The Economist December 1st 2007 - Online Public Access Catalog

Georgians accuse the Abkhaz of ethnic cleansing. The Abkhaz say they have reclaimed what was lost bydeportations to Turkey in the 19th century and to Siberia in the 20th century, as well as through laterGeorgian settlement (Stalin was Georgian). Today Russia supports the Abkhaz and South Ossetians withmoney, troops and passports. Both places use the rouble; Russian money is flowing in, especially toAbkhazia. The Russian passports let locals travel, but may also allow Russia to claim its citizens have beenattacked if Georgia tries to retake the enclaves.Yet even if Kosovo declares independence, Russian recognition is unlikely. It might, says Inal Pliev, ajournalist in Tskhinvali, be Russia's “holy duty”, but reality intrudes. South Ossetia is a tiny patchworkwith perhaps as few as 50,000 inhabitants in the Ossetian-controlled part. Much of the land is controlledby Georgians. It is linked to Russia by a tunnel through the mountains; on the other side is theautonomous Russian republic of North Ossetia.“Our aim is unification with North Ossetia,” says Alan Pliev. “We don't know if that would be as part ofRussia or as a separate united Ossetian state.” The deputy speaker of parliament, Juri Dzittsojty, iscautious. “I would prefer there to be an independent and united Ossetia, but today it is not possible. It issafer to be with Russia. The main aim of the struggle is to be independent of Georgia.”And tomorrow? If Russia recognised the enclaves, that might encourage bits of Russia that wantedindependence. This is why Russia is unlikely to act even if Kosovo is widely recognised. Yet the Georgiansare nervous. David Bakradze, the state minister for conflict resolution, says he is not worried aboutKosovo, but about “the misuse of Kosovo”.Copyright © 2007 The Economist Newspaper and The Economist Group. All rights reserved.