Table of Contents

• Mediterranean initiatives will be subject to substantial change.
The Barcelona process is likely to face significant funding
problems, as well as challenges to its scope and agenda as the
EU’s engagement on the European periphery expands through
the ENP. NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue is also likely to
expand, with more active partnership and perhaps eventual
membership in the Alliance for some participants. Portugal
could play a more active role as an advocate for the Dialogue
within the Alliance, and as a venue for Mediterranean meetings
of the North Atlantic Council. Sub-regional frameworks
such as the 5+5 in the western Mediterranean are also likely
to become more important for Portugal and its neighbors. If
there is interest, a permanent secretariat for the 5+5 might
well be located in Lisbon.
• There is a risk of re-nationalization in Mediterranean relations.
Discord within the EU, xenophobic trends, transatlantic disputes
over North Africa and the Middle East, and long-standing
sovereignty concerns in the south, could bolster national
rather than multilateral approaches to the region over the
next decade. This would be a strongly negative development,
especially from the perspective of Portugal and southern
Europe. The flux in Mediterranean and north-south relations
argues for a portfolio approach to engagement in the south,
balancing bilateral, European, and transatlantic initiatives.
• Concerted strategy toward North Africa and the Mediterranean
will be a key test for transatlantic cooperation. Relatively balanced
regional stakes and capabilities encourage a joint
approach, as EU, NATO and U.S. engagement increasingly
overlap. A more dynamic approach to political and economic
reform in the south – with somewhat different emphases on
each side of the Atlantic – is part of this equation. A reinvigorated
transatlantic partnership is likely to focus heavily
on the south, including Africa. Portugal will be well placed
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