circumstances must inevitably be drawn, yet if on all the facts ofthe particular case it is not the correct inference, then it should notbe drawn.” 412.36 In other words, because a person can usually predict the likelyoutcome (the natural consequences) of his conduct, it is usually fair <strong>and</strong>reasonable to infer that he did indeed predict <strong>and</strong> expect that outcome.However, while such an inference must be drawn in some cases, if it is notthe correct inference to draw in a particular situation (such as where anaccused raises a plausible defence of accident), then it should not be drawn.2.37 The House of Lords reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal,<strong>and</strong> reinstated the capital <strong>murder</strong> conviction. It rejected a subjective test asto intention. According to Viscount Kilmuir, it did not matter what theaccused contemplated as the probable result, or whether he evercontemplated at all, provided he was in law responsible <strong>and</strong> accountable forhis actions, ie, was a man capable of forming an intention, not insane withinthe M’Naghten Rules <strong>and</strong> not suffering from diminished responsibility.Assuming that he is so accountable for his actions, the only issue is whethergrievous bodily harm was the natural <strong>and</strong> probable result of the unlawful <strong>and</strong>voluntary act in question. The test for establishing this is what the ordinary,responsible man would, in all the circumstances of the case, havecontemplated as the natural <strong>and</strong> probable result. 422.38 In other words, the defendant’s subjective awareness regardingthe natural <strong>and</strong> probable outcome of his conduct <strong>and</strong> the risk of death orserious injury posed is irrelevant. Provided he had the mental capacity toform an intention, he will be held legally responsible for his actions on thebasis that death or serious injury was the natural <strong>and</strong> probable consequenceof his voluntary criminal act. An ordinary reasonable person’s foresight ofthe likely outcome of the accused’s behaviour will be the relevant marker.2.39 The decision in DPP v Smith provoked huge criticism. All thatwas necessary to establish the mental element for <strong>murder</strong> was to show thatthe accused intended to do some unlawful act which was likely to causedeath or serious injury, regardless of whether the accused realised it or not. 43Despite the English parliament’s intention to abolish constructive malice inthe English Homicide Act 1957, the decision in DPP v Smith had effectivelyreintroduced it. 4441424344R v Smith [1960] 2 All ER 450, 453.DPP v Smith [1960] 3 All ER 161, 167.See JC Smith, “Case <strong>and</strong> Comment: DPP v Smith” (1960) Crim LR 765.See <strong>Law</strong> <strong>Reform</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> Consultation Paper on Homicide: The Mental Element inMurder (LRC CP 17-2001) at paragraph 1.14. Section 4 of the Irish Criminal Justice36
2.40 In Hyam v DPP 45 the accused poured petrol through the letterboxof a house where a woman <strong>and</strong> her children were sleeping, in order tofrighten away the woman. The accused then set the petrol alight <strong>and</strong> the fireled to the death of two of the children. The trial judge told the jury that thenecessary intent would be established if they were satisfied that the accusedknew that it was highly probable that death or serious bodily harm wouldresult when she set fire to the house.2.41 The House of Lords considered whether proof that the accusedknew that it was highly probable that her actions would result in death orserious bodily harm would suffice to establish malice aforethought in thecrime of <strong>murder</strong>. The House of Lords, by a majority, upheld the <strong>murder</strong>conviction. All five judges held that malice aforethought was present if theaccused carried out an act knowing that it was highly probable that death orgrievous bodily harm would result.2.42 Since this state of mind was deemed to be a species of maliceaforethought, it was not essential that the House of Lords decide whether theaccused actually intended to kill or cause grievous bodily harm. Numerousviews were nonetheless expressed on the issue of whether foresight ofprobable consequences would amount to intention in the strict sense.2.43 Lord Hailsham invoked the definition of intention laid down byAsquith L.J. in the civil case of Cunliffe v Goodman: 46“an ‘intention’, to my mind, connotes a state of affairs which theparty ‘intending’ … does more than merely contemplate. Itconnotes a state of affairs which, on the contrary, he decides, sofar as in him lies, to bring about, <strong>and</strong> which, in point ofpossibility, he has a reasonable prospect of being able to bringabout by his own act of volition.”4546Act 1964 was introduced specifically to rule out an objective test for intention in<strong>murder</strong> cases.[1974] 2 All ER 41. The facts of this case are very similar to those in The People(DPP) v Cullen Central Criminal Court 17 November 1982; Court of Criminal Appeal11 March 1985, where the jury convicted the accused of <strong>murder</strong> <strong>and</strong> maliciousdamage based largely on the uncorroborated evidence of his accomplice, LynMadden. She was a prostitute who watched the defendant throw a fire bomb throughthe window of a house belonging to a woman called Dolores Lynch. Ms Lynch <strong>and</strong>two other women died in the blaze. Cullen was a pimp who claimed he wanted tofrighten Dolores Lynch, who had also previously worked as a prostitute <strong>and</strong> who hadattempted to get women away from Cullen’s influence. See Cullen v Toibín [1984]ILRM 577. See also “Court rejects killer’s appeal” in The Irish Times 12 March1985.[1950] 1 All ER 720, 724.37
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