12.07.2015 Views

Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory

Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory

Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

Mercier & Sperber: <strong>Why</strong> <strong>do</strong> <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> <strong>reason</strong>?Schoenbaum 2008, p. 265). The issue is not whether, onoccasion, <strong>reason</strong>ing c<strong>an</strong> help correct intuitive mistakes orbetter adapt us to novel circumst<strong>an</strong>ces. No <strong>do</strong>ubt, it c<strong>an</strong>.The issue is how far these occasional benefits explain thecosts incurred, <strong>an</strong>d hence the very existence of <strong>reason</strong>ingamong <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong>, <strong>an</strong>d also explain its characteristic features.In <strong>an</strong>y case, evolutionary hypotheses are of little helpunless precise enough to yield testable predictions <strong>an</strong>dexpl<strong>an</strong>ations. To establish that <strong>reason</strong>ing has a given function,we should be able at least to identify signature effectsof that function in the very way <strong>reason</strong>ing works.Here we w<strong>an</strong>t to explore the idea that the emergence of<strong>reason</strong>ing is best understood within the framework of theevolution of hum<strong>an</strong> communication. Reasoning enablespeople to exch<strong>an</strong>ge arguments that, on the whole, makecommunication more reliable <strong>an</strong>d hence more adv<strong>an</strong>tageous.The main function of <strong>reason</strong>ing, we claim, is <strong>argumentative</strong>(Sperber 2000a; 2001; see also Billig 1996;Dessalles 2007; Kuhn 1992; Perelm<strong>an</strong> & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969; <strong>for</strong> a very similar take on the special case ofmoral <strong>reason</strong>ing, see Gibbard 1990 <strong>an</strong>d Haidt 2001).For communication to be stable, it has to benefit bothsenders <strong>an</strong>d receivers; otherwise they would stopsending or stop receiving, putting <strong>an</strong> end to communicationitself (Dawkins & Krebs 1978; Krebs & Dawkins1984). But stability is often threatened by dishonestsenders who may gain by m<strong>an</strong>ipulating receivers <strong>an</strong>dinflicting too high of a cost on them. Is there a way toensure that communication is honest? Some signals arereliable indicators of their own honesty. Costly signalssuch as a deer <strong>an</strong>tlers or a peacock tail both signal <strong>an</strong>dshow evidence that the individual is strong enough topay that cost (Zahavi & Zahavi 1997). Saying “I am notmute” is proof that the speaker is indeed not mute.However, <strong>for</strong> most of the rich <strong>an</strong>d varied in<strong>for</strong>mationalcontents that <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> communicate among themselves,there are no available signals that would be proof oftheir own honesty. To avoid being victims of misin<strong>for</strong>mation,receivers must there<strong>for</strong>e exercise some degree ofwhat may be called epistemic vigil<strong>an</strong>ce (Sperber et al.2010). The task of epistemic vigil<strong>an</strong>ce is to evaluate communicator<strong>an</strong>d the content of their messages in order tofilter communicated in<strong>for</strong>mation.Several psychological mech<strong>an</strong>isms may contribute toepistemic vigil<strong>an</strong>ce. The two most import<strong>an</strong>t of thesemech<strong>an</strong>isms are trust calibration <strong>an</strong>d coherence checking.People routinely calibrate the trust they gr<strong>an</strong>t differentspeakers on the basis of their competence <strong>an</strong>d benevolence(Petty & Wegener 1998). Rudiments of trust calibrationbased on competence have been demonstratedin 3-year-old children (<strong>for</strong> reviews, see Clément 2010;Harris 2007). The ability to distrust malevolent in<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>tshas been shown to develop in stages between the ages of 3<strong>an</strong>d 6 (Mascaro & Sperber 2009).The interpretation of communicated in<strong>for</strong>mationinvolves activating a context of previously held beliefs<strong>an</strong>d trying to integrate the new with old in<strong>for</strong>mation.This process may bring to the <strong>for</strong>e incoherenciesbetween old <strong>an</strong>d newly communicated in<strong>for</strong>mation.Some initial coherence checking thus occurs in theprocess of comprehension. When it uncovers some incoherence,<strong>an</strong> epistemically vigil<strong>an</strong>t addressee must choosebetween two alternatives. The simplest is to reject communicatedin<strong>for</strong>mation, thus avoiding <strong>an</strong>y risk of beingmisled. This may, however, deprive the addressee of valuablein<strong>for</strong>mation <strong>an</strong>d of the opportunity to correct orupdate earlier beliefs. The second, more elaborate,alternative consists in associating coherence checking<strong>an</strong>d trust calibration <strong>an</strong>d allowing <strong>for</strong> a finer-grainedprocess of belief revision. In particular, if a highlytrusted individual tells us something that is incoherentwith our previous beliefs, some revision is unavoidable:We must revise either our confidence of the source orour previous beliefs. We are likely to choose the revisionthat reestablishes coherence at the lesser cost, <strong>an</strong>d thiswill often consist in accepting the in<strong>for</strong>mation communicated<strong>an</strong>d revising our beliefs.What are the options of a communicator w<strong>an</strong>ting tocommunicate a piece of in<strong>for</strong>mation that the addresseeis unlikely to accept on trust? One option may be <strong>for</strong> thecommunicator to provide evidence of her reliability inthe matter at h<strong>an</strong>d (<strong>for</strong> inst<strong>an</strong>ce, if the in<strong>for</strong>mation isabout health issues, she might in<strong>for</strong>m the addressee thatshe is a <strong>do</strong>ctor). But what if the communicator is not ina position to boost her own authority? Another option isto try to convince her addressee by offering premises theaddressee already believes or is willing to accept ontrust, <strong>an</strong>d showing that, once these premises are accepted,it would be less coherent to reject the conclusion th<strong>an</strong> toaccept it. This option consists in producing arguments<strong>for</strong> one’s claims <strong>an</strong>d in encouraging the addressee toexamine, evaluate, <strong>an</strong>d accept these arguments. Producing<strong>an</strong>d evaluating arguments is, of course, a use of <strong>reason</strong>ing.Reasoning contributes to the effectiveness <strong>an</strong>dreliability of communication by allowing communicatorsto argue <strong>for</strong> their claim <strong>an</strong>d by allowing addressees toassess these arguments. It thus increases both in qu<strong>an</strong>tity<strong>an</strong>d in epistemic quality the in<strong>for</strong>mation <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> are ableto share. Claiming as we <strong>do</strong> that this role of <strong>reason</strong>ing insocial interaction is its main function fits well with muchcurrent work stressing the role of sociality in the uniquecognitive capacities of <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> (Byrne & Whiten 1988;Dunbar 1996; Dunbar & Shultz 2003; Hrdy 2009; Humphrey1976; Tomasello et al. 2005; Whiten & Byrne1997). In particular, the evolutionary role of small groupcooperation has recently been emphasized (Dubreuil2010; Sterelny, in press). Communication plays <strong>an</strong> obviousrole in hum<strong>an</strong> cooperation both in the setting of commongoals <strong>an</strong>d in the allocation of duties <strong>an</strong>d rights. Argumentationis uniquely effective in overcoming disagreements thatare likely to occur, in particular in relatively equalitari<strong>an</strong>groups. While there c<strong>an</strong> hardly be <strong>an</strong>y archaeologicalevidence <strong>for</strong> the claim that argumentation already played<strong>an</strong> import<strong>an</strong>t role in early hum<strong>an</strong> groups, we note that<strong>an</strong>thropologists have repeatedly observed people arguingin small-scale traditional societies (Boehm et al. 1996;Brown 1991; Mercier, in press a).The main function of <strong>reason</strong>ing is <strong>argumentative</strong>:Reasoning has evolved <strong>an</strong>d persisted mainly because itmakes hum<strong>an</strong> communication more effective <strong>an</strong>d adv<strong>an</strong>tageous.As most evolutionary hypotheses, this claimruns the risk of being perceived as <strong>an</strong>other “just sostory.” It is there<strong>for</strong>e crucial to show that it entails falsifiablepredictions. If the main function of <strong>reason</strong>ing isindeed <strong>argumentative</strong>, then it should exhibit as signatureeffects strengths <strong>an</strong>d weaknesses related to the relativeimport<strong>an</strong>ce of this function compared to other potentialfunctions of <strong>reason</strong>ing. This should be testable through60 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2


Mercier & Sperber: <strong>Why</strong> <strong>do</strong> <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> <strong>reason</strong>?Hahn 2004; Rips 2002). When researchers have studie<strong>do</strong>ther skills specific to argumentation, per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce hasproved to be satisfactory. Thus, particip<strong>an</strong>ts are able torecognize the macrostructure of arguments (Ricco 2003),to follow the commitments of different speakers (Rips1998), <strong>an</strong>d to attribute the burden of proof appropriately(Bailenson & Rips 1996; see also Rips 1998, experiment3). On the whole, the results reviewed in this sectiondemonstrate that people are good at evaluating argumentsboth at the level of individual inferences <strong>an</strong>d at the level ofwhole discussions.2.2. Producing argumentsThe first studies that systematically investigated argumentproduction used the following metho<strong>do</strong>logy. 3 Particip<strong>an</strong>tswere asked to think about a given topic, such as “Wouldrestoring the military draft signific<strong>an</strong>tly increase America’sability to influence world events?” (Perkins 1985) or “Whatare the causes of school failure?” (Kuhn 1991). After beingleft to think <strong>for</strong> a few minutes, they had to state <strong>an</strong>d defendtheir view to the experimenter. The conclusions of thesestudies were quite bleak <strong>an</strong>d highlighted three mainflaws. The first is that people resort to mere expl<strong>an</strong>ations(“make sense” causal theories) instead of relying ongenuine evidence (data) to support their views.However, later research has shown that this is mostly <strong>an</strong>artifact of the lack of evidence available to the particip<strong>an</strong>ts:When evidence is made available, particip<strong>an</strong>ts will favor it(in both production <strong>an</strong>d evaluation) (Brem & Rips 2000;see also Hagler & Brem 2008; Sá et al. 2005). A secondflaw noted by Perkins <strong>an</strong>d Kuhn is the relative superficialityof the arguments used by particip<strong>an</strong>ts. This c<strong>an</strong> beexplained by a feature of the tasks: Unlike in a realdebate, the experimenter didn’t challenge the argumentsof the particip<strong>an</strong>ts, however weak they were. In a normal<strong>argumentative</strong> setting, a good argument is <strong>an</strong> argumentthat is not refuted. As long as they are not challenged, itmakes sense to be satisfied with seemingly superficialarguments. On the other h<strong>an</strong>d, people should be able togenerate better arguments when engaged in a realdebate. This is exactly what Kuhn <strong>an</strong>d her colleaguesobserved: Particip<strong>an</strong>ts who had to debate on a giventopic showed a signific<strong>an</strong>t improvement in the quality ofthe arguments they used afterwards (Kuhn et al. 1997;<strong>for</strong> similar results with <strong>an</strong>alogical <strong>reason</strong>ing, see Bl<strong>an</strong>chette& Dunbar 2001).The third flaw, according to Perkins <strong>an</strong>d Kuhn, is themost relev<strong>an</strong>t one here. Particip<strong>an</strong>ts had generally failedto <strong>an</strong>ticipate counterarguments <strong>an</strong>d generate rebuttals.For these two authors, <strong>an</strong>d indeed the critical thinking tradition,this is a very serious failing. Seen from <strong>an</strong> <strong>argumentative</strong>perspective, however, this may not be a simple flawbut rather a feature of argumentation that contributes toits effectiveness in fulfilling its function. If one’s goal isto convince others, one should be looking first <strong>an</strong>d <strong>for</strong>emost<strong>for</strong> supportive arguments. Looking <strong>for</strong> counterargumentsagainst one’s own claims may be part of a moresophisticated <strong>an</strong>d ef<strong>for</strong>tful <strong>argumentative</strong> strategy gearedto <strong>an</strong>ticipating the interlocutor’s response, but, in theexperimental setting, there was no back-<strong>an</strong>d-<strong>for</strong>th toencourage such <strong>an</strong> extra ef<strong>for</strong>t (<strong>an</strong>d particip<strong>an</strong>ts knewnot to expect such a back-<strong>an</strong>d-<strong>for</strong>th). If this is a correctexpl<strong>an</strong>ation of what need not be a flaw after all, then thedifficulty that people seem to have in coming up withcounterarguments should be easily overcome by havingthem challenge someone else’s claims rather th<strong>an</strong> defendingtheir own. Indeed, when mock jurors were asked toreach a verdict <strong>an</strong>d were then presented with <strong>an</strong> alternativeverdict, nearly all of them were able to find counterargumentsagainst it (Kuhn et al. 1994). In <strong>an</strong>otherexperiment, all particip<strong>an</strong>ts were able to find counterargumentsagainst a claim (which was not theirs) <strong>an</strong>d to <strong>do</strong> sovery quickly (Shaw 1996).When people have looked at <strong>reason</strong>ing per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce infelicitous <strong>argumentative</strong> settings, they have observed goodresults. Resnick <strong>an</strong>d her colleagues (1993) created groupsof three particip<strong>an</strong>ts who disagreed on a given issue. Analyzingthe debates, the researchers were “impressed by thecoherence of the <strong>reason</strong>ing displayed. Particip<strong>an</strong>ts . . .appear to build complex arguments <strong>an</strong>d attack structure.People appear to be capable of recognizing these structures<strong>an</strong>d of effectively attacking their individual componentsas well as the argument as a whole” (pp. 362–63; see also Blum-Kulka et al. 2002; Hagler & Brem2008; Stein et al. 1997; Stein et al. 1996). It is worthnoting that a strikingly similar pattern emerges from developmentalstudies (see Mercier, in press b).To sum up, people c<strong>an</strong> be skilled arguers, producing<strong>an</strong>d evaluating arguments felicitously. This good per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>cest<strong>an</strong>ds in sharp contrast with the abysmal resultsfound in other, non<strong>argumentative</strong>, settings, a contrastmade particularly clear by the comparison between individual<strong>an</strong>d group per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce.2.3. Group <strong>reason</strong>ingIf people are skilled at both producing <strong>an</strong>d evaluating arguments,<strong>an</strong>d if these skills are displayed most easily in <strong>argumentative</strong>settings, then debates should be especiallyconducive to good <strong>reason</strong>ing per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce. M<strong>an</strong>y types oftasks have been studied in group settings, with very mixedresults (<strong>for</strong> recent reviews, 4 see Kerr & Tindale 2004;Kerr et al. 1996). The most relev<strong>an</strong>t findings here arethose pertaining to logical or, more generally, intellectivetasks “<strong>for</strong> which there exists a demonstrably correct<strong>an</strong>swer within a verbal or mathematical conceptualsystem” (Laughlin & Ellis 1986, p. 177). In experimentsinvolving this kind of task, particip<strong>an</strong>ts in the experimentalcondition typically begin by solving problems individually(pretest), then solve the same problems in groups of fouror five members (test), <strong>an</strong>d then solve them individuallyagain (posttest), to ensure that <strong>an</strong>y improvement <strong>do</strong>es notcome simply from following other group members. Theirper<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce is compared with those of a control group ofparticip<strong>an</strong>ts who take the same tests but always individually.Intellective tasks allow <strong>for</strong> a direct comparison with resultsfrom the individual <strong>reason</strong>ing literature, <strong>an</strong>d the resultsare unambiguous. The <strong>do</strong>min<strong>an</strong>t scheme (Davis 1973) istruth wins, me<strong>an</strong>ing that, as soon as one particip<strong>an</strong>t hasunderstood the problem, she will be able to convince thewhole group that her solution is correct (Bonner et al.2002; Laughlin & Ellis 1986; Stasson et al. 1991). 5 Thisc<strong>an</strong> lead to big improvements in per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce. Some experimentsusing the Wason selection task dramatically illustratethis phenomenon (Moshm<strong>an</strong> & Geil 1998; see also Augustinova2008; Maciejovsky & Budescu 2007). The Wasonselection task is the most widely used task in <strong>reason</strong>ing,62 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2


Mercier & Sperber: <strong>Why</strong> <strong>do</strong> <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> <strong>reason</strong>?<strong>an</strong>d the per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce of particip<strong>an</strong>ts is generally very poor,hovering around 10% of correct <strong>an</strong>swers (Ev<strong>an</strong>s 1989;Ev<strong>an</strong>s et al. 1993; Johnson-Laird & Wason 1970).However, when particip<strong>an</strong>ts had to solve the task ingroups, they reached the level of 80% of correct <strong>an</strong>swers.Several challenges c<strong>an</strong> be leveled against this interpretationof the data. It could be suggested that the personwho has the correct solution simply points it out to theothers, who immediately accept it without argument,perhaps because they have recognized this person as the“smartest” (Oaks<strong>for</strong>d et al. 1999). The tr<strong>an</strong>scripts of theexperiments show that this is not the case: Most particip<strong>an</strong>tsare willing to ch<strong>an</strong>ge their mind only once they have beenthoroughly convinced that their initial <strong>an</strong>swer was wrong(e.g., see Moshm<strong>an</strong> & Geil 1998; Trognon 1993). More generally,m<strong>an</strong>y experiments have shown that debates areessential to <strong>an</strong>y improvement of per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce in group settings(<strong>for</strong> a review <strong>an</strong>d some new data, see Schulz-Hardtet al. 2006; <strong>for</strong> similar evidence in the development <strong>an</strong>d educationliterature, see Mercier, in press b). Moreover, inthese contexts, particip<strong>an</strong>ts decide that someone is smartbased on the strength <strong>an</strong>d relev<strong>an</strong>ce of her arguments <strong>an</strong>dnot the other way around (Littlepage & Mueller 1997).Indeed, it would be very hard to tell who is “smart” insuch groups – even if general intelligence were easily perceptible,it correlates only .33 with success in the Wasonselection task (St<strong>an</strong>ovich & West 1998). Finally, in m<strong>an</strong>ycases, no single particip<strong>an</strong>t had the correct <strong>an</strong>swer tobegin with. Several particip<strong>an</strong>ts may be partly wrong <strong>an</strong>dpartly right, but the group will collectively be able toretain only the correct parts <strong>an</strong>d thus converge on theright <strong>an</strong>swer. This leads to the assembly bonus effect, inwhich the per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce of the group is better th<strong>an</strong> that ofits best member (Blinder & Morg<strong>an</strong> 2000; Laughlin et al.2002; 2003; 2006; Lombardelli et al. 2005; Michaelsenet al. 1989; Sniezek & Henry 1989; Stasson et al. 1991;Tindale & Sheffey 2002). Once again there is a striking convergencehere, with the developmental literature showinghow groups – even when no member had the correct<strong>an</strong>swer initially – c<strong>an</strong> facilitate learning <strong>an</strong>d comprehensionof a wide variety of problems (Mercier, in press b).According to <strong>an</strong>other counterargument, people aresimply more motivated, generally, when they are in groups(Oaks<strong>for</strong>d et al. 1999). This is not so. 6 On the contrary,“the ubiquitous finding across m<strong>an</strong>y decades of research(e.g., see Hill 1982; Steiner 1972) is that groups usuallyfall short of <strong>reason</strong>able potential productivity baselines”(Kerr & Tindale 2004, p. 625). Moreover, other types ofmotivation have no such beneficial effect on <strong>reason</strong>ing. By<strong>an</strong>d large, monetary incentives, even subst<strong>an</strong>tial ones, failto improve per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce in <strong>reason</strong>ing <strong>an</strong>d decision-makingtasks (Ariely et al., 2009; Bonner & Sprinkle 2002; Bonneret al. 2000; Camerer & Hogarth 1999; <strong>an</strong>d, in the specificcase of the Wason selection task, see Johnson-Laird &Byrne 2002; Jones & Sugden, 2001). Thus, not <strong>an</strong>y incentivewill <strong>do</strong>: Group settings have a motivational power to which<strong>reason</strong>ing responds specifically. 7The <strong>argumentative</strong> <strong>theory</strong> also helps predict what willhappen in nonoptimal group settings. If all groupmembers share <strong>an</strong> opinion, a debate should not arise spont<strong>an</strong>eously.However, in m<strong>an</strong>y experimental <strong>an</strong>d institutionalsettings (juries, committees), people are <strong>for</strong>cedto discuss, even if they already agree. When all groupmembers agree on a certain view, each of them c<strong>an</strong> findarguments in its favor. These arguments will not be criticallyexamined, let alone refuted, thus providing othergroup members with additional <strong>reason</strong>s to hold thatview. The result should be a strengthening of the opinionsheld by the group (<strong>for</strong> a review, see Sunstein 2002; <strong>for</strong> arecent illustration, see Hinsz et al. 2008). Contra Sunstein’slaw of group polarization, it is import<strong>an</strong>t to bearin mind that this result is specific to artificial contexts inwhich people debate even though they tend to agree inthe first place. When group members disagree, discussionsoften lead to depolarization (Kog<strong>an</strong> & Wallach 1966;Vinokur & Burnstein 1978). In both cases, the behaviorof the group c<strong>an</strong> be predicted on the basis of the direction<strong>an</strong>d strength of the arguments accessible to groupmembers, as demonstrated by research carried out inthe framework of the Persuasive Argument Theory(Vinokur 1971), which ties up with the prediction of thepresent framework (Ebbesen & Bowers 1974; Isenberg1986; Kapl<strong>an</strong> & Miller 1977; Madsen 1978).The research reviewed in this section shows that peopleare skilled arguers: They c<strong>an</strong> use <strong>reason</strong>ing both to evaluate<strong>an</strong>d to produce arguments. This good per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ceoffers a striking contrast with the poor results obtainedin abstract <strong>reason</strong>ing tasks. Finally, the improvement inper<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce observed in <strong>argumentative</strong> settings confirmsthat <strong>reason</strong>ing is at its best in these contexts. We will nowexplore in more depth a phenomenon already mentionedin this section: the confirmation bias.3. The confirmation bias: A flaw of <strong>reason</strong>ingor a feature of argument production?The confirmation bias consists in the “seeking or interpretingof evidence in ways that are partial to existing beliefs,expectations, or a hypothesis in h<strong>an</strong>d” (Nickerson 1998,p. 175). It is one of the most studied biases in psychology(<strong>for</strong> review, see Nickerson 1998). While there is some individualvariation, it seems that everybody is affected tosome degree, irrespective of factors like general intelligenceor open mindedness (St<strong>an</strong>ovich & West 2007;2008a; 2008b). For st<strong>an</strong>dard theories of <strong>reason</strong>ing, theconfirmation bias is no more th<strong>an</strong> a flaw of <strong>reason</strong>ing.For the <strong>argumentative</strong> <strong>theory</strong>, however, it is a consequenceof the function of <strong>reason</strong>ing <strong>an</strong>d hence a featureof <strong>reason</strong>ing when used <strong>for</strong> the production of arguments.In fact, we suggest, the label confirmation bias has beenapplied to two distinct types of case, both characterized bya failure to look <strong>for</strong> counterevidence or counterargumentsto <strong>an</strong> existing belief, both consistent with the <strong>argumentative</strong>approach but brought about in different ways. In cases thatdeserve the label of confirmation bias, people are trying toconvince others. They are typically looking <strong>for</strong> arguments<strong>an</strong>d evidence to confirm their own claim, <strong>an</strong>d ignoring negativearguments <strong>an</strong>d evidence unless they <strong>an</strong>ticipate having torebut them. While this may be seen as a bias from a normativeepistemological perspective, it clearly serves the goal ofconvincing others. In <strong>an</strong>other type of case, we are dealingnot with biased <strong>reason</strong>ing but with <strong>an</strong> absence of <strong>reason</strong>ingproper. Such <strong>an</strong> absence of <strong>reason</strong>ing is to be expectedwhen people already hold some belief on the basis of perception,memory, or intuitive inference, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>do</strong> not haveto argue <strong>for</strong> it. Say, I believe that my keys are in my trousersbecause that is where I remember putting them. Time hasBEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2 63


Mercier & Sperber: <strong>Why</strong> <strong>do</strong> <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> <strong>reason</strong>?passed, <strong>an</strong>d they could now be in my jacket, <strong>for</strong> example.However, unless I have some positive <strong>reason</strong> to think otherwise,I just assume that they are still in my trousers, <strong>an</strong>dI <strong>do</strong>n’t even make the inference (which, if I am right,would be valid) that they are not in my jacket or <strong>an</strong>y ofthe other places where, in principle, they might be. Insuch cases, people typically draw positive rather th<strong>an</strong> negativeinferences from their previous beliefs. These positiveinferences are generally more relev<strong>an</strong>t to testing thesebeliefs. For inst<strong>an</strong>ce, I am more likely to get conclusive evidencethat I was right or wrong by looking <strong>for</strong> my keys inmy trousers rather th<strong>an</strong> in my jacket (even if they turnout not to be in my jacket, I might still be wrong in thinkingthat they are in my trousers). We spont<strong>an</strong>eously derivepositive consequences from our intuitive beliefs. This isjust a trusting use of our beliefs, not a confirmation bias(see Klaym<strong>an</strong> & Ha 1987).The <strong>theory</strong> we are proposing makes three broad predictions.The first is that the genuine confirmation bias (asopposed to straight<strong>for</strong>ward trust in one’s intuitive beliefs<strong>an</strong>d their positive consequences) should occur only in<strong>argumentative</strong> situations. The second is that it shoul<strong>do</strong>ccur only in the production of arguments. The rationale<strong>for</strong> a confirmation bias in the production of arguments tosupport a given claim <strong>do</strong>es not extend to the evaluationof arguments by <strong>an</strong> audience that is just aiming to bewell in<strong>for</strong>med. The third prediction is that the confirmationbias in the production of arguments is not a biasin favor of confirmation in general <strong>an</strong>d against disconfirmationin general: It is a bias in favor of confirmingone’s own claims, which should be naturally complementedby a bias in favor of disconfirming opposing claims<strong>an</strong>d counterarguments.3.1. Hypothesis testing: No <strong>reason</strong>ing, no <strong>reason</strong>ingbiasOne of the areas in which the confirmation bias has beenmost thoroughly studied is that of hypothesis testing, oftenusing Wason’s rule discovery task (Wason 1960). In thistask, particip<strong>an</strong>ts are told that the experimenter has inmind a rule <strong>for</strong> generating number triples <strong>an</strong>d that theyhave to discover it. The experimenter starts by giving particip<strong>an</strong>tsa triple that con<strong>for</strong>ms to the rule (2, 4, 6). Particip<strong>an</strong>tsc<strong>an</strong> then think of a hypothesis about the rule <strong>an</strong>d testit by proposing a triple of their own choice. The experimentersays whether or not this triple con<strong>for</strong>ms to therule. Particip<strong>an</strong>ts c<strong>an</strong> repeat the procedure until theyfeel ready to put <strong>for</strong>ward their hypothesis about the rule.The experimenter tells them whether or not their hypothesisis true. If it is not, they c<strong>an</strong> try again or give up.Particip<strong>an</strong>ts overwhelmingly propose triples that fit withthe hypothesis they have in mind. For inst<strong>an</strong>ce, if a particip<strong>an</strong>thas <strong>for</strong>med the hypothesis “three even numbers inascending order,” she might try 8, 10, 12. As argued byKlaym<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d Ha (1987), such <strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>swer corresponds toa “positive test strategy” of a type that would be quiteeffective in most cases. This strategy is not a<strong>do</strong>pted in areflective m<strong>an</strong>ner, but is rather, we suggest, the intuitiveway to exploit one’s intuitive hypotheses, as when wecheck that our keys are where we believe we left themas opposed to checking that they are not where it followsfrom our belief that they should not be. What we seehere, then, is a sound heuristic rather th<strong>an</strong> a bias.This heuristic misleads particip<strong>an</strong>ts in this case onlybecause of some very peculiar (<strong>an</strong>d expressly designed)features of the task. What is really striking is the failureof attempts to get particip<strong>an</strong>ts to <strong>reason</strong> in order tocorrect their ineffective approach. It has been shownthat, even when instructed to try to falsify the hypothesesthey generate, fewer th<strong>an</strong> one particip<strong>an</strong>t in ten is able to<strong>do</strong> so (Poletiek 1996; Tweney et al. 1980). Since thehypotheses are generated by the particip<strong>an</strong>ts themselves,this is what we should expect in the current framework:The situation is not <strong>an</strong> <strong>argumentative</strong> one <strong>an</strong>d <strong>do</strong>es notactivate <strong>reason</strong>ing. However, if a hypothesis is presentedas coming from someone else, it seems that more particip<strong>an</strong>tswill try to falsify it <strong>an</strong>d will give it up much morereadily in favor of <strong>an</strong>other hypothesis (Cowley & Byrne2005). The same applies if the hypothesis is generatedby a minority member in a group setting (Butera et al.1992). Thus, falsification is accessible provided that thesituation encourages particip<strong>an</strong>ts to argue against ahypothesis that is not their own.3.2. The Wason selection taskA similar interpretation c<strong>an</strong> be used to account <strong>for</strong> resultsobtained with the Wason selection task (Wason 1966). Inthis task, particip<strong>an</strong>ts are given a rule describing fourcards. In the original version, the cards have a numberon one side <strong>an</strong>d a letter on the other, although only oneside is visible – they might see, <strong>for</strong> inst<strong>an</strong>ce, 4, E, 7, <strong>an</strong>dK. The rule might read, “If there is a vowel on one side,then there is <strong>an</strong> even number on the other side.” Thetask is to say what cards need to be turned over to determinewhether the rule is true. In this task, too, it isuseful to distinguish the effects of intuitive mech<strong>an</strong>ismsfrom those of <strong>reason</strong>ing proper (as has long beensuggested by Wason & Ev<strong>an</strong>s 1975). Intuitive mech<strong>an</strong>ismsinvolved in underst<strong>an</strong>ding utter<strong>an</strong>ces will draw the particip<strong>an</strong>ts’attention to the cards that are made most relev<strong>an</strong>tby the rule <strong>an</strong>d the context (Girotto et al. 2001; Sperberet al. 1995). In the st<strong>an</strong>dard case, these will simply bethe cards mentioned in the rule (the vowel E <strong>an</strong>d theeven number 4), as opposed to those that would yieldthe correct <strong>an</strong>swer (the E <strong>an</strong>d the 7). Given that the 4c<strong>an</strong> only confirm the rule but not falsify it, the behaviorof particip<strong>an</strong>ts who select this card could be interpretedas showing a confirmation bias. However, as first discoveredby Ev<strong>an</strong>s (Ev<strong>an</strong>s & Lynch 1973), the simple additionof a negation in the rule (“if there is a vowel on one side,then there is not <strong>an</strong> even number on the other side”)leaves the <strong>an</strong>swers unch<strong>an</strong>ged (the E <strong>an</strong>d 4 are stillmade relev<strong>an</strong>t), but in this case these cards correspondto the correct, falsifying, response. So these intuitivemech<strong>an</strong>isms are not intrinsically linked to either confirmationor falsification: They just happen to point tocards that in some cases might confirm the rule <strong>an</strong>d, inother cases, might falsify it.Confirmation bias <strong>do</strong>es occur in the selection task but at<strong>an</strong>other level. Once the particip<strong>an</strong>ts’ attention has beendrawn to some of the cards, <strong>an</strong>d they have arrived at <strong>an</strong>intuitive <strong>an</strong>swer to the question, <strong>reason</strong>ing is used not toevaluate <strong>an</strong>d correct their initial intuition but to find justifications<strong>for</strong> it (Ev<strong>an</strong>s 1996; Lucas & Ball 2005; Roberts &Newton 2001). This is a genuine confirmation bias. As withhypothesis testing, this <strong>do</strong>es not me<strong>an</strong> that particip<strong>an</strong>ts are64 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2


Mercier & Sperber: <strong>Why</strong> <strong>do</strong> <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> <strong>reason</strong>?simply unable to underst<strong>an</strong>d the task or to try to falsify therule – only that <strong>an</strong> appropriate <strong>argumentative</strong> motivationis lacking. That particip<strong>an</strong>ts c<strong>an</strong> underst<strong>an</strong>d the task isshown by the good per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce in group settings, as mentionedearlier. Particip<strong>an</strong>ts should also be able to try tofalsify the rule when their first intuition is that the rule isfalse <strong>an</strong>d they w<strong>an</strong>t to prove it wrong. Researchers haveused rules such as “all members of group A are Y,”where Y is a negative or positive stereotype (Dawsonet al. 2002). Particip<strong>an</strong>ts who were most motivated toprove the rule wrong – those belonging to group A whenY was negative – were able to produce more th<strong>an</strong> 50%of correct <strong>an</strong>swers, whereas particip<strong>an</strong>ts from all theother conditions (groups other th<strong>an</strong> A <strong>an</strong>d/or positivestereotype) remained under 20%.3.3. Categorical syllogismsCategorical syllogisms are one of the most studied types of<strong>reason</strong>ing. Here is a typical example: “No C are B; All B areA; there<strong>for</strong>e some A are not C.” Although they are solvableby very simple programs (e.g., see Geurts 2003), syllogismsc<strong>an</strong> be very hard to figure out – the one just offered by wayof illustration, <strong>for</strong> inst<strong>an</strong>ce, is solved by less th<strong>an</strong> 10% of particip<strong>an</strong>ts(Chater & Oaks<strong>for</strong>d 1999). In terms of the mentalmodel <strong>theory</strong>, what the particip<strong>an</strong>ts are <strong>do</strong>ing is constructinga model of the premises <strong>an</strong>d deriving a possible conclusionfrom it (Ev<strong>an</strong>s et al. 1999). This constitutes theparticip<strong>an</strong>ts’ initial intuition. To correctly solve theproblem, particip<strong>an</strong>ts should then try to construct counterexamplesto this initial conclusion. But this would me<strong>an</strong>trying to falsify their own conclusion. The present <strong>theory</strong>predicts that they will not <strong>do</strong> so spont<strong>an</strong>eously. Andindeed, “<strong>an</strong>y search <strong>for</strong> counterexample models is weak ...particip<strong>an</strong>ts are basing their conclusions on the first modelthat occurs to them” (Ev<strong>an</strong>s et al. 1999, p. 1505; see alsoKlauer et al. 2000; Newstead et al. 1999).Again, we suggest, this should not be interpreted asrevealing a lack of ability but only a lack of motivation.When particip<strong>an</strong>ts w<strong>an</strong>t to prove a conclusion wrong,they will find ways to falsify it.This happens with normal conclusions presented bysomeone else (Sacco & Bucciarelli 2008) or when particip<strong>an</strong>tsare faced with so-called unbelievable conclusionssuch as “All fish are trout.” In this case, they will try toprove that the premises lead to the logical opposite of theconclusion (“Not all fish are trout”) (Klauer et al. 2000).Given that falsification leads to better <strong>an</strong>swers on thesetasks, this explains why particip<strong>an</strong>ts actually per<strong>for</strong>mmuch better when the conclusion is unbelievable (e.g.,see Ev<strong>an</strong>s et al. 1983). It is not that they <strong>reason</strong> more inthis case – they spend as much time trying to solve problemswith believable conclusions as with unbelievableones (Thompson et al. 2003). It is just that the direction<strong>reason</strong>ing takes is mostly determined by the particip<strong>an</strong>ts’initial intuitions. If they have arrived at the conclusionthemselves, or if they agree with it, they try to confirm it.If they disagree with it, they try to prove it wrong. In allcases, what they <strong>do</strong> is try to confirm their initial intuition.3.4. Rehabilitating the confirmation biasIn all three cases just reviewed – hypothesis testing, theWason selection task, <strong>an</strong>d syllogistic <strong>reason</strong>ing – asimilar pattern c<strong>an</strong> be observed. Particip<strong>an</strong>ts have intuitionsthat lead them towards certain <strong>an</strong>swers. If <strong>reason</strong>ingis used at all, it is mostly used to confirm these initial intuitions.This is exactly what one should expect of <strong>an</strong> <strong>argumentative</strong>skill, <strong>an</strong>d so these results bolster our claimthat the main function of <strong>reason</strong>ing is <strong>argumentative</strong>. Bycontrast, if people were easily able to abstract from thisbias, or if they were subject to it only in <strong>argumentative</strong> settings,then this would constitute evidence against thepresent <strong>theory</strong>.According to a more st<strong>an</strong>dard expl<strong>an</strong>ation of the confirmationbias, it is <strong>an</strong> effect of limitations in cognitiveresources <strong>an</strong>d in particular in working memory (e.g.,Johnson-Laird 2006). But it is hard to reconcile this expl<strong>an</strong>ationwith the fact that people are very good at falsifyingpropositions when they are inclined to disagree with them.In those cases, people are not held back by limitedresources even though the tasks are not cognitively easier.However, the idea that the confirmation bias is a normalfeature of <strong>reason</strong>ing that plays a role in the production ofarguments may seem surprising in light of the poor outcomesit has been claimed to cause. Conservatism inscience is one example (see Nickerson 1998 <strong>an</strong>d referencestherein). Another is the related phenomenon ofgroupthink, which has been held responsible <strong>for</strong> m<strong>an</strong>y disasters,from the Bay of Pigs fiasco (J<strong>an</strong>is 1982) to thetragedy of the Challenger shuttle (Esser & Lin<strong>do</strong>erfer1989; Moorhead et al. 1991) (<strong>for</strong> review, see Esser1998). In such cases, <strong>reason</strong>ing tends not to be used inits normal context: that is, the resolution of a disagreementthrough discussion. When one is alone or with people whohold similar views, one’s arguments will not be criticallyevaluated. This is when the confirmation bias is mostlikely to lead to poor outcomes. However, when <strong>reason</strong>ingis used in a more felicitous context – that is, in argumentsamong people who disagree but have a common interest inthe truth – the confirmation bias contributes to <strong>an</strong> efficient<strong>for</strong>m of division of cognitive labor.When a group has to solve a problem, it is much moreefficient if each individual looks mostly <strong>for</strong> arguments supportinga given solution. They c<strong>an</strong> then present these argumentsto the group, to be tested by the other members. Thismethod will work as long as people c<strong>an</strong> be swayed by goodarguments, <strong>an</strong>d the results reviewed in section 2 show thatthis is generally the case. This joint dialogic approach ismuch more efficient th<strong>an</strong> one where each individual onhis or her own has to examine all possible solutions carefully.8 The adv<strong>an</strong>tages of the confirmation bias are evenmore obvious given that each particip<strong>an</strong>t in a discussion isoften in a better position to look <strong>for</strong> arguments in favor ofhis or her favored solution (situations of asymmetrical in<strong>for</strong>mation).So group discussions provide a much more efficientway of holding the confirmation bias in check. Bycontrast, the teaching of critical thinking skills, which is supposedto help us overcome the bias on a purely individualbasis, <strong>do</strong>es not seem to yield very good results (Ritchart &Perkins 2005; Willingham 2008).For the confirmation bias to play <strong>an</strong> optimal role in discussions<strong>an</strong>d group per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce, it should be active onlyin the production of arguments <strong>an</strong>d not in their evaluation.Of course, in the back-<strong>an</strong>d-<strong>for</strong>th of a discussion, the productionof one’s own arguments <strong>an</strong>d the evaluation ofthose of the interlocutor may interfere with each other,making it hard to properly assess the two processesBEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2 65


Mercier & Sperber: <strong>Why</strong> <strong>do</strong> <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> <strong>reason</strong>?independently. Still, the evidence reviewed in section 2.1on the underst<strong>an</strong>ding of arguments strongly suggests thatpeople tend to be more objective in evaluation th<strong>an</strong> in production.If this were not the case, the success of group<strong>reason</strong>ing reviewed in section 2.3 would be very hard toexplain.4. Proactive <strong>reason</strong>ing in belief <strong>for</strong>mationAccording to the <strong>argumentative</strong> <strong>theory</strong>, <strong>reason</strong>ing is mostnaturally used in the context of <strong>an</strong> exch<strong>an</strong>ge of argumentsduring a discussion. But people c<strong>an</strong> also be proactive <strong>an</strong>d<strong>an</strong>ticipate situations in which they might have to argue toconvince others that their claims are true or that theiractions are justified. We would say that much <strong>reason</strong>ing<strong>an</strong>ticipates the need to argue. In this section, we willshow that work on motivated <strong>reason</strong>ing c<strong>an</strong> be usefullyreinterpreted in this perspective, <strong>an</strong>d, in the nextsection, we will show that the same applies to work on<strong>reason</strong>-based choice.M<strong>an</strong>y of our beliefs are likely to remain unchallengedbecause they are relev<strong>an</strong>t only to ourselves <strong>an</strong>d we <strong>do</strong>n’tshare them or because they are uncontroversial amongthe people we interact with or because we have sufficientauthority to be trusted when we assert them. While wethink of most of our beliefs – to the extent that we thinkabout them at all – not as beliefs but just as pieces ofknowledge, we are also aware that some of them are unlikelyto be universally shared, or to be accepted on trustjust because we express them. When we pay attention tothe contentious nature of these beliefs, we typically thinkof them as opinions. Opinions are likely to be challenged<strong>an</strong>d may have to be defended. It makes sense to look <strong>for</strong>arguments <strong>for</strong> our opinions be<strong>for</strong>e we find ourselvescalled upon to state them. If the search <strong>for</strong> arguments issuccessful, we will be ready. If not, then perhaps itmight be better to a<strong>do</strong>pt a weaker position, one that iseasier to defend. Such uses of <strong>reason</strong>ing have been intensivelystudied under the name of motivated <strong>reason</strong>ing 9(Kunda 1990; see also Krugl<strong>an</strong>ski & Freund 1983; Pyszczynski& Greenberg 1987; <strong>for</strong> a recent review, seeMolden & Higgins 2005).4.1. Motivated <strong>reason</strong>ingA series of experiments by Ditto <strong>an</strong>d his colleagues, involving<strong>reason</strong>ing in the context of a fake medical result, illustratethe notion of motivated <strong>reason</strong>ing (Ditto & Lopez1992; Ditto et al. 1998; 2003). Particip<strong>an</strong>ts had to putsome saliva on a strip of paper <strong>an</strong>d were told that, if thestrip ch<strong>an</strong>ged color or did not ch<strong>an</strong>ge color, dependingon the condition, this would be <strong>an</strong> indication of <strong>an</strong>unhealthy enzyme deficiency. Particip<strong>an</strong>ts, being motivatedto believe they were healthy, tried to garner arguments<strong>for</strong> this belief. In one version of the experiment,particip<strong>an</strong>ts were told the rate of false positives, whichvaried across conditions. The use they made of this in<strong>for</strong>mationreflects motivated <strong>reason</strong>ing. When the rate offalse positives was high, particip<strong>an</strong>ts who were motivatedto reject the conclusion used it to undermine the validityof the test. This same high rate of false positives was discountedby particip<strong>an</strong>ts who were motivated to acceptthe conclusion. In <strong>an</strong>other version of the experiment,particip<strong>an</strong>ts were asked to mention events in theirmedical history that could have affected the results ofthe test, which gave them <strong>an</strong> opportunity to discountthese results. Particip<strong>an</strong>ts motivated to reject the conclusionlisted more such events, <strong>an</strong>d the number ofevents listed was negatively correlated with the evaluationof the test. In these experiments, the very fact that the particip<strong>an</strong>t’shealth is being tested indicates that it c<strong>an</strong>not betaken <strong>for</strong> gr<strong>an</strong>ted. The reliability of the test itself is beingdiscussed. This experiment, <strong>an</strong>d m<strong>an</strong>y others to bereviewed in this article, demonstrate also that motivated<strong>reason</strong>ing is not mere wishful thinking (a <strong>for</strong>m of thinkingthat, if it were common, would in <strong>an</strong>y case be quite deleteriousto fitness <strong>an</strong>d would not be coherent with thepresent <strong>theory</strong>). If desires did directly affect beliefs inthis way, then particip<strong>an</strong>ts would simply ignore ordismiss the test. Instead, what they <strong>do</strong> is look <strong>for</strong> evidence<strong>an</strong>d arguments to show that they are healthy or at least <strong>for</strong><strong>reason</strong>s to question the value of the test.Other studies have demonstrated the use of motivated<strong>reason</strong>ing to support various beliefs that others might challenge.Particip<strong>an</strong>ts dig in <strong>an</strong>d occasionally alter their memoriesto preserve a positive view of themselves (Dunninget al. 1989; Ross et al. 1981; S<strong>an</strong>itioso et al. 1990). Theymodify their causal theories to defend some favoredbelief (Kunda 1987). When they are told the outcome ofa game on which they had made a bet, they use eventsin the game to explain why they should have won whenthey lost (Gilovich 1983). Political experts use similar strategiesto explain away their failed predictions <strong>an</strong>d bolstertheir theories (Tetlock 1998). Reviewers fall prey to motivated<strong>reason</strong>ing <strong>an</strong>d look <strong>for</strong> flaws in a paper in order tojustify its rejection when they <strong>do</strong>n’t agree with its conclusions(Koehler 1993; Mahoney 1977). In economic settings,people use in<strong>for</strong>mation flexibly so as to be able tojustify their preferred conclusions or arrive at the decisionthey favor (Boiney et al. 1997; Hsee 1995; 1996a; Schweitzer& Hsee 2002).All these experiments demonstrate that people sometimeslook <strong>for</strong> <strong>reason</strong>s to justify <strong>an</strong> opinion they areeager to uphold. From <strong>an</strong> <strong>argumentative</strong> perspective,they <strong>do</strong> this not to convince themselves of the truth oftheir opinion but to be ready to meet the challenges ofothers. If they find themselves unprepared to meet suchchallenges, they may become reluct<strong>an</strong>t to express <strong>an</strong>opinion they are unable to defend <strong>an</strong>d less favorable tothe opinion itself, but this is <strong>an</strong> indirect individual effectof <strong>an</strong> ef<strong>for</strong>t that is aimed at others. In a classical framework,where <strong>reason</strong>ing is seen as geared to achieving epistemicbenefits, the fact that it may be used to justify <strong>an</strong>opinion already held is hard to explain, especially since,as we will now show, motivated <strong>reason</strong>ing c<strong>an</strong> have direepistemic consequences.4.2. Consequences of motivated <strong>reason</strong>ing4.2.1. Biased evaluation <strong>an</strong>d attitude polarization. In al<strong>an</strong>dmark experiment, Lord <strong>an</strong>d colleagues (1979) askedparticip<strong>an</strong>ts who had been previously selected as beingeither defenders or opponents of the death penalty toevaluate studies relating to its efficiency as a deterrent.The studies given to the particip<strong>an</strong>ts had different conclusions:While one seemed to show that the deathpenalty had a signific<strong>an</strong>t deterrent effect, the other66 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2


Mercier & Sperber: <strong>Why</strong> <strong>do</strong> <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> <strong>reason</strong>?yielded the opposite result. Even though the metho<strong>do</strong>logiesof the two studies were almost identical, thestudies that yielded a conclusion not in line with the particip<strong>an</strong>ts’opinions were consistently rated as having beenmuch more poorly conducted. In this case, particip<strong>an</strong>tsused <strong>reason</strong>ing not so much to assess the studies objectivelyas to confirm their initial views by finding eitherflaws or strengths in similar studies, depending on theirconclusion. This phenomenon is known as biased assimilationor biased evaluation. This second description is somewhatmisleading. In this experiment – <strong>an</strong>d the m<strong>an</strong>y relatedexperiments that have followed it – particip<strong>an</strong>ts are indeedasked to evaluate <strong>an</strong> argument. However, what they <strong>do</strong> ismostly produce arguments to support or rebut the argumentthey are evaluating, depending on whether theyagree with its conclusion or not. Particip<strong>an</strong>ts are nottrying to <strong>for</strong>m <strong>an</strong> opinion: They already have one. Theirgoal is <strong>argumentative</strong> rather th<strong>an</strong> epistemic, <strong>an</strong>d it endsup being pursued at the expense of epistemic soundness.That particip<strong>an</strong>ts engage in this biased search <strong>for</strong> argumentseven when their task is to evaluate <strong>an</strong> argument has beendemonstrated by the experiments we now describe.Several other experiments have studied the way peopleevaluate arguments depending on whether they agree ordisagree with the conclusions. When people disagreewith the conclusion of <strong>an</strong> argument, they often spendmore time evaluating it (Edwards & Smith 1996). Thisasymmetry arises from the trivial fact that rejecting whatwe are told generally requires some justification,whereas accepting it <strong>do</strong>es not. Moreover, the time spenton these arguments is mostly devoted to finding counterarguments(Edwards & Smith 1996; see also Brock 1967;Cacioppo & Petty 1979; Eagly et al. 2000). Particip<strong>an</strong>tstend to comb through arguments <strong>for</strong> flaws <strong>an</strong>d end upfinding some, whether they are problems with the designof a scientific study (Klaczynski & Gor<strong>do</strong>n 1996b; Klaczynski& Narasimham 1998; Klaczynski & Robinson2000), issues with a piece of statistical <strong>reason</strong>ing (Klaczynski& Gor<strong>do</strong>n 1996a; Klaczynski & Lavallee 2005; Klaczynskiet al. 1997), or <strong>argumentative</strong> fallacies (Klaczynski1997). In all these cases, motivated <strong>reason</strong>ing leads to abiased assessment: <strong>Arguments</strong> with unfavored conclusionsare rated as less sound <strong>an</strong>d less persuasive th<strong>an</strong> argumentswith favored conclusions.Sometimes the evaluation of <strong>an</strong> argument is biased tothe point where it has <strong>an</strong> opposite effect to the oneintended by the arguer: On reading <strong>an</strong> argument with acounterattitudinal conclusion (one that goes against theirown beliefs or preferences), interlocutors may find som<strong>an</strong>y flaws <strong>an</strong>d counterarguments that their initial unfavorableattitude is in fact strengthened. This is thephenomenon of attitude polarization, which has beenstudied extensively since it was first demonstrated by(Lord et al. 1979; see also Greenwald 1969; Pomer<strong>an</strong>tzet al. 1995). 10 Taber <strong>an</strong>d Lodge (2006) have demonstratedthat, in the <strong>do</strong>main of politics, attitude polarization is mosteasily observed in particip<strong>an</strong>ts who are most knowledgeable(see also Bram<strong>an</strong> 2009; Redlawsk 2002). Their knowledgemakes it possible <strong>for</strong> these particip<strong>an</strong>ts to find morecounterarguments, leading to more biased evaluations.4.2.2. Polarization, bolstering, <strong>an</strong>d overconfidence.Attitude polarization c<strong>an</strong> also occur in simpler circumst<strong>an</strong>ces.Merely thinking about <strong>an</strong> object may be enoughto strengthen attitudes towards it (polarization). Thisphenomenon has been repeatedly demonstrated. Sadler<strong>an</strong>d Tesser (1973) had particip<strong>an</strong>ts listen to a recordingof a very pleas<strong>an</strong>t-sounding or unpleas<strong>an</strong>t-sounding individual.They then had to give their opinion of this individual,either after having to think about him or her or afterper<strong>for</strong>ming a distraction task. As expected, the opinionswere more extreme (in both directions) when particip<strong>an</strong>tshad to think about the individual. Tesser <strong>an</strong>d Conlee(1975) showed that polarization increases with the timespent thinking about <strong>an</strong> item, <strong>an</strong>d Jellison <strong>an</strong>d Mills(1969) showed that it increases with the motivation tothink. As in the case of polarization following biased evaluation,such polarization occurs only when particip<strong>an</strong>ts areknowledgeable (Tesser & Leone 1977; see also Millar &Tesser 1986). And the effect c<strong>an</strong> be mitigated by providinga reality check: The simple presence of the target objectwill dramatically decrease polarization (Tesser 1976).Some later experiments used a slightly different metho<strong>do</strong>logy(Chaiken & Yates 1985; Liberm<strong>an</strong> & Chaiken1991). Instead of simply thinking about the target object,particip<strong>an</strong>ts had to write a small essay about it. Not onlywas polarization observed in this case, but it was correlatedwith the direction <strong>an</strong>d number of the arguments put<strong>for</strong>ward in the essay. These results demonstrate that<strong>reason</strong>ing contributes to attitude polarization <strong>an</strong>d stronglysuggest that it may be its main factor. When people areasked to think about a given item toward which they intuitivelyhave a positive or negative attitude, what happens,we suggest, is that they reflect less on the item itselfth<strong>an</strong> on how to defend their initial attitude. M<strong>an</strong>y otherexperiments have shown that, once people have <strong>for</strong>med<strong>an</strong> attitude to a target, they will look <strong>for</strong> in<strong>for</strong>mation thatsupports this attitude (a phenomenon known as selectiveexposure; see Hart et al. 2009; Smith et al. 2008) <strong>an</strong>d tryto put <strong>an</strong>y in<strong>for</strong>mation they are given to the same use(Bond et al. 2007; Brownstein 2003), which leads themto choose inferior alternatives (Russo et al. 2006).According to the <strong>argumentative</strong> <strong>theory</strong>, <strong>reason</strong>ingshould be even more biased once the <strong>reason</strong>er hasalready stated her opinion, thereby increasing the pressureon her to justify it rather th<strong>an</strong> moving away from it. Thisphenomenon is called bolstering (McGuire 1964). Thus,when particip<strong>an</strong>ts are committed to <strong>an</strong> opinion, thinkingabout it will lead to a much stronger polarization(Lambert et al. 1996; Millar & Tesser 1986). Accountability(the need to justify one’s decisions) will also increasebolstering (Tetlock et al. 1989; <strong>for</strong> review, see Lerner &Tetlock 1999).Finally, motivated <strong>reason</strong>ing should also affect confidence.When particip<strong>an</strong>ts think of <strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>swer to a givenquestion, they will be spont<strong>an</strong>eously tempted to generate<strong>reason</strong>s supporting that <strong>an</strong>swer. This may then causethem to be overconfident in the <strong>an</strong>swer. Koriat <strong>an</strong>d his colleagues(1980) have tested this hypothesis by using generalknowledge questions such as “the Sabines were part of (a)<strong>an</strong>cient India or (b) <strong>an</strong>cient Rome.” After <strong>an</strong>swering thequestion, particip<strong>an</strong>ts had to produce <strong>reason</strong>s relev<strong>an</strong>t totheir <strong>an</strong>swers. Some particip<strong>an</strong>ts were asked to generate<strong>reason</strong>s supporting their <strong>an</strong>swer, while others were asked<strong>for</strong> <strong>reason</strong>s against it. The results <strong>for</strong> people who wereexplicitly asked to generate <strong>reason</strong>s supporting their<strong>an</strong>swer were no different from those in a control conditionwhere no <strong>reason</strong>s were asked <strong>for</strong>. This suggests thatBEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2 67


