KARIN HEINRICHS, FRITZ OSER & TERENCE LOVATINTRODUCTIONIm<strong>moral</strong> behaviour is omnipresent: In the daily news, we read about aggressivebehaviour , delinquency, sexual abuse, assassinations and racism, sexism and all forms<strong>of</strong> persistent violence. We hear about banking bonuses, about structural injusticetowards immigrants and substantial egocentrism with respect to animals and plants.At the same time, however, we complain about a lack <strong>of</strong> civility, civil courage, care,responsibility or tolerance in everyday life or we try to find appropriate solutions toethical problems like immigration or mobbing. What is the force that pushes peopleto act <strong>moral</strong>ly or not? Is there a motor that inhibits <strong>moral</strong>ity? Is there a power that –even beyond judgment and rationality - shakes the will to be fully <strong>moral</strong>? Are theresituations or emotional states that make people forget the standards <strong>of</strong> <strong>moral</strong>ity thatcivilizations have developed over thousands <strong>of</strong> years?In spite <strong>of</strong> all our knowledge and progress, and partly owing to overwhelmingproblems like pollution, population increase or climate change, and economicinjustices, we are still not able to provide sufficient answers to the followingquestions:– Why don’t people act <strong>moral</strong>ly even though they have such great knowledge, somany insights and/or are personally concerned? And what causes them to behaveim<strong>moral</strong>ly?– What prevents them from acting consistently, according to their <strong>moral</strong> judgment ,about what should be done?The editors <strong>of</strong> this handbook believe that the construct <strong>of</strong> <strong>moral</strong> <strong>motivation</strong> can – at leastpartly – answer these questions. Even though <strong>motivation</strong>al psychology has achievedmany insights into what drives people to behave and to act in general, our knowledgeis much less specific about what urges us to cope with and solve <strong>moral</strong> problem sappropriately. The drive to do the good is not the same as the drive to win in sport.The need to help another is not the same as the need to perform well in a test. Andthe external conditions for maintaining a rule <strong>of</strong> justice or to take responsibility for asocially deprived person is not the same as listening to a well-known musical piece.The <strong>Handbook</strong> <strong>of</strong> Moral Motivation aims to present currently explored approachesand the state <strong>of</strong> the art in research about what drives, urges and impels humans to<strong>moral</strong> judging and acting, as well as about the inner and outer conditions preventingus from acting consistently with our judgments or <strong>moral</strong> norms. In order to understandthe basics, it is good to be aware <strong>of</strong> Kohlberg’s, Rest’s, Colby & Damon’s, or Blasi’sK. Heinrichs, F. Oser & T. Lovat (Eds.), <strong>Handbook</strong> <strong>of</strong> Moral Motivation: <strong>Theories</strong>,Models, Applications, 1–6.© 2013 <strong>Sense</strong> <strong>Publishers</strong>. All rights reserved.
K. HEINRICHS, F. OSER & T. LOVATwork, but also to understand some philosophical bases like Kant’s metaphysik,Arendt’s <strong>moral</strong> philosophy, Rawls’ justice, or Habermas’ procedural <strong>moral</strong>ityconcepts. On these bases, we have attempted to collect important results and insightsfrom the fields <strong>of</strong> <strong>moral</strong> and <strong>motivation</strong>al psychology, and related fields, in orderto elaborate and discuss whether we have already gained answers to the questionsabove. Moreover, we wanted to point to the lack <strong>of</strong> adequate research and developperspectives for further projects in order to get closer to answering the basic questionsabout why people are willing and manage to do the good or the bad and to act <strong>moral</strong>lyor im<strong>moral</strong>ly.What do we already know? Moral psychology has been searching for explanations<strong>of</strong> im<strong>moral</strong> behaviour for many decades (see Garz, Oser & Alth<strong>of</strong>, 1999 on theissue <strong>of</strong> the judgment action gap). As Oser explicates in his paper (this volume), weknow at least 12 <strong>models</strong> are developed in this field that help to explain (or explainpartly) why people manage to be good and feel urged to act in ways consideredas <strong>moral</strong>ly adequate (Kohlberg & Candee, 1984; Rest, 1999; Bebeau & Monson,2011; Blasi, 1980; Nunner-Winkler & Sodian, 1988; Colby & Damon, 1992; Walker,2002; Krettenauer, 2011; Haidt, 2001). Though Rest himself admitted in 1999 that<strong>moral</strong> <strong>motivation</strong> was the worst elaborated component <strong>of</strong> his model and lackedappropriate empirical evidence (Rest, 1999, p.109), we notice that there has beenmuch progress in theoretical and empirical research on this issue during the lastdecade. Approaches to <strong>moral</strong> <strong>motivation</strong> (MM) have been more and more elaboratedand interlinked with one another. Nonetheless, the current state <strong>of</strong> the art still pointsto there being many different perspectives on <strong>moral</strong> <strong>motivation</strong>. Comparing theresults <strong>of</strong> related empirical research on <strong>moral</strong> <strong>motivation</strong> would be too difficultbecause different studies refer to varied types <strong>of</strong> <strong>moral</strong> problem s, <strong>moral</strong> contexts orpsychological preconditions <strong>of</strong> these, as well as focusing on differences, for exampleaccording to age, cultural background, developmental state or personal experience .The scientific landscape on this issue elicits a kind <strong>of</strong> atomistic topology and thediscussion on <strong>moral</strong> <strong>motivation</strong> has to be considered as disconnected from fields inother psychological sub-disciplines. So, in line with Lapsley and Narvaez, we wouldclaim that <strong>moral</strong> psychology is at the crossroads (Lapsley & Narvaez, 2005). Thereis an unsatisfied demand for enriching research on <strong>moral</strong> issues and especially on<strong>moral</strong> <strong>motivation</strong> and responsibility in the Kohlbergian, Selmanian, Nuccian, andother traditions, for broadening perspectives, thinking ‘outside the box’ <strong>of</strong> <strong>moral</strong>psychology and crossing disciplinary borders.The concept <strong>of</strong> MM is unique. Here are three examples: When Arendt (2003) askswho was motivated to resist in World War II, she answers that you find people ineach life setting, within poor and rich, within educated and non-educated, the ‘holy’and unholy, the naturally heroic and unheroic: people in differing circumstancesbut all reaching the point where they knew that they couldn’t live anymore withoutacting . Or, when Gibbs (2010) speaks about “the mutual help” approach, askingwho were the ones who went forward to challenge those “who regularly victimizeothers and society” (p. 153). The motive was that the power <strong>of</strong> such people, for2