JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine For Military Operations Other Than War

Chapter IVb. Intelligence and InformationGathering• MOOTW requires multi-disciplined,all-source, fused intelligence. Asingle source approach cannot supportall requirements.• Manned and unmanned aerialintelligence sensors, to includespace-based, can provide valuableinformation where other intelligenceinfrastructure is not in place. Remotesensing systems can provideinformation on terrain, weather andother environmental factors essentialto MOOTW. Data from spacesystems can be used to updateantiquated maps and provide up-todatelocations of facilities andobstacles. Sensors on space andaerial platforms can also monitorterrestrial force movement and assistin treaty verification. In addition,communications systems usingspace-based resources can providesecure, reliable dissemination ofintelligence and other informationwhere there is little or no existingcommunications infrastructure.• In MOOTW conducted outside theUnited States, human intelligence(HUMINT) may provide the mostuseful source of information.However, a HUMINT infrastructuremay not be in place when US forcesarrive; therefore, it needs to beestablished as quickly as possible.HUMINT can supplement otherintelligence sources withpsychological information notavailable through technical means.For example, while overhead imagerymay graphically depict the number ofpeople gathered in the town square,it cannot gauge motivations orenthusiasm of the crowds.Additionally, in underdeveloped areasbelligerent forces may not rely heavilyon radio communication, denying USforces intelligence derived throughsignal intercept. HUMINT isrequired to supplement signalsintelligence and overhead imagerywhich we typically rely upon toproduce the most accurate products.• Specific essential elements ofinformation which drive collectionmanagement process in MOOTW maydiffer in focus from those targeted inwar. In war, intelligence collectionincludes an entire range of factors witha major emphasis on the enemy’smilitary capability. Intelligencecollection in MOOTW, however,might require a focus onunderstanding the political, cultural,and economic factors that affect thesituation. Information collection andanalysis in MOOTW must oftenaddress unique and subtle problemsnot always encountered in war. It willrequire a depth of expertise in (and amental and psychological integrationwith) all aspects of the operationalenvironment’s peoples and theircultures, politics, religion, economics,and related factors; and any varianceswithin affected groups of people. It isonly through an understanding of thevalues by which people definethemselves, that an intervenor canestablish for himself a perception oflegitimacy and assure that actionsintended to be coercive, do in fact havethe intended effect. In addition,intelligence collection must focusquickly on transportationinfrastructure in the AOR/JOA, toinclude capabilities and limitations ofmajor seaports, airfields, and surfacelines of communications.IV-2Joint Pub 3-07