Does the Entry Mode of Foreign Banks Matter for Bank ... - EconomiX

- the government and the strategic investor, none with a majority part giving it the controlof the bank (a common pattern in the early privatization period) - may not help improvingthe bank’s performance, since conflicts of interest between the shareholders mayadversely affect the development of the bank’s strategy and will give the bankmanagement the effective influence on the bank 5 . On the other hand, pure Initial PublicOfferings and voucher programs, which leads to diffuse ownership, is also of littlebenefits because it may also leave incumbent managers with a stronger hold on the bankthan its shareholder. However, since our definition of foreign ownership requires thatfrom 50% of the bank capital is foreign-owned, a majority of M&As in our sample don’tface these problems as they have a controlling strategic investor.The second factor may be the nature of the inherited problems from former stateownedbanks faced by M&As. Indeed, there may be two major problems: an asset ofuncertain quality with some proportion of problem loans, and an overly large staff with anon negligible fraction of those with outdated skills (Abarbanell & Bonin, 1997). Theinherited problems could also stem from the bad legacy represented by countercommercialattitudes left over from the communist era, high operating costs and aboveaveragereserves, inefficient branch network, underdeveloped information technologies,and low quality clientele… (Majnoni, Shankar, & Varhegyi, 2003, p. 14). It takes timefor M&As to resolve the asset quality problem by restructuring bad loans and introducingnew lending practices and procedures. In some cases, these domestic banks acquired havehad long term relationships with traditional financially troubled industries, or the mergerand acquisition operations may have been facilitated by local authorities on condition thatthe new M&As maintain a certain level of financial support to these unattractive sectors.Therefore, it also takes time to reorient the loan portfolio away from these sectors intohealthier industries, especially in the presence of local pressure. It takes time, too, toreduce the workforce because of fear of labor action or of confrontation with the politicalbodies which have themselves employment objectives (Abarbanell & Bonin, 1997). Wecall this adjustment process the age effect. Thus, the time it takes to get rid of theinherited problems (measured by the age of the bank) serves to measure the extent ofthese problems.5 See, for example, (Abarbanell & Bonin, 1997) on the case of Bank Slaski in Poland.-17-