The importation of weaponry to regions of conflict perpetuatesviolence, impedes peacekeeping <strong>and</strong> development efforts,<strong>and</strong> undercuts the ability of the parental generation to socializeyouth.pushed the small arms problem onto the globalstage in the mid-1990s. Laurance, surveying theevidence, concluded that “while it is true that peoplebent on killing each other will do so regardlessof the weapons they possess, it is also true that acritical mass of weapons can be the impetus forstarting a major conflict.” 3Two case studies that received much attentionshaped the early response to this question.Researchers from Human Rights Watch arguedthat all four phases of the Rw<strong>and</strong>a conflict of the1990s—the invasion of Rw<strong>and</strong>a by Tutsi exiles, thediffusion of weapons to Hutus within Rw<strong>and</strong>a, thegenocide itself, <strong>and</strong> the raids by Hutu militia afterbeing expelled—were possible only because of thesupply of small arms <strong>and</strong> light weapons. 4 The secondcase pointing to the direct effect of armsbuildups on the outbreak of armed violence isKosovo. In 1997 the government of Albania collapsed<strong>and</strong>, in the subsequent instability, its significantarsenal of small arms <strong>and</strong> light weapons waspillaged. More than half of these weapons left thecountry, <strong>and</strong> many wereacquired by the KosovoLiberation Army (KLA).A very tense situation inKosovo, a province ofSerbia in which 1.7 millionethnic Albanians,though a majority, livedunder the domination of200,000 Serbs, very soonexploded into armed violence.The massive acquisitionof arms did notcreate the KLA's willingnessto use violence, butit did give them the meansto do so on a broad scale. 5The most comprehensivestudy of the impactof small arms <strong>and</strong> lightweapons on the outbreak <strong>and</strong> escalation of conflict,<strong>Arms</strong> <strong>and</strong> Ethnic Conflict, concludes that “armsaccumulation by ethnic groups or in conflict zonesseems a relatively good predictor of impending violence.”6 The authors regard their findings as preliminary,however, <strong>and</strong> call for research to clarifythe impact of weapons on governments' <strong>and</strong> ethniccommunities’ opportunity <strong>and</strong> willingness toemploy violence in pursuit of their goals:• Under what circumstances do arms produce orcontribute to the initiation of conflict? What arethe early warning indicators involving SALWthat could be used to better predict the outbreakof violence? 7• In what ways might arms fuel ongoing violence?• Do arms flows facilitate or hinder efforts toresolve ethnopolitical violence <strong>and</strong> conflict?• What is the effect of arms infusions on the likeli-14
hood <strong>and</strong> success of third-party efforts to resolvea conflict? 8Indirect EffectsDevelopment studies have identified the indirecteffects of small arms by pointing to the linkbetween SALW <strong>and</strong> instability <strong>and</strong> insecurity,which, in turn, are seen as responsible for a numberof socioeconomic effects (reduced productiveeconomic activities, limited possibilities for education,malfunctioning health structures) that hindera nation's or community's development. In addition,public health experts have documented theindirect deaths that occur during conflicts becauseof famine, interrupted health care, <strong>and</strong> increasedstress levels. In many African conflicts, for example,the death toll from indirect causes is considerablyhigher than the number of fatalities fromfighting.developmentIn the early work of the United Nations, theconcept of “sustainable disarmament for sustainabledevelopment” became a catch phrase for combiningthe work of the arms control <strong>and</strong> developmentcommunities. The concept is simple: sustainabledevelopment cannot exist in an insecureenvironment, as in the case of Mali in 1994, citedabove. Violent conflict destroys the physical infrastructureneeded for an economy to grow <strong>and</strong>diverts human <strong>and</strong> economic resources away fromagriculture, education, industry, <strong>and</strong> other constructiveactivities. Proliferation of weapons preventssustainable development by damaging fragileeconomies, deterring foreign investment, <strong>and</strong>diverting domestic economic resources to publicsecurity.Over the past decade we've learned a lot aboutthe impact of small arms on development. In postconflictsocieties, former combatants enter the jobmarket <strong>and</strong>, finding limited opportunities, oftenturn to crime. In El Salvador, the number of gunrelateddeaths was actually higher after the fightingended due to the extensive use of weapons in criminalactivities. In post-war Iraq, the disb<strong>and</strong>ing ofthe Iraqi army left at least 400,000 soldiers withouttheir jobs but with their guns.Fear <strong>and</strong> damaged public infrastructures c<strong>and</strong>eter public <strong>and</strong> private foreign investment.Development projects have been cancelled inLiberia, Niger, <strong>and</strong> Sierra Leone due to small armsviolence. Promised international development aidto post-war Afghanistan <strong>and</strong> to Iraq remains largelyunfulfilled due to insecurity. We also know thatorganized crime <strong>and</strong> black markets harm development.Profitable companies are now lucrative targets<strong>and</strong> businesses must invest in their own protectionto avoid kidnapping or other extortion. InColombia, the major guerrilla groups “earned” anaverage of $140 million annually between 1986 <strong>and</strong>2000 from ransom <strong>and</strong> other extortion activities.Research on the reciprocal relationship betweenunderdevelopment <strong>and</strong> gun violence is clearlycalled for. Toward this end, the Department forInternational Development of the government ofthe United Kingdom began a major assessment ofdevelopment, “Tackling Poverty by ReducingArmed Violence,” in 2003. 9 Nine SALW projectswere selected for evaluation. The researchers estimatedthat only 5% of the indicators being used inthese projects related to effects on development,poverty reduction, or humanitarian impacts. 10These projects simply did not have these outcomesas major concerns. Moreover, the study of thesenine projects concluded that for effective policy<strong>and</strong> programs, it was essential to go beyond monitoringprogress merely in terms of arms reduction(number of weapons collected, weapons sales <strong>and</strong>street prices). Measurements should also be madeof the direct impact on armed violence itself <strong>and</strong>the realities <strong>and</strong> perceptions of insecurity, as well asof other development <strong>and</strong> poverty-related effects.Evaluation research focused on such measuresshould be a high priority.15