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2nd USENIX Conference on Web Application Development ...

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knows whether to use internal or external storage. 35.7%<br />

of the 956 applicati<strong>on</strong>s have this Dangerous permissi<strong>on</strong>.<br />

INTERNET is the most popular permissi<strong>on</strong>. The<br />

higher prevalence of the INTERNET permissi<strong>on</strong> in free<br />

applicati<strong>on</strong>s and past work [5] indicate that free applicati<strong>on</strong>s<br />

comm<strong>on</strong>ly use the Internet to c<strong>on</strong>tact advertisers.<br />

Secti<strong>on</strong> 4.4.3 suggests enabling applicati<strong>on</strong>s to request<br />

access to a specific list of web domains. Accordingly,<br />

the Android Market could display a less severe warning<br />

for applicati<strong>on</strong>s with limited Internet access than for applicati<strong>on</strong>s<br />

with the full INTERNET. The warning could<br />

further notify the user if a known advertising domain is<br />

included in the specific domain list.<br />

6 Related Work<br />

Google Chrome Extensi<strong>on</strong>s. When Barth et al. introduced<br />

the Google Chrome extensi<strong>on</strong> permissi<strong>on</strong> system,<br />

they c<strong>on</strong>ducted a motivating analysis of 25 Google Chrome<br />

extensi<strong>on</strong>s [2]. However, their sample set is too limited<br />

to be definitive. Google employees authored 9 of<br />

the 25 extensi<strong>on</strong>s, and the extensi<strong>on</strong> platform had <strong>on</strong>ly<br />

been public for a few weeks prior to their study. The results<br />

of our large-scale evaluati<strong>on</strong> of Google Chrome extensi<strong>on</strong>s<br />

show that their small-scale study overestimated<br />

the prevalence of extensi<strong>on</strong> privileges. Guha et al. [8]<br />

performed a c<strong>on</strong>current, short study of the permissi<strong>on</strong>s<br />

used by Google Chrome extensi<strong>on</strong>s, although they do not<br />

study the effect of popularity. We provide a significantly<br />

more detailed discussi<strong>on</strong> of extensi<strong>on</strong> privileges.<br />

Android Applicati<strong>on</strong>s. Barrera et al. [1] analyze the<br />

permissi<strong>on</strong>s requested by 1, 100 free Android applicati<strong>on</strong>s.<br />

They primarily focus <strong>on</strong> the structure of the permissi<strong>on</strong><br />

system; they group applicati<strong>on</strong>s together using<br />

a neural network and look for patterns in permissi<strong>on</strong><br />

group requests. They note that 62% of the applicati<strong>on</strong>s<br />

collected in December 2009 use the INTERNET<br />

permissi<strong>on</strong>. Significantly more applicati<strong>on</strong>s in our data<br />

set use the INTERNET permissi<strong>on</strong>, which is possibly<br />

due to changes in applicati<strong>on</strong>s over time. We also provide<br />

data that can be used to evaluate two of their proposals<br />

for changes to Android permissi<strong>on</strong>s. First, they<br />

suggest that applicati<strong>on</strong>s should be able to simultaneously<br />

request multiple permissi<strong>on</strong>s with wildcards (e.g.,<br />

android.permissi<strong>on</strong>.SMS.*). Our Google Chrome<br />

survey shows that developers often use wildcards<br />

to request excessive privileges, and our Android study<br />

shows that the majority of applicati<strong>on</strong>s do not need access<br />

to all permissi<strong>on</strong>s in a group. Next, they propose<br />

that the INTERNET permissi<strong>on</strong> should support specific<br />

domain lists. A manual review finds that 14 of 27 applicati<strong>on</strong>s<br />

with the INTERNET permissi<strong>on</strong> would indeed be<br />

satisfied with access to a list of specific domains.<br />

11<br />

Researchers at SMobile present a survey of the permissi<strong>on</strong>s<br />

requested by 48, 694 Android applicati<strong>on</strong>s [18].<br />

They do not state whether their sample set is composed<br />

of free applicati<strong>on</strong>s, paid applicati<strong>on</strong>s, or a combinati<strong>on</strong>.<br />

They report that 68% of the applicati<strong>on</strong>s in their sample<br />

set request enough permissi<strong>on</strong>s to be c<strong>on</strong>sidered “suspicious.”<br />

We similarly find that applicati<strong>on</strong>s have high<br />

privilege requests. They also report with alarm that 9<br />

applicati<strong>on</strong>s request access to the BRICK permissi<strong>on</strong>,<br />

which can be used to make a ph<strong>on</strong>e n<strong>on</strong>-operati<strong>on</strong>al.<br />

However, this is a Signature permissi<strong>on</strong>; it is <strong>on</strong>ly available<br />

to a very small number of applicati<strong>on</strong>s signed by the<br />

device manufacturer. We find that a surprising number<br />

of applicati<strong>on</strong>s request Signature and SignatureOrSystem<br />

permissi<strong>on</strong>s, given that most applicati<strong>on</strong>s are unable<br />

to actually use these permissi<strong>on</strong>s.<br />

Kirin [6] is a tool that evaluates the security of an<br />

Android applicati<strong>on</strong>. It compares the applicati<strong>on</strong>’s requested<br />

permissi<strong>on</strong>s to a set of permissi<strong>on</strong> rules. They<br />

propose several rules and test them against 311 applicati<strong>on</strong>s.<br />

Their rules are specific enough to <strong>on</strong>ly flag a<br />

small number of the applicati<strong>on</strong>s in our set, but we did<br />

not check to see whether the applicati<strong>on</strong>s are malicious.<br />

User Warnings. We c<strong>on</strong>sider whether installati<strong>on</strong> warnings<br />

are of value to security-c<strong>on</strong>scious users. Other researchers<br />

have examined the best way to visually display<br />

installati<strong>on</strong> permissi<strong>on</strong>s to users [17] but not examined<br />

the frequency of prompts in install-time permissi<strong>on</strong> systems.<br />

Warning science literature indicates that frequent<br />

exposure to specific warnings, especially if the warnings<br />

do not lead to negative c<strong>on</strong>sequences, drastically reduce<br />

the warnings’ effectiveness [11, 15]. Other researchers<br />

have shown that browser warnings for phishing sites and<br />

invalid SSL certificates are ignored by most users [4, 16];<br />

it is possible that even infrequent permissi<strong>on</strong> installati<strong>on</strong><br />

warnings will be ignored.<br />

LUA. Windows users can reduce applicati<strong>on</strong> privileges<br />

by running Windows as a low-privileged user account<br />

(LUA). While in LUA mode, all applicati<strong>on</strong>s have reduced<br />

privileges. When an applicati<strong>on</strong> wants to perform<br />

a task that requires administrative privileges, Windows<br />

presents the user with a prompt for approval. Unlike<br />

the applicati<strong>on</strong> permissi<strong>on</strong> model discussed in this paper,<br />

<strong>on</strong>ly two security modes are available (user or administrative).<br />

Furthermore, in practice, users run in administrative<br />

mode all the time, thereby granting the system’s<br />

full privileges to applicati<strong>on</strong>s [12].<br />

<str<strong>on</strong>g>USENIX</str<strong>on</strong>g> Associati<strong>on</strong> <strong>Web</strong>Apps ’11: <str<strong>on</strong>g>2nd</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>USENIX</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>C<strong>on</strong>ference</str<strong>on</strong>g> <strong>on</strong> <strong>Web</strong> Applicati<strong>on</strong> <strong>Development</strong> 85

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