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Eva Rowe, 22, was driving from Hornbeck, La. to see herparents in Texas City when she stopped for gas andheard on the radio that the BP refinery had exploded.She tried to call her mom but received no answer. Both herparents worked six to seven days a week as contractors at therefinery."I was horrified and really scared," she said. "I feared theworst happened. My mom always answered her cell phone."The worst did happen. James and Linda Rowe were two ofthe 15 fatalities from the March 23, 2005 explosion and fire atBP's Texas City refinery that also injured over 170 people.The younger Rowe blamed London-based BP's cost-cuttingfor her parents death and filed a civil lawsuit against the companythat was settled out of court late last year.She wanted the company to change its approach to healthand safety and insisted on BP giving back to the communityand making public internal documents related to the case, sothat such an explosion could not happen again.Even though other lawsuits related to fatalities had beensettled, Rowe stood by her demands. It was only when attorneyswere getting ready to select jurors for trial that the lawsuitwas concluded.The settlement called for BP to donate millions of dollars toschools and medical facilities, including one where victimswere treated after the explosion, in addition to an undisclosedamount for Rowe.BP also met her demand that the company continue torelease documents related to the case."I'm very satisfied with the outcome to be able to help somany people in the community and make a difference forlong-term things," Rowe said. "I didn't want my parents tobe forgotten."Small town girlEva Rowe grew up in Hornbeck, a small town inwestern Louisiana. Her father usually worked out oftown at refineries in Texas and Louisiana, and hermom was a teacher's assistant at the local highschool for about 10 years.About a year before the explosion, James,48, and Linda, 47, decided they wanted to worktogether so they could live with each other. Itwould be the first time during their 30-yearmarriage that they did not live apart."My mom was like my sister. I was reallylost and didn't know what to do," she said. "Welaughed a lot, fished and used to do everythingtogether."For a long time after the accident she rang hermother's cell phone just to hear her mom's message."You forget what your mom sounds like," she said.As part of the settlement, BP promised to donate $32 millionto various colleges and hospitals in Texas, Tennessee andLouisiana. Rowe and her attorney have donated $100,000 eachto educational foundations.Safety problems addressedBP also promised to address problems at the Texas Cityrefinery including moving trailers away from operating unitsand to replace blowdown drum pressure-relief systems withflares. Those killed were working in temporary trailers at thetime of the explosion.Now that the case is settled, Rowe said she plans to go tocollege, buy a house, do charity work and advocate for workplacesafety nationwide. She is pressing for occupationalhealth legislation that would improve refinery conditions.AP Photo/The Galveston County Daily News, Kevin Bartram32 winter 2007 • <strong>USW@Work</strong>
An independent review panel ledby former Secretary of StateJames Baker found serious deficienciesin BP's approach to keepingworkers safe at its U.S. refineries.The Baker panel, which included aUSW representative, was convened atthe urging of the U.S. Chemical SafetyBoard after the Texas City explosion.The panel's recommendations focusedon improving BP's corporate safety oversight,safety culture and safety managementat all five refineries.The USW represents workers at BP'sfacilities in Texas City, Texas; Carson,Calif.; Toledo, Ohio and Whiting, Ind.BP’s refinery in Cherry Point, Wash., isnon-union.At each of the refineries the panelfound a lack of operating discipline, tolerationof serious deviations from safeoperating practices and complacencytoward serious process safety risks.BP focused and measured personalsafety such as slips, falls and vehicleaccidents, instead of real process safetyhazards such as leaks, spills, equipmentmalfunctions, excessive temperatures,corrosion and metal fatigue.Not unique to BP"We are under no illusion that thedeficiencies we have identified areunique to BP," Baker said. "If otherrefining and chemical companies considerour recommendations and apply them,we believe that those workplaces will besafer and that future tragedies like theTexas City accident can be avoided."Recognizing that adherence to safetystarts at the top, the panel recommendedthat BP management, including theboard of directors and top executives,not only voice the importance of processsafety but ensure their actions and policiesreflect their commitment to it.The panel urged BP to establish andput into practice an integrated and comprehensiveprocess safety managementsystem that consistently identifies,reduces and manages process safetyrisks. It said a system should be in placeto ensure all employees and contractorspossess an appropriate level of processsafety knowledge and expertise.Federal investigators blamed BP'scost-cutting and failure to act onknown safety hazards for a March23, 2005 explosion that killed 15 workersand injured more than 170 others atthe company's Texas City, Texas refinery.Notably, the U.S. Chemical SafetyBoard said the explosion could havebeen avoided if BP had installed a safetyflare system on the unit that exploded.Similar hazards exist throughout theindustry, the board said."The experience at BP should serveas a cautionary tale to every oil andchemical company," CSB ChairwomanCarolyn W. Merritt said.On the day of the Texas City explosion,a distillation tower was inadvertentlyover-filled with highly flammableliquid hydrocarbons during start up ofthe refinery's octane-boosting isomerizationunit (ISOM). Critical alarms andcontrol instrumentation malfunctioned.Pressure built up in the distillationtower, causing emergency relief valvesto open and empty the liquid and vapors,which overwhelmed a blowdown drumequipped with an attached vent stack.The flammable mix overflowed ontothe ground with the force of a geyser.Contract workers in nearby trailers werekilled and injured when the mix ignitedand caused a series of explosions.BP engineers in 2002 proposedreplacing the blowdown drum with asafer flare system in keeping with companypolicy, but this was never donebecause of cost pressures, said CSB leadinvestigator Don Holmstrom.The CSB's investigation showed thatBP's global management was aware ofproblems with maintenance, spendingand infrastructure as a result of auditsconducted in 2003 and 2004 well beforethe explosion.Stringent budget cuts throughout theBP system caused a progressive deteriorationof safety at Texas City, the boardfound. Maintenance and infrastructureexpenditures were reduced. Trainingstaff and control board operation positionswere cut."Every successful corporation mustcontain its costs," Merritt said. "But atan aging facility like Texas City, it is notresponsible to cut budgets related tosafety and maintenance without thoroughlyexamining the impact on the riskof a catastrophic accident."The USW took the lead in demandingan independent investigation ofthe March 2005 explosion at BP'sTexas City refinery, and is making surelessons are learned from the incident sothat it never happens again.Immediately after the explosion, theUSW sent Kim Nibarger, a health andsafety specialist, to be the union's leadinvestigator. When the Chemical SafetyBoard called for an independent reviewpanel to examine BP's safety culture andsystems, the union appointed GlennErwin, who directs the USW's Triangleof Prevention program. Erwin worked inthe chemical plant at Texas City when itwas owned by Amoco.The union and the company haveagreed in principle on a comprehensivejoint safety initiative to carry out thepanel's recommendations.<strong>USW@Work</strong> • winter 2007 33
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