional to populationgrowth. The man-to-land ratio was 3.30 in 1940 and 5.43 in 1960. Since oneRICE PRODUCTION UNDER THE INDEPENDENT BURMESE GOVERNMENT 49

hectare would produce enough rice for seven persons at the existing yieldcapacity, the man-to-land ratio still afforded some exportable surplus. As thisratio moved closer to seven, the margin left for export became smaller. Toavoid localized shortages, efficiency in processing, transportation, storage,and distribution became essential.Rice exportsThe agricultural sector plan projected that rice exports would attain prewarlevels. A favorable international rice market provided the country with moreearnings, although tonnage exported fell short of the level expected. There wasa great demand for rice in the international market—the 15 countries in prewardays to which Burma exported its rice swelled to 30 after the war, though thevolume involved was less. Rice was exported either through government-togovernmentsale or open sale through international tender. The first typecommanded a price that was 10-15% lower than that prevailing in the internationalmarket. Goodwill and other reciprocal measures characterized thetransaction. Two-thirds of the rice exported was sold on a government-togovernmentbasis. Because of the high price of rice at the international marketand the greater demand for it immediately after the war, earnings from riceexports provided the country with much needed capital. Of the 30 importingcountries, only 4 were major buyers: India, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Japan.During the early 1950s, a sellers’ market prevailed, and the rice trade posedno quality or transport problems. There was hardly any trade dispute. But withtime, as major buyers became self-sufficient, rice trading became difficult.Burmese officials went abroad to make transactions, but in spite of all theseefforts, sales slowed down, causing storage problems (Fig. 9).9. Rice storage godowns.50 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

This trade reduction severely affected the country's foreign exchangeearnings. The government called for some budget cuts in the investment plan.Some projects were rescheduled, and some were altogether shelved. Thecountry was forced to sell its surplus rice stock at lower prices to China,Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the German Democratic Republic, mainlythrough barter. Barter started in 1954 and took up 17% of the export volume;this proportion declined to 12% in later years.Table 25 presents the annual rice production and exports during theperiod. In 1940, 70% of the rice produced was exported (Table 25). After thewar, rice exports ranged from 28 to 51% of production. The export volume ofpostwar years amounted to a little more than half that of the prewar years.Export volume was between 1 and 2 million t, with the highest (1.864 milliont) being attained in 1956. The international market demand determined theexport volume during the period. Rice trade with Japan had diminishedgreatly since 1959. The reduced rice trade had an unfavorable impact on theimplementation schedule of the agricultural sector plan.Beneficiaries of productionThe period from 1940 to 1960 witnessed a drastic reduction in rice productionin the war years and a steady increase in the postwar years. The stability andsustainability of production during the period were not impressive. Twofactors were responsible for the erratic growth—abnormal weather (especiallyrainfall) and unstable peace and order conditions in the rural areas.Table 25. Rice production and export, 1950-60.Production (million t) aYear Export c Export %Unhusked rice Husked rice b (million t)1940195019511952195319541955195619571958195919606.8945.4035.6015.8425.5795.6516.0256.2825.4236.8827.1837.0854.3433.4043.5293.6803.5153.5603.7963.9583.4164.3364.5254.4643.1041.1841.2681.2600.9701.4611.6391.8641.7531.4101.6921.72271.534.835.934.227.641.043.247.151.332.537.438.6a Production figures from 1940 to 1954 taken from DSLR (various years); 1955-60 data taken fromRGUB (1966). b Converted using 63% recovery. c 1940 export data from U Lwin Chit 1949; 195060 export data from IRRI 1986.RICE PRODUCTION UNDER THE INDEPENDENT BURMESE GOVERNMENT 51

Stability and sustainabilityThe steady production growth declined in 1949 because of political rivalries.The communist party went underground and posed unwarranted securityrisks to farmers. This situation forced many farmers to move to urban areas.Rice production declined by nearly half a million tons. After that, productiongrowth continued at a slow pace until 1957, when adverse weather conditionscaused another 12% decline. In the following year, the ruling political partywas divided into two factions. This development greatly influenced theagricultural sector plan; rice production again fell during the two subsequentyears at the end of this era.Although SAMB procured rice at 300 kyats, brokers bought rice at a lowerprice during harvest, and they resold it to the SAMB buying depots. Asfarmers’ stock diminished, the brokers increased their purchase price. InOctober and November, just before the new harvest, prices paid by brokerswere higher than SAMB prices. The income of farmers would thus fluctuatewith the time they disposed of their stock. The inability of farmers to hold theirrice surplus stock reduced their profits. Despite these less favorable conditions,production was relatively stable and sustainable as a result of returningabandoned land to cultivation.EquityLegislation regarding land nationalization, debt remission, low-interest loans,fair rent, and security of land tenure had improved the equity of production toa certain extent. But farmers still had to rely on private moneylenders forcredit. In this period, thus, farmers were not as exploited, but they continuedto share their returns with private moneylenders. There were also traders whoearned a lot through speculation. At the time, no report on the costs and returnsin rice production was published, but estimates showed an improvement inprofit sharing (Table 26). Table 26 indicates an increase of the farmers’ sharefrom 16 to 43%. The higher share was derived from the smaller land rent andthe lower interest paid during the period.ImpactIndependence stimulated rice production to such an extent that a seconddistinct growth was observed during the period. However, unstable securityTable 26. Pald-out cost for rice production (1932 and 1960) (DA 1960, Grant1939).Particular 1932 1960Paid-out cost (% of total)Hired laborHired animal laborValue of seedLand rentFarmer’s share (%)844610440165753135284352 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

conditions and a weak international market diminished its impact. The growthonly partially fulfilled the aspirations of the farmers. Their participation in theimplementation of the agricultural sector plan was not fully rewarded. Theprocess of change was slow because of the war, the rapid population growth,and the lack of investment.RICE PRODUCTION UNDER THE INDEPENDENT BURMESE GOVERNMENT 53

CHAPTER IVRice production under theSocialist Republic GovernmentThe political rivalry that characterized the previous period finally led to thetransfer of government power to the military. In turn, the latter, ruling througha caretaker government, laid the groundwork for a free parliamentary election.It also effectively introduced changes in the administrative machinery,which was then plagued by inefficiency, lack of discipline, low staff morale,waste, and disorder. It tried to eliminate political influence in the discharge ofpublic duties.Security and administrative councils (SACs)—consisting of military, police,and civil officials—were established at the division, district, township,and village levels. The SACS reestablished law and order and improved publicadministration when they handed back power to the elected party in 1960. Butthis elected government was short-lived (1960-62); in 1962-74, it was replacedby the Revolutionary Government. This then led to the establishment of theSocialist Republic of the Union of Burma.These changes in government and administrative structure greatly influencedthe agricultural development plan. During the period, colonialadministration was completely abolished. The country was divided into sevenstates and seven divisions (Fig. 8). The Commissioner of the Burma CivilService Office, who used to run a division, was replaced by a DivisionalPeople’s Council; the Township Officer was superseded by a TownshipPeople’s Council; and the Headman, by a Village Tract People’s Council. Thedistrict structure in the administration setup was removed to bring thetownship closer to divisions or states. The People’s Council at the differentlevels was composed of five to seven members who were elected every fouryears (concurrent with the implementation of the four-year economic plan).Unlike the Burma Civil Service Officers, the People’s Councils took specialinterest in and responsibility for the development of the area, in addition tomaintaining law and order.People’s representation rather than central appointment was the principalessence of the change. This change facilitated the participation of the people in

the design, implementation, and evaluation of area development and economicplans. Legislation completely abolished landlordism and improved theplight of the poor farmers.Seminars were organized yearly to give farmers a chance to present theirneeds and air their grievances. The discussions in these seminars resulted inthe formation of Farmers’ Councils (later named Farmers’ Assiayones) inMarch 1967. The Farmers’ Assiayones promoted unity among farmers andfacilitated their adoption of modern technologies. It also enabled them toparticipate actively in the design, implementation, and monitoring of theagricultural development plan.Since farmers constituted the basic force in the implementation of theagricultural development plan, their participation ensured its successfulcompletion. The contribution of Farmers’ Assiayones in settling land disputes,disbursing and collecting agricultural loans, and pursuing other developmentalactivities was significant. For the first time, farmers had a role in the community,and their services received public recognition.World food shortages and the increasing population demanded greateragricultural production. Consequently, many international research institutescame into existence, like the IRRI in Los Baños, Laguna, Philippines, whichwas established to work mainly on rice. As part of a technology package, IRRIreleased modern rice varieties far superior to existing ones. Because of thelocation-specific nature of crop production, the technologies developed bythese international research institutes still had to be refined to suit localconditions. Burmese scholars who went to IRRI for postgraduate studiesimplemented adaptive research on the new varieties and technologies upontheir return. National agricultural research institutes were likewise establishedand equipped to carry out location-specific research. Other internationalagencies—the United Nations Development Programme, the Food and AgricultureOrganization, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank—andsome developed countries provided technical and financial assistance toimplement Burma’s agricultural development plan.Many factors contributed to the significant increase in rice productionduring this period. Peace and order conditions had improved considerably.Moreover, the period was marked by an environment that can be said to beconducive to development. Science stimulated rice production and effected asmooth technology transfer to farmers.After the Pyidawtha Plan, there was no economic plan laid out until 1970,when the government, guided by the Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP),drew up long- and short-term economic plans. The long-term plan (20-yrduration), was divided into five 4-yr short-term plans. The implementingguidelines of the BSPP highlighted four priorities for development: 1) toexpand production and exports in the agriculture, fishery, livestock, andforestry sectors; 2) to set up consumer goods industries to lessen imports; 3) to56 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

aise production to the highest possible level; and 4) to lay the foundation forheavy industries based on mineral production.The plan, calling for the transformation of the economic structure from anagricultural to an agriculture-based industrial economy, aimed to raise thestandard of living of the people by the plan’s termination date, 1993-94. At thistime, the share of contribution to the state should be: 48% from the publicsector, 26% from the cooperative sector, and 26% from the private sector. Theagricultural sector plan had three basic objectives: 1) to achieve food sufficiency,2) to provide sufficient raw materials for the industries, and 3) to assure exportof surplus products to increase capital investment.The first 4-year plan (in reality, only 3 yr: from 1971-72 to 1973-74) mightbe considered a preparatory period. This paved the way for the second 4-yrplan (1974-75 to 1977-78), which, in essence, marked the beginning of the 20-yr plan. The annual plan covers the period from April of the current year toMarch of the following year.Considering the targets of the four-year plan, the yearly plan was firstformulated at the central level, passed on to the divisional level, forwarded tothe township level, and finally sent to the village tract level for evaluation.With suggested changes, the plan was returned to the central level, usingthe same channels. The yearly plan was now finalized and submitted toparliament (Pyithu Hluttaw) to be promulgated as law in support of the plan’simplementation for the year. The performance report of the previous year wasalso simultaneously presented in the ”Report to the Pyithu Hluttaw on theFinancial, Economic, and Social Conditions of the Socialist Republic of theUnion of Burma.” Most data quoted in this analysis came from such yearlyreports and department reports.Rice area and productionRice production was steady in the beginning of the period and picked uprapidly toward the end. Increased production was initially brought about byarea expansion and later by yield increases. Strong support services maintainedthe momentum. Changes in the government’s administrative structure andpeople’s participation in the implementation of the national development planfacilitated progress.AreaThe agricultural sector plan encouraged crop intensification rather than areaexpansion to increase rice production. But the plan also called for recultivationof fallow ricelands abandoned during the war. During the period, areadevoted to rice increased slowly and reached its prewar level only in 1963, 18yr after the war. Since then, the rice area remained constant, with slightvariations due to weather abnormalities.RICE PRODUCTION UNDER THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC GOVERNMENT 57

Table 27 indicates the areas planted to rice in selected years. The rice areaat the end of the previous period (4 million ha) rose to 5 million ha, after whichit stabilized. As far as area expansion was concerned, the 4-yr plan targets weremet in the beginning but not quite in later years. On the whole, targetachievement was always excellent and reached 96% (even 100%) in someyears.Table 28 shows the rice area in the states and divisions in 1978, when thearea sown was at its highest level. The Irrawaddy, Pegu, and RangoonDivisions and the Mon and Arakan States were rice surplus areas while theremaining four divisions and five states were deficit areas. (A rice surplussituation exists when the percentage of sown area to total area exceeds thepercentage of population in the area.) The degree of surplus and deficit,though, varied. The Irrawaddy, Pegu, and Rangoon Divisions belong to thedelta areas, which provide surplus rice for both internal and external markets.Rice from surplus areas had to be distributed to deficit areas, with theremaining surplus comprising the export potential. Except for Mandalay andMagwe Divisions, the other five states and two divisions could become selfsufficientin rice if they could raise their annual rice production to a levelslightly higher than that of the population. This could be made possible byraising yields through new technologies. Mandalay and Magwe Divisionswould require more than yield increases to make them self-sufficient; theywould also need more irrigation facilities.In terms of rice environment, the 14 states and divisions could be groupedinto 4: rainfed environment (Irrawaddy, Pegu, and Rangoon), partially irrigatedTable 27. Rice area In Burma, 1980-85. aYearTarget area Sown area %(million ha) (million ha) achievementRemark b1960196219641970197419751976197719785.23---5.0185.0985.1665.2005.2174.2174.8375.1094.9755.1775.2045.0775.1365.24381---1031029899101No planSFYPSFYPSFYPSFYPTFYP19791980198119821983198419855.2385.2805.1435.0755.0095.0044.9175.0265.1274.9214.8824.8314.9174.902969796969698100TFYPTFYPTFYPFFYPFFYPFFYPFFYPa 1960-75 data taken from RGUB 1966, 1973, 1978; 1976-85 data taken from SRUB 1984,1987. b SFYP = second four-year plan, TFYP = third four-year plan, FFYP = fourth four-year plan.58 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

Table 28. Rice area and population, by state or division, 1978.Rice areaPopulationState ordivision a million ha % of total million % of totallrrawaddyPeguRangoonArakanMonSagaingShanKachinTenasserimKayahKarenChinMagweMandalayTotal1.3440.9180.5290.3270.2740.5490.3180.1190.0860.0240.1920.0340.1940.3355.24326181065106220.540.5464.1573.1773.1891.7111.3133.1193.1780.7350.7160.1260.8650.3232.6353.66828.88614.711.311.36.34.911.111.02.42.50.42.41.19.411.1Sources: Department reports. Department of Agriculture. a The first five entries were surplusareas; the rest were deficit areas.dry zone (Sagaing, Mandalay, and Magwe), coastal environment (Mon, Arakan,and Tenasserim), and rainfed elevated environment (Shan, Kachin, Chin,Kayah, and Karen) (Table 29).The delta zone formed an important rice area in view of its area coverageand surplus production. It had dependable rainfall and good soil conditionssuitable to rice cultivation. This zone was composed of four major riceenvironments as classified by Khush (1984)— rainfed lowland shallow,favorable; rainfed lowland shallow, submergence-prone; rainfed lowlandmedium deep, waterlogged; and deepwater.The central dry zone ranked next in terms of area and requirement for localconsumption. The majority of the rice area fell under three, classifications—irrigated with favorable temperature, favorable upland with short growingseason, and unfavorable upland with short growing season.Table 29. Rice areas under different environments.Environmentmillion haRice area% of totalRemarkDelta zoneCentral dry zoneCoastal zoneEastern andnorthern zone2.791.080.690.6953211313RainfedPartially rainfedand irrigatedRainfedRainfedRICE PRODUCTION UNDER THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC GOVERNMENT 59

The coastal zone comprised four rice environments similar to those foundin the delta zone.The eastern and northern zones had the majority of the rice area classifiedas unfavorable upland with long growing season. These lands were highlyelevated areas with highly leached acidic soils.The dry zone offered potential for rice area expansion if irrigation facilitiescould be provided while the delta could benefit from improvements inembankments and drainage.Total cropped area increased steadily with time, although rice area did notexpand. The increase in total cropped area resulted from planting of somecereals like wheat and maize, and some industrial crops like jute, cotton,sugarcane, and pulses. Rice, which occupied more than 70% of the totalcropped area at the start of this century, slowly decreased to 47% in 1985.Table 30 shows the area under rice in relation to total cropped area indifferent years. The percentage of rice to total cropped area was 76% in 1900,decreasing to 60% in 1960, and down again to 47% in 1985. The role of rice inthe agricultural sector had diminished, but it retained its major role in cropproduction activities. The economy of the country had yet to rely on it.YieldRice yield increased more than 80% during the period. It remained stationaryuntil 1976 and increased slowly afterward. The increase was more dramatic inthe late 1970s and in the early 1980s.Table 31 indicates that the national average rice yield remained at about 1.7t/ha until 1974; it later increased at a faster pace and reached 3 t/ha in 1982. Itstabilized afterward. Such an impressive yield increase was the result of theapplication of technology and the provision of support services. In the technologicalaspect, three factors were crucial—the dramatic spread of modernrice varieties (MVs), the greater use of chemical fertilizers, and the farmers’acceptance of improved agronomic practices.Table 30. Rice area In relation to total cropped area, 1900-85.YearRice area(million ha)All crops(million ha)% of rice1900191019201930194019601970198019853.4624.0264.1725.0065.0664.2174.9755.1274.9024.7985.7206.2947.1047.5686.8818.8079.43110.385767066706761565447Sources: Extracted from Appendix I and Appendix Ill.60 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

Table 31. Rice yield in selected years, 1960-85. aYear196119691973197419751976197719781979198019811982198319841985Target yield(t/ha)---1.81.81.91.92.02.12.32.62.73.13.13.3Actual yield%(t/ha)achievement1.6-1.7-1.8-1.8 991.81031.91022.01032.11062.41142.81222.91143.21163.11003.11003.194a 1961-82 yield data were taken from SRUB 1984; 1983-85 data came from SRUB 1987.RemarkNo planNo planNo planSFYPSFYPSFYPSFYPTFYPTFYPTFYPTFYPTFYPFFYPFFYPFFYPThe enthusiastic adoption of technology by the farmers was the outcomeof a new agricultural extension program called the Whole Township RiceProduction Program (WTRPP). (The WTRPP will be discussed in detail later.)The achievement of WTRPP was much higher than that obtained by the 20-yrplan. Even with the yearly target adjusted to the performance of the previousyear, the yield performance surpassed the adjusted yearly target in most years,especially those between 1975 and 1983 (Table 31). After 1983, the yield beganto stabilize. This study was prompted by this phenomenon.A similar yield trend had occurred in some Asian countries at about thesame time. When the rice yields in Burma, Indonesia, and the Philippines werecompared for the period 1970-84, it was found that yield increased (as in thecase of Burma) from about 1.7 t/ha in 1970 to 3.10 t/ha in 1984, a gain of 82%in 14 yr. In Indonesia, the yield rose from 2.36 t/ha in 1970 to 3.87 t/ha in 1984,a gain of 64% in the same period. The Philippines recorded a yield of 1.72 t/hain 1970 which rose to2.49 t/ha in 1984, gaining 45% in the same time frame. Butthe annual rate of increase in yield among these countries was irregular: 1-16%in Burma, 1-13% in Indonesia, and 1-10% in the Philippines. There weresimilarities in the reduction of the rate of increase around 1983 (IRRI 1986). Allthree countries registered less than 1% growth in yield in 1984, compared with8, 6, and 10% growth in 1981 (in Burma, Indonesia, and the Philippines,respectively) (Table 32).Yield data from these countries indicate that the rate of yield increase wassignificant in the 1970s up to the early 1980s (Table 32). It started to slow downin 1984. The three countries launched their own rice production programs. TheWTRPP in Burma, the BIMAS in Indonesia, and the Masagana 99 in thePhilippines utilized MVs and improved agronomic practices.RICE PRODUCTION UNDER THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC GOVERNMENT 61

In the meantime, local researchers exerted serious efforts to develop newrice varieties and soon released four high-yielding varieties—Ngwetoe, a localselection with a reasonably good response to fertilizer; C4-63, a variety bred byP. B. Escuro, a Filipino breeder; Shwe-wahtun, an IR5 mutant producedthrough irradiation by U Tin Myint, a local researcher; and Mashuri, a varietyintroduced from Malaysia. Areas devoted to these four MVs expanded slowly,reaching substantial coverage in the succeeding years. The DSLR monitoredthe sown area and yield of each variety.In 1977, U Thein Aung, a farmer from Taikkyi Township, RangoonDivision, introduced a high-yielding variety called Shwe-ta-soke. This provedthat farmers are capable of developing new technology.IR5 was extensively sown throughout the country. However, it was laterreplaced by the IR5 mutant, which became popular in Lower Burma andbecame an established MV. Under irrigated conditions, Ngwetoe was extensivelysown in Middle Burma, while C4-63 and Mashuri were particularlypopular in Upper Burma. Shwe-ta-soke was accepted in low-lying areas ofLower Burma under rainfed conditions. Other MVs were tried and, whenproven superior, replaced the previous MVs.In 1985, researchers reported that there were 15 prospective MVs for theIrrawaddy Division; 13 for the Pegu Dvision; 14 for Rangoon Division; 8 forArakan State, 7 for Mon and Karen States; 8 for Sagaing Division; 11 for Shan,Chin, Kachin, and Kayah States; and 7 each for Mandalay and TenasserimDivisions. Pending final technical evaluation from location trials and seedmultiplication centers, these new MVs would replace the existing six MVs inaccordance with locational suitability.Table 34. Areas (000 ha) planted to modem variaties in different years, 1970-85. aYear IR5 Ngwetoe C4-63 IR5 Mutant Mashuri Shwe-ta-soke Others Total1970197119721973197419751976197719781979198019811982198319841985173 (91) b148 (79)150 (74)177 (70)237 (72)251 (76)256 (57)215 (42)183 (25)200 (16)189 (9)166 (7)150 (7)117 (5)102 (4)104 (4)17 (9)14 (80)15 (7)21 (8)23 (7)29 (9)34 (8)46 (9)60 (8)66 (5)62 (3)56 (3)57 (3)47 (2)51 (2)52 (2)25 (13)38 (19)55 (22)68 (21)51 (15)38 (8)39 (7)46 (7)51 (4)71 (3)69 (3)63 (3)47 (2)50 (2)50 (2)------12 (3)38 (7)116 (16)316 (25)694 (34)817 (36)852 (37)867 (37)946 (37)961 (37)------110 (24)150 (31)245 (34)317 (26)486 (24)578 (26)511 (22)539 (23)537 (21)468 (18)-------8 (2)42 (6)235 (19)452 (22)497 (22)576 (25)562 (24)537 (21)520 (20)-------8 (2)29 (4)59 (5)93 (5)72 (3)69 (3)164 (7)334 (13)443 (17)190 (4) c187 (4)203 (4)253 (5)328 (6)331 (7)450 (9)512 (10)721 (14)1244 (25)2047 (40)2255 (46)2278 (47)2343 (48)2557 (52)2598 (53)a 1970-75 data from SRUB 1977, 1976-82 data from SRUB 1984, and 1983-85 data from department reports.b Figures in parentheses are percentages of area.c Figures in parentheses (last column) refer to MV% of rice area.RICE PRODUCTION UNDER THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC GOVERNMENT 65

The areas devoted to MVs in selected years are shown in Table 34. MVcoverage of a mere 19,000 ha (4% of total area in 1970) had swelled to 2.6 millionha in 1985, representing a 53% increase in 15 yr. The rate of expansion wasgradual in the beginning, resulting in an annual increase of only 2%, but it rosesharply after 1978, with an annual increase of 10% until 1981; it declinedafterward.IR5, Ngwetoe, and C4-63 were the only three MVs planted until 1976,when the IR5 mutant replaced IR5, and Mashuri substituted for C4-63. Shweta-sokereplaced the long-duration local varieties in the low-lying areas ofLower Burma. Areas devoted to promising MVs (which were under evaluationat that time) are listed in Table 34 as ”Others.” Of these promisingvarieties, the Mashuri mutant showed potential to replace Mashuri and C4-63,and reselected IR42 started replacing Shwe-ta-soke in Lower Burma. Theeasily shattered grains of Mashuri had long been disliked by the farmers butthis variety was nevertheless tolerated because there were no better ones.Similarly, Shwe-ta-soke’s popularity declined as rice millers complained oflow outturn as a result of milling it after long storage.Some MVs, being hybrids, tended to show genetic instability. Farmersaggravated the problem by mixing the different varieties on the threshingfloor. The admixture was so severe that, in some instances, farmers needed toharvest twice for — early-maturing grains, which were selectively harvested,and then for the remaining plants (often covering one quarter of the area)which were harvested a few days later.The area devoted to MVs expanded rapidly in the late 1970s and sloweddown after 1981. This change in rate of adoption necessitated an objectiveevaluation. One question raised concerned the ability of researchers to breednew MVs that would satisfy the needs of farmers and that would suit riceenvironments never before explored.Rice, belonging to a different grain type as classified by Beale (1927), alsofollowed a distinct pattern. In the previous two periods, the bold C-type grainwas very popular in Irrawaddy, Pegu, and Rangoon Divisions since it was theone being exported to India, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia. The European and othermarkets preferred the thin, long A-type. Furthermore, new high-yieldingvarieties with thin, long A-type grains were introduced, eventually replacingthe C-type grain. With these changes, the rice area devoted to A grainincreased.Table 35 shows the area covered by different grain types during the period.The area under A-type grain increased from 12 to 42%, while the area devotedto C-type grain declined from 58 to 23% . The A-type grain would continue toexpand at the expense of the C-type grain.Seed distributionThe DA became more active in its seed distribution program during the period.It distributed pure strains of local rice varieties in the earlier period, but as the66 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