Mercier & Sperber: <strong>Why</strong> <strong>do</strong> <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> <strong>reason</strong>?thinking of <strong>reason</strong>s to support their <strong>an</strong>swer is what people<strong>do</strong> spont<strong>an</strong>eously <strong>an</strong>yhow when they regard their <strong>an</strong>swernot as <strong>an</strong> obvious piece of knowledge but as <strong>an</strong> opinionthat might be challenged. By contrast, particip<strong>an</strong>ts in theother group were much less overconfident. Having tothink of arguments against their <strong>an</strong>swer enabled them tosee its limitations – something they would not <strong>do</strong> ontheir own (<strong>for</strong> replications <strong>an</strong>d extensions to the phenomenonof hindsight bias <strong>an</strong>d the fundamental attributionerror, see Arkes et al. 1988; Davies 1992; Griffin &Dunning 1990; Hirt & Markm<strong>an</strong> 1995; Hoch 1985; Yateset al. 1992). It is then easy to see that overconfidencewould also be reduced by having particip<strong>an</strong>ts discusstheir <strong>an</strong>swers with people who favor different conclusions.4.1.3. Belief persever<strong>an</strong>ce. Motivated <strong>reason</strong>ing c<strong>an</strong> alsobe used to h<strong>an</strong>g on to beliefs even when they have beenproved to be ill-founded. This phenomenon, known asbelief persever<strong>an</strong>ce, is “one of social psychology’s mostreliable phenomena” (Guenther & Alicke 2008, p. 706;<strong>for</strong> <strong>an</strong> early demonstration, see Ross et al. 1975). Theinvolvement of motivated <strong>reason</strong>ing in this effect c<strong>an</strong> bedemonstrated by providing particip<strong>an</strong>ts with evidenceboth <strong>for</strong> <strong>an</strong>d against a favored belief. If belief persever<strong>an</strong>cewere a simple result of some degree of psychologicalinertia, then the first evidence presented should be themost influential, whether it supports or disconfirms thefavored belief. On the other h<strong>an</strong>d, if evidence c<strong>an</strong> beused selectively, then only evidence supporting thefavored belief should be retained, regardless of the orderof presentation. Guenther <strong>an</strong>d Alicke 2008 tested thishypothesis in the following way. Particip<strong>an</strong>ts first had toper<strong>for</strong>m a simple perceptual task. This task, however,was described as testing <strong>for</strong> “mental acuity,” a made-upconstruct that was supposed to be related to general intelligence,making the results of the test highly relev<strong>an</strong>t toparticip<strong>an</strong>t’s self-esteem. Particip<strong>an</strong>ts were then givenpositive or negative feedback, but a few minutes laterthey were told that the feedback was actually bogus <strong>an</strong>dthe real aim of the experiment was explained. At threedifferent points, the particip<strong>an</strong>ts also had to evaluatetheir per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce: right after the task, after the feedback,<strong>an</strong>d after the debriefing. In line with previous results, theparticip<strong>an</strong>ts who had received positive feedback showed aclassic belief-persever<strong>an</strong>ce effect <strong>an</strong>d discounted thedebriefing, which allowed them to preserve a positiveview of their per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce. By contrast, those who hadreceived negative feedback did the opposite: They tookthe debriefing fully into account, which allowed them toreject the negative feedback <strong>an</strong>d restore a positive viewof themselves. This strongly suggests that belief persever<strong>an</strong>ceof the type just described is <strong>an</strong> inst<strong>an</strong>ce of motivated<strong>reason</strong>ing (<strong>for</strong> applications to the <strong>do</strong>main of politicalbeliefs, see Prasad et al. 2009). 114.1.4. Violation of moral norms. The results reviewed sofar have shown that motivated <strong>reason</strong>ing c<strong>an</strong> lead topoor epistemic outcomes. We will now see that ourability to “find or make a <strong>reason</strong> <strong>for</strong> everything one has amind to <strong>do</strong>” (Fr<strong>an</strong>klin 1799) c<strong>an</strong> also allow us to violateour moral intuitions <strong>an</strong>d behave unfairly. In a recentexperiment, Valdesolo <strong>an</strong>d DeSteno (2008) have demonstratedthe role <strong>reason</strong>ing c<strong>an</strong> play in maintaining moralhypocrisy (when we judge someone else’s action byusing tougher moral criteria th<strong>an</strong> we use to judge ourown actions). Here is the basic setup. On arriving at thelaboratory, particip<strong>an</strong>ts were told that they would be per<strong>for</strong>mingone of two tasks: a short <strong>an</strong>d fun task or a long <strong>an</strong>dhard task. Moreover, they were given the possibility ofchoosing which task they would be per<strong>for</strong>ming, knowingthat the other task would be assigned to <strong>an</strong>other particip<strong>an</strong>t.They also had the option of letting a computerchoose at r<strong>an</strong><strong>do</strong>m how the tasks would be distributed.Once they were <strong>do</strong>ne assigning the tasks, particip<strong>an</strong>tshad to rate how fair they had been. Other particip<strong>an</strong>ts,instead of having to make the assignment themselves,were at the receiving end of the allocation <strong>an</strong>d had nochoice whatsoever; they had to rate the fairness of the particip<strong>an</strong>twho had <strong>do</strong>ne the allocation, knowing the exactconditions under which this had been <strong>do</strong>ne. It is then possibleto compare the fairness ratings of particip<strong>an</strong>ts whohave assigned themselves the easy task with the ratingsof those who have been assigned the hard task. The differencebetween these two ratings is a mark of moral hypocrisy.The authors then hypothesized that <strong>reason</strong>ing, since itallows particip<strong>an</strong>ts to find excuses <strong>for</strong> their behavior, wasresponsible <strong>for</strong> this hypocrisy. They tested this hypothesisby replicating the above conditions with a twist: The fairnessjudgments were made under cognitive load, whichmade <strong>reason</strong>ing close to impossible. This had the predictedresult: Without the opportunity to <strong>reason</strong>, theratings were identical <strong>an</strong>d showed no hint of hypocrisy.This experiment is just one illustration of a more generalphenomenon. Reasoning is often used to find justifications<strong>for</strong> per<strong>for</strong>ming actions that are otherwise felt to be unfairor immoral (B<strong>an</strong>dura 1990; B<strong>an</strong>dura et al. 1996; Bersoff1999; Cr<strong>an</strong>dall & Eshlem<strong>an</strong> 2003; D<strong>an</strong>a et al. 2007; Diekm<strong>an</strong>net al. 1997; Haidt 2001; Mazar et al. 2008; Mooreet al. 2008; Snyder et al. 1979; <strong>for</strong> children, see Gummerumet al. 2008). Such uses of <strong>reason</strong>ing c<strong>an</strong> havedire consequences. Perpetrators of crimes will betempted to “blame the victim” or find other excuses tomitigate the effects of violating their moral intuitions(Ry<strong>an</strong> 1971; <strong>for</strong> a review, see Hafer & Begue 2005),which c<strong>an</strong> in turn make it easier to commit new crimes(Baumeister 1997). This view of <strong>reason</strong>ing <strong>do</strong>vetails withrecent theories of moral <strong>reason</strong>ing that see it mostly as atool <strong>for</strong> communication <strong>an</strong>d persuasion (Gibbard 1990;Haidt 2001; Haidt & Bjorklund 2007).These results raise a problem <strong>for</strong> the classical view of<strong>reason</strong>ing. In all these cases, <strong>reason</strong>ing <strong>do</strong>es not lead tomore accurate beliefs about <strong>an</strong> object, to better estimatesof the correctness of one’s <strong>an</strong>swer, or to superior moraljudgments. Instead, by looking only <strong>for</strong> supporting arguments,<strong>reason</strong>ing strengthens people’s opinions, distortstheir estimates, <strong>an</strong>d allows them to get away with violationsof their own moral intuitions. In these cases, epistemic ormoral goals are not well served by <strong>reason</strong>ing. By contrast,<strong>argumentative</strong> goals are: People are better able to supporttheir positions or to justify their moral judgments.5. Proactive <strong>reason</strong>ing in decision makingIn the previous section, we argued that much <strong>reason</strong>ing is<strong>do</strong>ne in <strong>an</strong>ticipation of situations where <strong>an</strong> opinion mighthave to be defended, <strong>an</strong>d we suggested that work onmotivated <strong>reason</strong>ing c<strong>an</strong> be fruitfully reinterpreted in68 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2


Mercier & Sperber: <strong>Why</strong> <strong>do</strong> <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> <strong>reason</strong>?this light. It is not just opinions that may have to bedefended: People may also have to put <strong>for</strong>ward argumentsto defend their decisions <strong>an</strong>d actions, <strong>an</strong>d they may <strong>reason</strong>proactively to that end. We w<strong>an</strong>t to argue that this is themain role of <strong>reason</strong>ing in decision making. This claimst<strong>an</strong>ds in sharp contrast to the classical view that <strong>reason</strong>ingabout possible options <strong>an</strong>d weighing up their pros <strong>an</strong>dcons is the most reliable way – if not the only reliableway – to arrive at sound decisions (J<strong>an</strong>is & M<strong>an</strong>n 1977;Kahnem<strong>an</strong> 2003; Simon 1955). This classical view has in<strong>an</strong>y case been vigorously challenged in much recentresearch. Some argue that the best decisions are base<strong>do</strong>n intuition <strong>an</strong>d made in split seconds (e.g., see Klein1998), a view rendered popular by Gladwell (2005).Others maintain that the solution lies with the unconscious<strong>an</strong>d advise us to “sleep on it” (Claxton 1997; Dijksterhuis2004; Dijksterhuis & v<strong>an</strong> Olden 2006; Dijksterhuis et al.2006b). We briefly review these challenges to the classicalview be<strong>for</strong>e considering the subst<strong>an</strong>tial literature on<strong>reason</strong>-based choice <strong>an</strong>d interpreting it in the light ofthe <strong>argumentative</strong> <strong>theory</strong> of <strong>reason</strong>ing.5.1. To what extent <strong>do</strong>es <strong>reason</strong>ing help in deciding?In <strong>an</strong> initial series of studies, Wilson <strong>an</strong>d his colleagueslooked at the effect of <strong>reason</strong>ing on the consistencybetween attitudes <strong>an</strong>d behavior (<strong>for</strong> review, see Wilsonet al. 1989a; see also Koole et al. 2001; Millar & Tesser1989; Sengupta & Fitzsimons 2000; 2004; Wilson &LaFleur 1995; Wilson et al. 1984; 1989b). The basic paradigmis as follows: Particip<strong>an</strong>ts are asked to state their attitudeto a given object. In one condition, they have toprovide <strong>reason</strong>s <strong>for</strong> these attitudes. It has been consistentlyobserved that attitudes based on <strong>reason</strong>s were much lesspredictive of future behaviors (<strong>an</strong>d often not predictive atall) th<strong>an</strong> were attitudes stated without recourse to <strong>reason</strong>s.This lack of correlation between attitude <strong>an</strong>d behaviorresulting from too much <strong>reason</strong>ing c<strong>an</strong> even lead particip<strong>an</strong>tsto <strong>for</strong>m intr<strong>an</strong>sitive preferences (Lee et al. 2008).Using similar paradigms in which some particip<strong>an</strong>ts areasked <strong>for</strong> <strong>reason</strong>s, it was found that providing <strong>reason</strong>s ledparticip<strong>an</strong>ts to choose items that they were later less satisfiedwith (Wilson et al. 1993) or that were less in line with theratings of experts (McMackin & Slovic 2000; Wilson &Schooler 1991). Particip<strong>an</strong>ts got worse at predicting theresults of basketball games (Halberstadt & Levine 1999).People who think too much are also less likely to underst<strong>an</strong><strong>do</strong>ther people’s behavior (Albrechtsen et al. 2009; Ambady &Gray 2002; Ambady et al. 2000). This stream of experimentswas later followed up by Dijksterhuis <strong>an</strong>d his colleagues,who introduced a modified paradigm. Here, particip<strong>an</strong>tsare given lists of features describing different items (suchas flats <strong>an</strong>d cars) designed in such a way that some itemshave more positive features. In the baseline condition, particip<strong>an</strong>tshad to say which item they preferred immediatelyafter they had been exposed to these features. In the consciousthought condition, they were left to think about theitems <strong>for</strong> a few minutes. Finally, in the unconsciousthought condition, particip<strong>an</strong>ts spent the same amount oftime <strong>do</strong>ing a distraction task. Across several experiments,it was found that the best per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce was obtained inthis last condition: Unconscious thought was superior toconscious thought (<strong>an</strong>d to immediate decision) (Dijksterhuis2004; Dijksterhuis & v<strong>an</strong> Olden 2006; Dijksterhuis et al.2006b; 2009).However, some of Dijksterhuis’s results have provenhard to replicate (Acker 2008; Newell et al. 2009; Thorsteinson& Withrow 2009), <strong>an</strong>d alternative interpretations havebeen proposed in some cases (Lassiter et al. 2009). In ameta-<strong>an</strong>alysis of this literature, Acker (2008) observedthat in only a few experiments was unconscious thought signific<strong>an</strong>tlysuperior to conscious thought, amounting to a nullresult when all the experiments were taken into account.Even so, there was no signific<strong>an</strong>t adv<strong>an</strong>tage of consciousthought over immediate choice. This is typically the kin<strong>do</strong>f situation where, according to classical theories, <strong>reason</strong>ingshould help: A new choice has to be made, with the optionswell delimited <strong>an</strong>d the pros <strong>an</strong>d cons exposed. It is there<strong>for</strong>equite striking that <strong>reason</strong>ing (at least <strong>for</strong> a few minutes) <strong>do</strong>esnot bring <strong>an</strong>y adv<strong>an</strong>tage <strong>an</strong>d is sometimes inferior to intuitive,unconscious processes. Finally, studies of decisionmaking in natural environments converge on similar conclusions:Not only are most decisions made intuitively, butwhen conscious decision-making strategies are used, theyoften result in poor outcomes (Klein 1998). In the next subsection,we explore a framework designed to explain suchfindings by showing that <strong>reason</strong>ing pushes people nottowards the best decisions but towards decisions that areeasier to justify.5.2. Reason-based choiceStarting in the late 1980s, a group of leading researchers indecision making developed the framework of <strong>reason</strong>-basedchoice (<strong>for</strong> <strong>an</strong> early review, see Shafir et al. 1993). Accordingto this <strong>theory</strong>, people often make decisions because theyc<strong>an</strong> find <strong>reason</strong>s to support them. These <strong>reason</strong>s will notfavor the best decisions or decisions that satisfy some criterionof rationality, but decisions that c<strong>an</strong> be easily justified<strong>an</strong>d are less at risk of being criticized. According to the<strong>argumentative</strong> <strong>theory</strong>, this is what should happen whenpeople are faced with decisions where they only haveweak intuitions. In this case, <strong>reason</strong>ing c<strong>an</strong> be used to tipthe scales in favor of the choice <strong>for</strong> which <strong>reason</strong>s aremost easily available. One will then at least be able todefend the decision if its outcome proves unsatisfactory.Reason-based choice is well illustrated in a l<strong>an</strong>dmarkarticle by Simonson (1989) in which he studied, in particular,the attraction effect (Huber et al. 1982; <strong>for</strong> a cross-culturalvariation, see Briley et al. 2000). The attraction effectoccurs when, given a set of two equally valuable alternatives,a third alternative is added that is just as good as<strong>an</strong>other one of the first alternatives on one trait butinferior on the second trait. This addition tends to increasethe rate of choice of the <strong>do</strong>minating option in a m<strong>an</strong>ner notwarr<strong>an</strong>ted by rational models. Here is one example used inSimonson’s experiments. Particip<strong>an</strong>ts had to choosebetween packs of beer that varied along the two dimensionsof price <strong>an</strong>d quality. Beer A was of lower qualityth<strong>an</strong> beer B but was also cheaper, <strong>an</strong>d the two attributesbal<strong>an</strong>ced in such a way that both beers were regularlychosen in a direct comparison. However, some particip<strong>an</strong>tshad to choose between these two beers plus beerC, which was more expensive th<strong>an</strong> beer B but notbetter. When this beer was introduced, particip<strong>an</strong>tstended to pick beer B more often. It is easy to account<strong>for</strong> this finding within the framework of <strong>reason</strong>-basedBEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2 69


Mercier & Sperber: <strong>Why</strong> <strong>do</strong> <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> <strong>reason</strong>?choice: The poorer alternative makes the choice of the<strong>do</strong>minating one easy to justify. (“Beer B is of the samequality as but cheaper th<strong>an</strong> this other beer!”) To confirmthis intuition, Simonson made <strong>an</strong>d tested the three followingpredictions: (1) a choice based on <strong>reason</strong>s should berein<strong>for</strong>ced when particip<strong>an</strong>ts have to justify themselves,(2) a choice based on <strong>reason</strong>s will be perceived as easierto justify <strong>an</strong>d less likely to be criticized, <strong>an</strong>d (3) a choicebased on <strong>reason</strong>s should give rise to more elaborate expl<strong>an</strong>ations.The results of three experiments supported thesepredictions. Moreover, these results also showed that particip<strong>an</strong>tswho made choices based on <strong>reason</strong>s tended tomake choices that fitted less well with their own preferencesas stated be<strong>for</strong>e the choice was made. Finally,<strong>an</strong>other set of experiments demonstrated that, when particip<strong>an</strong>tswere able to use their intuitions more, becausethey were familiar with the alternatives or because thedescriptions of these alternatives were more detailed,they were less prone to the attraction effect (Ratneshwaret al. 1987). Several well-known challenges to the viewof <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> as making rational decisions th<strong>an</strong>ks to their<strong>reason</strong>ing abilities have been, or c<strong>an</strong> be, reinterpreted ascases of <strong>reason</strong>-based choice.5.3. What <strong>reason</strong>-based choice c<strong>an</strong> explain5.3.1. Disjunction effect. The sure-thing principle(Savage 1954) states that, when someone favors A over Bif event E happens <strong>an</strong>d keeps the same preference orderingif E <strong>do</strong>es not happen, then her choices should not beinfluenced by <strong>an</strong>y uncertainty about the occurrence ofE. Shafir <strong>an</strong>d Tversky (1992; Tversky & Shafir 1992)have recorded several violations of this principle. Forinst<strong>an</strong>ce, we c<strong>an</strong> compare the reaction of particip<strong>an</strong>ts tothe following problems (Tversky & Shafir 1992):Win/lose versionsImagine that you have just played a game of ch<strong>an</strong>ce that gaveyou a 50% ch<strong>an</strong>ce to win $200 <strong>an</strong>d a 50% ch<strong>an</strong>ce to lose $100.The coin was tossed <strong>an</strong>d you have either won $200 or lost $100.You are now offered a second identical gamble: 50% ch<strong>an</strong>ce towin $200 <strong>an</strong>d 50% ch<strong>an</strong>ce to lose $100. Would you?: (a) acceptthe second gamble. (b) reject the second gamble. (Tversky &Shafir 1992, p. 306)Whether they have won or lost in the first gamble, amajority of particip<strong>an</strong>ts accept the second gamble.However, they are likely to <strong>do</strong> so <strong>for</strong> different <strong>reason</strong>s:In the win scenario, they <strong>reason</strong> that they c<strong>an</strong> easily risklosing half of the $200 they have just won. In the lose scenario,however, they might take the second gamble as <strong>an</strong>opportunity to make up <strong>for</strong> their previous loss. In thesetwo cases, while the choice is the same, the <strong>reason</strong>s <strong>for</strong>making it are incompatible. Thus, when particip<strong>an</strong>ts <strong>do</strong>not know what is going to be the outcome of the firstbet, they have more trouble justifying the decision toaccept the second gamble: The <strong>reason</strong>s seem to contradicteach other. As a result, a majority of particip<strong>an</strong>ts who <strong>do</strong>not know the result of the first gamble reject the secondgamble even though they would have accepted it whateverthe result of the first gamble. The authors tested this expl<strong>an</strong>ationfurther by devising a comparison that had the sameproperties as the one just described, except that the<strong>reason</strong>s <strong>for</strong> making the “accept” decision were the sameirrespective of the outcome of the first gamble. In thiscase, particip<strong>an</strong>ts made exactly the same choiceswhether or not they knew the result of the first gamble(<strong>for</strong> a similar experiment with a vari<strong>an</strong>t of the prisoner’sdilemma, see Croson 1999).5.3.2. Sunk-cost fallacy. The sunk-cost fallacy is the“greater tendency to continue <strong>an</strong> endeavor once <strong>an</strong> investmentin money, ef<strong>for</strong>t, or time has been made” (Arkes &Blumer 1985, p. 124). A well-known real-life example isthat of the Concorde: The British <strong>an</strong>d French governmentsdecided to keep paying <strong>for</strong> a pl<strong>an</strong>e that they knewwould never turn a profit. Arkes <strong>an</strong>d Ayton (1999) haveargued that such mistakes result from <strong>an</strong> unsatisfactoryuse of explicit <strong>reason</strong>s such as “<strong>do</strong> not waste.” We willbriefly review the evidence they presented, <strong>an</strong>d add more.First of all, Arkes <strong>an</strong>d Ayton (1999) contrast the robustsunk-cost effects observed in <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> (Arkes & Blumer1985; Garl<strong>an</strong>d 1990; Staw 1981) with the absence ofsuch mistakes among <strong>an</strong>imals. 12 They also point out thatchildren <strong>do</strong> not seem prone to this error (<strong>for</strong> morerecent, convergent evidence, see Klaczynski & Cottrell2004; Mors<strong>an</strong>yi & H<strong>an</strong>dley 2008). If <strong>reason</strong>ing were notthe cause of this phenomenon but the cure <strong>for</strong> it, the oppositewould be expected. Finally, some experiments havevaried the availability of justifications – a factor thatshould not be relev<strong>an</strong>t <strong>for</strong> st<strong>an</strong>dard models of decisionmaking. Thus, when particip<strong>an</strong>ts c<strong>an</strong> justify the waste,they are less likely to be trapped by sunk costs (Som<strong>an</strong>& Cheema 2001). By contrast, when particip<strong>an</strong>ts find itharder to justify ch<strong>an</strong>ging their course of actions, theyare more likely to commit the fallacy (Bragger et al.1998; 2003).5.3.3. Framing. Framing effects occur when people givedifferent <strong>an</strong>swers to structurally similar problems dependingon their wording – their “frame” (Tversky & Kahnem<strong>an</strong>1981). Our intuitions are generally blamed <strong>for</strong> theseeffects (Kahnem<strong>an</strong> 2003). Another expl<strong>an</strong>ation that c<strong>an</strong> beseen as either complementary or alternative to this one isthat different frames make some <strong>reason</strong>s more or less available,thus modifying the way <strong>reason</strong>ing affects our decisions.Several results support this interpretation (see McKenzie2004; McKenzie & Nelson 2003). First, as mentionedearlier, particip<strong>an</strong>ts who <strong>reason</strong> more about the tasks aremore influenced by framing effects (Igou & Bless 2007).Second, when groups make decisions on framed problems,the groups tend to converge on the <strong>an</strong>swer that is supportedby the strongest <strong>reason</strong>s (McGuire et al. 1987; Milch et al.2009; Paese et al. 1993). If the particip<strong>an</strong>ts’ <strong>an</strong>swers weretruly based on their intuitions, the <strong>an</strong>swer proposed by thegroup would tend to be the me<strong>an</strong> of these different intuitions(Allport 1924; Farnsworth & Behner 1931). Instead,these findings have to be explained within the frameworkof the Persuasive Argument Theory (Vinokur 1971;Vinokur & Burnstein 1978), showing that the decisions arebased on <strong>reason</strong>s.5.3.4. Preference inversion. The ability to evaluate preferencescorrectly is necessary <strong>for</strong> economic models ofdecision making, but preferences c<strong>an</strong> vary dramaticallydepending on the way they are measured. Someone mayrate A higher th<strong>an</strong> B <strong>an</strong>d still choose B over A (Bazerm<strong>an</strong>et al. 1992; Irwin et al. 1993; Kahnem<strong>an</strong> & Ritov 1994;Slovic 1975; Tversky et al. 1988). For example, the relativerating of two objects c<strong>an</strong> vary or even be reversed,70 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2


Mercier & Sperber: <strong>Why</strong> <strong>do</strong> <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> <strong>reason</strong>?depending on whether they are rated separately or jointly(Hsee 1996b; 1998; Hsee et al. 1999). Thus, when the followingtwo objects are presented in isolation – a musicdictionary with 10,000 entries that is “like new,” <strong>an</strong>d onewith 20,000 entries <strong>an</strong>d a torn cover – people rate theone with 10,000 entries more highly. However, whenpeople have to choose between the two, they favor theone that has more entries, despite the torn cover (Hsee1996b). Such effects fit perfectly in the current framework:People choose <strong>an</strong> alternative because they c<strong>an</strong> provide “acompelling argument <strong>for</strong> choice that c<strong>an</strong> be used to justifythe decision to oneself as well as to others” (Tversky et al.1988, p. 372). In the <strong>for</strong>egoing example, people lackreliable intuitions – they c<strong>an</strong>not tell how m<strong>an</strong>y entries agood music dictionary should have. Lacking such intuitions,they fall back on <strong>reason</strong>ing <strong>an</strong>d let their judgmentsbe guided by ease of justification – in this case, the conditionof the dictionary that easily justifies a high or lowprice. On the other h<strong>an</strong>d, dimensions with numericalvalues will often provide compelling justifications whenoptions are presented jointly. This bias c<strong>an</strong> lead to suboptimaldecisions (Hsee & Zh<strong>an</strong>g 2004).More generally, “decision-makers have a tendency toresist affective influence, <strong>an</strong>d to rely on rationalistic attributesto make their decisions” (Hsee et al. 2003, p. 16;see also Okada 2005). Indeed, rationalistic attributesmake <strong>for</strong> easy justifications. For inst<strong>an</strong>ce, in one experiment,particip<strong>an</strong>ts had either to choose between the followingtwo options or to rate them: A roach-shapedchocolate weighing 2 ounces <strong>an</strong>d worth 2 <strong>do</strong>llars, <strong>an</strong>d aheart-shaped chocolate weighing half <strong>an</strong> ounce <strong>an</strong>dworth 50 cents (Hsee 1999). A majority (68%) of particip<strong>an</strong>tschose the roach-shaped chocolate, even thoughmore th<strong>an</strong> half (54%) thought they would enjoy theother more. The particip<strong>an</strong>ts who chose the bigger,roach-shaped chocolate did so because the feeling ofdisgust, being “irrational,” was hard to justify, especiallycompared with the difference in price <strong>an</strong>d size.However, in the light of the results from the psychologyof disgust (e.g., Rozin et al. 1986), we c<strong>an</strong> tell that theirchoice was certainly the wrong one.5.3.5. Other inappropriate uses of <strong>reason</strong>s. M<strong>an</strong>y otherinappropriate uses of <strong>reason</strong>s have been empirically demonstrated.Investors’ decisions are guided by <strong>reason</strong>s that seemgood but are unrelated to real per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce (Barber et al.2003). People will use a rule such as “more variety isbetter” or “<strong>do</strong>n’t pick the same things as others” to guidetheir decisions, even when less variety or more con<strong>for</strong>mitywould actually be more in line with their preferences(Ariely & Levav 2000; Berger & Heath 2007; Simonson1990). Use of a rule such as “<strong>do</strong>n’t pay <strong>for</strong> delays” will leadto behaviors that go against one’s own interest (Amir &Ariely 2003). When <strong>for</strong>ecasting their affective states,people rely on explicit lay theories (Igou 2004), which willoften lead them astray (Hsee & Hastie 2006). Because “it’sbetter to keep options open,” people will be reluct<strong>an</strong>t tomake <strong>an</strong> unalterable decision even when they would bebetter off making it (Gilbert & Ebert 2002). When indulgingin a he<strong>do</strong>nic act, people feel they need a <strong>reason</strong> <strong>for</strong> suchindulgence, even though this <strong>do</strong>es not actually ch<strong>an</strong>ge thequality of the experience (Xu & Schwarz 2009). Reasonbasedchoice has also been used to explain effects relatedto loss aversion (Simonson & Nowlis 2000), the effect ofattribute bal<strong>an</strong>ce (Chernev 2005), the tendency to be overwhelmedby too much choice (Scheibehenne et al. 2009;Sela et al. 2009), the feature creep effect (Thompson et al.2005a), the en<strong>do</strong>wment effect (Johnson et al. 2007),aspects of time discounting (Weber et al. 2007), <strong>an</strong>dseveral other departures from the norms of rationality(Shafir et al. 1993).Another sign that <strong>reason</strong>-based choice c<strong>an</strong> lead to nonnormativeoutcomes is that sometimes <strong>reason</strong>s that are notrelev<strong>an</strong>t to the decision will nonetheless play a role. Forinst<strong>an</strong>ce, the same irrelev<strong>an</strong>t attribute will sometimes beused as a <strong>reason</strong> <strong>for</strong> choosing <strong>an</strong> item (Carpenter et al.1994) <strong>an</strong>d sometimes as a <strong>reason</strong> <strong>for</strong> rejecting it (Simonsonet al. 1993; 1994), depending on what decision it makeseasier to justify (Brown & Carpenter 2000). People willalso be influenced by irrelev<strong>an</strong>t pieces of in<strong>for</strong>mationbecause they find it hard to justify ignoring them(Tetlock & Boettger 1989; Tetlock et al. 1996).All of these experiments demonstrate cognitivelyunsound uses of <strong>reason</strong>ing. There are two ways to explainthese findings. One could argue that these are inst<strong>an</strong>cesof a mech<strong>an</strong>ism designed <strong>for</strong> individual cognition, <strong>an</strong>d inparticular <strong>for</strong> decision making, that sometimes getsmisused. According to the <strong>argumentative</strong> <strong>theory</strong>, however,the function of <strong>reason</strong>ing is primarily social: In particular,it allows people to <strong>an</strong>ticipate the need to justify theirdecisions to others. This predicts that the use of <strong>reason</strong>ingin decision making should increase the more likely one isto have to justify oneself. This prediction has been borneout by experiments showing that people will rely more on<strong>reason</strong>s when they know that their decisions will later bemade public (Thompson & Norton 2008) or when theyare giving advice (in which case one has to be able tojustify oneself [see Kray & Gonzalez 1999]). By contrast,when they are choosing <strong>for</strong> others rather th<strong>an</strong> <strong>for</strong> themselves,they are less prone to these effects because thereis then less need <strong>for</strong> a utilitari<strong>an</strong>, justifiable decision (Hamilton& Thompson 2007). Finally, it should be stressed thatthe picture of <strong>reason</strong>ing painted in these studies may beoverly bleak: Demonstrations that <strong>reason</strong>ing leads toerrors are much more publishable th<strong>an</strong> reports of its successes(Christensen-Szal<strong>an</strong>ski & Beach 1984). Indeed, inmost cases, <strong>reason</strong>ing is likely to drive us towards gooddecisions. This, we would suggest, is mostly becausebetter decisions tend to be easier to justify. The <strong>reason</strong>swe use to justify our decisions have often been tr<strong>an</strong>smittedculturally <strong>an</strong>d are likely to point in the right direction – aswhen people justify their avoid<strong>an</strong>ce of sunk-cost mistakesby using the rule they have learned in class (Simonson &Nye 1992). In such cases, the predictions of the <strong>argumentative</strong><strong>theory</strong> coincide with those of more classical theories.However, what the results just reviewed show is that,when a more easily justifiable decision is not a good one,<strong>reason</strong>ing still drives us in the direction of ease of justification.Even if they are rare, such cases are crucial to comparingthe present <strong>theory</strong> (<strong>reason</strong>ing drives us to justifiabledecisions) with more classical ones (<strong>reason</strong>ing drives us togood decisions).6. Conclusion: Reasoning <strong>an</strong>d rationalityReasoning contributes to the effectiveness <strong>an</strong>d reliabilityof communication by enabling communicators to argueBEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2 71


Mercier & Sperber: <strong>Why</strong> <strong>do</strong> <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> <strong>reason</strong>?<strong>for</strong> their claim <strong>an</strong>d by enabling addressees to assessthese arguments. It thus increases both in qu<strong>an</strong>tity <strong>an</strong>din epistemic quality the in<strong>for</strong>mation <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> are able toshare.We view the evolution of <strong>reason</strong>ing as linked to that ofhum<strong>an</strong> communication. Reasoning, we have argued,enables communicators to produce arguments to convinceaddressees who would not accept what they say on trust; itenables addressees to evaluate the soundness of thesearguments <strong>an</strong>d to accept valuable in<strong>for</strong>mation that theywould be suspicious of otherwise. Thus, th<strong>an</strong>ks to <strong>reason</strong>ing,hum<strong>an</strong> communication is made more reliable <strong>an</strong>dmore potent. From the hypothesis that the main functionof <strong>reason</strong>ing is <strong>argumentative</strong>, we derived a number ofpredictions that, we tried to show, are confirmed by existingevidence. True, most of these predictions c<strong>an</strong> bederived from other theories. We would argue, however,that the <strong>argumentative</strong> hypothesis provides a more principledexpl<strong>an</strong>ation of the empirical evidence (in the caseof the confirmation bias, <strong>for</strong> inst<strong>an</strong>ce). In our discussionof motivated <strong>reason</strong>ing <strong>an</strong>d of <strong>reason</strong>-based choice, notonly did we converge in our prediction with existing theories,but we also extensively borrowed from them. Evenin these cases, however, we would argue that our approachhas the distinctive adv<strong>an</strong>tage of providing clear <strong>an</strong>swers tothe why-questions: <strong>Why</strong> <strong>do</strong> <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> have a confirmationbias? <strong>Why</strong> <strong>do</strong> they engage in motivated <strong>reason</strong>ing? <strong>Why</strong><strong>do</strong> they base their decisions on the availability of justificatory<strong>reason</strong>s? Moreover, the <strong>argumentative</strong> <strong>theory</strong> of<strong>reason</strong>ing offers a unique integrative perspective: Itexplains wide swaths of the psychological literaturewithin a single overarching framework.Some of the evidence reviewed here shows not only that<strong>reason</strong>ing falls short of delivering rational beliefs <strong>an</strong>drational decisions reliably, but also that, in a variety ofcases, it may even be detrimental to rationality. Reasoningc<strong>an</strong> lead to poor outcomes not because <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> are bad atit but because they systematically look <strong>for</strong> arguments tojustify their beliefs or their actions. The <strong>argumentative</strong><strong>theory</strong>, however, puts such well-known demonstrationsof “irrationality” in a novel perspective. Hum<strong>an</strong> <strong>reason</strong>ingis not a profoundly flawed general mech<strong>an</strong>ism; it is aremarkably efficient specialized device adapted to acertain type of social <strong>an</strong>d cognitive interaction at whichit excels.Even from a strictly epistemic perspective, the <strong>argumentative</strong><strong>theory</strong> of <strong>reason</strong>ing <strong>do</strong>es not paint a wholly dishearteningpicture. It maintains that there is <strong>an</strong> asymmetrybetween the production of arguments, which involves <strong>an</strong>intrinsic bias in favor of the opinions or decisions of thearguer whether they are sound or not, <strong>an</strong>d the evaluationof arguments, which aims at distinguishing good argumentsfrom bad ones <strong>an</strong>d hence genuine in<strong>for</strong>mationfrom misin<strong>for</strong>mation. This asymmetry is often obscuredin a debate situation (or in a situation where a debate is<strong>an</strong>ticipated). People who have <strong>an</strong> opinion to defend<strong>do</strong>n’t really evaluate the arguments of their interlocutorsin a search <strong>for</strong> genuine in<strong>for</strong>mation but rather considerthem from the start as counterarguments to be rebutted.Still, as shown by the evidence reviewed in section 2,people are good at assessing arguments <strong>an</strong>d are quiteable to <strong>do</strong> so in <strong>an</strong> unbiased way, provided they have noparticular axe to grind. In group <strong>reason</strong>ing experimentswhere particip<strong>an</strong>ts share <strong>an</strong> interest in discovering theright <strong>an</strong>swer, it has been shown that truth wins (Laughlin& Ellis 1986; Moshm<strong>an</strong> & Geil 1998). While particip<strong>an</strong>tsin collective experimental tasks typically produce argumentsin favor of a variety of hypotheses, most or evenall of which are false, they concur in recognizing soundarguments. Since these tasks have a demonstrably validsolution, truth <strong>do</strong>es indeed win. If we generalize to problemsthat <strong>do</strong> not have a provable solution, we should atleast expect good arguments to win, even if this is notalways sufficient <strong>for</strong> truth to win (<strong>an</strong>d, in section 2, wehave reviewed evidence that this is indeed the case).This may sound trivial, but it is not. It demonstrates that,contrary to common bleak assessments of hum<strong>an</strong> <strong>reason</strong>ingabilities, people are quite capable of <strong>reason</strong>ing in <strong>an</strong>unbiased m<strong>an</strong>ner, at least when they are evaluating argumentsrather th<strong>an</strong> producing them, <strong>an</strong>d when they areafter the truth rather th<strong>an</strong> trying to win a debate.Couldn’t the same type of situation that favors soundevaluation favor comparable soundness in the productionof arguments? Note, first, that situations where a sharedinterest in truth leads particip<strong>an</strong>ts in a group task to evaluatearguments correctly are not enough to make themproduce correct arguments. In these group tasks, individualparticip<strong>an</strong>ts come up with <strong>an</strong>d propose to the groupthe same inappropriate <strong>an</strong>swers that they come up within individual testing. The group success is due to, first<strong>an</strong>d <strong>for</strong>emost, the filtering of a variety of solutions,achieved through evaluation. When different <strong>an</strong>swers areinitially proposed <strong>an</strong>d all of them are incorrect, then allof them are likely to be rejected, <strong>an</strong>d wholly or partlynew hypotheses are likely to be proposed <strong>an</strong>d filtered inturn, thus explaining how groups may <strong>do</strong> better th<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>yof their individual members.Individuals thinking on their own without benefitingfrom the input of others c<strong>an</strong> assess only their own hypotheses,but in <strong>do</strong>ing so, they are both judge <strong>an</strong>d party, orrather judge <strong>an</strong>d advocate, <strong>an</strong>d this is not <strong>an</strong> optimalst<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>for</strong> pursuing the truth. Wouldn’t it be possible, inprinciple, <strong>for</strong> <strong>an</strong> individual to decide to generate avariety of hypotheses in <strong>an</strong>swer to some question <strong>an</strong>dthen evaluate them one by one, on the model of SherlockHolmes? What makes Holmes such a fascinating characteris precisely his preternatural turn of mind operating in aworld rigged by Con<strong>an</strong> Doyle, where what should beinductive problems in fact have deductive solutions.More realistically, individuals may develop some limitedability to dist<strong>an</strong>ce themselves from their own opinion, toconsider alternatives <strong>an</strong>d thereby become more objective.Presumably this is what the 10% or so of people who passthe st<strong>an</strong>dard Wason selection task <strong>do</strong>. But this is <strong>an</strong>acquired skill <strong>an</strong>d involves exercising some imperfectcontrol over a natural disposition that spont<strong>an</strong>eouslypulls in a different direction.Here, one might be tempted to point out that, after all,<strong>reason</strong>ing is responsible <strong>for</strong> some of the greatest achievementsof hum<strong>an</strong> thought in the epistemic <strong>an</strong>d moral<strong>do</strong>mains. This is undeniably true, but the achievementsinvolved are all collective <strong>an</strong>d result from interactionsover m<strong>an</strong>y generations (on the import<strong>an</strong>ce of social interactions<strong>for</strong> creativity, including scientific creativity, seeCsikszentmihalyi & Sawyer 1995; Dunbar 1997; John-Steiner 2000; Okada & Simon 1997). The whole scientificenterprise has always been structured around groups,from the Lince<strong>an</strong> Academy <strong>do</strong>wn to the Large Hadron72 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2


Mercier & Sperber: <strong>Why</strong> <strong>do</strong> <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> <strong>reason</strong>?Collider. In the moral <strong>do</strong>main, moral achievements suchas the abolition of slavery are the outcome of intensepublic arguments. We have pointed out that, in group settings,<strong>reason</strong>ing biases c<strong>an</strong> become a positive <strong>for</strong>ce <strong>an</strong>dcontribute to a kind of division of cognitive labor. Still,to excel in such groups, it may be necessary to <strong>an</strong>ticipatehow one’s own arguments might be evaluated by others<strong>an</strong>d to adjust these arguments accordingly. Showingone’s ability to <strong>an</strong>ticipate objections may be a valuable culturallyacquired skill, as in medieval disputationes (seeNovaes 2005). By <strong>an</strong>ticipating objections, one may evenbe able to recognize flaws in one’s own hypotheses <strong>an</strong>dgo on to revise them. We have suggested that thisdepends on a painstakingly acquired ability to exertsome limited control over one’s own biases. Even amongscientists, this ability may be uncommon, but those whohave it may have a great influence on the developmentof scientific ideas. It would be a mistake, however, totreat their highly visible, almost freakish, contributionsas paradigmatic examples of hum<strong>an</strong> <strong>reason</strong>ing. In mostdiscussions, rather th<strong>an</strong> looking <strong>for</strong> flaws in our own arguments,it is easier to let the other person find them <strong>an</strong><strong>do</strong>nly then adjust our arguments, if necessary.In general, one should be cautious about using the strikingaccomplishments of <strong>reason</strong>ing as proof of its overallefficiency, since its failures are often much less visible(see Ormerod 2005; Taleb 2007). Epistemic success maydepend to a signific<strong>an</strong>t extent on what philosophers havedubbed epistemic luck (Pritchard 2005); that is, ch<strong>an</strong>cefactors that happen to put one on the right track. Whenone happens to be on the right track <strong>an</strong>d “more right”th<strong>an</strong> one could initially have guessed, some of the distortingeffects of motivated <strong>reason</strong>ing <strong>an</strong>d polarization mayturn into blessings. For inst<strong>an</strong>ce, motivated <strong>reason</strong>ingmay have pushed Darwin to focus obsessively on theidea of natural selection <strong>an</strong>d explore all possible supportingarguments <strong>an</strong>d consequences. But, <strong>for</strong> one Darwin,how m<strong>an</strong>y Paleys?To conclude, we note that the <strong>argumentative</strong> <strong>theory</strong> of<strong>reason</strong>ing should be congenial to those of us who enjoyspending endless hours debating ideas – but this, ofcourse, is not <strong>an</strong> argument <strong>for</strong> (or against) the <strong>theory</strong>.ACKNOWLEDGMENTSWe are grateful to Paul Bloom, Ruth Byrne, Peter Carruthers,Nick Chater, Jon Haidt, Ira Noveck, Guy Politzer,Je<strong>an</strong>-Baptiste V<strong>an</strong> der Henst, Deirdre Wilson, <strong>an</strong>d four<strong>an</strong>onymous reviewers <strong>for</strong> useful suggestions <strong>an</strong>d criticismson earlier versions of this article. Our work has been supportedby a Ph.D gr<strong>an</strong>t of the DGA (Paris) to HugoMercier <strong>an</strong>d by the CSMN (Oslo).NOTES1. Recently, <strong>reason</strong>ing has been used simply as a synonym ofinference <strong>an</strong>d is then unproblematically attributed to inf<strong>an</strong>ts(Spelke & Kinzler 2007) or to nonhum<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>imals (Blaisdellet al. 2006). In this article, however, we use “<strong>reason</strong>ing” in itsmore common <strong>an</strong>d narrower sense. The content of the articleshould make it clear why we see this as a principled terminologicalchoice.2. Our functional hypothesis will be tested without referenceto specific mech<strong>an</strong>isms (as is common in evolutionary biology).Even if one c<strong>an</strong> ask to what extent attributing <strong>an</strong> <strong>argumentative</strong>function to <strong>reason</strong>ing suggests or favors a specific algorithmicaccount, this will not be the focus of this article. There is, in<strong>an</strong>y case, no obvious clash between our functional account <strong>an</strong>dvarious algorithmic accounts that have been offered, <strong>for</strong> inst<strong>an</strong>ce,by Ev<strong>an</strong>s (2007), Johnson-Laird (2006), or Rips (1994).3. In the psychology of <strong>reason</strong>ing, some tasks c<strong>an</strong> be describedas production tasks because particip<strong>an</strong>ts have to produce a logicallyvalid conclusion from a set of premises. However, thesetasks are very different from the production of arguments in adebate. In a dialogic context, one starts from the conclusion<strong>an</strong>d tries to find premises that will convince one’s interlocutor.It is this me<strong>an</strong>ing of production that is relev<strong>an</strong>t here.4. It should be noted that this spotty record may be partlyexplained by very artificial conditions: In the vast majority ofgroup experiments, particip<strong>an</strong>ts are asked to interact withpeople they <strong>do</strong>n’t know <strong>an</strong>d will never meet again, <strong>an</strong>d toper<strong>for</strong>m tasks that have no bearing on their lives outside the laboratory.When <strong>an</strong>y of these factors is made more natural, per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ceimproves. Debates about political matters betweenlaypeople often lead to epistemic improvement (L<strong>an</strong>demore, inpress; Mercier & L<strong>an</strong>demore, in press). Groups that are usedto working together are much more efficient (Michaelsen et al.1989). And collaborative learning is hugely successful in schools(Slavin 1995).5. Other, slightly weaker results are obtained <strong>for</strong> inductivetasks (Laughlin et al. 1991; 2002; 2003; 2006). Debates are alsoa well-known way of improving comprehension in m<strong>an</strong>y<strong>do</strong>mains (e.g., see Anderson et al. 1996; 2001; Foot et al. 1994;Howe 1990; Johnson & Johnson 2007; 2009; Lao & Kuhn2002; Nussbaum 2008; Nussbaum & Sinatra 2003; Slavin 1995;Smith et al. 2009; Tolmie et al. 1993; v<strong>an</strong> Boxtel et al. 2000;Webb & Palinscar 1996).6. Incidentally, <strong>an</strong>other adv<strong>an</strong>tage of the <strong>theory</strong> suggestedhere is that it makes testable predictions about the contextsthat should motivate the use of <strong>reason</strong>ing; namely, contexts inwhich real or <strong>an</strong>ticipated argumentation takes place. This contrastswith st<strong>an</strong>dard dual-process theories, which <strong>do</strong> not have aprincipled <strong>an</strong>d testable way of predicting when system 2 <strong>reason</strong>ingshould be triggered.7. It may be worth mentioning that what general motivationfails to bring about is efficient or unbiased <strong>reason</strong>ing ratherth<strong>an</strong> <strong>reason</strong>ing per se. If you pay people to get the right <strong>an</strong>swerin, say, the Wason selection task, they may <strong>reason</strong> more butwill still be as biased, <strong>an</strong>d their <strong>an</strong>swer will still be wrong.8. The Delphi technique is a method of <strong>for</strong>ecasting that c<strong>an</strong>be seen as trying to make the best of the confirmation bias byhaving different experts critique one <strong>an</strong>other’s predictions <strong>an</strong>djustify their own predictions. Its effectiveness shows that, in <strong>an</strong>appropriate context, the confirmation bias c<strong>an</strong> be conducive tovery good per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce (Green et al. 2007; Keeney et al. 2001;Powell 2003; Rowe & Wright 1999; Tichy 2004).9. Note that motivated, or motivation, as used here <strong>do</strong> notrefer to conscious motivation based on <strong>reason</strong>s, as in “I’mgoing to think of arguments supporting this opinion of mine incase someone questions me later.” Instead, it refers to processesthat influence either the direction or the triggering of <strong>reason</strong>ingin a mostly unconscious m<strong>an</strong>ner. Even though a lawyer, <strong>for</strong>inst<strong>an</strong>ce, c<strong>an</strong> consciously trigger <strong>reason</strong>ing <strong>an</strong>d influence itsdirection, this is the exception <strong>an</strong>d not the rule. Generally,people (including lawyers) have limited control over the triggeringof <strong>reason</strong>ing or the direction it takes.10. Attitude polarization is most likely to occur in individualswho hold a very strong attitude with a high degree of confidence.The problem is, then, that these individuals will tend to fall at oneend of the attitude scale be<strong>for</strong>e reading the arguments, whichmakes it close to impossible to detect <strong>an</strong>y movement towards amore extreme attitude. This c<strong>an</strong> explain, at least in part, thefailed replications of Kuhn <strong>an</strong>d Lao (1996) <strong>an</strong>d Miller et al.(1993).11. Incidentally, this <strong>do</strong>es not explain all <strong>for</strong>ms of belief persever<strong>an</strong>ce:Other mech<strong>an</strong>isms may be involved in some inst<strong>an</strong>cesBEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2 73


