USA - International Encyclopaedia of Laws

Constitutional Formation and Design, Part I, Ch. 1 58–5958. Federal constitutional amendments affecting voting and apportionmenthave also had a pronounced effect on state constitutions. The federal Constitutionoriginally left voting qualifications and apportionment to the states. Thefederalization of voting law began with the adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment,requiring that states not discriminate in their voting qualifications on thebasis of race, and continued with the adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment(women’s suffrage), the Twenty-Fourth Amendment (poll tax), and the Twenty-Sixth Amendment (eighteen-year-old vote). These amendments imposed uniformnational standards for voting, removing a major source of constitutionalcontroversy from state control. Many states subsequently brought their constitutionsinto conformity with the federal requirements, either deleting inconsistentprovisions or adopting amendments analogous to the federal amendments.Beginning in the 1960s, the Fourteenth Amendment spawned successfulchallenges to state systems of legislative apportionment and to state regulationsof voting, such as poll taxes and residency requirements. 1 Congress also enactedthe Voting Rights Act of 1965, and this act – together with its 1982 amendments– dramatically expanded and intensified federal supervision over stateelectoral laws and practices. Yet these federal interventions have not altogetherprecluded an independent state role. For example, many state constitutionsrequire that local boundaries be respected in districting decisions, and stateapportionment commissions and state courts have continued to enforce thatrequirement, insofar as it can be reconciled with the federal ‘one person, onevote’ standard. 21. See, e.g. Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), and Dunn v.Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).2. See, e.g., Fischer v. State Bd. of Elections, 879 S.W.2d 475 (Ky. 1994); Fonfara v.Reapportionment Commission, 610 A.2d 153 (Conn. 1992).59. Finally, Congress, acting through its spending power, may reach manysubjects normally reserved to the states, although it does so indirectly. It mayaccomplish its aims indirectly by attaching conditions to federal spendingprograms or grants. State constitutions may make state compliance with suchconditions difficult. For example, Congress required that states enact ‘certificateof need’ legislation as a condition for the receipt of federal health planning funds.Prior to this requirement, the North Carolina Supreme Court had ruled that state‘certificate of need’ legislation was unconstitutional as granting special privilegesand monopolies in violation of the North Carolina Constitution. 1 North Carolinatherefore argued that the congressional requirement interfered with state sovereignty.A federal district court rejected this argument. 2 This decision left NorthCarolina with the choice of foregoing the federal funds, amending its constitution,or seeking a different interpretation from its supreme court. Nevertheless, Congressmay sometimes choose not to impose conditions in federal grant programs thatrequire a state to do something that its constitution prohibits. 31. In re Certificate of Need for Aston Park Hospital, Inc., 193 S.E.2d 729, 736 (N.C. 1973).2. North Carolina ex rel. Morrow v. Califano, 445 F. Supp. 532, 535–536 (E.D.N.C. 1977),aff’d. mem., 435 U.S. 962 (1978).3. Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 U.S. 402, 416–419 (1974) (‘Whatever the case might be if therewere no expression of specific congressional intent, Title I evinces a clear intention that stateConstitutional Law – Suppl. 34 (October 1999) USA (Sub-national) – 29