Table 35. Rice area planted, by grain type, 1960-85.PeriodPercentage of area planted toA 0 C D E1961-651966-701971-751976-801981-851213162142461012175852464223202119171068988Sources: Department files, Agricultural Corporation.MV area expanded, it concentrated its activities on the new MV seeds. Theexperimental stations bred new MV strains and carried out breeder andfoundation seed multiplication activities.Seed farms throughout the country were also involved in foundation seedmultiplication. There were no commercial seed producers, but the DA registeredsome farmers who, serving as seed growers, produced certified seed.Seed was important in the drive for higher rice production especially whenMVs constituted a critical component. The seed distribution program, however,fell short of expectation. The yearly distribution of improved seed during theperiod is shown in Table 36.Table 36 indicates that the volume of seed distributed increased from 1,400t in 1961 to 10,000-20,000 t in later years. Even this amount covered only 5-7%of the sown area. There remained a lot more room for improvement. The WorldBank assisted the seed program by providing the experimental stations andseed farms with the necessary equipment. Under existing threshing practices,seed needed to be replenished with pure strains at least once in 3 yr. Theexpansion of MVs also required distribution of seeds of new varieties duringthe first year. There were also seed exchanges among farmers, but a systematicand well-organized seed program was found essential to aid in the drive forhigher production.FertilizersChemical fertilizer was an important input during this period. The use offertilizer increased steadily at an annual rate of approximately 10% until 1967.The rate then increased rapidly as more MVs were used in rice production.MVs would not be able to exhibit their high-yielding potential unless accompaniedby a reasonable dose of fertilizers. Acceptance of fertilizers byfarmers was largely because of their acceptance of MVs. Before the advent ofMVs, fertilizer use was not popular, in spite of low prices and credit availability.Thus, MVs and fertilizers were integrated simultaneously in Burmese agriculture.In subsequent years, a dynamic agricultural extension programgreatly promoted fertilizer utilization. Although supply always exceededdemand before this extension effort, demand far surpassed supply during theRICE PRODUCTION UNDER THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC GOVERNMENT 67

Table 36. Distribution of improved seed, 1961-85. aAmount Area %Year distributed coveredarea(t) b(ha)coverage19611968196919701971197219731974197519761977197819791980198119821983198419851,47010,5804,65011,97014,9008,88018.78019,39011,3304,0004,2408.94013,73036.06010,73010,63013,25019,02015,63028,000205,00090,000232,000290,000172,000365,000377,000220,00078,00082,000174,000267,000700,000208,000206,000257,00039,000304,0000.64.11.84.75.83.57.27.34.21.51.63.35.113.74.24.25.37.56.2a 1961, 68-70 data taken from SRUB 1972; 1970-74 data taken from SRUB 1977; 1975-78 datafrom SRUB 1979; 9179-82 data from SRUB 1984: and 1983-85 data from SRUB 1987. b Amountdistributed converted from baskets to t andcalculated for area coverage with the common seedingrate.program years. The need for more fertilizers became apparent as the areaplanted to MVs expanded.In earlier days, farmers did not want to use fertilizers for fear of spoilingthe soil or making it too dependent on fertilizers. They also doubted theprofitability of using fertilizers. But they soon found out that the high-yieldingpotential of MVs could not be realized without fertilizers. Compared withother crops, the share of rice in the use of fertilizer was low in the beginning,but it soon took a major portion after more areas were planted to MVs. Theyearly utilization of fertilizer is given in Table 37.Fertilizer utilization in Burma rose from about 17,000 t in 1960 to 417,000t in 1985, constituting a 25-fold increase in a period of 25 yr (Table 37). Theincrease was most pronounced in the 1970s. The share of rice in fertilizerutilization was about 40% in the beginning of the period, rising to about 70%as MV areas expanded. Rice enjoyed more than 80% of the share during thespecial extension program.Initially, sugarcane, jute, cotton, groundnut, and rubber utilized a substantialamount of fertilizer. (These crops were separately handled by ARDCon a project-to-project basis.) Furthermore, local rice varieties did not respondwell to fertilizer. But as more as fertilizer-responsive MVs were sown, rice took68 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

All fertilizers were imported until 1975, when urea was produced fromtwo local factories (rated capacity, 130,000 t/yr). Production capacity washigher than utilization capacity at the time. Industry officials were concernedabout production exceeding utilization, but agriculture officials were optimistic.The rapid expansion in MV areas and the enthusiastic acceptance of fertilizersby farmers removed the doubts entertained by industry. They later found outthat urea production was not even enough to satisfy the increasing demandand had to be supplemented through importation. One urea factory doubledits rated capacity, but fertilizer production still fell short of demand. A thirdfactory, with 200,000 t/yr capacity, was then constructed in 1985.Rice, particularly the MVs, used the largest amount of fertilizer. Table 38shows the amount of fertilizer used for MVs during the WTRPP.The MVs utilized a big proportion of the fertilizers, leaving only a smallamount (4-7%) for local varieties. This occurred in areas affected by floods,pests, and diseases; fertilizer was used to enable the crops to recover.The increase in the use of fertilizers between 1969 and 1985 was very high,but Burma used less fertilizer than did many other Asian countries. Consumptionper hectare of arable and permanently cropped land was 1.2 kg ofnutrients in 1966, rising to 16.7 kg in 1982. Compare these figures with 8.4-51.2kg in Bangladesh, 6.8-75.0 kg in Indonesia, and 11.3-28.8 kg in the Philippinesduring the same period (ADB 1985). (These levels of fertilizer use wereaverages of consumption in different years relative to cropped area.) Actualfertilizer rates applied by farmers differed with soil fertility conditions andcrops.Based on fertilizer availability and demand, the AC distributed fertilizerat the rate of 63 kg urea, 33 kg triple superphosphate, and 21 kg muriate ofpotash/ ha. The recommended rate based on research findings is much higher.Research results from numerous experiments conducted at experimentalstations and in farmers’ fields for a number of years indicated that MV ricewould require 250 kg urea, 188 kg triple superphosphate, and 94 kg muriate ofpotash/ha for maximum yield; the optimum requirement per hectare is 104 kgurea, 94 kg triple superphosphate, and 78 kg muriate of potash. These ratestake into consideration the prevailing prices of fertilizers and rice (ARI 1975).Table 38. Utilization of fertilizers (tons) by modern rice varieties, 1979-85 (SRUB1987).Year MV Total % utilization of MV1979198019811982198319841985162,206203,698226,580289,978326,421291,673327,191173,904205,330227,167290,783332,203304,678328,4369399100100989610070 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

The rates of fertilizer calculated for distribution were, therefore, much lowerthan the recommended rates. The supply level of fertilizer determined dosage.Fertilizer was imported annually. Upon arrival at the Rangoon port in theopen season (November to March), it was transported to transit storage placesfor distribution. Locally produced urea also had to be stored in various partsof the country before distribution. Fertilizer factories maintained daily production,and the AC took care of delivery and storage.Since more than 80% of the fertilizer was used for rice, the bulk of fertilizerdistribution took place between January and May, when farmers disposed oftheir rice harvest and bought fertilizer for the next season. This, in fact, was thetime the farmers had ready money for fertilizer procurement.Government loans were also disbursed during this time. Annual factoryproduction of fertilizer did not reveal the supply level for that year, but actualsupply consisted of urea in storage plus the production output from factoriesin the open season. This amount of urea, supplemented by imports, was theamount available for distribution during the year. For triple superphosphateand muriate of potash, annual procurement plus the balance made up thesupply. Distribution of fertilizer during this limited period often createdtransportation problems, especially after the energy crisis. Movement of allagricultural products took place during the open season, and fertilizer distributionwas only a small portion of this huge volume.Table 39 shows the chemical fertilizer supply level for different years andin what year utilization was highest. This table was constructed from datapresented in Reports to the Pyithu Hluttaw in 1984 and 1987. The fertilizersupply level was 200,000 t in 1979-80 and rose to 407,000 t in 1985-86, anincrease of more than 100% in a short time. The increase was mainly due to theincreased supply of urea. This amount, however, did not coincide with theutilization figures in Table 37. Utilization of fertilizer in a particular yeardepends on 1) expansion of MV area, 2) availability of stock at the distributionTable 39. Fertilizer supply, imports, and domestic production (000 t), 1979-85(SRUB 1984,1987).ImportsLocallyPeriod Triple Muriate produced TotalUrea superphosphate of potash urea1979-801980-811981-821982-831983-841984-851985-869.080.7101.0172.093.886.947.954.062.8106.687.561.5130.198.54.09.024.823.517.021.830.0133.9122.2132.5100.5116.5150.4230.8200.9274.7364.9383.5288.8389.2407.2RICE PRODUCTION UNDER THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC GOVERNMENT 71

points, 3) availability of cash among farmers, 4) production of local factoriesduring the open season and amount of importation, and 5) the activities ofextension personnel.Fertilizers were sold throughout the country using a fixed price whichreflected neither the cost of producing fertilizer locally nor the internationalprice of imported fertilizer. In the beginning, the selling price of fertilizers wasbased on the imported price plus charges for handling, storage, and transportation.The prices for different years varied; after 1974, when the use offertilizer became popular and when it played an important role in agriculture,the prices of fertilizer no longer changed with time. Prices of various fertilizersin different years are given in Table 40.Urea was sold at 768 kyats/t in 1965-66. Thereafter, with the changinginternational market price, the price went down to as low as 440 kyats in 1971-72. After 1975, local urea became predominant, and the selling price waspegged at 360 kyats/t, where it has remained up to this day. The price of triplesuperphosphate also varied with the years, from 526 kyats/t in 1966-67 to 463kyats/t in 1971-72. In 1975, it was constant at 1294 kyats/t as the internationalmarket prices spiralled because of the world energy crisis. The price of muriateof potash was pegged at 480 kyats/t in 1966-67 and increased to 598 kyats/t in1975; this price has prevailed until today.The prices of triple superphosphate and muriate of potash have notchanged for the past 13 yr. This has meant a heavy subsidy on fertilizers, witha substantial budget commitment. This burden was somehow eased by fixingthe procurement price of rice such that it fell below the international marketprice. The procurement price of rice in terms of rice equivalent averaged 42%of the average export price for the period 1982-84.The response of MVs to NPK application has been averaged from anumber of fertilizer experiments and expressed in mathematical terms (KhinWin et a1 1975):Table 40. Selling price of fertilizers (kyats/t) in different years, 1965-85.aTripleMuriatePeriod b Urea superphosphate of potash1965-661966-671970-711971-741975-85768600550440360-5265264631294480480480598a Sources: Department reports, Agricultural and Rural Development Corporation and AgriculturalCorporation. b Fertilizers were sold in 50-kg bags from 1965 to 1974. From 1975 to 1985, ureawas sold in 25kg bags and triple superphosphate and muriate of potash were distributed in 50-kg bags.72 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

Y = 2447 + 13.65 N - 0.073 N 2Y = 2447 + 16.11 P 2 O 5 - 0.11 P 2 O 52Y = 2447 + 14.18 K 2 O - 0.14 K 2 O 2for nitrogenfor phosphorusfor potassium oxidewhere Y is the yield of rice.On the basis of this response curve and the prevailing prices of fertilizerand rice, one could surmise that the use of fertilizers on MVs would result ina value-cost ratio of 3, meaning that an investment of 1 kyat would result in aprofit of 2 kyats. Changing fertilizer and rice prices would certainly affect thisratio. Although the rice trade was controlled all along, it was reported that in1987, the government had decontrolled rice procurement. This action wouldchange the price of rice and the value-cost ratio. If the fertilizer prices remainedthe same, the ratio would be in favor of the farmers.The ADB Agriculture Department calculated the prices and costs offertilizers and estimated the implicit subsidy of various fertilizers for differentyears (Table 41). The data indicate that the subsidy on urea constituted threetimes the sale price; the subsidy on triple superphosphate, three-fourths thesale price; and that on muriate of potash, about twice the sale price.AgrochemicalsThe expansion of MVs and the greater use of fertilizers in rice cultivationnecessitated the use of agrochemicals. The low cropping intensity, the hot anddry summer months, and the high mountain ranges at the borders served asdeterrents to widespread infestation of pests and diseases. Infestation occurredonly in localized areas. Farmers, being Buddhists, were reluctant to kill livingorganisms, and the use of agrochemicals was never fully appreciated. The AClikewise encouraged pest surveillance and scouting and used agrochemicalsonly in unavoidable cases. This resulted in pest infestations reaching epidemicproportions because of untimely control.Agrochemicals were used in two forms—emulsified liquid and dust.Some, like Gammexame, DDT, and Lindane, came in both liquid and dustforms and were commonly used because they were cheap. They were usedagainst caseworms Nymphula depunctalis, cutworms Cirphis albistigma, and riceTable 41. Prices and subsidy costs of fertilizers (kyats/t), 1979-83 (ADB 1985).PeriodUrea Triple superphosphate Muriate of potashSale Implicit Sale Implicit Sale Implicitprice subsidy price subsidy price subsidy1979–801980–811981–821982–831983–8436036036036036037676586511531135124412441244124412445241095935118698259859859859859857595110541453965RICE PRODUCTION UNDER THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC GOVERNMENT 73

hispa Hispa armigera. Though annual infestation ranged from 2 to 4% of thesown area, the agrochemicals effectively controlled these pests. In some years,blast disease was reported, and it required the use of perenox or agrosan GNdust. Another commonly used agrochemical was Endrin emulsion concentrate.These agrochemicals, though banned in other countries, remained major itemsbecause of their cost competitiveness.The annual consumption of agrochemicals by ricelands is given in Table42. In most years, farmers preferred the powder to the liquid form, but therewere a few years (1972 and 1984) when more liquid agrochemicals were usedthan powder agrochemicals. The annual consumption of powders rangedfrom 100 to 700 t; that of liquids ranged from a low 50 thousand to a high 400thousand liters. The AC also sold hand dusters, hand sprayers, and powercombinedsprayer-dusters. Yearly sales registered between 500 and 3000 unitsof insecticide applicators only. The use of agrochemicals was more popular incrops other than rice.Table 42. Annual consumption of agrochemicals, 1962-85. aYear bLiquidPowder(000 kg) c (000 liters) cchemicalschemicals196219631964196519661967196819691970197119721973197419751976197719781979198019811982198319841985329310314135181213230385232868073631256918614421123216714910682496745975266661201751822032548137592661776311921211315715219924817396a Sources: For 1962-70 data, RGUB 1970; for 1971-73, SRUB 1974: for 1974-78, SRUB 1979;for 1979-82, SRUB 1984; for 1983-85, SRUB 1987. b Some years mentioned utilization of cerealsbut this was taken as that of rice considering it took more than 90% of consumption. c All data inpound and gallon converted to kg and liter, respectively.74 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

Extensive use of agrochemicals with long-lasting residual action is certainlynot desirable. Preventive measures, surveillance and scouting, combinedwith the introduction of reasonably resistant varieties (rather thanincreased use of agrochemicals), should constitute the long-range strategy.There were some reports of indiscriminate use of agrochemicals, including afew incidents with fatalities.A lot more needs to be done in the field of agrochemical utilization beforeit can contribute significantly to rice production. Especially wanting are effortsto promote protective clothing, correct dispensing, proper use of applicators,containment of health hazards, and use of antidotes in emergency cases.Agricultural loansIn this period, agricultural loans played an increasingly important role as theneed for agricultural credit became critical. The new technology required moreinputs and needed more hired labor, and this meant additional cost to thefarmers. The government was the sole agency that provided agricultural loans,since private moneylending was declared illegal. Aside from the very fewprivate moneylenders taking the risk, government loans adequately coveredthe farmers’ cultivation costs.During this period, changes in lending agency, lending amount, lendingrate, and lending procedures were instituted. The State Agricultural Bank,which undertook loan disbursement, continued its business with greaterefficiency and confidence. The Department of General Administration stoppedits loan disbursement activities in 1965. The State Agricultural Bank wasrenamed Myanma Agricultural Bank (MAB) in 1976, and it took charge ofseasonal, medium-term, and long-term agricultural loans. The amount ofagricultural loans increased greatly, especially after 1978 when the WTRPPwas launched. The lending rate also rose substantially to help solve thefarmers’ credit problem.MAB loans were granted through village banks. Farmers were charged12% interest per annum and were asked to leave 1% of the loan as compulsorysaving. The MAB charged the village bank 8% per annum, leaving 4% ascapital to be used by the village bank. The MAB also gave the bank a 10%commission on the loan principal recovered, plus 2% on all interests recovered.It could now accumulate these earnings and use them for future lendingwithout the assistance of the MAB. This change in procedures, with the closesupervision of the SACS before 1974 and the People’s Councils after that,contributed to the smooth disbursement and repayment of loans. The nationalrecovery rate for seasonal loans has averaged more than 90% since then.Agricultural loans, thus, supplemented the original objective, with quite atangible contribution to rice production.RICE PRODUCTION UNDER THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC GOVERNMENT 75

The amounts of agricultural loans given to rice and other crops are givenin Table 43. The annual loan disbursement of 57 million kyats in 1960 increasedto 1.19 billion kyats in 1985. The increase in agricultural loans was steady until1978, when a drastic increase occurred. Rice loans comprised 85-88% of thecrop loans. From 1974 to 1977, loan disbursement for rice went down as theTrade Corporation (the agency responsible for rice procurement) used an"advanced purchase" system in rice surplus areas. Rice loans disbursed by theMAB during these years were only for areas without procurement centers. Theadvanced purchase system was discontinued after 1978 when the MABresumed loan disbursement.Such high disbursement of loans after 1978 could be attributed to theexpansion of area devoted to MVs and to the higher lending rate. The lendingrate was 19.77 kyats/ha in the previous period, rising to 29.65 in 1962, 74.13 in1963, 86.49 in 1967, and 172.97 in 1977. These lending rates, fixed for all ricevarieties, were given in two installments—70-80% was disbursed beforecultivation, while the remainder was given at harvest. Since 1978, farmers hadrequested that loans be divided into two equal parts—one half before cultivationand the other half just before harvest. In 1981, the lending rate was raised twice(345.94 kyats/ha) to meet extra expenditures for labor and other inputs.In 1978, the MAB also made loans available for the purchase of draft cattle,power tillers, and water pumps. Crop loans, however, remained a majorcomponent of the lending operations.Improved lending procedures and closer supervision by responsiblepersonnel resulted in high loan repayment. A repayment rate of 90% comparedfavorably with 78% in the previous period. The high repayment rate alsoindicated the profitability of modern rice technology.An ADB agricultural sector survey team estimated that the MAB loanscovered approximately 80% of the credit requirement for rice (ADB 1985). InTable 43. Agricultural loans (million kyats) granted In selected years, 1960-85. aYear Rice All crops % share of rice Remark19601970197419781979198019811982198319841985-124.71.1693.4720.8701.41040.81063.71040.41055.11033.957.4151.43.3809.6845.5826.51176.41210.11190.71218.71197.6-82338685858888878786Not mentióned separatelyAdvanced purchase systema Sources: For 1960 data, SRUB 1970; for 1970-72, SRUB 1974; for 1974, SRUB 1977; for 1975-78, SRUB 1979; for 1979–82, SRUB 1984; and for 1983-85, SRUB 1987.76 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

this period, credit could be considered adequate in meeting rice cultivationrequirements in spite of the huge area and the large number of farmersinvolved. The adequacy of the amount of loan could not, in itself, be taken assatisfactory. It should be disbursed on time to cover the partial cost of riceproduction. In earlier periods, loans were often given late, usually after theplanting season, and farmers just spent the money for nonproductive purposes.This misuse of credit was one of the important reasons for low repayment.The MAB had contributed substantially to higher rice production, butthere remained some areas that needed improvement. Credit availability in arelatively adequate amount influenced the decision of farmers to adoptmodern technology. Without such a large amount of agricultural loans available,rapid rice production growth would not have been possible.Draft cattleDraft cattle continued to be the main source of power, providing more than90% of the requirement. In rice production, draft cattle were involved fromtillage operation to threshing and farm transport. During this time, smallpower tillers were introduced, but their use was limited because of their highrepair and maintenance costs and fuel needs. Cattle would remain the mainsource of power in Burmese agriculture in the foreseeable future.In the beginning of the period, the cattle population stood at 3.284 millionhead, rising to 6.516 million head in 1985, with an average annual growth rateof 2.2%. This growth rate surpassed that of gross sown area, resulting in lessload share with time. The cattle population level was, therefore, consideredfavorable to crop production.Table 44 shows the gross sown area and the corresponding cattle populationin different years. Gross sown area increased from 7 million ha in thebeginning of the period to more than 10 million ha. The increase came mainlyTable 44. Gross sown area and draft cattle In selected years, 1960-85. aGrossDraftYear sown area cattle(000 ha) (000 head)Load(ha/pair)196019651970197519801982198419856,9358,7759,0409,44210,0389,91010,51610,3853,2844,2424,1185,0185,7346,1376,3666,5164.234.144.393.763.502.233.303.19a Sources: For 1960 data, RGUB 1966; for 1965 and 1970, SRUB 1973; for 1975, SRUB 1979;for 1980 and 1982, SRUB 1984; and for 1984 and 1985, SRUB 1987.RICE PRODUCTION UNDER THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC GOVERNMENT 77

from double-cropped areas (Table 44). Cattle also rose from 3.3 million to 6.5million head, an almost 100% increase. Cattle growth exceeded cropped areagrowth—the load factor of 4.23 ha/pair decreased to 3.19 in a period of two anda half decades. (For yearly data, see Appendix III.)This favorable cattle population level, combined with the short growthduration of MVs, increased cropping intensity in the country to an appreciableextent. A pair of cattle at the end of the rice season appeared exhausted; usingthem for the second crop was simply unreasonable. The farmer either gotanother pair of cattle or he used a tractor or power tiller to undertake theoperations efficiently. Moreover, cattle manure was an important nutrientsource supplementing scarce fertilizer. Farmers usually applied farmyardmanure to rice nurseries.Burmese farmers had a strong attachment to the animals and spentsubstantial amount of money for feed (rice bran, oil cake, or a mixture of thetwo), almost the same amount they spent for their own food.Since 1970, the MAB had provided loans for the purchase of draft cattleand carts. These loans (usually six-year duration) had to be repaid in six equalinstallments at low interest (12% per annum). The cattle purchased werepledged as surety. The size of the loan depended on the local price of draftcattle—between 2000 and 3000 kyats/animal. The cart would cost about 2000kyats and the loans for cattle and cart were often administered together.However, a separate loan for either cattle or cart was possible. There wereloans to acquire power tillers that would relieve the load of cattle and increasefarm power, but these were not very popular. Aside from the maintenance andfuel problems of power tillers, the favorable cattle population reduced theneed for the machines.The government lifted the ban on the slaughter of cattle to stabilize meatand fish prices. A close watch by the People’s Councils on the indiscriminateslaughter of cattle at various levels averted the depletion of cattle stock. In spiteof the adequate number of cattle in the country, a great potential for furtherimproving this important agricultural asset existed. Population pressure onland was relatively low, and there were many areas that could support cattleraising with success. Climatic conditions in these areas—a critical factor forsuch an endeavor—were most appropriate for feed and fodder production.Additionally, many crop byproducts could provide high-quality feed. Encouragementof cattle breeding in these areas, together with proper veterinary care,would further enhance the draft cattle position in the country.Support servicesStronger support services characterized the period. Sufficiently trainedmanpower and reasonably equipped laboratories—results of internationalassistance—contributed greatly to agricultural development. The institu-78 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

tional framework reestablished during the last period provided the servicesdemanded by development programs. The peace and order situation in thecountry had improved. The administrative structure had also been realignedto serve the people effectively. Farmers were well-motivated, and they eagerlyparticipated in the agricultural sector program. The priority enjoyed by theagricultural sector in the earlier period, more of a lip service than anything else,lacked financial support. The government made more investments during thisperiod.InvestmentIn the agricultural sector, crop production was a major activity and thegovernment made major investments in this subsector. The forestry andlivestock subsectors also offered more investment opportunities, but thesewere less than those found in the crop subsector. Major investments weremade in agricultural research, extension, irrigation, and agricultural mechanization,with substantial impact on crop production. Agricultural sectorinvestments accounted for about 10% of total investments in the beginning ofthe period, increasing to nearly 20% in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Thisimprovement in investment climate resulted in the correspondingly highercontribution of the agricultural sector to the gross domestic product of Burma.Table 45 compares government investment in the agricultural sector againsttotal investment in selected years.Government investment in all sectors increased steadily in the beginning,but the rate of increment was more substantial since 1977-78 (Table 45).Investment in the agricultural sector increased from 66 million kyats in 1962 to1.2 billion kyats in 1985. The increase was more pronounced after 1977-78,Table 45. Government Investment in the agricultural sector in selected years(1962-85) . a Investment (million kyats)PeriodTotal all sectors Agricultural sector % of agricultural sector1962-631964-651968-691970-711971-721972-731977-781978-791982-831983-841985-8649357275577189473532785124820181536747667981629473645a95137913791158131411811102017171718a Sources: SRUB 1972, 1974, 1977, 1979, 1984, 1987.RICE PRODUCTION UNDER THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC GOVERNMENT 79

when investment in the agricultural sector rose by more than 25% a year until1982-83. The percentage share of the agricultural sector in total investmentstood at 13% in 1962; it rose to 20% in 1977-78, and slid down again to 18% in1985. In spite of this rapid increase, government investment in the agriculturalsector was considered low, compared with the 38% allocation to the industrialsector. Industrial sector investment, of course, included agribased industrieslike fertilizer, power tiller, and water pump factories.Private investments—in the form of land improvement, drainage, andsmall-scale irrigation systems—also existed but these were not reflected in thestatistics.More investments are needed to promote crop production, but it would bedesirable to consider the investment-worthiness of the various componentsinvolved in the agricultural sector.Agricultural researchWhen the government adopted crop intensification rather than area expansionas a strategy to increase rice production, agricultural research and extensionconstituted the most important support service in the implementation of theagricultural sector plan. This government action influenced the direction of thecountry’s research efforts. Research is critical in the achievement of verticalproductivity growth rather than of horizontal area expansion. But it took sometime for research to seize this opportunity. Research funding increased greatlyduring the period, especially after the 1970s. Investment in research increasedappreciably when foreign-assisted projects were initiated and implemented.In the beginning of the period until the late 1960s, research was not giventhe importance it deserved. Research infrastructure, inherited at the onset ofindependence, had not changed much. The nine central experimental stationsundertook mainly varietal improvement research. Research activities failed toproduce the technology demanded by the agricultural sector plan. Because ofvast differences in soil, water availability, and agronomic management practicesbetween experimental stations and farmers’ fields, one could not expectresearch recommendations emanating from the stations to achieve the sameresults in every area. Satisfying the need of individual farmers would also becertainly beyond the capacity of the research stations, but recommendationsshould suit a large number of potential users. Research facilities, in thebeginning of the period, remained inadequate in terms of personnel, equipment,and relevant programs.Two divisions under AC—the Agricultural Research Institute (ARI) andthe Applied Research Division (ARD)—are responsible for the development oftechnology. In the early 1970s, ARI, situated 15 km north of Rangoon, wasmoved to Yezin, a good 410 km farther north. Equipped with more laboratoryand field facilities, ARI was transferred to serve both Upper and Lower Burma.The United Nations Development Programme and the Food and Agriculture80 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

