Flood plain cultivation is shown with the Pamir Mountains as a backdrop in Wakhan, <strong>Afghanistan</strong>. (Photo byJohn Winnie Jr., Wildlife Conservation Society-<strong>Afghanistan</strong>, 2011)<strong>Afghanistan</strong> <strong>Oversight</strong> Program <strong>and</strong> Activities<strong>USAID</strong> <strong>OIG</strong> provides oversight of <strong>USAID</strong> activities in <strong>Afghanistan</strong> through an intensive program ofaudits, investigations, <strong>and</strong> outreach <strong>and</strong> coordination activities.To execute this program as effectively as possible, <strong>OIG</strong> has exp<strong>and</strong>ed its presence in <strong>Afghanistan</strong> inrecent years. In the past, <strong>OIG</strong> provided oversight remotely using personnel based in Washington,D.C., <strong>and</strong> our regional office in the Philippines. In 2009, we established a permanent, on-thegroundpresence in Kabul. As of <strong>June</strong> 30, 2012, our Country Office in <strong>Afghanistan</strong> had13 personnel.<strong>OIG</strong> spent approximately $18.5 million to provide oversight for <strong>Afghanistan</strong> from FY 2003 throughthe third quarter of FY 2012. <strong>USAID</strong> <strong>OIG</strong> oversight activities there during the same periodproduced $230.7 million in returns for the U.S. Government.The U.S. Government reopened the <strong>USAID</strong> mission in Kabul in 2002. Since FY 2002, <strong>USAID</strong> hasprovided approximately $14.0 billion to increase Afghan stability, provide humanitarianassistance, <strong>and</strong> address needs in education, health, economic growth, <strong>and</strong> governance.<strong>USAID</strong> <strong>OIG</strong> <strong>Afghanistan</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Pakistan</strong> <strong>Oversight</strong> <strong>Report</strong> 7
In recent years, <strong>OIG</strong> has covered a wide array of<strong>USAID</strong> programs in <strong>Afghanistan</strong>, including thosefor relief <strong>and</strong> stabilization, reconstruction,economic growth, education, <strong>and</strong> health care.Since the start of FY 2003, <strong>USAID</strong> <strong>OIG</strong> has issued100 financial audits, performance audits, <strong>and</strong>reviews of <strong>Afghanistan</strong>-related assistance efforts.These reports made 355 recommendations forimprovements to <strong>USAID</strong> programs <strong>and</strong> activities.Performance Audits <strong>and</strong> Reviews<strong>USAID</strong> <strong>OIG</strong> has issued 52 performance audits <strong>and</strong>reviews relating to <strong>USAID</strong> programs <strong>and</strong> activitiesin <strong>Afghanistan</strong> since FY 2003. Performance audits<strong>and</strong> reviews conducted in recent years have notedthe need for improvements in a range ofmanagement <strong>and</strong> performance areas.Six in ten reports have identified contract or projectmanagement deficiencies <strong>and</strong> noncompliance with relevant procedures or regulations. Four in tenhave found internal control weaknesses, <strong>and</strong> more than a third have noted risks to projectsustainability <strong>and</strong> that security problems hampered project implementation or monitoring.<strong>OIG</strong> completed two performance audits in <strong>Afghanistan</strong> during the quarter:Map of <strong>Afghanistan</strong>. (Central Intelligence AgencyWorld Factbook, 2011)Audit of <strong>USAID</strong>/<strong>Afghanistan</strong>’s Incentives Driving Economic Alternatives for the North, East,<strong>and</strong> West Program (<strong>Report</strong> No. F-306-12-004-P, <strong>June</strong> 29, 2012). <strong>USAID</strong>/<strong>Afghanistan</strong>’sIncentives Driving Economic Alternatives for the North, East, <strong>and</strong> West is a $150 million, 5-yearprogram that began in March 2009 <strong>and</strong> is implemented through a consortium led byDevelopment Alternatives Inc. (DAI), with Mercy Corps <strong>and</strong> ACDI/VOCA as subimplementers.The program, which was designed to dissuade Afghans from growing poppy plants byincreasing access to legal, commercially viable, alternative sources of income, was achievingonly mixed results. For example, in 2010 <strong>and</strong> 2011, the program reported repairing orconstructing only 80 of the 161 miles of transportation infrastructure targeted.Changes in program focus <strong>and</strong> staff turnover slowed progress. Beginning in 2009, the focus ofthe program shifted away from communities where poppies were cultivated. Continual changein staff at the mission, its Office of Agriculture, <strong>and</strong> among implementing partners was anotherhindrance. Since the inception of the program, DAI has had five project directors, while themission has had six directors <strong>and</strong> three agreement officer’s technical representatives (nowcalled agreement officer’s representatives). Incoming personnel came with different visions ofthe program, had varying priorities <strong>and</strong> operating styles, <strong>and</strong> in many cases did not documentchanges to the program.8 <strong>USAID</strong> <strong>OIG</strong> <strong>Afghanistan</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Pakistan</strong> <strong>Oversight</strong> <strong>Report</strong>