Fishing capacity management and IUU fishing in Asia - FAO.org

More documents

Recommendations

Info

(see below). Boxes 4 and 5 provide an assessment of the policy tools that have been shown to workin addressing fishing capacity and those that do not.Conclusion: While there has been progress in the region since 2002 in developing appropriatepolicy instruments (mainly fisheries-specific Management Plans) for long-term strategic managementof fishing capacity, there appears to be a major issue within the region of a lack of appropriate toolsfor policy implementation. The tools that are lacking include methods, such as regular census orBox 4: Capacity management tools – what does workTools that do work Immediate Effect(s) Longer-term Effect(s)Individual effort quotas (IEQs)denominated in trawl time,gear use, time away from port,fishing days, etc.Group fishing rightsCommunity DevelopmentQuotas (CDQs)Territorial Use Rights (TURFs)Management and ExploitationAreas for Benthic Resources(MEABRs)Limited Access PrivilegePrograms (LAPPs)Designated Access PrivilegePrograms (DAPPs)Individual fishing rights (IFQs)Individual transferable quotas(ITQs)Taxes and royalties●●●●●●●●enforcement difficultadditional regulations requiredto control inputsubstitutionreallocation of the fisheryto the recipient communityreallocation of the fisheryto the recipient communitymarket forces drive outovercapacityconsolidation occurs ifovercapitalizedmarket forces drive outovercapacityconsolidation if overcapitalizedSource: Adapted from “Management tools – what does not work and what does” presentation by Rebecca Metzner atthe APFIC Regional consultative workshop on Managing Fishing Capacity and IUU Fishing, Phuket, June 2007.●●●●●●●●●●●●capital stuffing – where a vessel’shorsepower, length, breadth, andtonnage are increased – frequentlyoccursrequires regulations to ensuretraceability and to control transshipmentcreate motives for IUU fishingcapacity will increaserequires group understanding ofasset value of user rights, capabilityto managereduction of overcapacity or capacitycontainment depends on subsequentmanagementrequires group understanding ofasset value of user rights, capabilityto managereduction of overcapacity or containmentof capacity linked to subsequentmanagementcapacity managed automatically,overcapacity does not occur/recurcompliance concerns internalizedby fishers to protect asset (rallyagainst IUU fishing) supplementaryregulations helpful to reinforceconservationadministratively intensive: requireconstant adjustment of tax levels tomaintain capacity at desired levelpolitically difficult to impose, easierto rescind14
egistration and licensing systems, to effectively measure fishing capacity as well as policy toolsthat have been shown to be effective in reducing or managing fishing capacity. Without these tools,capacity measurement, management and reduction initiatives will be difficult. Data collectionsystems to measure catch and fishing effort are reported to be widespread among the largestindustrial and artisanal fisheries although, given the commonly reported ineffectiveness of vesselBox 5: Capacity management tools – what does not workTools that do notworkImmediateeffectsLong-term effectsGear & vesselrestrictionsInitial reduction inharvests●●●●Substitution of unregulated inputs or new gear types toreplace restricted inputsregulations lose effectiveness and additional regulationsrequiredcreate motives for IUU fishingcapacity will increaseLimited entryprogramsAggregate quotastotal allowablecatches (TACs)Non-transferablevessel catch limits(individual quotas/IQs)Buy-back programsLimits participationLikely to accelerate,not reduce, thegrowth of fishingcapacityOvercapacity notaddressedmay limit additionalgrowth of capacityPurchase ofvessel(s), license(s),and/or gear(s)capacity may betemporarily reducedin the fishery●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●capital stuffing – where a vessel’s horsepower, length,breadth, and tonnage are increased – typically occursdrives changes (technological innovations) in gear, infishing periods or areascreate motives for IUU fishingcapacity will increasecapacity and effort increase if effort and entryunrestrictedrace for fish (“fishing derby”) developspotential for frequent overruns of the TAC resulting inoverexploitation frequently result in excess processingcapacity and processing plant down time during closedseason(s) additional regulations required, particularly tolimit discarding and falsereporting, ensure traceability and to control transshipmentcreate motives for IUU fishingcapacity will increaserequires regulations to ensure traceability and to controltransshipmentadditional regulations requiredcreate motives for IUU fishingcapacity will increaseany improvements in stock abundance will attractadditional capacitycreate motives for IUU fishingcapacity will increaseSource: Adapted from “Management tools – what does not work and what does” presentation by Rebecca Metzner atthe APFIC Regional consultative workshop on Managing Fishing Capacity and IUU Fishing, Phuket, June 2007.15
Page 1 and 2: Fishing capacitymanagement and IUUf
Page 3 and 4: The designation and presentation of
Page 5 and 6: Table of contentsExecutive summary
Page 7 and 8: 1. IntroductionAsia is the world’
Page 9 and 10: 2. MethodologyUp to date informatio
Page 11 and 12: 3. Fisheries capacity management in
Page 13 and 14: Unless these pre-requisites are add
Page 15 and 16: Box 3: What the fishers are saying
Page 17 and 18: Table 3: A summary of tools availab
Page 19: fisheries with management plans, th
Page 23 and 24: It is also interesting to note from
Page 25 and 26: Table 5: Comparison between reporte
Page 27 and 28: 4. IUU issues in APFIC countriesIUU
Page 29 and 30: It is clear that foreign IUU fishin
Page 31 and 32: Conclusions: Countries of the regio
Page 33 and 34: The RPOA, which is designed to begi
Page 35: ASIA-PACIFIC FISHERY COMMISSIONFAO

Fishing capacity management and IUU fishing in Asia - FAO.org

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?