Organization assisted ARI by providing equipment and expertise, while ACtook care of the laboratory and field facilities. ARI had five disciplinarydivisions (Soils, Botany, Plant Pathology, Entomology, and Agronomy) andsix crop-oriented divisions (Cereal Crops, Oil Crops, Food Crops, Fiber Crops,Sugar Crops, and Horticulture Crops)—all fairly well-equipped and -staffed.ARD also expanded its experimental stations from 9 to 14, one station foreach state or division. In collaboration with ARI, these experimental stationswere designed to conduct location-specific research.The release of MVs that outyielded the local varieties impressed thecountry’s planners and administrators. Since then, agricultural research wasdeemed crucial in efforts to increase crop production. Higher crop productivitywas regarded possible through technical change.Agricultural research now enjoyed the prestige it deserved. The governmentformed the Research Policy Direction Board composed of ministerscoming from science-related departments. The Agricultural Science ResearchDivision constituted 1 of the 14 science divisions under this Board. Agriculturalresearch programs were laid down by the Agricultural Research Committee ofthe Agricultural Science Research Division. The Agricultural Research Committeewas composed of members from the AC, faculty members from theInstitutes of Agriculture and Economics, and officials of departments involvedin agricultural science. The Committee drew long- and short-term researchprograms in line with the national objectives of the agricultural sector plan.Implementation of the research program was done mainly by ARI andARD; other institutes and departments also undertook research programs tothe extent permitted by their resources. The Committee also organized anannual research congress where about 25-30 research papers were presented.The Committee also developed technology from these research findings,examining such outputs before passing these to the AC Extension Division fordissemination.The manpower capability of ARI has expanded to a level that can bereasonably considered sufficient to meet the needs of the country. The technicalstaff of the two divisions increased from 120 to 931:74 postgraduate degreeholders and about twice as many research assistants who hold Bachelor ofAgriculture degrees. The research support staff (Bachelor of Agriculture,Diploma, and agricultural high school graduates) assisted the technical staff.The proportion of postgraduate degree holders in the four disciplines (plantbreeding, soil science, plant protection, and agronomy) appeared well-balanced.Unlike in the previous years, research was not oriented to plant breedingalone; it covered other fields as well.Research workers, however, required some motivation, especially thepostgraduate degree holders who had been exposed to better working environmentsin advanced countries. They tended to restrict themselves to thelaboratories and avoided working in the fields. Correct attitude and behaviorRICE PRODUCTION UNDER THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC GOVERNMENT 81

The program brought research and extension personnel together, close enoughto change their attitude toward each other. Varietal trials using cultivarsintroduced from other countries offered a good exercise in effective coordinationamong researchers, extension workers, and farmers.Farmers’ participation in these programs was impressive. But their involvementwas not complete, considering that researchers and extensionworkers predetermined the treatments (in the case of extensive fertilizer trials)and the varieties (in the case of varietal trials) and imposed these on the farmersat a later stage. Had the farmers participated right from the beginning, hadtheir needs been clearly defined, and had their situation been assessed withdue consideration to resources at hand, the results would have been better.Proper linkages and a more thorough understanding of these groups of peoplewere important in developing technologies appropriate to a particular situationand to a specific group.Many foreign-assisted research projects, both in the experimental stationsand in farmers’ fields, were initiated and implemented in the late 1970s. Theseprojects contributed resources in the form of expertise, equipment, and training.Research, then, contributed effectively to the agricultural sector plan.Agricultural extensionThe DA and ARDC continued their extension activities in the beginning of theperiod. ARDC handled economically important crops that needed specialattention to raise their productivity. Because of the more flexible administrativeand financial structure of ARDC, its actions were more dynamic. They,however, often lacked sustainability because of inadequate technical support.The DA, though it lacked the other agency’s dynamism and mobility, wasreasonably well-supported technologically.These two agencies were merged to form the AC in 1974. The ExtensionDivision of the AC continued its extension activities and, with sufficient staffand funds, achieved what neither one could do alone before. The staff whojoined the extension service started as Village Extension Managers (VEMs),irrespective of educational qualification. In time, they were promoted toVillage Tract Extension Manager, Township Extension Manager, DeputyDivisional Extension Manager, Divisional Extension Manager, and GeneralExtension Manager. Advanced educational qualifications could accelerate therate of promotion.The extension approach employed was the same as that used in theprevious period. A new technology, or a new variety, or the use of fertilizer wasdemonstrated on a carefully selected small plot located at the junction of roadsleading to the town. Farmers readily admitted that the yield of this demonstrationplot was higher than those of surrounding plots, but they had doubtsabout input availability and timeliness of delivery. Nor were they sure aboutthe technology’s profitability. They thought that such a technology would onlyRICE PRODUCTION UNDER THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC GOVERNMENT 83

work in experimental plots endowed with sufficient inputs, but it would notwork in their own fields.A proper understanding of the farmers’ milieu—their problems, potential,limitations, resources, and social processes—was needed to achieve thedesired effect. It was generally accepted that when farmers consider a newtechnology, they go through a logical problem-solving process involving thesesteps: awareness, interest, evaluation, trial, and adoption or rejection (Swansonet al 1984). Neglect of farmers’ feelings or lack of seriousness on the part of theextension workers often reduced the effectiveness of such demonstrations.The country launched long- and short-term national economic programsembracing the agricultural sector plans. Technology was essential in implementingthese plans effectively. Burmese agriculture—consisting of smallfarms, with the majority at the subsistence level and operated by farmers withlow education—needed technology appropriate to their situation. Their currentcrop production practices were based on experience, accumulated througha number of years, and were passed on from one generation to another. Theywould not change their practices that easily, unless they were sure that thetechnology would work in their environment. What the extension workersthought and what the farmers perceived often differed diametrically.Constantly in touch with farmers, the VEMs served as frontline workers,their success depending on their attitudes toward the farmers and the activitiesthey performed. Young and inexperienced, most of them were not happy withthe uncomfortable life in the village. As they gained some experience, theytried to move to urban areas. They realized that conditions prevailing at theinstitute differed from those in the field. For those who were not reallydedicated and mission-oriented, the task facing them proved formidable.They soon found themselves working with farmers who were tough, intelligent,hard-working, ingenious, and resilient. The leadership of the youngVEMs would not be accepted easily. Farmers were always purposeful andreasonably efficient in managing the resources at their disposal, and theycould not stand to see laziness and stupidity in their midst. Moreover, theVEMs were given responsibilities that they could barely undertake. Table 46shows the average area of responsibility assigned to each VEM.The number of VEMs increased from 1800 in 1972 to 7075 in 1985 (Table46). During the same period, gross sown area rose from 8 million to 10 millionha, reducing the average area of responsibility for each VEM from 4600 to 1500ha. With the existing roads and transportation system, one would consider1000 ha for each VEM appropriate. Such an area would comprise approximately350 farm families, probably situated in two or three villages. The presentmanpower strength of VEMs in AC slightly fell short of requirement, thoughit increased nearly 400% in a little more than two decades. Agriculturegraduates were available, but AC could not provide them job positions. Beinga government organization, AC needed time to reorganize and increase itsstaff.84 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

Table 46. Average area of responsibility for each VEM in different years, 1962-85. aNo. of Gross Average area ofPerod VEMs sown area responsibility for(million ha)each VEM (ha)196219661970197419781982198517923787388255925392669370758.3768.6509.0409.5009.8629.91010.3854647228423291699166314811468a Sources: RGUB 1974, 1979, 1984, 1987.Unlike the previous era when there were only 10 Bachelor of Agriculturegraduates a year, the present period witnessed about 200 students graduatingfrom the Institute of Agriculture annually. Agriculture courses gained prominenceand attracted many bright students during this period.Changing administrative structure, changing technology, and changingneeds necessitated the design of an extension strategy that would be appropriateto the prevailing conditions in the country. This need became moreapparent when the training and visit (T&V) approach employed in WorldBank projects proved less effective than expected.Administrative structure had been completely changed. Prior to thischange, the district was the focal point of administration, with the DeputyCommissioner as head. The revamp brought people closer to the centraladministration, and this expedited many of its developmental functions.Townships and divisions were now administered by elected representatives ofthe people (the People's Councils) instead of by lone civil officers.Farmers were also motivated; enthusiastic about the change, they werereadily united under the Farmers' Assiayones. Technology was available frominternational research institutes. What was needed was local adaptive research,agriculture being location-specific. The National Research Institute was staffedby qualified scientists and sufficiently equipped to conduct such locationspecificresearch.The AC was further strengthened with the addition of some staff positions.Institutional machinery that could develop appropriate technology and transferit to the farmers was now in place. Now that conditions in the country wereconducive to progress, it was only a matter of developing and initiating asuitable extension strategy.This extension strategy for rice was developed and tried on a pilot scale,and practiced on a wider scale with other crops in subsequent years. It was a"selective concentrative strategy" which became known as the Whole TownshipRice Production Program (WTRPP). The strategy radically changed AC'spractice of equally allocating its limited resources to its various functions. WithRICE PRODUCTION UNDER THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC GOVERNMENT 85

such a practice, resources were spread too thinly to be effective. WTRPP basedits action on proven technology that would take maximum advantage of theprevailing conditions while minimizing the effects of constraints. With theactive participation of researchers, extension workers, people’s representatives,and farmers themselves, the new rice production technology wasdiffused to help farmers increase their yield. The township served as theprimary unit in the program. An average township has approximately 40,000ha of riceland, and a population of 100,000. Schools, markets, hospitals, andrailway stations were normally found in the capital.WTRPP has five components—proven new technology, government supportand leadership, selectivity and concentration, mass participation, anddemonstration and competition.Proven new technologyResults of research about high-yielding MVs, responses of rice to fertilizers,rate and method of fertilizer applications, plant protection practices, optimumplant population densities, and many other components of rice yield werealready available. These were carefully examined by both researchers andextension workers and presented as a new technology package.Government support and leadershipThe AC specified 10 impact points that would comprise the new rice productiontechnology: 1) MV with high yield potential (both exotic and local), 2) propertillage, 3) correct plant population, 4) correct seedling age, 5) application ofFYM, 6) application of chemical fertilizers, 7) proper weeding, 8) proper watermanagement, 9) control of insects and diseases, and 10) minimizing losses.Different MVs suited to different environments and those appropriate tothe specific townships had to be identified. During the time of insurgency,farmers paid less attention to proper tillage and consequently obtained reducedyields because of weed problems.As to plant population, the traditional method used 150,000 plantinghills/ha based on their experience with long growth-duration, photoperiodsensitivelocal varieties. Research revealed 300,000 planting hills/ha as optimum,but this was not accepted by farmers. Considering that transplantingcharges were paid on an area basis, transplanters objected to higher plantpopulation because it merely involved more work. Transplanters again didnot want to use 25- to 30-day-old seedlings simply because they were used tothe bigger 40-to 60-day-old seedlings of local varieties.For the short-duration MVs, these impact points contributed a lot to theachievement of higher yields. Fertilizer application in rice cultivation-quitea new experience for farmers-required that the right type of fertilizer beapplied at the right time in the right amount. This impact point generated theleast resistance from farmers. Farmyard manure application, though a well-86 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

established practice among farmers, was set aside when chemical fertilizersbecame available. Farmers thought that with fertilizers, there was no moreneed for FYM. They did not realize the complementary nature of the two, andit was thus necessary to correct this misinformation.The impact point for proper weeding was necessitated by improper tillageoperations. A properly tilled plot with good water management seldomrequired weeding. In this perspective, these two impact points were related.Proper drainage and irrigation or keeping an adequate level of water underrainfed rice cultivation was a technique the farmers had learned through theyears.Control of insects and diseases was especially critical in the case of newlyintroduced MVs that were prone to insect and disease attack when givenhigher doses of fertilizer.The last impact point—minimizing losses—was essential as farmers usedto delay harvesting (because of labor shortage) without realizing the magnitudeof losses incurred. These losses could be substantial, since their judgmentof the right harvest time was always 5-10 d off the optimum.The BSPP and the Farmers’ Assiayones provided the political leadership,while the state agencies assisted in every possible way to successfully implementWTRPP. At the township level, a Township Party Unit provided politicalleadership, and the Township People’s Council, assisted by AC, supervisedWTRPP implementation. Since the members of the Township Party Unit andthe People’s Council belonged to the township, they were familiar with thephysical, biological, social, and economic milieu of their constituents. Theywere authorized to coordinate the activities of the various government agencieswithin the township and make decisions about program implementation. ATownship Extension Manager, with his staff of extension workers, took anactive role in technology transfer and input distribution. Each VEM supervised800 ha (or approximately 300 farm families); this compared favorably with thenational average of 1500 ha.Selectivity and concentrationOn the national scale, agricultural sector investment had increased, but itsshare relative to the industrial sector remained small. Rather than spread thelimited resources equally but thinly, the strategy opted to use all resources inareas where there was high probability of success. Selectivity was applied interms of locality, rice variety, extension personnel, and management method.Townships with manageable size, reasonably good physical conditions, andaccessibility were selected. From the research results, exotic and local ricevarieties were selected to suit chosen localities. Selectivity of extension personnelinvolved choosing young, active, innovative team workers with the rightattitude toward the farmers. Other criteria included technical capability,imagination, diligence, and appreciation of the farmer’s life.RICE PRODUCTION UNDER THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC GOVERNMENT 87

Mass participationThe new technology had a high labor requirement. However, rural populationincreased at a faster pace than did area expansion. There was rural underemploymentbecause agriculture, being seasonal, demanded more labor at aspecific time-more than what the locality could provide. This was especiallytrue of transplanting and harvesting, the two most labor-consuming operationsin rice cultivation. The new technology required transplanting of 25- to30-day-old seedlings at twice the number of planting hills. The high laborrequirement was met by voluntary exchange of labor among villages ortownships as organized by the People’s Councils. A mass movement involvingstudents and other workers was likewise mobilized. Musicians and dancerswere among the volunteer labor who provided entertainment through songsand dances depicting MV cultivation (Fig. 11, 12). Agriculture, being the mainsector of the country’s economy, drew the attention of the masses; its progresswas everybody’s concern.Demonstration and competitionThe strategy encouraged farmers to demonstrate their capability in riceproduction by competing with each other in such activities as transplanting,harvesting, and maximizing yield. These competitions among farmers andamong townships tested their capabilities to the fullest. Township People’sCouncils awarded prizes to farmers who excelled in rice production (Fig. 13).The AC provided prizes to townships that gave the best performance in theprogram.11. Voluntary labor contribution.88 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

12. Voluntary labor harvesting rice.Pilot programThe old practice of agricultural extension involved technology disseminationachieved by assigning a number of villages (usually 5-7 villages, depending onpopulation density and accessibility) to each VEM. Under the new strategy,collective work under a collective leadership was the rule. Ten to twelve VEMswere grouped together and assigned to an area comprising 50-80 villages. TheVEMs were made to stay together at a technology diffusion center, commonlycalled a “production camp” (Fig. 14). Each production camp had a dormitory13. Awarding ceremony.RICE PRODUCTION UNDER THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC GOVERNMENT 89

14. Production camp at Hmawbi township.for the VEMs and a training hall for both VEMs and farmers. The VEMs stayedin production camps and visited their families once a week. Given theresponsibility to implement the WTRPP in the area allotted to the camp, theydivided the task among themselves by dividing the same area into three or foursubareas.Such a division clearly defined individual responsibilities and groupaction. The work of the township and production camps was supervised by amain committee and four subcommittees (Agricultural Management, CultivationActivities, Procurement and Distribution of Inputs, and Disease andInsect Control). At the township level, the Chairman of the Township People’sCouncil led the main committee, composed of representatives from the masses,class organizations, and government agencies. He was assisted by the TownshipExtension Manager. At the production camp level, one executive member ofthe Township People’s Council led one subcommittee and was assisted by themost senior VEM. The activities of the four subcommittees were organized andcoordinated by the main committee.The Agricultural Management Subcommittee determined resourceavailability and allocated shares to places where they were most needed.Statistics on labor, cattle, and land were collected by this subcommittee. It alsoprescribed individual, communal, and governmental action in the detailedplanning of the township.The Cultivation Activities Subcommittee oversaw timely cultivation—from tilling to harvesting and threshing. It advised farmers on such topics asproper tillage, correct seedling age, correct plant population, and correct time90 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

of harvesting. It sought voluntary labor in cases where operations could not bedone on time. It was also responsible for the collective purchase of the requiredimplements and other necessary utensils. It coordinated the irrigation anddrainage practices of farmers, always the cause of serious disputes. Sincedraining of water had to be done from field to field, water requirements wereoften a debatable issue among neighboring farms.The Procurement and Distribution of Inputs Subcommittee was responsiblefor the procurement of MV seeds, fertilizers, agrochemicals, and theirtimely distribution to farmers. To ensure a smooth flow of inputs and tofacilitate distribution, it also made arrangements for adequate transportationand storage facilities.The Disease and Insect Control Subcommittee regularly monitored insectsand diseases in the field, more frequently during unfavorable weather. Itcoordinated implementation of preventive and control measures with the ACpest control squad. Farmers were usually hesitant to kill insects on a massivescale; and only a few kept their own insecticide applicators. They used to waituntil insect occurrence had reached epidemic proportions. Insecticide applicatorswere kept by AC at the production camps, and the pest control squadwas mobilized immediately when the situation demanded.Each production camp kept necessary statistics on rice area, MV planted,cattle population, labor availability, implement and input availability,agrometeorological data, and the area of responsibility covered by the camp(aided by maps, charts, and tables). The rice production targets, the camp'swork programs, and achievements to date were also reflected in these tables,along with names of staff manning the camp.15. Agricultural extension worker at production camp.RICE PRODUCTION UNDER THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC GOVERNMENT 91

Many slogans explaining the objectives and activities of the program werealso posted inside the production camps. Translation of these slogans wouldlead to loss of essence and meaning, but two translations are worth mentioning—oneslogan said “Problems are inconsequential but human power iscritical,” and another pointed to the need to “Appreciate and love the dignityof labor.”Training and meetings conducted frequently at production camps madethem busy places. Other government agencies used the camps to carry outtheir activities (Fig. 15, 16). The MAB, for instance, used the camps to disburseloans, while the Health Department used them to give out vaccines. In someareas, farmers used the training hall of the camp to entertain guests duringweddings. Central and division leaders also used the camps in addition toresearchers who were reluctant to visit the rural areas and who would ratherstay in the camps for a short period. The people found more uses for theproduction camps than they expected.Although the cost of constructing a production camp was part of WTRPPexpenditure (on a fixed rate by AC), farmers contributed money to make itbetter than those in other townships. The townships, having one main campand four to five smaller camps, competed with each other, not only in riceproduction but also in the magnificence of their buildings.The new technology with its 10 impact points was first tried in 1975 on 162ha in Phalon Village, Taikkyi Township, Rangoon Division. It involved 59farmers. These preproject activities served as a training ground for 41 extensionworkers. They also served as a means to test the farmers’ attitude towardtechnological change and also acted as guide to ascertain the kind of compo-16. Fertilizer distribution at production camp.92 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

nents that a larger project would require. Researchers also participated in theprogram.The results were encouraging. The average rice yield in the area rose from1.9 to 5.1 t/ha. At the beginning of the rice season, about 8% of the farmers inthe area rejected the project, while 52% were indifferent. The remaining 40%cooperated and tried the new technology. At the end of the season, the greatincrease in rice yield softened the attitude of the other farmers. Surprisingly,those who had initially resisted the technology cooperated more eagerly in thesecond year, serving as the best unpaid extension workers. The preprojectwork was expanded in 1976—it now covered 18 villages, 1886 ha, and 506farmers. Again, the average rice yield increased from 2.1 to 4.0 t/ha.Full-scale programThe experience gained during these past two years, together with the administrativesupport given by AC, put the program into action starting withtwo townships in 1977-78. The AC supplemented the township staff withagriculture graduates working on a temporary basis—at a rate of 800 ha perVEM. The overworked township staff were thus relieved, and each VEM gota suitable workload. The young VEMs underwent 2 mo of preservice trainingon various aspects of agricultural planning, implementation, and evaluation,with special reference to the concepts and implementation programs ofWTRPP. This helped improve the knowledge and attitude of the young VEMs,who were the main force behind the program. In-service training of existingtownship staff on topics like MVs, fertilizers, agrochemicals, and plant protectiontechniques motivated them to work with more confidence. In recognition ofthese efforts, a number of AC staff were elected to offices at the different levelsof Party functionaries and People's Councils.The first two townships covered by the WTRPP were Shwebo in UpperBurma (38,315 ha) and Taikkyi in Lower Burma (52,662 ha). Results wereencouraging. The rice yield in Shwebo went up from 2.4 to 3.1 t/ha, while thatin Taikkyi rose from 2.0 to 2.8 t/ha. Rice production in Shwebo was 24% higherthan the target; in Taikkyi, it was 28% higher.In 1978-79, WTRPP expanded, covering 23 townships and involving850,000 ha. The yield increased from 2.1 to 2.8 t/ha, a 33% increment. Usingmultiple regression, a production function was estimated to account for thesources of yield increase. About 97% of the yield change could be explained bythis regression analysis. Various factors contributed to the yield increase: ureafertilizer application contributed 40%; correct seedling age, 18%; row transplanting,24%; potash fertilizer application, 14%; and insect control, 1% (KhinWin et a1 1981).The success of the program attracted many more townships, and it hasbecome widespread since then. The number of townships increased to 43 in1979-80, 72 in 1980-81 and 1981-82, and 82 in 1982-83. The number remainedthe same in the following years until the program ended in 1985-86. TheRICE PRODUCTION UNDER THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC GOVERNMENT 93

involvement of more townships representing a wide range of rice environmentsslackened the pace of the program's implementation and called for acritical analysis of the program.The 82 townships (of a total of 314) presented a wide variation in environments.Rice area coverage under the program constituted 2.6 million ha or 52%of the total area. These townships could be broadly classified into four distinctrice environments. The delta environment included Irrawaddy, Rangoon, andPegu Divisions; the coastal area included Mon and Arakan States and theTenasserim Division; the Sagaing, Mandalay, and Magwe Divisions constitutedthe dry zone environment comprising both irrigated and rainfed areas; andKachin, Chin, Shan, Kayah, and Karen States formed the northeastern zoneenvironment. The number of WTRPP townships under different environmentsin different years is shown in Table 47.The delta environment had 44 townships, which enjoyed good climaticand soil conditions. The coastal environment had 12 townships, while therainfed dry zone environment had 10. There were 9 townships belonging to thenortheastern zone; 7 townships were under the irrigated dry zone. Theaverage rice sown area in this period, 4.8 million ha, was broken down intoapproximately 2.6 million ha for the delta environment and approximately 0.7million ha each for the coastal, dry, and northeastern zone environments. Thedelta environment thus took 56% of the rice area, while the other threeenvironments constituted 14.5% each.WTRPP was very often misunderstood as a whole township modernvariety program. WTRPP did not encourage the whole township to plant MVs.With selectivity and concentration as bases of the whole strategy, MVs wereplanted only in areas where the growing conditions were right. Some areas stillused local varieties (LVs) because these were suited to their specific fieldconditions; farmers would use a new variety if it could adapt to said conditions.In the WTRPP area, a mixture of MVs and LVs existed, with MVs beingTable 47. Townships under the program belonging to different rice environments,1977-85. a Number of townships under different environmentsPeriod1977-781978-791979-801980-811981-821982-831983-841984-85198586Delta Coastal Irrigated Rainfed North Totaldry zone dry zone eastern zone111204043444444441510121212121214 67 77 87 87 107 107 107 101478999922343727882828282a Sources: Annual department reports, Agricultural Corporation.94 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

