Small Arms and Light Weapons - Harry Frank Guggenheim ...

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the “demand chain.” This conceptualization drawsattention to the mutuality of supply and demandand makes clear that demand-oriented interventionscan be initiated at places other than the endusestage.Three Dimensions of DemandDemand for small arms and light weapons(SALW) arises from at least three sources: demandby state security sectors, demand by organizedarmed nonstate groups, and micro-level demandexercised by individuals.demand by armed forces andstate institutionsWhile lack of reliable information on nationalholdings and procurement decisions limits clarityabout what drives demand from this source, we doknow that the demand for weapons for nationalarmed forces and police is capricious, and dependson such factors as defense policy, procurementcycles, budgetary constraints, force structures andmobilization strategy, and historical precedents.Efforts at increasing transparency in national holdingswill illuminate this dimension of demand.demand by armed nonstate groupsThis includes arming before and during conflict,perhaps keeping and replenishing stocks duringcease-fires, and the use of arsenals and the threat ofarming as a bargaining chip. A certain amount isalso understood about this dimension of demand.The armed group is a central feature of most contemporaryarmed conflicts. Demand is in part afunction of their financial resources, of commandand control structures, and, in particular, of accessto conflict goods. Also important are formal orinformal alliances between and among groups.demand by individualsLess attention has been given to understanding athird dimension of demand: those factors affectingmicro-level acquisition and ownership patternsamong civilians and groups in countries affected bylarge-scale societal violence. The remainder of thisarticle focuses principally on this category ofdemanders. Failure to understand this group risksthe misapplication of effort and resources in interventionstrategies.Donor governments, affected countries, the UNDepartment for Peacekeeping (DPKO), the WorldBank, the UN Development Programme (UNDP),and a host of nongovernmental organizations areinitiating a range of interventions, such asamnesties, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration(DDR) programs, awareness and publicinformation campaigns, and weapons-for-developmentschemes that emphasize removal of weaponsfrom communities and armed actors. But many ofthese initiatives fail to capture the range of motivationsunderpinning weapons acquisition. Forexample, Kenyan herders, according to Weiss(2004), “often referred to coercive weapons collectionas 'forced upgrades' because the only net effectis the need to replace seized guns with the newermodels now available on the market.” Clearly,appraising demand at this micro-level is vital toimproving the effectiveness of such programs andthe design of others.Unpacking Micro-Level DemandIn recent years, modest levels of attention havebegun to be paid to understanding factors drivingmicro-level demand. A number of quantitativestudies have highlighted the relationships betweenpoverty and income inequality (independent variables)and firearm homicide to explain demand forweapons. 2 Criminologists and sociologists haveanalyzed the relationships among delinquency,repeat offenders, dysfunctional families, andweapons use. Qualitative research has drawn onthe experiences of community-based organizationsand development agencies seeking to reduce levelsof armed violence in areas where they operate. A32
ange of international workshops 3 have compiled anumber of common approaches to violence reductionand lessening the demand for small arms. 4But demand-related research has thus far beengeneral, and little is known about how demand factorsrelate to each other or to what extent interventionsdesigned to reduce demand genuinelyaffect the incidence of armed violence. In somecases, demand for firearms is equated with demandfor violence, an assumption that does not apply inall scenarios. Moreover, research has been slow tofilter up to policy-makers and diplomats. The conceptof demand remains an elusive subject area tothose involved in designing and negotiating armscontrol initiatives. As a result, demand continuesto be undervalued and ignored.A recent paper by Muggah and Brauer (2004)introduces a new way to think about demand, newat any rate for much of the pertinent communityof diplomats, researchers, and field workers. 5 Theapproach focuses on means and motivation, that is,on individual and group preferences for weaponsArms reduction or forced-upgrade program?End users will seek to replace confiscatedweapons if efforts to reduce the supply ofsmall arms aren’t supplemented by strategiesto reduce demand. Bonfire preparations,Kenya, 2003.and on the monetary and nonmonetary resourcesrequired and real and relative prices asked forfirearms. It is important to jointly evaluate allthree aspects. For example, a seemingly tranquil,weaponless community may in fact be seethingwith desire for armament (high preferences), onlyto be prevented from implementing its desires bylack of resources and/or weapons prices regarded astoo high relative to other needs.The majority of activist and policy-orientedreports on demand, such as they are, have focusedprimarily on the motivations (or “preferences”) forarming, to the exclusion of a consideration of themeans (resources and the price constraint).Demand from this perspective is seen as a cluster ofmutually reinforcing cultural, economic, andpolitical preferences for owning a weapon. It canbe, inter alia, a function of inherited and sociallyconstructed ideas about masculinity, the unambiguousand seemingly rational pursuit of self-protection,or a means to fulfilling a legitimate livelihoodoption. Multiple preferences can operatesimultaneously, and they are dynamic across timeand space. For example, a homeowner's belief thata weapon is necessary for family protection maychange if she feels community-watch schemes arenow providing sufficient security, even as her “deeppreference”—security for herfamily—remains an importantmotivating concern.It is important to recognizethat preferences are not necessarilyconfined to the individual,but can also be collectivelyrealized. Ethnographicresearch in Nuer society inSouth Sudan, by Evans-Pritchard in the 1930s andHutchinson in recent years,provides evidence of a shiftfrom a group-based premiumon weapons to an individual-33
Page 2 and 3: CONTENTSWEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
Page 5 and 6: Small Arms Research:Where We Are an
Page 7 and 8: arms and light weapons.The initial
Page 9 and 10: tended to become “small arms expe
Page 11 and 12: evolvers and self-loading pistols,
Page 13 and 14: dence that rates of domestic murder
Page 15 and 16: texts, small arms can also contribu
Page 17 and 18: hood and success of third-party eff
Page 19 and 20: national character and are more clo
Page 21 and 22: Direct effectsFatal and non-fatal i
Page 23 and 24: Guns in CrimeNicolas FlorquinIntrod
Page 25 and 26: tem, Miller and Cohen (1996) showed
Page 27 and 28: Quantitative Criminology 19: 199-20
Page 29 and 30: egions, there are significant produ
Page 31 and 32: laws or international embargoes on
Page 33: Means and Motivations:Rethinking Sm
Page 37 and 38: Demand in PracticeThe past ten year
Page 39 and 40: ConclusionsThe demand model summari
Page 41: CONTRIBUTORSDavid C. Atwood is the

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