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The Economics of the Russian Nuclear Power Industry - Bellona

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11completion rate, including <strong>the</strong> equipment available in <strong>the</strong> storehouse, is no lower than 35 percent; <strong>the</strong>completion cost is around RUR 75 billion, plus 10 percent on account <strong>of</strong> it being an even‐numbed unit).<strong>The</strong> costs <strong>of</strong> new construction at <strong>the</strong> sites <strong>of</strong> Novovoronezh NPP II and Leningrad NPP II are even higher.At that, construction time frames are only getting extended fur<strong>the</strong>r, which is evidenced by <strong>the</strong> examples<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se units.” 22It is quite possible that nuclear construction is unjustifiably overpriced owing to ubiquitouscorruption, 23 a problem prevalent in all <strong>Russian</strong> industries as well as bodies <strong>of</strong> government. According toNigmatulin, corruption would account for no less than 40 percent <strong>of</strong> total costs. Clearly, corruptionresults not just in growing project costs, but also in an inferior quality <strong>of</strong> construction materials usedat <strong>the</strong> site and a less‐than‐desirable level <strong>of</strong> compliance with construction guidelines. <strong>Nuclear</strong>construction is a field where very strict requirements must be imposed with regard to <strong>the</strong> qualificationsand skills <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> workforce engaged in <strong>the</strong> project, but in today’s Russia, <strong>the</strong> majority <strong>of</strong> labourersbuilding nuclear energy sites are unskilled migrant workers from Central Asia. From <strong>the</strong> economic point<strong>of</strong> view, this could well lead to an increase in future maintenance costs for <strong>the</strong> plant and a shorterservice life on <strong>the</strong> whole. 24That actual construction costs exceed those projected at <strong>the</strong> outset is <strong>of</strong>ten called anextraordinary situation and assurances are heard that as construction experience accumulates and newnuclear construction sites become more uniform across <strong>the</strong> industry, costs will decrease accordingly.<strong>The</strong> reality, however, is yet to <strong>of</strong>fer any evidence to support such claims.Estimated costs <strong>of</strong> building NPPs for export.<strong>The</strong> costs <strong>of</strong> nuclear construction projects implemented by Rosatom abroad are noticeablyhigher than in domestic projects – and thus may in fact be closer to <strong>the</strong> real expenses incurred. Forinstance, <strong>the</strong> price <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> project Russia has negotiated to build in Turkey’s Akkuyu was last year cited atover $5 billion per one 1.15‐gigawatt power unit. 25In Belarus, Rosatom’s export construction wing, Atomstroiexport, has landed a contract to buildbetween 2011 and 2015 a nuclear power plant operating two VVER‐type reactors in power units with acombined capacity <strong>of</strong> 2,400 megawatts. 26 According to a document entitled “Belarus’s Strategy for22 Passing <strong>of</strong>f ideas as facts, plans as results, and words as deeds, interview with Bulat Nigmatulin, November 22,2010, PRoAtom.Ru. (Zamysel vydayotsya za fakt, plan za rezultat, slovo za delo. 22.11.2010, ProAtom.Ru,www.proatom.ru/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=2660, in <strong>Russian</strong>).23 Yegor Mityukhin. Corruption in Rosatom: Grand larceny at Novovoronezh NPP II construction site, news article,December 23, 2009, PRoAtom.Ru. (Mityukhin Ye. Korruptsiya v Rosatome: Masshtabniye khishcheniya pristroitelstve Novovoronezhskoi AES‐2, 23.12.2009, PRoAtom.Ru,www.proatom.ru/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=2106, in <strong>Russian</strong>).24 <strong>The</strong> US is currently implementing a programme by which <strong>the</strong> operational lifetimes <strong>of</strong> nuclear power plants thathave been in operation for nearly 60 years will be extended by ano<strong>the</strong>r 20 years. A sufficient level <strong>of</strong> reliability <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> main structural components that are not subject to replacement must be shown as <strong>the</strong> necessary condition toobtain an extension on <strong>the</strong> existing operational license. Because <strong>the</strong> removable power production equipment isregularly upgraded in <strong>the</strong> course <strong>of</strong> operation, it is only <strong>the</strong> wear and tear – <strong>the</strong> fatigue – <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> materials used tobuild <strong>the</strong> plant that does not allow an NPP to stay in operation forever. See, for instance: <strong>Nuclear</strong> power plants getto be 20 years older, news article. Aftenposten, November 11, 2010. (Atomkraftverk får bli 20 år eldre,Aftenposten, 22.11.2010, www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/uriks/article3914773.ece, in Norwegian).25 Energy Minister Shmatko: <strong>Russian</strong> Federation, Turkey agree on NPP construction terms, news article. RIANovosti, May 8, 2010. (RF i Turtsiya soglasovali vse usloviya stroitelstva AES, RIA Novosti, 08.05.2010,http://www.rian.ru/economy/20100508/232023678.html, in <strong>Russian</strong>).26 <strong>The</strong> highly unpopular project to be carried out by Russia in Belarus’s Ostrovets, Grodno Region, has faced bothvigorous opposition from <strong>Russian</strong> and Belarusian environmentalists and <strong>of</strong>ficial objections from neighbouringcountries, such as Austria and Lithuania (<strong>the</strong> plant is to be built only some fifty kilometres away from <strong>the</strong>Lithuanian capital, Vilnius). A preliminary deal on <strong>the</strong> project in Ostrovets (where initial construction works at <strong>the</strong>site had already started) was reached between <strong>the</strong> <strong>Russian</strong> and Belarusian governments in early 2011, followed by

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