Table 48. Changes in area planted to modem varieties (MVs) and local varieties(LVs) and their yields under different environments, 1975-85. aArea (million ha)Environment 1975 1985 Yield (t/ha)MV LV MV LV 1975 1985DeltaCoastalDry zoneNortheastern zone0.250.010.12-2.410.680.710.711.700.270.520.170.960.420.310.541.931.591.751.283.432.712.692.18Total0.384.512.662.23aSources: Department reports, Agricultural Corporation (various years).dominant. Table 48 shows areas planted to MVs and LVs and their yieldsunder different environments during the program years.During the period, the area planted to MVs rose from 0.38 million to 2.66million ha. This occurred mainly in the delta environment, followed by the dry,coastal, and northeastern zones. Likewise, average yield increased from 1.8 to3.0 t/ha, with an average increase of 1.50 t/ha in the deltas, 1.12 t/ha in thecoastal areas, and 0.9 t/ha in the dry and northeastern zones. The bigger areadevoted to MVs was mainly responsible for such yield increases.Fifty-three percent of the rice area nationwide was planted to MVs. On aregional scale, the delta and dry zones grew MVs on 64% of their riceland; thecoastal and northeastern zones had MVs in 39 and 24% of their area, respectively.In the delta environment, future MVs must have traits that would beuseful in flood-prone and deepwater situations. Though annual rainfall wasfairly regular, its erratic distribution and the poor drainage systems oftencaused flooding. In the dry zone environment, unreliable and scanty rainfallcalled for drought-resistant MVs. The coastal environment, on the other hand,had the problem of saline intrusion during monsoons and occasional floodingcaused by heavy rains and thus needed saline-resistant MVs. Unlike the otherenvironments, the northeastern zone required cold-tolerant MVs.Many townships wanted to join the WTRPP as they witnessed the benefitsenjoyed by program townships—more inputs (especially fertilizers), moreassistance from extension people, access to production camps, greater budgetaryallocation, the use of government vehicles, and more attention fromhigher authorities. Because of the special facilities, the annual rice productiontarget of the townships included in the program was set 10-15% higher thanthat specified in the national agricultural sector plan. Townships that are notinvolved in WTRPP tried their best to expand MV area coverage and appliedscientific management practices, working very hard to achieve a performancethat would facilitate admission to WTRPP. The WTRPP thus motivatedtownships outside the program. Calculation of average yields prior to theRICE PRODUCTION UNDER THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC GOVERNMENT 95

program, without the program (WOP), and with the program (WP) yielded thedata shown in Table 49.Before the program, the average rice yield was approximately 1.7 t/ha,rising to 2 t/ha WOP and 3 t/ha WP. The WTRPP raised the yield by as muchas 50%. Since the program area planted both MVs and LVs, WP yield wasslightly less than MV yield and WOP yield was slightly higher than LV yield.As the WTRPP expanded, the selectivity and concentration strategy beganto show signs of stress and strain. It became the victim of its own popularity.As time passed, the growth rate slowed down. Table 50 shows the averagenational and program township yield and production data during the period.As expected, rice yield in the program townships exceeded the nationalaverage. But the difference between the two became narrower with time. In thebeginning, the program township yielded more than 50% of the nationalaverage (2.94 t/ha vs 1.94 t/ha). But after 1981-82, the gap was limited to about15% (3.63 t/ha vs 3.0 t/ha). This difference remained the same until 1985-86.The national average yield rose from 1.7 t/ha in the beginning of the period to3.07 t/ha in 1985-86, an increase of more than 70%, which was mainlyattributed to the program.Since rice sown area remained stable during the program period, riceproduction in the country exhibited the same phenomenon as did rice yield.The share of the program townships, only 3% of national production in the firstyear of the program, grew to more than 60% in 1981-82. It then stabilized untilthe program ended. The country's rice production was recorded at approximately7 million t before the introduction of the program; it increased to morethan 14 million t in 1981-82. The production level remained almost constantthereafter.The effect of the WTRPP was caused principally by technological changethat generated a sharp increase in yield and consequently induced higher riceproduction. Production growth surpassed population growth and revived thedeclining rice export trade. Technological change in the program revolvedaround the 10 impact points that were further energized by institutional andTable 49. Average yield of rice under different environments In program andnonprogram areas, 1977-85. aEnvironmentAverage yield (t/ha)Prior to the program WOP b WPDeltaCoastalDry zoneNortheastern zone2.071.651.771.262.461.972.001.903.422.943.192.68Av1.662.083.06a Sources: Department reports, Agricultural Corporation (various years).b WOP = without program,WP = with program.96 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

Table 50. Average yield and production of rice at the national and program townshiplevels 1977-85. a Average yield (t/ha) Production (million t) % of townshipPeriod1977-781978-791979-801980-811981-821982-831983-841984-851985-86to nationalNational Program National Program productiontownshipstownships1.942.102.352.772.943.153.073.103.072.942.873.123.403.473.633.523.573.519.3110.3610.2813.1113.9214.1514.2914.2614.320.272.333.727.408.528.918.688.588.572.922.536.256.461.263.060.760.254.8a Sources: For 1977-82 data, SRUB 1984; for 1983-85. SRUB 1987.social factors. The institutional factors included improved extension services,production camps, farmer and staff trainings, and active involvement ofrelated government agencies. Social factors, on the other hand, involved massparticipation, a motivated farmers' group, and strong leadership by thepeople's representatives. These factors certainly contributed substantially tothe success of the program. Data can be analyzed to estimate the contributionof technical, institutional, and social factors that generated the change.Analysis of the programData collected during the program years—some coming from township levels,others from production camps, and still others from sample interviews offarmer-participants—allow for an analysis of the changes in rice yield. Usingthese data, a linear multivariate response function was estimated to accountfor the sources of contribution to yield. The variables included in the regressionanalysis for the whole country are shown below with their symbols. (Fordetailed observations in different years, see Appendices VI and VII.)Variable Symbol Variable SymbolArea (%) sown with MVRow transplanted area (%)Area (%) sown with 25- to 30-day-oldseedlingsArea (%) sown with 20- x 15-cm spacinglntercultivated area (%)Water management area (%)Manure applied (t/ha)Urea applied (kg/ha)Triple superphosphate applied (kg/ha)Muriate of potash applied (kg/ha)Pest-protected area (%)Pest-infested area (%)Total labor used (d/10 ha)Area per extension worker (ha)x 12x 1 Number of production camps in thex 11x 2 townshipx 3x 3 1x 4x 5x 6Number of staff trained during the yearFarmers' training (high level)Farmers' training (medium level)Voluntary labor (high level)Voluntary labor (medium level)Rice environment (delta)x 13x 14x 15x 16x 17x 18x 7 Rice environment (coastal)x 19x 1 7 Rice environment (irrigated)x 20x 11 7x 8x 9Rice environment (dry zone)Rainfall relative to normalProgram life (yr experience of thex 21x 22x 23x 10 workers)RICE PRODUCTION UNDER THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC GOVERNMENT 97

Yield in kg/ha was used as the dependent variable, while the other factorslisted (X 1 -X 23 ) were hypothesized to affect yield. Using a complete data set from1977-78 to 1983-84, the equation was estimated with 308 observations collectedfrom 52 townships.A stepwise regression procedure was used in such a manner that eachequation was estimated with progressively larger subsets of independentvariables that best explain yield (based on the F test for statistical significanceof the coefficient of determination).Some variables were found to be correlated to a considerable extent. Thiswas not unexpected, as these technical variables, by their very nature under thenew technology, were, in fact, closely related. The correlation coefficientbetween X 31(spacing indicating the plant population) and X 2 (row transplantedarea percentage) and also that between X 31and X 3 (seedling age) werehigh (see Appendix VIII).In practice, the row transplanting variable served as a prerequisite toachieving correct plant population, while seedling age, on the other hand,determined the number of seedlings per hill and population density as well.Variables X 2 and X 3 were thus taken into the model as explanatory variables forX 31. Such a high correlation coefficient was also observed among fertilizervariables X 7 (urea), X 71(triple superphosphate), and X 711(muriate of potash).Thus, X 7 was chosen as the main variable to represent all fertilizer variables.The information obtained about farmers’ training, voluntary labor, andrice environment had high variability, and the returns were graded as low,medium, and high, respectively.Table 51. Regression coefficients of 11 statistically significant variables usingdata obtained from 52 townships.Independent variable Symbol Coefficient aArea % sown with MVArea % sown with 25 to 30-d-old seedlingsPest-protected area (%)Total labor use (d/10 ha)Number of production camps in townshipsFarmers’ training (high level)Farmers’ training (medium level)Rice environment (delta)Rice environment (coastal)Rainfall relative to normalProgram lifeConstant (kg/ha)R 2 valueStandard errorX 1X 3X 8X 10X 12X 14X 15X 16X 19X 22X 239.33****3.16***2.09***0.61***28.38***196.12***134.35**594.55****601.78****612.27****259.84****179.710.73358.39a **** = significant at the 0.1% level, *** = significant at the 1% level, and ** = significant atthe 5% level.98 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

Results of analysisOf the variables used, 11 contributed significantly to yield (Table 51). Theregression coefficients of 11 statistically significant variables at the 0.1, 1, and5% levels are shown with a 73% coefficient of determination. The resultsindicate that yield per hectare was contributed mainly by the followingvariables:Area sown with MVArea sown with 25- to 30-day-old seedlingsPest-protected areaTotal labor useNumber of production camps in the townshipFarmers’ trainingRice environment (delta and coastal)Rainfall relative to normalProgram lifeX 1 (area % with MV) provided a coefficient of 9.33; this figure wouldinclude the fertilizer effect, which could not be estimated separately by theequation. Likewise, X 3 (area sown with 25- to 30-day-old seedlings) and X 8 (pestprotectedarea) contributed to rice yield. Variable X 10 (total labor use) was alsosignificant, but it yielded a small coefficient. Extension variables like X 10 , X 14 ,and X 15 also contributed to the higher rice yield. As to rice environment, theimportance of the delta and coastal areas was reflected in the size of thecontribution they made to achieve higher rice yield. The equation pointed tothe important environments and dominant factors that had substantial impactson the success of the program. The significance shown by program life(variable X 23 ) underscored the need for management efficiency and motivationof People's Council members and other administrative bodies for successfultechnology transfer. Variable X 22 (rainfall relative to normal) showed a signifi-Table 52. Yield differences during the program years.VariableSymbolIncrease due to theprogramkg/ha %Area % sown with MVArea % sown with correct seedling agePest-protected area (%)Increase in labor useNumber of production camps in townshipsFarmers' trainingRainfall relative to normalProgram lifeYield increase explained by the modelActual yield increaseX 1260X 393X 208X 7310X 4512X 14 , X 2015X 3722X 271237 757 1936531063539109100RICE PRODUCTION UNDER THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC GOVERNMENT 99

cant impact on yield. (The average rainfall during the program period was 1.26with a standard variation of 0.70.)With these 11 yield-contributing variables, yield changes resulting fromthe new technology were calculated following the method used by Herdt andMandac (1979). As shown in Table 52, two variables—program life and areasown with MV—contributed a major portion (75%) of the yield increase. Theother factors contributed the remaining 25%, each around 5% of the yieldchange.Further analysisWith data collected from production camps, the factors that contributed toyield under different rice environments were analyzed following the samemultivariate regression analysis. Factors affecting the yield would be differentdue to the diverse physical, social, and economic conditions in these environments.The independent variables used in the analysis are listed below. Theset of variables used was the same as that used in the national model, but somedata (e.g., rainfall, labor use, and pest infestation) were not obtained fromproduction camps. To represent weather conditions indirectly, harvested area(%) was taken as one variable in the analysis.VariableArea (%) sown with MVRow transplanted area (%)Area (%) sown with 25- to 30-day-old seedlingsArea (%) sown with 20- x 15-cm spacinglntercultivated area (%)Water management area (%)Manure applied (t/ha)Urea applied (kg/ha)Triple superphosphate applied (kg/ha)Muriate of potash applied (kg/ha)Pest-protected area (%)Area per extension worker (ha)Number of staff trained during the yearFarmers’ training (high level)Farmers’ training (medium level)Voluntary labor (high level)Voluntary labor (medium level)Program lifeHarvested area (%)Yield (t/ha)SymbolX 1X 2X 3X 1 3X 4X 5X 6X 7X 1 711X 7X 8X 11X 13X 14X 15X 16X 17X 23X 24YYield was used as a dependent variable, while independent variables X 1 -X 24 were hypothesized to affect yield.100 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

Of the 19 variables used, 11 were statistically significant in the deltaenvironment, 5 in the coastal, 11 in the dry zone rainfed, 3 in the dry zoneirrigated, and 8 in the northeastern zone (Table 53).As expected, variables that contributed to yield varied in different environments:11 variables (with 1 carrying a negative sign) were found to havecontributed to yield in the delta zone; 5 variables (2 positive and 3 negative)represented the coastal environment; 11 variables (7 positive and 4 negative),the dry zone rainfed and irrigated conditions; and 8 variables (2 negative), thenortheastern zone. As a whole, the analysis differed from the national model,signifying that factors responsible for yield change in different environmentsvaried widely. However, such variables as X 1 (area sown with MV) and X 23(program life) had varying degrees of response but had the same effect underalmost all conditions.Table 53 shows that for the delta environment, 11 variables were statisticallysignificant (7 variables at the 0.1% level, 1 variable at the 1% level, and 3Table 53. Regression coefficients of variables calculated from data obtained from productioncamps representing different environments. a Dry North-Variable Symbol Delta Coastal zone Irrigated easternrainfedzoneArea % sown with MVRow transplanted area (%)Area % sown with 25 to30-d-old seedlingslntercultivated area (%)Water management area(%)Manure applied (t/ha)Urea applied (kg/ha)Pest-protected area (%)Area per extension worker(ha)Number of staff trainedduring the yearFarmers' training (highlevel)Farmers' training(medium level)Voluntary labor (high level)Voluntary labor(medium level)Program lifeHarvested area (%)Constant (kg/ha)R 2 valueStandard errorX 6.57***1X ns2X 6.36***3X ns4X ns 5X 97.58***6X 4.26***7X 84.15***X 11 –0.13*X 13X 14X 15X 119.27*16X ns17X 465.16*23X ns241,113.550.85260.9816.09***nsnsnsnsnsns–64.29**ns10.69***–4.76*6.99**5.44**ns97.10**3.94*ns-0.30***nsnsns7.72*nsns5.92*nsns4.46***8.06***5.63**nsnsns–1.59**ns0.19*1.71* –17.49* ns ns –10.90*379.56*** –611.40*** ns ns ns249.44** ns 243.73* ns 449.13***ns nsns –341.57**231.74ns2,484.700.76199.75–312.33**7.21**1,448.790.53450.93nsns375.08***ns582.80*** nsns ns1,758.63 2,017.750.81 0.86150.42 272.24a *** = significant at .1% level. ** = significant at 1% level. * = significant at 5% level. ns = not significant.RICE PRODUCTION UNDER THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC GOVERNMENT 101

variables at the 5% level) with an 85% coefficient of determination. The yieldin the deltas was contributed mainly by:area sown with MV,area sown with 25- to 30-day-old seedlings,manure and chemical fertilizer applied,pest-protected area,training of staff and farmers,voluntary labor, andexperience accumulated through program life.Area per extension worker (X 11 ) showed a negative sign. The delta had amean value of 1603 ha per extension worker—a relatively large ratio foreffective technology transfer. As in the national model, MV, seedling age, plantprotection, training, voluntary labor, and program life had a positive influenceon yield. The analysis pointed out that proper management of these factorswas important in raising yield. It was also apparent that as area for MVexpanded, training of extension staff and farmers became more crucial.The factors that contributed to rice yield in the coastal environment werearea sown with MV and experience during the program period. In view of thehigh rainfall in this area, the other variables remained less important as far ascontribution to yield was concerned. Variable X 8 (% pest-protected area) in thezone meant a pest-infested area of 1-2%, which was well below the averagelevel of 10% in other zones. Being equivalent to a pest-infested area, it showeda negative sign. Training of extension staff and farmers did not contribute toyield; they even had a negative effect. This can be explained, perhaps, by thefact that during the training period, the extension staff were away from theirduty stations and the farmers were away from their fields. Transportationproblems in the coastal regions resulted in longer periods of absence from thefield. Under such a situation, the training curriculum and course durationmust be carefully considered.The factors that contributed to rice yield in the dry zone environment weremore inconsistent, especially under the dry zone rainfed condition. Under thiscondition, 11 variables significantly contributed to yield; but 7 variablescarried positive signs and 4 had negative signs, with a 53% coefficient ofdetermination. The seven variables with positive sign—X 1 , X 3 , X 4 , X 6 , X 7 , X 15 , andX 24 —followed the same pattern and exhibited the same phenomenon as didthe variables in the delta environment. An exception was X 4 , which was significantonly under the dry zone condition. Intercultivation in this environmentled to weeding and changing the soil physical condition, and constituted animportant impact point on which to raise yield. Controlling weeds by floodingwas not possible under the limited-rainfall Condition. A better explanation isneeded for variables that carried a negative sign—X 2 , X 11 , X 17 , and X 23 .Rice production in this region fell short of demand, and deficit forcedfarmers to use marginal areas. The production of rice was so dependent on102 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

weather that it influenced rice production more than technological factors did.This was the only environment where the variable X 23 (program life) had anegative sign. With the pervading weather adversity in this environment, riceyield started to decline in the later part of the program period, resulting in thenegative effects of X 17 and X 23 . As to X 11 (area per extension worker), the dryzone rainfed had a mean value of 710 ha, which was considered large under theexisting infrastructure. Negative X 2 (row transplanted area %) was also presumedto be weather-related. This environment has to be studied morecarefully before final program plans are made. Unless a breakthrough inresearch to contain adverse conditions is achieved (through new MVs or newtechnology), continuation of the WTRPP in this area is not recommended.Unlike the rainfed dry zone environment, the dry zone irrigated environmenthad only 3 significant variables with an 81% coefficient of determination.Intercultivation was again an important impact point, underscoringthe importance of weeding under the dry zone environment. Two othervariables—X 7 (urea fertilizer application) and X 23 (program experience)-brought about change in rice yield. Other variables showed no significantchange like area sown to MV (this variable previously exhibited an effect inother environments). This is probably because the dry zone irrigated environmenthad already reached the maximum level of MV production, andfurther increases would have necessitated introduction of newer techniques.In the meantime, intercultivation, urea application, and improvement inmanagement efficiency should be done to further induce yield.The northeastern environment was slow in adopting the new technologydue to lack of accessibility and the very favorable man-to-land ratio. Therewere fewer infrastructure facilities and less population pressure. However, asthe population began to increase, Shan and Karen States became rice-deficitareas and relied on other divisions for supply. Moreover, most areas weresituated on hills and in valleys, representing a completely different environment.The results in the table indicate that eight variables were statisticallysignificant (86% coefficient of determination), with two variables having anegative sign. The factors that positively influenced yield per hectare were:area sown with MV,row transplanted area,area sown with 25- to 30-day-old-seedlings,area per extension worker,farmers’ training, andvoluntary labor contribution.These variables were expected to have an impact on yield in an environmentrelatively slow in adopting new technology. The reasons given for otherenvironments still hold. In most environments, the MVs should possess coldtolerance. The existing area sown to MVs included irrigated rice and varietiescultivated early to escape the cold spell. Such a practice was not possible in allRICE PRODUCTION UNDER THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC GOVERNMENT 103

places. Areas with late rainfall had to rely on traditional varieties that wereknown to tolerate low temperatures. Many areas used upland rice cultivationbecause of the hilly nature and physical conditions of the sites.Two variables with negative signs were X 7 (urea application) and X 13 (stafftraining). One would not expect fertilizer to have a negative effect on rice yield.But it appeared that fertilizer availability became limited in the final phase ofthe program when demand far exceeded supply. A closer look at the fertilizersupply in the area revealed a decrease from 100 kg/ha before 1980 to 75 kg/ha as the program expanded in other areas. Though the effect of X 7 continuouslydecreased during the program years, other factors such as X 1 , X 2 , X 3 , andX 15 had a positive influence; all combined had a positive effect on yield andoffset the possible loss due to the lower rate of fertilizer use. This resulted ina gradual yield increase in this area. The negative sign in X 13 (the number ofstaff trained during the year) indicated that the extension workers in thecoastal areas should not be away too long from their duty stations.Altogether, the independent variables chosen for the analysis indicated astrong impact on rice yield—many with positive and a few with negativeeffects. These variables differed in the magnitude of their effects in differentenvironments. The most important variable that greatly contributed to yieldchange was area sown with MVs. Undoubtedly, the effect due to MVs includedthe effect due to fertilizers since they could not be estimated separately.Another variable that substantially contributed to change in rice yield wasprogram life. This meant that the rich experience gained by extension personnelwas quite instrumental in affecting yield. This finding emphasizes the importanceof management efficiency and of motivating responsible administratorsin effective technology transfer.The results also yielded information that may be useful in mapping futureresearch and extension strategies in different regions of the country. Theseresults, if examined in the light of the level of adoption of the independentvariables, would certainly reveal gaps that have to be filled in future programs.Inasmuch as rice production was mainly rainfed, weather consciousnesswould remain an important factor. A technological approach in consonancewith weather behavior would maximize effects. Table 54 indicates the presentlevel of technological adoption of the various variables used in this analysis.It shows the potential of each variable with the existing technology underdifferent environments.Adoption of various technologies varied with environment (Table 54).The reasons for nonadoption could be 1) farmers were not properly convincedof their usefulness, and 2) that the technology was simply not suitable to theirsituation.The most important variable, use of MVs, played a central role in theadoption process. It required the use of manure and fertilizers along withcorrect seedling age and correct plant population.104 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

Table 54. Present level of technological adoption under different environments (1984).VariableMean value in different environmentsSymbol Delta Coastal Dry zone Dry zone NorthrainfedIrrigated easternArea % sown with MVRow transplanted area (%)Area % sown with correct seedling ageArea % sown with 20- x 15-cm spacinglntercultivated area (%)Water management area (%)Manure applied (t/ha)Urea applied (kg/ha)TSP a applied (kg/ha)MOP b applied (kg/ha)Pest-protected area %Area per extension worker (ha)No. of staff trained during the yearFarmers’ training (high level)Farmers’ training (medium level)Voluntary labor (high level)Voluntary labor (medium level)Program lifeHarvested area % (weather)Rice yield (t/ha)X 1X 2X 3X 31X 4X 5X 6X 7X 71X 711X 8X 11X 13X 14X 15X 16X 17X 23X 24Y67.383.256.977.356.758.31.965.123.017.134.91,063160.80.10.30.42.198.33.8459.519.665.466.40.80.80.847.517.05.02.980660.30.70.00.42.099.43.4395.174.478.590.538.573.73.2101.543.65.779.8710110.40.00.40.42.783.43.0296.599.562.989.563.290.72.595.655.57.837.9373110.00.00.20.52.788.14.4825.157.538.371.236.538.60.676.325.75.16.658150.40.40.10.42.096.03.19a TSP = Triple superphosphate.b MOP = muriate of potash.Area planted to MVs rose from 10 to about 53% during the program years.This increase in area resulted in a greater demand for chemical fertilizers. Sinceurea constituted the bulk of fertilizers used, its availability and use in theprogram area reflected MV expansion.The higher rice yields and production resulted from two essential aspectsof the WTRPP-technology development and technology transfer. The functionalsteps involved in technology development and transfer are shown inFigure 10. The system is so designed that research results are first examined (interms of soundness and location adaptability) before a technical message isformulated. The development of the message involves researchers, extensionworkers, administration personnel, and farmers alike (Fig. 10).Production camps played an important role in the proper functioning ofthe WTRPP. The camps brought about a closer relationship between extensionworkers and farmers. Usually, an extension worker would spend most of histime in the office, waiting for farmers to consult him. But it did not happen thatway. Farmers rarely visited the extension office for two reasons. First, theyassumed that these offices offered trouble rather than benefits. And, havingidentified these offices with courts, they tried their best to avoid them. Thesecond reason is even more discouraging. They believed that the extensionstaff would not be able to solve their problems as the technicians wereRICE PRODUCTION UNDER THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC GOVERNMENT 105