Commentary/Mercier & Sperber: <strong>Why</strong> <strong>do</strong> <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> <strong>reason</strong>?(e.g., see Anderson et al. 1980), but the availability of argumentssupporting the discredited belief may still be crucial (see Andersonet al. 1985).12. It has been shown that pigeons fall prey to the fallacybut only when no indication was given that they were in sucha situation (Navarro & F<strong>an</strong>tino 2005). The instructionsreceived by hum<strong>an</strong> particip<strong>an</strong>ts always make this point clear,so these experiments confirm the point made by Arkes <strong>an</strong>dAyton (1999).Open Peer CommentaryArguing, <strong>reason</strong>ing, <strong>an</strong>d the interpersonal(cultural) functions of hum<strong>an</strong> consciousness<strong>do</strong>i:10.1017/S0140525X10002785Roy F. Baumeister, a E. J. Masicampo, b <strong>an</strong>d C. Nath<strong>an</strong>DeWall ca Department of Psychology, Florida State University, Tallahassee,FL 32306-4301; b Department of Psychology, Tufts University, Med<strong>for</strong>d, MA02155; c Department of Psychology, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY40506-0044.baumeister@psy.fsu.edu.ej.masicampo@tufts.edu cnath<strong>an</strong>dewall@gmail.comhttp://www.psy.fsu.edu/≏baumeistertice/index.htmlhttp://ase.tufts.edu/psychology/ambady/ej.htmlhttp://www.uky.edu/≏njdewa2/home.htmlAbstract: Our recent work suggests that (1) the purpose of hum<strong>an</strong>conscious thought is participation in social <strong>an</strong>d cultural groups, <strong>an</strong>d (2)logical <strong>reason</strong>ing depends on conscious thought. These mesh well withthe argument <strong>theory</strong> of <strong>reason</strong>ing. In broader context, the distinctivelyhum<strong>an</strong> traits are adaptations <strong>for</strong> culture <strong>an</strong>d inner processes serveinterpersonal functions.A long tradition has regarded hum<strong>an</strong> thinking as a solitary, if notsolipsistic, exercise aimed at facilitating behavior. This has privilegedthe assumption that <strong>reason</strong>ing is mainly <strong>for</strong> enabling individualsto seek the truth. Mercier <strong>an</strong>d Sperber (M&S) haveinstead invoked <strong>an</strong> interpersonal dimension: Reasoning is <strong>for</strong>arguing.The idea M&S adv<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>do</strong>vetails nicely with our own work,which has en<strong>do</strong>rsed the view that uniquely hum<strong>an</strong> <strong>for</strong>ms of cognitionserve interpersonal functions. One such function is the use<strong>an</strong>d accumulation of accurate knowledge in culture. To be sure,to say that <strong>reason</strong>ing is <strong>for</strong> arguing <strong>do</strong>es not me<strong>an</strong> <strong>reason</strong>ing isirrelev<strong>an</strong>t to seeking the truth, but people seek the truth collectively,not individually. Hum<strong>an</strong>s are cultural <strong>an</strong>imals, whichme<strong>an</strong>s they use cultural systems as their strategy <strong>for</strong> improvingsurvival <strong>an</strong>d reproduction (e.g., Baumeister 2005). Hence thedistinctively hum<strong>an</strong> traits, such as the capacity <strong>for</strong> <strong>reason</strong>, aremainly <strong>for</strong> creating culture, sustaining it, <strong>an</strong>d participating in it.Culture accumulates knowledge across time, <strong>an</strong>d huge swathesof knowledge – from cooking <strong>an</strong>d farming to mathematics,science, <strong>an</strong>d technology – c<strong>an</strong> be mastered only by havingm<strong>an</strong>y individuals build on one <strong>an</strong>other’s adv<strong>an</strong>ces across generations.Arguing is a vital me<strong>an</strong>s by which a cultural groupbuilds its stock of knowledge. Even scientists, in principle themost inveterate truth seekers, have been known to argue, <strong>an</strong>dindeed much of the process of science is conducted as arguingwith <strong>an</strong>d about evidence. Individuals who are bred to arguec<strong>an</strong> thus combine to <strong>for</strong>m groups that collectively accumulateincreasingly accurate knowledge. Me<strong>an</strong>while, hominids bornwith less capacity to argue would fail to participate fully inculture, which may have reduced their ability to survive <strong>an</strong>dreproduce.The notion that <strong>reason</strong>ing is <strong>for</strong> arguing fits nicely with <strong>an</strong>otherargument we have en<strong>do</strong>rsed, which is that hum<strong>an</strong> thought is <strong>for</strong>sharing one’s thoughts <strong>an</strong>d experiences with others. For moreth<strong>an</strong> a century, psychology has regarded William James’sfamous conclusion that thinking is <strong>for</strong> <strong>do</strong>ing as <strong>an</strong> unassailabletruism. Yet our own research has led us to entertain a rivalhypothesis, that much of thinking is <strong>for</strong> talking (see Baumeister& Masicampo 2010). This applies particularly to consciousthought, defined as the adv<strong>an</strong>ced hum<strong>an</strong> <strong>for</strong>m of cognition thatdiffers from what most <strong>an</strong>imals have.M<strong>an</strong>y investigators operationally define conscious thought asthose thoughts the person c<strong>an</strong> report to others. Few, however,seem to have heeded the implication that the purpose of consciousthought is precisely <strong>for</strong> enabling people to tell theirthoughts to one <strong>an</strong>other.The interpersonal bases of thinking are <strong>an</strong> exciting adv<strong>an</strong>ce<strong>an</strong>d represent potentially a fundamental ch<strong>an</strong>ge in how thefield underst<strong>an</strong>ds the goals <strong>an</strong>d purposes of hum<strong>an</strong> thought,especially conscious thought. There have been two overlappingdebates about consciousness in recent decades. One is whetherconscious thoughts have <strong>an</strong>y causal influence on behavior.A recent survey suggests a positive <strong>an</strong>swer (Baumeister et al.2011). The other, more difficult question is what value isserved by having thoughts be conscious. That is, could notthose same thoughts influence behavior just as effectivelywithout being conscious? It is difficult to make <strong>an</strong> evolutionaryor functional case <strong>for</strong> adv<strong>an</strong>tages of having thoughts inside theindividual mind be conscious. But it is easy to make the case<strong>for</strong> the adv<strong>an</strong>tages of being able to communicate thoughts with<strong>an</strong> org<strong>an</strong>ized group, which is what conscious thought enables.Merely sharing thoughts is already helpful in terms of collectiveuse of in<strong>for</strong>mation, but M&S’s focus on arguing is a hugeboost <strong>an</strong>d extension to this line of thinking. We wish we hadthought of it! Conscious thought enables people to talk toothers <strong>an</strong>d thereby enables small groups to resolve differences.By talking, people c<strong>an</strong> resolve conflicts, influence one <strong>an</strong>other,converge on the truth (aided vitally by <strong>reason</strong>ing when thereare differences), <strong>an</strong>d thereby function together more harmoniously<strong>an</strong>d effectively th<strong>an</strong> nonhum<strong>an</strong> groups. Nonhum<strong>an</strong><strong>an</strong>imals, in contrast, have a have a relatively simple <strong>an</strong>d unsophisticatedl<strong>an</strong>guage apparatus compared with <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong>. They resolveconflicts through aggression instead of reconciliation, <strong>do</strong>minateothers instead of attempting to persuade one <strong>an</strong>other, <strong>an</strong>d relyon what appears true in the present environment instead ofusing logical <strong>reason</strong>ing to underst<strong>an</strong>d that things are not alwaysas they initially seem. Thus, M&S’s <strong>theory</strong> sheds light on whathas made hum<strong>an</strong> beings such a successful species in usingculture as <strong>an</strong> adv<strong>an</strong>ced <strong>for</strong>m of social life to improve survival<strong>an</strong>d reproduction.Consistent with that emphasis <strong>an</strong>d with M&S’s article, we havefound that logical <strong>reason</strong>ing depends on conscious thought(DeWall et al. 2008). These experiments showed that <strong>reason</strong>ingimproved as conscious processing was engaged, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>reason</strong>ingquickly deteriorated when conscious attention was preoccupiedelsewhere. In contrast, logical <strong>reason</strong>ing per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce was unaffectedby either preoccupying or engaging (priming) the unconsciousprocessing system.In short, we view M&S’s article as <strong>an</strong> import<strong>an</strong>t complementto other work emphasizing hum<strong>an</strong> consciousnessasservinginterpersonal <strong>an</strong>d cultural functions. Conscious thoughtenables both <strong>reason</strong>ing <strong>an</strong>d adv<strong>an</strong>ced <strong>for</strong>ms of communication,including arguing. Hum<strong>an</strong> evolution was partly based on developingmental powers to enable group members to communicatein<strong>for</strong>mation <strong>for</strong> group action, which is the foundation ofculture. Conscious logical <strong>reason</strong>ing <strong>an</strong>d interpersonalarguing are vital parts of that process <strong>an</strong>d thus help to definehum<strong>an</strong> nature.74 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2


Commentary/Mercier & Sperber: <strong>Why</strong> <strong>do</strong> <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> <strong>reason</strong>?Regret <strong>an</strong>d justification as a link fromargumentation to consequentialism<strong>do</strong>i:10.1017/S0140525X10002852Terry Connolly a <strong>an</strong>d Jochen Reb ba Eller College, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721; b SingaporeM<strong>an</strong>agement University, Singapore 178899.Connolly@u.arizona.edu jochenreb@smu.edu.sghttp://m<strong>an</strong>agement.eller.arizona.edu/faculty/tconnolly.asphttp://www.business.smu.edu.sg/faculty/org<strong>an</strong>isational_behavior/jreb.aspAbstract: Mercier <strong>an</strong>d Sperber (M&S) argue that <strong>reason</strong>ing has evolvedprimarily as <strong>an</strong> adjunct to persuasive communication rather th<strong>an</strong> as abasis <strong>for</strong> consequential choice. Recent research on decision-relatedregret suggests that regret aversion <strong>an</strong>d concomit<strong>an</strong>t needs <strong>for</strong>justification may underpin a complementary mech<strong>an</strong>ism that c<strong>an</strong>, ifappropriately deployed, convert M&S’s facile arguer into <strong>an</strong> effectivedecision maker, with obvious evolutionary adv<strong>an</strong>tages.Mercier <strong>an</strong>d Sperber (M&S) make the provocative case that, inevolutionary terms, <strong>reason</strong>ing is better seen as <strong>an</strong> adjunct to communicationth<strong>an</strong> as a guide to decision making. However, sincethere are also evolutionary adv<strong>an</strong>tages to effective consequentialchoice, broadly interpreted, what might this ability be based on?We argue that emotional responses, specifically those associatedwith regret aversion <strong>an</strong>d justification, may serve such a role,linking argument making of the sort described by M&S to consequentialdecision making.In a continuing program of research, we have shown that regretaversion c<strong>an</strong> help in overcoming decision errors. Much of thisresearch draws on decision justification <strong>theory</strong> (Connolly & Zeelenberg2002; Connolly et al. 1997), which distinguishes regret associatedwith a (comparatively) poor outcome (outcome regret) fromthat associated with the judgment that the focal decision waswrong or poorly made – that is, was “unjustified” (self-blame orprocess regret). Ef<strong>for</strong>ts to avoid regret of this latter sort facilitatesimproved decision processes (Reb & Connolly 2010), in<strong>for</strong>mationsearch (Reb 2008) <strong>an</strong>d task learning (Reb & Connolly 2009).It also appears to reduce or eliminate <strong>reason</strong>-based decisionerrors, such as those discussed in M&S sections 5.2 <strong>an</strong>d 5.3.For example, Connolly et al. (2010) compared the effects ofexternal accountability <strong>an</strong>d regret priming on the attraction (ordecoy) effect, in which <strong>an</strong> option is seen as more desirablewhen it <strong>do</strong>minates <strong>an</strong> irrelev<strong>an</strong>t decoy option. Replicatingearlier studies (Simonson & Nye 1992; Slaughter et al. 2006),we showed that accountability (a dem<strong>an</strong>d to justify one’s choiceto others) exacerbated the attraction effect, consistent withM&S’s argument. Regret priming, in contrast, with its dem<strong>an</strong>dto justify one’s decision to oneself, eliminated the effect. Itseems that making regret salient may have led to a more bal<strong>an</strong>ceduse of <strong>reason</strong>ing whose goal was less to convince others <strong>an</strong>d moreto arrive at a choice that satisfies one’s own values <strong>an</strong>d st<strong>an</strong>dards.Reb (2005) showed that regret priming also reduced or eliminate<strong>do</strong>ther “<strong>reason</strong>-based” effects such as the compromise effect(Simonson 1989), in which <strong>an</strong> option is more desirable when presentedas a compromise, <strong>an</strong>d the accept/reject effect (Shafir &Tversky 1992), in which the same option tends to be bothrejected <strong>an</strong>d selected. In all these <strong>reason</strong>-based choice effects,the justifying arguments <strong>do</strong> not withst<strong>an</strong>d close scrutiny. Theyare simply “shallow but nice-sounding rationales” (Simonson1989, p. 170) that might serve to convince <strong>an</strong> uncritical externalaudience but not one’s thoughtful self. In contrast, regretpriming did not reduce the most import<strong>an</strong>t attribute effect(Slovic 1975) where the justifying argument c<strong>an</strong> <strong>reason</strong>ably beconstrued to both self <strong>an</strong>d others as a legitimate tiebreakerbetween equally valued options (Reb 2005).Regret priming appears to involve both motivational <strong>an</strong>d attention-directingeffects, which are sometimes quite subtle. Forexample, Reb <strong>an</strong>d Connolly (2009) used unobtrusive priming ofeither outcome or self-blame regret in a repeated decision taskwhere feedback on outcomes of unchosen options was offered.Subjects primed <strong>for</strong> outcome regret rejected such feedback moreoften, learned more slowly, <strong>an</strong>d ultimately per<strong>for</strong>med less wellth<strong>an</strong> those primed <strong>for</strong> self-blame regret (thus falling victim to themyopic regret aversion trap: avoiding short-term regret led themto experience greater long-term regret). Both groups were motivatedto avoid regret, but one did so by avoiding painful comparisons,the other by following a justifiable decision process.In summary we find persuasive M&S’s case that <strong>reason</strong>ing isprimarily <strong>for</strong> persuasive argumentation rather th<strong>an</strong> <strong>for</strong> effectiveconsequential choice. Given the evolutionary adv<strong>an</strong>tages of thelatter, however, it is plausible that other systems may have developedto support such choice processes. A growing body of evidencesuggests that mech<strong>an</strong>isms of regret, regret avoid<strong>an</strong>ce,<strong>an</strong>d justification c<strong>an</strong> serve such a decision-improving role.Specifically, aversion of process regret may complement thefluent argument maker <strong>an</strong>d tweak it to pay more bal<strong>an</strong>ced attentionto <strong>an</strong>d weighing of the pros <strong>an</strong>d cons associated with adecision problem. Because of the <strong>an</strong>ticipatory nature of regret,attention may further be directed to future consequences thatare predicted to impact experienced regret. Mech<strong>an</strong>isms ofregret <strong>an</strong>d justification thus suggest import<strong>an</strong>t linkagesbetween the argument-rich communicator sketched by M&S<strong>an</strong>d the purposive consequentialist dem<strong>an</strong>ded by rationalchoice models of hum<strong>an</strong> decisions. We see such evidence as<strong>do</strong>vetailing neatly with, <strong>an</strong>d modestly extending, the findingscompiled in the target article. Perhaps ironically, as the centralrole of <strong>reason</strong>ing in assuring good choices has come increasinglyinto <strong>do</strong>ubt in recent decision research, emotions, earlier seen as<strong>an</strong> obstacle to effective decision making, are increasingly beingfound to per<strong>for</strong>m crucial functions in facilitating such decisions.The freak in all of us: Logical truth seekingwithout argumentation<strong>do</strong>i:10.1017/S0140525X10002827Wim De NeysCentre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)–Université de Toulouse,Maison de la Recherche, 31058 Toulouse Cedex 9, Fr<strong>an</strong>ce.Wim.deneys@univ-tlse2.fr http://www.univ-tlse2.fr/ltc/deneysAbstract: Mercier <strong>an</strong>d Sperber (M&S) sketch a bleak picture of logical<strong>reason</strong>ing in classic, non<strong>argumentative</strong> tasks. I argue that recentprocessing data indicate that despite people’s poor per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce they atleast seek to adhere to traditional logical norms in these tasks. Thisimplies that classic <strong>reason</strong>ing tasks are less artificial – <strong>an</strong>d logical<strong>reason</strong>ing less exceptional – th<strong>an</strong> M&S’s framework suggests.Mercier <strong>an</strong>d Sperber (M&S) argue that the notoriously badlogical <strong>reason</strong>ing per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce in classic <strong>reason</strong>ing <strong>an</strong>ddecision-making tasks c<strong>an</strong> be attributed to the lack of <strong>argumentative</strong>context or interaction in these tasks. They point out thatwhen the same problems are put in <strong>an</strong> <strong>argumentative</strong> context,people have little trouble solving them. From this they concludethat, except <strong>for</strong> a few “almost freakish” (sect. 6, para. 7) individuals,people will engage in a genuine logical <strong>reason</strong>ing processonly when arguing. Clearly, this seems to question the validityof classic <strong>reason</strong>ing tasks: In these non<strong>argumentative</strong> tasks,people will typically not <strong>do</strong> what they <strong>do</strong> in the real (<strong>argumentative</strong>)world. This impression is further strengthened by M&S’sclaim that it would be a mistake to treat as paradigmatic examplesof hum<strong>an</strong> <strong>reason</strong>ing those few individuals who <strong>do</strong> exert controlover their biases <strong>an</strong>d m<strong>an</strong>age to solve the classic <strong>reason</strong>ing tasks.I w<strong>an</strong>t to point out that although M&S nicely demonstrate thatproviding <strong>an</strong> <strong>argumentative</strong> context c<strong>an</strong> boost people’s logical<strong>reason</strong>ing per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce, this <strong>do</strong>es not imply that people <strong>do</strong> notBEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2 75


Commentary/Mercier & Sperber: <strong>Why</strong> <strong>do</strong> <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> <strong>reason</strong>?already seek to <strong>reason</strong> logically in the absence of this context. Itshould be stressed that M&S’s claims with respect to the poorper<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce in classic <strong>reason</strong>ing tasks are typically based on traditionalstudies that focused merely on accuracy data (i.e., theoutput of the <strong>reason</strong>ing process).Recent studies that examined a wider r<strong>an</strong>ge of processingmeasures such as latency or brain-activation data (e.g., Bonner& Newell 2010; De Neys et al. 2008) sketch a more optimisticpicture of people’s <strong>reason</strong>ing per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce in the classic, non<strong>argumentative</strong>tasks. These data suggest that although peoplevery often fail to select the correct logical response, they atleast seek to adhere to the logical norm. For example, althoughpeople typically fail to solve classic <strong>reason</strong>ing problems inwhich intuitive beliefs conflict with normative considerations,latency studies indicate that people <strong>do</strong> take longer to respondto these problems compared to problems in which the normsare not being violated (e.g., Bonner & Newell 2010; De Neys& Glumicic 2008). Problems in which cued intuitive beliefs conflictwith logical considerations are also longer inspected <strong>an</strong>dbetter recalled (e.g., Ball et al. 2006; De Neys & Glumicic 2008).Neuroscientific research further suggests that brain areasinvolved in the detection of conflict between competing responsesare activated when people err <strong>an</strong>d violate a logical norm (e.g., DeNeys et al. 2008; 2010). Clearly, if people were not at least engagedin some elementary logical processing <strong>an</strong>d tried to adhere to thelogical norm, it is hard to see why violating it would affect theirinference process. In addition, De Neys <strong>an</strong>d Fr<strong>an</strong>ssens (2009)observed that after solving problems in which the intuitive believability<strong>an</strong>d logical validity of a conclusion conflicted, <strong>reason</strong>ersshowed <strong>an</strong> impaired access to words that were associated withthe intuitive beliefs. Such <strong>an</strong> impaired memory access is considereda key marker of inhibitory processing. Even people whowere always biased by their beliefs showed a minimal impairment,indicating that they had attempted to inhibit the intuitive beliefsbut failed to complete the process. Once again, if people werenot trying to adhere to the logical norm, there would be no<strong>reason</strong> <strong>for</strong> them to block the conflicting belief-based response.The crucial point is that these studies suggest that even without<strong>an</strong> <strong>argumentative</strong> context people are already engaging in a logical<strong>reason</strong>ing process. What the “freakish” individuals who give thecorrect response seem to be better at is completing the inhibitionof conflicting intuitive heuristic responses (De Neys & Fr<strong>an</strong>ssens2009; Houdé et al. 2000). However, the import<strong>an</strong>t finding in thestudies cited is that all <strong>reason</strong>ers are at least engaging in this inhibitionprocess <strong>an</strong>d try to adhere to the logical norm. In that sensewe’re all freaks who seek logical truth when solving classic<strong>reason</strong>ing tasks. The bottom line is that this indicates that thest<strong>an</strong>dard tasks are less artificial – <strong>an</strong>d logical <strong>reason</strong>ing in thesetasks less exceptional – th<strong>an</strong> M&S’s framework might suggest.In sum, M&S convincingly demonstrate that hum<strong>an</strong> <strong>reason</strong>ingc<strong>an</strong> benefit from <strong>an</strong> <strong>argumentative</strong> context. By pointing to recentprocessing data, I tried to clarify that this <strong>do</strong>es not necessarilyimply that people simply fail to engage in a logical <strong>reason</strong>ingprocess in the absence of such a context. This should givepause <strong>for</strong> thought be<strong>for</strong>e drawing strong negative conclusionswith respect to the validity of classic <strong>reason</strong>ing tasks or the illogicalnature of people’s <strong>reason</strong>ing in these tasks.Reasoning as a lie detection device<strong>do</strong>i:10.1017/S0140525X10002815Je<strong>an</strong>-Louis DessallesTelecom ParisTech, F-75013 Paris, Fr<strong>an</strong>ce.jl@dessalles.fr http://www.dessalles.frAbstract: The biological function of hum<strong>an</strong> <strong>reason</strong>ing abilities c<strong>an</strong>not beto improve shared knowledge. This is at best a side effect. A moreplausible function of argumentation, <strong>an</strong>d thus of <strong>reason</strong>ing, is toadvertise one’s ability to detect lies <strong>an</strong>d errors. Such selfish behavior iscloser to what we should expect from a naturally selected competence.I fully support the central claim by Mercier & Sperber’s (M&S)that deliberative <strong>reason</strong>ing is a by-product of <strong>argumentative</strong> competence.But if the function of <strong>reason</strong>ing is argumentation, whatis the (biological) function of argumentation? According to(M&S), <strong>argumentative</strong> <strong>reason</strong>ing improves “both in qu<strong>an</strong>tity<strong>an</strong>d in epistemic quality the in<strong>for</strong>mation <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> are able toshare” (sect. 1.2, para. 9) <strong>an</strong>d, th<strong>an</strong>ks to it, “hum<strong>an</strong> communicationis made more reliable <strong>an</strong>d more potent” (sect. 6, para. 2).If the biological function of <strong>reason</strong>ing is to achieve sharedknowledge optimization (SKO), as suggested in the targetarticle, then why <strong>do</strong> people show obvious limitations such as confirmationbias? M&S <strong>an</strong>swer that in<strong>for</strong>mation quality is optimized,not at the individual level, but at the group level. Itwould even be a good thing that individuals specialize on their(probably erroneous) line of <strong>reason</strong>ing, as long as argumentexch<strong>an</strong>ge restores global in<strong>for</strong>mation quality. The problem isthat natural selection <strong>do</strong>es not operate at the collective level.Shared knowledge belongs to the phenotype of no one.How <strong>do</strong>es the speaker benefit from uttering <strong>an</strong> argument? Ifthe purpose is to correct or update her own earlier beliefs, whygo public with it? And if it is to correct or update others’beliefs, what’s her adv<strong>an</strong>tage? M&S’s expl<strong>an</strong>ation <strong>for</strong> the existenceof deliberative <strong>reason</strong>ing <strong>do</strong>es not escape the general evolutionarypara<strong>do</strong>x of communication: If it benefits listeners only,there should be no speakers; <strong>an</strong>d if it benefits speakers only(<strong>for</strong> example, by allowing m<strong>an</strong>ipulation), there should be no listeners.Invoking collective benefits <strong>do</strong>es not offer <strong>an</strong> escaperoute if we wish to remain on firm Darwini<strong>an</strong> ground.To solve the para<strong>do</strong>x, we must depart from SKO. My proposal(Dessalles 1998) is that hum<strong>an</strong>like <strong>reason</strong>ing started with logicalconsistency checking (CC), <strong>an</strong>d that <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> used it as a lie detection(LD) device. As a response to the risk of appearing self-contradicting,the ability to restore consistency (RC) throughargumentation emerged. In this game, in<strong>for</strong>mation quality isnot what is at stake. The point <strong>for</strong> individuals is to advertise(AD) their ability to per<strong>for</strong>m or resist LD. This advertisement behaviormakes sense within a costly signaling model of hum<strong>an</strong>communication (Dessalles 2007; 2008).The main difference with M&S’s position comes from AD.M&S are close to the CC/RC distinction when they speak ofevaluation vs. production (of arguments). They fail, however, tosee that these two faculties did not evolve <strong>for</strong> the sake of <strong>an</strong>y<strong>for</strong>m of public knowledge, but as signals. Individuals who c<strong>an</strong>publicly signal lies or errors by naming inconsistencies (CC)derive immediate social benefit (Dessalles 2007). Those whopublicly restore consistency (RC) gain social benefit, as well, orregain their momentarily lost status.Contrary to SKO, the competitive nature of AD explains why<strong>reason</strong>ing is far from remaining a private activity: Argumentationtakes up the major part of the 16,000 words spoken daily, onaverage (Mehl et al. 2007). Moreover, various observations byM&S make more sense within AD rather th<strong>an</strong> SKO, especiallythe fact that people are better at finding inconsistencies inothers’ line of <strong>reason</strong>ing <strong>an</strong>d at finding support <strong>for</strong> their own.Another argument in favor of AD is the futility of m<strong>an</strong>y conversationaltopics, which makes no sense from <strong>an</strong> SKO perspective.Yet <strong>an</strong>other good example of the divergence between AD <strong>an</strong>dSKO is offered by the BBS commentary system: Commentatorsare of course concerned by the overall quality of scientific knowledge,but most of them are even more motivated by the urge toshow their ability to point to some inconsistency in the targetarticle. SKO would perhaps hold if contributors accepted thattheir names be omitted.M&S str<strong>an</strong>gely <strong>do</strong> not mention a fundamental common propertybetween deliberative <strong>reason</strong>ing <strong>an</strong>d argumentation. Bothprocesses seem to consist in a sequential alternation betweenlogical incompatibilities <strong>an</strong>d attempts to resolve them. This76 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2


Commentary/Mercier & Sperber: <strong>Why</strong> <strong>do</strong> <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> <strong>reason</strong>?property is concisely captured by the conflict-abduction-negationprocedure that describes <strong>argumentative</strong> processes (Dessalles2008). The sequential nature of <strong>argumentative</strong> <strong>reason</strong>ing supportsthe central claim of the target article, but it is at oddswith <strong>an</strong>y idea of knowledge optimization. Virtually all artificial<strong>reason</strong>ing devices (from chess players to pl<strong>an</strong>ning programs)involve parallelism whenever possible (especially in mutioptioncomparison). So-called truth-mainten<strong>an</strong>ce systems <strong>an</strong>d argumentationsystems make use of graph representations that are notlimited to sequential processing (e.g., Dung 1995). In comparison,hum<strong>an</strong> <strong>argumentative</strong> <strong>reason</strong>ing is skewed. It is bound tostart from a logical incompatibility, <strong>an</strong>d then sequentiallycreeps <strong>for</strong>ward through recursive attempts to solve the currentincompatibility <strong>an</strong>d then detect new ones. Such m<strong>an</strong>ifestly suboptimalprocedure <strong>do</strong>es not make sense if the aim is knowledgeoptimization. It makes perfect sense, however, in the LD/ADcontext.The biological import<strong>an</strong>ce of in<strong>for</strong>mational capabilities is aconsequence of the particular political context of our species(Dessalles 2007). In that context, in<strong>for</strong>mation is not import<strong>an</strong>tas such; it is rather <strong>an</strong> excuse to show off in<strong>for</strong>mational capabilities,such as being the first to point to unexpected events. In theabsence of a lie detection system, such communication is boundto checkable, almost immediate, events. The advent of CC capabilitiesoffered a new occasion <strong>for</strong> individuals to compete, byallowing them to advertise their lie <strong>an</strong>d error detection capabilities.This new competition has side effects, such as opening thepossibility of communicating about past events that c<strong>an</strong>not bechecked directly. Knowledge improvement also turns out to bea side effect of <strong>reason</strong>ing <strong>an</strong>d argumentation. When <strong>reason</strong>ing<strong>an</strong>d producing arguments, speakers follow a more selfishagenda, which is to show off their competence <strong>for</strong> dealing with<strong>an</strong>omalies in in<strong>for</strong>mation.Reasoning is <strong>for</strong> thinking, not just <strong>for</strong> arguing<strong>do</strong>i:10.1017/S0140525X10002773Jonath<strong>an</strong> St. B. T. Ev<strong>an</strong>sCentre <strong>for</strong> Thinking <strong>an</strong>d L<strong>an</strong>guage, School of Psychology, University ofPlymouth, Plymouth PL4 8AA, United King<strong>do</strong>m.j.ev<strong>an</strong>s@plymouth.ac.ukAbstract: There is indeed extensive evidence that people per<strong>for</strong>m fairlypoorly in <strong>reason</strong>ing tasks <strong>an</strong>d that they often construct arguments <strong>for</strong>intuitively cued responses. Mercier & Sperber (M&S) may also be rightto claim that <strong>reason</strong>ing evolved primarily as argumentation. However, ifit did, the facility became exapted to the function of supportinguniquely hum<strong>an</strong> abilities <strong>for</strong> reflective thinking <strong>an</strong>d consequentialdecision making.A number of claims are made in the target article that are difficultto dispute. People <strong>do</strong> appear to be skilled at everyday argumentationwhile struggling to solve <strong>reason</strong>ing problems presented inthe psychological laboratory. There is a great deal of evidence inthe psychology of <strong>reason</strong>ing <strong>an</strong>d decision making – as theauthors demonstrate with admirable scholarship – that peoplefrequently use <strong>reason</strong>ing to justify intuitively cued responses.And of course it is much easier to argue that people evolvedskills of argumentation th<strong>an</strong> the ability to solve <strong>reason</strong>ing problems.However, as is commonly observed by evolutionary theorists,a facility which evolves <strong>for</strong> one function may become“exapted” <strong>for</strong> <strong>an</strong>other. Hence, my only concern is that theauthors may have used their own <strong>for</strong>midable skills of argumentationto overstate the case against explicit <strong>reason</strong>ing as a tool <strong>for</strong>rational thinking <strong>an</strong>d decision making.As Mercier <strong>an</strong>d Sperber (M&S) note, their <strong>an</strong>alysis has implications<strong>for</strong> the now ubiquitous dual-process theories of highercognition (Ev<strong>an</strong>s 2008). It is interesting to note that the veryfirst such <strong>theory</strong> in the psychology of <strong>reason</strong>ing was consistentwith the authors’ proposals. Wason <strong>an</strong>d Ev<strong>an</strong>s (1975; Ev<strong>an</strong>s &Wason 1976) distinguished between type 1 (intuitive) processes,which unconsciously cued the relev<strong>an</strong>ce of certain cards on theWason selection task, <strong>an</strong>d type 2 (explicit <strong>reason</strong>ing) processes,which served to confabulate justifications <strong>for</strong> these choices.Although it seems clear now that people <strong>do</strong> <strong>reason</strong> on the selectiontask, there is strong evidence that this is focused on findingjustifications <strong>for</strong> unconscious cued cards. However, where such ajustification c<strong>an</strong>not be found, recent evidence indicates that particip<strong>an</strong>tsmay withhold <strong>an</strong> intuitively prompted response (Ev<strong>an</strong>s& Ball 2010). Hence, even in this case, <strong>reason</strong>ing is per<strong>for</strong>mingsome beneficial role in decision making.M&S are also correct to say that in more recent years dualprocesstheorists have emphasised the efficacy of type 2 processingin problem solving <strong>an</strong>d decision making, especially <strong>for</strong>novel problems (e.g., Ev<strong>an</strong>s 2010; Ev<strong>an</strong>s & Over 1996;Kahnem<strong>an</strong> & Frederick 2002; St<strong>an</strong>ovich 1999; 2010). In particular,theorists have emphasized the ability of some individuals,especially those of higher cognitive ability, to engage in hypotheticalthinking <strong>an</strong>d mental simulation, decoupling their actualbeliefs in order to support suppositional <strong>reason</strong>ing (Ev<strong>an</strong>s2007; St<strong>an</strong>ovich 2010). Such theorists attribute the unique cognitive<strong>an</strong>d cultural achievements of the hum<strong>an</strong> species to the developmentof a second system of cognition or a new mind, largelyunavailable to other <strong>an</strong>imals. Moreover, it is proposed thatwhile both new <strong>an</strong>d old minds have instrumental rationality,they pursue different goals by different cognitive mech<strong>an</strong>isms(Ev<strong>an</strong>s 2010; St<strong>an</strong>ovich 2004). In particular, the old mind(broadly shared with higher <strong>an</strong>imals) is driven by the past, replicatingby evolution or individual learning past successes, whereasthe new mind (distinctively hum<strong>an</strong>) c<strong>an</strong> conduct mental simulations<strong>an</strong>d <strong>reason</strong> consequentially, <strong>an</strong>ticipating the future.M&S deal with this issue rather dismissively, stating that “thepossibility to deal with novelty <strong>an</strong>d to <strong>an</strong>ticipate the future is lessa characterization of <strong>reason</strong>ing th<strong>an</strong> it is of learning” (sect. 1.2,para. 3), going on to argue that the occasional successes of <strong>reason</strong>ingin helping us to solve problems would be insufficient to explainits evolution. It is possible to agree with the latter claim whilestrongly disputing the <strong>for</strong>mer. First, the learning mech<strong>an</strong>isms ofthe old mind <strong>do</strong> only enable us to repeat what has worked in thepast. For novel problems which require simulation of futureevents, such a mech<strong>an</strong>ism is largely useless. And while we areadmittedly fairly poor at consequential decision making (Baron1994) we c<strong>an</strong> <strong>do</strong> it. Since 1945, politici<strong>an</strong>s have so far resistedtheir traditional practice of applying their most powerfulweapons to their enemies when such weapons are nuclear, presumablybecause of the <strong>an</strong>ticipated catastrophic consequences.And while it is debatable whether the hum<strong>an</strong> race will in factavoid the disastrous effects of climate ch<strong>an</strong>ge, it could hardly bedenied that the world is currently engaged in detailed hypotheticalthinking (aided by computer models) about the future of thepl<strong>an</strong>et, <strong>an</strong>d that much current policy is being driven by this. Noother <strong>an</strong>imal c<strong>an</strong> even remotely think <strong>an</strong>d act in this way.M&S, as other evolutionary psychologists be<strong>for</strong>e them, assertthe <strong>do</strong>main-specific nature of hum<strong>an</strong> <strong>reason</strong>ing <strong>an</strong>d apparentlyoverlook the import<strong>an</strong>ce of heritable general intelligence (<strong>for</strong>detailed critique of such arguments, see St<strong>an</strong>ovich 2004; St<strong>an</strong>ovich& West 2003). Research on dual-process <strong>theory</strong> has provideda mass of evidence that the ability to solve novel<strong>reason</strong>ing <strong>an</strong>d decision problems is related to individual differencesin general intelligence, working-memory capacity, <strong>an</strong><strong>do</strong>ther (highly correlated) measures of cognitive ability. Solvingnovel problems is also related to rational thinking dispositions,which help to determine (St<strong>an</strong>ovich 2009; 2010) the tendencyto engage reflective <strong>reason</strong>ing rather th<strong>an</strong> rely on intuition (seealso Frederick 2005). Such findings fly in the face of fashionableclaims (e.g., Dijksterhuis et al. 2006b; Gigerenzer 2007; Gladwell2005) that we are better off relying on intuition th<strong>an</strong> engaging ourpowers of <strong>reason</strong>ing.BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2 77


Commentary/Mercier & Sperber: <strong>Why</strong> <strong>do</strong> <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> <strong>reason</strong>?The difficulty which such advocates of intuition have faced is toexplain why <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> evolved a capacity <strong>for</strong> <strong>reason</strong>ing which isbest not trusted. M&S attempt to fill that gap in the targetarticle, thus supporting what I believe to be a d<strong>an</strong>gerouslyflawed line of <strong>reason</strong>ing about hum<strong>an</strong> intelligence. It is notnecessary to follow them <strong>do</strong>wn this path in order to respect theintegrity of their arguments about the evolution of <strong>reason</strong>ingvia argumentation. Unique hum<strong>an</strong> abilities <strong>for</strong> reflectivethought have required the evolution of a number of facilities,including l<strong>an</strong>guage, metarepresentation, <strong>an</strong>d large <strong>for</strong>ebrains,none of which could plausibly have been driven by some Darwini<strong>an</strong>need <strong>for</strong> a new mind. If there were such a driver, surelyother <strong>an</strong>imals would have evolved hum<strong>an</strong>-like intelligence. It ismore plausible to argue that the new mind was <strong>an</strong> evolutionaryaccident, in which case <strong>an</strong> exapted ability <strong>for</strong> <strong>reason</strong>ing derivedfrom argumentation may well be part of that story.Artificial cognitive systems: Where <strong>do</strong>esargumentation fit in?<strong>do</strong>i:10.1017/S0140525X10002839John FoxDepartment of Engineering Science, University of Ox<strong>for</strong>d, Ox<strong>for</strong>d OX1, UnitedKing<strong>do</strong>m.John.fox@eng.ox.ac.uk www.cossac.orgAbstract: Mercier <strong>an</strong>d Sperber (M&S) suggest that hum<strong>an</strong> <strong>reason</strong>ing isreflective <strong>an</strong>d has evolved to support social interaction. Cognitive agentsbenefit from being able to reflect on their beliefs whether they are actingalone or socially. A <strong>for</strong>mal framework <strong>for</strong> argumentation that has emergedfrom research on artificial cognitive systems that parallels M&S’sproposals may shed light on mental processes that underpin socialinteractions.Mercier <strong>an</strong>d Sperber (M&S) offer a provocative view of argumentationas <strong>reason</strong>ing <strong>for</strong> social purposes. Hum<strong>an</strong> <strong>reason</strong>ing,they suggest, is not the same as classical inference in the sensethat in <strong>reason</strong>ing, the rationale <strong>for</strong> conclusions is available <strong>for</strong>reflection <strong>an</strong>d hence <strong>for</strong> communication <strong>an</strong>d discussion. This is<strong>an</strong> import<strong>an</strong>t distinction, but there are also grounds <strong>for</strong> believingthat reflective <strong>reason</strong>ing has general benefits <strong>for</strong> <strong>an</strong>y cognitiveagent, not just <strong>for</strong> social interaction.A <strong>do</strong>main in which these benefits are evident is <strong>reason</strong>ing <strong>an</strong>ddecision making in medicine. I have a long-st<strong>an</strong>ding interest inthe cognitive mech<strong>an</strong>isms that support decision making <strong>an</strong><strong>do</strong>ther high-level cognitive processes that underpin hum<strong>an</strong> expertise,<strong>an</strong>d argumentation has acquired a central role in our work.Early approaches based on logical <strong>an</strong>d probabilistic simulationsof cognitive processes yielded promising results (Fox 1980), butextending either model to capture the flexible <strong>an</strong>d adaptive characterof hum<strong>an</strong> thinking proved difficult. Among the <strong>reason</strong>s <strong>for</strong>this were that there was no representation of the rationale onwhich to reflect – to question prior conclusions or the relev<strong>an</strong>ceof evidence, <strong>for</strong> example.Subsequent work has sought to address this. This research programmehas focused on artificial intelligence (AI) rather th<strong>an</strong>psychology, so my comments should be taken as complementaryto the M&S hypothesis rather th<strong>an</strong> directly addressing it.However, I will suggest that a cognitive agent, whether hum<strong>an</strong>or artificial, derives major benefits from being able to reflect onits mental states; its goals, intentions, justifications <strong>for</strong> itsbeliefs <strong>an</strong>d so on (Das et al. 1997; Fox & Das 2000; Fox et al.1990). Metacognitive capabilities confer flexibility <strong>an</strong>d robustnesswhether <strong>an</strong> agent is acting alone or in concert with others.Mercier <strong>an</strong>d Sperber’s (M&S’s) distinction between inference,which they call “intuitive,” <strong>an</strong>d <strong>reason</strong>ing, which af<strong>for</strong>ds “reflection,”may perhaps be clarified by a <strong>for</strong>mal perspective. A st<strong>an</strong>dardway of <strong>for</strong>malizing inference systems is to provide a“signature” that specifies how one set of sentences (e.g., propositions)is entailed by <strong>an</strong>other set of sentences (e.g., a databaseof propositions <strong>an</strong>d rules). This is a typical inference signature:DatabaseConclusion LInferenceThat is to say: Conclusion c<strong>an</strong> be validly inferred from Databaseunder the axioms of inference system L.Complex cognitive tasks like decision making <strong>an</strong>d pl<strong>an</strong>ningrequire a more complex signature. To emulate hum<strong>an</strong> clinicaldecision making, we sought a <strong>reason</strong>ing model in which generalmedical knowledge is applied to specific patient data by arguingthe pros <strong>an</strong>d cons of alternative ways of achieving clinical goals.This is summarized by the following signature.Knowledge < Data(Claim, Grounds, Qualifier) LAArgumentationIn contrast to the atomic conclusion of the inference signature,this <strong>for</strong>mulation makes the structure of arguments explicit. InLA, a Logic of Argument (Fox et al. 1993), the structure distinguishesthree things: the Claim (a tentative conclusion),Grounds (justification), <strong>an</strong>d Qualifier (the confidence in theClaim warr<strong>an</strong>ted by the argument. As in classical decision<strong>theory</strong>, but not classical logic, collections of arguments c<strong>an</strong> beaggregated within the LA framework to yield <strong>an</strong> overallmeasure of confidence in competing claims. For example, <strong>an</strong>agent may have multiple lines of argument <strong>for</strong> <strong>an</strong>d against competingdiagnoses or treatments, each of which increases ordecreases overall confidence.LA was developed <strong>for</strong> cognitive tasks like situation assessment,decision making, <strong>an</strong>d pl<strong>an</strong>ning, which often involve uncertainty.Uncertainty is modelled explicitly by me<strong>an</strong>s of the Qualifier <strong>an</strong>dthere<strong>for</strong>e permits reflection. A qualifier may indicate that <strong>an</strong>argument “supports” or “opposes” a claim, <strong>for</strong> example. In TheUses of Argument the philosopher Stephen Toulmin has alsopointed out that people routinely use linguistic qualifiers suchas “presumably...,” “possibly...,” “probably...,” <strong>an</strong>d theirlexical <strong>an</strong>d affixal negative <strong>for</strong>ms; linguistic qualifiers c<strong>an</strong> be <strong>for</strong>malisedas conditions <strong>for</strong> accepting claims based on collections ofarguments (Elv<strong>an</strong>g-Gor<strong>an</strong>sson et al. 1993). Qu<strong>an</strong>titative schemes<strong>for</strong> expressing argument strength, such as Bayesi<strong>an</strong> representations(e.g., Oaks<strong>for</strong>d <strong>an</strong>d Chater [2009] discussion in BBS vol.32) c<strong>an</strong> also be accommodated within the framework (Fox2003; Fox et al. 1993).It is a truism that the more supporting (opposing) argumentsthere are <strong>for</strong> a claim, the more (less) confidence we shouldhave in it, which we have called the evidential mode (Fox, inpress). Another mode, dialectical argumentation, exploits theobservation that discussion <strong>an</strong>d debate also commonly involves“attacks” which rebut or undercut the arguments of otheragents. Researchers in AI <strong>an</strong>d computational logic are giving subst<strong>an</strong>tialattention to argumentation <strong>for</strong> modelling interactions <strong>an</strong>ddialogues between cognitive agents (Besnard & Hunter 2008).Argumentation <strong>theory</strong> may there<strong>for</strong>e offer insights into thekinds of social interactions that M&S are investigating.Formal argumentation <strong>theory</strong> has practical applications. LA isthe foundation of PRO<strong>for</strong>ma, a l<strong>an</strong>guage <strong>for</strong> modelling cognitiveagents (Fox & Das 2000; Fox et al. 2003); which has been used todevelop m<strong>an</strong>y practical decision tools, notably in medicine(OpenClinical 2001–6). Argumentation <strong>theory</strong> may also help toclarify the philosophical <strong>an</strong>d theoretical nature of somewhatvague notions like evidence, as this term is commonly used inlegal, medical, scientific, <strong>an</strong>d other kinds of <strong>reason</strong>ing <strong>an</strong>d ineveryday decision-making <strong>an</strong>d evidence-based discussions(OpenClinical 2001–6).These practical uses of argumentation <strong>theory</strong> <strong>do</strong> not directlyaddress M&S’s proposition that hum<strong>an</strong> cognition has evolvedto support argument-based <strong>reason</strong>ing, but the practical power78 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2


