safeguarding democracy inside the eu - Transatlantic Academy

• Third, the concern that such interventionsthemselves are in and of themselves paternalisticand, ultimately, illiberal.• Finally, the charge that only smaller, relativelypowerless member states would ever be subjectto interference from Brussels (in a sense, then,this criticism also comes down to a suspicion ofhypocrisy).These are not unreasonable concerns. But one cancounter them and, in the process, develop a set ofcriteria as to when and how European interventionis justified. In fact, the real problem arises not ata relatively abstract theoretical level, but when itcomes to policy instruments and concrete politicalstrategies. To say it outright: as of now, the EUhas no convincing tool kit to deal with situationsthat probably not many Eurocrats — or, for thatmatter, European elites more broadly — everforesaw. Brussels, as well as national capitals,seemed to have assumed that the consolidation ofliberal democracies in the run-up to EU accessionwas irreversible. Once inside the club, so therather complacent reasoning seemed to go, youngdemocracies would count their blessings and neverlook back (or, for that matter, sideways and forwardto illiberal forms of statecraft).To be sure, the repertoire of legal and politicalinstruments the EU has at its disposal at themoment to exert pressure on member statesmight occasionally work — but it can also appeararbitrary and opportunistic. I propose extendingthis repertoire as well as the creation of a new kindof democracy watchdog — tentatively called the“Copenhagen Commission” — that can raise aEurope-wide alarm about deteriorations in the ruleof law and democracy. Such a body also ought to beable to trigger a limited set of “smart sanctions.”4Transatlantic Academy