“ignorant” of farm conditions. Farmers were simply too busy to visit theextension office, especially when the outcome was uncertain.Farmers themselves realized that MVs occupied a central position in theWTRPP. They organized and improved their capabilities to adopt MVs. ButMVs required more care and investment and involved more risks and labor.Moreover, farmers needed to gain access to required inputs and extensionservices. The introduction of production camps in the existing extension setupproved appropriate. Production camps right in the middle of ricefields contributedto effective dissemination of agricultural information.Having been provided with technology and the appropriate institutionaland infrastructure support, the Burmese farmers could no longer be consideredresistant to change. They were as responsive as anyone could expect inany society. The program’s success could thus be attributed to the inclusion ofproduction camps in the WTRPP.Another factor that indirectly contributed to the WTRPP was the competitioncomponent. Farmers in the program townships were encouraged tocompete with each other in such activities as transplanting and harvesting, andin achieving the highest yield. The objective was to increase the efficiency inthese labor- and time-limiting operations. The criteria used in the evaluationincluded not only speed in operation but also accuracy and exact methodicalfinish in line with the given impact points.Competition among villages or townships led to greater efficiency in theseoperations. For example, row planting was usually done with the aid of guidestrings. After gaining experience, the farm hands were able to transplant inrows accurately without using guide strings. The competition was muchkeener in the yield contests. Fields not smaller than 0.4 ha (1 acre) would benominated and included in the contest at harvest time; authorities from othertownships would do the harvesting to avoid bias. The first prize was usuallygiven to farmers who produced more than 9 t/ha. In addition, AC awardedprizes to farmers who produced more than 5 t/ha (this was three times thenational average yield at that time). During the first year of the program, 1599farmers won prizes. In the second year, the number of winners increasedalmost tenfold. Later, the limit was raised to 7.5 t/ha, and many were still ableto reach it. The AC finally decided to award prizes not to the individuals butto the township as a whole. Performance was evaluated in terms of yield target,percentage of harvested area, and continuous achievement for the past 3 yr;this would be a measure of the growth rate of the township.When prizes were awarded to individuals, it was found that most winnerscame from favorable areas having fertile soils, good drainage, and very rareweather disturbances. In addition, the farmers who won possessed the necessarydrive and initiative.Sixty-four percent of the winners belonged to the delta environment; 24%,dry irrigated; 9%, coastal; 2%, northeastern; and 1%, dry zone rainfed. As to the106 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

size of holdings, 40% of the prize winners had 3-4 ha, about 30% worked infarms less than 2 ha, and another 30% cultivated more than 5 ha. Thisobservation turned out to be contrary to expectation. It was originally thoughtthat farmers with small landholdings had better chances of winning, sincethese were more manageable than larger farms. And as for age, 61% of the prizewinners were old (more than 50 yr), while only 39% were young. With respectto magnitude of yield, 8% won by producing more than 9 t/ha; 92% had yieldsbetween 7 and 9 t/ha. These observations point to the possibility of the presenttechnology achieving yields of 7 t/ha with good management and favorableenvironments.Evaluation of the programThe successful implementation of the WTRPP created a definite impact on theeconomic and social life of the population. Economic progress could bemeasured by the increased value of production of the country and also that ofthe agricultural sector during the program years. Since the agricultural sectorconstituted a major sector of the country's economy, and since crop productionwas the main subsector in the agricultural sector (with rice as principal crop),the value of production of the crop subsector, the agricultural sector, and thetotal sector would provide a good indicator of the economic impact of theprogram.Table 55 shows the value of production of the said sectors and subsectorsfrom 1961 to 1986. The crop production subsector accounted for more than 70%of the agricultural sector share, representing more than 40% in the total valueof all sectors. The annual increase in value of the crop subsector was duemainly to rice. The agricultural sector’s annual growth rate of 3-5% during theTable 55. Value of production of the agricultural sector at 1969-70 base price(million kyats), 1961-85. aYearAgricultural sectorTotal % ofCrop Livestock Forestry Sector % all agriculturaland fisherytotal cropsectors sector1961-621969-701977-781978-791979-801980-811981-821982-831983-841984-851985-862,510.93,276.34,081.04,346.04,515.85,059.75,500.35,805.26,089.86,302.16,466.7565.9945.91,152.11,220.01,298.71,414.61,506.11,550.51,658.41,819.51,854.8341.8398.5446.5511.3521.3530.9560.3582.5573.4612.4635.73,418.64,620.75,679.66,077.86,335.87,005.27,566.77,938.28,321.68,374.08,957.273717272717273737375728,617.711,009.213,281.214,072.514,765.516,155.617,347.018,289.219,085.220,270.720,831.24042434343434443444143a Sources: For 1961-62. 196470, and 1977-80 data, SRUB 1984; for 1981-85, SRUB 1987.RICE PRODUCTION UNDER THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC GOVERNMENT 107

preprogram years increased to about 10% in 1980; it then declined slowly to 7%in 1981, 5% in 1982, 4% in 1983, 6% in 1984, and 3% in 1985. The value of the cropsubsector—2.5 billion kyats in 1961—rose to 6.5 billion kyats in 1985, anincrease of more than 100%. The rate of increase was especially rapid duringthe WTRPP years.These data clearly reflected the effect of the program on the country’seconomy at the national level. At the divisional level, the effect of the programdiffered with environment. Calculation of average production and additionalcosts under different environments resulted in various benefit-cost (B/C)ratios (Table 56).Economic returns due to the new technology were reasonably attractivefor all environments except the dry zone rainfed (Table 56). Operations in thedelta, coastal, and dry zone irrigated areas resulted in a profit of 280 kyats/ha,while the northeastern zone obtained 170 kyats. There was a B/C value of 2 forthe 3 environments while the northeastern zone obtained a value of only 1.7.Although the northeastern zone enjoyed less profit and a lower B/C, theprospects of the new technology could still be considered encouraging. Thedry zone rainfed did not respond well to the existing technology, indicating theneed for a new technology appropriate to the location. The profits and B/Cratios would change with the changing prices of rice and inputs, both of whichare presently fixed and controlled. The price of rice did not reflect theinternational market price or the cost of production, because major inputs likefertilizers were heavily subsidized. The recent decontrol of the rice tradewould influence the profit and B/C which could very well have an impact onthe adoption of new technology.On a national scale, the benefits needed no special explanation, butbenefits to individual farmers were often questioned. It is true that the newtechnology demanded higher labor and inputs than did traditional practices,but the higher returns fully compensated for the additional cost, leaving areasonable profit margin. The cost and return analysis for new and traditionaltechnologies indicated favorable returns with the new technology. The averagecost of production before the program amounted to 816.15 kyats/ha(119.62 kyats/ha were input costs and 696.53 kyats/ha were other costs). TheTable 56. Average additional yield and cost under different environments, 1983.EnvironmentIncreased Production Additionalproduction of rice cost before cost Net B/Cthe program (kyats/ha) benefitt/ha kyats/ha (kyats/ha)Delta 1.28 552 783 273 279 2.02Coastal 1.32 569 755 290 279 1.96Dry zone irrigated 1.19 513 1003 239 274 2.15Dry zone rainfed 0.59 254 785 240 14 1.06Northeastern zone 0.92 397 1050 228 169 1.74108 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

average yield at that time was 2.20 t/ha (984.08 kyats/ha), leaving a profit of167.93 kyats/ha. The average production cost increased to 1140 kyats/ha afterthe program, requiring an additional cost of 323.85 kyats/ha. This costincluded 190.71 kyats/ha for inputs and 949.29 kyats/ha for other costs. Sincethe average yield was 3.52 t/ha with a value of 1517.37 kyats, the profitamounted to 377.37 kyats/ha. This figure compared favorably with 167.93kyats/ha profit obtained using traditional practices.These cost and return figures agreed closely with the figures computed byJayasuriya (1984) for 1980-81. He obtained a profit of 142 and 377 kyats/ha fortraditional and new technology, respectively (Table 57).The new technology required more expenditures than did traditionalpractices, but returns from it were higher. Jayasuriya (1984) found that theaverage cost of the new technology was 1152 kyats/ha as against 804 kyats/ha for the traditional practice. The new technology obtained a yield of 3556 kg/ha and achieved a gross return of 1529 kyats/ha; the traditional practice hada yield of 2200 kg/ha and a gross return of 946 kyats/ha. The profit from usingthe new technology was computed to be 377 kyats/ha as against 142 kyats/hafrom using traditional practice. These calculations include total labor costs(both family and hired labor). An average family generally provided 65% ofTable 57. Costs and returns of rice production (kyats/ha) using traditional and newtechnologies, 1981 (Jayasuriya 1984).Particular Traditional technology New technologycostsMaterial costSeedsFertilizerManurePesticideSubtotalLabor costLand preparationUprooting of seedlings andtransplantingWeedingCrop maintenanceHarvesting and threshingSubtotalAnimal hired laborTotal costReturnsAverage yield (kg/ha)Gross returns (kyats/ha)Gross margin (kyats/ha)3020261772181501632167583145805220094614244766771942731833089201776182115235561529377RICE PRODUCTION UNDER THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC GOVERNMENT 109

the labor requirement from the household, while only 35% constituted hiredlabor. The profit had to be added to the earnings of family labor to estimatefamily income.The social impact of the program would be hard to determine quantitatively,but many have concluded that the WTRPP changed the social conditions of thepopulation. The farmers were recognized for their part in rebuilding thecountry's economy. For the first time, they were given an important role in thecommunity and their services received public appreciation.Multiplier effectThe effect of WTRPP extended beyond the farmer population. In a country likeBurma where the majority of the people directly or indirectly relied onagriculture, any progress achieved in the production of a major crop in thecountry had a definite impact. The success of the program at the township levelhad a great influence on the whole population, as income generated from thehigher rice production was used to buy more goods and services in the sametownship.This multiplier effect of the WTRPP was clearly demonstrated in a surveydone in Okpo, a township 177 km north of Rangoon, which joined the programin 1978-79. The survey used data from four agencies operated by the State—theOkpo Railway Station of the Burma Railway Corporation, the Okpo SmallLoan Department of the Burma Economic Bank, the Okpo Liquor Shop of theRestaurant and Beverage Trade Corporation, and the Okpo Police Station. Inaddition, data were also collected from private, medium-sized businesses.Table 58 shows the average monthly income of the Okpo Railway Stationfor a 4-yr period, starting the year before the township joined the WTRPP. Asrice production increased, the people earned more and became more mobile.There was no increase in frequency of rail services. The higher income of therailway station was due to the influx of more people traveling by train. Thedata showed that the average monthly income of the railway station increasednearly 300%. Farmers usually visited Rangoon and other places after the riceharvest.Table 58. Monthly income of the Okpo Railway Station, 1978-81. aPeriodMonthly income (kyats)Lowest Highest Average1977-781978-791979-801980-818,73010,37720,50026,58617,91521,10935,90039,80212,14414,76227,56732,190a Sources: Department reports, Agricultural Corporation (various years).110 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

Table 59. Monthly transactions of the Okpo Small Loan Department, 1978-81. aPeriodNumber of customersAmount of money loaned (kyats)Lowest Highest Average Lowest Highest Average1978-791979-801980-8130113616880360428959635720856,24022,55530,54599,79598,72545,98583,30062,10039,420a Sources: Department reports. Agricultural Corporation (various yeras).Table 59 shows monthly transactions of the Small Loan Department of theOkpo township going down to half their usual volume in the 2 yr that WTRPPbecame successful. The number of customers also diminished, indicating thatprivate moneylenders also suffered the same fate. There was less volume ofbusiness as the income of the rural masses increased. (The Small Loan Departmentneeded surety, while the private moneylenders transacted loansbased on personal connection, without surety, but at higher interest rates.)There was a substantial reduction of the private moneylending business,which, in the first place, was not officially allowed.Statistics were also taken from the Restaurant and Beverage Trade Corporation,a government agency that operated in Okpo. Sale of liquors by thecorporation increased appreciably after the program. Table 60 shows thecorporation’s sale proceeds for 3 yr. Liquor sales increased by 60%. It wascommon practice for many farmers to enjoy liquor after selling their rice. It issafe to assume that many illegal liquor shops operated by private traders alsohad increased sales.A survey taken of private businesses like restaurants, general stores,tailors, tricycle operators, pony cart operators, and passenger and freightbuses clearly showed higher returns from their businesses after the program.Moreover, police officials reported that the crime rate in the township had beendrastically reduced. The WTRPP definitely had a positive influence on theeconomic and social conditions of the townships involved in the program.The survey enumerators also looked into how farmers with large holdingsand who enjoyed good harvests spent their additional income. Their findingspointed to four distinct groups of farmers: the first group used their newlyfound wealth to repay loans; the second group bought or changed cattle; thethird group bought sewing machines, radios, cassettes, bicycles, or gold; andTable 60. Monthly sale proceeds of liquor (kyats), 1978-81. aPeriod Lowest Highest Average1978-791979-801980-8125,81940,33950,24252,95674,12861,313a Sources: Department reports, Agricultural Corporation (various years).34,04452,55855,810RICE PRODUCTION UNDER THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC GOVERNMENT 111

the fourth group, exercising a common Burmese belief, offered alms to ensurea better future.IrrigationWater is a major constraint in Burmese agriculture. Unlike the previous twoperiods, when irrigation work remained almost static, this period witnessed asubstantial increase in irrigation facilities. The government invested largesums of money in irrigation work—constructing new dams, improving embankmentsand drainage, and repairing and maintaining the existing networks.During the same period, three large irrigation dams were constructed, onein Pegu Division using the country’s own resources and two in MandalayDivision supported by World Bank and Asian Development Bank loans. Thelatter two are multipurpose dams with a capacity for irrigating 0.12 million ha.In addition to these large irrigation dams, there were four other small constructions.Farmers also constructed small-village diversion weirs on seasonal andperennial streams on a communal basis. The government financed one-thirdof the expenditures on these constructions. Flood protection and drainageimprovement works were necessary in high-rainfall areas in Lower Burma,where rice dominated other crops. Such projects in Lower Burma, withassistance from the World Bank, made more land suitable for MV expansion.Irrigation with lift pumps was also extended in Lower Burma, using waterfrom small creeks and rivers that crisscross the delta. A tube-well irrigationproject was also initiated in the Sagaing Division with the World Bank loan.New irrigation work took time to construct. Furthermore, a longer periodwas required to convince the farmers to change from rainfed to irrigatedsystems. There was, therefore, a time lag before any irrigation project couldyield any substantial benefit.Cotton in Upper Burma and jute in Lower Burma enjoyed the newirrigation facilities and satisfied the growing demand of the newly built textileand jute mills. They played a relatively minor role in the drive for increased riceproduction. The resulting rice production growth came mainly from the shiftto MVs, the use of fertilizers, and the implementation of the extensionstrategy.The expansion of irrigation facilities during the period is reflected in Table61. The irrigated area of 569,000 ha in 1961 increased to more than 1 million hain 1985. Area under irrigated rice also nearly doubled—from about 0.5 millionto nearly 1 million ha—while area devoted to other crops (especially industrialcrops) rose almost fourfold. In the beginning of the period, rice enjoyed a morethan 80% share in irrigation facilities, but this was reduced to about 70% in1985.112 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

Table 61. Irrigated areas for rice, 1961-85. alrrigated area bYear Net % % sharesown area Rice Other Total irrigated of ricecrops1961196219631964196519661967196819691970197119721973197419751976197719781979198019811982198319841985716276907968794179007798769577957778789679627884806481038130802881108251805783178413823082708359837247249966368363366369174172273675273282687287583285789683287386580583986185897126162167180176177177205210259281272249253241260303292321319352369419376569625825850813839868918927946101110131098112111281073111711991124119411841157120812801234a Sources: For 1961-67 data, RGUB 1970; for 1968-73, SRUE 1974; for 1974-78, SRUE 1979;for 1979-82, SRUB 1984; and for 1983-85, SRUB 1987. b lrrigated area includes double-croppedarea.Crop cultivation in irrigated areas received supplementary water and soduring years of scanty rainfall the effect of irrigation was more pronounced.The contribution of irrigation to the rice production program was minimal, butMV area expansion was beneficial only in the irrigated areas in Upper Burma.It also enhanced cropping intensity.MechanizationThe government organized the Agricultural Mechanization Department (AMD)to introduce mechanization to Burmese agriculture. It bought more tractors tosupplement draft animals. But AMD played a limited role and providedtractors only for tillage operations. There was practically no mechanization inthe other aspects of production.Tractors proved more useful in the dry upland zone than in the smallricefields. But with the expansion of MVs, farmers cultivated a second cropafter rice, utilizing the residual soil moisture. The draft animals were completely88101110111112121213131414141314151414141415151583808080787980817878747275787878777574737370696770RICE PRODUCTION UNDER THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC GOVERNMENT 113

exhausted after one season of rice cultivation and were not able to carry outtillage operations for the second crop. Tractors served well under thesesituations when tillage operations had to be done in a limited time before lossof soil moisture (Fig. 17). Farmers used AMD tractors for tillage, and the draftanimals were harnessed only in the final operations.This system helped relieve the burden on draft cattle to a great extent.Tractor-operated tillage involved plowing and harrowing. AMD gave themachines to farmers at a subsidized rate, but fuel, spare parts, and repair andmaintenance costs inhibited their extensive use. Table 62 shows tillage operationsundertaken by tractors in selected years.AMD reported work in acre-turn which means a tractor plowing orharrowing on one acre. Farmers used tractors for one plowing or one harrowingor, at times, two harrowings, depending on the soil's physical conditions andthe crops to be cultivated. There is no way to calculate the area covered by thetractors, but it may be assumed that every farmer paid for one tractor run only.(AMD converted acre-turn to hectare-turn to indicate area coverage mentionedin Table 62.) Evidently, the data are overestimated in view of the usualpractice of employing one tractor plowing followed by one harrowing, whichwould record two instead of one hectare-turn. But even with these data, thearea coverage of 2% in 1962 increased to only 9% in 1985. Actual area coveragemay have been in the range of half a million ha or around 5% of the net sownarea in 1985.Though coverage was not impressive, the work done by the tractorssubstantially reduced the load factor of draft animals. Furthermore, tillageoperations were done in a short time before great loss of soil moisture. Tractorsthus indirectly contributed to the rice production program by providing anopportunity to exploit the short growth duration characteristics of MVs.Farmers appreciated the utility of tractors; demand always exceeded supply17. Tractor tillage operation for second crop.114 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

Table 62. Tillage operation by tractors in selected years, 1962-85. aNet Areas under %Year sown area tractor-operated(000 ha) tillage b (000 ha)196219741979198019811982198319841985769081038057831784138230827083598372145305603689783773704739769areacoveragea Sources: For 1962-74 data, SRUB 1977; for 1979-81, SRUB 1984; for 1982-85, SRUB 1987.b Acre-turn converted to hectare-turn.248899999because of the limited number of tractors, compounded by repair and maintenanceproblems. Although tractor-operated tillage was particularly popularfor the dry zone crops in Upper Burma (Fig. 17), its contribution in LowerBurma, though minimal, greatly enhanced cropping intensity when used withshort growth duration MVs.Cropping intensityThe turn of events during this period resulted in higher cropping intensity. Theagricultural sector plan emphasized double cropping wherever possible. Themost notable events that helped increase cropping intensity were 1) expansionof MVs with short growth duration; 2) increased tractor tillage facilities;3) higher prices of crops, especially edible oil-bearing crops; and 4) farmer'sability to invest the extra income earned from the higher rice yield.The role of MVs in promoting higher cropping intensity was often overlooked.Farmers timed the sowing of MVs so they could harvest in late Octoberor early November, immediately after the monsoon. Enough moisture wouldthen be left in the soil to sustain the second crop. Double cropping was bothlabor- and management-intensive. Rice in the field was quickly harvested andpiled on the threshing floor while land preparation for the second crop waspromptly being undertaken. Tractor tillage operation could be found in manyplaces, but in some areas, farmers used a new pair of draft animal to do thework.If AMD could provide rice threshers and dryers, cropping intensity mightincrease even more. The prices of crops—especially edible oil-bearing cropslike groundnut, sesamum, or sunflower—had risen, making double croppingvery profitable. In places where there was low waterholding capacity of thesoil, pulses were planted after rice. The expenses incurred for the second cropgenerally came from their extra income supplemented with MAB loans. WhatRICE PRODUCTION UNDER THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC GOVERNMENT 115

aised cropping intensity was therefore, not increased irrigation facilities butuse of MVs.Table 63 shows the cropping intensity used in Burma during the period,distinguishing between multiple-cropped areas with irrigation and thosewithout. The multiple-cropped area of half a million ha in 1961 rose to 2 millionha in 1985. Ninety percent of this increment did not have irrigation. Themultiple-cropped area in the irrigated tract had an increase of only 140,000 haas compared with an increase of more than a million ha in nonirrigated areas.Cropping intensity in the country rose from 107 to 124% during the period.There remained a great potential for further increases in the irrigated tract. Rice- groundnut, rice - sesamum, rice - sunflower, rice - pulses, and jute - riceconstituted common cropping patterns in Lower Burma, while the croppingpatterns in Upper Burma with irrigation were cotton - rice, sesamum - rice, rice- pulses, and rice - rice.Rice tradingRice trade was handled by traders, millers, and the SAMB until 1963. Thegovernment took over the entire rice trade in 1964 and entrusted the businessto Trade Corporation No. 1, (this was later called the Agriculture and FarmProduce Trade Corporation [AFPTC] in 1976) under the Ministry of Trade. TheTable 63. Cropping intensity, 1961-85 (SRUB 1987).YearMultiple-cropped area (000 ha) Net Croppingsown intensityWith Without Total area (%)irrigation irrigation196119641968196919701971197219731974197519761977197819791980198119821983198419853365102109107121123127145143135136158125122140146144194175499755901920103711041099122812511169121112961452124915991614153417441962183853282010031029114412251222135513961312134614321610137417211754168018882156201371627941779577787896686278848065810381308028811182528057831784138230827083598372107110113113115115116117117116117118120117121121120123126124116 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

18. AFPTC rice procurement center.AFPTC was tasked with rice procurement and processing. The MyanmaExport and Import Corporation (MEIC), under the same Ministry, was incharge of export. AFPTC and MEIC replaced SAMB in supervising the wholerice trade.Rice was procured by many agents in many places. When procured bytraders, rice was carried to the rice mills or storage places in or near the rice millcompound. In the case of AFPTC, many temporary procurement centers wereopened. From these centers, rice was transported to the mills by the StateoperatedBurma Railway Corporation, Inland Water Transport Corporation,or Road Transport Corporation (Fig.18). Private transport facilities werelikewise utilized.Before the annual rice harvest, the Ministry of Trade would announce theprocurement prices of different types and grades of rice. Prices were fixed for100 baskets (or 2100 kg) in January and February, increasing by 10 kyats fromMarch to June, and again by 5 kyats from July to December. The prices changedsix times during the period (Table 64).Table 64. Prices of different types of rice (kyats per 100 baskets), 1962-85 . aYearType of grainA B C D1962-63b to 1965-661966-671967-68 to 1971-721972-731973-741974-75 to 1985-863303603784486349553253553734426259403303403584256009003854154335147261090a Sources: For 1962-83 data, SRUB 1984; for 1984-85, SRUB 1987.b Refers to period 1 Apr 1962to 31 Mar 1963.RICE PRODUCTION UNDER THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC GOVERNMENT 117

The price variation was due to the differences in quality. It started with anaverage of 340 kyats per 100 baskets in 1962-63, increasing to 370 kyats in 1966-67, and then to 388 kyats in 1967-68. The average price remained constant untilit rose again to 460 kyats in 1972-73. There was another increase in 1973-74,bringing the average price to 650 kyats. The final increase was most pronounced,with the average price pegged at 970 kyats.Grain type D, a popular grade in the urban markets, fetched a higher pricethan did other types. Grain type A, popular for both local consumption andexport, came next. Grain types B and C were readily acceptable in the urbanand rural areas, respectively. In recent years, with the expansion of MVs(mostly type A grain), production of type A grains exceeded those of othertypes. More than 60% of AFPTC-procured rice belonged to type A; type Ccomprised only about 25%.In the beginning, AFPTC based its procurement target on the productionestimates of the DSLR. The rice procured was then milled in AFPTC-owned or-contracted mills. (All rice mills in the country had to be registered wh AFPTC.)Milled rice was distributed through consumers’ cooperatives in urban andrice-deficit areas. The surplus was then exported by MEIC. The governmentplaced great emphasis on internal rice distribution, which expanded annuallybecause of population growth and the low price. Rice was sold at a uniformprice throughout the country, which led to increased internal consumption,leaving only a small portion for export. In some years when AFPTC procurementwent down, public hoarding affected both internal and external ricetrade. AFPTC procurement in selected years is shown in Table 65.Government monopoly of the rice trade increased the volume fourfold inrice procurement alone—from 1 million to 4 million t (Table 65). Annualprocurement volume fluctuated between2 million and 4 million t (representing30-40% of production). In years of good weather, about 35-40% of productionwas bought by AFPTC; but in years when weather abnormalities occurred, thequantity went down abruptly. In 1966, when the monsoon departed earlierthan usual, rice production was drastically reduced to about 6.5 million t.Correspondingly, the AFPTC procured only 2 million t, much below theprocurement target.Since rice was distributed by cooperatives from the AFPTC stock, thepublic tended to panic during low-procurement years. The price of rice in thefree market went up, resulting in a large price disparity between that offeredby cooperatives and that given in the free market. This price disparity was evenlarger for higher grain quality rice. The public resorted to hoarding, whichbrought the threat of a rice shortage. Retailers similarly hoarded rice andhanded out cash to farmers as some form of advanced payment for availablestock for the coming harvest. Farmers were reluctant to sell their stock toAFPTC, and the government suspended rice trade control temporarily for oneyear to relieve public anxiety. The farmers who still possessed surplus stockenjoyed a higher price for rice during that year.118 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

