Ageing and welfare reform in the Nordic Countries, 1990-2010 ...

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2010). Evaluations comparing individual elements generally find positive, but less certain effects(Djuve & Kavli, 2007: 57-70).The introduction programmes are de facto quite similar (Djuve & Kavli, 2007: 85-90), and it hasbeen claimed more generally that the Nordic differences as regards integration policy is a matter of”practical convergence” and ”discursive divergence” (Hedetoft, 2006). This is overstating thepoint, however (Brochmann & Hagelund, 2010: 359). There is no doubt that Denmark really hasbeen more inclined to impose Danish norms and use the stick; Sweden has been more inclined toaccept diversity and use the carrot, with Norway falling in-between. Still, all four countries have putmore more emphasis on labour market integration, and on duties, than previously. 16It is noteworthy that employment rates for non-western immigrants have increased considerably,and the employment/unemployment gaps as compared to other countries have narrowed(Brockmann, 2010: 350, 362). From a lowest point in 1996, employment rates among female nonwesternimmigrants doubled, from about 25 per cent to about 50 per cent in 2008 (DanmarksStatistik, 2009: 66-67). Integration programmes and other policy initiatives may have played a role,but increasing average duration of residence and economic prosperity are undoubtedly moreimportant. It is also worth noting that work ethic among non-western immigrants is very strong;they even follow the unusually strong non-financial emploment commitment in the Nordic countries(Svallfors et al., 2001; Goul Andersen, 2008). Finally, it is noteworthy that among secondgeneration immigrants women are cathing up very fast as regards educational attainments (Tranæs,2008) whereas ethnic inequality is to a larger extent reproduced among men. Still, ethnicdifferences in tertiary education are evaporating both among men and women. The problem ismainly that male immigrants are more inclined to drop out from apprenticeship education.Even though immigration has implied net costs rather than net benefits – at least in Denmark(Wadensjö & Orrje, 2002) and probably in the other countries as well – it has not undermined thewelfare state economically. Whether this is attributable to policy adjustments remains a matter ofdispute. Nor has immigration undermined support for the welfare state. Even for social assistanceprogrammes targeted increasingly at immigrants nothing indicates falling solidarity (GoulAndersen, 2010). In Denmark where immigration was exploited as an issue even by the”conventional” right parties in three subsequent elections 2001, 2005 and 2007 (Green-Pedersen &Krogstrup, 2008), the issue contributed to the largest parliamentary majority to the right since theend of the first World War. This happened simulatenously with the highest support ever measuredfor the welfare state. This is tantamount to welfare chauvinism, and in Denmark there have been afew tendencies towards a dual welfare state. Even though a logic of party competition 17 served togrant disproportional influence to the anti-immigration Danish People’s Party 2001-11, the pathtowards a dual welfare state has always been constrained, however. Even in Denmark such trends16 It also remains that in addition to visible and partly symbolic ”tough” measures, the Danish Ministry of Integrationhas supported a huge number of projects aimed at improving conditions of life and integration for immigrants.17 The Danish People’s Party has been critically dependent on keeping the issue alive and has sought to invent ever newimmgration issues. It was standard to require concessions in this field in exchange for supporting the government’soverall policies. Being mutually dependent, both the government and the Danish People’s Party were willing tocompromise. During the opposition period, the basic Social Democratic strategy was to accept most proposals in orderto make immigration a non-issue. Basically, this was the same logic as followed by the Liberal prime minister AndersFogh Rasmussen on welfare.12
were largely limited to measures aimed at keeping low-qualified immigrants out. 18 But these policychanges did tend to reinforce poverty and in particular child poverty problems for a minority ofimmigrants, and relative poverty among immigrants is more widespread in Denmark than inSweden (Sainsbury, 2005).In addition to including ”new” groups for employment efforts, it should be underlined that nearly alllabour shedding policies of the 1990s or earlier have been terminated. In Finland, schemes from thecrisis encouraging older workers to retire were gradually phased out. In Denmark, it was decidedalready in 1994-1995 to scrap a sabbatical leave and to abolished a ”transitional allowance”enabling long-term unemployed to retire from the age of 50 (both schemes were introcuced in 1992and extended/improved in 1993). Educational leave was terminated a few years later, in favour of a”work first” – approach. Finally, the right for elderly workers in Denmark to maintainunemployment benefits indefinitely, and to be exempted from activation, was cut off bit by bit, andeventually fully abolished, in the early 2000s. As a result, Scandinavian employment rates for 55-64years olds are among the highest in the EU, even for men (OECD 2010b; see also above).4. Other measuresTho obligation to work and to participate in activation programmes has always been a verysignificant trait of the Swedish active labour market policy (Jensen, 1989,1990). In Denmark, on theother hand, it became a strong priority alrteady from the late 1970s to make the unemploymentinsurance system as inclusive as possible. When activation was introduced in Denmark around1980, the main purpose was to extend the duration of unemployment benefits. 19 Throughparticipation in a job offer programme of 6-9 months, it was possible to requalify twice for 2½years of unemployment benefits, de facto extending the duration of unemployment benefits to 8½ -9 years. This was an extreme situation that does not really find a counterpart in other countries,even though labour shedding for elderly workers during the Finnish crisis in the 1990s bears someresemblance.Whereas activation in Denmark was originally an instrument to protect social rights, improvingqualifications was the classic purpose of activation in Scandinavia, including Denmark after the biglabour market reform in 1993/1994. After this reform, unemployment in Denmark was18 Erroneously, the Danish People’s Party tried to extend anti-immigrant policies to families with three children ormore, based on the impression that immigrants had large families. In 2010 the party negotiated a maximum for childbenefits largely eliminating child benefits for the third and subsequent children (Goul Andersen, 2010). This wascounterproductive: In the first place, immigrants only constituted a small minority among families with three or morechildren. Furthermore, fertility among immigrants has declined rapidly and is moving below average by 2010. It istelling, however, that there was no problem to reach agreement with the government. In face of public protest, the ruleswere re-negotiated a couple of days after presentation of the the agreement. The example illustrates that there were fewconstraints for the pursuit of this goal. Still, social protection did not move straightforwardly towards dualism. There arefundamental constraints such as the Danish constitution, European Union law, and other international conventions. Thescope of the latter has expanded, and it is difficult to imagine how the development could be pushed much further (GoulAndersen, 2007). Finally, it should be noted that immigrants cannot be cut off from social rights to any important extentin a universal welfare state with a strong emphasis on social services.19 There were some attempts to activate young people as well (so-called youth guarantee). At that time, Danish policiestargeted at the young was also very inclusionary, as far as possible enabling young people to enter the unemploymentbenefit system rather than leaving them as social assistance recipients.13
Page 1 and 2: Ageing and welfare reform in the No
Page 3 and 4: employment incentives as well as in
Page 5 and 6: In the other countries (Norway to b
Page 7 and 8: pensions, early retirement and work
Page 9 and 10: As regards sustainability, the Dani
Page 11: levels. The latter measures were ad
Page 15 and 16: 2007). However, the impact of such
Page 17 and 18: for average taxes, and even more fo
Page 19 and 20: Table 5. Marginal tax rates for wor
Page 21 and 22: References:Agell, Jonas, Peter Engl
Page 23 and 24: Goul Andersen, Jørgen (2011a). “
Page 25 and 26: Work? Experiences with Activation S

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