Executive SummaryRecent illiberal turns in Hungary andRomania have prompted <strong>the</strong> question what,if anything, <strong>the</strong> EU could and should do toprotect liberal <strong>democracy</strong> within member states.This paper discusses four principled concerns about<strong>democracy</strong>-saving EU interventions in memberstates: that an institution that is itself largelyundemocratic cannot credibly protect <strong>democracy</strong>;that <strong>the</strong>re are in fact no common Europeanstandards that could be used to determine whe<strong>the</strong>ra member state is departing from a sharedEuropean understanding of <strong>democracy</strong>; thatinterventions are per se illiberal; and, finally, thatonly small states will be subject to intervention, aform of EU hypocrisy that delegitimizes Brusselsboth in <strong>the</strong> states concerned and possibly across<strong>the</strong> EU as a whole. This paper counters all <strong>the</strong>seconcerns and argues that, ultimately, <strong>the</strong> problemwith intervention is not to be found on a <strong>the</strong>oreticalnormative level, but on a practical plane. As ofnow, <strong>the</strong> EU lacks a tool-kit to intervene effectivelyin member states; whatever it has recently usedby way of sticks and carrots can seem arbitrary oropportunistic. This paper concludes by makinga number of modest proposals as to how thissituation might be remedied. In particular, itsuggests <strong>the</strong> creation of an expert body, tentativelycalled <strong>the</strong> “Copenhagen Commission,” whichcontinuously assesses <strong>democracy</strong> and <strong>the</strong> rule oflaw within member states. Such an institution oughtto be authorized to conduct its own investigations,to raise <strong>the</strong> alarm about turns to illiberalism —and to impose a very limited range of sanctions.The existing mechanisms should stay in place, butideally would be complemented with <strong>the</strong> possibilityof entirely excluding a state from <strong>the</strong> EU.Safeguarding Democracy <strong>inside</strong> <strong>the</strong> EU 1
1IntroductionIn <strong>the</strong> nightmare of <strong>the</strong> darkAll <strong>the</strong> dogs of Europe bark,And <strong>the</strong> living nations wait,Each sequestered in its hate;Intellectual disgraceStares from every human face,And <strong>the</strong> seas of pity lieLocked and frozen in each eye.From W. H. Auden, “In Memory of W. B. Yeats”If a people — especially one whose freedom hasnot yet become prescriptive — does not value itsufficiently to fight for it, and maintain it againstany force which can be mustered within <strong>the</strong> country,even by those who have <strong>the</strong> command of <strong>the</strong> publicrevenue, it is only a question in how few years ormonths that people will be enslaved. Ei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>government which it has given to itself, or somemilitary leader or knot of conspirators who contriveto subvert <strong>the</strong> government, will speedily put an endto all popular institutions: unless indeed it suits <strong>the</strong>irconvenience better to leave <strong>the</strong>m standing, and becontent with reducing <strong>the</strong>m to mere forms; for, unless<strong>the</strong> spirit of liberty is strong in a people, those whohave <strong>the</strong> executive in <strong>the</strong>ir hands easily work anyinstitutions to <strong>the</strong> purposes of despotism.From J. S. Mill, “A Few Words on Non-Intervention”Are <strong>the</strong>re limits to political change within <strong>the</strong>European Union? Or, put less abstractly,what if a member state appears to be on apath toward a regime that is no longer recognizableas a form of liberal <strong>democracy</strong>? Put even morebluntly, could <strong>the</strong>re be a dictatorship <strong>inside</strong> <strong>the</strong>EU? If such a specter appeared, should Brusselssomehow step in to save or, for that matter, revive<strong>democracy</strong>? Or would this constitute an illegitimateform of meddling in <strong>the</strong> domestic affairs ofcountries that, after all, have delegated specificpowers to Europe — and not empowered Brusselsto be a policeman <strong>safeguarding</strong> liberal <strong>democracy</strong>across <strong>the</strong> European continent, or even just tolecture Europeans from Lapland to Lampedusaon how popular rule is correctly understood? All<strong>the</strong>se are no longer <strong>the</strong>oretical questions: recentdevelopments in Hungary and Romania have putsuch challenges squarely on <strong>the</strong> agenda of Europeanpolitics — even if concerns about a possible slidetoward illiberalism in both countries have beenlargely overshadowed by <strong>the</strong> <strong>eu</strong>ro crisis.I argue that it is legitimate for Brussels to interferein individual member states for <strong>the</strong> purpose ofprotecting liberal <strong>democracy</strong>. Four commonconcerns about such interventions are largelymisplaced.• First, <strong>the</strong> criticism that <strong>the</strong>y are hypocriticalbecause <strong>the</strong> Union is itself not democratic and<strong>the</strong>refore in no position credibly to act as <strong>the</strong>guardian of <strong>democracy</strong> on <strong>the</strong> continent.• Second, <strong>the</strong> worry that <strong>the</strong>re is no single, fullyagreed model of European liberal <strong>democracy</strong>that could be used as a template to decidewhe<strong>the</strong>r countries are departing from shared“European Standard” (<strong>the</strong>re might often betalk of such standards, but effectively, so criticswould claim, <strong>the</strong>y don’t exist).Safeguarding Democracy <strong>inside</strong> <strong>the</strong> EU 3