Table 65. Annual rice procurement (million t), 1960-85. aRice Rice %Year procurement production procurement b196019611962196319641965196619671968196919701971197219731974197519761977197819791980198119821983198419850.7330.7210.5680.9084.0143.2402.0072.1593.0032.9652.9572.2041.2191.4852.6643.1842.8892.1993.3683.5704.2124.3064.0604.0863.6694.0867.0856.7987.5507.6678.3737.9296.5317.6467.8967.8598.0338.0467.2408.4668.4489.0629.1729.31310.36210.28313.10713.92314.14614.16514.25514.317101181250413128383837271718323532243335323129292629a Sources: For 1960-64, RGUB 1966; for 1965-70, SRUB 1972; for 1971-72, SRUB 1974; for1973-74, SRUBSRUB 1987. b 1977; for 1976-78, SRUB 1979; for 1979-82, SRUB 1984; and for 1983-85,Procurement by State Agricultural Marketing Board; private procurement notIncluded.In 1967, the weather was normal and rice production rose again to thenormal level but farmers were slow in disposing of their surplus stock. Theywere hoping for a higher price in the succeeding months. The governmentincreased the price, but farmers did not fully respond to it. This also reversedthe pricing structure. In the hope of getting a bigger turnout at the beginningof the procurement season, the government offered higher prices for rice soldin January-February, and reduced the price in March-April and again in April-May. The 1967 procurement volume did not increase appreciably (Table 65).Since the government gave priority to internal distribution, exports diminishedduring these years.The Party and the People’s Council organized the farmers to have theirsurplus stock disposed. The results were discouraging. At the end of theprocurement season, the government announced that it would not procure oldstocks of rice in the coming year. Since then, rice procurement suffered variousdrawbacks that affected the annual procurement volume of AFPTC. Farmersquestioned the accuracy of the production estimates made by the DSLR, whichRICE PRODUCTION UNDER THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC GOVERNMENT 119

were used by AFPTC to set procurement targets. The first production estimatewas done even before farmers had finished transplanting. Although theforecast was later revised through a survey conducted by the DSLR a fewmonths after, AFPTC still based its procurement targets on the first forecast.The AFPTC introduced a ready reckoner system for determining saleablesurplus from data on yield and harvested area. In that table, yield was on thetop horizontal column and harvested area was on the side vertical column.Values of saleable surplus in the table were higher as size of holdings and yieldbecame larger. The ready reckoner system was a tool for assessing saleablesurplus, but was not readily accepted by farmers because they felt that the tablewas too complicated and ambiguous.The AFPTC again initiated an individual family recording system thatlisted the following information: number of family members, rice sown andharvested area, land fertility, variety used, inputs used, yield, production,family consumption, seed requirement, labor and cattle charges paid in kind,and social needs. The objective was to deduct all the needs of the family fromproduction to determine saleable surplus. This system again proved unsatisfactory.The government then adopted an advanced purchase system butsuspended it 4 yr after. The low production in 1972 and 1973 due to the latedeparture of the monsoon again adversely affected the procurement target.Rice procurement went down to a little more than a million t (representing 18%of production).Despite these problems, rice procurement by AFPTC rose again in lateryears, especially during WTRPP implementation. Because of higher production,procurement once more exceeded 4 million t during these years, but notwithout raising controversial issues in the process. Though rice area plantedand harvested were generally accepted, there never was complete agreementon yield.With collaboration from farmers, the AC staff conducted a crop cuttingexercise in 1 plot for every 40 ha (100 acres) harvested, threshed, and weighedin 1 d. The DSLR and the AC staff relied on results from the crop cutting plotsfor their yield estimates; these were refined occasionally with informationcollected from farmers during their crop cutting exercise. Many disputes aroseon the issue of representativeness of the plot selected and the estimation ofmoisture correction for dry weight. Naturally, the DSLR and AC estimatestended to be higher, while farmer estimates tended to be lower (for them to geta lower sale quota). People’s Council members who were farmers themselvesdecided on the yield and production levels upon which selling quota to theAFPTC was finally based. Farmers were eager to sell their surplus rice in thefree market where they could get higher prices—about two to two-and-a-halftimes that offered by AFPTC.At procurement time, farmers who were not able to fulfill the quota werearraigned. To escape arrest, some sold the rice left for family consumption and120 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

for seeds; still others sold their assets (like draft animals) to buy rice from othersto fulfill the AFPTC quota. Some were eventually arrested. These cases causedantagonism between the farmers and the government. The farmers claimedthat, although the AFPTC purchase price had risen substantially in 1974, thereal price of rice had gone down. They pointed out that the prices of other cropsand basic commodities had spiralled. The government explained the largeamount of subsidy for fertilizers, tractor plowing, irrigation, and other socialactivities, but the effects of these services were not apparent. The quantity ofrice retained by the farmers for the free market was hard to determine althoughsome estimated that might be about 10-15% of production.Saddled with problems, the annual rice procurement program dragged onthrough the years until 1987, when the government lifted the control on theinternal rice trade. The price of rice more than doubled, but it was not clear howthis move would influence the economy of the country.Rice millingDuring the period, the rice milling industry was composed of 3400 rice millsof varying sizes with a milling capacity of 2000 t/h or more than 48,000 t/d.These rice mills were grouped into three categories—AFPTC-owned mills,AFPTC-contracted mills, and small mills and hullers. (All rice mills in thecountry needed to be registered with AFPTC.)AFPTC-owned mills were constructed recently with assistance from ADBand the Overseas Economic Development Fund of Japan. Representing only5% of total milling capacity, these modern mills, equipped with rubber rollersand run by electric motors, have a capacity of 100 t/d.AFPTC-contracted mills were old, constructed more than 50 yr ago byprivate citizens. They were operated by husk-fired boilers. Hulling was doneby using stone discs coated on both surfaces with emery and cement. On theother hand, small mills and hullers were those owned by the private sector orby cooperatives that had sprouted recently in many parts of the country. Ricefor internal consumption and export came from AFPTC-owned and -contractedmills, while rice for farmer families and the free market came from small millsand hullers.Table 66 shows the number of different mills operating in the country andtheir milling capacity. More than 50% of the rice was being processed byAFPTC-contracted mills, followed by privately owned small mills. Cooperativemills were expanded, but their share in the milling industry amounted toonly 4%.Except for the modern rice mills owned by AFPTC, most mills, becausethey were obsolete, had a milling recovery of around 60%. Rice millers did notwant to renovate their mills. Poor milling recovery was further compoundedby poor postharvest practices. Untimely harvesting led to more immaturegrains (in the case of early harvest) or overripened grains (in the case of lateRICE PRODUCTION UNDER THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC GOVERNMENT 121

Table 66. Rice mills and their milling capacity, 1983 (ADB 1985).Mill typeAFPTC-owned aAFPTC-contractedPrivate (for family consumption)Cooperative mills and hullersRegistered hullersTotal registeredNumbersof mills44943103426411983438Nominalmillingcapacity(t/h)1021166591771512087a AFPTC = Agriculture and Farm Produce Trade Corporation.harvest). Both cases led to reduced milling recovery. In addition, there washigh breakage during milling caused by weak grains. The factors that contributedto weak grains were animal trodding during threshing, cracking causedby overexposure to the sun, and the large difference between day and nighttemperatures to which the grain was exposed while on the threshing floor.AFPTC supplied the spare parts for mills registered with it, but the privatemillers did not fully cooperate, resulting in minimal maintenance of the oldmills.Because of the shortage in milling capacity, there was a proliferation ofhullers—some registered and some illegal-in many rural areas. The governmentbanned hullers in the Irrawaddy, Pegu, and Rangoon Divisionsbecause of their low milling recovery. The People’s Council, through millingpermits, also controlled milling of rice retained for consumption by farmers.These milling permits were issued partially (two to three installments) untilthe AFPTC procurement target was achieved. The idea was to force the farmersto sell their quota on time if they wanted to mill their rice for home consumption.Even after fulfilling their quota and obtaining the milling permit, farmersfound it difficult to make two or three trips to the mills to have the rice milledfor family use. The average distance between the village and the rice millsranged from 7 to 10 km, and making 2 or 3 trips with a row boat or cart provedimpractical.Distance was not the only factor; the waiting time in the mill often lastedfor one or two nights, discouraging the farmers even more. This offered anopportunity for traders and millers to come in and exchange rice for the millingpermit (ten baskets of unhusked rice exchanged for four baskets of milled rice),charging the farmers in kind for transportation and milling. Farmers werethankful that they did not have to make several trips to the mill and wait in themill compound. This margin, taken in kind by traders in cooperation withmillers, became the source of supply of rice for the free market. Althoughissuance of the rice milling permit by the People's Council was intended122 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

primarily to help achieve the AFPTC procurement target and to check the freemarket trade, it failed to accomplish these objectives.On the whole, the rice milling industry needed to be expanded either byconstructing new mills or renovating existing ones. A lot more was needed toincrease milling recovery. Aside from the issue of milling, there were problemsof storage and transport. Deficiencies in these aspects led to bothquantitative and qualitative losses. In the Okpo Township, the annual procurementof 35,000 t in preprogram years increased to 72,000 t after theWTRPP. This doubling of rice procurement far exceeded the storage andmilling capacity of the township. Since rice was procured in the open seasonand was piled in the open field, there was a need to store in a shed when themonsoon set in. The township had 11 rice mills that began operation at thesame time as the rice procurement program. When the monsoon set in, storagefacilities in the mill compound could accommodate whatever amount was left.But when procurement doubled that year, storage facilities were insufficient,making it necessary to store rice temporarily in public places like monasteriesand temples. Large losses were incurred during transport and storage.It was thus necessary to improve rice milling, storage, and transportfacilities to cope with the expected production growth on an area-to-area basis.Every grain saved was an extra grain produced. Efforts to increase riceproduction would never be successful if the necessary facilities for storage,transportation, and milling were not improved accordingly.Rice consumptionAverage per capita consumption per year had increased substantially duringthe period due to special emphasis given to internal distribution of rice by thegovernment. Rice was cheap and a constant price was set throughout thecountry. Higher consumption was noted in rice-deficit areas. Given a choice,people preferred rice to other cereals. As calculated in the previous periods,average per capita consumption was 148 kg in 1985 compared with 107 in 1960.This figure varied widely from region to region. The Burmese, in addition totwo hearty meals, ate a lot of rice products and delicacies as snacks. Urbandwellers ate relatively less rice inasmuch as they could enjoy a diversified diet.Many wheat preparations were used as an alternative.Average per capita rice production was 407 kg/yr. This exceeded percapita consumption and enabled the country to export surplus rice afterdeducting requirements for seed and giving allowance for waste. This surpluscame from the increased yield, which reached a national average of 3000 kg/ha. Many planners had predicted that the country might have to import rice ifproduction continued to be as slow as it was in the beginning of the era. Thesuccessful introduction of MVs, supported by a reasonable amount of inputsand adequate extension services, accelerated growth and disproved the pre-RICE PRODUCTION UNDER THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC GOVERNMENT 123

diction. The question of sustaining this growth and further accelerating riceproduction now came up. Per capita consumption would not likely decrease,and, at the same time, population would grow at the regular pace of 2% perannum.Rice exportsPrivate traders no longer handled rice export since 1965 when MEIC was madesolely responsible for that duty. After internal distribution, surplus AFPTCprocuredrice was exported by MEIC. Four selling practices were followed:government-to-government sale, direct sale, tender sale, and barter sale.Government-to-government sale fetched a price lower than the internationalmarket price, but goodwill and other reciprocatory measures were consideredin such transactions. Direct sale to private firms with a long business associationwith the country was also practiced. Part of the export was also made under theinternational tender system, while some followed the barter system.Exports during the period declined gradually in the beginning but decreasedabruptly after 1966, when the country experienced serious droughts. Thisreduced the rice output. The volume of AFPTC-procured rice went down,leaving a small amount available for export after internal distribution. Sincethen, the AFPTC rice procurement system has been modified many times butthere has been no appreciable result.The annual rice production and export data are presented in Table 67 (eachfinancial year starts 1 Apr and ends 31 Mar). There might be some overlap inthe sense that export for a particular year does not really relate to theproduction for that year. Some might have come from stocks from the previousyear and some from the present year, depending on the time of shipment.However, in a continuous course, the data reflect the export trend in relationto production trend.The period started with nearly 2 million t of export, representing 40% ofproduction. In 1966, it slowly decreased to a little more than 1 million t,representing only 30% of production. Export abruptly went down from thenon, reaching a low of 100,000 in 1973. It slowly increased again at the end of theperiod, reaching only 750,000 t.Several factors may explain this decline in export in spite of the steadyproduction growth. Population growth required more rice for internal distribution.More losses accompanied higher production. Compounding thesefactors was the unfavorable international rice market. Regular client countrieslike India, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka bought much lesser amounts as theygained momentum in their drive for self-sufficiency. Prices also went downsignificantly in the international market, thereby reducing the foreign exchangeearnings of the country.The need to improve quality in such a competitive market and to establishregular customers with good trade standing was apparent. It was simply124 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

Table 67. Annual rice production and export (million t), 1960-85.Year Unhusked Milled rice Export b % of export torice equivalent a production196019611962196319641965196619671968196919701971197219731974197519761977197819791980198119821983198419857.0856.7987.5507.6678.3737.9296.5317.6467.8967.8598.0338.0467.2408.4468.4489.0629.1729.31310.36210.28313.10713.92314.14614.16514.25514.3174.2514.0794.5304.6005.0244.7573.9194.5884.7384.7154.8204.8284.3445.0685.0695.4375.5035.5886.2176.1707.8648.3548.4888.4998.5538.5901.7491.5911.7181.7121.4131.3351.1280.5400.3520.5490.6400.8110.5240.1460.2140.2910.6280.6690.3510.5910.6530.6740.7010.8580.7210.750413938372828291271213171234511126108881089a Milled rice equivalent calculated with 50% rice recovery.b Export figures for 1960-84 were takenfrom IRRI 1986; 1985 data from SRUB 1987.impossible to raise the quality of rice under a struggling rice milling industryconsisting of old and obsolete mills and with a continuously changing purchasingsystem. The rice purchasing system also lacked incentives to ensurepure and high-quality rice. Even the small price differential given for qualitywas not seriously applied by the AFPTC procurement center staff.Despite these impediments, the country should continue to strengthenand promote the rice industry. Rice export earnings would remain the controllingfactor in the successful implementation of the national economicdevelopment plan. Although the outlook for rice export appeared dim at themoment—only 3% of world production enters the international market—thegrowing populations in Asia, Africa, South America, and the Middle East willincrease the demand for rice. This should improve Burma’s standing ininternational trade. Rice will remain the staple for a large segment of the worldpopulation.RICE PRODUCTION UNDER THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC GOVERNMENT 125

Beneficiaries of productionThe period covering 1960-85 witnessed steady rice production growth in thebeginning, followed by rapid growth after the successful introduction of MVsand the use of fertilizers. The stability of production was less encouraging. Theweather factor that caused growth instability was further compounded byunavailability of inputs in sufficient amounts. There were also flaws in theprocurement system that caused misunderstandings in the allocation of thesale quota.Stability and sustainabilityThe steady production growth stopped in 1966 because of the early departureof the monsoon. Production went down by 20% during the year, creating flawsin the procurement, processing, distribution, and marketing systems. It tooka few years to bring the situation back to normal, but bad weather struck againin 1972, reducing the yield by 10%. Rice production covered a wide area anddepended mainly on rainfall; either flood or drought occurred in some partsof the country. This adversely affected production and it was hard to concludewhether “good” weather enhanced rice production in a particular year. Whenmany areas received enough rainfall during the growing period, that year wastaken as a good-weather year.Again, as rice production began to use increasing amounts of fertilizer, theavailability of this input in sufficient amount at the right time would determinethat year's output. It often happened that use of less fertilizers slowed downproduction and led to lower foreign exchange earnings. Less foreign exchangeearnings meant less importation of fertilizer, leading again to low production—a vicious cycle. Thus, production growth brought about by yield increasesduring the period may be considered less stable.Maintaining a high growth rate posed many problems. The price of riceduring the period changed six times, but it was hard to determine how thesechanges promoted stability and sustainability of production. The governmentdid not directly manipulate the price mechanism, but it stimulated productionthrough low-interest agricultural loans, distribution of fertilizers at subsidizedrates, and investments in irrigation, mechanization, research, andextension.EquityThe new technology that increased rice production required more expendituresbut also offered higher profits. The allocation of paid-out costs for bothtraditional and new technologies is given in Table 68. A farmer spent 84% ofhis output as paid-out cost in the first period, leaving him only 16% as his share.The situation improved in the second period, with the farmer spending only57% of his output as paid-out cost while enjoying 43% as his share. In the third126 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

Table 68. Comparison of paid-out cost of traditional and new technology (percentof production).Particular 1932 1960Traditional1981NewPaid-out costHired laborHired animal laborSeedFertilizerManureLand rent8446104--405753135--283262129683305110915132Sources: Department reports, Agricultural Corporation (various years).period, a farmer needed to pay only 30% of his output as paid-out cost,enabling him to retain 70% as his share.With traditional technology, 62% of these paid-out costs were used forhired labor, 6% for fertilizers, and 8% for manure; 3% covered the nominal landtax levied by the government. The corresponding figures for the new technologywere 51, 15, 13, and 2%, respectively. (Land rent was greatly reduced in thethird period because of the abolition of the landlord class.)In this period, farmers undoubtedly benefited from the new technology.A high percentage of produce enjoyed by hired labor showed a favorabledistribution of output among the landless farmers. The new technologyneeded more labor than did the traditional practice and subsequently, providedmore opportunities for rural employment. The increasing labor input generatedgreater rice output, which was then distributed reasonably well to thelandless workers. Aside from farmers, the laborers were likewise benefited bythe new technologyImpactScience generated rapid rice production growth during the period, especiallyin the late 1970s and early 1980s when WTRPP gained momentum. Butlimitations in foreign exchange and the existing infrastructure—which forcedan annual increasing demand for fertilizer—lessened the impact. MVs replacedlocal varieties in almost all favorable areas; the adverse environmentsrequired newer MVs adaptable to the situation.The role of farmers in the country’s drive for higher agricultural productionwas widely appreciated. Unity among farmers organized under theFarmers’ Assiayones helped elevate their status in society. Many rural projectson water supply, health and sanitation education, cooperatives, and otherinfrastructure affirmed public recognition of their services. Introduction of thehealth and accident insurance system for draft cattle purchased under MABloans encouraged farmers to take more risks. There were some plans toRICE PRODUCTION UNDER THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC GOVERNMENT 127

introduce a crop insurance scheme to support rainfed agricultural systems.The farmers’ emergence from an exploited to a respectable class in society was,by itself, clear proof of the impact of rapid rice production growth. But farmerswere somewhat resentful of the slow increase in the price of rice in relation tochanges in prices of other crops, which were not under government control.During the period, the impact of rice production was less than expected.It would be unimaginable to experience rice scarcity in a country that was oncea premier exporter. The public anxiously needed to be assured of a continuedsupply of rice, since it lacked confidence in the AFPTC and the consumers’cooperatives. The supply of good-quality rice from cooperatives was uncertain;meanwhile, one could buy any amount in the open market at higherprices. Mismanagement and manipulation by some dishonest people of theprocurement, processing, storage, and distribution of rice created “scarcityamidst plenty.” Many of the problems were self-created.In 1987, the government lifted control of the rice trade. It would beinteresting to assess its impact on the economic and social conditions of thecountry.128 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

CHAPTER VImplications for the futureAnalysis of production growth covering 100 yr reveals both rising and stagnatinggrowth periods. Rice plays such an important role in the economic andsocial life of the people of Burma that successive governments, at differenttimes, controlled rice production to achieve their objectives. These manipulationswere mainly responsible for the rising and stagnating pattern of production.Rice production in Burma depends on many factors within and outside thecontrol of the government. Weather determines average rice production in aparticular year. Other factors like land tenure, loan assistance, draft cattleavailability, and support services such as procurement, processing, marketing,transportation, research, and extension also influence rice production.Control of these factors to attain government objectives defines the pattern ofrice production growth.The annual rice production data were grouped into three arbitrarilyclassified periods in accordance with significant historical events. These threeclasses were further delineated based on the changing attitudes of farmers andgovernment. Farmers play an important role since they are the ones heavilyinvolved in production. Government policies determine how farmers workand how support services are provided.The first period, which was under the British colonial government, witnessedincreased rice production brought about by cultivating swamplands.Certain legislation and incentives in many forms contributed to this achievement.The primary concerns of government at the time were to maintain lawand order, collect revenues, and produce more rice for export. A governmentstructure to help attain these objectives was devised and installed. Riceproduction growth during the period was characterized by the frustration ofa majority of farmers who gave up their lands to moneylenders because theywere not able to repay their loans at the stipulated time. Economic inequalityled to social inequality, and this finally brought about civil unrest.During the second period, the country gained independence from theBritish government and the new government introduced corrective legislation

to improve the plight of farmers. Rice production was again pushed upwardby restoring the lands abandoned during World War II. But rural insecurityand the civil war impeded further growth, and the period ended withoutachieving the targets set forth by the government. This was the period whenpeople entertained hopes for a better future, but the newly independentgovernment only managed to partially fulfill such expectations.During the third period, the government succeeded in abolishing thestructure put in place by the colonial government. Science induced rapidproduction growth by increasing yields. Strong support services and highlymotivated farmers made this rapid growth possible. After some time, growthslowed down when the institutional framework and infrastructure wereunable to cope with the demands of a rapidly expanding rice productionprogram. Production growth had far-reaching impacts. In addition to itseconomic and social impacts on the population, the new technology made thecountry progressive.There remains a great potential for further growth. But the selective andconcentrative strategy employed in this period needs to be revised. The yieldin physically adverse environments needs to be improved. Also, resourcepoorfarmers cannot utilize existing technology because it is not appropriateto their situation. These two issues deserve the attention of researchers.The involvement of researchers and extension workers in the WTRPPoffers them valuable experience which is useful in developing future researchprograms. They gain practical knowledge of how the new technology worksunder favorable environments. This experience will be extremely helpful indeveloping technology appropriate for adverse environments and for resourcepoorfarmers-concerns which were somehow ignored during this period.The new technology must have beneficial impacts in terms of productivity andequity. As research aims to raise yield by exploiting the remaining growthpotential, it is necessary that equity considerations be incorporated in it. Thiswill be possible only if farmers are involved in the process of developing andtransferring technology right from the start.The farmers certainly have the inherent capability to develop new technologiesappropriate to their conditions. By simultaneously harnessing thiscapability and using recent advances in agricultural science, appropriatesolutions to their field problems can be easily found. One proof of this is theShwe-ta-soke, a modern variety developed by farmers without any assistancefrom research scientists.Investment alternativesIn a situation where investment is restricted, it is necessary to prioritize theproblems to be addressed. Investments in such programs as irrigation, landparceling, and land leveling take time to recover. Several years are neededbefore returns are realized. Considerable economic and social benefits from130 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

agricultural research can be brought about quickly with comparatively lessinvestment if its direction and application are clearly defined. The benefit-costratio can exceed other forms of investment. The country has sufficient manpowerand facilities to conduct user-oriented research, while many internationalresearch institutes, with their latest scientific advances, are ready to help.The participation of farmers in planning, implementing, and evaluatingagricultural sector plans are now well in place; what is needed is technologysuited to previously neglected areas. At present, the location-specific nature ofagricultural technology is widely recognized, and area-based research recommendationsare common. Identification and characterization of problemareas are usually done.As important as the area-based concept is the human-based approach toraise rice production and guarantee sustainability and equity. The need forbeneficiaries to participate has not been disputed, but the means of accomplishingthis has always been a source of disagreement among policymakers.Future research direction in the country should comprise at least twocomponents: 1) maintenance research to sustain progress already made, and2) farmer participatory research to overcome barriers in the present-daysituation. Resources for research should be allocated efficiently to take advantageof the existing institutional setup while allotting a reasonable amountfor the farmer participatory research component. This requirement is wellwithin the capability of the government.Farmer participatory research and extensionAgriculture is the largest and most productive sector of Burma’s economy, andit will remain so in the future. Investment in agricultural research is essential,since it can transform the economy. Experience has proven that the clientparticipatory approach to agricultural development planning, implementation,and evaluation results in remarkable success. The present situation offers agood opportunity to initiate a farmer participatory research and extensionprogram to substantially improve the quality of life of the rural poor. It ispremised on the farmers’ ability to help themselves.Selectivity and concentration have proven effective in diffusing technologiesfrom experimental stations to resource-rich or not-so-poor farmers who workin environments that closely resemble those in the research stations. The notso-poorfarmers in both favorable and unfavorable environments have alreadyenjoyed the fruits of the new technology. Resource-poor farmers miss out onthe new technology because it is not appropriate to their conditions. It isimperative that a technology adapted to the circumstances of resource-poorfarmers be developed. Involving them in the process right from the beginningensures productivity, stability, sustainability, and equity in such a rice productionsystem.IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE 131

Farmer participatory research is often mistaken as “on-farm trials” but thetwo differ completely. On-farm trials are designed by researchers who applytreatments that they think are necessary. Though the experiment is conductedin farmers’ fields, farmers are not involved in its design. The farmer participatoryresearch and extension approach has farmers working with scientists inanalyzing the biological, social, and economic conditions on the farms.Poor farmers always seek technology that will increase their income andimprove their lives while keeping their risks within a reasonable limit. Theyare so poor that they cannot afford to take great risks; when technology fails,they have nothing to fall back on. They have to face a long period of indebtednessonce the technology proves inappropriate.Farmer participatory research and extension will develop technology thatwill enable resource-poor farmers to secure better livelihood from agricultureby putting science to practice with a minimum of risks. This proposal will focuson farmers for whom such research and extension programs are made. Thisapproach should be tried on rice in view of the experience gained with theWTRPP. If it succeeds, it should cover other crops. The subsequent discussionwill focus on the proposed methodology to accomplish this goal.Formulation and implementation of the farmer participatory approachshould be done in five steps: selection of scientists, motivation of scientists,preprogram activities, drawing of a detailed research program, and transfer oftechnology.Selection of scientistsThe first step involves choosing skilled scientists with the right attitude for thework. Most scientists come from urban areas, but a few come from rural areas.Some scientists from the rural areas belong to families of resource-rich farmers.They usually do not understand the conditions surrounding resource-poorfarmers. Some, after returning from postgraduate studies, try to keep awayfrom the realities of rural life. They tend to restrict themselves to experimentalstations and to continue research initiated during their postgraduate studies,irrespective of local needs. Their reluctance to work in the villages and sharein the discomfort of village life underscores the need to instill in them the rightattitudes and values.Moreover, they have a low opinion of farmers. After specializing in aparticular discipline, their regard for other disciplines also declines. The needfor multidisciplinary approach is evident, and motivating scientists to interactwith others from other disciplines becomes necessary. Researchers rarely visitthe villages; when they do, they stay only for a very short time. Such short visitsdo not benefit either farmers or scientists. During these brief visits, it isprobable that scientists meet only the resource-rich farmers or adoptors oftechnology. Feedback information comes from technology adoptors who aremore concerned with improvement of a given technology. It is unlikely thatresource-poor farmers are given the chance to present their views.132 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