Commentary/Mercier & Sperber: <strong>Why</strong> <strong>do</strong> <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> <strong>reason</strong>?of argumentation techniques seems to corroborate their beliefthat there are good evolutionary <strong>reason</strong>s why <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> argue. I<strong>do</strong> not intend to make psychological claims or predictionsbased on the specifics of LA, however. The logic was not developedas a descriptive model, <strong>an</strong>d more recent argumentationsystems <strong>do</strong> not all comply with its signature. However thegeneral approach may offer a framework <strong>for</strong> articulating <strong>an</strong>dcomparing psychological theories of inference <strong>an</strong>d <strong>reason</strong>ing<strong>an</strong>d the cognitive processes that depend on them.It appears that there are signific<strong>an</strong>t convergences betweenM&S’s psychological proposals <strong>an</strong>d developments in AI <strong>an</strong>d computerscience which have been driven by interests in artificialcognitive systems. Argumentation is a new <strong>an</strong>d versatile <strong>reason</strong>ingparadigm that is being studied in m<strong>an</strong>y different fields; itmay have wide implications <strong>for</strong> general theories of cognition.Reasoning, argumentation, <strong>an</strong>d cognition<strong>do</strong>i:10.1017/S0140525X10002979Keith Fr<strong>an</strong>kishDepartment of Philosophy, The Open University, Milton Keynes MK7 6AA,United King<strong>do</strong>m.k.fr<strong>an</strong>kish@open.ac.ukhttp://www.open.ac.uk/Arts/philos/fr<strong>an</strong>kish.htmAbstract: This commentary <strong>do</strong>es three things. First, it offers furthersupport <strong>for</strong> the view that explicit <strong>reason</strong>ing evolved <strong>for</strong> publicargumentation. Second, it suggests that promoting effectivecommunication may not be the only, or even the main, function ofpublic argumentation. Third, it argues that the data Mercier <strong>an</strong>dSperber (M&S) cite are compatible with the view that <strong>reason</strong>ing hassubsequently been co-opted to play a role in individual cognition.I agree with Mercier <strong>an</strong>d Sperber (M&S) on the need <strong>for</strong> a dualprocessperspective that distinguishes intuitive inference <strong>an</strong>dexplicit <strong>reason</strong>ing, <strong>an</strong>d I find M&S’s case <strong>for</strong> the <strong>argumentative</strong><strong>theory</strong> of <strong>reason</strong>ing attractive. The <strong>theory</strong> is also a salutary correctiveto the tendency of dual-process theorists to see explicit(“type 2”) <strong>reason</strong>ing as unbiased <strong>an</strong>d normatively correct. (Hence<strong>for</strong>th,I shall follow M&S in using “<strong>reason</strong>ing” <strong>for</strong> explicitthought processes, as opposed to non-conscious intuitiveinferences.)Here I shall add some brief, broadly sympathetic comments.First, I w<strong>an</strong>t to outline a further <strong>reason</strong> <strong>for</strong> thinking that <strong>reason</strong>ingevolved <strong>for</strong> social, <strong>argumentative</strong> purposes. M&S claim that<strong>reason</strong>ing is a personal-level activity, involving the constructionof complex arguments in response to intuitive beliefs about thestrength of the component steps. This view, which I havemyself defended in various places (e.g., Fr<strong>an</strong>kish 1998; 2004;2009), requires that <strong>reason</strong>ers have intuitive-level knowledge ofrules of inference, such as modus ponens, which guides theirexplicit <strong>reason</strong>ing. (Rules here includes rules of thumb; the argumentswe construct need not be demonstrative; see Fr<strong>an</strong>kish2004.) Now, there are two main <strong>for</strong>ms these rules could take:They could be abstract, defined over concepts <strong>an</strong>d logical structures,or they could be linguistic, defined over the words <strong>an</strong>dstructures of a natural l<strong>an</strong>guage. (Rules of the latter kind c<strong>an</strong>be applied in constructing arguments, provided the argumentsare expressed linguistically, either overtly or in inner speech.)They are far more likely to take the latter <strong>for</strong>m, however,especially in early hum<strong>an</strong> societies. Knowledge of linguisticrules c<strong>an</strong> be obtained relatively easily in the course of exposureto, <strong>an</strong>d engagement in, argument with one’s peers. (It mighteven be purely procedural, embedded in routines <strong>for</strong> m<strong>an</strong>ipulatinglinguistic structures.) Knowledge of abstract rules, by contrast,would require explicit teaching, or at least abstractionfrom previously acquired linguistic rules. (These considerationsare set out at more length in Fr<strong>an</strong>kish 1998 <strong>an</strong>d 2004.) Notethat I am assuming here that the knowledge that guides explicitargument construction is largely learned. The case <strong>for</strong> this isstrong; <strong>reason</strong>ing strategies are known to be responsive toverbal instruction <strong>an</strong>d to vary dramatically between individuals(e.g., St<strong>an</strong>ovich 1999). Note, too, that this view is compatiblewith M&S’s claim that there is a specialized intuitive mech<strong>an</strong>ism<strong>for</strong> representing arguments. It merely implies that the mech<strong>an</strong>ismoperates primarily on linguistic representations <strong>an</strong>d that itsrule database is acquired.If this is right, then it supports the view that the original functionof <strong>reason</strong>ing was social <strong>an</strong>d <strong>argumentative</strong>. For it suggeststhat individual <strong>reason</strong>ing is <strong>an</strong> internalized version of overt argumentation,conducted in inner speech <strong>an</strong>d guided by knowledgeacquired in the course of public argumentation. (There are other<strong>reason</strong>s, too, <strong>for</strong> thinking that conscious <strong>reason</strong>ing is l<strong>an</strong>guageinvolving;see, e.g., Carruthers 1996 <strong>an</strong>d 1998.) And this inturn suggests that public argumentation predated individual<strong>reason</strong>ing <strong>an</strong>d that whatever adaptations we have <strong>for</strong> <strong>reason</strong>ingoriginally evolved to serve the <strong>for</strong>mer. (We c<strong>an</strong> tell a bootstrappingstory about the origins of the knowledge that guidespublic argumentation, involving a process of cultural evolution.)Second, I w<strong>an</strong>t to say something about the function of publicargumentation. M&S argue that this is to make communicationmore efficient <strong>an</strong>d reliable. I agree that argumentation <strong>do</strong>esthis, but it may not be its only, or even main, function. As thedata M&S cite make clear, group <strong>reason</strong>ing is often a strikinglyeffective process of inquiry, which zeroes in on the correct solution.Reasoning may thus have evolved primarily <strong>for</strong> collectivecognition, if not <strong>for</strong> the individual variety. (It would not be surprisingif evolution preferred collective cognitive mech<strong>an</strong>isms.Early hum<strong>an</strong> societies would have depended heavily on collectiveaction <strong>an</strong>d problem solving, whereas individual projects mighthave disrupted group cohesion.) Argumentation may haveother import<strong>an</strong>t social functions, too. For example, displays of<strong>argumentative</strong> prowess may serve to attract mates, providing evidenceof health <strong>an</strong>d mental acuity.Third, while I agree that <strong>reason</strong>ing evolved to serve publicargumentation (<strong>an</strong>d still <strong>do</strong>es serve it), I suspect M&S underestimatethe extent to which it has subsequently been co-opted toplay a role in individual cognition. For the dem<strong>an</strong>ds of argumentation<strong>an</strong>d individual cognition may not be as different as M&Ssuppose. There are two points here. First, sound argumentstend to be convincing <strong>an</strong>d optimal decisions defensible, so <strong>an</strong><strong>argumentative</strong> mech<strong>an</strong>ism will often deliver the same results acognitive mech<strong>an</strong>ism would. Secondly, the biases natural to argumentationmay also affect much individual <strong>reason</strong>ing. For this toomay often have a quasi-<strong>argumentative</strong> structure, with individualsseeking to defend their attitudes <strong>an</strong>d decisions against criticismfrom their future selves.I shall exp<strong>an</strong>d on the latter point. The idea is that, even asprivate <strong>reason</strong>ers, we have other motives besides epistemicones. We often accept propositions <strong>for</strong> pragmatic <strong>reason</strong>s,because we find them com<strong>for</strong>ting, or because they are popularwith our peers. Moreover, we value psychological stability <strong>for</strong>its own sake; we like to have a settled set of opinions (to knowour own minds) (Fr<strong>an</strong>kish 2004). We may there<strong>for</strong>e be inclinedto bolster our opinions with arguments, so that our futureselves will be able to resist counter-evidence <strong>an</strong>d avoid distressingch<strong>an</strong>ges of mind. Thus, even in private we may tend todisplay confirmation bias <strong>an</strong>d motivated, proactive <strong>reason</strong>ing.Something similar goes <strong>for</strong> decision making. Intentions serve tocoordinate future pl<strong>an</strong>ning (e.g., Bratm<strong>an</strong> 1987), <strong>an</strong>d in m<strong>an</strong>ycases it is better to <strong>for</strong>m <strong>an</strong>d stick with <strong>an</strong> intention, even if itis not optimal, th<strong>an</strong> to remain undecided or keep ch<strong>an</strong>gingone’s pl<strong>an</strong>s. Given this, people may tend to settle on decisionsthey find easy to justify to themselves, <strong>an</strong>d to buttress themwith arguments, so that they will not be tempted to revisethem later. Hence, they may still tend to exhibit <strong>reason</strong>-basedchoice, even when they <strong>do</strong> not have <strong>an</strong> eye on the reactions oftheir peers.BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2 79


Commentary/Mercier & Sperber: <strong>Why</strong> <strong>do</strong> <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> <strong>reason</strong>?Thus, while the results cited by M&S may show that <strong>reason</strong>ing isnot well adapted <strong>for</strong> individual intellectual inquiry (which, as M&Srightly stress, we find very hard), they <strong>do</strong> not show that it is notadapted to other roles in individual cognition, broadly construed.Of course, as M&S note, motivated <strong>reason</strong>ing <strong>an</strong>d <strong>reason</strong>-basedchoice often have unwelcome consequences (especially, perhaps,in modern technological societies), but, if <strong>an</strong>ything, this tends tosupport the present suggestion, since the more functions thesebiases have, the more gains there are to offset the costs.Reasoning as deliberative in function butdialogic in structure <strong>an</strong>d origin<strong>do</strong>i:10.1017/S0140525X10002906Peter Godfrey-Smith a <strong>an</strong>d Kritika Yegnash<strong>an</strong>kar<strong>an</strong> ba Department of Philosophy, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138;b Department of Philosophy, Bard College, Ann<strong>an</strong>dale-on-Hudson, NY 12504.pgs@fas.harvard.edu kyegnash@bard.eduhttp://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/≏pgs/Abstract: Mercier <strong>an</strong>d Sperber (M&S) claim that the main function of<strong>reason</strong>ing is to generate support <strong>for</strong> conclusions derived unconsciously.An alternative account holds that <strong>reason</strong>ing has a deliberative functioneven though it is <strong>an</strong> internalized <strong>an</strong>alogue of public discourse. Wesketch this alternative <strong>an</strong>d compare it with M&S’s in the light of theempirical phenomena they discuss.Mercier <strong>an</strong>d Sperber (M&S) argue that the function of <strong>reason</strong>ingis <strong>argumentative</strong>: “It is to devise <strong>an</strong>d evaluate arguments intendedto persuade” (see their abstract). This contrasts with a more familiardeliberative view of <strong>reason</strong>ing, which holds that the functionof <strong>reason</strong>ing is to draw new conclusions <strong>an</strong>d <strong>for</strong>m new beliefs.Reasoning within that more familiar view is then seen as aspecial kind of inference, perhaps one with a distinctive relationshipto consciousness <strong>an</strong>d the rational faculties of the wholeagent. Such views also tend to be individualistic; they hold thatthe psychology of <strong>reason</strong>ing has no special relation to social life.M&S <strong>do</strong> allow that sometimes <strong>reason</strong>ing leads to new conclusionson practical <strong>an</strong>d theoretical matters being drawn bythe <strong>reason</strong>er, conclusions that c<strong>an</strong> be put to use in guidingaction. But this is <strong>an</strong> incidental by-product of <strong>reason</strong>ing’s mainfunction, where “function” is understood in evolutionary terms.There is also a third option, however, one drawing on the viewsof the Russi<strong>an</strong> psychologist Lev Vygotsky (1986). On this view,<strong>reason</strong>ing is deliberative in function but dialogic in structure (Yegnash<strong>an</strong>kar<strong>an</strong>2010). Reasoning is <strong>an</strong> internalized <strong>an</strong>alogue of interpersonaldiscourse. Interpersonal discourse itself might betypically a complicated mix of attempts to persuade, attempts tothink things through <strong>an</strong>d <strong>for</strong>m new conclusions, <strong>an</strong>d other activities,but what results in our psychology is a tool whose functionis primarily deliberative. We <strong>do</strong> not think that this view is clearlysuperior to M&S’s, but we <strong>do</strong> think it is <strong>an</strong> import<strong>an</strong>t option tohave on the table when considering the evolution of <strong>reason</strong>ing<strong>an</strong>d the opposition between deliberative <strong>an</strong>d <strong>argumentative</strong> views.Once we have the contrast between M&S’s view <strong>an</strong>d theVygotski<strong>an</strong> version of the deliberative view in mind, themessage of the empirical evidence is less clear. M&S say that,on their view, “<strong>reason</strong>ing should produce its best results whenused in <strong>argumentative</strong> contexts, most notably in group discussions”(sect. 1.2, para. 11). This, they say, is what we actuallyfind. But if the aim of <strong>reason</strong>ing is to help in persuasion, onewould think that a context of dialogue would promote more<strong>an</strong>d more agile deployment of justifications <strong>for</strong> whatever eachagent <strong>an</strong>tecedently believes, not a willingness to respond toothers’ arguments by ch<strong>an</strong>ging one’s mind. M&S see people aspoor individual <strong>reason</strong>ers but “skilled arguers,” where skilledarguers “are not after the truth but after arguments supportingtheir views” (see their abstract). But that picture is at tensionwith the fact that people interacting in groups are, as M&Saccept, quite good at finding the truth by exch<strong>an</strong>ging ideas, <strong>an</strong>dnot merely at buttressing their own positions. And on the M&Sview as we underst<strong>an</strong>d it, <strong>an</strong>y similarity between ch<strong>an</strong>ges ofmind induced by the social exch<strong>an</strong>ge of ideas <strong>an</strong>d ch<strong>an</strong>ges ofmind induced by private reflection is incidental.On the other side, some <strong>for</strong>ms of confirmation bias <strong>do</strong> fit betterwith M&S’s view. On a Vygotski<strong>an</strong> deliberative view, <strong>an</strong> agent hasno good <strong>reason</strong> to prefer a search <strong>for</strong> confirmation of a hypothesisthey are inclined to believe, to a search <strong>for</strong> disconfirmation of thehypothesis. On M&S’s view, this tendency <strong>do</strong>es make sense.Finally, we suggest that M&S may underestimate the adaptivevalue of the directions agents may be in led by conscious <strong>reason</strong>ing.For example, they discuss <strong>an</strong> experiment where individualsare asked to choose between a small heart-shaped chocolate<strong>an</strong>d a larger chocolate shaped like a roach. Most individualschose the roach-shaped one, because making the other choicewould be harder to rationally justify. M&S say that “in the lightof the results from the psychology of disgust ..., we c<strong>an</strong> tellthat their choice was certainly the wrong one” (sect. 5.3.4,para. 2). But if <strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>alogue of this chocolate choice was facedin <strong>an</strong> evolutionary setting, a <strong>reason</strong>er would win out.Underst<strong>an</strong>ding, evaluating, <strong>an</strong>d producingarguments: Training is necessary <strong>for</strong><strong>reason</strong>ing skills<strong>do</strong>i:10.1017/S0140525X1000292XMaralee HarrellDepartment of Philosophy, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 15213.mharrell@cmu.eduhttp://www.hss.cmu.edu/philosophy/faculty-harrell.phpAbstract: This commentary suggests that the general population hasmuch less <strong>reason</strong>ing skill th<strong>an</strong> is claimed by Mercier & Sperber (M&S).In particular, m<strong>an</strong>y studies suggest that the skills of underst<strong>an</strong>ding,evaluating, <strong>an</strong>d producing arguments are generally poor in thepopulation of people who have not had specific training.The target article by Mercier & Sperber (M&S) offers severalarguments <strong>for</strong> their Reasoning is Argumentation hypothesis –that the primary function of <strong>reason</strong>ing in hum<strong>an</strong> beings is toevaluate <strong>an</strong>d produce arguments intended to persuade. WhileI believe that the Reasoning is Argumentation hypothesis is interesting<strong>an</strong>d should be explored, my comments focus on onespecific claim M&S make.To show that the predictions of their hypothesis are borne out,M&S point to multiple psychological studies that purport todemonstrate that people are generally able to <strong>reason</strong> well. Inthis context, <strong>reason</strong>ing well consists in being able to underst<strong>an</strong>d,evaluate, <strong>an</strong>d produce arguments. In particular, M&S claim thatstudies show that (1) people are good at evaluating both subarguments<strong>an</strong>d overall arguments, <strong>an</strong>d (2) people c<strong>an</strong> generallyproduce good arguments in a debatelike setting.In fact, the experimental evidence from a variety of studies,including surprisingly m<strong>an</strong>y that are cited favorably by M&S,suggests that people <strong>do</strong> not have these particular skills. Onegeneral challenge in extracting broader lessons from experimentaldata is that the skills of underst<strong>an</strong>ding, evaluating, <strong>an</strong>d producingarguments are vaguely defined in the literature in general,<strong>an</strong>d the target article is no exception. There is a crucial distinctionbetween argument content <strong>an</strong>d argument structure that isignored, <strong>an</strong>d some studies focus solely on argument content,while others focus on argument structure. The extent to whicheither kind of study supports claims about particip<strong>an</strong>ts’ abilityto <strong>reason</strong> well depends on this distinction in <strong>an</strong> import<strong>an</strong>t way.80 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2


Commentary/Mercier & Sperber: <strong>Why</strong> <strong>do</strong> <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> <strong>reason</strong>?The definition of <strong>an</strong> argument given by M&S is st<strong>an</strong>dard: A setof statements, one of which is the conclusion, which is supposed tobe epistemically supported by the other statements, called the premises.The content of <strong>an</strong> argument refers to the propositions thatare expressed by the premises <strong>an</strong>d conclusion, whereas the structureof the argument refers to the way the premises work togetherto support the conclusion. Successfully underst<strong>an</strong>ding <strong>an</strong> argumentconsists in being able to identify both the content <strong>an</strong>d thestructure of the argument: the conclusion, the premises, <strong>an</strong>d theparticular way the premises support the conclusion (e.g.,whether the premises are linked or convergent). Successfully evaluating<strong>an</strong> argument consists in being able to assess the content(i.e., determine whether the premises are true) <strong>an</strong>d the structure(i.e., determine whether, assuming that they are true, the premisesactually <strong>do</strong> support the conclusion). Finally, successfully constructing<strong>an</strong> argument consists in being able to supply true premises<strong>an</strong>d specify how those premises work together to supportthe conclusion. Although structure <strong>an</strong>d content are both relev<strong>an</strong>t<strong>for</strong> all three activities, they are relev<strong>an</strong>t in different ways, <strong>an</strong>d sogreat care is required (but not always taken) in designing experimentaltasks that appropriately test them.Problematic empirical evidence arises <strong>for</strong> all three: argumentunderst<strong>an</strong>ding, argument evaluation, <strong>an</strong>d argument production.For the first process, there actually seems to be sc<strong>an</strong>t researchin the area of argument underst<strong>an</strong>ding. The little research that<strong>do</strong>es exist in this area is mixed. Some studies (e.g., Ricco 2003,cited by M&S) suggest that <strong>for</strong> simple arguments, adults c<strong>an</strong>,when prompted, differentiate between linked <strong>an</strong>d convergentarguments. Other studies, however, suggest that, even <strong>for</strong>simple arguments, untrained college students c<strong>an</strong> identify theconclusion but without prompting are poor at both identifyingthe premises <strong>an</strong>d how the premises support the conclusion(Harrell 2006; 2008; <strong>for</strong>thcoming).Second, argument evaluation is usually loosely, <strong>an</strong>d onlyimplicitly, defined as being able either to identify <strong>reason</strong>ing fallaciesor to differentiate <strong>reason</strong>able arguments from un<strong>reason</strong>ableones. The research on argument evaluation seems mixed, at best.In particular, a number of systematic biases have been found.When witnessing <strong>an</strong> argument from the outside, particip<strong>an</strong>ts’ judgmentof the burden of proof depends on who speaks first (Bailenson& Rips 1996, cited by M&S), <strong>an</strong>d particip<strong>an</strong>ts routinely mistakeinnocuous repetition <strong>for</strong> circularity (Rips 2002, cited by M&S).When participating in <strong>an</strong> argument themselves, particip<strong>an</strong>ts tendto <strong>reason</strong> less well th<strong>an</strong> when witnessing <strong>an</strong> argument (Neum<strong>an</strong>et al. 2006; Thompson et al. 2005b; both cited by M&S).Finally, in m<strong>an</strong>y of these studies, the perception by theresearchers that particip<strong>an</strong>ts were able to “build complex arguments”(sect. 2.2, para. 3) is vague or ambiguous. Producing <strong>an</strong>argument is import<strong>an</strong>tly different from, <strong>for</strong> example, mere factgathering, but the research focuses almost exclusively on nothingmore complex th<strong>an</strong> the listing of <strong>reason</strong>s to believe. Even <strong>for</strong>this simple kind of argument production, studies suggest thatboth low- <strong>an</strong>d high-cognitive-ability particip<strong>an</strong>ts have difficultyproducing evidence <strong>for</strong> a claim (Sá et al. 2005, cited by M&S).Contrary to the claims by M&S, a wide literature supports thecontention that the particular skills of underst<strong>an</strong>ding, evaluating,<strong>an</strong>d producing arguments are generally poor in the population ofpeople who have not had specific training <strong>an</strong>d that specific trainingis what improves these skills. Some studies, <strong>for</strong> example, showthat students per<strong>for</strong>m signific<strong>an</strong>tly better on <strong>reason</strong>ing tasks onlywhen they have learned to identify premises <strong>an</strong>d conclusions(Shaw 1996, cited by M&S) or have learned some st<strong>an</strong>dard argumentationnorms (Weinstock et al. 2004, cited by M&S). M&Smay be correct that some of these negative results arisebecause the stakes are too low, but m<strong>an</strong>y studies that showimprovements from specific training occur in high-stakesenvironments like a college course (Harrell, <strong>for</strong>thcoming;Twardy 2004; v<strong>an</strong> Gelder 2005; v<strong>an</strong> Gelder et al. 2004). Thissuggests that difficulty with underst<strong>an</strong>ding, evaluating, <strong>an</strong>d producingarguments may be a deeper feature of our cognition.The <strong>argumentative</strong> <strong>theory</strong> of <strong>reason</strong>ing appliesto scientists <strong>an</strong>d philosophers, too<strong>do</strong>i:10.1017/S0140525X10002931John A. JohnsonDepartment of Psychology, Pennsylv<strong>an</strong>ia State University, DuBois, PA 15801.j5j@psu.eduhttp://www.personal.psu.edu/≏j5j/Abstract: Logical consistency dem<strong>an</strong>ds that Mercier <strong>an</strong>d Sperber’s(M&S’s) <strong>argumentative</strong> <strong>theory</strong> of <strong>reason</strong>ing apply to their own<strong>reason</strong>ing in the target article. Although they hint that their argumentapplies to professional <strong>reason</strong>ers such as scientists <strong>an</strong>d philosophers,they <strong>do</strong> not develop this idea. In this commentary, I discuss theapplicability of <strong>argumentative</strong> <strong>theory</strong> to science <strong>an</strong>d philosophy,emphasizing the perils of moral <strong>reason</strong>ing.Mercier <strong>an</strong>d Sperber (M&S) argue that the primary evolvedfunction of <strong>reason</strong>ing is persuasive argumentation. If theprimary function of <strong>an</strong>y evolved trait – including <strong>reason</strong>ingability – is the same <strong>for</strong> all members of a species, then itfollows that professional <strong>reason</strong>ers (including scientists <strong>an</strong>d philosophers)are primarily in the business of persuasive argumentation.Furthermore, if M&S’s dual-process model of <strong>reason</strong>ing isaccurate, professional <strong>reason</strong>ers initially arrive at their conclusionsby intuitive leaps <strong>an</strong>d only later construct logical argumentsto convince others of these conclusions. The notion thatscientists <strong>an</strong>d philosophers are more concerned with persuadingothers that something is true th<strong>an</strong> with discovering truth contradictsthe image of scientists <strong>an</strong>d philosophers as dispassionatetruth-seekers. This response to M&S’s target article aims todevelop this subversive implication of their argument.That M&S’s <strong>argumentative</strong> <strong>theory</strong> applies to their own <strong>reason</strong>ingis necessary if their <strong>theory</strong> is to be consistent. To suggestotherwise is to commit what Little (1972) called the nonreflexivefallacy. Yet M&S spend virtually the entire article discussingstudies of nonscientists <strong>an</strong>d nonphilosophers, with just the briefestmention of how their <strong>theory</strong> might apply to professional <strong>reason</strong>ers.One exception is a reference to reviewers of scientificm<strong>an</strong>uscripts who look <strong>for</strong> flaws in papers to justify rejectionwhen they <strong>do</strong> not agree with a paper’s conclusion. They alsoremark near the end of their article that even among scientiststhe ability to control one’s own biases is “uncommon” <strong>an</strong>d“almost freakish” (sect. 6, para. 7).Perhaps the dearth of examples of professional-<strong>reason</strong>ing-quaargumentationis due to space limitations. Or, perhaps there islittle empirical research on this topic. Or, perhaps other professional<strong>reason</strong>ers will not find the <strong>theory</strong> as congenial as M&Ssuggest in their concluding sentence. After all, it could be somewhatdeme<strong>an</strong>ing to see one’s professional activity (<strong>reason</strong>ing) asequivalent to ordinary squabbling over whether my favoritesports team is better th<strong>an</strong> your favorite sports team. WhereasLittle (1972) aims to elevate ordinary people to the status of scientists,M&S appear to be challenging the status of scientists <strong>an</strong>d philosophersas elite thinkers. To suggest that “[s]killed arguers,however, are not after the truth but after arguments supportingtheir views” (see the M&S abstract) is to challenge the idea thatscientists <strong>an</strong>d philosophers are motivated in <strong>an</strong> unbiased way bypure curiosity about what is true.I believe that we professional <strong>reason</strong>ers should accept M&S’shumbling view of our activities because it is <strong>an</strong> accurate descriptionof reality. Yes, we are interested in truth, but we relish thethought of convincing others that we have discovered import<strong>an</strong>ttruths. I must confess that the M&S thesis was immediately congenialto me because it affirms my own long-held beliefs abouthow professional <strong>reason</strong>ers such as scientists <strong>an</strong>d moral philosophersgo about their work (Johnson et al. 1988). Observations ofthe actual behavior of scientific researchers indicate that textbookdescriptions of science are highly inaccurate. Scientists <strong>do</strong> notbegin with a thorough set of dispassionate observations aboutBEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2 81


Commentary/Mercier & Sperber: <strong>Why</strong> <strong>do</strong> <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> <strong>reason</strong>?some aspect of the world, followed by <strong>for</strong>mulation of hypothesesthat are tested <strong>an</strong>d immediately ab<strong>an</strong><strong>do</strong>ned if disconfirmed bydata. I propose that the following account is more accurate.Research <strong>for</strong> professional <strong>reason</strong>ers begins with <strong>an</strong> emotionalattraction to certain ideas, <strong>an</strong> attraction Tomkins (1965) called“ideo-affective reson<strong>an</strong>ce.” This emotional reson<strong>an</strong>ce c<strong>an</strong> causescientists to cling tenaciously to ideas, even in the face of counterevidence.In some ways, science resembles legal proceedings inwhich the very best case <strong>for</strong> guilt or innocence is presented byuncompromising prosecuting <strong>an</strong>d defense attorneys, respectively.Scientists who resonate to different views clash in conferences<strong>an</strong>d in journals. Each seeks to convince others that he or she iscorrect. M&S review research indicating that when members ofgroups holding disparate views debate, each arguing <strong>for</strong> a differentview, “truth wins” (sect. 2.3, para. 1). Perhaps truth <strong>do</strong>es win oftenenough in jury trials <strong>an</strong>d scientific debates, but as we all know,sometimes it <strong>do</strong>es not. M&S might be expressing unwarr<strong>an</strong>ted optimismhere.I w<strong>an</strong>t to close my commentary with some observations aboutmoral <strong>reason</strong>ing. Research by Haidt (2001), mentioned by M&S,<strong>an</strong>d by Joshua Greene (2003) strongly supports a dual-processmodel wherein people inst<strong>an</strong>t<strong>an</strong>eously decide if <strong>an</strong> act is “good”<strong>an</strong>d there<strong>for</strong>e something we “ought” to <strong>do</strong> by taking note of theimmediate, reflexive feelings that emerge when thinking aboutthe act. In the second stage of the dual process, they mayattempt to defend their feelings in terms of rational argument. Professionalphilosophers are much better at the <strong>reason</strong>ing part of theprocess, but are still guided initially by emotional reflexes. Theimmediacy <strong>an</strong>d inevitability of certain emotions (e.g., revulsionon contemplating the torture of a child) c<strong>an</strong> lead philosophers<strong>an</strong>d nonphilosophers alike into making pronouncements suchas “That we ought to refrain from torturing children is a moraltruth.”But only propositions about what is the case c<strong>an</strong> be true or false.Moral pronouncements express reflexive feelings about how weought to behave <strong>an</strong>d are there<strong>for</strong>e not truth-apt. “Moral truth” isa category mistake. I have a yet-untested two-part hypothesisabout why so m<strong>an</strong>y people (including moral philosophers) makethis apparent category mistake (Johnson 2007). First, hum<strong>an</strong>beings are prone to mistakenly assuming that when they feel astrong <strong>an</strong>d immediate emotion, this is a reliable sign of a selfevidenttruth. Second, although moral systems evolved becausethey conferred benefits on all particip<strong>an</strong>ts (compare M&S’s observationthat persuasive communication must be sufficiently beneficialto both parties, else the capacity <strong>for</strong> being persuadedwould be selected against <strong>an</strong>d go out of existence), the propensityof a person to be responsive to moral “oughts” c<strong>an</strong> be exploited bysomeone who benefits at that person’s expense. Compare, <strong>for</strong>example, the persuasiveness of “Give me ten percent of yourmoney because I w<strong>an</strong>t it” with “That we have a duty to tithe tothe church is a venerable moral truth.” Scrutiny of <strong>an</strong>y rhetoricalef<strong>for</strong>t is wise, particularly those in the moral <strong>do</strong>main.True to the power of one? Cognition,argument, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>reason</strong>ing<strong>do</strong>i:10.1017/S0140525X10002992Drew Michael Khlentzos <strong>an</strong>d Bruce StevensonL<strong>an</strong>guage <strong>an</strong>d Cognition Research Centre, Psychology, School of Behavioural,Cognitive <strong>an</strong>d Social Sciences, University of New Engl<strong>an</strong>d, Armidale 2351,Australia.dkhlentz@une.edu.au bstevens@une.edu.auhttp://www.une.edu.au/staff/dkhlentz.phphttp://www.une.edu.au/staff/bstevens.phpAbstract: While impressed by much of what Mercier & Sperber (M&S)offer through their <strong>argumentative</strong> hypothesis, we question whetherthe specific competencies entailed in each system are adequate. Inparticular, whether system 2 might not require independent <strong>reason</strong>ingcapabilities. We explore the adequacy of the expl<strong>an</strong>ations offered <strong>for</strong>confirmation bias <strong>an</strong>d the Wason selection task.For Mercier <strong>an</strong>d Sperber (M&S), what appears as poor <strong>reason</strong>ingis actually appropriate argument – social dialogue facilitates<strong>reason</strong>ing by prompting agents to <strong>for</strong>mulate arguments <strong>an</strong>ddefend them from objections. M&S propose a dual-processmodel with system 1 (S 1 ) a consortium of inference mech<strong>an</strong>isms<strong>an</strong>d system 2 (S 2 ), <strong>an</strong> S 1 apologist. We identify some features wethink require clarification <strong>an</strong>d provide alternative interpretationsof phenomena used by M&S to support their model.If S 1 generates conclusions without revealing their derivation(modular-like), then where <strong>do</strong>es S 2 acquire the competence tosupport these arguments? What type of <strong>reason</strong>ing is required<strong>for</strong> it to construct these arguments, or <strong>do</strong>es it run data backthrough S 1 <strong>for</strong> a <strong>reason</strong>ed result? Related to this is the issue of<strong>argumentative</strong> contexts which trigger S 2 . These appear to bericher in in<strong>for</strong>mation, creating a potential confound <strong>for</strong> the <strong>argumentative</strong>hypothesis: Is it the <strong>argumentative</strong> feature or theincreased in<strong>for</strong>mation that is critical?The social psychology findings M&S adduce to support theirview present a puzzle <strong>for</strong> it: How c<strong>an</strong> truth win out amongstsophistical S 2 s committed not to discovering the facts but todefending S 1 ’s representation of them? Convergence-on-truthsuggests there’s more to S 2 th<strong>an</strong> defence of S 1 . One alternativeviews S 2 as a dynamic, defeasible <strong>reason</strong>er that sifts through S 1outputs, independently generating conclusions to be updated inthe light of new in<strong>for</strong>mation.Presumably S 1 must support probabilistic as well as deductiveinferences. In which case, some regulatory role <strong>for</strong> S 2 is inescapable.Suppose S 1 has both deductive <strong>an</strong>d probabilistic mech<strong>an</strong>isms<strong>an</strong>d these produce compatible results with input X bothdeductively entailing <strong>an</strong>d probabilistically supporting Y. Imaginenew evidence E emerging that undermines Y so that X þ Emakes Y not probable. Nonetheless, E c<strong>an</strong>not affect the derivationof Y from X. So X þ E still entails Y. Whence S 2 has to decidewhether to defend Y since it is derivable from X þ E or surrenderY as X þ E makes Y improbable. How would it make this decision?Consider now M&S’s views on confirmation bias. M&S denyconfirmation bias is a flaw in <strong>reason</strong>ing. Yet if the aim of eachagent’s S 2 is to persuade others, confirmation bias would justpolarize views with no agent prepared to listen to <strong>an</strong>other’s arguments.Alternatively, if each S 2 defends <strong>an</strong> agent’s beliefs againstobjections, amassing evidence <strong>for</strong> those beliefs is import<strong>an</strong>t but<strong>an</strong>ticipating likely objections <strong>an</strong>d preparing a defence is no lessso. Relative to aims of persuasion or defence, then, confirmationbias registers as a fault in <strong>reason</strong>ing.Compare <strong>an</strong> M&S-styled S 2 -<strong>reason</strong>er Aaron with a defeasibleS 2 -<strong>reason</strong>er Belle. Aaron is convinced the river mussels are goodto eat since he’s eaten them the past five days. Belle felt ill aftereating them the day be<strong>for</strong>e. She advises Aaron to refrain. Aaron’sS 2 considers positive evidence <strong>an</strong>d discounts negative evidence.So Aaron eats the mussels <strong>an</strong>d falls ill. In contrast, Belle’s S 2 constructsfast generalizations on the fly. Having eaten them <strong>for</strong> fourdays, Belle inferred (G) the mussels are good to eat. But now herS 2 enables Belle to a<strong>do</strong>pt a position appropriate to the evolvingevidence. The crucial difference between Aaron <strong>an</strong>d Belle isthis: Were they to swap roles, Belle would feel no internalpressure from her S 2 to eat the mussels (unlike Aaron fromhis): Evidence someone else fell ill c<strong>an</strong> prompt a defeasible <strong>reason</strong>erto update (G) as disconfirming <strong>an</strong>d confirming evidenceare weighted equally. Whilst M&S’s model allows S 1 to updatein<strong>for</strong>mation, <strong>reason</strong>ing to a new conclusion (belief revision)appears <strong>an</strong>omalous.Does the <strong>argumentative</strong> hypothesis yield the best expl<strong>an</strong>ationof <strong>reason</strong>ing per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce? Take the Wason selection task. M&Sclaim that when agents are asked to assess the truth of (W) Ifthere’s a vowel on one side of a card, there’s <strong>an</strong> even number onits other side <strong>for</strong> <strong>an</strong> E, K, 4, 7 array, their S 1 matches cards to82 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2


Commentary/Mercier & Sperber: <strong>Why</strong> <strong>do</strong> <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> <strong>reason</strong>?verbal cues, prompting them to choose the E card <strong>an</strong>d 4 card.Their S 2 then defends this choice against objections.This matching hypothesis belies the sem<strong>an</strong>tic complexity of(W), which contains <strong>an</strong> indefinite “a card” nested within thescope of a conditional. Such constructions c<strong>an</strong> vary in me<strong>an</strong>ing.“If Ralph has a credit card, he buys tickets with it” is true ifRalph has four different credit cards but uses only one to buytickets. However “if Sue has a pet, she feeds it” is false if Suefeeds her goldfish, starving her three kittens: “A pet” me<strong>an</strong>severy pet where “a credit card” me<strong>an</strong>s some credit card. Indefinitessuch as “a card” in (W) could be assigned a default existentialreading (some) by <strong>an</strong> S 1 sem<strong>an</strong>tic module. If contextual cluesor background in<strong>for</strong>mation <strong>do</strong>n’t subsequently override it, this(mistaken) interpretation could become fixed, leading subjectsto look <strong>for</strong> some card with <strong>an</strong> even number on one side <strong>an</strong>d avowel on the other, as the majority <strong>do</strong>. Alternatively, if thesem<strong>an</strong>tic module defaults to a generic reading of (W), since generics(like the mussels are good) tolerate exceptions, the 7 card’srole becomes opaque, rendering it non-salient once more.For defeasible <strong>reason</strong>ers used to generic generalisations, figuringout the minimum number of occluded elements that need tobe revealed to determine whether (W) is true is no trivial task.They fail not because they aren’t called on to defend theirview, as M&S contend, but because they have little or no experiencetesting exceptionless generalisations.<strong>Why</strong> then <strong>do</strong> they succeed in group settings? A rival problemsolvingmodel of <strong>reason</strong>ing says this is due to two factors:1. Group settings are in<strong>for</strong>mationally rich with alternativehypotheses articulated, <strong>reason</strong>s <strong>for</strong> them explained <strong>an</strong>d discussed,<strong>an</strong>d2. Subjects’ sem<strong>an</strong>tic modules are specifically designed tocompute the logical implications of others’ statements to determinewhat those statements me<strong>an</strong> (Crain & Khlentzos 2010).Further, since this model assumes subjects share a commongoal of finding the correct solution, it is no mystery why subjectsshould converge on that solution.What people may <strong>do</strong> versus c<strong>an</strong> <strong>do</strong><strong>do</strong>i:10.1017/S0140525X10002864De<strong>an</strong>na KuhnDepartment of Hum<strong>an</strong> Development, Teachers College, Columbia University,New York, NY 10027.dk100@columbia.edu www.education<strong>for</strong>thinking.orgAbstract: It warr<strong>an</strong>ts examining how well people c<strong>an</strong> come to argueunder supportive conditions, not only what they <strong>do</strong> under ordinaryconditions. Sustained engagement of young people in dialogicargumentation yields more th<strong>an</strong> the temporary “contextual effect” thatMercier & Sperber (M&S) identify in the target article. If suchengagement were to become the norm, who c<strong>an</strong> say what theargumentive potential of future generations is?In the target article, Mercier & Sperber (M&S) make the strongclaim that epistemic goals are not well served by argumentive<strong>reason</strong>ing because it <strong>do</strong>es not enh<strong>an</strong>ce the accuracy or validityof one’s claims. Evidence is too ample to deny that people commonlyinvoke argumentive <strong>reason</strong>ing to support their assertionsin ways that are habitual, often mindless, <strong>an</strong>d self-serving.Where I would fault M&S, rather, is in their focus on how argumentive<strong>reason</strong>ing most often <strong>do</strong>es function, to the exclusion ofhow it c<strong>an</strong> (<strong>an</strong>d <strong>for</strong> some <strong>do</strong>es) come to function, as a consequenceof education, engagement, <strong>an</strong>d a recognition of its epistemicvalue. Although people may use argument in self-servingways that they are in limited comm<strong>an</strong>d of, it <strong>do</strong>esn’t follow thatthey c<strong>an</strong>not achieve greater conscious comm<strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>d come todraw on it in a way that will enh<strong>an</strong>ce their cognitive power.Moreover, as my own most recent research clearly shows(Goldstein et al. 2009; Kuhn & Crowell, in press; Kuhn et al.2008), sustained engagement of young people in dialogic argumentationyields more th<strong>an</strong> the temporary “contextual effect”of a social setting that M&S identify. In their review of ourresearch, they focus on earlier work in which on a single occasionparticip<strong>an</strong>ts are asked to generate <strong>an</strong> argument to support theirview regarding the cause of a particular social problem (Kuhn1991). The particip<strong>an</strong>ts generally <strong>do</strong> poorly, with little sign ofimprovement from a<strong>do</strong>lescence through old age, tending todescribe a plausible scenario of how the problem could arise<strong>an</strong>d failing to differentiate that scenario from actual or potentialevidence that this is how it <strong>do</strong>es in fact arise.In more recent work, we have engaged young people in sustaineddialogic argumentation about signific<strong>an</strong>t issues. We focuson middle school as <strong>an</strong> optimal period to undertake this ef<strong>for</strong>t,<strong>an</strong>d we follow Billig (1987), Graff (2003), <strong>an</strong>d, be<strong>for</strong>e him, thesociocultural tradition of Vygotsky (1978) <strong>an</strong>d others, in takingthe everyday social practice of argumentation as a starting point<strong>an</strong>d pathway <strong>for</strong> development of individual argumentive skill.The dialogic context provides the “missing interlocutor” (Graff2003) that gives expository argument its point. The medium of discourseis electronic, yielding the signific<strong>an</strong>t adv<strong>an</strong>tage of providinga tr<strong>an</strong>script of the exch<strong>an</strong>ge that remains available throughout <strong>an</strong>dfollowing the discourse. Contributions to face-to-face discourse, incontrast, disappear as soon as they are spoken. In addition toserving as a reference point <strong>an</strong>d framework during the dialogs,these tr<strong>an</strong>scripts become the object of various reflective activitiesparticip<strong>an</strong>ts engage in.With sustained engagement over multiple months, dialogic argumentationprogresses from what starts out as the norm amongyoung a<strong>do</strong>lescents – exposition of one’s own views with sc<strong>an</strong>tattention to those of the opponent – to recognition of the needto attend to the opponent’s claims <strong>an</strong>d identify weaknesses, <strong>an</strong>dfrom there to sustained sequences of counterargument <strong>an</strong>d rebuttal.Perhaps most import<strong>an</strong>t, not immediately but with time, thesenewly developed skills tr<strong>an</strong>sfer to the individual context that M&Sfocus on. Relative to a carefully matched comparison group at thesame school, our particip<strong>an</strong>ts wrote superior individual essays on <strong>an</strong>ew topic, ones more often addressing strengths <strong>an</strong>d weaknesses ofboth sides of <strong>an</strong> issue. Equally import<strong>an</strong>t is young people’s progressin the epistemological <strong>do</strong>main of recognizing the centrality ofcounterargument <strong>an</strong>d of evidence to sound argumentation. Againrelative to the comparison group, particip<strong>an</strong>ts showed greater recognitionof the role of both, <strong>for</strong> example in seeking in<strong>for</strong>mation tobring to bear on their arguments.In a word, we need to examine how argument may come to beused under these favorable, supportive conditions, not onlyunder more ordinary conditions. If broader engagement of thissort were to become the norm, who c<strong>an</strong> say what the argumentivepotential of future generations is? With education systems worldwideclaiming commitment to the broad goal of students learningto use their minds well, so as to be able to apply them to new,unknown problems, we should at least seriously explore thequestion.The world looks small when you only lookthrough a telescope: The need <strong>for</strong> a broad <strong>an</strong>ddevelopmental study of <strong>reason</strong>ing<strong>do</strong>i:10.1017/S0140525X10002918Darcia NarvaezDepartment of Psychology, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN 46556.dnarvaez@nd.edu http://www.nd.edu/≏dnarvaezAbstract: If the target article represents the summary findings of thefield, <strong>reason</strong>ing research is deeply flawed. The vision is too narrow <strong>an</strong>dBEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2 83


Commentary/Mercier & Sperber: <strong>Why</strong> <strong>do</strong> <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> <strong>reason</strong>?seems to fall into biological determinism. Hum<strong>an</strong>s use <strong>reason</strong>ing ineffective ways apparently not studied by researchers, such as <strong>reason</strong>ing<strong>for</strong> action. Moreover, as the brain develops through adulthood <strong>an</strong>dfrom experience so <strong>do</strong> <strong>reason</strong>ing capabilities.My two critiques address the limited scope of the research <strong>an</strong>dthe neglect of hum<strong>an</strong> development. These undermine the generalizabilityof Mercier <strong>an</strong>d Sperber’s conclusions.First, the way <strong>reason</strong>ing is defined <strong>an</strong>d studied leads tonarrow, incomplete findings. Mercier <strong>an</strong>d Sperber cite researchthat ignores a great deal of <strong>reason</strong>ing behavior. For example,at the sociopolitical level <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> use <strong>reason</strong> to design <strong>an</strong>dch<strong>an</strong>ge laws, constitutions, institutions, <strong>an</strong>d visions such as theDeclaration of Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights. Reasoning at the everyday levelincludes figuring out what course of action to take: <strong>for</strong> our <strong>an</strong>cestors,when to migrate to the next <strong>for</strong>aging ground; <strong>for</strong> us, how tobal<strong>an</strong>ce the daily dem<strong>an</strong>ds of work <strong>an</strong>d family. Nor is there <strong>an</strong>yreference to how people <strong>reason</strong> after a poor outcome: For our<strong>an</strong>cestors, why was the hunt unsuccessful today <strong>an</strong>d what c<strong>an</strong>we <strong>do</strong> differently tomorrow? For us, how did I lose my coolwith my child <strong>an</strong>d how c<strong>an</strong> I avoid that in the future? Theauthors make no distinctions among types of goal-motivated<strong>reason</strong>ing, excluding pre-hoc (pl<strong>an</strong>ning – what should my pl<strong>an</strong>sbe today?), post-hoc (reflecting—how did things go?), <strong>an</strong><strong>do</strong>nline executive <strong>reason</strong>ing (e.g., this pl<strong>an</strong> is not working, whatshould I <strong>do</strong>?). Even children employ <strong>reason</strong>ing <strong>for</strong> action whenthey consider how to climb a tree, how it is going, <strong>an</strong>d reflecton their failure or success.The authors describe <strong>reason</strong>ing as a process more akin torhetoric, completely leaving out practical <strong>reason</strong>ing. They claimthat hum<strong>an</strong> <strong>reason</strong>ing evolved to competitively persuade othersof one’s viewpoint rather th<strong>an</strong> <strong>for</strong> making the best decision.This astonished me – how adaptive would it be to follow a rhetoricallygifted con m<strong>an</strong> or inexperienced group member in thePleistocene? The experience-based wis<strong>do</strong>m of the elders wasmuch more adv<strong>an</strong>tageous.The research tasks used <strong>an</strong>d interpretations employed seem topresume that <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> are primarily self-interested, a notoriouslyimplausible view outside the West (Sahlins 2008). Of coursethere c<strong>an</strong> be situations that press individuals to be competitiverather th<strong>an</strong> cooperative in decision making, but from <strong>an</strong>thropologicalaccounts our <strong>an</strong>cestors were cooperators within theirgroups, not the ego-driven competitors described by theauthors (Fry 2006). It seems import<strong>an</strong>t to distinguish betweenself-interested cognition <strong>an</strong>d cognition motivated by other concerns.For example, how <strong>do</strong> the authors explain the ef<strong>for</strong>ts ofWarren Buffet <strong>an</strong>d Bill Gates (givingpledge.org) to persuadewealthy individuals to contribute half of their wealth towardscharity <strong>an</strong>d the common good? Certainly they used rhetoricalskills in their mission but whence the motivation? How wouldthe authors explain the <strong>reason</strong>ing skills <strong>an</strong>d motivations of thelikes of Nelson M<strong>an</strong>dela <strong>an</strong>d Abraham Lincoln in solving theirsociety’s challenges?Second, the authors seem to assume that people <strong>do</strong>n’tdevelop in <strong>reason</strong>ing capacities <strong>an</strong>d that the college studentrepresents hum<strong>an</strong> capability. There seems to be <strong>an</strong> implicit biologicaldeterminism in the target article, a view that is empiricallyuntenable (Lewontin et al. 1987).The research findings are circumscribed by the populationusually studied – college students – giving a false impression ofhum<strong>an</strong> capabilities. Wis<strong>do</strong>m is found more typically in matureadults, not sophomores. Brain development after the teenageyears is fundamental <strong>for</strong> mature <strong>reason</strong>ing capabilities. In themid to late 20s <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> acquire greater executive functioncapacities (Luna et al. 2001), which allow <strong>for</strong> the ability to movepast the subcortical decision-making system, highly influencedby the situation, <strong>an</strong>d use prefrontal capacities that facilitate perspectivetaking <strong>an</strong>d empathy with greater awareness of consequences(Goldberg 2001). In middle age, adult brains undergofurther myelinization, peaking in inductive <strong>reason</strong>ing (Schaie &Willis 2010).One c<strong>an</strong>not draw <strong>an</strong>y firm conclusions about <strong>reason</strong>ingwithout examining mature adults in ecologically valid tasks.Researchers should study <strong>reason</strong>ing in adults as they per<strong>for</strong>mtheir roles as experts: experienced parents, judges, ministers<strong>an</strong>d counselors, shopkeepers <strong>an</strong>d community leaders, umpires<strong>an</strong>d zookeepers. These experts learn to merge self <strong>an</strong>d moralinterests or they falter in their roles. Experts develop in <strong>reason</strong>ingcapabilities, tapping into intuitions, explicit knowledge, <strong>an</strong>d<strong>do</strong>main-specific paradigms that novices lack (Hogarth 2001).Instead, the focus in psychological studies seems to be on whatunderdeveloped minds <strong>an</strong>d brains of a certain sort <strong>do</strong> well –make quick judgments <strong>an</strong>d use words to m<strong>an</strong>ipulate others toget one’s way. Elsewhere I criticize this shortsighted focus inmoral judgment research (Narvaez 2010).Further, it’s not at all clear that the researchers are studyingoptimal brains even at the college level. The prefrontal cortex,the seat of executive functions, apparently c<strong>an</strong> be damagedprior to its maturation from addictive use of drugs (Bechara2005) <strong>an</strong>d activities that keep the more primitive parts of thebrain active, such as violent video games (Mathews et al. 2005),suggesting that <strong>reason</strong>ing capacities may be diminished inthose who engage deeply in such activities. Socioculturalfactors also affect <strong>reason</strong>ing, such as deteriorating child-rearingpractices (Narvaez 2008), which may play a role in the lowerrates of empathy (Konrath et al., in press) <strong>an</strong>d moral <strong>reason</strong>ing(Thoma & Bebeau 2008), <strong>an</strong>d in greater egocentrism if not thenarcissism (Twenge & Campbell 2009) reported in college studentstoday.Finally, it is highly questionable whether it is appropriate at allto generalize to hum<strong>an</strong> nature from the study of westerners orAmeric<strong>an</strong>s. Henrich et al. (2010) point out how the vast majorityof psychological studies <strong>an</strong>d conclusions are based on Western,Educated, Industrialized, Rich, <strong>an</strong>d Democratic (WEIRD) particip<strong>an</strong>tswho represent less th<strong>an</strong> 12% of the world population(college students, a subset of that).The review leaves this reader unsatisfied with the work in thefield. Reasoning needs to be defined more systematically <strong>an</strong>d holisticallyby those who study it. In light of the narrow definition,the limited task set, <strong>an</strong>d the population usually studied, it is notsurprising that the findings are so pessimistic. Hum<strong>an</strong>s use<strong>reason</strong> in m<strong>an</strong>y more adaptive ways th<strong>an</strong> described here.People <strong>an</strong>d brains develop; experience <strong>an</strong>d culture matter.Rather th<strong>an</strong> a review of hum<strong>an</strong> capabilities, we have a glimpseinto a narrow slice of <strong>reason</strong>ing by immature <strong>reason</strong>ers from <strong>an</strong>abnormal culture.Putting <strong>reason</strong>ing <strong>an</strong>d judgement in theirproper <strong>argumentative</strong> place<strong>do</strong>i:10.1017/S0140525X1000289XMike Oaks<strong>for</strong>dDepartment of Psychological Sciences, Birkbeck College, University ofLon<strong>do</strong>n, Lon<strong>do</strong>n WC1E 7HX, United King<strong>do</strong>m.mike.oaks<strong>for</strong>d@bbk.ac.ukhttp://www.bbk.ac.uk/psyc/staff/academic/moaks<strong>for</strong>dAbstract: This comment agrees with Mercier <strong>an</strong>d Sperber’s (M&S’s)thesis on the <strong>argumentative</strong> function of <strong>reason</strong>ing but suggests that <strong>an</strong>account of argument strength is required. A Bayesi<strong>an</strong> account ofargument strength (Hahn & Oaks<strong>for</strong>d 2007) shows how thedeployment of deductive fallacies, weak inductive arguments, <strong>an</strong>djudgment fallacies such as base-rate neglect, c<strong>an</strong> all be rationallydefended in the right <strong>argumentative</strong> context.Mercier <strong>an</strong>d Sperber’s (M&S’s) hypothesis – “the function of<strong>reason</strong>ing is <strong>argumentative</strong>. It is to devise <strong>an</strong>d evaluate argumentsintended to persuade” (see their abstract) – is a timely<strong>an</strong>d import<strong>an</strong>t thesis that sits well with related arguments84 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2


