Does the Entry Mode of Foreign Banks Matter for Bank ... - EconomiX
Does the Entry Mode of Foreign Banks Matter for Bank ... - EconomiX
Does the Entry Mode of Foreign Banks Matter for Bank ... - EconomiX
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1. IntroductionThe second half <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1990s witnessed a dramatic increase <strong>of</strong> <strong>for</strong>eignparticipation in emerging markets’ banking systems. Central and Eastern Europeancountries, especially <strong>the</strong> Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, witnessed <strong>the</strong> moststriking changes, with <strong>for</strong>eign presence rising from around 10% at <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> 1994 toaround 60% at <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> 1999 (Mathieson & Roldos, 2001). The trans<strong>for</strong>mation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>communist mono-bank system into a two-tier one has led <strong>the</strong> authorities to open up <strong>the</strong>banking system to new entries and <strong>for</strong>eign banks have taken this opportunity to make<strong>the</strong>ir presence felt through greenfield investments. The banking crises that resulted fromstate-owned banks holding huge amounts <strong>of</strong> non-per<strong>for</strong>ming loans <strong>for</strong>ced <strong>the</strong>governments <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se countries to undertake vast programs <strong>of</strong> bank privatization thateventually drew in <strong>for</strong>eign banks through mergers and acquisitions <strong>of</strong> domestic banks.The need to comply with <strong>the</strong> requirements <strong>of</strong> membership in <strong>the</strong> OECD and <strong>for</strong> EuropeanUnion accession has led <strong>the</strong> Czech, Hungary, and Poland to fur<strong>the</strong>r removal <strong>of</strong> barriers toentry.Given <strong>the</strong> main objectives <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se countries in liberalizing <strong>the</strong>ir banking systemsare to promote banking efficiency and stability, it is useful to assess whe<strong>the</strong>r this policyhas been effective. In this paper, we attempt to do so by looking at <strong>the</strong> comparativeper<strong>for</strong>mance between <strong>the</strong> two modes <strong>of</strong> entry <strong>of</strong> <strong>for</strong>eign banks – greenfield investment(hereafter Greenfields) versus entry by merging with or acquiring a domestic bank 2(hereafter M&As), and between <strong>the</strong> M&As and domestic banks.To this end, we use stochastic frontier analysis to model and measure <strong>the</strong> costefficiency <strong>of</strong> banks in three transition economies: <strong>the</strong> Czech Republic, Hungary, andPoland. We adopt a maximum likelihood approach to estimation in which <strong>the</strong> variance <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> one-sided error term is modeled jointly with <strong>the</strong> cost frontier, thus enabling us toretrieve efficiency scores, as well as estimating <strong>the</strong> various determinants <strong>of</strong> X-inefficiency. This one-stage approach gets round <strong>the</strong> recurrent criticisms inherent in <strong>the</strong>2 We define <strong>for</strong>eign banks as those in which <strong>for</strong>eign owners (Companies + Individuals) hold at least 50% <strong>of</strong>total share capital. A greenfield investment involves <strong>the</strong> establishment <strong>of</strong> an institution from scratch,whereas a merger and acquisition implies <strong>the</strong> purchase <strong>of</strong> a firm's (here a bank's) shares or o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>for</strong>m <strong>of</strong>capital. In this paper, we are exclusively interested in a control acquisition, i.e. <strong>the</strong> purchase <strong>of</strong> equal to ormore than 50% <strong>of</strong> a bank's capital.-2-