Motivation of scientistsUnder these circumstances, the most one can do is to select scientists with somebias toward the rural poor. They are then motivated to participate effectivelyin the program. Most scientists tend to be individualistic, independent, stubborn,and self-centered, but they respond positively if properly motivated.Such motivation should include ways to induce them to interact withpeople from different disciplines so as to create a good working atmosphere.Specialists from various disciplines use their own language, and it is thusimportant to find a common language that everybody will understand andthat will enable them to agree on what practical action to take. This processrequires a delicate approach, since a specialist in one discipline, usually proudof his own knowledge, will not likely listen to another. A postgraduate degreein this case serves as a professional blinder.Greater coordination and understanding among researchers are essentialfor effective implementation of the farmer participatory research and extensionprogram. The institutionalized knowledge that researchers have acquiredfrom the university enables them to show how things should be done. They arenot usually good listeners, and their relationship with farmers can be characterizedas the type existing between a teacher and a student.Such an attitude will not work with this approach. The relationshipbetween researchers and farmers should be one where they are seen as”partners in progress.” The researchers’ usual negative attitude toward thepoor farmers needs to be changed. Scientists need not be in the habitual role ofa teacher; they can also be learners. Teamwork constitutes a pivotal part of thewhole approach. The solutions to the farmers’ problems can neither be foundin a single discipline nor offered by a single individual. Effective collaborationamong various disciplines is a prerequisite.Preprogram activitiesPreprogram activities should focus on two aspects-identification of the areaand identification of the target groups. These should start 2 mo before actualrice cultivation (May in Lower Burma and June in Upper Burma). Since thetownship serves as the smallest administrative unit, it should be used as thestarting point in area identification.The township should be at the center of a well-defined rice environment.Using national statisticsand relying on the judgment of experienced researchers,it should not be difficult to locate such a township. Once the township has beenidentified, the researchers should collect all the statistical data available andintegrate the results of research in their own discipline.With the aid of a township map, the scientists can identify village tractsand villages that are situated far from railways and highways; these willcertainly have many resource-poor farmers. The assistance of the TownshipPeople’s Council will be valuable in selecting the villages. Using statisticsIMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE 133

collected from township headquarters as a guide, the target group can be easilyidentified. The resource-poor farmers usually have holdings less than theaverage size and own fields that are usually infertile and situated far from thevillage. Their dwellings, clothes, and utensils indicate their poverty. Theirmain productive asset is their labor.The first move is to meet with village leaders and representatives, explainto them the objectives of the program, and secure their cooperation. Thesediscussions should identify the resource-poor farmers, describe what they aredoing, and show how they are coping. Afterward, all resource-poor farmersare assembled. The township statistics are confirmed and compared with theaverage to ensure that those assembled really represent the resource-poorfarmers of the area. Through free-wheeling and frank discussions, theirphysical, biological, economic, and social conditions are determined. Theresearchers now select from among those present, five farmers to represent thewhole group by participating in the project.Resource-poor farmers possess knowledge that is different from “institutionalized”knowledge. Their knowledge is considered inferior by manyand has generally never been properly utilized. They have accumulated andrefined this indigenous knowledge over time from one generation to another.The idea is to blend the institutionalized knowledge system with the farmers'indigenous knowledge system, and thus produce technology that is appropriateto the area and to the people. This is when researchers exchange roles withfarmers-when they visualize what they would do if they were tilling the landthemselves. The farmers are, in reality, agronomists, economists, and sociologistsall rolled into one. They solve a particular problem based on theirprevious experiences in the agronomic and socioeconomic spheres.These discussions may point to the need to develop technology adaptedto the area and to conduct new research. The first involves verification work,while the second implies designing a new research project using a new set oftreatments. Both aspects will serve as bases for drawing a detailed workingprogram.A detailed working programResearchers and farmers are now ready to draw up a detailed workingprogram that will cover both aspects, starting from tillage operations toharvest and disposal of the produce. The necessary data and observations willbe recorded at different stages of the operation. Then ten impact pointsgenerated from research may serve as a springboard for discussion. Dependingon the circumstances, farmers may add or delete some of these impact points.Farmers, who are usually timid, have to be encouraged to participate insuch discussions. In these meetings, the responsibilities of both farmers andresearchers are defined. This division of responsibilities and the work determinethe nature of the researchers' succeeding visits—either in small groups134 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

or as individuals. Research is to be evaluated jointly at different stages until theend.In this approach, the usual statistical analyses may be dispensed with, butresearchers may want to discuss with farmers the need to replicate. Finalevaluation may not be restricted only to yield or other yield components;farmers may propose other criteria to evaluate experiments based on theirresources and environments. Hopefully, results from such experiments willyield new technology that will ensure productivity, stability, sustainability,and equity. More fine-tuning of the technology thus developed may be doneto suit diverse environments.Farmer participatory extensionTechnology developed using this approach will have no problem gettingdisseminated. Since users are involved right from the beginning, acceptance ofthe technology is assured. Technology transfer, however, may follow differentpaths. The transfer may beaccomplished through friend-to-friend or neighborto-neighborencounters. One can expect that the technology will be diffusedwidely and rapidly.With this approach, farmers’ attitudes are expected to change. They willlearn to appreciate researchers for giving them special attention. They will feelimportant and will consequently lose their feelings of inferiority. At the sametime, farmers will become more conscious of their weaknesses and will bemore organized in asking for more services.This approach establishes a congenial relationship among farmers, extensionworkers, and researchers. Involving researchers in the process oftechnology development erases their “too theoretical” image. Moreover, itenables them to understand the rural poor better, the processes that made thempoor, and the factors that perpetuate their situation.In 1983-84, this extension approach was tried in three places in the country,covering 1062 ha and involving 856 farmers. The main crop used was longstaple cotton. Details were reported at an ADB regional seminar in 1984 (KhinWin et al 1984).Farmer participatory research and extension requires huge manpowerinputs in terms of skilled scientists. The available manpower in the country isnot adequately tapped to implement such an approach in view of the large areaand the large majority of farmers involved. The idea is to develop a methodologythat will harness the underutilized manpower available in the countrythrough proper motivation and effective mass participation.Once the methodology has been developed, a wider application is possiblewith fewer manpower and skillrequirements. It will complement the country’sdevelopment programs, which aim to raise the population’s standard ofliving. The collaborative approach will surely provide great satisfaction to allparticipants, because technology development will enable families of re-IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE 135

source-poor farmers to secure better means of livelihood from rice cultivation.A new technology that will give sufficient rice yield for consumption plus aprofitable surplus will always be welcome. If the farmer participatory approachis applied to various sites over time, the local economy will be enhanced, andthis will have a direct impact on the country’s rural development.136 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

CHAPTER VIConclusionsBurma’s economy will continue to rely on the agricultural sector in theforeseeable future. Rice, which occupies a prominent position in that sector,will certainly shape the economic viability, political stability, and social statusof the country. Internal rice consumption will rise with increasing population.Other cereals are not expected to assume a significant share of the dietarystaple. The demand for rice in the international market will also grow becauseof increasing populations in the rice-consuming countries of Asia, Africa, andSouth America. It is therefore imperative that rice production in the country beincreased.Science, which induced rice production growth in the last period, can spuranother wave of growth if technology appropriate to the situation can bedeveloped and installed. Science has already exploited the areas with “immediategrowth potential,” and it is crucial to extend this to areas with “futuregrowth potential.” These are the areas where rice production growth isachievable once the correct strategy is employed. The 50% area coverage ofMVs in the last period indicates that 50% of the area has “immediate growthpotential,” while the remaining 50% represents areas with “future growthpotential.”It is also possible that some parts of the future-growth-potential regionmay consist of areas with low growth potential, where topography is toorough, the soils too poor, or water too scanty or too deep to encourage aneconomically feasible and technologically applicable rice production system.Elimination of such marginal lands with low growth potential must be madean integral part of the new production campaign. It will be an importantcomponent in the process of changing from a subsistence agriculture systemto a commercial one.The new approach should include steps to identify and eliminate lowgrowth-potentialareas, although people living in these places also merit

attention. It would be wasteful to devote scarce resources to ventures wheresuccess is virtually impossible. Major technological changes are necessary forthis situation, but breakthroughs in science cannot be foreseen. Thus, developmentalefforts in these areas must consider nonagricultural production activitiesor crops other than rice that are appropriate to the environment.The program must ensure a regular supply of rice. Areas with low growthpotential are estimated to be around 10% of the present rice area in the country.With this assumption, the remaining 40% of the area is considered to havefuture growth potential. A new strategy appropriate to this kind of area isrequired to induce another wave of production growth. In this case, thestrategy that proved successful in areas with immediate growth potential willnot work. The farmer participatory research and extension approach will bethe one most suitable.A carefully designed approach for technology development and transfercan bring about economic growth and can help attain key national objectives.The country now has the facilities and the experience to launch a new riceproduction program to take care of the remaining areas. Both financial andpolitical commitments are essential to achieve results in a short time. Thetechnologies developed under this approach will be immediately applicable,highly equitable, and socially acceptable.Resources for research should be divided into two components. The firstone should utilize existing technology within the current institutional frameworkand infrastructure through adaptive research conducted in close collaborationwith international research institutes. These second component shouldinitiate a new technology development program for areas with future growthpotential. The human-based concept must be integrated with the area-basedconcept.The development program should also include steps to promote progressin other aspects (e.g., credit, availability of farm animals, milling) that areknown to influence rice production. Such a program will certainly haveeconomic, political, and social implications for the whole population of thecountry. If successful, the program will earn more foreign exchange for greaterinvestments in irrigation, embankments, drainage, and land consolidation.The impact of modern agricultural science has to be seriously evaluated.Scientific advances should be utilized in the design of a low-energy, sustainableagricultural development system. This system should also conform to theagroecosystem and the socioeconomic conditions under which farmers live.Farmer participation, in this regard, will certainly lead to development withouthaving any adverse effects on the existing socioeconomic system.While increasing crop yield would be an important aspect of this program,experience has emphasized the need to improve the resource base and to usethese resources more efficiently.138 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

References citedAdas M (1974) The Burma delta. University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, Wisconsin.ADB—Asian Development Bank (1985) Burma agricultural sector study. Vol. 1. Mainreport. Manila, Philippines.AC—Agricultural Corporation (various years) Report of the Whole Township RiceProduction Program. For the years 1977-78, 1978-79, 1979-80, 1980-81, 1981-82,1982-83,1984-85, and 1985-86. Rangoon, Burma.Barker R A, Herdt R W, Rose B (1985) The rice economy of Asia. Resources for theFuture, Inc. in cooperation with The International Rice Research Institute, P.O. Box933, Manila, Philippines.Beale R A (1927) A scheme of classification of the varieties of rice found in Burma. PusaAgricultural Research Institute Bulletin No. 167. Pusa, India.Binns BO (1948) Agricultural economy in Burma. Superintendent Government Printingand Stationery, Rangoon, Burma.Cheng Siok-Hwa (1968) The rice industry of Burma, 1852-1940. University of MalayaPress, Kuala Lumpur.DA—Department of Agriculture (Burma) (1958) Rice. Market Section Survey No. 9.Superintendent Government Printing and Stationery, Rangoon, Burma.DSLR—Department of Settlement and Land Records (various years) Season and cropreports. From 1902 to 1985. Rangoon, Burma.Grant J W (1939) The rice crop in Burma. Superintendent Government Printing andStationery, Rangoon, Burma.Government of Burma (1948) Two-year plan of economic development. SuperintendentGovernment Printing and Stationery, Rangoon.Harvey G E (1946) British ruler in Burma, 1824-1942. Faber and Faber, London.Herdt R W, Mandac A M (1979) Overview, findings and implications of constraintsresearch, 1975-1978. Paper presented at the Workshop on Rice Yield Constraints,30 Apr-3 May 1979, Kandy, Sri Lanka.Hill J, Jayasuriya S (1986) An inward-looking economy in transition. Occasional PaperNo. 80. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.IRRI—International Rice Research Institute (1986) World rice statistics 1985. P. O. Box933, Manila, Philippines.Jayasuriya S K (1984) Technical change and revival of the Burmese rice industry. Dev.Econ. 22(2):137-154.

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AppendicesAppendix I. Sown area and production of rice, 1830-1985.Sown area Production Sown area ProductionYear (million ha) (million t) Year (million ha) (million t)183018351845185518601865187018751880188518901895190019011902190319041905190619071908190919101911191219131914191519161917191819190.0270.0950.1430.4020.5390.5820.7020.9631.2551.4972.3292.6333.4603.3423.3573.7663.7493.7563.7213.7763.9344.0474.0263.9764.1364.1814.2594.2104.2784.3334.2024.2410.0440.1540.2310.6490.8700.9401.1331.5551.9892.4183.7614.2525.5885.3975.4226.0826.0546.0616.0106.0986.3546.5366.5026.4216.6797.1246.4575.8675.7787.0937.2756.028193719381939194019411942194319441945194619471948194919501951195219531954195519561957195819591960196119621963196419651966196719685.0535.0115.0315.0664.9884.3293.0902.6312.6293.2013.4793.9653.6493.7033.8284.0164.0343.9754.0514.0773.9864.0874.2004.2174.5974.8375.0495.1095.0144.9894.9345.0196.8926.7447.9426.8947.7385.7523.0532.5452.6773.8445.4405.1644.5815.4035.6015.8425.5795.6516.0256.2825.4236.8827.1837.0856.7987.5507.6678.3737.9296.5317.6467.896continued on next page

Appendix 1 continuedSown area Production Sown area ProductionYear (million ha) (million t) Year (million ha) (million t)192019211922192319241925192619271928192919301931193219331934193519364.1724.3314.4374.5484.6274.6774.7744.7354.8794.9415.0064.8024.8774.9544.8974.8054.9276.0086.1296.3576.3575.7816.5006.8437.5577.0247.1387.2957.5086.1017.1877.5627.5897.322196919701971197219731974197519761977197819791980198119821983198419854.9554.9754.9774.8625.0895.1775.2045.0775.1365.2435.0265.1274.9214.8824.8314.9174.9027.8598.0338.0467.2408.4668.4489.0629.1729.31310.36210.28313.10713.92314.14614.16514.25514.317Sources: 1. Sown area, 1830-1930, Grant 1939. 2. Sown area, 1931-40. Cheng 1968. 3. Sownarea, 1941-54, DSLR, various years. 4. Sown area, 1955-63. RGUB 1966. 5. Sown area, 1964-70, RGUB 1973. 6. Sown area, 1971-75, RGUB 1978, 7. Sown area, 1976-82. SRUB 1984. 8.Sown area, 1983-85, SRUB 1987. 9. Production, 1913-54, DSLR, various years. 11. Production,1955-63, RGUB 1966. 12. Production, 1964-70, SRUB 1973. 13. Production. 1971-75, SRUB1978. 14. Production, 1976-82, SRUB 1984. 15. Production. 1982-85. SRUB 1987.Appendix II. Government agricultural loans (000 kyats), 1900-85.ShareRice a All crop a of rice(%)Remark190019051910191519161917191819191920192119221923192419251926192719281116809291,3041,2709371,2901,1593,1991,9031,5812,5422,443nananana1116809201,3041,2709371,2901,1593,1991,9031,5812,5422,443nananana100100100100100100100100100100100100100----Total loans advanced under theLand Improvement Loan Act of1884 and under the Agriculturists’Loan Act of 1884 forrice area expansioncontinued on next page144 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

Appendix II continuedShareRice a All crops a of rice(%)Remark19291930193119321933193419351936193719381939194019411942194319441945194619471948194919501951195219531954195519561957195819591960196119621963196419651966196719681969197019711972197319741975na9614,6051,596856395365480na22nananananananananananananananananananananananananana83,76789,108103,444122,700124,694109,9377,520na1,1351,399na9614,6051,596856395365480na22nanananananananananananana54,30052,10042,70048,30046,00056,10042,90057,40072.60069,100215,100284,300229,200102,876106,138125,185146,422151,381151,05730,257na3,28143,860100100100100100100100–100100–––––––––––––––––––––––––81848384827325–353Tenants of governmentestates, agricultural creditsocietles, and state agriculturalbank. Total loansadvanced under the agriculturists'Loan Act and StateAgricultural Bank. Loan issuedunder credit society discontinued.Loans only for rice-deficitareas. Advanced purchasesystem practiced by riceprocurement agency, 1974-77.continued on next pageAPPENDICES 145

Appendix II continuedShareRice a All crops a of rice(%)Remark19761977197819791980198119821983198419851,7379,790693,430720,755701,4271,040,7631,063,6961,040,4091,055,1191,033,38865,400115,398809,597845,455826,4611,176,4381,210,1111,190,6801,218,7031,197,585398685858888878786Sources: 1. From 1900 to 1939, Cheng 1968.2. From 1953 to 1957, RGUB 1964. From 1957to 1968, SRUB 1970.4. From 1968 to 1969, RGUB 1970.5. From 1970 to 1972, SRUB, 1974.6. For 1974, SRUB 1977. 7. From 1975 to 1978, SRUB 1979.8. From 1979 to 1982. SRUB1984. 9. From 1983 to 1985, SRUB 1987. a na = not available.Appendix III. Draft cattle and load factor, 1901-85.Gross Cattle WorkloadPeriod sown area population per Remark(000 ha) (000 head) pair a1901190419091914191919241929193419391936195319541955195619571958195919601961196219631964196519664,7985,2495,7205,9876,2946,7117,1047,3117,5687,5616,5416,4226,5506,5566,4566,6766,8816,9537,6948,3768,7168,7568,7758,6501,7631,9202,2972,4372,7452,8492,996na3,1483.0672,8142,9042,9392.9743,0213,0893,1853,2843,3903,4193,7294,2334,2424,0755.445.464.984.914.594.714.74-4.814.934.654.424.464.394.274.324.324.234.544.904.674.144.144.26AV 1936-41continued on next page146 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

Appendix III continuedGross Cattle WorkloadPeriod sown area population per(000 ha) (000 head) pair aRemark19671968196919701971197219731974197519761977197819791980198119821983198419858,6478,7988,8079,0409,1879,1079,4209,5009,4429.3749,5429,8629,43110,03810,1679,91010,15810,51610,3854,2134,0264,0674,1184,0514,2384,2664,9445,0185,0875,1805,3335,5645,7345,9506.1376,2596,3666,5164.104.374.334.394.544.304.423.843.763.693.683.703.393.503.423.233.253.303.19a Workload means area in ha undertaken by a pair of cattle. na = not applicable.Sources: 1. DSLR, various years. 2. RGUB 1964. 3. RGUB 1966. 4. RGUB 1973. 5. RGUB 1978.6. SRUB 1984.7. SRUB 1987.Appendix IV. Annual rice exports, 1860-1985.Year Exports Year Exports Year Exports(000 t) (000 t) (000 t)18601870188018901900-011901-021902-031903-041904-051905-061906-071907-081908-091909-101910-111911-121912-13126381807120820972830228417542194203222052389216424022381219223531923-241924-251925-261926-271927-281928-291929-301930-311931-321932-331933-341934-351935-361936-371937-381938-391933-40235224813148253330102847299328393209258432023428282928072827297931041960-611961-621962-631963-641964-651965-661966-671967-681968-691969-701970-711971-721972-731973-741974-751975-761976-771722159117441712141313351128540352541640811511144208286628continued on next pageAPPENDICES 147

Appendix IV continuedYear Exports Year Exports Year Exports(000 t) (000 t) (000 t)1913-141914-151915-161916-171917-181918-191919-201920-211921-221922-2327012286164617181982299923592107230026101950-511951-521952-531953-541954-551955-561956-571957-581958-591959-601184126812609701461163918641753141016921977-781978-791979-801980-811981-821982-831983-841984-851985-86669351591653674701858721520Sources: 1. For the years 1860 to 1928-29, Grant 1939. 2. For the years 1929-40. Lwin Chit1949. 3. For the years 1950-61 to 1984-85, IRRI 1985. 4. For 1985-86. SRUB 1987.Appendix V. Prices of rice per 100 baskets or 2100 kg (1845-1985). aYear Price Year Price Year Price1845 b18551860186518701875188018851890189519001901190219031904190519061909191019111912191319141915845455070651009595959595100110951051201301101301601301201251916191719181919192019211922192319241925192619271928192919301931 c1932193319341935193619371938193911010510014018019019518019519519018016516013075808084114109117114117194019451946 d1947194819491950195119521953195419551956195719581959196019611962 e -6519661967-71197219731974-85106271381329322326349331314317335325326340350361384400330340358425600900a Sources: 1. Prices for 1845-1930. Grant 1939. 2. Prices for 1831-39. Cheng 1968. 3. Pricesfor 1940-61, SRUB, various years. 4. Prices for 1962-85. SRUB 1987. b Prices for 1845-1930quoted in rupee which had the same monetary value as kyat. These are average prices in Rangoon.c Prices for 1931-39 are average prices in Rangoon, quoted in rupees.d Prices for 1946-1961 paidby private traders in Rangoon and large cities, quoted in kyats. SAMB -government organizationprice is 300 kyats for type C. e Prices for 1962-85 are fixed by government for C-type grains.148 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

Appendix VI. Changes in variable means over the program period (based on 17 towships for theyears 1977/78-1983/84).Variable Symbol 1977-78 1978-79 1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 1983-84Area (%) sown withMV aRow transplantedarea (%)Area (%) sown with25- to 30-dayoldseedlingsArea (%) sown with20- x 15-cmspacinglntercultivated area(%)Water managementarea (%)Manure applied (t/haUrea applied (kg/ha)TSP a applied (kg/ha)MOP a applied (kg/ha)Pest-protected area(%)Pest-infested area(%)Total labor used(d/10 ha)Area per extensionworker (ha)No. of productioncamps in thetownshipNo. of staff trainedduring the cropyearFarmer training(high level)Farmer training(medium level)Voluntary labor(high level)Voluntary labor(medium level)Rice environment(delta)Rice environment(coastal)X 1X 2X 3X 3 1X 4X 5X 6X 7X 7 1X 7 11X 8X 9X 10657(128)X 111426(1049)X 12X 13X 14X 15X 16X 17X 18X 1926.1(23.9)13.8(18.3)31.1(28.7)20.9(20.6)5.8(11.0)29.6(33.5)1.10(1.20)33.0(19.2)9.6(10.6)1.8(3.7)13.1(26.3)2.1(2.9)1.5(1.5)18(32)0.12(0.33)0.24(0.44)0.06(0.29)0.12(0.33)0.53(0.51)0.00(0.0039.9(27.6)46.4(33.9)56.6(25.4)53.2(27.7)27.3(26.4)62.1(29.2)1.53(1.13)63.0(32.7)28.8(18.2)5.4(7.1)20.5(30.8)3.6(4.0)778(140)533(248)6.5(3.9)82(55)0.24(0.44)0.47(0.51)6.18(0.39)0.35(0.49)0.53(0.51)0.00(0.00)56.0 68.6(27.7) (28.4)68.9 74.1(32.5) (30.9)63.8 74.1(22.1) (24.4)72.0 82.5(21.9) (19.9)30.2 40.9(26.8) (25.3)60.3 65.2(33.2) (34.3)1.53 1.83(0.98) (1.36)67.2 62.2(16.8) (21.4)29.8 27.9(13.2) (12.7)4.6 3.0(6.1) (3.3)21.7 30.9(33.3) (39.5)3.6 3.4(3.9) (3.7)867 897(143) (159)556 599(255) (275)6.8 6.9(3.7) (3.4)124 188(144) (244)0.41 0.59(0.51) (0.51)0.29 0.18(0.47) (0.39)0.29 0.47(0.47)0.47(0.51)0.24(0.51) (0.44)0.53 0.53(0.51) (0.51)0.00 0.00(0.00) (0.00)71.3 72.3(28.6) (28.3)72.0 78.7(30.6) (30.6)77.7 72.8(24.6) (23.3)82.3 84.4(20.8) (20.2)52.3 47.2(34.2) (34.2)68.8 70.1(30.5) (29.8)2.11 2.23(1.66) (1.83)63.8 75.6(19.8) (21.1)24.7 30.2(13.9) (13.9)3.1 6.3(3.0) (5.0)33.2 33.2(41.1) (44.9)1.5 1.1(2.6) (2.1)932 944(103) (105)686 652(297) (299)6.7 6.7(2.7) (2.7)191 134(280) (173)0.53 0.65(0.51) (0.49)0.29 0.18(0.47) (0.39)0.24 0.29(0.11) (0.47)0.24 0.29(0.47) (0.49)0.53 0.53(0.51) (0.51)0.00 0.00(0.00) (0.00)75.2(27.9)75.4(29.1)66.1(26.1)85.7(19.3)50.0(32.6)67.5(30.6)2.11(1.61)84.8(23.8)33.4(17.4)8.9(6.7)37.9(43.7)2.8(4.6)946(106)639(300)6.7(2.7)122(175)0.59(0.51)0.18(0.39)0.35(0.49)0.35(0.49)0.53(0.51)0.00(0.00)continued on next pageAPPENDICES 149