Commentary/Mercier & Sperber: <strong>Why</strong> <strong>do</strong> <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> <strong>reason</strong>?in the literature. For example, Hahn & Oaks<strong>for</strong>d (2007)argued:Typically, <strong>reason</strong>ing takes place in the service of argumentation, that is,in the attempt to persuade yourself or others of a particular position.Argumentation is the overarching hum<strong>an</strong> activity that studies of deductive<strong>reason</strong>ing, inductive <strong>reason</strong>ing, judgment, <strong>an</strong>d decision making arereally required to explain. (p. 705)M&S argue that demonstrations “that people are skilled atassessing arguments seems to st<strong>an</strong>d in sharp contrast with findingsfrom the psychology of <strong>reason</strong>ing” (sect. 2.1, para. 3). Theydiscuss particip<strong>an</strong>ts’ failures to employ logical rules but not thefrequent en<strong>do</strong>rsement of logical fallacies, although they suggestthat, “unlike logical fallacies, fallacies of argumentation come indegrees” (sect. 2.1, para. 4). M<strong>an</strong>y argumentation theoristsargue that all argumentation, not just the fallacies, is a matterof degree. For example, Perelm<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969)argued, “The aim of argumentation is not to deduce consequencesfrom given premises; it is rather to elicit or increasethe adherence of the members of <strong>an</strong> audience to theses thatare presented <strong>for</strong> their consent” (p. 9). Here we argue thatlogical fallacies <strong>an</strong>d logical rules subserve argumentation butonly to the extent that they to “come in degrees.” A corollary tothis argument is that judgmental fallacies such as base-rateneglect may also arise in the same context.I focus on the deductive fallacy of denying the <strong>an</strong>tecedent (DA)in conditional <strong>reason</strong>ing, <strong>for</strong> example:There<strong>for</strong>eIf a bird is a sw<strong>an</strong>, then it is whiteThat bird was not a sw<strong>an</strong>That bird was not whiteThis inst<strong>an</strong>ce of DA is clearly a logical fallacy as there are whitebirds that are not sw<strong>an</strong>s. However, suppose someone (Con) isdeploying DA against someone (Pro) who has argued that aparticular bird was white via the logical rule of modus ponens(MP), if a bird is a sw<strong>an</strong>, then it is white, that bird was a sw<strong>an</strong>,there<strong>for</strong>e, it was white. To refute Pro’s argument the respondentmust deny one of the premises. Con chooses to “deny the <strong>an</strong>tecedent”– that is, to deny that the bird was a sw<strong>an</strong>, from whichit “follows” that the bird was not white (Godden & Walton2004). From <strong>an</strong> <strong>argumentative</strong> perspective this seems like a perfectlysound strategy.However, the falsity of the consequent – the bird was notwhite – could not follow logically from this use of DA. Ratherit undermines <strong>an</strong>other property of Pro’s intended conclusion –that is, “that it should be believed” (Godden & Walton 2004,p. 232). A Bayesi<strong>an</strong> probabilistic approach to argument strength<strong>for</strong> the conditional cashes out this intuition (Hahn & Oaks<strong>for</strong>d2007; Oaks<strong>for</strong>d & Hahn 2007). Hahn <strong>an</strong>d Oaks<strong>for</strong>d (2007) proposedthat people’s degree of belief in the conclusion given thepremises provides one measure of argument strength. Theyequate this measure with the conditional probability of the conclusiongiven the premises: <strong>for</strong> MP this is Pr(bird is whitejbird is asw<strong>an</strong>) (see Oaks<strong>for</strong>d & Chater 2007; Oaks<strong>for</strong>d et al. 2000).Another measure, which they refer to as “argument <strong>for</strong>ce,” isthe ch<strong>an</strong>ge in degree of belief brought about by the argument.They equate this measure with the likelihood ratio, which mapsthe prior odds into the posterior odds: <strong>for</strong> MP this ratio isPr(bird is whitejbird is a sw<strong>an</strong>)/Pr(bird is whitejbird is not asw<strong>an</strong>).It is quite easy to show that contexts c<strong>an</strong> arise where both Pro’s<strong>an</strong>d Con’s arguments seem warr<strong>an</strong>ted. Suppose that the sw<strong>an</strong>sare in a bird s<strong>an</strong>ctuary containing equal numbers of white <strong>an</strong>dblack sw<strong>an</strong>s: Pr(bird is whitejbird is a sw<strong>an</strong>) ¼ 0.5, <strong>an</strong>d thatmost of the birds in the s<strong>an</strong>ctuary are neither white nor sw<strong>an</strong>s:<strong>for</strong> example, Pr(bird is white) ¼ Pr(bird is a sw<strong>an</strong>) ¼ 0.1. Onthis distribution, the likelihood ratio <strong>for</strong> the MP argument is 9;the bird is 9 times more likely to be white given it is a sw<strong>an</strong>th<strong>an</strong> if it were not a sw<strong>an</strong>. In contrast, the likelihood ratio <strong>for</strong>DA, Pr(bird is not whitejbird is not a sw<strong>an</strong>)/Pr(bird is not whitejbirdis a sw<strong>an</strong>), is much lower; the bird is only about 2 times morelikely not to be white given it is not a sw<strong>an</strong> th<strong>an</strong> if it were a sw<strong>an</strong>.So, in terms of the <strong>for</strong>ce of the respective arguments, MP seemsstronger th<strong>an</strong> DA, which seems to warr<strong>an</strong>t Pro’s openingargument.Con’s DA counter-argument c<strong>an</strong> be characterised as notingthat priors matter <strong>an</strong>d that it is highly unlikely that the bird wasa sw<strong>an</strong>. That is, his counter-argument suggests that Pro has neglectedthe base rates, a common bias in judgement research(Bar-Hillel 1980; Kahnem<strong>an</strong> & Tversky 1973). When priors aretaken in to account, Pro’s MP argument is weak; that is, the posteriorprobability is only 0.5. In contrast, the posterior probabilityof the DA argument, Pr(bird is not whitejbird is not a sw<strong>an</strong>), is0.94. So, in this context, in terms of the strength of the respectivearguments DA seems stronger th<strong>an</strong> MP, which seems to warr<strong>an</strong>tCon’s counter-argument: The conclusion of the DA argumentshould be believed more th<strong>an</strong> the conclusion of the MP argument.The next exch<strong>an</strong>ge between Pro <strong>an</strong>d Con would probablyfocus on Pro’s grounds <strong>for</strong> apparently neglecting the base rate<strong>an</strong>d believing that <strong>for</strong> this particular bird, Pr(bird is a sw<strong>an</strong>) . 0.1.This <strong>an</strong>alysis supports M&S’s contention that <strong>reason</strong>ing is <strong>for</strong>argument but only when we give a probabilistic <strong>an</strong>alysis of howlogical rule <strong>an</strong>d fallacies affect people’s degrees of belief intheir conclusions. In conclusion, we would argue that putting<strong>reason</strong>ing <strong>an</strong>d judgment in their proper <strong>argumentative</strong> placecompels us to a probabilistic underst<strong>an</strong>ding of deductive<strong>reason</strong>ing.On the design <strong>an</strong>d function of rationalarguments<strong>do</strong>i:10.1017/S0140525X10002943John E. Opfer <strong>an</strong>d Vladimir SloutskyDepartment of Psychology, Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43210.opfer.7@osu.edu sloutsky@psy.ohio-state.eduhttp://faculty.psy.ohio-state.edu/opfer/opfer/opfer.htmlhttp://cogdev.cog.ohio-state.eduAbstract: It is unclear how <strong>an</strong> <strong>argumentative</strong> environment would select<strong>for</strong> better <strong>reason</strong>ing given three general findings. First, argumentrationality typically fails to persuade poor <strong>reason</strong>ers. Second, <strong>reason</strong>edargumentation competes with more persuasive <strong>an</strong>d less rationalarguments <strong>for</strong> limited cognitive resources. Third, those poor at<strong>reason</strong>ing fail to distinguish between valid <strong>an</strong>d invalid arguments.Reasoning, there<strong>for</strong>e, is poorly designed <strong>for</strong> argument.Did <strong>reason</strong>ing evolve because it is best suited <strong>for</strong> communicatingarguments? In the target article, Mercier & Sperber (M&S)claim this might be the case even though individuals poorlygenerate <strong>an</strong>d recognize valid arguments. If, however, individualsare poor at generating <strong>an</strong>d recognizing valid arguments, there areseveral – in our view, insurmountable – obstacles <strong>for</strong> this type ofthinking evolving <strong>for</strong> <strong>an</strong>y social function.First, <strong>reason</strong>ed argumentation would fail to achieve the goal ofpersuasion – ch<strong>an</strong>ges in beliefs <strong>an</strong>d attitudes. One of the mostcommon pitfalls of everyday <strong>reason</strong>ing is that nonrationalfactors (e.g., believability of <strong>an</strong> argument, confidence <strong>an</strong>d statusof the arguer, <strong>an</strong>d self-interest of the receiver) trump logical validityin argument evaluation (<strong>for</strong> review of believability effects,see Ev<strong>an</strong>s et al. 1993). The emergence of a trait <strong>for</strong> recognizingvalid arguments, there<strong>for</strong>e, would offer no particular benefit ina context of like-headed <strong>reason</strong>ers: Valid arguments would onlyconvert the converted. Examples of this come from the phenomenonof belief polarization (Lord et al. 1979), where openexch<strong>an</strong>ges of arguments serve only to pull disput<strong>an</strong>ts awayfrom recognizing valid alternatives.BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2 85


Commentary/Mercier & Sperber: <strong>Why</strong> <strong>do</strong> <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> <strong>reason</strong>?Another example of valid <strong>reason</strong>ing failing to persuade comesfrom studies of dyadic learning in children. A common finding inthis literature (e.g., Ames & Murray 1982) is that when conservers<strong>an</strong>d nonconservers share their <strong>reason</strong>s <strong>for</strong> conservation problems,the <strong>for</strong>mer persuade the latter. But is this a case of <strong>reason</strong>triumph<strong>an</strong>t – or of less-confident students yielding to theirmore-confident peers? Suggesting this might be a victory <strong>for</strong> confidenceover <strong>reason</strong>, Levin <strong>an</strong>d Druy<strong>an</strong> (1993) found that confidencewas much higher among conservers th<strong>an</strong> nonconservers.Further, when problems were switched to science problemswith high rates of misconceptions, the competence/confidencecorrelation was flipped – <strong>an</strong>d children found the confidentincompetents more persuasive th<strong>an</strong> their better-<strong>reason</strong>ingpeers. (From this perspective, it’s easy to see why <strong>do</strong>gmatic creationistsw<strong>an</strong>t scientists to “teach the controversy.”)Could it be (as argued by M&S) that <strong>reason</strong>ing evolved tohelp people detect untrustworthy sources by flagging inconsistencyin their arguments? Developmental evidence suggeststhat this is unlikely because children detect trustworthinesslong be<strong>for</strong>e they detect argument inconsistency. For example,when Morris <strong>an</strong>d Hasson (2010) presented children with simulatedarguments of the simplest logical <strong>for</strong>m (e.g., Puppet 1claims “There is a sticker in the box!” <strong>an</strong>d Puppet 2 claims“There is no sticker in the box!”), nearly 100% of 4- <strong>an</strong>d 5-year-olds failed to detect <strong>an</strong> inconsistency between the twoclaims (Morris & Hasson 2010). At the same time, ability todetect a source as trustworthy emerges by 3 or 4 years of age(e.g., Jaswal & Neely 2006; Koenig et al. 2004). Given this, itc<strong>an</strong>not be that detecting trustworthiness requires the ability todetect argument inconsistency.Second, <strong>reason</strong>ed argumentation is expensive <strong>an</strong>d maycompete <strong>for</strong> limited cognitive resources with less expensive“hot” cognition. Recognizing <strong>an</strong>d generating valid arguments(that are not already believable) requires subst<strong>an</strong>tial cognitiveresources, including a heavy cost to working memory (Barrouilletet al. 2000). This cost increases dramatically with <strong>an</strong> increasein the number of premises <strong>an</strong>d introduction of qu<strong>an</strong>tifiers. Atthe same time, if the goal is persuasion, “hot” cognition (e.g.,appeals to emotionally laden examples) c<strong>an</strong> offer a less expensivealternative (Petty & Cacioppo 1996). Given that the cost ofgenerating <strong>an</strong>d comprehending logical arguments outweighsthose of “hot” cognition, without offering subst<strong>an</strong>tial benefits,a mut<strong>an</strong>t with <strong>an</strong> elevated ability <strong>for</strong> logical argument wouldhave no competitive adv<strong>an</strong>tage against her demagogic disput<strong>an</strong>ts.Thus, it is difficult to see how the <strong>argumentative</strong> contextwould provide the ideal environment <strong>for</strong> the evolution oflogical argument.Third, operator/receiver parity precludes benefits of sociallearning or knowledge tr<strong>an</strong>sfer. Although it is often tempting todraw <strong>an</strong>alogies between l<strong>an</strong>guage <strong>an</strong>d <strong>reason</strong>ing (e.g., Braine &O’Brien 1998), the difference between the two is profound.Unlike <strong>reason</strong>ing, l<strong>an</strong>guage proficiency is (more or less) universalin hum<strong>an</strong> adults. Consequently, in linguistic communication,more proficient l<strong>an</strong>guage users (operators) c<strong>an</strong> pull less proficientl<strong>an</strong>guage learners (receivers) along the path to greater proficiency.This is not the case with <strong>reason</strong>ed argumentation,however. Here, operator <strong>an</strong>d receiver characteristics are moresymmetrical: When a person who is receptive to invalid argumentsis put in the role of the operator, invalid argumentsfollow, <strong>an</strong>d when a person who produces invalid arguments isput in the role of the receiver, valid <strong>an</strong>d invalid arguments arenot discriminated. Consequently, communicating <strong>reason</strong>sacross individuals c<strong>an</strong>not, by itself, add <strong>an</strong>ything to argumentation.Indeed, one of the most striking findings in cognitive developmentconcerns how greatly ch<strong>an</strong>ge in l<strong>an</strong>guage proficiencyoutpaces that of logical thinking, as well as how little <strong>reason</strong>edargumentation is affected by observing a more proficient <strong>reason</strong>er(as observed by Levin & Druy<strong>an</strong> 1993).The failures of everyday <strong>reason</strong>ing that we think would makethe <strong>argumentative</strong> context <strong>an</strong> inhospitable environment <strong>for</strong> theevolution of <strong>reason</strong>ing are seen in a str<strong>an</strong>ge light by M&S.According to them, these failures support their accountbecause they arise mostly outside <strong>an</strong> <strong>argumentative</strong> context.Yet, even if we were to stipulate this as true, superior <strong>reason</strong>ingin <strong>an</strong> <strong>argumentative</strong> context <strong>do</strong>es not support their claim aboutthe evolution of <strong>reason</strong>ing: It would imply that arguments facilitate<strong>reason</strong>ing, not that <strong>reason</strong>ing facilitates arguments. Yet, if<strong>reason</strong>ing is designed <strong>for</strong> arguments, as M&S contend, qualityof <strong>reason</strong>ing must facilitate or hinder quality of arguments,whereas the reverse is unnecessary. To take M&S’s <strong>an</strong>alogy, toshow that the structure of the foot is designed <strong>for</strong> walking, onemust show that a different structure would facilitate or impedewalking – not that process of walking strengthens the foot ofthe walker.In our view, the kind of argument that is optimally designed <strong>for</strong>social communication – that is, would have the largest effect onm<strong>an</strong>ipulating <strong>an</strong>other’s behavior – is not necessarily a <strong>reason</strong>edargument but <strong>an</strong> argument that is believable, emotive, easy togenerate on the fly, <strong>an</strong>d clear to others. Put simply, <strong>reason</strong>edargumentation is no more likely to have evolved <strong>for</strong> social communicationth<strong>an</strong> is the posture of the foot to have evolved <strong>for</strong>disco.What is argument <strong>for</strong>? An adaptationistapproach to argument <strong>an</strong>d debate<strong>do</strong>i:10.1017/S0140525X1000302XDavid PietraszewskiDepartment of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06520-8205.david.pietraszewski@yale.eduAbstract: A consideration of selection pressures on the psychology ofargument suggests that fixing the truth value of claims is not theprimary criterion <strong>for</strong> argument generation or evaluation. Instead,argument psychology is designed to ch<strong>an</strong>ge representations in otherminds as a way to negotiate conflicts of interest <strong>an</strong>d as a way to signalsocial coordination.Mercier <strong>an</strong>d Sperber’s (M&S’s) <strong>an</strong>alysis of <strong>reason</strong>ing as designed<strong>for</strong> argumentation represents <strong>an</strong>other blow to certain long-heldassumptions about cognitive processes: That <strong>reason</strong>ing is theabstract application of a propositional calculus used to determinewhat is true. Instead, M&S suggest that <strong>reason</strong>ing is the output ofargumentation psychology, a suite of cognitive systems designedto h<strong>an</strong>dle incommensurate representations between people. Thisis courageous <strong>an</strong>d provocative because it suggests that enterprisessuch as science are h<strong>an</strong>dled by a psychology designed<strong>for</strong> argumentation. Insofar as <strong>reason</strong>ing c<strong>an</strong> be defined as <strong>an</strong>interestingly coherent natural category, M&S are likely correct.However, the argument c<strong>an</strong> be taken further. If <strong>reason</strong>ing is<strong>for</strong> argument, what is argument <strong>for</strong>? While M&S allude to this,there is some value in explicitly addressing the function of argumentbecause it directly speaks to how argumentation psychologyshould work.Consider the case of the evaluation of factual or policy claims.It is tempting to think that argument’s proper <strong>do</strong>main in suchcases is to determine the truth or accuracy of incommensuraterepresentations – a natural consequence of in<strong>for</strong>mation beingdistributed nonuni<strong>for</strong>mly across bodies – that some peoplehave access to in<strong>for</strong>mation that others <strong>do</strong> not, <strong>an</strong>d that, givenimperfect in<strong>for</strong>mation, each person is expected to prefer one’sown data <strong>an</strong>d conclusions <strong>an</strong>d be wary of others. On this view,even if <strong>reason</strong>ing is <strong>for</strong> argument, then the ultimate logic of argumentis the same as the classical view of <strong>reason</strong>ing – as a way ofdetermining truth – albeit in a way that diverges from a rationalview, by virtue of the division of in<strong>for</strong>mation access in the realworld.86 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2


Commentary/Mercier & Sperber: <strong>Why</strong> <strong>do</strong> <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> <strong>reason</strong>?However, a consideration of the selection pressures <strong>for</strong> argumentsuggests that this is not a complete picture of the functionof argument <strong>an</strong>d thus not a complete picture of the psychology ofargumentation, even when dealing with claims ostensibly abouttruth. Here’s why.Communication exists because it affects behavior. This makescommunicated in<strong>for</strong>mation a particularly powerful way to leverageothers’ capacities. This creates opportunity <strong>for</strong> collaboration,as well as exploitation, <strong>an</strong>d as such there will be selection on bothsenders <strong>an</strong>d receivers of argument. M&S <strong>do</strong> not ignore that conflictof interest is inherent in communication – suggesting theexistence of epistemic vigil<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>for</strong> ensuring that only “reliable,”“effective,” “quality” in<strong>for</strong>mation is acted on. But what constitutesreliable, effective, or quality in<strong>for</strong>mation? Certainly, asM&S imply, a criterion of accuracy applies to a class of claims.“The bear is on this side of the river” <strong>an</strong>d “The bear is on theother side of the river” are factual claims warr<strong>an</strong>ting investigationof truth value. The bear is somewhere, after all, <strong>an</strong>d argumentwill help determine where.However, while there is <strong>reason</strong> to think that there is strongselection <strong>for</strong> discovering the accuracy <strong>for</strong> certain classes ofclaims, there is also good <strong>reason</strong> to think that there is little selection<strong>for</strong> searching <strong>for</strong> the accuracy of m<strong>an</strong>y others. Instead, ifsignaled in<strong>for</strong>mation is capable of causing others to act, thereis selection to broadcast representations that will cause othersto modify their current or future actions with respect to thesender. Because utility <strong>an</strong>d accuracy are ultimately separable,even <strong>for</strong> factual claims, there is not always selection <strong>for</strong> accuracy,but instead <strong>for</strong> a psychology that fixes representations –in oneself <strong>an</strong>d in others – along actuarially beneficialdimensions.This suggests at least two broad classes of selection pressures<strong>an</strong>d, subsequently, two broad classes of argument psychology:First, is a class of argumentation psychology designed toh<strong>an</strong>dle conflicts of interest over self-regarding <strong>an</strong>d other-regardingbehaviors, the goal of which is to ch<strong>an</strong>ge representations ofthe payoff structure of pursuing certain future pl<strong>an</strong>s. This viewof argument has already uncovered a highly-specific “grammar”of argument structure in both senders <strong>an</strong>d receivers (Petersenet al. 2010; Sell 2006; Tooby et al. 2008).Second, is a class of argumentation psychology designedaround social coordination. Because shared mental content is aconsequence of coordinated activities, <strong>an</strong>d because cooperationrequires a meeting of the “minds,” shared mental representationsc<strong>an</strong> be used as markers <strong>an</strong>d facilitators of social coordination. Inother words, the exposition of claims – <strong>an</strong>d the signal of agreementor disagreement with them – c<strong>an</strong> be used as a social instrumentto mark affiliation. Agreement <strong>an</strong>d disagreement there<strong>for</strong>ebecome commodities in themselves as a way of signaling thecoordination strength <strong>an</strong>d challenging others. This class of argumentationpsychology should be designed to conflate evaluationsof the argument with the source <strong>an</strong>d social context of the argument;who is arguing should be just as import<strong>an</strong>t as what theyare saying when considering the “goodness” of <strong>an</strong> argument.Additionally, the motivation to argue, <strong>an</strong>d the choice of argumentcontent itself, should be at least in part the result of strategic nonconsciousassessments of the local social world. This view of argumenthas already led to the discovery of evidence that the mindtreats certain classes of claims as markers of social affiliation (Pietraszewskiet al., in preparation).These are not aberr<strong>an</strong>t uses of argument, but, rather, thesefunctions lie at the core of how the hum<strong>an</strong> psychological competenceof argument – <strong>an</strong>d thus how “<strong>reason</strong>ing” – works. Thevaluation of social coordination, <strong>for</strong> example, is likely built rightinto the sinew <strong>an</strong>d bone of argumentation – both in terms ofthe criteria <strong>for</strong> generating arguments <strong>an</strong>d <strong>for</strong> the criteria of assessingargument. This suggests that <strong>reason</strong>ing is not simply base<strong>do</strong>n argument, but on argument designed <strong>for</strong> negotiating conflictsof interest <strong>an</strong>d signaling social coordination rather th<strong>an</strong> exclusivelyfixing truth.You c<strong>an</strong>’t have your hypothesis <strong>an</strong>d test it: Theimport<strong>an</strong>ce of utilities in theories of <strong>reason</strong>ing<strong>do</strong>i:10.1017/S0140525X10002980Fenna H. PoletiekDepartment of Psychology, Leiden University, The Netherl<strong>an</strong>ds.poletiek@fsw.leidenuniv.nlAbstract: Mercier <strong>an</strong>d Sperber’s (M&S’s) <strong>theory</strong> of <strong>reason</strong>ing c<strong>an</strong>notpredict <strong>reason</strong>ing in the absence of <strong>an</strong> <strong>argumentative</strong> context. Applyingthe <strong>theory</strong> to hypothesis testing behavior, I propose that hypothesistesting is often motivated by determining the true inference <strong>an</strong>d that<strong>reason</strong>ing models should account <strong>for</strong> utilities (affected by variousmotives, including the wish to convince) of <strong>reason</strong>ing outcomes.Mercier <strong>an</strong>d Sperber’s (M&S’s) <strong>argumentative</strong> <strong>theory</strong> of <strong>reason</strong>ing(ATR) claims that <strong>reason</strong>ing is aimed not at improving knowledge,but at persuading. According to ATR, <strong>an</strong> <strong>argumentative</strong>context (actual or proactive) is a necessary condition <strong>for</strong> <strong>reason</strong>ing<strong>an</strong>d <strong>reason</strong>ing is biased toward winning the argument. It willbe argued that the very logic of ATR is problematic <strong>an</strong>d that itc<strong>an</strong> not deal with a large majority of <strong>reason</strong>ing contexts inwhich agents (also) <strong>reason</strong> to determine a true or valid conclusion.I propose that a <strong>theory</strong> of <strong>reason</strong>ing should incorporateutilities of <strong>reason</strong>ing outcomes, to explain various motives <strong>for</strong><strong>reason</strong>ing, including <strong>argumentative</strong> motives.Although M&S discuss in detail the function of <strong>reason</strong>ing, it isnot always clear how <strong>reason</strong>ing is defined. If we assume <strong>reason</strong>ingto be about opinions <strong>an</strong>d preferences <strong>for</strong> which no normative st<strong>an</strong>dardis available, <strong>an</strong> <strong>argumentative</strong> view is quite straight<strong>for</strong>ward.People indeed may argue about political opinions <strong>an</strong>d preferenceswith no other goal th<strong>an</strong> to convince. However, if <strong>reason</strong>ing is thetreatment of in<strong>for</strong>mation about some (yet unknown) true or validinference, with the objective to reduce inference errors, then the<strong>argumentative</strong> <strong>theory</strong> is puzzling. Indeed, the ATR <strong>theory</strong> of<strong>reason</strong>ing disregards this inherent concern of approximating thevalid conclusion, going against what <strong>reason</strong>ing is defined to be.The uneasy coexistence of finding out the truth <strong>an</strong>d seeking confirmation<strong>for</strong> one’s belief in ATR is apparent in M&S’s <strong>an</strong>alysis of theconfirmation bias in hypothesis testing studies (Wason 1960). On theone h<strong>an</strong>d, M&S acknowledge, in line with classical critical <strong>an</strong>alyses ofthe confirmation bias (Klaym<strong>an</strong> & Ha 1987; Poletiek 1996; 2001;Wetherick 1962), that particip<strong>an</strong>ts’ behavior in these studies is notindicative of a biased search of supporting test outcomes, but thatit reflects a sound heuristic. Thisheuristicistestinghypotheseswith positive predictions. Using M&S’s example, suppose I believethat my keys are in my jacket because that is where I rememberputting them. I look <strong>for</strong> them in my jacket (positive testing) <strong>an</strong>dnot in my purse (negative testing). Hence, as opposed to theinterpretation of positive testing as a tendency to confirm (confirmationbias) (Cowley & Byrne 2005; Wason 1960), positive testingmay occur with no other goal th<strong>an</strong> finding out the truth, as thereal-life example suggests. According to ATR, positive testing is adefault heuristic that involves no <strong>reason</strong>ing proper.However, as M&S further argue, <strong>reason</strong>ing c<strong>an</strong> be triggered inhypothesis testing situations if <strong>an</strong> <strong>argumentative</strong> context is provided.Moreover, in such a context, <strong>reason</strong>ing is directed at falsification,according to ATR: Falsification is accessible provided that the situationencourages particip<strong>an</strong>ts to argue against a hypothesis that isnot their own, as M&S propose This logic reveals the old misinterpretationthat test choice (positive or negative) is tuned at the emergenceof favorable test result.Infact,puttingone’sideatoa(eitherpositive or negative) test assumes the objective to find out the truth<strong>an</strong>d is there<strong>for</strong>e at odds with testing in order to save our idea fromconfirmations or disconfirmations. Poletiek (1996) showed that particip<strong>an</strong>tsin a hypothesis testing experiment are aware of the incompatibilityof finding out the truth <strong>an</strong>d coming up with confirmingtest outcomes only. Particip<strong>an</strong>ts felt that they were looking <strong>for</strong> in<strong>for</strong>mationabout the validity of a hypothesis, <strong>an</strong>d that they could notcontrol the test outcomes by choosing a test strategy. It was onlyBEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2 87


Commentary/Mercier & Sperber: <strong>Why</strong> <strong>do</strong> <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> <strong>reason</strong>?Table 1 (Poletiek). Utilities of <strong>reason</strong>ing outcomes about H (the<strong>reason</strong>er’s subjective belief), assuming <strong>an</strong> epistemic motive (A), <strong>an</strong><strong>argumentative</strong> motive (B), <strong>an</strong>d both types of motives (C).their expectation of the outcome that ch<strong>an</strong>ged when they tested ahypothesis they did not believe to be true (falsification wasexpected). When testing their best guess, they expected a confirmingoutcome.Besides determining the truth, m<strong>an</strong>y considerations may affecthow we <strong>reason</strong> <strong>an</strong>d whether we <strong>reason</strong>. These considerations c<strong>an</strong>be modeled as a cost-benefit <strong>an</strong>alysis of making the right inference.In Wason’s (1960) task, students participating in the experimentmight not care much about making <strong>reason</strong>ing errors. Thekey seeker might per<strong>for</strong>m a negative test (looking <strong>for</strong> the keys insome place other th<strong>an</strong> the jacket) because the costs of a positiveone are too high: The jacket was left behind in a friend’s house<strong>an</strong>d the ef<strong>for</strong>t too great to walk back to check the jacket. Alternatively,we might be in a hurry <strong>an</strong>d have time to check just onelocation, enh<strong>an</strong>cing the benefits of good <strong>reason</strong>ing.To predict <strong>reason</strong>ing behavior, we need a model with utilitiesof <strong>reason</strong>ing outcomes. A suitable tool is signal-detection <strong>theory</strong>.Motives c<strong>an</strong> be expressed in the utilities of inference errors <strong>an</strong>din <strong>reason</strong>ing behavior predicted on the basis of the risk we areprepared to take with regard to particular erroneous inferences(Poletiek & Berndsen 2000). For example, as shown in Table 1,a pure epistemic motive would be modeled with (A) low utilitiesof making <strong>an</strong>y false inferences. A pure <strong>argumentative</strong> motivewould be expressed in (B) a very high willingness to make thefalse inference that our favorite hypothesis is true; <strong>an</strong>d (C)<strong>reason</strong>ing with both motives (searching <strong>for</strong> a valid inferencewithin both practical or <strong>argumentative</strong> constraints) is reflectedwith some in-between utilities with regard to making a false ora correct inference about our favorite hypothesis.In this m<strong>an</strong>ner, <strong>reason</strong>ing in a variety of contexts <strong>an</strong>d with avariety of goals c<strong>an</strong> be modeled, offering <strong>an</strong> eleg<strong>an</strong>t alternativeto the para<strong>do</strong>x of the ATR that we start up a <strong>reason</strong>ing trajectoryabout a prior belief if <strong>an</strong>d only if the end of the route leads us toinferring that belief again.When <strong>reason</strong>ing is persuasive but wrong<strong>do</strong>i:10.1017/S0140525X10002761Robert J. SternbergAH is trueInfer H 10 0Infer not-H 0 10Infer H 10 10Infer not-H 0 0Infer H 10 4Infer not-H 0 6BCNot-H is trueProvost <strong>an</strong>d Senior Vice President, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, OK74078.Robert.sternberg@okstate.eduAbstract: Mercier <strong>an</strong>d Sperber (M&S) are correct that <strong>reason</strong>ing <strong>an</strong>dargumentation are closely related. But they are wrong in arguing thatthis relationship is one of evolutionary adaptation. In fact, persuasive<strong>reason</strong>ing that is not veridical c<strong>an</strong> be fatal to the individual <strong>an</strong>d to thepropagation of his or her genes, as well as to the hum<strong>an</strong> species as awhole.In the target article, Mercier & Sperber (M&S) brilli<strong>an</strong>tly show acrucial relationship between argumentation <strong>an</strong>d <strong>reason</strong>ing. Butthe relationship is not the one they claim to show.Consider two individuals facing <strong>an</strong> adaptive challenge. A threatof some kind is about to confront them. One of the individuals, A,recognizes the threat; the other, B, fails, <strong>for</strong> whatever <strong>reason</strong>, torecognize it. The two individuals argue over the existence of thethreat or, perhaps, its severity. Each argues compellingly <strong>for</strong> hisor her point of view. After all, with inductive <strong>reason</strong>ing base<strong>do</strong>n incomplete <strong>an</strong>d often ambiguous in<strong>for</strong>mation, arguments c<strong>an</strong>have inductive strength but not deductive certainty; <strong>an</strong>d theirinductive strength <strong>do</strong>es not necessarily correspond to their veridicality(as <strong>an</strong>yone will have observed who has seen a defense attorneygets off his guilty client scot free). A <strong>an</strong>d B both act on thebasis of their <strong>reason</strong>ing. A survives <strong>an</strong>d B dies (as a result of abear attack, a lightning strike, <strong>an</strong> automobile accident, a pl<strong>an</strong>ecrash, or whatever the threat in question happened to be).A <strong>an</strong>d B both used their <strong>reason</strong>ing in the service of argumentation,but <strong>reason</strong>ing was adaptive by virtue of the veridicality of itsconclusion, not by virtue of the persuasiveness of the arguments(which may or may not correspond to veridicality in real-worldambiguous situations with incomplete in<strong>for</strong>mation). So <strong>reason</strong>ingcould scarcely have evolved in the service of argumentation,because those wonderful arguers who did not perceive thingsveridically would have been less able to reproduce th<strong>an</strong> thosearguers who did perceive things veridically. The brilli<strong>an</strong>t <strong>reason</strong>erswho argued wrongly regarding threats had m<strong>an</strong>y more opportunitiesto perish be<strong>for</strong>e reproducing th<strong>an</strong> those <strong>reason</strong>ers,persuasive or not, who saw threats as they were.The same phenomenon occurs at a group level. Consider globalwarming. Global warming threatens the existence of hum<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong><strong>do</strong>ther life on the pl<strong>an</strong>et Earth, <strong>an</strong>d yet deniers, including scientists,put the life of all hum<strong>an</strong> org<strong>an</strong>isms on the pl<strong>an</strong>et – the replicationof the species’ genes <strong>an</strong>d hence the survival of the species– at risk. Reasoning is being used in the service of argumentation,but not always <strong>for</strong> evolutionarily adaptive purposes, at least withrespect to the genes of the individuals involved.The opening view of M&S that “<strong>reason</strong>ing should produce itsbest results when used in <strong>argumentative</strong> contexts, most notably ingroup discussions” (sect. 1.2, para. 11) is clearly wrong, as are thearguments that follow from it. The problem is that in this quotation,as throughout the article, there is <strong>an</strong> ambiguity regardingthe me<strong>an</strong>ing of “best results.” If <strong>reason</strong>ing is about persuasiveness,perhaps the authors are right. But if <strong>reason</strong>ing is about veridicality,they are wrong.J<strong>an</strong>is (1972) recognized the fallacy of the <strong>reason</strong>ing in his workon groupthink. He observed that groups of academically brilli<strong>an</strong>tgovernment officials could make horrible mistakes that wereactually compounded by their being in groups. More generally,the phenomenon is referred to as “group polarization” (Moscovici& Zavalloni 1969). People like Robert McNamara <strong>an</strong>d,more recently, Donald Rumsfeld, come to mind – people who,despite their academic brilli<strong>an</strong>ce, <strong>reason</strong>ed poorly, yet wereable to persuade m<strong>an</strong>y by their (false) arguments. St<strong>an</strong>ovich(1993; 2009) coined the irrational but often persuasive <strong>reason</strong>ingof IQ-smart people “dysrationalia” (<strong>for</strong> related ideas, see alsoSternberg 2002).In the short run, <strong>reason</strong>ing in the service of argument may wellbe adaptive. For example, a job c<strong>an</strong>didate who is persuasive isperhaps more likely to get the job th<strong>an</strong> one who is unpersuasive;a politici<strong>an</strong> who is persuasive is more likely to be elected or, atleast, to be believed. But as recent presidential <strong>an</strong>d other electionshave shown, persuasiveness (at least to the masses) c<strong>an</strong> beattained even by c<strong>an</strong>didates who c<strong>an</strong>not string together a88 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2


Commentary/Mercier & Sperber: <strong>Why</strong> <strong>do</strong> <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> <strong>reason</strong>?coherent sentence. In the long run, the arguments of demagogicpolitici<strong>an</strong>s are likely to lead to chaos. In the same way, the argumentsof unscrupulous but persuasive clergymen are leading toterrorist attacks today.If, as the authors argue, “the main function of <strong>reason</strong>ing is toproduce arguments to convince others rather th<strong>an</strong> to find thebest decision” (sect. 1.2, para. 11), then hum<strong>an</strong> survival is inserious jeopardy. In today’s world, <strong>reason</strong>ing very likely isbeing used primarily to convince others rather th<strong>an</strong> to find thebest decision, but this use of <strong>reason</strong>ing is not evolutionarily adaptive<strong>for</strong> survival in the long run.Perhaps, as a society, we are placing too much emphasis on<strong>reason</strong>ing in the service of argumentation, whether it is oncollege applications, in job interviews, or in elections. Instead,our society should place more emphasis on wis<strong>do</strong>m, the directionof <strong>reason</strong>ing (<strong>an</strong>d other skills) toward a common good, over thelong as well as the short term, through the infusion of positiveethical values (Sternberg et al. 2007). In a microcosm, thetarget article represents what has gone wrong with society as awhole: Society has come to care more about <strong>reason</strong>ing in theservice of persuasion th<strong>an</strong> <strong>reason</strong>ing in the service of truth oreven some kind of ethical good. This trend risks leading not tobetter adaptation of <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> but, rather, to their ultimatedestruction.The chronometrics of confirmation bias:Evidence <strong>for</strong> the inhibition of intuitivejudgements<strong>do</strong>i:10.1017/S0140525X10002876Edward J. N. Stupple a <strong>an</strong>d Linden J. Ball ba Centre <strong>for</strong> Psychological Research, University of Derby, Derby DE22 1GB,United King<strong>do</strong>m; b Department of Psychology, L<strong>an</strong>caster University, L<strong>an</strong>casterLA1 4YF, United King<strong>do</strong>m.e.j.n.stupple@derby.ac.uk l.ball@l<strong>an</strong>caster.ac.ukhttp://psychology.derby.ac.uk/staff/Ed_Stupple.htmlhttp://www.psych.l<strong>an</strong>cs.ac.uk/people/LindenBall.htmlAbstract: Mercier & Sperber (M&S) claim that the phenomenon ofbelief bias – which they consider to be <strong>an</strong> archetypal m<strong>an</strong>ifestation of ageneral confirmation bias in hum<strong>an</strong> <strong>reason</strong>ing – provides fundamentalsupport <strong>for</strong> their <strong>argumentative</strong> <strong>theory</strong> <strong>an</strong>d its basis in intuitivejudgement. We propose that chronometric evidence necessitates amore nu<strong>an</strong>ced account of belief bias that is not readily captured by<strong>argumentative</strong> <strong>theory</strong>.Mercier & Sperber’s (M&S’s) impressive <strong>argumentative</strong> <strong>theory</strong>reassesses the function of <strong>reason</strong>ing, not as involving the noblepursuit of truth, but instead as a Machiavelli<strong>an</strong> communicativeart with persuasion <strong>an</strong>d self-interest at its core. A case in pointis the infamous confirmation bias, whereby individuals seemmotivated to seek confirmatory evidence <strong>for</strong> their existingbeliefs <strong>an</strong>d hypotheses <strong>an</strong>d fail to look <strong>for</strong> counterevidence orcounterarguments (Nickerson 1998). M&S claim that a quintessentialdemonstration of confirmation bias that supports their<strong>theory</strong> c<strong>an</strong> be seen in the phenomenon of belief bias, wheresome contemporary theories suggest that people try to confirmbelievable conclusions but disconfirm unbelievable ones (seethe selective processing model described by Ev<strong>an</strong>s 2007, <strong>an</strong>dthe multinomial model of Klauer et al. 2000). Thus, in both thecase of believable <strong>an</strong>d unbelievable conclusions, M&S claimthat people show a motivation “to confirm their initial intuition”(sect. 3.3, para. 3) with unbelievable conclusions effectively promoting<strong>an</strong> intuition-guided debias (Ev<strong>an</strong>s 2000) leading toimproved logical responding. M&S further propose that, whenpeople deal with <strong>an</strong> unbelievable conclusion, “it is not that they<strong>reason</strong> more in this case. . . . It is just that the direction <strong>reason</strong>ingtakes is mostly determined by the particip<strong>an</strong>ts’ initial intuitions”(sect 3.3, para. 3).Our contention, however, is that this latter claim flies in theface of current chronometric evidence in the belief-bias literature,which suggests that a more subtle interpretation of thephenomenon is needed that is not couched purely in terms ofthe operation of a general confirmation bias. In particular, processing-timedata <strong>for</strong> syllogistic arguments consistently indicatethat particip<strong>an</strong>ts <strong>reason</strong> most when the conclusion is believablebut invalid (Ball et al. 2006; Stupple & Ball 2008; Thompsonet al. 2003). Such a finding is inconsistent with M&S’s viewthat people simply seek support <strong>for</strong> prior beliefs. Confirmatorymental models of the premises of arguments with believableinvalidconclusions are readily available, so why should signific<strong>an</strong>tlylonger processing times arise with these problems? Wepropose instead that m<strong>an</strong>y particip<strong>an</strong>ts show a capacity toinhibit confirmation-oriented processing with such arguments,with the resulting attempt at logical <strong>an</strong>alysis taking time toapply. Of course, the complexity of the required logical processingme<strong>an</strong>s that a belief-based response may still often win out,perhaps with people defaulting to such a response under cognitiveload (cf. Quayle & Ball 2000). This would produce a responsepattern that looks like confirmatory behaviour, but where thechronometric data support a very different account of the processingthat is actually taking place.To elaborate on our proposals we outline three possible routesthat particip<strong>an</strong>ts could take through Ev<strong>an</strong>s’ (2007) selective processingmodel when confronted with belief-oriented syllogisticarguments (cf. Ball 2010; Ev<strong>an</strong>s 2009). First, particip<strong>an</strong>ts couldemploy a pure response bias <strong>an</strong>d respond in accord<strong>an</strong>ce withbelief without engaging <strong>an</strong>y <strong>an</strong>alytic processing whatsoever,either <strong>for</strong> a truth-seeking or <strong>argumentative</strong> purpose. Second, inaccord<strong>an</strong>ce with <strong>argumentative</strong> <strong>theory</strong>, particip<strong>an</strong>ts could seekconfirmatory evidence so as to warr<strong>an</strong>t the accept<strong>an</strong>ce of believableconclusions (including believable-invalid ones) <strong>an</strong>d the refutationof unbelievable conclusions (including unbelievable-vali<strong>do</strong>nes). Finally, particip<strong>an</strong>ts could attempt to suspend notions ofbelief <strong>an</strong>d disbelief altogether. For example, rather th<strong>an</strong> searching<strong>for</strong> a supporting model <strong>for</strong> <strong>an</strong> believable-invalid conclusion,they would inhibit a heuristic response as well as confirmatoryoriented<strong>an</strong>alytic response, instead engaging in <strong>an</strong> exhaustivesearch <strong>for</strong> a model of the premises that provides a counterexampleto the given conclusion.The import<strong>an</strong>t question that follows from our <strong>an</strong>alysis is this:What if examples of all three <strong>reason</strong>ing approaches werepresent in belief-bias data sets? We suggest that the resultingaggregation of these strategies would lead to the pattern ofresponse times that has typically been observed (Ball et al.2006; Stupple & Ball 2008; Thompson et al. 2003), with believable-invalidconclusions being associated with extended processingtimes relative to other problems because of the presenceof a subset of <strong>reason</strong>ers who resist intuitive judgements. Thisgroup of <strong>reason</strong>ers would most likely be those described by St<strong>an</strong>ovich<strong>an</strong>d West (2000) as a<strong>do</strong>pting the “normative construal” ofthe task because they possess the cognitive capacity needed to<strong>reason</strong> through dem<strong>an</strong>ding deductive problems.This latter interpretation of chronometric findings is supportedby data that we have recently acquired (<strong>for</strong> a preliminary report,see Ball 2010) demonstrating that increased response times <strong>for</strong>believable-invalid problems are predictive of increased overallresponse accuracies across belief-oriented problems (i.e., thesetimes reflect the behaviour of high-ability <strong>reason</strong>ers). Thesedata also concur with the observation by Thompson et al.(2010) that the particip<strong>an</strong>ts who spend more time <strong>reason</strong>ingare more likely to reach a logical conclusion. However, Thompsonet al. propose <strong>an</strong> alternative interpretation of the inflatedinspection times <strong>for</strong> believable-invalid problems that is more inkeeping with <strong>argumentative</strong> <strong>theory</strong> th<strong>an</strong> our account. In theirModified Verbal Reasoning <strong>theory</strong> they suggest that particip<strong>an</strong>tsare motivated to find confirmatory support <strong>for</strong> believableBEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2 89


Commentary/Mercier & Sperber: <strong>Why</strong> <strong>do</strong> <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> <strong>reason</strong>?problems <strong>an</strong>d so allow <strong>an</strong> extended response deadline <strong>for</strong> suchproblems (perhaps <strong>an</strong> attractive proposition <strong>for</strong> the <strong>argumentative</strong><strong>theory</strong>). Thompson et al. claim that since the <strong>reason</strong>ingprocess is more difficult <strong>for</strong> invalid th<strong>an</strong> valid problems, this combinedwith the increased motivation to support believable conclusionsresults in the corresponding increase in response times<strong>for</strong> believable-invalid problems. We would argue, however, thatin a<strong>do</strong>pting this perspective one would expect a far greater accept<strong>an</strong>cerate <strong>for</strong> believable-invalid problems th<strong>an</strong> is observed(accept<strong>an</strong>ces are typically in the 50%–70% r<strong>an</strong>ge), since a confirmingmodel is readily available to those particip<strong>an</strong>ts whoexpend the ef<strong>for</strong>t trying to find one.In sum, we disagree with M&S’s assertion that a motivatedattempt at confirmation necessarily drives belief-bias effects insyllogistic <strong>reason</strong>ing. Instead, we claim that m<strong>an</strong>y particip<strong>an</strong>tsattempt to seek out the deductive truth of presented arguments<strong>an</strong>d <strong>do</strong> so at the considerable cognitive expense of inhibitingtheir intuitive judgements, as is particularly evident in the caseof syllogisms with believable-invalid conclusions. On this issue,at least, we would argue against M&S’s <strong>argumentative</strong> <strong>theory</strong>,but perhaps we c<strong>an</strong>not rule out having <strong>do</strong>ne so in order toconfirm a pre-existing hypothesis.Spont<strong>an</strong>eous inferences provide intuitivebeliefs on which <strong>reason</strong>ing proper depends<strong>do</strong>i:10.1017/S0140525X10002803James S. Ulem<strong>an</strong>, Laura M. Kressel, <strong>an</strong>d SoYon RimDepartment of Psychology, New York University, New York, NY 10003.jim.ulem<strong>an</strong>@nyu.edu lmk323@nyu.edu soyon.rim@nyu.eduhttp://www.psych.nyu.edu/ulem<strong>an</strong>https://files.nyu.edu/lmk323/public/Abstract: Spont<strong>an</strong>eous inferences are unconscious, automatic, <strong>an</strong>dapparently ubiquitous. Research has <strong>do</strong>cumented their variety(particularly in the social <strong>do</strong>main) <strong>an</strong>d impact on memory <strong>an</strong>djudgment. They are good c<strong>an</strong>didates <strong>for</strong> Mercier <strong>an</strong>d Sperber’s(M&S’s) “intuitive beliefs.” Forming spont<strong>an</strong>eous inferences is highlycontext sensitive, varying with the perceiver’s conscious <strong>an</strong>dunconscious goals, <strong>an</strong>d implicit <strong>an</strong>d explicit theories about the <strong>do</strong>mainin question.Persuasive as the target article is in arguing that “<strong>reason</strong>ingproper” is implicitly intended “to devise <strong>an</strong>d evaluate argumentsintended to persuade” (abstract of the target article), it says toolittle about the unconscious “process of inference” that generatesthe “intuitive beliefs” that are input to this <strong>reason</strong>ing. This is aserious omission, because one c<strong>an</strong>not <strong>do</strong>cument how <strong>reason</strong>ingmight select <strong>an</strong>d shape arguments without specifying what theinputs to <strong>reason</strong>ing are. Recent work on spont<strong>an</strong>eous social inferences(e.g., Ulem<strong>an</strong> et al. 2008) illustrates some of the methods<strong>an</strong>d findings that may fill in this gap.Spont<strong>an</strong>eous inferences are unintended, unconscious, practicallyef<strong>for</strong>tless, typically uncontrollable, <strong>an</strong>d apparently ubiquitous.Most research has been on spont<strong>an</strong>eous trait inferences(STIs; <strong>for</strong> <strong>an</strong> early review, see Ulem<strong>an</strong> et al. 1996). Consider“John returned the wallet with all the money in it.” Whenasked to memorize or merely familiarize themselves with suchsentences, most people infer that John is honest. This has beenshown with cued recall, lexical decisions, probe reaction times,savings-in-relearning, <strong>an</strong>d false-recognition paradigms. Peopleare more likely to assert that “honest” was in the sentencepaired with John’s photo th<strong>an</strong> the sentence paired with Harry’sphoto, even though it was not (false recognition; To<strong>do</strong>rov &Ulem<strong>an</strong> 2002). When people are subsequently asked to learnword pairs such as “John – honest,” they <strong>do</strong> so more readilyth<strong>an</strong> “Harry – honest,” even though they no longer recognizewhich trait-implying sentence described John (savings-inrelearning).And they rate John (in a photo) as more honest,even though they c<strong>an</strong>not remember what he did or that theymade <strong>an</strong>y inference at all (Carlston & Skowronski 2005). So, asMercier & Sperber (M&S) claim, these unconscious inferencesprovide the raw material <strong>for</strong> conscious judgments <strong>an</strong>d presumably<strong>for</strong> the “<strong>reason</strong>ing proper” that justifies these judgments.Spont<strong>an</strong>eous social inferences are not restricted to traits.There is good evidence that goals <strong>an</strong>d situational (not just trait)causes of behavior are spont<strong>an</strong>eously inferred. When peopleread about unjust situations, they spont<strong>an</strong>eously activate suchconcepts as “unfair” <strong>an</strong>d “injustice,” but only when theyimagine themselves being treated unfairly (Ham & V<strong>an</strong> denBos 2008). They spont<strong>an</strong>eously infer causes of largely nonsocialevents (Hassin et al. 2002). In these studies, the texts (or pictures;see Fiedler et al. 2005) are pretested by asking people <strong>for</strong> theirconscious inferences. Stimuli that reliably imply whatever is ofinterest are then tested <strong>for</strong> spont<strong>an</strong>eous inferences. The samemethods have been used to demonstrate that there are cultural<strong>an</strong>d personality differences in who makes which inferences (seeUlem<strong>an</strong> et al. 2008).Multiple spont<strong>an</strong>eous inferences c<strong>an</strong> occur simult<strong>an</strong>eously tothe same stimuli. For example, Ham <strong>an</strong>d Vonk (2003) showedthat both dispositional <strong>an</strong>d situational inferences during comprehensionof a single event (“She got <strong>an</strong> A on the chemistry exam.”! smart, <strong>an</strong>d ! easy). This suggests that, just as Swinney(1979) found that homonyms (“b<strong>an</strong>k”) initially activate multipleme<strong>an</strong>ings (“money,” “river”) during text comprehension, multipleinferences occur spont<strong>an</strong>eously during the observation ofevents, <strong>an</strong>d later selection among them occurs on the basis ofwider contexts.Like m<strong>an</strong>y concepts, traits have multiple me<strong>an</strong>ings <strong>an</strong>d uses(Ulem<strong>an</strong> 2005). Traits c<strong>an</strong> function as causal explainations of behavior,or traits c<strong>an</strong> function as simple descriptions of behavior.The same is likely true of other concepts that are activated spont<strong>an</strong>eously.In explicit dialogue, the pragmatic context in whichtraits appear allows us to determine their intended me<strong>an</strong>ing<strong>an</strong>d function. But when inferences are spont<strong>an</strong>eous (i.e., unconscious),no such context exists. Recent research has shown thatisolated trait terms function cognitively as causes, not merely asdescriptions (Kressel & Ulem<strong>an</strong> 2010). And subsequent unpublishedwork (Kressel 2010) shows that people with strongerimplicit (as well as explicit) causal theories of traits’ me<strong>an</strong>ingare more likely to make STIs.Such trait inferences c<strong>an</strong> become associated with the “wrong”actors, in spont<strong>an</strong>eous trait tr<strong>an</strong>sference (STT). If person A sayssomething that implies a trait about person B, <strong>an</strong>d only person Ais present (or pictured), that trait becomes associated with personA (Skowronski et al. 1998). This <strong>do</strong>es not occur if person B is alsopictured, however (Goren & To<strong>do</strong>rov 2009). This suggests thatspont<strong>an</strong>eously inferred concepts are easily “bound” to incorrectsources. Thus, events c<strong>an</strong> spont<strong>an</strong>eously activate a variety ofunconscious concepts <strong>an</strong>d associations, all of which providegrist <strong>for</strong> the “<strong>reason</strong>ing proper” mill.Which concepts are activated, <strong>an</strong>d which associations or bindingsoccur, are context sensitive in other ways. Rim et al. (2009)have shown that, consistent with construal level <strong>theory</strong>, STI ismore likely if the actor is more psychologically dist<strong>an</strong>t, eithertemporally or spatially. People think of dist<strong>an</strong>t things moreabstractly, <strong>an</strong>d traits are <strong>an</strong> import<strong>an</strong>t kind of social abstraction.Furthermore, unpublished data (Rim et al. 2010) show that nonconsciouslyprimed goals c<strong>an</strong> shape which inferences occur spont<strong>an</strong>eously<strong>an</strong>d are bound to actors. Thus, nonconscious goalsaffect spont<strong>an</strong>eous inferences in several ways, all outside ofawareness.Finally, research on the logical inferences made during textcomprehension goes well beyond bridging <strong>an</strong>d predictive inferences.Lea (1995) showed that deductions according to modusponens (if p, then q; p; there<strong>for</strong>e q) occur spont<strong>an</strong>eously, <strong>an</strong>dCampion (2006) uncovered ways that certain <strong>an</strong>d hypothetical90 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2


Commentary/Mercier & Sperber: <strong>Why</strong> <strong>do</strong> <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> <strong>reason</strong>?inferences differ. Thus, spont<strong>an</strong>eous inferences are not limited tothe social <strong>do</strong>main. When stimuli present enough clear in<strong>for</strong>mation<strong>an</strong>d constraints, both logical <strong>an</strong>d illogical inferencesoccur (e.g., Rader & Sloutsky 2002).The <strong>for</strong>mation of “intuitive beliefs” is more complex th<strong>an</strong> thetarget article describes. Research on spont<strong>an</strong>eous inferences(social <strong>an</strong>d otherwise) c<strong>an</strong> tell us much about how intuitivebeliefs are <strong>for</strong>med <strong>an</strong>d what they are, be<strong>for</strong>e <strong>reason</strong>ing propershapes them into persuasive arguments.Incidentally, the argument that people c<strong>an</strong> distinguish goodarguments from bad, based on Petty <strong>an</strong>d Cacioppo’s (1979) persuasionresearch, is completely circular. They have no principledbasis <strong>for</strong> constructing good versus poor arguments; the argumentsare simply pretested to have these properties.Query <strong>theory</strong>: Knowing what we w<strong>an</strong>t byarguing with ourselves<strong>do</strong>i:10.1017/S0140525X10002797Elke U. Weber <strong>an</strong>d Eric J. JohnsonCenter <strong>for</strong> Decision Sciences, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027.euw2@columbia.edu ejj3@columbia.eduAbstract: Mercier <strong>an</strong>d Sperber (M&S) argue that <strong>reason</strong>ing is social <strong>an</strong>d<strong>argumentative</strong>, <strong>an</strong>d that this explains m<strong>an</strong>y apparently irrational judgmentphenomena. We look at the relationship between interpersonal <strong>an</strong>dintrapersonal argumentation <strong>an</strong>d discuss parallels <strong>an</strong>d differences fromthe perspective of query <strong>theory</strong>, a memory-based model of constructivepreferences. We suggest <strong>an</strong> import<strong>an</strong>t goal is to integrate models acrossinference <strong>an</strong>d preference.Mercier <strong>an</strong>d Sperber’s (M&S’s) provocative perspective suggeststhat inference has adapted to a social world where argumentationis common, <strong>an</strong>d that m<strong>an</strong>y phenomena identified as <strong>reason</strong>ingerrors are not errors but adaptive when considered as inferencesembedded in a social world.We agree that inferences are often constructed when confrontinga problem, <strong>an</strong>d that this construction is influenced by contextrather th<strong>an</strong> generated by unvarying algorithms. We suggest,however, that inference construction is affected not just bysocial <strong>for</strong>ces but also by properties of hum<strong>an</strong> memory retrieval<strong>an</strong>d multiple goals of decision makers.This commentary describes parallels <strong>an</strong>d differences betweenM&S’s <strong>argumentative</strong> hypothesis <strong>an</strong>d a memory-based accountof preference construction: query <strong>theory</strong> (QT). M&S cite twoapplications of QT as examples of <strong>reason</strong>-based choice withresulting choice inconsistencies; namely, the en<strong>do</strong>wment effect(Johnson et al. 2007) <strong>an</strong>d greater discounting of time duringdelay th<strong>an</strong> during acceleration decisions (Weber et al. 2007).However, QT is more th<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>other example of <strong>reason</strong>-basedchoice. It provides evidence <strong>an</strong>d process-level specification ofthe implicit memory-retrieval <strong>an</strong>d argument-integration processespeople use to evaluate choice options <strong>an</strong>d demonstratestheir causal role in arriving at a decision. Just as M&S unpackintuitive inference, QT treats intuitive preferences neither as aprimitive (as in economics [Becker & Stigler 1977]) nor as a mysteriousblack box (as in social cognition [Dijksterhuis et al.2006a]), but instead <strong>do</strong>cuments the cognitive mech<strong>an</strong>isms usedin constructing preferences (Weber & Johnson 2006).These are the key process specifications of QT: (1) Peoplequery past experience <strong>for</strong> evidence supporting different choiceoptions, (2) these queries are executed sequentially, <strong>an</strong>d (3) thefirst query produces richer representations because of outputinterference. This occurs because, as evidence <strong>for</strong> the firstoption is generated, evidence supporting other choice optionsis temporarily suppressed. Finally, (4) choice follows from theresulting bal<strong>an</strong>ce of evidence. Since the order of optionsconsideration influences the bal<strong>an</strong>ce of evidence, it is import<strong>an</strong>tto know what determines which choice option gets queried first.Characteristics of the choice environment often determine whatoption is considered first, such as the existence of decisiondefaults. Like M&S, QT suggests that framing effects occurbecause different frames make <strong>reason</strong>s differentially available.QT finds that framing works by influencing the order in whichtwo options are considered <strong>an</strong>d thus the bal<strong>an</strong>ce of evidence,which mediates choice (Johnson et al. 2007; Weber et al.2007). For example, different countries have different defaults<strong>for</strong> org<strong>an</strong> <strong>do</strong>nation, which ch<strong>an</strong>ges the order in which queriespro versus con <strong>do</strong>nating are considered, producing differentlevels of org<strong>an</strong> <strong>do</strong>nation (Johnson & Goldstein 2003). Similarlythe order of consideration c<strong>an</strong> be affected by different attributelabels that trigger positive versus negative emotions <strong>for</strong> differentchoice options (Hardisty et al. 2010).Just like the inferential processes described by M&S, QTprocesses operate automatically, without awareness, <strong>an</strong>d areeffective (though sometimes biased) products of motivated cognition.The motivation <strong>for</strong> which option to consider first makessense most of the time. Default options currently in place weretypically selected <strong>for</strong> good <strong>reason</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d have not caused injuryor harm. Options that trigger desire have desirable features,<strong>an</strong>d options that <strong>do</strong>n’t trigger disgust or contempt are typicallysuperior to those that <strong>do</strong>. Giving such options <strong>an</strong> adv<strong>an</strong>tage byquerying arguments <strong>for</strong> their selection first is a way of makingthe right decision faster <strong>an</strong>d with greater confidence. Both inference<strong>an</strong>d preference trade off between accuracy <strong>an</strong>d efficiency<strong>an</strong>d confidence, though these different goals <strong>do</strong> not alwayswork in opposite directions. Whereas <strong>argumentative</strong> goals raiseconfidence in one’s inferences or decisions <strong>an</strong>d also shortentime to reach them, the initially favored options or opinions typicallyhave good <strong>reason</strong> behind them, <strong>an</strong>d the seemingly biasedinference or preference reflects mostly <strong>reason</strong>able Bayesi<strong>an</strong>priors, with perhaps some built-in conservatism.These parallels between M&S’s hypothesis <strong>an</strong>d QT suggestthat the purpose of argumentation is not purely interpersonal,but that implicit argument recruitment, in some outcomebiasingfashion, is also <strong>an</strong> intrapsychic process that is part ofimplicit preference construction. Note that Fr<strong>an</strong>klin’s commentabout the hum<strong>an</strong> ability to “find or make a <strong>reason</strong> <strong>for</strong> everythingone has a mind to <strong>do</strong>” (cited by M&S in support of social argumentation[sect. 4.1.4, para. 1]) was prompted by his internalstruggle between vegetari<strong>an</strong> beliefs <strong>an</strong>d the tempting smell offreshly caught fish on a sea voyage (Fr<strong>an</strong>klin 1817/2006). (Hejustified eating the fish by recalling the observation, while watchingthe fish being cle<strong>an</strong>ed, that it had eaten other, smaller fish.)While this is <strong>an</strong> example of conscious inference, justification,<strong>an</strong>d argumentation, M&S <strong>an</strong>d QT argue that such memory retrievals<strong>an</strong>d inferences occur const<strong>an</strong>tly <strong>an</strong>d without consciousawareness to guide our actions. Few choices offer <strong>do</strong>minatingalternatives, <strong>an</strong>d internal conflict between competing objectives<strong>an</strong>d hence choice alternatives is the norm. Like Fr<strong>an</strong>klin’sexample, m<strong>an</strong>y decisions also have the potential <strong>for</strong> postdecisionalregret, making it import<strong>an</strong>t to bolster confidence that thechosen option is in fact the best one.Are there differences between intrapsychic <strong>an</strong>d interpersonalargumentation? One difference relates to one of the mostcrucial components of QT’s sequential argumentation; namely,the process of output interference, where the first query <strong>for</strong> evidencesupporting the implicitly favored, <strong>an</strong>d thus first-considered,choice option temporarily inhibits arguments <strong>for</strong> otherchoice options, hence reducing generation of support <strong>for</strong> itduring subsequent queries. This is clearly <strong>an</strong> intrapsychicprocess, not <strong>an</strong> interpersonal one. It is only when I generate arguments<strong>for</strong> a given action (<strong>an</strong>d not when someone else <strong>do</strong>es so)that the accessibility of arguments <strong>for</strong> other actions in my mindgets inhibited. To the extent that we find similar subtle biasingof choices in line with the goals of motivated cognition ingroup discussion <strong>an</strong>d decision settings, it must be accomplishedBEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2 91


Commentary/Mercier & Sperber: <strong>Why</strong> <strong>do</strong> <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> <strong>reason</strong>?by different processes. Smith et al. (2009) suggest that interpersonalargumentation in group decisions ch<strong>an</strong>ges goal-specificweights <strong>an</strong>d not the order by which evidence is considered <strong>an</strong>dthus its recall success. M&S find similar differences in implicitinference processes when inferences are made by a single individualor by several individuals in a group setting.In summary, preference <strong>an</strong>d inference tasks seem connected,among other things, by a common <strong>argumentative</strong> nature, whichmay suggest shared cognitive mech<strong>an</strong>isms (Weber & Johnson2009).Reasoning, robots, <strong>an</strong>d navigation: Dual roles<strong>for</strong> deductive <strong>an</strong>d abductive <strong>reason</strong>ing<strong>do</strong>i:10.1017/S0140525X10002955J<strong>an</strong>et WilesSchool of In<strong>for</strong>mation Technology & Electrical Engineering, University ofQueensl<strong>an</strong>d, Brisb<strong>an</strong>e 4072, Australia.wiles@itee.uq.edu.au http://www.itee.uq.edu.au/≏j<strong>an</strong>etw/Abstract: Mercier & Sperber (M&S) argue <strong>for</strong> their <strong>argumentative</strong><strong>theory</strong> in terms of communicative abilities. Insights c<strong>an</strong> be gained byextending the discussion beyond hum<strong>an</strong> <strong>reason</strong>ing to rodent <strong>an</strong>d robotnavigation. The selection of arguments <strong>an</strong>d conclusions that aremutually rein<strong>for</strong>cing c<strong>an</strong> be cast as a <strong>for</strong>m of abductive <strong>reason</strong>ing that Iargue underlies the construction of cognitive maps in navigation tasks.Mercier <strong>an</strong>d Sperber’s (M&S’s) <strong>theory</strong> of the adaptive value of<strong>argumentative</strong> <strong>reason</strong>ing is intriguing from a computational perspective,since the search <strong>for</strong> arguments that support a given conclusionis computationally more difficult (viewed as a <strong>reason</strong>ingproblem) th<strong>an</strong> logical <strong>reason</strong>ing. The first logical solvers weredeveloped in the 1950s (Newell & Simon 1956). Argumentativecomputers are yet to be developed.Argumentative <strong>reason</strong>ing, defined broadly as the discovery ofstatements to support a given conclusion c<strong>an</strong> be cast as a <strong>for</strong>mof adbuctive <strong>reason</strong>ing, or inferring a precondition from a consequent(following Peirce 1931–35). Such <strong>reason</strong>ing is logically fallacious,but as M&S’s target article details, it is typical of hum<strong>an</strong>behaviour to select arguments <strong>an</strong>d conclusions that together aremutually rein<strong>for</strong>cing.We accept M&S’s arguments <strong>for</strong> the adaptive value of <strong>argumentative</strong><strong>reason</strong>ing as a communicative skill. However, just asquestions have been raised in other fields about the evolutionof the sophisticated communicative abilities of <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong>, we c<strong>an</strong>also ask how <strong>an</strong> <strong>argumentative</strong> ability could have evolved.M<strong>an</strong>y evolutionary adaptations are thought to be exaptations;that is, new uses <strong>for</strong> existing structures. Verbal <strong>argumentative</strong><strong>reason</strong>ing obviously draws on linguistic ability, but it need notpostdate it. We consider the possibility that cognitive abilitiesunderlying <strong>argumentative</strong> <strong>reason</strong>ing may predate the evolutionof l<strong>an</strong>guage by exapting abductive abilities from other <strong>do</strong>mains.Reasoning is not the only <strong>do</strong>main where adaptive behaviourmay utilise abductive <strong>reason</strong>ing. A much more <strong>an</strong>cient evolutionaryability, which <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> share with other mammals, birds, reptiles,<strong>an</strong>d even insects, is the ability to navigate. Much is knownabout the navigational systems of mammals, including theneural representations of places (O’Keefe & Dostrovsky 1971)linked into cognitive maps (O’Keefe & Nadel 1978; Tolm<strong>an</strong>1948), grid cells (Moser et al. 2008), <strong>an</strong>d head-direction cells(Taube et al. 1990). Complementing neural studies are computationalmodels <strong>an</strong>d embodied robots, <strong>an</strong>d it is the fully functionalrobotic systems (Arleo & Gerstner 2000; Kuipers 2000; Mil<strong>for</strong>d& Wyeth 2003; Thrun 2003) that provide insight <strong>for</strong> thiscommentary.Two approaches c<strong>an</strong> be contrasted <strong>for</strong> robotic navigationalsystems: a logically correct approach based on Bayesi<strong>an</strong><strong>reason</strong>ing (<strong>an</strong>alogous to deductive <strong>reason</strong>ing), <strong>an</strong>d one base<strong>do</strong>n a bio-inspired approach that exploits a <strong>for</strong>m of abductive<strong>reason</strong>ing to constructive a cognitive map. In mobile robots, akey problem is to maintain <strong>an</strong> estimate of one’s current locationwhile exploring <strong>an</strong>d mapping a new environment (called simult<strong>an</strong>eouslocalisation <strong>an</strong>d mapping [SLAM]).Given in<strong>for</strong>mationabout localisation (such as a Global Positioning System [GPS]),mapping is a relatively straight<strong>for</strong>ward deductive <strong>reason</strong>ingproblem, <strong>an</strong>d conversely, given a map, localisation is straight<strong>for</strong>ward.However, when both tasks must be solved simult<strong>an</strong>eously(in the absence of GPS), the errors in each compound. M<strong>an</strong>ylocations <strong>do</strong> not have unique l<strong>an</strong>dmarks; apparently unique featuresof one environment may turn out to be present only tr<strong>an</strong>sientlyor to be shared by other locations. Even recognising apreviously visited location at a later time c<strong>an</strong> be challenging. Invision-only SLAM, one of the best-per<strong>for</strong>ming systems is theRatSLAM system (Mil<strong>for</strong>d 2008), inspired by the hippocampalmapping system of the rodent. Initially developed using placecells <strong>an</strong>d head-direction cells, it was discovered early on thatthe robots also needed something akin to grid cells (althoughwhen the model was first developed in 2003, grid cells themselveswere yet to be discovered). RatSLAM learns the paths that arobot traverses through its environment <strong>an</strong>d links them intomaps. It uses a unique optimisation system that maintains in<strong>for</strong>mationthat is locally consistent, while also estimating a globalmap.If a location is considered a “conclusion” in a mapping task,<strong>an</strong>d features of the environment are considered “arguments tosupport that conclusion,” then systems that are effective at navigationare of necessity abductive <strong>reason</strong>ers. Maps are constructedby using locations <strong>for</strong> which there is evidence, <strong>an</strong>d evidence isretained when it is useful <strong>for</strong> localisation. Maps <strong>an</strong>d their evidenceneed to be mutually rein<strong>for</strong>cing to be useful. The hippocampushas been linked to m<strong>an</strong>y aspects of cognition as well asspatial memory. Argumentative <strong>reason</strong>ing may well be thelatest of its exapted abilities.Some empirical qualifications to thearguments <strong>for</strong> <strong>an</strong> <strong>argumentative</strong> <strong>theory</strong><strong>do</strong>i:10.1017/S0140525X10002840Christopher R. WolfeDepartment of Psychology, Miami University, Ox<strong>for</strong>d, OH 45056.WolfeCR@muohio.eduhttp://think.psy.muohio.edu/home/Abstract: The empirical research on the psychology of argumentationsuggests that people are prone to fallacies <strong>an</strong>d suboptimal per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>cein generating, comprehending, <strong>an</strong>d evaluating arguments. Reasoning<strong>an</strong>d argumentation are interrelated skills that use m<strong>an</strong>y of the samecognitive processes. The processes we use to convince others are alsoused to convince ourselves. Argumentation would be ineffective if wecouldn’t <strong>reason</strong> <strong>for</strong> ourselves.Mercier <strong>an</strong>d Sperber (M&S) are insightful in proposing a stronglink between <strong>reason</strong>ing <strong>an</strong>d argumentation. Underst<strong>an</strong>ding the<strong>argumentative</strong> context sheds light on the processes of <strong>reason</strong>ing.However, empirical research on the psychology of argumentationcontradicts several of their key claims. Contrary to their position,<strong>reason</strong>ing biases are common even in the context of argumentation,the confirmation bias is not a feature of argumentation <strong>an</strong>dactually weakens arguments, <strong>an</strong>d people cling to claims lessrigidly th<strong>an</strong> is tacitly assumed by the authors.M&S’s review of the literature on the psychology of argumentationis surprisingly sparse. Un<strong>for</strong>tunately, the data suggest thatpeople are subject to fallacies <strong>an</strong>d suboptimal per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce ingenerating, comprehending, <strong>an</strong>d evaluating arguments. Kuhn92 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2


Commentary/Mercier & Sperber: <strong>Why</strong> <strong>do</strong> <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> <strong>reason</strong>?(2001) found that 4-year-old children are able to distinguishbetween evidence <strong>an</strong>d expl<strong>an</strong>ation. However, children areoften poor at generating arguments (Me<strong>an</strong>s & Voss 1996). In a<strong>do</strong>lescents,national educational assessments find that only about15% of 12th graders are adequately skilled in developingwritten arguments (Beatty 1996; Greenwald et al. 1999). AnneBritt <strong>an</strong>d colleagues conducted a series of experiments on thecomprehension, evaluation, <strong>an</strong>d generation of <strong>argumentative</strong>texts by college students. Among their findings, only about 35%of particip<strong>an</strong>ts were able to identify the main claims <strong>an</strong>d<strong>reason</strong>s in arguments, 37% failed to reject unsupported arguments,32% failed to reject unwarr<strong>an</strong>ted arguments, 48%included other-side in<strong>for</strong>mation in their arguments, <strong>an</strong>d 65%wrote essays that did not include a single <strong>reason</strong> to supporttheir claims (Britt & Kurby 2005; Britt & Larson 2003; Brittet al. 2005; Larson et al. 2004). Britt et al. (2008) found that universitystudents have difficulty precisely recalling the main predicateof argument claims, but less difficulty recalling thepredicates of comparable narrative statements. Wolfe et al.(2007) found that highly implausible <strong>reason</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d warr<strong>an</strong>ts (<strong>for</strong>example, Paul should walk to the store “because walking is theabsolute best exercise that will ever exist, <strong>an</strong>d exercising c<strong>an</strong>lead to immortality”) yielded higher agreement th<strong>an</strong> the sameclaims without support. Argumentation is a fundamental skillthat permeates hum<strong>an</strong> thinking (Voss & V<strong>an</strong> Dyke 2001).However, M&S have painted <strong>an</strong> unduly optimistic portrait ofour argumentation abilities.Some of what M&S describe as “confirmation bias” is sometimescalled the “myside bias” (Baron 1995; Perkins et al. 1991;Toplak & St<strong>an</strong>ovich 2003; Wolfe & Britt 2005; 2008; Wolfeet al. 2009a). Although some authors use the terms interch<strong>an</strong>geably,confirmation bias typically refers to a biased search <strong>for</strong> orweighing of evidence, whereas myside bias refers to biases ingenerating <strong>reason</strong>s or arguments (Wolfe & Britt 2008). M&Sstate that the confirmation bias “is a consequence of the functionof <strong>reason</strong>ing <strong>an</strong>d hence a feature of <strong>reason</strong>ing when used <strong>for</strong> theproduction of arguments” (sect. 3, para. 1, emphasis theirs). Mycolleagues <strong>an</strong>d I have conducted a series of experiments on argumentation,<strong>an</strong>d the evidence differs in key respects from theirassertions (Wolfe & Britt 2005; 2008; Wolfe et al. 2009a).Wolfe & Britt (2008) had particip<strong>an</strong>ts write <strong>argumentative</strong>essays under different conditions. Some were assigned to writeessays <strong>for</strong> <strong>an</strong>d others against <strong>an</strong> unpopular proposition. Particip<strong>an</strong>tshad access to a number of pro <strong>an</strong>d con online texts, <strong>an</strong>dwe also examined their search behavior. We found that themyside bias was pervasive. However, it was not linked to particip<strong>an</strong>t’spersonal opinions. People exhibited the myside bias whenarguing <strong>for</strong> the side with which they personally disagreed just asoften as <strong>for</strong> the side with which they agreed. We have replicatedthis finding, yet also find signific<strong>an</strong>t correlations between opinionstrength <strong>an</strong>d myside bias on non<strong>argumentative</strong> <strong>reason</strong>ing tasks(Wolfe & Boone, under review; Wolfe & Britt 2008). Moreover,particip<strong>an</strong>ts exhibiting the myside bias in their arguments werenot biased in their search. They sought out both pro-side <strong>an</strong>dcon-side texts.The myside bias is indeed a bias – even in the context of argumentation.To illustrate, a content <strong>an</strong>alysis of published authenticarguments found that most writers included other-side in<strong>for</strong>mationin their arguments, commonly <strong>for</strong> the purpose of rebuttal(see Wolfe & Britt 2008). In laboratory experiments, presenting<strong>an</strong>d rebutting other-side in<strong>for</strong>mation consistently leads tobetter ratings of agreement, argument quality, <strong>an</strong>d impressionsof authors th<strong>an</strong> <strong>do</strong>es excluding other-side in<strong>for</strong>mation (Wolfe &Boone, under review; Wolfe et al. 2009a). The myside biasweakens arguments measurably.The factors predicting the myside bias in written essays areindividual differences in beliefs about argumentation. Evidencestems from successful tutorials that signific<strong>an</strong>tly reduce themyside bias in generating <strong>an</strong>d evaluating arguments (Wolfeet al. 2009a; 2009b), <strong>an</strong>swers to the open-ended question “whatmakes a good argument?” (Wolfe & Britt 2008), <strong>an</strong>d reliable individualdifference measures (Wolfe & Boone, under review;Wolfe & Britt 2009). The context of argumentation ch<strong>an</strong>ges thenature of the myside bias, but one-sided argumentation is problematic<strong>an</strong>d not <strong>an</strong> inherent feature of argumentation.A tacit assumption in M&S’s account is that people havestrong, stable preferences <strong>an</strong>d unwavering commitments toclaims. Argumentation is seen as a <strong>for</strong>m of rationalization usedto convince others of claims derived from intuitive processesabout which people are only dimly aware. Yet, starting withearly research on in<strong>for</strong>mal <strong>reason</strong>ing (Perkins et al. 1983), wehave learned that positions are often fluid <strong>an</strong>d tentative. As<strong>reason</strong>ing progresses, those positions undergo ch<strong>an</strong>ges. We typicallyargue about matters that are “debatable,” where <strong>reason</strong>ablepeople arrive at different conclusions <strong>an</strong>d are open to persuasion.I believe that <strong>reason</strong>ing <strong>an</strong>d argumentation are interrelated skillsdrawing on m<strong>an</strong>y of the same cognitive processes – two sides ofthe same coin. Dual-process theories suggest that people lackaccess to m<strong>an</strong>y of our own cognitive processes. Thus, when wehave tentative intuitions that are not well understood, we usem<strong>an</strong>y of the same processes to convince ourselves that in othercontexts we use to convince other people. However flawedthese processes may be, argumentation would be ineffective ifwe were not also able to <strong>reason</strong> <strong>for</strong> ourselves.Deliberative democracy <strong>an</strong>d epistemichumility<strong>do</strong>i:10.1017/S0140525X10002888Kevin Chien-Ch<strong>an</strong>g WuNational Taiw<strong>an</strong> University College of Medicine, Taipei, Taiw<strong>an</strong>.ccwu88@ntu.edu.twAbstract: Deliberative democracy is one of the best designs that couldfacilitate good public policy decision making <strong>an</strong>d bring about epistemicgood based on Mercier <strong>an</strong>d Sperber’s (M&S’s) <strong>theory</strong> of <strong>reason</strong>ing.However, three conditions are necessary: (1) <strong>an</strong> ethic of individualepistemic humility, (2) a pragmatic deflationist definition of truth, <strong>an</strong>d(3) a microscopic framing power <strong>an</strong>alysis during group <strong>reason</strong>ing.In recent decades, we have witnessed m<strong>an</strong>y public policy sc<strong>an</strong>dals<strong>an</strong>d controversies in which, compared with laypersons,experts are not necessarily better in either epistemic or moralaspects (Godlee 2010; Jas<strong>an</strong>off 2003; Wynne 1996). Followingthe loss of public trust in expert decision making, new discoursesof deliberative democracy <strong>for</strong> public policy making haveappeared (Lengwiler 2008). Examples in the new trend ofemphasizing public participation are consensus conferences, citizens’juries, citizens’ p<strong>an</strong>els, <strong>an</strong>d the like (Abelson et al. 2003).Usually, there are two me<strong>an</strong>ings of deliberation: The first is “aparticular sort of discussion” that “involves the careful <strong>an</strong>dserious weighing of <strong>reason</strong>s <strong>for</strong> <strong>an</strong>d against some proposition”(Fearon 1998, p. 63). The second is “<strong>an</strong> interior process” of<strong>reason</strong> weighing by <strong>an</strong> individual (Fearon 1998, p. 63). Deliberativedemocracy a<strong>do</strong>pts the first me<strong>an</strong>ing, so deliberative democracyfits in Mercier <strong>an</strong>d Sperber’s (M&S’s) group-<strong>reason</strong>ingsituation.M<strong>an</strong>y theoretical arguments support deliberative democracy,but here I focus on the epistemic aspect of deliberative democracy.According to John Dewey’s experimentalist account ofdemocracy, the epistemic power of democracy is inseparablefrom citizens’ collective deliberation. In a democratic regime,citizens are engaged to deliberate collectively over the <strong>for</strong>eseenconsequences of public policies <strong>an</strong>d then choose, test, evaluate,<strong>an</strong>d revise the policies implemented. Accordingly, the discussionsamong citizens with diverse backgrounds <strong>an</strong>d local knowledgecould facilitate the fair recognition of public interestBEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2 93


Response/Mercier & Sperber: <strong>Why</strong> <strong>do</strong> <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> <strong>reason</strong>?problems <strong>an</strong>d the a<strong>do</strong>ption of public policy proposals that arecomprehensive enough. Public policy choice <strong>an</strong>d implementationis like <strong>an</strong> experiment in whether dynamic feedback fromthe policy implementation will render <strong>an</strong>other session of democraticdeliberation (Anderson 2006). Also, according to <strong>an</strong>otherpragmatist, C. S. Peirce, a proposition could be true if it c<strong>an</strong>survive the test of best <strong>reason</strong>s, evidence, <strong>an</strong>d arguments(Misak 2009). Since almost no one would deem the seeking oftruth <strong>an</strong> unworthy goal, it holds that deliberation in a democraticregime would offer the best ch<strong>an</strong>ce of achieving this goal (Talisse2009).As already mentioned, the typically a<strong>do</strong>pted concept criteria ofdeliberative democracy include the state of disagreement amongthe particip<strong>an</strong>ts <strong>an</strong>d the task of reaching collective decisions(Thompson 2008). There<strong>for</strong>e, a good design of deliberativedemocracy would be compatible with the propositions by M&Sabout <strong>reason</strong>ing <strong>for</strong> arguments. Accordingly, all individuals, nomatter whether they are experts or laypersons, are subject toproactive <strong>reason</strong>ing. When these individuals deliberate alone,they usually <strong>reason</strong> to confirm, rather th<strong>an</strong> scrutinize, their originalarguments. It is better to conduct group <strong>reason</strong>ing such thateach member c<strong>an</strong> contribute to mutual non-proactive evaluationsof arguments <strong>an</strong>d conclusions not in their favor. For M&S,“[a]rgumentation is uniquely effective in overcoming disagreementsthat are likely to occur, in particular in relatively equalitari<strong>an</strong>groups” (sect. 1.2, para. 9).Also, to legitimize the conclusions reached through deliberativedemocracy, it is usually proposed that in the process ofmutual justification (presenting <strong>an</strong>d responding to <strong>reason</strong>sintended to justify a political decision [Gutm<strong>an</strong>n & Thompson2004]), deliberative democracy should have such characteristicsas public spiritedness (arguments <strong>for</strong> common good), equalrespect <strong>for</strong> each particip<strong>an</strong>t, accommodation (retaining the possibilityof collaboration on other issues), <strong>an</strong>d equal participation(no <strong>do</strong>mination phenomenon) (Thompson 2008). The epistemicgood of deliberative democracy comes from engaging peoplewith different motivations <strong>for</strong> group <strong>reason</strong>ing <strong>an</strong>d subjectingeach version of <strong>reason</strong>ing to mutual scrutiny. Thus, currenttheoretical proposals have shown that deliberative democracy isone of the best designs <strong>for</strong> facilitating good public policy, asimplied in M&S’s <strong>theory</strong>.Empirical research into the effectiveness of deliberativedemocracy is still in its burgeoning stage, but the qualifiedpromise of deliberative democracy demonstrates that deliberationis not <strong>an</strong> easy task (Ryfe 2005). A good design of deliberativedemocracy should establish rules to maintain the theoreticalaims, allow people to tell stories to make cultural me<strong>an</strong>ings inaddition to making cognitive sense, encourage leadership thatfacilitates deliberation, endeavor to relate the outcome of deliberationto the particip<strong>an</strong>ts, <strong>an</strong>d finally create environments tofacilitate learning how to deliberate (Ryfe 2005). All thesecomplicated issues were not addressed by M&S <strong>an</strong>d couldsupplement their propositions as applied outside of the experimentalfields.Three conditions are needed <strong>for</strong> deliberative democracy toachieve epistemic good. First, when it comes to equal participationin deliberative democracy, the explicit <strong>an</strong>d implicit st<strong>an</strong>dards<strong>for</strong> the concepts used in the communication might leadto the exclusion of the concepts used by the marginalizedgroups to make cultural me<strong>an</strong>ings. In this kind of “hermeneuticinjustice” (Fricker 2007), the majority’s conceptual frameworkmight squeeze out or mask the minority’s specific experiences.For example, in John Rawls’ <strong>for</strong>mulation of public <strong>reason</strong>, ifthe contents of claims contain concepts that are not easily available<strong>an</strong>d assessable by the public, these claims would be excludedfrom the public <strong>do</strong>mains because they contain no recognitionworthy<strong>reason</strong>s (Morg<strong>an</strong>-Olsen 2010). However, we should not<strong>for</strong>get that the frames <strong>an</strong>d ways we observe <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>alyze thingsoften constrain our decisions <strong>an</strong>d results (Wu 2008). There<strong>for</strong>e,we should uphold <strong>an</strong> ethic of epistemic humility by which wetake serious novel concepts <strong>an</strong>d experiences presented indeliberation.Second, we should recognize that if the epistemic goal of deliberativedemocracy were to seek truth, then the dynamism in theprocess would only point us to the deflationist version of truth.There is no way we could ascertain the realist version of truththrough deliberation over the feedback from the implementationof public policies. Sticking to the realist version of truth woulddisrupt the function of deliberation, bringing it to a halt. Third,pursuing the previous two conditions, we have to <strong>an</strong>alyze theexplicit <strong>an</strong>d implicit operations of microscopic framing powersempirically during group <strong>reason</strong>ing. Here, I <strong>do</strong> not insist onthe abolition of all these operations of framing powers (Lengwiler2008), but we should underst<strong>an</strong>d whether the minority concepts<strong>an</strong>d frames are given their due course <strong>for</strong> sense making <strong>an</strong>dme<strong>an</strong>ing making. Based on the findings, we could furtherdesign the rules that would meet the requirements of epistemichumility.Authors’ ResponseArgumentation: Its adaptiveness <strong>an</strong>d efficacy<strong>do</strong>i:10.1017/S0140525X10003031Hugo Mercier a <strong>an</strong>d D<strong>an</strong> Sperber ba Philosophy, Politics <strong>an</strong>d Economics Program, University of Pennsylv<strong>an</strong>ia,Philadelphia, PA 19104; b Je<strong>an</strong> Nicod Institute (EHESS-ENS-CNRS), 75005Paris, Fr<strong>an</strong>ce; <strong>an</strong>d Department of Philosophy, Central Europe<strong>an</strong> University,Budapest, Hungary.hmercier@sas.upenn.edu d<strong>an</strong>@sperber.frhttp://sites.google.com/site/hugomercier/ http://www.d<strong>an</strong>.sperber.frAbstract: Having defended the usefulness of our definition of<strong>reason</strong>ing, we stress that <strong>reason</strong>ing is not only <strong>for</strong> convincingbut also <strong>for</strong> evaluating arguments, <strong>an</strong>d that as such it has <strong>an</strong>epistemic function. We defend the evidence supporting the<strong>theory</strong> against several challenges: People are good in<strong>for</strong>malarguers, they <strong>reason</strong> better in groups, <strong>an</strong>d they have aconfirmation bias. Finally, we consider possible extensions, firstin terms of process-level theories of <strong>reason</strong>ing, <strong>an</strong>d second inthe effects of <strong>reason</strong>ing outside the lab.We are grateful to the commentators <strong>for</strong> their support,their insightful criticisms, <strong>an</strong>d their useful suggestions.Even when we felt we were being misunderstood, welearned – or so we hope – how to make our case in aclearer <strong>an</strong>d more compelling m<strong>an</strong>ner. In <strong>an</strong>sweringthese commentaries, we focus in turn on the evolution<strong>an</strong>d the function of <strong>reason</strong>ing, on its strengths <strong>an</strong>dbiases, <strong>an</strong>d on its mode of operation. But first we have todefend our definition of <strong>reason</strong>ing against severalchallenges.R1. Different definitions of <strong>reason</strong>ingIn the target article, we defined <strong>reason</strong>ing as the mental actof constructing or evaluating <strong>an</strong> argument that is at leastpartly explicit In particular, it must contain both a conclusion<strong>an</strong>d <strong>reason</strong>s to accept this conclusion, even ifsome of the steps leading from these <strong>reason</strong>s to the conclusionsare left implicit. In this sense, <strong>reason</strong>ing is in94 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2


Response/Mercier & Sperber: <strong>Why</strong> <strong>do</strong> <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> <strong>reason</strong>?contrast with ordinary intuitive inference, a process thatyields a conclusion without articulating the <strong>reason</strong>s toaccept it. So far, our definition is close enough to philosophical<strong>an</strong>d commonsense use of the term <strong>reason</strong>ing <strong>an</strong>d atodds with the now widespread use in psychology of“<strong>reason</strong>ing” as a mere synonym of inference. Needless tosay, several definitions of <strong>reason</strong>ing may each target aphenomenon worth studying.In line with much evolutionary psychology, weassumed that the mind is <strong>an</strong> articulation of m<strong>an</strong>y fairlyspecialized mech<strong>an</strong>isms; in particular, mech<strong>an</strong>isms ofintuitive inference that are specialized <strong>for</strong> a specific cognitive<strong>do</strong>main or task such as recognizing faces, interpretingtheir expressions, processing frequencies, <strong>an</strong>d decodingspeech. Even though it contrasts with ordinary intuitiveinference, <strong>reason</strong>ing as we describe it is itself a <strong>for</strong>m ofhigher-order intuitive inference with a specialized<strong>do</strong>main <strong>an</strong>d task: It delivers intuitions about <strong>reason</strong>s-conclusionsrelationships. This way of distinguishing <strong>reason</strong>ingproper from other inferential mech<strong>an</strong>isms is largelyrooted in the same kind of observations <strong>an</strong>d concernsthat have led to the development of dual-process ordual-system approaches to <strong>reason</strong>ing (as we have discussedin greater detail in Mercier & Sperber 2009).Several commentaries defend a different definition of<strong>reason</strong>ing that may be closer to that of inference ingeneral or to a more st<strong>an</strong>dard dual-process approach tosystem 2 <strong>reason</strong>ing.Khlentzos & Stevenson suggest that some type ofsystem 2 <strong>reason</strong>ing must have evolved to arbitratebetween contradictory system 1 outputs. Unless a veryliberal definition of system 2 is a<strong>do</strong>pted – one that encompassesmuch more th<strong>an</strong> <strong>reason</strong>ing as it is defined here – itseems as though such problems are routinely solved bysystem 1 itself. Any cognitively complex org<strong>an</strong>ism will befaced with contradictory outputs – <strong>for</strong> inst<strong>an</strong>ce, when perceptioncontradicts memory because the environment hasch<strong>an</strong>ged – <strong>an</strong>d must have ways to arbitrate among them.Reasoning may help accomplish this task in some difficultcases, but it is specifically geared toward this end – <strong>an</strong>dthis would be true even with a much broader definitionof the term <strong>reason</strong>ing.Poletiek makes a comparable proposal regarding actionselection, using the example of people looking <strong>for</strong> their keys<strong>an</strong>d having to choose between different search strategies.According to her, it is mostly a consideration of costs <strong>an</strong>dbenefits that decide whether the search is “confirmatory”or “falsificatory.” But, as we suggested, such choices arecommonly made without <strong>reason</strong>ing proper (a point Poletiekseems to agree with). Evolved intuitive mech<strong>an</strong>isms ofaction selection are designed to take into account costs<strong>an</strong>d benefits without producing the <strong>reason</strong>s <strong>for</strong> theirchoices. Reasoning, on the other h<strong>an</strong>d, produces such<strong>reason</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d hence a justification <strong>for</strong> a course of actionwithout directly triggering it. Narvaez suggests in thesame vein that <strong>reason</strong>ing “includes figuring out whatcourse of action to take” (para. 2). While <strong>reason</strong>ing is sometimesused in decision making – as reviewed in section 5 ofthe target article – the vast majority of our actions areguided by intuitions <strong>an</strong>d so fall outside of the scope of<strong>reason</strong>ing as defined <strong>an</strong>d thus outside the scope of thearticle, as well.More generally, thinking <strong>an</strong>d action selection involvemore th<strong>an</strong> just <strong>do</strong>main-specific intuitive inferences <strong>an</strong>dreflective <strong>reason</strong>ing. In m<strong>an</strong>y dual-process models,system 2 is in fact likely to encompass mech<strong>an</strong>isms otherth<strong>an</strong> <strong>reason</strong>ing. Ev<strong>an</strong>s suggests hypothetical thinking –the ability to represent future situations. Narvaez refersto some <strong>for</strong>ms of elaborated pl<strong>an</strong>ning. Connolly & Rebtalk of mech<strong>an</strong>isms designed to avoid decisions wewould regret, making interesting suggestions regardingways to eliminate some <strong>reason</strong>ing biases – in particular<strong>reason</strong>-based choice. These authors point out that thesemech<strong>an</strong>isms c<strong>an</strong> directly lead to good outcomes withoutinvolving argumentation, <strong>an</strong>d see this as <strong>an</strong> objection toour evolutionary argument. But these mech<strong>an</strong>isms <strong>do</strong>not qualify as <strong>reason</strong>ing under our definition – they arenot necessarily reflective, they <strong>do</strong> not deal with arguments,<strong>an</strong>d so on. Still, these suggestion point towards <strong>an</strong> interestingdirection of research. While system 1 is commonlyseen as a set of difference mech<strong>an</strong>isms, system 2 is oftenconsidered to be more unitary. It is also possiblehowever to view system 2 as comprising several differentmech<strong>an</strong>isms, such as <strong>reason</strong>ing, pl<strong>an</strong>ning, imagination,<strong>an</strong>d strategic thinking, each with a specific function.What might justify seeing these different mech<strong>an</strong>isms aspart of a single system is, <strong>for</strong> inst<strong>an</strong>ce, their heavy use ofworking memory or of metarepresentational machinery.If different system 2 mech<strong>an</strong>isms shared such commonresources, this might help explain the covariation oftraits measured by various measures of cognitive abilitystressed by Ev<strong>an</strong>s.Our definition of <strong>reason</strong>ing may be debatable, but the<strong>argumentative</strong> approach to <strong>reason</strong>ing is about <strong>reason</strong>ingas we defined it. To object to this definition, it is notenough to offer <strong>an</strong>other definition that may be <strong>reason</strong>able<strong>an</strong>d useful. What would have to be shown is that ours failsto identify a phenomenon with enough autonomy <strong>an</strong>dintegrity to be a proper object of study <strong>an</strong>d insight.R2. Evolution <strong>an</strong>d function of <strong>reason</strong>ingA number of objections <strong>an</strong>d suggestions were based, wefeel, on a partial or, in some cases, mistaken underst<strong>an</strong>dingof our hypothesis on the evolution <strong>an</strong>d the function of<strong>reason</strong>ing. The misunderst<strong>an</strong>ding we are most eager tocorrect consists in attributing to us the view that <strong>reason</strong>inghas only rhetorical rather th<strong>an</strong> both rhetorical <strong>an</strong>d epistemicgoals. We didn’t argue that <strong>reason</strong>ing is designed onlyto find arguments in order to persuade others (Godfrey-Smith & Yegnash<strong>an</strong>kar<strong>an</strong>; Poletiek). We <strong>do</strong>n’t holdthat epistemic goals should be poorly served by <strong>reason</strong>ing(Khlentzos & Stevenson; Kuhn), or that mere rhetoric isall it takes to influence people (Narvaez; Sternberg). Nor<strong>do</strong>es it follow from our account that people should hardlyever ch<strong>an</strong>ge their mind (Wolfe). On the contrary, <strong>reason</strong>ingevolved in part to make people ch<strong>an</strong>ge their mind bygiving them good <strong>reason</strong>s to <strong>do</strong> so. These misunderst<strong>an</strong>dingsmay be linked to the fact that, in the target article, wedevoted more space to the production of arguments bycommunicators (whose goal is indeed to persuade) th<strong>an</strong>to the evaluation of these arguments by the audience(whose goal is to be in<strong>for</strong>med). This imbal<strong>an</strong>ce reflectedthe present state of the literature we surveyed ratherth<strong>an</strong> a theoretical bias. Actually, the <strong>argumentative</strong><strong>theory</strong> would not make evolutionary sense if argumentsBEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2 95


Response/Mercier & Sperber: <strong>Why</strong> <strong>do</strong> <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> <strong>reason</strong>?were addressed to people who were wholly unable toevaluate them from a sound epistemic perspective.R2.1. The <strong>do</strong>uble-sided <strong>argumentative</strong> functionof <strong>reason</strong>ing<strong>Why</strong> <strong>do</strong>es <strong>reason</strong>ing exist at all, given that it is a relativelyhigh-cost mental activity with a relatively high failure rate?To <strong>an</strong>swer this question, we proposed to step back fromthe study of individual cognitive processes <strong>an</strong>d to look atthe evolution of hum<strong>an</strong> communication. Hum<strong>an</strong>s areimmersed in a flow of socially tr<strong>an</strong>smitted in<strong>for</strong>mation<strong>an</strong>d are highly dependent on it. For communication tohave evolved, it had to be adv<strong>an</strong>tageous to both communicators<strong>an</strong>d receivers (who are, of course, the same individualsbut acting in two different capacities). What makescommunication adv<strong>an</strong>tageous to receivers is that it providesthem with rich in<strong>for</strong>mation that they could not, ornot easily, have obtained on their own. For this, the in<strong>for</strong>mationthey receive has to be genuine in<strong>for</strong>mation; that is,close enough to truth. What makes communication adv<strong>an</strong>tageousto communicators is that it allows them to achievesome desirable effect in the receivers. For this, the in<strong>for</strong>mationthey emit has to be conducive to this effect,whether it is true or false.Dessalles, who has himself developed a perspective insome respects comparable to ours, underst<strong>an</strong>ds us to claimthat “the biological function of <strong>reason</strong>ing is to achieveshared knowledge optimization” (para. 2) <strong>an</strong>d that this is<strong>do</strong>ne not at the individual but at the group level. We <strong>do</strong>argue that the main function of <strong>reason</strong>ing is indeedsocial but by serving the social interests of individualsrather th<strong>an</strong> the collective interests of the group.To reap the benefits of communication while limitingthe risk of being misled, receivers must exercise what wehave called epistemic vigil<strong>an</strong>ce (Sperber et al. 2010).There is no fail-safe algorithm to sort genuine from spuriousin<strong>for</strong>mation; hence, we argue, various cost-effectiveheuristics that may contribute to approximating such asorting are likely to have evolved. The main heuristic ofepistemic vigil<strong>an</strong>ce consists in assessing the trustworthinessof communicators. Thus, we agree with Opfer &Sloutsky that “children detect trustworthiness longbe<strong>for</strong>e they detect argument inconsistency” (para. 4)(e.g., see Mascaro & Sperber 2009). But if detecting thetrustworthiness of communicators were the only heuristicused, then receivers would end up rejecting a goodamount of genuine <strong>an</strong>d relev<strong>an</strong>t in<strong>for</strong>mation when theylack sufficient ground to accept it on trust. For inst<strong>an</strong>ce,few if <strong>an</strong>y readers of our article would accept its conclusionsjust out of trust in its authors! To be more effective,epistemic vigil<strong>an</strong>ce must be exercised not onlytowards the source of in<strong>for</strong>mation but also towards itscontent. Independently of its source, a message mayhave a greater or a lesser believability. This believabilityis assessed by considering its coherence with backgroundknowledge. Coherence checking, we argue, is the secondmajor heuristic used in filtering communicated in<strong>for</strong>mation,<strong>an</strong>d is at the basis of <strong>reason</strong>ing proper.Coherence checking starts as a method <strong>for</strong> receivers tofilter in<strong>for</strong>mation; it ends up being exploited also by communicatorswho engage in coherence displays in order tohave their messages accepted. Just as receivers wouldfilter out some genuine in<strong>for</strong>mation if they relied only onthe trustworthiness of the source, communicators wouldfail to communicate some believable messages if theyrelied only on their own authority. Arguing consists in displayingcoherence-based <strong>reason</strong>s <strong>for</strong> the accept<strong>an</strong>ce of agiven message. It is, in essence, <strong>an</strong> “honest display” strategyopened to evaluation <strong>an</strong>d aimed at the audience’s epistemicconcerns. Of course, what is displayed may be <strong>an</strong>invalid argument made in the service of deception <strong>an</strong>din the hope that its invalidity won’t be detected. Contraryto what Dessalles attributes to us, we <strong>do</strong> not believe thatcommunicators argue in order “to correct or updateothers’ beliefs” (para. 3) when it is not to their adv<strong>an</strong>tage.They argue <strong>for</strong> whatever it is adv<strong>an</strong>tageous to them to havetheir audience believe. Often enough, <strong>for</strong> inst<strong>an</strong>ce, whencommunicating to coordinate action, communicator <strong>an</strong>daudience have convergent interests in sharing true in<strong>for</strong>mation,but this is far from being always the case.In <strong>an</strong> evolutionary perspective, receivers’ coherencechecking creates selective pressure <strong>for</strong> communicators’coherence displays in the <strong>for</strong>m of arguments, which inturn creates selective pressure <strong>for</strong> adequate evaluation ofarguments on the part of receivers. At least in some culturalcontexts, this results in a kind of arms race towardsgreater sophistication in the production <strong>an</strong>d evaluationof arguments. Of course, argumentation c<strong>an</strong> be misused<strong>an</strong>d abused – <strong>for</strong> inst<strong>an</strong>ce, by arguing above the head ofone’s audience (Sperber 2009) or by lacing argumentswith appeals to emotion. Doing so, however, is morelikely to serve the interests of the communicator th<strong>an</strong>those of the audience. Contrary to what Opfer &Sloutsky maintain, “hot” persuasion is adv<strong>an</strong>tageous tocommunicators only to the extent that receivers yield toit, but it is not adv<strong>an</strong>tageous to receivers who care to bewell in<strong>for</strong>med. For this they had better <strong>reason</strong>, as Petty<strong>an</strong>d Cacioppo (whom Opfer & Sloutsky oddly cite insupport of their claim) have shown in numerous experimentsthat demonstrate precisely this point: Whenpeople are motivated to <strong>reason</strong>, they <strong>do</strong> a better job ataccepting only sound arguments, which is quite generallyto their adv<strong>an</strong>tage (e.g., see Petty et al. 1981).R2.2. Other functions of <strong>reason</strong>ing?Several commentators, while agreeing that argumentationmay be <strong>an</strong> import<strong>an</strong>t function of <strong>reason</strong>ing, suggest that itmay serve other functions, as well: either social functionsother th<strong>an</strong> the production <strong>an</strong>d evaluation of arguments(Baumeister, Masicampo, & DeWall [Baumeisteret al.]; Dessalles; Fr<strong>an</strong>kish; Pietraszewski) orfunctionscontributing to individual cognition (Ev<strong>an</strong>s; Fr<strong>an</strong>kish;Godfrey-Smith & Yegnash<strong>an</strong>kar<strong>an</strong>). We recognize thepossibility. Our claim is that argumentation is the main functionof <strong>reason</strong>ing, <strong>an</strong>d we tried to demonstrate this claim byshowing the signature of this function in the way <strong>reason</strong>ingactually functions, <strong>an</strong>d in particular in what has been seenas flaws <strong>an</strong>d that we argue are features of <strong>reason</strong>ing. Anyevolved mech<strong>an</strong>ism c<strong>an</strong> be put to a variety of uses: Themouth c<strong>an</strong> be used to play a wind instrument, the skin c<strong>an</strong>be used to display tattoos, <strong>an</strong>d the sense of smell c<strong>an</strong> beused to develop wine expertise. Whether these additionaluses become functions in the biological sense, or evenmain functions (in which case Gould <strong>an</strong>d Vrba’s term exaptationmight be properly applied) depends on the relative96 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2