Appendix VIcontinuedVariable Symbol 1977-78 1978-79 1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 1983-84Rice environment(irrigated)Rice environment(dry zone)Rainfall relative tonormalProgram life (year)Rice yield (t/ha)X 20X 21X 22X 23Y0.24(0.44)0.18(0.39)1.46(0.76)1.00(0.00)2.28(0.39)0.24(0.44)0.18(0.39)1.48(0.77)1.141(0.00)2.88(0.48)0.24(0.44)0.18(0.39)1.50(0.78)1.73(0.00)3.17(0.62)0.24(0.44)0.18(0.39)1.52(0.79)2.00(0.00)3.55(0.82)0.24(0.44)0.18(0.39)1.54(80.80)2.24(0.00)3.64(0.72)0.24(0.44)0.18(0.39)1.56(0.81)2.45(0.00)3.74(0.74)0.24(0.44)0.18(0.39)1.58(0.82)2.65(0.00)3.52(0.65)a TSP = Triple superphosphate, MOP = muriate potash, MV = modern variety; figure in () = Standard deviation,150 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

Appendix VII. Means and standard deviations of variables (52 program townships).Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SDAll combined1977-84 1977-78 1978-79 1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 1982-84Variable Symbol (308 obs) (17 obs) (31 obs) (52 obs) (52 obs) (52 obs) (52 obs) (52 obs)Area (%) sown 55.7 23.6 67.5 23.3 69.5 23.919.8 65.9 22.5 70.6 24.313.3 27.9 15.2 27.9 15.52.6 6.0 5.9 7.0 5.334.7 25.6 36.9 20.9 33.87.4 2.6 7.2 2.4 3.687 917 89 918 90X 1 27.8 26.1 23.9 33.2 25.0 41.6 25.2 58.9 23.9 63.9 Total labor used X 858 131 658 128 753 13110799 130 (d/10 ha)868 116 913 with MVRow trans- X 2 58.1 37.3 13.8 18.3 30.9 31.6 51.2 39.1 64.6 35.2 66.9 33.6 70.4 33.7 68.2 33.3plantedarea (%)Area (%) sown X 3 59.1 29.3 31.1 20.7 43.8 27.2 50.9 28.9 64.3 28.0 69.5 27.7 66.7 25.6 63.2 27.7with 25to 30-day-oldseedlingsArea (%) sown X 3 ' 64.9 33.1 20.9 20.6 36.5 30.3 56.6 32.3 74.4 28.1 74.2 28.9 75.8 28.7 74.5 28.9with 20-x 15-cmspacinglntercultivated X 4 35.9 32.8 5.8 11.0 19.8 25.0 24.1 28.3 40.0 30.6 45.6 33.9 42.5 33.2 46.9 34.6area (%)Water manage- X 5 50.4 36.6 29.6 33.5 44.5 35.1 41.4 36.4 55.2 36.7 55.2 36.3 55.7 35.7 54.6 37.2ment area(%)1.66 1.49 1.48 1.5 1.4Manure applied X 6 1.32 1.37 1.09 1.20 1.18 1.07 0.99 1.02 1.37 1.36 1.43 (t/ha)Urea applied X 7 55.0 24.9 33.0 19.2 51.1 24.9 45.4 26.0 49.6 20.6 53.2 (kg/ha)TSP applied (kg/ha)X 7 ' 22.5 15.1 9.7 10.7 20.9 17.1 19.9 15.5 20.9 12.3 20.9 MOP applied X 7 " 4.0 4.9 1.8 3.7 3.8 6.2 2.8 4.3 2.5 3.0 2.4 (kg/ha)Pest-protected X 19.6 32.5 13.1 26.3 18.4 32.4 8area (%)11.4 24.6 18.9 32.6 24.3 Pest-infested X 2.5 6.6 2.1 2.9 2.0 3.4 9area (%)1.6 2.8 3.8 10.9 2.7

All combined1977-84 1977-78 1978-79 1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 1982-84Variable Symbol (308 obs) (17 obs) (31 obs) (52 obs) (52 obs) (52 obs) (52 obs) (52 obs)Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SDArea per ex- 847 635 1426 1050 1019 945 1011 750 761 539 764 448 713 377 692 381tension X 11Rice environ- X 0.09 0.28 0.18 0.39 0.13 0.34 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.2721mentworker (ha)No. of produc- X 5.1 3.0 1.5 1.5 4.0 4.0 4.2 3.5 5.7 2.8 5.8 2.4 tion camps 125.8 2.4 5.8 2.4in township:No. of staff X 96 148 18 32 49 57 66 97 121 168 123 190 trained 13115 157 109 157during cropyearFarmer training X 0.44 0.50 0.12 0.33 0.19 0.40 0.38 0.49 0.54 0.50 0.46 0.50 (high level) 14Farmer training X 0.32 0.47 0.24 0.44 0.32 0.48 0.38 0.49 0.29 0.46 0.37 0.48 (medium 15level)Voluntary labor X 0.16 0.37 0.06 0.24 0.10 0.30 0.15 0.36 0.21 0.41 0.15 0.36 (high level) 16Voluntary labor X 0.27 0.44 0.12 0.33 0.23 0.43 0.25 0.44 0.29 0.46 0.21 0.41 (medium 17level)Rice environ- X 0.58 0.49 0.53 0.51 0.52 0.51 0.60 0.50 0.60 0.50 0.60 0.50 18ment(delta)Rice environ- X 0.09 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.25 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.30 ment19(coastal)Rice environ- X 0.15 0.36 0.24 0.44 0.23 0.43 0.13 0.34 0.13 0.34 0.13 0.34 ment20(irrigated)0.54 0.29 0.17 0.29 0.60 0.10 0.13 0.50 0.46 0.38 0.46 0.50 0.30 0.34 0.52 0.33 0.19 0.38 0.60 0.10 0.13 0.500.470.400.490.500.300.34(dry zone)

Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD1.2 0.69 1.251.973.470.220.512.213.610.700.190.581.272.433.470.710.180.47All combined1977-84 1977-78 1978-79 1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 1982-84Variable Symbol (308 obs) (17 obs) (31 obs) (52 obs) (52 obs) (52 obs) (52 obs) (52 obs)Rainfall rela- X 22 1.26 0.70 1.46 0.76 1.38 0.76 1.21 0.68tive tonormalProgram life (yr) X 1.81 0.51 1.00 0.00 1.23 0.21 1.35 0.3223Rice yield Y 3.19 0.68 2.28 0.39 2.58 0.53 2.75 0.58(t/ha)1.221.693.310.680.250.58

Appendix VIII. Correlation coefficients between variables.Varia- Y X 1 X 2 X 3 X 4 X 5 X 6 X 7 X 8 X 9 X 10 X 11 X 12 X 13 X 14 X 15 X 16 X 17 X 18 X 19 X 20 X 21 X 22 X 23bleY 1.00 0.61 0.49 0.47 0.41 0.39 0.32 0.40 0.24 -0.05 0.37 -0.21 0.51 0.17 0.29 0.01 0.10 0.16 0.24 -0.11 0.06 -0.23 -0.04 0.63x 1 1.00 0.41 0.43 0.28 0.37 0.41 0.56 0.32 0.04 0.28 -0.23 0.30 0.04 0.27 -0.11 0.12 0.24 -0.07 -0.11-0.25 0.14 0.21 0.55x 21.00 0.54 0.49 0.52 0.37 0.40 0.21 0.14 0.31 -0.42 0.30 0.10 0.22 -0.01 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.34 0.22 0.10 0.36 0.42x 31.00 0.58 0.13 0.21 0.05 0.06 0.19 -0.07 0.39 0.10 0.17 -0.03 0.10 0.01 0.23 -0.22 0.09 0.04 0.10 0.03 0.34x 41.00 0.58 0.13 0.21 0.05 0.06 0.19 -0.07 0.39 0.10 0.17 -0.03 0.10 0.01 0.23 -0.22 0.09 0.04 -0.01 0.34x 51.00 1.19 0.36 0.28 0.00 0.15 -0.18 0.27 0.12 0.23 -0.06 0.14 0.07 0.02 -0.36 0.25 0.04 0.33 0.27x 61.00 0.36 0.41 -0.05 0.15 -0.21 0.28 0.00 0.12 -0.09 0.09 0.11 -0.15 -0.04 0.27 0.16 0.26 0.26x 71.00 0.25 0.03 0.23 -0.40 0.24 0.13 0.07 -0.02 0.15 0.14 -0.10 -0.28 039 0.06 0.39 0.57x 81.00 0.02 0.14 0.16 0.20 -0.05 -0.09 -0.01 0.18 0.02 -0.05 -0.18 0.12 0.22 0.21 0.23x 91.00 0.07 -0.12 -0.02 -0.02 0.09 -0.07 -0.08 0.10 -0.11 -0.04-0.01 0.17 0.09 0.06x 101.00 -0.33 0.24 0.04 0.05 -0.07 0.04 0.08 -0.38 0.26 0.14 0.07 0.20 0.56x 111.00 -0.20 -0.10 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.14 0.25 0.11 -0.25-0.09-0.33 -0.37x 121.00 0.27 0.24 0.01 0.32 0.15 0.35 -0.17 -0.12-0.07-0.21 0.46x 131.00 0.28 -0.10 0.31 0.04 0.20 -0.16 0.06 -0.09 -0.04 0.23x 141.00 0.61 0.14 0.07 0.00 -0.09 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.21x 151.00 -0.06 0.05 0.20 0.05 -0.10-0.47-0.21 -0.05x 161.00 -0.27 0.16 -0.14-0.04 0.05 -0.02 0.18x 171.00 -0.01 -0.06 0 03 -0.01 0.01 0.13x 181.00 -0.37 -0.50-0.37-0.65 -0.03x 191.00 -0.13-0.10-0.33 -0.05x 201.00 -0.13 0.71 0.06x 211.00 0.42 0.06x 221.00 0.11x 231.00

Conversion factors1 kilogram (kg)1 kilometer (km)1 metric ton (mt)1 hectare (ha)1 acre (ac)1 basket of rice1 kyat (1985)1 US$ (1980)Exchange rate (1948-71) 1US$Plan periodsFirst Four-Year Plan:Second Four-Year Plan:Third Four-Year Plan:Fourth Four-Year Plan:Twenty-Year Plan:= 2.205 pounds (lb)= 0.621 mile (mi)= 0.98 ton (t)= 2.471 acres (ac)= 0.8361 square meter (m 2 )= 20.86 kg or 46 lb= US$0.125= K8= K4.761971 /72 (1 Apr 1972 - 31 Mar 1982) -Mar 19741974/75 - 1977/781978/79 - 1981/82l982/83 - 1985/861974/75 -1993/94APPENDICES 155

IndexAdas, M 6Africa 125, 137Agricultural and RuralDevelopment Corporation41, 44-45, 68, 72, 83Agricultural and RuralDevelopment Five-Year Plan37, 39, 44Agricultural Corporation 2, 63,67, 70-74, 81, 83-85, 87-88, 91-94,96, 106, 110-111, 120, 127agricultural development 9, 27,40-41, 45, 55-56, 63, 78, 131, 138agricultural loans 7-8, 18, 23-24,33, 39, 41-44, 48-49, 56, 71, 75-78,111-112, 126, 129Agricultural MechanizationDepartment 113-115agricultural research 27, 40, 44-45, 64, 79-83, 126, 129, 131Agricultural Research Committee81Agricultural Research Institute40, 45, 67, 70, 80-82Agricultural research programs80Agricultural Science ResearchDivision 81agricultural sector 14, 44-46, 60,78-80, 87-88, 107,137agricultural sector plan 8, 39-40,44, 47, 50-53, 56-57, 63, 78, 80-81, 83-84, 95, 115, 131agriculture 2, 3, 8, 10, 12, 14, 24,28, 43-45, 56, 67, 72, 77, 84-85,88, 110, 112, 131-132Agriculture and Farm ProduceTrade Corporation 76, 116-125,128agriculturists 25Agriculturists' Loan Act 24, 42agrochemicals 23, 40, 73-75, 91,93agroecological zone 2, 10Akyab 27Alaungsithu 46Applied Research Division 80,81Arakan 6, 15, 17, 58-59, 65, 94area 7-10, 17-21, 26-27, 30, 33-34,38, 41, 43-44, 46-47, 57-58, 60,65-67, 77, 80, 84-85, 88, 94-97,98-105, 112-114, 116, 120, 126,137-138Asia 1, 30-31, 70, 125, 137Asian Development Bank 56, 70,73, 76, 112, 121, 135awareness 84INDEX 157

Bangladesh 1, 70Barker, R A 31, 34, 35barter 9, 51, 124Bay of Bengal 1, 4Beale, R A 21, 66BIMAS 61Binns, B O 31bran 23, 26, 30, 78British 6, 7, 8, 17, 30, 32, 37British Colonial Government 6,17, 37, 48, 129buffalo 26bullock 26, 28Burma Railway Corporation 110,117Burma Socialist Program Party56, 87Burmese Independent Government6, 37byat 21, 22C4-63 65, 66capital 7, 17-18, 23, 29, 34, 41, 47,57Cheng, S H 6, 17, 24, 29, 30Chettyar 24, 25, 38Chin 15, 59, 65China 1, 51Chinese 24, 25, 30civil war 130competition 86, 88, 92, 106, 124cooperatives 41, 42, 57, 118, 121,122, 127costs and returns 10, 34-35, 52,108-109, 126, 127cotton - rice 116credit 9, 38, 41-43, 48, 52, 75-76,82, 138cropping intensity 27-29, 37, 47,73, 78, 113, 115-116cropping pattern 28, 47cut worms 73Czechoslovakia 51delta 2, 7, 14, 17, 19, 25, 27, 28-29,33, 35, 58-60, 94-106, 108, 112demonstration 40, 45-46, 82-84,86, 88Department of Agriculture 21-23, 27-29, 35, 40-41, 44-46, 52,59, 66, 83Department of Settlement andLand Records 20, 21, 27, 32,39-40, 43, 51, 65, 118-120Divisional People's Council 55,78, 119draft cattle 10-12, 19, 23-27, 29,30, 39, 43, 44, 47, 76-78, 90, 111,113-115, 120, 127, 129ear-cutting caterpillar 23eastern and northeastern zone59-60, 94-96, 191, 103, 105, 108Emata 21-22, 117-118environment 7, 58-60, 66, 86, 94-100, 104-106, 108, 127, 130-131,135, 138rainfed 33, 58-59, 65, 94-97,101, 105-106, 108dry zone 3, 28, 31, 59-60, 94-97, 102-103, 105, 106, 108, 115irrigated 97, 100-101, 105,106, 108coastal 2, 14, 19, 27, 29, 33,59-60, 94-99, 102, 104-106, 108Escuro, P B 65evaluation 63-66, 84, 93, 106-107,131, 135experimental stations 27, 40, 63-64, 67, 70, 80-81, 83, 131-132export 3, 6-9, 17, 29, 31-32, 48-51,58, 63, 96, 117, 121, 123-125,128-129extension 10, 22-23, 28-29, 40, 44,45, 57, 67, 72, 79-80, 82-83, 85,87, 89, 95, 97, 99, 105-106, 123,126, 129European 7, 30, 32, 66158 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

farmers 6-9, 13, 18, 23, 25-26, 29,34, 39, 40, 52, 56, 60, 63-65, 67,73, 77, 82-87, 89, 97-98, 102, 105-107, 110-111, 121, 127-131, 134-135Farmers’ Assiayones 56, 85, 87,127farmer participatory research andextension approach 131-133,135-136, 138farmers’ seminar 56farmers’ training 97-103, 105fertilizer 8, 10, 23, 28, 40-41, 44-45, 60, 67-73, 78, 82-83, 86-87,91-93, 95, 98-99, 102, 104-105,109, 112, 121, 126-127ammonium phosphate 40, 69ammonium sulfate 40, 69muriate of potash 69-72, 93,97-98,100-101,105triple superphosphate 40-41,69-72, 97-98, 100-101, 105urea 40-41, 69-72, 93, 97-98,100-101, 103-105fishery 56, 107fish meal 23Food and Agriculture Organization1, 2, 56, 80forestry 45, 56, 79, 107General AdministrationDepartment 75General Administration loans41, 43German Democratic Republic 51Grant, J W 18-19, 21, 32, 34-35, 52gross domestic product 2, 3, 79groundnut cake 26guano 23Gulf of Martaban 1, 4Harvey, G E 14Herdt, R W 31, 35, 100Hill, J 2Hmawbi 27, 90Hungary 51immigration 7, 17impact 6, 8-9, 14-15, 20, 34, 43,46, 51-53, 79, 87, 96, 99-100, 102-104, 106-108, 110, 127-128, 130,134,138Imperial Japanese Army 37, 38independence 6, 8, 37, 39, 48, 52,80India 17, 32-33, 50, 66, 24Indians 7, 17-18, 24, 30Indonesia 50, 61-62, 66, 70, 124industrial sector 80, 87Inland Water TransportCorporation 117inputs 10, 63-64, 67, 75, 82-84, 87,91, 95, 106, 108-109, 120, 123,126interest 8, 24, 35, 41, 43-44, 52, 75,78, 84, 111International Rice ResearchInstitute 9, 56, 61, 63, 82investment 17, 23, 25, 27, 44, 49,53, 57, 79-80, 87, 106, 126, 130-131investment plan 51IR5 63, 65, 66IR5 mutant 65, 66IR8 63IR42 66Irrawaddy 7, 14, 15, 17-19, 58,65-66, 94, 122irrigation 3, 14, 28, 44-46, 58, 60,63, 79-80, 87, 91, 97, 112-113,116, 121, 126, 130, 138Japan 50-51, 121Jayasuriya S 3, 109jute - rice 116INDEX 159

Kachin 15, 59, 65, 94kanzo 19kaing 19Karen 15, 59, 65, 94, 103kaukkyi 14, 22kauklat 14, 22kaukyin 14Kayah 15, 59, 65, 94Khush, G S 59Kyaukse 63labor 7, 10-11, 25, 29-30, 34-35,47, 52, 75, 87-88, 90, 97-103, 105-106, 108-110, 120, 127, 134land 7-8, 18-19, 24-26, 29, 34, 37,44, 52, 90, 112, 115, 127, 129-130,137-138Land and Rural DevelopmentCorporation 44land improvement 45, 80Land Improvement Loan Act 24,41, 42landlord 8, 25, 29, 30, 34-35, 56,127Land Nationalization Act 8, 44land productivity 25Letywezin 21-22, 117-118livestock 30, 45, 56, 79, 107Lower Burma 7, 17, 19, 23, 25-26,28-30, 45, 47, 65-66, 80, 93, 112,115-116, 133Lwin Chit 32, 51Magwe 5, 15, 58-59, 94Malaysia 30, 65Mandac, A M 100Mandalay 5, 15, 27, 58-59, 65, 94,112manure 23, 28, 34, 78, 86-87, 97,100-102, 104-105, 109, 127market 10, 25, 29, 32, 49, 50, 72,124, 126, 128-129, 137Martaban 6Masagana 99 61Mashnri 65, 66mass participation 55, 57, 86, 88,97, 135mayin rice 13mechanization 28, 44, 46-47, 79,113, 126Middle Burma 65Middle East 125Midon 21-22, 117-118millers 21, 29-30, 48-49, 66, 116,121-122milling industry 29-30, 32, 121,123, 125milling outturn 22, 23, 66, 121-123Ministry of Trade 116, 117Mon 15, 58-59, 65, 94moneylenders 7-8, 18, 24-25, 33-34, 38, 41, 43, 52, 75, 111, 129monsoon 1-2, 13, 25, 28, 33, 95,115, 118, 120, 123, 126Moscardi, E 82motivation 81, 97, 99, 104, 130,132-133, 135Mudon 27Myanma Agricultural Bank 75-76, 78, 92, 115, 127Myanma (Burma) Economic Bank110Myanma Export and ImportCorporation 117-118, 124Myaungmya 27National Research Institute 85Ngasein 21-22, 117-118Ngwetoe 65Nyi Nyi 2Okpo 110-111, 123Okpo Liquor Shop 110Okpo Police Station 110Okpo Railway Station 110160 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA

Okpo Small Loan Department110, 111Overseas Economic DevelopmentFund (Japan) 121Pegu 6, 14-15, 58, 65-66, 94, 112,122Phalon 92Philippines 9, 56, 61-63, 70precipitation 1, 2procurement 10, 45, 48-49, 52, 71-73, 76, 91, 117-126, 128-129procurement prices 48, 52, 117production camp 89-92, 95, 97-100, 105-106production equity 6, 8-10, 34, 52,126, 130-131, 135production stability 6-7, 9-10, 33-34, 51-55, 126, 131, 135production sustainability 6-7, 9-10, 33-34, 51-52, 126, 131, 135profit 6, 52, 73, 108-110, 126Pyidawtha Plan 37, 56Pyithu Hluttaw 57, 71Rainfall 4, 19, 33, 46, 51, 95, 97-100, 102, 104, 113, 126Rangoon 5, 14-15, 33, 40, 48, 58,65-66, 71, 80, 92, 94, 110, 122research congress 81Research Policy Direction Board81resource-poor farmers 130-134,136Restaurant and Beverage TradeCorporation 110-111Revolutionary Council 6Revolutionary Government 55rice caseworm 23,73rice classification 13-14, 21rice consumption 31, 49, 118,120-121, 123, 137rice cultivation 3, 7, 10, 17, 19, 25,40, 88, 114rice - groundnut 29, 47, 116rice hispa 23, 74rice mills 29-30, 48rice production 3, 6-10, 20-21, 23,25-26, 29, 31-34, 37-40, 49, 51-52,55, 57, 62-63, 77, 95-97,102-103,119, 123-126, 129-130, 137rice - pulse 28, 47, 116rice - sesamum 28, 47, 116rice storage 9-10, 25, 29, 49, 50,66, 91, 117, 123,128rice - sunflower 116Road Transport Corporation 117S 1 - Fluvisols, Gleysols 1, 5S 2 - Lithosols, Regosols, Andosols5S 3 - Vertisols 1, 5S 4 - Luvisols, Nitrosols 5S 5 - Aerisols, Terralsols 5Sagaing 15, 59, 65, 94, 112Security and administrative council55, 75seed 6, 22-23, 25, 27-29, 34, 40,52, 63, 67-68, 91, 109, 120-121,123, 127seed distribution 22, 40, 45, 66-67Selective concentrative extensionstrategy 10, 85-87, 94, 96,112,130-131Shan 15, 59, 65, 94, 103Shwebo 93Shwe-ta-soke 65-66,130Simla Plan 37, 48small mills 30, 48-49, 121-122Socialist Republic of the Union ofBurma 6, 14, 55, 57, 61-62, 65,68, 70, 74, 76, 79, 97, 107, 113,116-117,119soils 1, 3, 7, 29soil distribution 1, 4South America 125, 137South Indians 24-25spike-harrow 12INDEX 161

Sri Lanka 32-33, 50, 66, 124State Agricultural Bank 41-43,75State Agricultural Marketing Board48-49, 52, 116-117, 119Steinberg, D I 49Suez Canal 7Swanson, B E 84Taikkyi 65, 92-93Taungpulu 46technology 6, 10, 27, 60, 63-65,80, 82-88, 92, 96, 105-106,126-127, 130-132, 134-138temperature 2, 59, 122Tenancy Act 25tenants 25, 30Tenasserim 1, 6, 15, 17, 59, 65, 94Thailand 32threshing 11-12, 25, 29, 34, 66-67,77, 90, 109, 115, 122tillage 11-12, 25, 77, 86-87, 90,113-115, 134Tin Myint 65Township People's Council 55,78, 85, 87-88, 90, 93, 99, 120, 122,133tractors 28, 45-47, 78, 113-115,121trade 27, 29-30, 32-33, 35, 37, 48-51, 73, 108, 116, 118, 121, 123-125,128Trade Corporation See Agricultureand Farm Produce TradeCorporationtraders 29, 48, 52, 116-117,122transplanting 11, 13, 30, 34, 88,93, 106, 109transportation 10, 25, 48-50, 71,77, 84, 91, 102, 122-123, 129trial adoption 63, 65, 84Two-Year Economic Plan 37United Kingdom 30United Nations DevelopmentProgramme 56, 80Upper Burma 7, 17, 19, 26, 28, 30,45-47, 63, 65, 80, 93, 112-113,115-116, 133U Thein Aung 65variables 97-98, 100-102, 104varieties 20-23, 27-28, 33, 40, 56,63, 65-66, 68, 70, 75, 81, 83, 86-87, 93-95, 104-106, 112, 114-116,120, 123, 126-127Veterinary Department 26, 27Village Extension Manager 83-85, 87, 89, 93voluntary labor 88-89, 91Walinsky, L J 41-42, 45Whole Township Rice ProductionProgram 61, 63, 69-70, 75, 82,85-87, 89, 92-96, 105-107, 110-111, 120, 127, 130, 132Winkelmann, D 82Win Khin 2, 72, 93, 135winnowing 11, 34World Bank 56, 67, 85, 112World War II 8-9, 25, 29, 48, 130Ye Goung 1yield 7, 10, 18-23, 28, 33-34, 38-39, 49, 57-58, 60-62, 65, 73, 86,93, 95-100, 102-107, 109, 115,120, 123, 130, 135-136, 138yield per hectare 19-20, 39, 60-62,93, 95-97, 105-107, 109, 123162 A CENTURY OF RICE IMPROVEMENT IN BURMA