Response/Mercier & Sperber: <strong>Why</strong> <strong>do</strong> <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> <strong>reason</strong>?contribution these uses make to the fitness of org<strong>an</strong>ismsen<strong>do</strong>wed with the mech<strong>an</strong>ism.Dessalles <strong>an</strong>d Fr<strong>an</strong>kish suggest that argumentationcould have evolved as a me<strong>an</strong>s to display one’s intellectualskills. Indeed, argumentation c<strong>an</strong> be put to such a use.However, the hum<strong>an</strong> drive to show off is so strong thatjust about everything in our physical <strong>an</strong>d cognitivemakeup has been recruited to that effect. People mayindeed run, fight, or argue to impress others. But whatmakes these per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ces not only impressive but relev<strong>an</strong>tis that running, fighting <strong>an</strong>d arguing are useful <strong>for</strong>purposes other th<strong>an</strong> impressing others. Moreover, the productionof arguments typically involves a high degree ofmere satisficing (Mercier, submitted a). People <strong>do</strong> notlook <strong>for</strong> the best <strong>for</strong>mulation of the best possible argument.Instead, they use the first minimally decent argumentthat comes to mind. If it works, then it wasn’tworth expending more ef<strong>for</strong>t. If it <strong>do</strong>esn’t, it is easy totry a rebuttal or <strong>an</strong>other argument. This way of arguingis to be expected only if the goal is to convince, but itwould be very surprising if <strong>reason</strong>ing had the function todisplay one’s skills by producing impressive arguments.In other words, <strong>reason</strong>ing is more like a crow’s th<strong>an</strong> a peacock’stail: It may be a bit drab, but it serves its main functionwell. Its occasional use, <strong>for</strong> inst<strong>an</strong>ce, in academicmilieus, to display one’s intellectual skills is unlikely tocontribute to fitness to the point of having become a biologicalfunction, let alone the main function of <strong>reason</strong>ing.Pietraszewski rightly points out that argumentation isused not just in the defense of factual claims but also ofclaims that are not properly speaking matters of fact butmore matters of choice or of social alignment. He distinguishestwo classes of cases, one where the goal of argumentsis “to ch<strong>an</strong>ge representations of the payoff structureof pursuing certain future pl<strong>an</strong>s” (para. 8). When argumentationis used <strong>for</strong> such purpose, it recruits intuitionsthat bear on the <strong>do</strong>main at h<strong>an</strong>d – <strong>for</strong> example, what isadv<strong>an</strong>tageous or what is well regarded – <strong>an</strong>d puts<strong>for</strong>ward <strong>reason</strong>s <strong>for</strong> a conclusion. Such cases may fallsquarely under the characterization we have given of<strong>reason</strong>ing. Pietraszewski also draws attention to a secondclass of cases where “agreement <strong>an</strong>d disagreement ...become commodities in themselves as a way of signalingthe coordination strength <strong>an</strong>d challenging others. Thisclass of argumentation psychology should be designed toconflate evaluations of the argument with the source <strong>an</strong>dsocial context of the argument; who is arguing should bejust as import<strong>an</strong>t as what they are saying when consideringthe ‘goodness’ of <strong>an</strong> argument” (para. 9). This is a welcome<strong>an</strong>d import<strong>an</strong>t observation, but <strong>do</strong>es it point to <strong>an</strong>otherfunction of <strong>reason</strong>ing? We would suggest rather that ithighlights that communication typically involves a mix ofme<strong>an</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d goals. The main relev<strong>an</strong>ce of a communicativeact may be in its explicit content, in its implicatures, or inthe very fact that it took place at all (Sperber & Wilson1995); it may have to <strong>do</strong> with tr<strong>an</strong>smission of factual in<strong>for</strong>mationor, indeed, with signaling agreement <strong>an</strong>d disagreement.This c<strong>an</strong> be <strong>do</strong>ne in particular by using argumentsnot so much to convince but to polarize. The phenomenonof polarization that, in the target article, we discussedmostly in negative terms, should probably be seen as fulfillinga function along the lines suggested by Pietraszewski.This said, it is not clear that it bears so much onthe function of <strong>reason</strong>ing rather th<strong>an</strong> on a wider r<strong>an</strong>ge ofmech<strong>an</strong>isms of social cognition that exploit <strong>an</strong>d interactwith argumentation in a variety of communicative interactions.In particular, as Opfer & Sloutsky insist <strong>an</strong>d asSell (2006, quoted by Pietraszewski) has shown with theexample of <strong>an</strong>ger, “hot” communication interferes withargumentation in import<strong>an</strong>t ways, reminding us that argumentationis only one device <strong>for</strong> persuasion among several.Baumeister et al. draw attention to two majorphenomena linked to <strong>reason</strong>ing: consciousness <strong>an</strong>dculture. We noted that <strong>reason</strong>ing is a typically consciousactivity but we did not elaborate <strong>for</strong> lack of sufficientlyclear ideas regarding consciousness in general <strong>an</strong>d itsrelationship to <strong>reason</strong>ing in particular. Baumeister et al.propose to extend the social hypothesis towards consciousthought in general: “Conscious thought enables people totalk to others <strong>an</strong>d thereby enables small groups to resolvedifferences” (para. 6). Their arguments are indeed verycongenial to the <strong>argumentative</strong> <strong>theory</strong>. Reasoning couldthen be seen as one part of a larger set of mental processesthat are not typically thought of as being social by nature,even though they actually are. Baumeister <strong>an</strong>d colleagueshave made <strong>for</strong>ays in this direction, <strong>an</strong>d we hope that moreresearch will follow, shedding new light on well-known butstill puzzling results.Regarding the role of <strong>reason</strong>ing in culture, we agree thatindeed it is a source of cultural innovation (<strong>for</strong> example, intechnology, law, <strong>an</strong>d the sciences) <strong>an</strong>d that it plays a role incultural communication (with great cultural variations, wesurmise). However, we are not convinced that this is thefunction or even a function of <strong>reason</strong>ing. Reasoning isadv<strong>an</strong>tageous to individuals who are better able to persuadeothers or to discriminate good from bad arguments. Most ofthe arguments <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> produce <strong>an</strong>d evaluate are about verylocal concerns: Who <strong>for</strong>got to close the <strong>do</strong>or? Should wewalk or take the bus? Was John lying or mistaken?Reasoned <strong>an</strong>swers to these local questions <strong>do</strong>n’t everreach a cultural level of distribution. Reasoning in orderto improve laws or to discover new techniques is veryrare. It may well be beneficial to the group, but that isnot enough to assume that <strong>reason</strong>ing evolved, throughgroup selection, <strong>for</strong> such a benefit.Godfrey-Smith & Yegnash<strong>an</strong>kar<strong>an</strong>, drawing onVygotsky, make the interesting suggestion that “<strong>reason</strong>ingis deliberative [i.e., individualistic] in function but dialogicin structure” (para. 3). We <strong>do</strong> not dispute that <strong>reason</strong>ingc<strong>an</strong> be used <strong>for</strong> individual ratiocination. Even though solitary<strong>reason</strong>ing may not be the most effective way toenh<strong>an</strong>ce individual cognitive goals, we <strong>do</strong> not excludethat such enh<strong>an</strong>cement may have sufficiently contributedto the relative fitness of <strong>reason</strong>ers to constitute a functionof <strong>reason</strong>ing. What we would dispute is that this is at alllikely to be the main function of <strong>reason</strong>ing, <strong>an</strong>d theGodfrey-Smith & Yegnash<strong>an</strong>kar<strong>an</strong> commentary is helpfulto spell out the argument. If they are right <strong>an</strong>d individualistic<strong>reason</strong>ing is dialogic in structure, why should this beso? Were a computer scientist to design a <strong>reason</strong>ingprogram (not specifically aimed at argumentation),would she opt <strong>for</strong> such a structure? In fact, m<strong>an</strong>y <strong>reason</strong>ingprogram have been developed in artificial intelligence(AI) <strong>an</strong>d in the psychology of <strong>reason</strong>ing (e.g., Johnson-Laird 2006; Rips 1994), <strong>an</strong>d typically they generatearguments (in the <strong>for</strong>mal sense of the term) without <strong>an</strong>ydialogic back-<strong>an</strong>d-<strong>for</strong>th between two agents. We suggestthat this dialogic structure of individual <strong>reason</strong>ing is theBEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2 97


Response/Mercier & Sperber: <strong>Why</strong> <strong>do</strong> <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> <strong>reason</strong>?signature of its primarily <strong>argumentative</strong> main function. Wewould argue moreover that the main contribution of<strong>reason</strong>ing to individual cognition is in helping peopleevaluate other people’s arguments.Both Ev<strong>an</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d Fr<strong>an</strong>kish suggest <strong>an</strong> interesting way toreconcile our suggestion that <strong>reason</strong>ing may have evolved<strong>for</strong> argumentation <strong>an</strong>d the more classical view that itserves first <strong>an</strong>d <strong>for</strong>emost individual cognitive goals. This individualisticfunction, Ev<strong>an</strong>s argues, might be <strong>an</strong> exaptationfrom <strong>an</strong> initial <strong>argumentative</strong> function favored by the concomit<strong>an</strong>tevolution of “l<strong>an</strong>guage, metarepresentation, <strong>an</strong>d large<strong>for</strong>ebrains” (para. 6). Fr<strong>an</strong>kish proposes that <strong>reason</strong>ing, evenif it primarily evolved <strong>for</strong> argumentation, might have beensubst<strong>an</strong>tially “co-opted to play a role in individual cognition”(para. 5). As we said in the preceding paragraph, we <strong>do</strong> notexclude the possibility that <strong>reason</strong>ing may also be adaptive inhelping individual ratiocination. Still, our argument remainsthat the m<strong>an</strong>y apparent failings of <strong>reason</strong>ing – our knowledgeof which owes much to Ev<strong>an</strong>s himself – make bettersense as the signature of a main <strong>argumentative</strong> function.Ev<strong>an</strong>s insists on the role of <strong>reason</strong>ing in <strong>an</strong>ticipating thefuture. While <strong>an</strong>ticipating the future is a major aspect ofhum<strong>an</strong> cognition, it is not clear to us what specific role<strong>reason</strong>ing plays in this process, by contrast with other abilitiessuch as imagination <strong>an</strong>d simulation. It is even lessclear what features of <strong>reason</strong>ing, if <strong>an</strong>y, are specifically tailored<strong>for</strong> this role. Fr<strong>an</strong>kish points out that <strong>reason</strong>ing c<strong>an</strong>be used to strengthen our resolve by buttressing ourdecisions with supporting arguments. Indeed, <strong>reason</strong>ingc<strong>an</strong> <strong>do</strong> exactly that. However, if weakness of resolve hadbeen enough of a problem to favor the evolution of amech<strong>an</strong>ism to deal with it, presumably the natural selectionsolution would have been to strengthen our resolvedirectly rather th<strong>an</strong> to adapt <strong>reason</strong>ing to find resolutionstrengtheningarguments. Moreover, this very tendencyto use <strong>reason</strong>ing to bolster our beliefs <strong>an</strong>d decisions islikely to have more negative th<strong>an</strong> positive consequences,as highlighted in section 4.2 of the target article.R3. Strengths <strong>an</strong>d biases of <strong>reason</strong>ing<strong>an</strong>d argumentationR3.1. Are we really good at argumentation?If <strong>reason</strong>ing evolved <strong>for</strong> argumentation, <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> shouldpossess decent <strong>argumentative</strong> skills: They should be ableto engage in <strong>an</strong> in<strong>for</strong>mal debate, constructing, evaluating,<strong>an</strong>d rebutting arguments. Several commentators questionthat this is so, pointing to research that shows signific<strong>an</strong>timprovement in <strong>argumentative</strong> ability through learning<strong>an</strong>d casting <strong>do</strong>ubt on the data we presented to defend<strong>argumentative</strong> skills.Harrell, Kuhn, <strong>an</strong>d Wolfe all point to very interestingdata showing improvement in argumentation skills withtraining – as well as the relative poverty of these skillsbe<strong>for</strong>e training. Most of the studies cited, however, bearon meta-<strong>argumentative</strong> skills. Kuhn et al. (2008) reportgains in “meta-level communications about the discourse”(p. 1310). Larson et al. (2004) study the underst<strong>an</strong>ding oflong written arguments. Critical thinking skills are oftenevaluated through the ability to draw argument schemasor to recognize the different components of <strong>an</strong> argument<strong>an</strong>d their relationship to one <strong>an</strong>other. Such skills mayvery well be crucial <strong>for</strong> success in modern academic lifeor even be of relev<strong>an</strong>ce to participation in democratic life,<strong>an</strong>d their study in import<strong>an</strong>t in its own right. However,they are not part of what one c<strong>an</strong> expect basic <strong>argumentative</strong>skills to be. L<strong>an</strong>guage provides a useful <strong>an</strong>alogy. Onec<strong>an</strong> be a fluent l<strong>an</strong>guage user without being able to tellwhat a verb is or, a <strong>for</strong>tiori, to parse a sentence. Likewise,one c<strong>an</strong> be a skilled arguer without being able to recognizeargument <strong>for</strong>ms or draw argument schemas. In both cases,these abilities c<strong>an</strong> help – a mastery of syntax c<strong>an</strong> make onea better poet, a mastery of argument schemes a better essayist– but they are not necessary.One study seems to tap into a more fundamental <strong>argumentative</strong>skill – the ability to draw counterarguments (Goldsteinet al. 2009). In this experiment, sixth <strong>an</strong>d seventh graders hadto choose between a counterargument <strong>an</strong>d a novel argumentin a fictitious discussion, <strong>an</strong>d they tended to choose the latterinstead of the <strong>for</strong>mer. Even though the context successfullymimicked a debate, it <strong>do</strong>es not follow that the particip<strong>an</strong>tswere highly motivated to defend a position that had been arbitrarilyassigned to them. In such a context, it is not surprisingthat they should engage in satisficing <strong>an</strong>d pick <strong>an</strong> argumentthat might just be enough. Moreover, although the counterargumentoption might have been <strong>for</strong>mally superior, it is notclear that it would have been the most efficient one in a realdiscussion.Harrell <strong>an</strong>d Wolfe also dispute the data used as evidenceof people’s basic <strong>argumentative</strong> skills. Harrell suggests deflationaryinterpretations <strong>for</strong> several of the findings we cite,but, however ingenious, these interpretations are not compelling.To be more specific: Bailenson <strong>an</strong>d Rips (1996) <strong>do</strong>observe that being the first speaker increases the burdenof proof. But with contentious first sentences such as “abortionsshould not be illegal” (p. S7), this is hardly surprising –or nonnormative. In Rips (2002), the repetitions are nothingbut innocuous, <strong>an</strong>d so particip<strong>an</strong>ts are right to discountarguments accordingly. Neum<strong>an</strong> et al. (2006) <strong>do</strong> not reallyobserve worse per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce among people who argue. Particip<strong>an</strong>tswere merely avoiding pointing out a fallacy in apolite dialogue (cf. Rips 2002, n. 1), but they were still perfectlyable to detect it in a rougher discussion. Thompsonet al. (2005) observed more belief bias when people wereengaged in <strong>an</strong> argument ... because people were askedabout their opinion <strong>an</strong>d not logical validity. Far fromhaving “difficulty producing evidence <strong>for</strong> a claim” (Harrell,para. 7), the particip<strong>an</strong>ts in the study by Sá et al. (2005)were able to muster nearly six arguments to defend theiropinion on difficult topics (<strong>for</strong> example, <strong>Why</strong> <strong>do</strong> childrenfail in school?). If these arguments were not always thebest, this is only to be expected in such circumst<strong>an</strong>ces (asexplained in sect. 2.3 of the target article).Ulem<strong>an</strong>, Kressel, & Rim [Ulem<strong>an</strong> et al.] point outthat the strong <strong>an</strong>d weak arguments used in most persuasionresearch are “pretested ... to have these properties”(para. 10), so that it is hardly surprising that strong argumentsshould be more convincing. That researchers w<strong>an</strong>tto make sure their intuitions about argument strengthare appropriate <strong>do</strong>es not me<strong>an</strong> that they are withoutgrounding, however. For inst<strong>an</strong>ce, when trying to persuadestudents that a new exam would be beneficial, astrong argument might be that “average starting salariesare higher <strong>for</strong> graduates of schools with the exams”(Petty & Cacioppo 1979, p. 1921) accomp<strong>an</strong>ied by relev<strong>an</strong>tstatistics. By contrast, a weak argument might read “by notadministering the exams, a tradition dating back to the98 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2


Response/Mercier & Sperber: <strong>Why</strong> <strong>do</strong> <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> <strong>reason</strong>?<strong>an</strong>cient Greeks was being violated.” It is not a stretch to findsome objectivity in this judgment of strength: It is not amere experimental artifact that the stronger arguments, inthese experiments, <strong>do</strong> actually provide more support <strong>for</strong>their conclusion. Finally, Wolfe mentions a study inwhich “implausible <strong>reason</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d warr<strong>an</strong>ts ... yieldedhigher agreement th<strong>an</strong> the same claims without support”(para. 2). Famously, L<strong>an</strong>ger et al. (1978) had alreadydemonstrated the effect of poor <strong>reason</strong>s more th<strong>an</strong> 30years ago. However, they also showed that the effectmostly disappeared when the stakes increased – as arguedin the target article, whether people genuinely evaluatearguments depends on how much they care about (<strong>an</strong>d disagreewith) the conclusion.So, without denying that spont<strong>an</strong>eous argumentationskills are imperfect <strong>an</strong>d c<strong>an</strong> be improved by teaching –<strong>an</strong>d that this is linked to the variable import<strong>an</strong>ce givento argumentation in different cultures <strong>an</strong>d institutions –we maintain that they display a remarkable superiority tothe <strong>reason</strong>ing skill elicited in non<strong>argumentative</strong> contexts.R3.2. How efficient is group <strong>reason</strong>ing?This question has elicited contrary opinions from the commentators.Khlentzos & Stevenson think that good per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>cein groups is obvious since “subjects share acommon goal of finding the correct solution” (para. 11).However, the same particip<strong>an</strong>ts c<strong>an</strong> face the same problemswith the same goal but individually fail, so having thecorrect <strong>an</strong>swer as a goal c<strong>an</strong> hardly be the whole story.Johnson, on the other h<strong>an</strong>d, questions the generality ofgood group per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce, <strong>an</strong>d Sternberg claims thatgroups are actually very poor at <strong>reason</strong>ing or decisionmaking, citing as a support the groupthink syndrome orgroup polarization. First, it should be stressed that the <strong>argumentative</strong><strong>theory</strong> <strong>do</strong>es not predict that groups will alwaysmake better decisions, but merely that <strong>reason</strong>ing shouldwork better in the context of a genuine debate. M<strong>an</strong>yother factors besides <strong>reason</strong>ing c<strong>an</strong> impact the outcome ofa discussion – strategic considerations, face saving, <strong>an</strong>d so<strong>for</strong>th. And <strong>reason</strong>ing in group c<strong>an</strong> also bring poor outcomeswhen there is no genuine deliberation. Actually, in section2.3 of the target article, we offer <strong>an</strong> expl<strong>an</strong>ation based onthe <strong>argumentative</strong> <strong>theory</strong> <strong>for</strong> group polarization. Withouta refutation of this expl<strong>an</strong>ation, we <strong>do</strong>n’t seen how thisvery phenomenon c<strong>an</strong> be used as evidence against the<strong>theory</strong>. Finally, Opfer & Sloutsky mention one studythat showed groups of children per<strong>for</strong>ming more poorlyafter a discussion (Levin & Druy<strong>an</strong> 1993). It is true thatsometimes the best arguments will point in the wrong direction.When, in the early 20th century, geologists arguedagainst Alfred Wegener’s <strong>theory</strong> of continental drift, theirmistaken conclusions stemmed not from poor <strong>reason</strong>ingbut from the state of knowledge at the time. Moreover,the expl<strong>an</strong>ation offered by Opfer & Sloutsky – that thegroup member with the correct <strong>an</strong>swer is simply more confident– has already been refuted in section 2.3 of the targetarticle (<strong>for</strong> inst<strong>an</strong>ce, how could that account <strong>for</strong> groups per<strong>for</strong>mingbetter th<strong>an</strong> their best member?).R3.3. The strength of the confirmation biasWhen we look <strong>for</strong> arguments in a debate, we are mostlyinterested in arguments <strong>for</strong> our side or against the otherside. This is why, we surmised, the confirmation bias is afeature of <strong>reason</strong>ing, at least in its role of argument producer.De Neys, Poletiek, Stupple & Ball, <strong>an</strong>d Wolfe havereservations about the prevalence <strong>an</strong>d robustness of thisbias.Poletiek questions the evidence from hypothesistesting problems cited in support of the idea that the confirmationbias is specific to <strong>reason</strong>ing (sect. 3.1). We agreewith Poletiek that most of hypothesis testing is actually notdirected by <strong>reason</strong>ing, <strong>an</strong>d that confirmatory strategies arethe result of heuristics that <strong>do</strong> not display a genuine confirmationbias. But this <strong>do</strong>es not explain why people failto a<strong>do</strong>pt falsificatory strategies when they are asked to<strong>an</strong>d a<strong>do</strong>pt them spont<strong>an</strong>eously when they test someoneelse’s hypothesis. It seems as though <strong>reason</strong>ing is unableto correct our own intuitions even though it c<strong>an</strong> easilytry to correct those of others.Wolfe mentions a number of studies about the mysidebias; that is, the tendency <strong>for</strong> particip<strong>an</strong>ts to mostly – oronly – give arguments that support their opinion. One ofthese studies show that, although “pervasive,” the mysidebias could be oriented by the instructions (Wolfe & Britt2008). Particip<strong>an</strong>ts could be made to write essays againsttheir opinion about a pretend requirement to “impose a2-year math requirement <strong>for</strong> all students” (p. 8). But inthis experiment, particip<strong>an</strong>ts did not have to generatethe arguments themselves. Instead, they were providedwith a series of arguments <strong>for</strong> <strong>an</strong>d against the position.As a result, they did not have to fight their confirmationbias <strong>an</strong>d engage in the truly hard task of generating argumentsagainst their own point of view. The resultingmyside bias merely reflects a belief that it is better toprovide arguments only <strong>for</strong> one’s side rather th<strong>an</strong> also<strong>for</strong> the other side. As Wolfe <strong>an</strong>d Britt (2008) observed,essayists often mention arguments <strong>for</strong> the other side –typically to rebut them <strong>an</strong>d give even more weight totheir own argument. But writing essays is as much of abasic <strong>argumentative</strong> skill as writing novels is a basic linguisticskill. It is there<strong>for</strong>e not surprising that untrainedparticip<strong>an</strong>ts should exhibit a myside bias <strong>an</strong>d that, asWolfe points out, training c<strong>an</strong> attenuate it.The belief bias is one of the phenomena that, we surmised,show that people have a confirmation bias: They will takeinto account their beliefs about the conclusion when evaluatingthe logical validity of a syllogism. De Neys <strong>an</strong>d Stupple&Ballquestion our interpretation of the belief bias data.They both point out that people – at least some people –try to engage in logical <strong>reason</strong>ing when faced with such problems.That they try is hardly surprising: Particip<strong>an</strong>ts aremerely responding to instructions that emphasize logical validity.We agree that in <strong>reason</strong>ing tasks people try to providethe correct, logically valid <strong>an</strong>swer. What is more interesting isthat most of them fail. Given that the tasks are not computationallyhard, this indicates that <strong>reason</strong>ing is not gearedtowards pure logical validity, but that it takes into accountother factors, such as believability.R4. On the working of <strong>reason</strong>ingR4.1. The algorithmic levelOur target article focuses on the ultimate level of expl<strong>an</strong>ation:What is the function of <strong>reason</strong>ing? A <strong>theory</strong>at that level has implications <strong>for</strong> the algorithmicBEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2 99


Response/Mercier & Sperber: <strong>Why</strong> <strong>do</strong> <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> <strong>reason</strong>?implementation of <strong>reason</strong>ing, but this was not the subjectmatter of our article, <strong>an</strong>d, to be c<strong>an</strong>did, we are still in theprocess of working out these implications satisfactorily. Atfirst blush, moreover, the <strong>argumentative</strong> approach <strong>do</strong>esnot imply a single, narrow characterization of thisimplementation. We there<strong>for</strong>e acknowledge this presentlimitation of our contribution that in particular Khlentzos& Stevenson have underscored, <strong>an</strong>d we are grateful <strong>for</strong>the positive suggestions of several commentators.Oaks<strong>for</strong>d’s Bayesi<strong>an</strong> probabilistic approach (para. 4)allows <strong>for</strong> a fine-grained <strong>an</strong>alysis of argument strength<strong>an</strong>d of the ch<strong>an</strong>ges in degree of beliefs they warr<strong>an</strong>t.Like ours, this a computational <strong>theory</strong>, but it specifies aproximal function – how to ch<strong>an</strong>ge our beliefs in responseto arguments – rather th<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong> ultimate one. As a consequence,it has the potential of taking us one step furtherin the direction of <strong>an</strong> algorithmic <strong>theory</strong>.Dessalles points out the sequential nature of <strong>reason</strong>ing,<strong>an</strong>d asks how the <strong>argumentative</strong> <strong>theory</strong> c<strong>an</strong> account <strong>for</strong>this feature. First, it is import<strong>an</strong>t to mention that even ifthe explicit part of <strong>reason</strong>ing is sequential – we makeonly one argument step at a time – other processeswithin <strong>reason</strong>ing (such as argument search) may wellwork in a parallel fashion. The sequential nature of explicit<strong>reason</strong>ing c<strong>an</strong> be explained by its linguistic character (thatmight not be necessary <strong>for</strong> pure solitary <strong>reason</strong>ing if itexists, but that c<strong>an</strong>not be bypassed in argumentation),l<strong>an</strong>guage itself being sequential, <strong>for</strong> several <strong>reason</strong>s unrelatedto <strong>reason</strong>ing or argumentation (Pinker & Bloom1990; see also Carruthers 1996).Wiles mentions abduction as a plausible mech<strong>an</strong>ismthrough which <strong>reason</strong>ing could find arguments. Shepoints to other psychological mech<strong>an</strong>isms that also relyon abduction, such as spatial navigation, suggesting that<strong>reason</strong>ing might have been exapted from these mech<strong>an</strong>isms.However, given that <strong>reason</strong>ing deals with inputs<strong>an</strong>d outputs that are very different from those of theseother systems, the possibility of <strong>an</strong> evolutionary exaptationscenario remains very speculative. This <strong>do</strong>es not me<strong>an</strong> thatthese other mech<strong>an</strong>isms have nothing to teach students of<strong>reason</strong>ing. To the extent that the problems solved by, <strong>for</strong>example, mech<strong>an</strong>isms of spatial navigation are similar tothe problem facing <strong>reason</strong>ing – finding <strong>an</strong> acceptableargument within a large set of potentially relev<strong>an</strong>t propositions– then, as suggested by Wiles’s commentary, wec<strong>an</strong> expect commonalities in the solutions used in bothcases (<strong>for</strong> further elaboration on this point, see Mercier,submitted a).Ulem<strong>an</strong> et al. present interesting evidence <strong>an</strong>d argumentson intuitive (or “spont<strong>an</strong>eous”) inferences. Weagree that these inferences constitute most of cognition,<strong>an</strong>d that they influence which arguments are used <strong>an</strong>dhow they are evaluated. We agree moreover that muchmore must be <strong>do</strong>ne on the relationship between intuitiveinference <strong>an</strong>d <strong>reason</strong>ing, even if much relev<strong>an</strong>t work hasalready been <strong>do</strong>ne in the framework of dual-systemapproaches to <strong>reason</strong>ing.Finally, Weber & Johnson offer a process-level specificationof how <strong>reason</strong>ing works in decision making. Accordingto their <strong>theory</strong> – query <strong>theory</strong> – particip<strong>an</strong>ts facing adecision query their memory <strong>for</strong> relev<strong>an</strong>t in<strong>for</strong>mation orexperiences. Two features of this <strong>theory</strong> are particularlyrelev<strong>an</strong>t in the context of the <strong>argumentative</strong> <strong>theory</strong>.First, as a result of this process, “choice follows from theresulting bal<strong>an</strong>ce of evidence,” so that this <strong>theory</strong> predicts<strong>reason</strong>-based choice. The second import<strong>an</strong>t point is that“the first query produces richer representations becauseof output interference” (para. 5). To the extent thatfurther queries might represent perspective that are lesscongenial to the individual – <strong>for</strong> inst<strong>an</strong>ce, trying to seethe problem from someone else’s perspective – a mech<strong>an</strong>ismthat favors the first query c<strong>an</strong> create a <strong>for</strong>m of confirmationbias. Given that query <strong>theory</strong> predicts <strong>reason</strong>basedchoice <strong>an</strong>d that it might also explain some <strong>for</strong>msof confirmation bias, it is quite congenial to the <strong>argumentative</strong>approach. However, rather th<strong>an</strong> being a question of“intrapsychic <strong>an</strong>d interpersonal argumentation” (para. 8),as Weber & Johnson suggest, the question c<strong>an</strong> perhapsbe more usefully framed as a difference in level of <strong>an</strong>alysis.We believe that query <strong>theory</strong> could also help explainaspects of interpersonal argumentation – how we findarguments – whereas the <strong>argumentative</strong> <strong>theory</strong> alsomakes predictions regarding intrapsychic phenomena –such as <strong>reason</strong>-based choice. The difference is thatquery <strong>theory</strong> offers predictions based on the workings of<strong>reason</strong>ing, whereas the <strong>argumentative</strong> <strong>theory</strong> offers predictionsbased on the function of <strong>reason</strong>ing. Given thatthey are not at the same level, these expl<strong>an</strong>ations <strong>do</strong> notcompete. Assume, <strong>for</strong> inst<strong>an</strong>ce, that <strong>reason</strong>-based choiceis entirely due to the processes delineated in query<strong>theory</strong>. We would still need to underst<strong>an</strong>d why thisprocess is there in the first place, <strong>an</strong>d why the outcomesof such a process are generally adaptive – questions thatthe <strong>argumentative</strong> <strong>theory</strong> aims at <strong>an</strong>swering.Another way to better underst<strong>an</strong>d the processes of<strong>reason</strong>ing is through modeling. Fox’s Logic of Argumentis a possible solution that is congenial to our proposalbecause it dist<strong>an</strong>ces itself from <strong>for</strong>mal logic to encompassthe subtleties of argument structure. The fields of AI <strong>an</strong>din<strong>for</strong>mal logic are now teeming with models of argumentsthat c<strong>an</strong> be conveniently simulated on computers, <strong>an</strong>d thisis certainly <strong>an</strong> interesting way to develop <strong>for</strong> <strong>an</strong>y <strong>theory</strong> of<strong>reason</strong>ing or argumentation.R4.2. Reasoning outside the labThe target article focused its review on experimentscarried out in the laboratory, mostly with Westerncollege students. Narvaez rightly points out the limitationsof such a narrow focus. In their review of cross-culturalpsychology work, Henrich et al. (2010) have shownthat in m<strong>an</strong>y <strong>do</strong>mains WEIRD people – people fromwestern educated industrialized rich democraticcountries – behave in ways that are different from therest of the world (para. 9). In the case of <strong>reason</strong>ing <strong>an</strong>dargumentation, scholars have hypothesized that suchskills are a mostly Western tradition, born in classicalGreece <strong>an</strong>d nurtured in the Enlightenment. It wouldindeed by a deadly blow to the <strong>theory</strong> if some cultureswere unwilling to argue or unable to <strong>reason</strong>. Happily <strong>for</strong>us (<strong>an</strong>d <strong>for</strong> these cultures), the available data <strong>do</strong> notpoint in that direction. While there certainly are differencesin <strong>reason</strong>ing <strong>an</strong>d <strong>argumentative</strong> style (e.g., seeNorenzay<strong>an</strong> et al. 2002), there is no report of a culturethat would be deprived of these skills. The two most frequentlyalleged cases are illiterate societies – which aresupposed to be unable to <strong>reason</strong> – <strong>an</strong>d Eastern cultures –which are supposed to be unwilling to argue. Yet members100 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2


References/Mercier & Sperber: <strong>Why</strong> <strong>do</strong> <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> <strong>reason</strong>?of illiterate populations c<strong>an</strong> solve logical problems in theproper contexts, <strong>an</strong>d the intellectual history of Eastern culturesis as fraught with debates as that of the West. Whileour <strong>theory</strong> could certainly be strengthened if the data fromnon-WEIRD cultures were richer, available data point tosimilar patterns the whole world over (Mercier, in press a).Narvaez also regrets the absence of developmentaldata from the target article, accusing us of “implicit biologicaldeterminism” (para 5). Our thesis is evolutionary<strong>an</strong>d pays attention to biological factors, but developmentitself is of obvious biological relev<strong>an</strong>ce. Again, l<strong>an</strong>guagec<strong>an</strong> be a useful <strong>an</strong>alogy. Researchers who think thatl<strong>an</strong>guage is <strong>an</strong> adaptation <strong>do</strong> not deny that differentl<strong>an</strong>guages are acquired in cognitive development. Likewise,the <strong>argumentative</strong> <strong>theory</strong> <strong>do</strong>es not need <strong>argumentative</strong>skills to be just innate. The main <strong>reason</strong> so littlespace was devoted to <strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>alysis of developmental evidenceis that there is so much of it that it warr<strong>an</strong>ted awhole other article (Mercier, in press b). In this otherarticle, it is shown that children c<strong>an</strong> argue from veryearly on – long be<strong>for</strong>e they c<strong>an</strong> <strong>do</strong> <strong>an</strong>y abstract <strong>reason</strong>ing– that they are also prone to the confirmation bias,<strong>an</strong>d that they <strong>reason</strong> better in groups – which is why collaborativelearning has proven to be so successful ineducation.Narvaez is joined by Wu in drawing attention to<strong>reason</strong>ing in the political sphere. The results discussedby Wu offer further support <strong>for</strong> the <strong>argumentative</strong><strong>theory</strong>. In particular, he refers to the development ofdeliberative democracy as illustrating the power of group<strong>reason</strong>ing. M<strong>an</strong>y arguments c<strong>an</strong> be garnered in supportof <strong>an</strong> increased participation of citizens in policydebates: more legitimate <strong>an</strong>d fairer outcomes, increasein trust <strong>an</strong>d positive public behavior, etc. But Wu pointsto a more recent trend that emphasizes the epistemicvalue of deliberative democracy: Beyond all their otheradv<strong>an</strong>tages, debates c<strong>an</strong> also yield epistemically superioroutcomes (Cohen 1986; Estlund 2007; L<strong>an</strong>demore2007). Empirical results in political science support theclaim that groups c<strong>an</strong> per<strong>for</strong>m well, with deliberationsyielding more in<strong>for</strong>med <strong>an</strong>d more coherent opinions <strong>an</strong>ddecisions (<strong>for</strong> review, see Mercier & L<strong>an</strong>demore, inpress). Incidentally, the <strong>argumentative</strong> <strong>theory</strong> is also in agood position to help explain some of the blat<strong>an</strong>t failuresof political debates, whether it is polarization (L<strong>an</strong>demore& Mercier, submitted) or the d<strong>an</strong>gers of widely publicizeddebates (Mercier, submitted b).Johnson correctly argues that the <strong>theory</strong> should apply toscientists <strong>an</strong>d philosophers – including the authors of thistarget article – as well as to laypersons. Indeed, it is notunlikely that, despite genuine ef<strong>for</strong>ts to remain objective,we have been guilty of the confirmation bias, thereby illustratingour <strong>argumentative</strong> <strong>theory</strong> by the very m<strong>an</strong>ner inwhich we were arguing <strong>for</strong> it. Argumentation <strong>an</strong>d debateshave always played a central role in philosophy, be it in classicalGreece, Akbar’s India, or the Warring States Period inChina. The lone philosopher always runs the risk of usingher great <strong>reason</strong>ing abilities to build a system of highinternal coherence on shaky intuitive foundations. Even ifscientists rely more on empirical evidence th<strong>an</strong> <strong>do</strong> philosophersto correct their intuitions, their <strong>reason</strong>ing is stilldeeply <strong>argumentative</strong>. A scientific article or book is alwaysa “long argument” in Darwin’s famous words. Moreover –<strong>an</strong>d contrary to popular representation of the lone genius –groups have always been the crucial place <strong>for</strong> scientific<strong>reason</strong>ing (e.g., see Dunbar 1995).Johnson also points out the import<strong>an</strong>ce of arguments inthe moral <strong>do</strong>main, suggesting that people might beespecially vulnerable to arguments that exploit moral“oughts.” Some moral psychologists would disagree <strong>an</strong>dsuggest instead that people are rarely receptive to moralarguments, being more easily influenced by narratives oremotional appeals (Bloom 2010; Haidt & Bjorklund2007). The <strong>argumentative</strong> <strong>theory</strong> predicts <strong>an</strong> intermediarystate of affairs: People should be somewhat receptive tomoral arguments while evaluating them on the basis oftheir own moral intuitions (Mercier, in press c).R5. ConclusionWhile our target article may have unwittingly offered <strong>an</strong>illustration of the confirmation bias, we hope that this discussionhas, at least a little, exemplified the epistemic benefits of<strong>reason</strong>ing in group. It has not led us to revise the <strong>theory</strong> in<strong>an</strong>y major way. Still, several commentaries point to fascinatingdirections <strong>for</strong> future research. More needs to be <strong>do</strong>ne tolink our ultimate level <strong>theory</strong> with process theories of <strong>reason</strong>ing,<strong>an</strong>d we are grateful <strong>for</strong> several very useful suggestions inthis respect. We agree that <strong>reason</strong>ing outside the laboratoryneeds to be investigated more thoroughly <strong>an</strong>d hope that afocus on argumentation <strong>an</strong>d <strong>reason</strong>ing in interaction c<strong>an</strong>help push in this direction. Finally, other mech<strong>an</strong>ismsbesides <strong>reason</strong>ing might benefit from being seen as havingasocialfunction.Oursisacontributiontothegrowingbody of research showing how, <strong>an</strong>d how much, the hum<strong>an</strong>mind is a social mind.References[The letters “a” <strong>an</strong>d “r” be<strong>for</strong>e author’s initials st<strong>an</strong>d <strong>for</strong> target article <strong>an</strong>dresponse references, respectively]Abelson, J., Forest, P.-G., Eyles, J., Smith, P., Martin, E. & Gauvin, F.-P. (2003)Deliberation about deliberative methods: Issues in the design <strong>an</strong>d evaluationof public participation processes. Social Science & Medicine 57:239–51.[KC-CW]Acker, F. (2008) New findings on unconscious versus conscious thought in decisionmaking: Additional empirical data <strong>an</strong>d meta-<strong>an</strong>alysis. Judgment <strong>an</strong>d DecisionMaking 3(4):292–303. [aHM]Albrechtsen, J. S., Meissner, C. A. & Susa, K. J. (2009) C<strong>an</strong> intuition improvedeception detection per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce? Journal of Experimental Social Psychology45(4):1052–55. [aHM]Allen, C., Bekoff, M. & Lauder, G., eds. (1998) Nature’s purposes. MIT Press. [aHM]Allport, F. (1924) Social psychology. Houghton Mifflin. [aHM]Ambady, N., Bernieri, F. J. & Richeson, J. A. (2000) Toward a histology of socialbehavior: Judgmental accuracy from thin slices of the behavioral stream. In:Adv<strong>an</strong>ces in Experimental Social Psychology, vol. 32, ed. M. P. Z<strong>an</strong>na, pp.201–71. Academic Press. [aHM]Ambady, N. & Gray, H. (2002) On being sad <strong>an</strong>d mistaken mood effects on theaccuracy of thin-slice judgments. Journal of Personality <strong>an</strong>d Social Psychology83:947–61. [aHM]Ames, G. J. & Murray, F. B. (1982) When two wrongs make a right: Promotingcognitive ch<strong>an</strong>ge by social conflict. Developmental Psychology 18:894–97.[JEO]Amir, O. & Ariely, D. (2003) Decision by rules: Disassociation between preferences<strong>an</strong>d willingness to act. Working paper, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,Cambridge. [aHM]Anderson, C. A., Lepper, M. R. & Ross, L. (1980) Persever<strong>an</strong>ce of social theories:The role of expl<strong>an</strong>ation in the persistence of discredited in<strong>for</strong>mation. Journal ofPersonality <strong>an</strong>d Social Psychology 39(6):1037–49. [aHM]BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2 101


References/Mercier & Sperber: <strong>Why</strong> <strong>do</strong> <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> <strong>reason</strong>?Anderson, C. A., New, B. L. & Speer, J. R. (1985) Argument availability as amediator of social <strong>theory</strong> persever<strong>an</strong>ce. Social Cognition 3(3):235–49.[aHM]Anderson, E. (2006) The epistemology of democracy. Episteme: Journal of SocialEpistemology 3(1–2):8–22. [KC-CW]Anderson, T., Howe, C., Soden, R., Halliday, J. & Low, J. (2001) Peer interaction<strong>an</strong>d the learning of critical thinking skills in further education students.Instructional Science 29(1):1–32. [aHM]Anderson, T., Howe, C. & Tolmie, A. (1996) Interaction <strong>an</strong>d mental models ofphysics phenomena: Evidence from dialogues between learners. In: Mentalmodels in cognitive science: Essays in honour of Phil Johnson-Laird, ed.J. Oakhill & A. Garnham, pp. 247–73. Psychology Press. [aHM]Ariely, D., Gneezy, U., Loewenstein, G. & Mazar, N. (2009) Large stakes <strong>an</strong>d bigmistakes. Review of Economic Studies 76(2):451–69. [aHM]Ariely, D. & Levav, J. (2000) Sequential choice in group settings: Taking the roadless traveled <strong>an</strong>d less enjoyed. Journal of Consumer Research 27(3):279–90.[aHM]Arkes, H. R. & Ayton, P. (1999) The sunk cost <strong>an</strong>d Concorde effects: Are <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong>less rational th<strong>an</strong> lower <strong>an</strong>imals? Psychological Bulletin 125(5):591–600.[aHM]Arkes, H. R. & Blumer, C. (1985) The psychology of sunk cost. Org<strong>an</strong>izationalBehavior <strong>an</strong>d Hum<strong>an</strong> Decision Processes 35(1):124–40. [aHM]Arkes, H. R., Guilmette, T. J., Faust, D. & Hart, K. (1988) Eliminating the hindsightbias. Journal of Applied Psychology 73(2):305–307. [aHM]Arleo, A. & Gerstner, W. (2000) Spatial cognition <strong>an</strong>d neuro-mimetic navigation: Amodel of hippocampal place cell activity. Biological Cybernetics 83(3):287–99. [JW]Augustinova, M. (2008) Falsification cueing in collective <strong>reason</strong>ing: Example of theWason selection task. Europe<strong>an</strong> Journal of Social Psychology 38(5):770–85.[aHM]Bailenson, J. N. & Rips, L. J. (1996) In<strong>for</strong>mal <strong>reason</strong>ing <strong>an</strong>d burden of proof.Applied Cognitive Psychology 10(7):S3–16. [MH, arHM]Ball, L. J. (2010) The dynamics of <strong>reason</strong>ing: Chronometric <strong>an</strong>alysis <strong>an</strong>d dualprocesstheories. In: The science of <strong>reason</strong>: A festschrift <strong>for</strong> Jonath<strong>an</strong> St. B. T.Ev<strong>an</strong>s, ed. K. I. M<strong>an</strong>ktelow, D. E. Over & S. Elqayam, pp. 283–307. PsychologyPress. [EJNS]Ball, L. J., Philips, P., Wade, C. N. & Quayle, J. D. (2006) Effects of belief <strong>an</strong>d logicon syllogistic <strong>reason</strong>ing: Eye-movement evidence <strong>for</strong> selective processingmodels. Experimental Psychology 53:77–86. [WDN, EJNS]B<strong>an</strong>dura, A. (1990) Selective activation <strong>an</strong>d disengagement of moral control.Journal of Social Issues 46(1):27–46. [aHM]B<strong>an</strong>dura, A., Barbar<strong>an</strong>elli, C., Caprara, G. V. & Pastorelli, C. (1996) Mech<strong>an</strong>isms ofmoral disengagement in the exercise of moral agency. Journal of Personality<strong>an</strong>d Social Psychology 71:364–74. [aHM]Barber, B. M., Heath, C. & Ode<strong>an</strong>, T. (2003) Good <strong>reason</strong>s sell: Reason-basedchoice among group <strong>an</strong>d individual investors in the stock market. M<strong>an</strong>agementScience 49(12):1636–52. [aHM]Bar-Hillel, M. (1980) The base-rate fallacy in probability judgments. Acta Psychologica44:211–33. [MO]Barkow, J. H., Cosmides, L. & Tooby, J., eds. (1992) The adapted mind. Ox<strong>for</strong>dUniversity Press. [aHM]Baron, J. (1994) Nonconsequentialist decisions. Behavioral <strong>an</strong>d Brain Sciences17:1–42. [JStBTE]Baron, J. (1995) Myside bias in thinking about abortion. Thinking & Reasoning1:221–35. [CRW]Barrouillet, P., Grosset, N. & Lecas, J.-F. (2000) Conditional <strong>reason</strong>ing by mentalmodels: Chronometric <strong>an</strong>d developmental evidence. Cognition 75:237–66.[JEO]Baumeister, R. F. (1997) Evil: Inside hum<strong>an</strong> violence <strong>an</strong>d cruelty. Freem<strong>an</strong>.[aHM]Baumeister, R. F. (2005) The cultural <strong>an</strong>imal: Hum<strong>an</strong> nature, me<strong>an</strong>ing, <strong>an</strong>d sociallife. Ox<strong>for</strong>d University Press. [RFB]Baumeister, R. F. & Masicampo, E. J. (2010) Conscious thought is <strong>for</strong> facilitatingsocial <strong>an</strong>d cultural interactions: How mental simulations serve the <strong>an</strong>imal–culture interface. Psychological Review 117:945–71. [RFB]Baumeister, R. F., Masicampo, E. J. & Vohs, K. D. (2011) Do conscious thoughtscause behavior? Annual Review of Psychology 62:331–62. [RFB]Bazerm<strong>an</strong>, M. H., Loewenstein, G. F. & White, S. B. (1992) Reversals of preferencein allocation decisions: Judging <strong>an</strong> alternative versus choosing among alternatives.Administrative Science Quarterly 37(2):220–40. [aHM]Beatty, A. S., Reese, C. M., Persky, H. R. & Carr, P. (1996) NAEP 1994 U.S. HistoryReport Card: Findings from the National Assessment of Educational Progress.U. S. Department of Education. Available at: http://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/pubsinfo.asp?pubid ¼ 96085 [CRW]Bechara, A. (2005) Decision making, impulse control <strong>an</strong>d loss of willpower to resistdrugs: A neurocognitive perspective. Nature Neuroscience 8:1458–63. [DN]Becker, G. & Stigler, G. J. (1977) De gustibus non est disput<strong>an</strong>dum. Americ<strong>an</strong>Economic Review 67:76–90. [EUW]Berger, J. A. & Heath, C. (2007) Where consumers diverge from others: Identitysignaling <strong>an</strong>d product <strong>do</strong>mains. Journal of Consumer Research 34(2):121–34. [aHM]Bersoff, D. M. (1999) <strong>Why</strong> good people sometimes <strong>do</strong> bad things: Motivated<strong>reason</strong>ing <strong>an</strong>d unethical behavior. Personality <strong>an</strong>d Social Psychology Bulletin25(1):28–39. [aHM]Besnard, P. & Hunter, A. (2008) Elements of argumentation. MIT Press. [JF]Billig, M. (1996) Arguing <strong>an</strong>d thinking: A rhetorical approach to social psychology.Cambridge University Press. [DK, aHM]Blaisdell, A. P., Sawa, K., Leising, K. J. & Waldm<strong>an</strong>n, M. R. (2006) Causal <strong>reason</strong>ingin rats. Science 311(5763):1020–22. [aHM]Bl<strong>an</strong>chette, I. & Dunbar, K. (2001) Analogy use in naturalistic settings: The influenceof audience, emotion, <strong>an</strong>d goals. Memory & Cognition 29(5):730–35. [aHM]Blinder, A. S. & Morg<strong>an</strong>, J. (2000) Are two heads better th<strong>an</strong> one? An experimental<strong>an</strong>alysis of group vs. individual decision making. NBER Working Paper 7909,National Bureau of Economic Research, Princeton, NJ. [aHM]Bloom, P. (2010) How <strong>do</strong> morals ch<strong>an</strong>ge? Nature 464(7288):490. [rHM]Blum-Kulka, S., Blondheim, M. & Hacohen, G. (2002) Traditions of dispute: Fromnegotiations of Talmudic texts to the arena of political discourse in the media.Journal of Pragmatics 34(10–11):1569–94. [aHM]Boehm, C., with comments by Antweiler, C., Eibl-Eibesfeldt, I., Kent, S., Knauft,B. M., Mithen, S., Richerson, P. J. & Wilson, D. S. (1996) Emergencydecisions, cultural-selection mech<strong>an</strong>ics, <strong>an</strong>d group selection. CurrentAnthropology 37(5):763–93. [aHM]Boiney, L. G., Kennedy, J. & Nye, P. (1997) Instrumental bias in motivated<strong>reason</strong>ing: More when more is needed. Org<strong>an</strong>izational Behavior <strong>an</strong>d Hum<strong>an</strong>Decision Processes 72(1):1–24. [aHM]Bond, S. D., Carlson, K. A., Meloy, M. G., Russo, J. E. & T<strong>an</strong>ner, R. J. (2007)Precommitment bias in the evaluation of a single option. Org<strong>an</strong>izational Behavior<strong>an</strong>d Hum<strong>an</strong> Decision Processes 102(2):240–54. [aHM]Bonner, B. L., Baum<strong>an</strong>n, M. R. & Dalal, R. S. (2002) The effects of memberexpertise on group decision making <strong>an</strong>d per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce. Org<strong>an</strong>izational Behavior<strong>an</strong>d Hum<strong>an</strong> Decision Processes 88:719–36. [aHM]Bonner, C. & Newell, B. R. (2010) In conflict with ourselves? An investigation ofheuristic <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>alytic processes in decision making. Memory & Cognition38:186–96. [WDN]Bonner, S. E., Hastie, R., Sprinkle, G. B. & Young, S. M. (2000) A review of theeffects of fin<strong>an</strong>cial incentives on per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce in laboratory tasks: Implications<strong>for</strong> m<strong>an</strong>agement accounting. Journal of M<strong>an</strong>agement Accounting Research12(1):19–64. [aHM]Bonner, S. E. & Sprinkle, G. B. (2002) The effects of monetary incentives on ef<strong>for</strong>t<strong>an</strong>d task per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce: Theories, evidence, <strong>an</strong>d a framework <strong>for</strong> research.Accounting, Org<strong>an</strong>izations <strong>an</strong>d Society 27(4–5):303–45. [aHM]Bragger, J. D., H<strong>an</strong>tula, D. A., Bragger, D., Kirn<strong>an</strong>, J. & Kutcher, E. (2003) Whensuccess breeds failure: History, hysteresis, <strong>an</strong>d delayed exit decisions. Journalof Applied Psychology 88(1):6–14. [aHM]Bragger, J. L., Bragger, D. H., H<strong>an</strong>tula, D. A. & Kirn<strong>an</strong>, J. P. (1998) Hysteresis <strong>an</strong>duncertainty: The effect of in<strong>for</strong>mation on delays to exit decisions. Org<strong>an</strong>izationalBehavior <strong>an</strong>d Hum<strong>an</strong> Decision Processes 74(3):229–53. [aHM]Braine, M. D. S. & O’Brien, D. P. (1998) Mental logic. Erlbaum. [JEO]Bram<strong>an</strong>, E. (2009) Law, politics, <strong>an</strong>d perception: How policy preferences influencelegal <strong>reason</strong>ing. University of Virginia Press. [aHM]Bratm<strong>an</strong>, M. E. (1987) Intention, pl<strong>an</strong>s, <strong>an</strong>d practical <strong>reason</strong>. Harvard UniversityPress. [KF]Brem, S. K. & Rips, L. J. (2000) Expl<strong>an</strong>ation <strong>an</strong>d evidence in in<strong>for</strong>mal argument.Cognitive Science 24:573–604. [aHM]Briley, D. A., Morris, M. W. & Simonson, I. (2000) Reasons as carriers of culture:Dynamic versus dispositional models of cultural influence on decision making.Journal of Consumer Research 27(2):157–78. [aHM]Britt, M. A. & Kurby, C. A. (2005) Detecting incoherent in<strong>for</strong>mal arguments. Paperpresented at the 15th Annual Meeting of the Society <strong>for</strong> Text <strong>an</strong>d Discourse,Amsterdam, The Netherl<strong>an</strong>ds. [CRW]Britt, M. A., Kurby, C. & Wolfe, C. R. (2005) Memory <strong>for</strong> claims of simple arguments.Paper presented at the 15th Annual Meeting of the Society <strong>for</strong> Text <strong>an</strong>dDiscourse. Amsterdam, The Netherl<strong>an</strong>ds. [CRW]Britt, M. A., Kurby, C. A., D<strong>an</strong><strong>do</strong>tkar, S. & Wolfe, C. R. (2008) I agreed with what?Memory <strong>for</strong> simple argument claims. Discourse Processes 45:52–84. [CRW]Britt, M. A. & Larson, A. A. (2003) Constructing representations of arguments.Journal of Memory <strong>an</strong>d L<strong>an</strong>guage 48:794–810. [CRW]Brock, T. C. (1967) Communication discrep<strong>an</strong>cy <strong>an</strong>d intent to persuade as determin<strong>an</strong>tsof counterargument production. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology3(3):269–309. [aHM]Brown, C. L. & Carpenter, G. S. (2000) <strong>Why</strong> is the trivial import<strong>an</strong>t? A <strong>reason</strong>sbasedaccount <strong>for</strong> the effects of trivial attributes on choice. Journal of ConsumerResearch 26(4):372–85. [aHM]Brown, D. E. (1991) Hum<strong>an</strong> universals. McGraw-Hill. [aHM]Brownstein, A. L. (2003) Biased predecision processing. Psychological Bulletin129(4):545–68. [aHM]102 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2


References/Mercier & Sperber: <strong>Why</strong> <strong>do</strong> <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> <strong>reason</strong>?Butera, F., Legrenzi, P., Mugny, G. & Pérez, J. A. (1992) Influence sociale et raisonnement.Bulletin de Psychologie 45:144–54. [aHM]Byrne, R. W. & Whiten, A., eds. (1988) Machiavelli<strong>an</strong> intelligence: Social expertise<strong>an</strong>d the evolution of intellect in monkeys, apes, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong>. Ox<strong>for</strong>d UniversityPress. [aHM]Cacioppo, J. T. & Petty, R. E. (1979) Effects of message repetition <strong>an</strong>d position oncognitive response, recall, <strong>an</strong>d persuasion. Journal of Personality <strong>an</strong>d SocialPsychology 37(1):97–109. [aHM]Camerer, C. & Hogarth, R. M. (1999) The effect of fin<strong>an</strong>cial incentives on per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>cein experiments: A review <strong>an</strong>d capital-labor <strong>theory</strong>. Journal of Risk<strong>an</strong>d Uncertainty 19(1):7–42. [aHM]Campion, N. (2006) Hypothetical <strong>an</strong>d certain inferences from conditional argumentsread in texts. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory,<strong>an</strong>d Cognition 32:547–58. [JSU]Carlston, D. E. & Skowronski, J. J. (2005) Linking versus thinking: Evidence <strong>for</strong> thedifferent associative <strong>an</strong>d attributional bases of spont<strong>an</strong>eous trait tr<strong>an</strong>sference<strong>an</strong>d spont<strong>an</strong>eous trait inference. Journal of Personality <strong>an</strong>d Social Psychology89:884–98. [JSU]Carpenter, G. S., Glazer, R. & Nakamoto, K. (1994) Me<strong>an</strong>ingful br<strong>an</strong>d fromme<strong>an</strong>ingless differentiation: The dependence on irrelev<strong>an</strong>t attributes. Journalof Marketing Research 31(3):339–50. [aHM]Carruthers, P. (1996) L<strong>an</strong>guage, thought <strong>an</strong>d consciousness: An essay in philosophicalpsychology. Cambridge University Press. [KF, rHM]Carruthers, P. (1998) Conscious thinking: L<strong>an</strong>guage or elimination? Mind <strong>an</strong>dL<strong>an</strong>guage 13:457–76. [KF]Chaiken, S. & Yates, S. (1985) Affective-cognitive consistency <strong>an</strong>d thought-inducedattitude polarization. Journal of Personality <strong>an</strong>d Social Psychology 49(6):1470–81. [aHM]Chater, N. & Oaks<strong>for</strong>d, M. (1999) The probability heuristics model of syllogistic<strong>reason</strong>ing. Cognitive Psychology 38:191–258. [aHM]Chernev, A. (2005) Context effects without a context: Attribute bal<strong>an</strong>ce as a <strong>reason</strong><strong>for</strong> choice. Journal of Consumer Research 32(2):213–23. [aHM]Christensen-Szal<strong>an</strong>ski, J. J. & Beach, L. R. (1984) The citation bias: Fad <strong>an</strong>d fashionin the judgment <strong>an</strong>d decision literature. Americ<strong>an</strong> Psychologist 39(1):75–78.[aHM]Claxton, G. (1997) Hare brain, tortoise mind: How intelligence increases when youthink less. HarperCollins. [aHM]Clément, F. (2010) To trust or not to trust? Children’s social epistemology. Reviewof Philosophy <strong>an</strong>d Psychology 1(4):531–49. [aHM]Cohen, J. (1986) An epistemic conception of democracy. Ethics 97(1):26–38.[rHM]Connolly, T., Ordóñez, L. D. & Coughl<strong>an</strong>, R. (1997) Regret <strong>an</strong>d responsibility in theevaluation of decision outcomes. Org<strong>an</strong>izational Behavior <strong>an</strong>d Hum<strong>an</strong>Decision Processes 70:73–85. [TC]Connolly, T., Reb, J. & Kausel, E. E. (2010) Intuitive politici<strong>an</strong>s or intuitive penitents?Regret aversion, accountability <strong>an</strong>d justification in the decoy effect.Working paper, University of Arizona, Tucson. [TC]Connolly, T. & Zeelenberg, M. (2002) Regret in decision making. Current Directionsin Psychological Science 11:212–16. [TC]Corner, A. & Hahn, U. (2009) Evaluating science arguments: Evidence, uncertainty,<strong>an</strong>d argument strength. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied15(3):199–212. [aHM]Corner, A., Hahn, U. & Oaks<strong>for</strong>d, M. (2006) The slippery slope argument: Probability,utility <strong>an</strong>d category reappraisal. In: Proceedings of the 28th AnnualMeeting of the Cognitive Science Society, ed. R. Sun & N. Miyake, pp. 1145–50. Erlbaum. [aHM]Cowley, M. & Byrne, R. M. J. (2005) When falsification is the only path to truth. In:Proceedings of the 27th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, ed. B.G. Bara, L. Barsalou & M. Buchiarelli, pp. 512–17. Erlbaum. [aHM, FHP]Crain, S. & Khlentzos, D. (2010) The logic instinct. Mind <strong>an</strong>d L<strong>an</strong>guage 25(1):30–65. [DMK]Cr<strong>an</strong>dall, C. S. & Eshlem<strong>an</strong>, A. (2003) A justification–suppression model of theexpression <strong>an</strong>d experience of prejudice. Psychological Bulletin 129(3):414–46. [aHM]Croson, R. T. A. (1999) The disjunction effect <strong>an</strong>d <strong>reason</strong>-based choice in games.Org<strong>an</strong>izational Behavior <strong>an</strong>d Hum<strong>an</strong> Decision Processes 80(2):118–33. [aHM]Csikszentmihalyi, M. & Sawyer, R. K. (1995) Creative insight: The social dimensionof a solitary moment. In: The nature of insight, ed. R. J. Sternberg & J. E.Davidson, pp. 329–63. MIT Press. [aHM]Cunningham, C. B., Schilling, N., Anders, C. & Carrier, D. R. (2010) The influenceof foot posture on the cost of tr<strong>an</strong>sport in <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong>. Journal of ExperimentalBiology 213(5):790–97. [aHM]D<strong>an</strong>a, J., Weber, R. A. & Ku<strong>an</strong>g, J. X. (2007) Exploiting moral wiggle room:Experiments demonstrating <strong>an</strong> illusory preference <strong>for</strong> fairness. EconomicTheory 33(1):67–80. [aHM]Das, S., Fox, J., Els<strong>do</strong>n, D. & Hammond, P. (1997) A flexible architecture <strong>for</strong> ageneral intelligent agent. Journal of Experimental & Theoretical ArtificialIntelligence 9:407–40. [JF]Davies, M. F. (1992) Field dependence <strong>an</strong>d hindsight bias: Cognitive restructuring<strong>an</strong>d the generation of <strong>reason</strong>s. Journal of Research in Personality 26(1):58–74. [aHM]Davis, J. H. (1973) Group decisions <strong>an</strong>d social interactions: A <strong>theory</strong> of socialdecision schemes. Psychological Review 80(2):97–125. [aHM]Dawkins, R. & Krebs, J. R. (1978) Animal signals: In<strong>for</strong>mation or m<strong>an</strong>ipulation? In:Behavioural ecology: An evolutionary approach, ed. J. R. Krebs & N. B.Davies, pp. 282–309. Basil Blackwell. [aHM]Dawson, E., Gilovich, T. & Reg<strong>an</strong>, D. T. (2002) Motivated <strong>reason</strong>ing <strong>an</strong>d per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ceon the Wason selection task. Personality <strong>an</strong>d Social PsychologyBulletin 28(10):1379–87. [aHM]De Neys, W. & Fr<strong>an</strong>ssens, S. (2009) Belief inhibition during thinking: Not alwayswinning but at least taking part. Cognition 113:45–61. [WDN]De Neys, W. & Glumicic, T. (2008) Conflict monitoring in dual process theories of<strong>reason</strong>ing. Cognition 106:1248–99. [WDN]De Neys, W., Moyens, E. & V<strong>an</strong>steenwegen, D. (2010) Feeling we’re biased:Autonomic arousal <strong>an</strong>d <strong>reason</strong>ing conflict. Cognitive, Affective, & BehavioralNeuroscience 10:208–16. [WDN]De Neys, W., Vart<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>, O. & Goel, V. (2008) Smarter th<strong>an</strong> we think: When ourbrains detect that we are biased. Psychological Science 19:483–89. [WDN]Dennett, D. C. (1969) Content <strong>an</strong>d consciousness. Routledge & Keg<strong>an</strong> Paul.[aHM]Dessalles, J.-L. (1998) Altruism, status, <strong>an</strong>d the origin of relev<strong>an</strong>ce. In: Approachesto the evolution of l<strong>an</strong>guage: Social <strong>an</strong>d cognitive bases, ed. J. R. Hur<strong>for</strong>d, M.Studdert-Kennedy & C. Knight, pp. 130–47. Cambridge University Press.Available at: http://www.dessalles.fr/papiers/pap.evol/Dessalles_96122602.pdf[J-LD]Dessalles, J.-L. (2007) <strong>Why</strong> we talk: The evolutionary origins of l<strong>an</strong>guage. Ox<strong>for</strong>dUniversity Press. [J-LD, aHM]Dessalles, J.-L. (2008) La pertinence et ses origines cognitives: Nouvelles théories.Hermes Science. Available at: http://pertinence.dessalles.fr [J-LD]DeWall, C. N., Baumeister, R. F. & Masicampo, E. J. (2008) Evidence that logical<strong>reason</strong>ing depends on conscious processing. Consciousness <strong>an</strong>d Cognition17:628–45. [RFB]Diekm<strong>an</strong>n, K. A., Samuels, S. M., Ross, L. & Bazerm<strong>an</strong>, M. H. (1997)Self-interest <strong>an</strong>d fairness in problems of resource allocation: Allocatorsversus recipients. Journal of Personality <strong>an</strong>d Social Psychology 72(5):1061–74. [aHM]Dijksterhuis, A. (2004) Think different: The merits of unconscious thought inpreference development <strong>an</strong>d decision making. Journal of Personality <strong>an</strong>dSocial Psychology 87(5):586–98. [aHM]Dijksterhuis, A., Bos, M. W., Nordgren, L. F. & v<strong>an</strong> Baaren, R. B. (2006a) Complexchoices better made unconsciously? Science 313:760–61. [EUW]Dijksterhuis, A., Bos, M. W., Nordgren, L. F. & v<strong>an</strong> Baaren, R. B. (2006b) Onmaking the right choice: The deliberation-without-attention effect. Science311(5763):1005–1007. [aHM, JStBTE]Dijksterhuis, A., Bos, M. W., v<strong>an</strong> der Leij, A. & v<strong>an</strong> Baaren, R. B. (2009) Predictingsoccer matches after unconscious <strong>an</strong>d conscious thought as a function ofexpertise. Psychological Science 20(11):1381–87. [aHM]Dijksterhuis, A. & v<strong>an</strong> Olden, Z. (2006) On the benefits of thinking unconsciously:Unconscious thought c<strong>an</strong> increase post-choice satisfaction. Journal of ExperimentalSocial Psychology 42(5):627–31. [aHM]Ditto, P. H. & Lopez, D. F. (1992) Motivated skepticism: Use of differentialdecision criteria <strong>for</strong> preferred <strong>an</strong>d nonpreferred conclusions. Journal of Personality<strong>an</strong>d Social Psychology 63(4):568–84. [aHM]Ditto, P. H., Munro, G. D., Ap<strong>an</strong>ovitch, A. M., Scep<strong>an</strong>sky, J. A. & Lockhart, L. K.(2003) Spont<strong>an</strong>eous skepticism: The interplay of motivation <strong>an</strong>d expectation inresponses to favorable <strong>an</strong>d unfavorable medical diagnoses. Personality <strong>an</strong>dSocial Psychology Bulletin 29(9):1120–32. [aHM]Ditto, P. H., Scep<strong>an</strong>sky, J. A., Munro, G. D., Ap<strong>an</strong>ovitch, A. M. & Lockhart, L. K.(1998) Motivated sensitivity to preference-inconsistent in<strong>for</strong>mation. Journal ofPersonality <strong>an</strong>d Social Psychology 75(1):53–69. [aHM]Dubreuil, B. (2010) Paleolithic public goods games: <strong>Why</strong> hum<strong>an</strong> culture <strong>an</strong>dcooperation did not evolve in one step. Biology <strong>an</strong>d Philosophy. 25(1):53–73. [aHM]Dunbar, K. (1995) How scientists really <strong>reason</strong>: Scientific <strong>reason</strong>ing in real-worldlaboratories. In: The nature of insight, ed. R. J. Steinberg & J. Davidson, pp.365–95. MIT Press. [rHM]Dunbar, K. (1997) How scientists think: Online creativity <strong>an</strong>d conceptual ch<strong>an</strong>ge inscience. In: Conceptual structures <strong>an</strong>d processes: Emergence discovery <strong>an</strong>dch<strong>an</strong>ge, ed. T. B. Ward, S. M. Smith & S. Vaid, pp. 461–93. Americ<strong>an</strong>Psychological Association. [aHM]Dunbar, R. I. M. (1996) The social brain hypothesis. Evolutionary Anthropology6:178–90. [aHM]Dunbar, R. I. M. & Shultz, S. (2003) Evolution of the social brain. Science302:1160–61. [aHM]Dung, P. M. (1995) On the acceptability of arguments <strong>an</strong>d its fundamental role innonmonotonic <strong>reason</strong>ing, logic programming <strong>an</strong>d n-person games. ArtificialBEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2 103


References/Mercier & Sperber: <strong>Why</strong> <strong>do</strong> <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> <strong>reason</strong>?Intelligence 77:321–57. Available at: http://dli.iiit.ac.in/ijcai/IJCAI-93-VOL2/PDF/003.pdf [J-LD]Dunning, D., Meyerowitz, J. A. & Holzberg, A. D. (1989) Ambiguity <strong>an</strong>d selfevaluation:The role of idiosyncratic trait definitions in self-serving assessmentsof ability. Journal of Personality <strong>an</strong>d Social Psychology 57(6):1082–90. [aHM]Eagly, A. H., Kulesa, P., Br<strong>an</strong>non, L. A., Shaw, K. & Hutson-Comeaux, S. (2000)<strong>Why</strong> counterattitudinal messages are as memorable as proattitudinal messages:The import<strong>an</strong>ce of active defense against attack. Personality <strong>an</strong>d Social PsychologyBulletin 26(11):1392–408. [aHM]Ebbesen, E. B. & Bowers, R. J. (1974) Proportion of risky to conservative argumentsin a group discussion <strong>an</strong>d choice shifts. Journal of Personality <strong>an</strong>d SocialPsychology 29(3):316–27. [aHM]Edwards, K. & Smith, E. E. (1996) A disconfirmation bias in the evaluation ofarguments. Journal of Personality <strong>an</strong>d Social Psychology 71(1):5–24. [aHM]Elv<strong>an</strong>g-Gor<strong>an</strong>sson, M., Krause, P. J. & Fox, J. (1993) Acceptability of arguments aslogical uncertainty. In: Symbolic <strong>an</strong>d qu<strong>an</strong>titative approaches to <strong>reason</strong>ing <strong>an</strong>duncertainty: Proceedings, Europe<strong>an</strong> Conference ECSQUARU 93, ed. M.Clarke, R. Kruse & S. Moral, pp. 79–84. Springer-Verlag. [JF]Esser, J. K. (1998) Alive <strong>an</strong>d well after 25 years: A review of groupthink research.Org<strong>an</strong>izational Behavior <strong>an</strong>d Hum<strong>an</strong> Decision Processes 73(2–3):116–41.[aHM]Esser, J. K. & Lin<strong>do</strong>erfer, J. S. (1989) Groupthink <strong>an</strong>d the space shuttle Challengeraccident: Toward a qu<strong>an</strong>titative case <strong>an</strong>alysis. Journal of Behavioral DecisionMaking 2(3):167–77. [aHM]Estlund, D. (2007) Democratic authority. A philosophical framework. PrincetonUniversity Press. [rHM]Ev<strong>an</strong>s, J. St. B. T. (1989) Bias in hum<strong>an</strong> <strong>reason</strong>ing: Causes <strong>an</strong>d consequences.Erlbaum. [aHM]Ev<strong>an</strong>s, J. St. B. T. (1996) Deciding be<strong>for</strong>e you think: Relev<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>an</strong>d <strong>reason</strong>ing in theselection task. British Journal of Psychology 87:223–40. [aHM]Ev<strong>an</strong>s, J. St. B. T. (2000) Thinking <strong>an</strong>d believing. In: Mental models in <strong>reason</strong>ing,ed. J. Garcìa-Madruga, N. Carrie<strong>do</strong> & M. J. González-Labra, pp. 41–56.Universidad Nacional de Educacion a Dist<strong>an</strong>zia. [EJNS]Ev<strong>an</strong>s, J. St. B. T. (2002) Logic <strong>an</strong>d hum<strong>an</strong> <strong>reason</strong>ing: An assessment of thededuction paradigm. Psychological Bulletin 128(6):978–96. [aHM]Ev<strong>an</strong>s, J. St. B. T. (2007) Hypothetical thinking: Dual processes in <strong>reason</strong>ing <strong>an</strong>djudgment. Psychology Press. [JStBTE, aHM, EJNS]Ev<strong>an</strong>s, J. St. B. T. (2008) Dual-processing accounts of <strong>reason</strong>ing, judgment <strong>an</strong>dsocial cognition. Annual Review of Psychology 59:255–78. [JStBTE]Ev<strong>an</strong>s, J. St. B. T. (2009) How m<strong>an</strong>y dual process theories <strong>do</strong> we need: One, two orm<strong>an</strong>y? In: In two minds: Dual processes <strong>an</strong>d beyond, ed. J. St. B. T. Ev<strong>an</strong>s & K.Fr<strong>an</strong>kish, pp. 33–54. Ox<strong>for</strong>d University Press. [EJNS]Ev<strong>an</strong>s, J. St. B. T. (2010) Thinking twice: Two minds in one brain. Ox<strong>for</strong>d UniversityPress. [JStBTE]Ev<strong>an</strong>s, J. St. B. T. & Ball, L. J. (2010) Do people <strong>reason</strong> on the Wason selectiontask? A new look at the data of Ball et al. (2003). Quarterly Journal of ExperimentalPsychology 63:434–41. [JStBTE]Ev<strong>an</strong>s, J. St. B. T., Barston, J. L. & Pollard, P. (1983) On the conflict between logic<strong>an</strong>d belief in syllogistic <strong>reason</strong>ing. Memory & Cognition 11:295–306. [aHM]Ev<strong>an</strong>s, J. St. B. T., H<strong>an</strong>dley, S. J., Harper, C. N. J. & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1999)Reasoning about necessity <strong>an</strong>d possibility: A test of the mental model <strong>theory</strong> ofdeduction. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, <strong>an</strong>dCognition 25(6):1495–513. [aHM]Ev<strong>an</strong>s, J. St. B. T. & Lynch, J. S. (1973) Matching bias in the selection task. BritishJournal of Psychology 64(3):391–97. [aHM]Ev<strong>an</strong>s, J. St. B. T., Newstead, S. E. & Byrne, R. M. J. (1993) Hum<strong>an</strong> <strong>reason</strong>ing: Thepsychology of deduction. Erlbaum. [aHM, JEO]Ev<strong>an</strong>s, J. St. B. T. & Over, D. E. (1996) Rationality <strong>an</strong>d <strong>reason</strong>ing. PsychologyPress. [JStBTE, aHM]Ev<strong>an</strong>s, J. St. B. T. & Wason, P. C. (1976) Rationalisation in a <strong>reason</strong>ing task. BritishJournal of Psychology 63:205–12. [JStBTE, aHM]Farnsworth, P. R. & Behner, A. (1931) A note on the attitude of social con<strong>for</strong>mity.Journal of Social Psychology 2:126–28. [aHM]Fearon, J. D. (1998) Deliberation as discussion. In: Deliberative democracy,ed. J. Elster, pp. 44–68. Cambridge University Press. [KC-CW]Fiedler, K., Schenck, W., Watling, M. & Menges, J. I. (2005) Priming traitinferences through pictures <strong>an</strong>d moving pictures: The impact of open<strong>an</strong>d closed mindsets. Journal of Personality <strong>an</strong>d Social Psychology88:229–44. [JSU]Foot, H., Howe, C., Anderson, A., Tolmie, A. & Warden, D. (1994) Group <strong>an</strong>dinteractive learning. Computational Mech<strong>an</strong>ics Press. [aHM]Fox, J. (1980) Making decisions under the influence of memory. PsychologicalReview 87(2):190–211. [JF]Fox, J. (2003) Logic, probability <strong>an</strong>d the cognitive foundations of rational belief.Journal of Applied Logic 1:197–224. [JF]Fox, J. (in press) Arguing about the evidence. In: Evidence, inference <strong>an</strong>d enquiry,ed. P. Dawid, W. Twining & M. Vasilaki. Ox<strong>for</strong>d University Press/British Academy. [JF]Fox, J., Beveridge, M. & Glasspool, D. (2003) Underst<strong>an</strong>ding intelligent agents:Analysis <strong>an</strong>d synthesis. AI Communications 16(3):139–52. [JF]Fox, J., Clark, D., Glowinski, A. & O’Neil, M. (1990) Using predicate logic tointegrate qualitative <strong>reason</strong>ing <strong>an</strong>d classical decision <strong>theory</strong>. IEEE Tr<strong>an</strong>sactionson Systems, M<strong>an</strong>, <strong>an</strong>d Cybernetics 20(2):347–57. [JF]Fox, J. & Das, S. (2000) Safe <strong>an</strong>d sound: Artificial intelligence in hazar<strong>do</strong>us applications.MIT Press. [JF]Fox, J., Glasspool, D., Grecu, D., Modgil, S., South, M. & Patkar, V. (2007) Argumentation-basedinference <strong>an</strong>d decision-making: A medical perspective. IEEEIntelligent Systems 22(6):34–41. [JF]Fox, J., Krause, P. J. & Elv<strong>an</strong>g-Gor<strong>an</strong>sson, M (1993) Argumentation as a generalframework <strong>for</strong> uncertain <strong>reason</strong>ing. In: Proceedings of the Ninth AnnualConference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, ed. D. Heckerm<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>dE. H. Mamd<strong>an</strong>i, pp. 428–34. Morg<strong>an</strong> Kaufm<strong>an</strong>. [JF]Fr<strong>an</strong>kish, K. (1998) Natural l<strong>an</strong>guage <strong>an</strong>d virtual belief. In: L<strong>an</strong>guage <strong>an</strong>d thought:Interdisciplinary themes, ed. P. Carruthers & J. Boucher, pp. 248–69. CambridgeUniversity Press. [KF]Fr<strong>an</strong>kish, K. (2004) Mind <strong>an</strong>d supermind. Cambridge University Press. [KF]Fr<strong>an</strong>kish, K. (2009) Systems <strong>an</strong>d levels: Dual-system theories <strong>an</strong>d the personalsubpersonaldistinction. In: In two minds: Dual processes <strong>an</strong>d beyond, ed. J. St.B. T. Ev<strong>an</strong>s & K. Fr<strong>an</strong>kish, pp. 89–107. Ox<strong>for</strong>d University Press. [KF]Fr<strong>an</strong>klin, B. (1817/2006) The autobiography of Benjamin Fr<strong>an</strong>klin. NuVision.(Original work published 1817.) [aHM, EUW]Frederick, S. (2005) Cognitive reflection <strong>an</strong>d decision making. Journal of EconomicPerspectives 19(4):25–42. [JStBTE]Fricker, M. (2007) Epistemic injustice: Power <strong>an</strong>d the ethics of knowing. Ox<strong>for</strong>dUniversity Press. [KC-CW]Fry, D. P. (2006) The hum<strong>an</strong> potential <strong>for</strong> peace: An <strong>an</strong>thropological challenge toassumptions about war <strong>an</strong>d violence. Ox<strong>for</strong>d University Press. [DN]Garl<strong>an</strong>d, H. (1990) Throwing good money after bad: The effect of sunk costs on thedecision to escalate commitment to <strong>an</strong> ongoing project. Journal of AppliedPsychology 75(6):728–31. [aHM]Geurts, B. (2003) Reasoning with qu<strong>an</strong>tifiers. Cognition 86(3):223–51. [aHM]Gibbard, A. (1990) Wise choices, apt feelings. Cambridge University Press. [aHM]Gigerenzer, G. (2007) Gut feelings. Penguin. [JStBTE]Gilbert, D. T. (2002) Inferential correction. In: Heuristics <strong>an</strong>d biases, ed. T. Gilovich,D. Griffin & D. Kahnem<strong>an</strong>, pp. 167–84. Cambridge University Press.[aHM]Gilbert, D. T. & Ebert, J. E. J. (2002) Decisions <strong>an</strong>d revisions: The affective <strong>for</strong>ecastingof ch<strong>an</strong>geable outcomes. Journal of Personality <strong>an</strong>d Social Psychology82(4):503–14. [aHM]Gilovich, T. (1983) Biased evaluation <strong>an</strong>d persistence in gambling. Journal of Personality<strong>an</strong>d Social Psychology 44(6):1110–26. [aHM]Girotto, V., Kemmelmeier, M., Sperber, D. & V<strong>an</strong> der Henst, J.-B. (2001) Inept<strong>reason</strong>ers or pragmatic virtuosos? Relev<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>an</strong>d the deontic selection task.Cognition 81(2):69–76. [aHM]Gladwell, M. (2005) Blink: The power of thinking without thinking. Little,Brown. [aHM]Gladwell, M. (2005) Blink. Penguin. [JStBTE]Godden, D. M. & Walton, D. (2004) Denying the <strong>an</strong>tecedent as a legitimate <strong>argumentative</strong>strategy: A dialectical model. In<strong>for</strong>mal Logic 24:219–43. [MO]Godlee, F. (2010) Conflicts of interest <strong>an</strong>d p<strong>an</strong>demic flu: WHO must act now torestore its credibility, <strong>an</strong>d Europe should legislate. British Medical Journal340:1256–57. [KC-CW]Goldberg, E. (2001) The executive brain. Ox<strong>for</strong>d University Press. [DN]Goldstein, M., Crowell, A. & Kuhn, D. (2009) What constitutes skilled argumentation<strong>an</strong>d how <strong>do</strong>es it develop? In<strong>for</strong>mal Logic 29(4):379–95. [DK, rHM]Goren, A. & To<strong>do</strong>rov, A. (2009) Two faces are better th<strong>an</strong> one: Eliminating falsetrait associations with faces. Social Cognition 27:222–48. [JSU]Graff, G. (2003) Clueless in academe: How schooling obscures the life of the mind.Yale University Press. [DK]Green, K. C., Armstrong, J. C. & Graefe, A. (2007) Methods to elicit <strong>for</strong>ecasts fromgroups: Delphi <strong>an</strong>d prediction markets compared. Foresight: The InternationalJournal of Applied Forecasting Fall: 17–21. [aHM]Greene, J. D. (2003) From neural “is” to moral “ought”: What are the moralimplications of neuroscientific moral psychology? Nature Reviews: Neuroscience4:847–50. [JAJ]Greenwald, A. G. (1969) The open-mindedness of the counterattitudinal roleplayer. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 5(4):375–88. [aHM]Greenwald, E. A., Persky, H. R., Campbell, J. R. & Mazzeo, J. National Assessmentof Educational Progress. (1999) NAEP 1998 Writing Report Card <strong>for</strong> theNation <strong>an</strong>d the States. U. S. Department of Education. Available at: http://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/pubsinfo.asp?pubid ¼ 1999462. [CRW]Grice, H. P. (1975) Logic <strong>an</strong>d conversation. In: Syntax <strong>an</strong>d sem<strong>an</strong>tics, vol. 3: Speechacts, ed. P. Cole & J. P. Morg<strong>an</strong>. Seminar Press. [aHM]Griffin, D. W. & Dunning, D. (1990) The role of construal processes in overconfidentpredictions about the self <strong>an</strong>d others. Journal of Personality 59(6):1128–39. [aHM]104 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2


References/Mercier & Sperber: <strong>Why</strong> <strong>do</strong> <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> <strong>reason</strong>?Guenther, C. L. & Alicke, M. D. (2008) Self-enh<strong>an</strong>cement <strong>an</strong>d belief persever<strong>an</strong>ce.Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 44(3):706–12. [aHM]Gummerum, M., Keller, M., Takezawa, M. & Mata, J. (2008) To give or not to give:Children’s <strong>an</strong>d a<strong>do</strong>lescents’ sharing <strong>an</strong>d moral negotiations in economicdecision situations. Child Development 79(3):562–76. [aHM]Gutm<strong>an</strong>n, A. & Thompson, D. (2004) <strong>Why</strong> deliberative democracy? PrincetonUniversity Press. [KC-CW]Hafer, C. L. & Begue, L. (2005) Experimental research on just-world <strong>theory</strong>:Problems, developments, <strong>an</strong>d future challenges. Psychological Bulletin131(1):128–67. [aHM]Hagler, D. A. & Brem, S. K. (2008) Reaching agreement: The structure & pragmaticsof critical care nurses’ in<strong>for</strong>mal argument. Contemporary EducationalPsychology 33(3):403–24. [aHM]Hahn, U. & Oaks<strong>for</strong>d, M. (2007) The rationality of in<strong>for</strong>mal argumentation: ABayesi<strong>an</strong> approach to <strong>reason</strong>ing fallacies. Psychological Review 114:704–32.[aHM, MO]Hahn, U., Oaks<strong>for</strong>d, M. & Bayindir, H. (2005) How convinced should we be bynegative evidence? In: Proceedings of the 27th Annual Meeting of the CognitiveScience Society, ed. B. G. Bara, L. Barsalou & M. Buchiarelli, pp. 887–92.Erlbaum. [aHM]Haidt, J. (2001) The emotional <strong>do</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d its rational tail: A social intuitionist approachto moral judgment. Psychological Review 108(4):814–34. [JAJ, aHM]Haidt, J. & Bjorklund, F. (2007) Social intuitionists <strong>reason</strong>, in conversation. In:Moral Psychology, vol. 2: The cognitive science of morality: Intuition <strong>an</strong>ddiversity, ed. W. Sinnott-Armstrong, pp. 241–54. MIT Press. [arHM]Halberstadt, J. B. & Levine, G. M. (1999) Effects of <strong>reason</strong>s <strong>an</strong>alysis on the accuracyof predicting basketball games. Journal of Applied Social Psychology29(3):517–30. [aHM]Ham, J. & v<strong>an</strong> den Bos, K. (2008) Not fair <strong>for</strong> me! The influence of personal relev<strong>an</strong>ceon social justice inferences. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology44:699–705. [JSU]Ham, J. & Vonk, R. (2003) Smart <strong>an</strong>d easy: Co-occurring activation of spont<strong>an</strong>eoustrait inferences <strong>an</strong>d spont<strong>an</strong>eous situational inferences. Journal of ExperimentalSocial Psychology 39:434–47. [JSU]Hamilton, R. W. & Thompson, D. V. (2007) Is there a substitute <strong>for</strong> directexperience? Comparing consumers’ preferences after direct <strong>an</strong>d indirectproduct experiences. Journal of Consumer Research 34(4):546–55. [aHM]Hardisty, D. H., Johnson, E. J. & Weber, E. U. (2010) A dirty word or a dirty world?Attribute framing, political affiliation, <strong>an</strong>d query <strong>theory</strong>. Psychological Science21:86–92. [EUW]Harm<strong>an</strong>, G. (1986) Ch<strong>an</strong>ge in view: Principles of <strong>reason</strong>ing. MIT Press. [aHM]Harrell, M. (2006) Diagrams that really are worth ten thous<strong>an</strong>d words: Usingargument diagrams to teach critical thinking skills. In: Proceedings of the 28thAnnual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, p. 2501. Erlbaum.[MH]Harrell, M. (2008) No computer program required: Even pencil-<strong>an</strong>d-paper argumentmapping improves critical thinking skills. Teaching Philosophy 31:351–74. [MH]Harrell, M. (<strong>for</strong>thcoming) Argument diagramming <strong>an</strong>d critical thinking in introductoryphilosophy. Higher Education Research <strong>an</strong>d Development. [MH]Harris, P. L. (2007) Trust. Developmental Science 10(1):135–38. [aHM]Hart, W., Albarracin, D., Eagly, A. H., Brech<strong>an</strong>, I., Lindberg, M. & Merrill, L.(2009) Feeling validated versus being correct: A meta-<strong>an</strong>alysis of selectiveexposure to in<strong>for</strong>mation. Psychological Bulletin 135(4):555–88. [aHM]Hassin, R. R., Bargh, J. A. & Ulem<strong>an</strong>, J. S. (2002) Spont<strong>an</strong>eous causal inferences.Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 38:515–22. [JSU]Henrich, J., Heine, S. & Norenzay<strong>an</strong>, A. (2010) The weirdest people in the world?Behavioral <strong>an</strong>d Brain Sciences 33(2–3):61–83. [rHM, DN]Hill, G. W. (1982) Group versus individual per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce: Are Nþ1 heads betterth<strong>an</strong> one? Psychological Bulletin 91(3):517–39. [aHM]Hinsz, V. B., Tindale, R. S. & Nagao, D. H. (2008) Accentuation of in<strong>for</strong>mationprocesses <strong>an</strong>d biases in group judgments integrating base-rate <strong>an</strong>d casespecificin<strong>for</strong>mation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 44(1):116–26. [aHM]Hirt, E. R. & Markm<strong>an</strong>, K. D. (1995) Multiple expl<strong>an</strong>ation: A consider-<strong>an</strong>alternativestrategy <strong>for</strong> debiasing judgments. Journal of Personality <strong>an</strong>d SocialPsychology 69(6):1069–86. [aHM]Hoch, S. J. (1985) Counterfactual <strong>reason</strong>ing <strong>an</strong>d accuracy in predicting personalevents. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, <strong>an</strong>d Cognition11(4):719–31. [aHM]Hogarth, R. M. (2001) Educating intuition. University of Chicago Press. [DN]Houdé, O., Zago, L., Mellet, E., Moutier, S., Pineau, A., Mazoyer, B. & Tzourio-Mazoyer, N. (2000) Shifting from the perceptual brain to the logical brain: Theneural impact of cognitive inhibition training. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience12:721–28. [WDN]Howe, C. J. (1990) Physics in the primary school: Peer interaction <strong>an</strong>d the underst<strong>an</strong>dingof floating <strong>an</strong>d sinking. Europe<strong>an</strong> Journal of Psychology of Education5(4):459–75. [aHM]Hrdy, S. B. (2009) Mothers <strong>an</strong>d others. Belknap Press. [aHM]Hsee, C. K. (1995) Elastic justification: How tempting but task-irrelev<strong>an</strong>t factorsinfluence decisions. Org<strong>an</strong>izational Behavior <strong>an</strong>d Hum<strong>an</strong> Decision Processes62(3):330–37. [aHM]Hsee, C. K. (1996a) Elastic justification: How unjustifiable factors influence judgments.Org<strong>an</strong>izational Behavior <strong>an</strong>d Hum<strong>an</strong> Decision Processes 66(1):122–29. [aHM]Hsee, C. K. (1996b) The evaluability hypothesis: An expl<strong>an</strong>ation <strong>for</strong> preferencereversals between joint <strong>an</strong>d separate evaluations of alternatives. Org<strong>an</strong>izationalBehavior <strong>an</strong>d Hum<strong>an</strong> Decision Processes 67(3):247–57. [aHM]Hsee, C. K. (1998) Less is better: When low-value options are valued more highlyth<strong>an</strong> high-value options. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 11(2):107–21. [aHM]Hsee, C. K. (1999) Value seeking <strong>an</strong>d prediction-decision inconsistency: <strong>Why</strong> <strong>do</strong>n’tpeople take what they predict they’ll like the most? Psychonomic Bulletin &Review 6(4):555–61. [aHM]Hsee, C. K. & Hastie, R. (2006) Decision <strong>an</strong>d experience: <strong>Why</strong> <strong>do</strong>n’t we choosewhat makes us happy? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10(1):31–37. [aHM]Hsee, C. K., Loewenstein, G. F., Blount, S. & Bazerm<strong>an</strong>, M. H. (1999) Preferencereversals between joint <strong>an</strong>d separate evaluations of options: A review <strong>an</strong>dtheoretical <strong>an</strong>alysis. Psychological Bulletin 125(5):576–90. [aHM]Hsee, C. K. & Zh<strong>an</strong>g, J. (2004) Distinction bias: Misprediction <strong>an</strong>d mischoice due tojoint evaluation. Journal of Personality <strong>an</strong>d Social Psychology 86(5):680–95.[aHM]Hsee, C. K., Zh<strong>an</strong>g, J., Yu, F. & Xi, Y. (2003) Lay rationalism <strong>an</strong>d inconsistencybetween predicted experience <strong>an</strong>d decision. Journal of Behavioral DecisionMaking 16(4):257–72. [aHM]Huber, J., Payne, J. W. & Puto, C. (1982) Adding asymmetrically <strong>do</strong>minatedalternatives: Violations of regularity <strong>an</strong>d the similarity hypothesis. Journal ofConsumer Research 9(1):90–98. [aHM]Humphrey, N. K. (1976) The social function of Intellect. In: Growing points inethology, ed. P. P. G. Bateson & R. A. Hinde, pp. 303–17. Cambridge UniversityPress. [aHM]Igou, E. R. (2004) Lay theories in affective <strong>for</strong>ecasting: The progression of affect.Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 40(4):528–34. [aHM]Igou, E. R. & Bless, H. (2007) On undesirable consequences of thinking: Framingeffects as a function of subst<strong>an</strong>tive processing. Journal of Behavioral DecisionMaking 20(2):125–42. [aHM]Irwin, J. R., Slovic, P., Lichtenstein, S. & McClell<strong>an</strong>d, G. H. (1993) Preferencereversals <strong>an</strong>d the measurement of environmental values. Journal of Risk <strong>an</strong>dUncertainty 6(1):5–18. [aHM]Isenberg, D. J. (1986) Group polarization: A critical review <strong>an</strong>d meta-<strong>an</strong>alysis.Journal of Personality <strong>an</strong>d Social Psychology 50(6):1141–51. [aHM]Jacken<strong>do</strong>ff, R. (1996) How l<strong>an</strong>guage helps us think. Pragmatics <strong>an</strong>d Cognition4(1):1–34. [aHM]J<strong>an</strong>is, I. L. (1972) Victims of groupthink. Houghton-Mifflin. [RJS]J<strong>an</strong>is, I. L. (1982) Groupthink, 2nd rev. ed. Houghton Mifflin. [aHM]J<strong>an</strong>is, I. L. & M<strong>an</strong>n, L. (1977) Decision making: A psychological <strong>an</strong>alysis of conflict,choice, <strong>an</strong>d commitment. Free Press. [aHM]Jas<strong>an</strong>off, S. (2003) Technologies of humility: Citizen participation in governingscience. Minerva 41:223–44. [KC-CW]Jaswal, V. K. & Neely, L. A. (2006) Adults <strong>do</strong>n’t always know best: Preschoolers usepast reliability over age when learning new words. Psychological Science17:757–58. [JEO]Jellison, J. M. & Mills, J. (1969) Effect of public commitment upon opinions.Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 5(3):340–46. [aHM]Johnson, D. W. & Johnson, R. T. (2007) Creative constructive controversy: Intellectualchallenge in the classroom, 4th ed. Interaction. [aHM]Johnson, D. W. & Johnson, R. T. (2009) Energizing learning: The instructionalpower of conflict. Educational Researcher 38(1):37–51. [aHM]Johnson, E. J. & Goldstein, D. G. (2003) Do defaults save lives? Science 302:1338–39. [EUW]Johnson, E. J., Haubl, G. & Kein<strong>an</strong>, A. (2007) Aspects of en<strong>do</strong>wment: A query<strong>theory</strong> of value construction. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning,Memory, <strong>an</strong>d Cognition 33:461–73. [aHM, EUW]Johnson, J. A. (2007, June) The evolution of moral rules from natural laws. Posterpresented at the 19th <strong>an</strong>nual meeting of the Hum<strong>an</strong> Behavior <strong>an</strong>d EvolutionSociety, Williamsburg, VA. [JAJ]Johnson, J. A., Germer, C. K., Efr<strong>an</strong>, J. S. & Overton, W. F. (1988) Personality asthe basis <strong>for</strong> theoretical predilections. Journal of Personality <strong>an</strong>d Social Psychology55:824–35. [JAJ]Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2006) How we <strong>reason</strong>. Ox<strong>for</strong>d University Press. [arHM]Johnson-Laird, P. N. & Byrne, R. M. J. (2002) Conditionals: A <strong>theory</strong> ofme<strong>an</strong>ing, pragmatics, <strong>an</strong>d inference. Psychological Review 109(4):646–78.[aHM]Johnson-Laird, P. N. & Wason, P. C. (1970) Insight into a logical relation. QuarterlyJournal of Experimental Psychology 22(1):49–61. [aHM]John-Steiner, V. (2000) Creative collaboration. Ox<strong>for</strong>d University Press. [aHM]BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2 105


References/Mercier & Sperber: <strong>Why</strong> <strong>do</strong> <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> <strong>reason</strong>?Jones, M. & Sugden, R. (2001) Positive confirmation bias in the acquisition ofin<strong>for</strong>mation. Theory <strong>an</strong>d Decision 50(1):59–99. [aHM]Kahnem<strong>an</strong>, D. (2003) A perspective on judgment <strong>an</strong>d choice: Mapping boundedrationality. Americ<strong>an</strong> Psychologist 58(9):697–720. [aHM]Kahnem<strong>an</strong>, D. & Frederick, S. (2002) Representativeness revisited: Attributesubstitution in intuitive judgement. In: Heuristics <strong>an</strong>d biases: The psychologyof intuitive judgment, ed. T. Gilovich, D. Griffin & D. Kahnem<strong>an</strong>, pp. 49–81.Cambridge University Press. [JStBTE, aHM]Kahnem<strong>an</strong>, D. & Frederick, S. (2005) A model of heuristic judgment. In: TheCambridge h<strong>an</strong>dbook of thinking <strong>an</strong>d <strong>reason</strong>ing, ed. K. Holyoak & R. G.Morrison, pp. 267–94. Cambridge University Press. [aHM]Kahnem<strong>an</strong>, D. & Ritov, I. (1994) Determin<strong>an</strong>ts of stated willingness to pay <strong>for</strong>public goods: A study in the headline method. Journal of Risk <strong>an</strong>d Uncertainty9(1):5–37. [aHM]Kahnem<strong>an</strong>, D. & Tversky, A. (1972) Subjective probability: A judgment of representativeness.Cognitive Psychology 3(3):430–54. [aHM]Kahnem<strong>an</strong>, D. & Tversky, A. (1973) On the psychology of prediction. PsychologicalReview 80:237–57. [MO]Kahnem<strong>an</strong>, D., Slovic, P. & Tversky, A. (1982) Judgment under uncertainty:Heuristics <strong>an</strong>d biases. Cambridge University Press. [aHM]Kapl<strong>an</strong>, M. F. & Miller, C. E. (1977) Judgments <strong>an</strong>d group discussion: Effect ofpresentation <strong>an</strong>d memory factors on polarization. Sociometry 40(4):337–43.[aHM]Katz, J. J. (1986) Cogitations. Ox<strong>for</strong>d University Press. [aHM]Keeney, S., Hasson, F. & McKenna, H. P. (2001) A critical review of the Delphitechnique as a research metho<strong>do</strong>logy <strong>for</strong> nursing. International Journal ofNursing Studies 38(2):195–200. [aHM]Kerr, N. L., Maccoun, R. J. & Kramer, G. P. (1996) Bias in judgment: Comparingindividuals <strong>an</strong>d groups. Psychological Review 103(4):687–719. [aHM]Kerr, N. L. & Tindale, R. S. (2004) Group per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>an</strong>d decision making.Annual Review of Psychology 55:623–55. [aHM]Kersten, D., Mamassi<strong>an</strong>, P. & Yuille, A. (2004) Object perception as Bayesi<strong>an</strong>inference. Annual Review of Psychology 55:271–304. [aHM]Klaczynski, P. A. (1997) Bias in a<strong>do</strong>lescents’ everyday <strong>reason</strong>ing <strong>an</strong>d its relationshipwith intellectual ability, personal theories, <strong>an</strong>d self-serving motivation. DevelopmentalPsychology 33(2):273–83. [aHM]Klaczynski, P. A. & Cottrell, J. M. (2004) A dual-process approach to cognitivedevelopment: The case of children’s underst<strong>an</strong>ding of sunk cost decisions.Thinking & Reasoning 10(2):147–74. [aHM]Klaczynski, P. A. & Gor<strong>do</strong>n, D. H. (1996a) Everyday statistical <strong>reason</strong>ing duringa<strong>do</strong>lescence <strong>an</strong>d young adulthood: Motivational, general ability, <strong>an</strong>d developmentalinfluences. Child Development 67(6):2873–91. [aHM]Klaczynski, P. A. & Gor<strong>do</strong>n, D. H. (1996b) Self-serving influences on a<strong>do</strong>lescents’evaluations of belief-relev<strong>an</strong>t evidence. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology62(3):317–39. [aHM]Klaczynski, P. A., Gor<strong>do</strong>n, D. H. & Fauth, J. (1997) Goal-oriented critical <strong>reason</strong>ing<strong>an</strong>d individual differences in critical <strong>reason</strong>ing biases. Journal of EducationalPsychology 89(3):470–85. [aHM]Klaczynski, P. A. & Lavallee, K. L. (2005) Domain-specific identity, epistemicregulation, <strong>an</strong>d intellectual ability as predictors of belief-based <strong>reason</strong>ing:A dual-process perspective. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology92(1):1–24. [aHM]Klaczynski, P. A. & Narasimham, G. (1998) Development of scientific <strong>reason</strong>ingbiases: Cognitive versus ego-protective expl<strong>an</strong>ations. Developmental Psychology34(1):175–87. [aHM]Klaczynski, P. A. & Robinson, B. (2000) Personal theories, intellectual ability, <strong>an</strong>depistemological beliefs: Adult age differences in everyday <strong>reason</strong>ing tasks.Psychology <strong>an</strong>d Aging 15(3):400–16. [aHM]Klauer, K. C., Musch, J. & Naumer, B. (2000) On belief bias in syllogistic <strong>reason</strong>ing.Psychological Review 107(4):852–84. [aHM, EJNS]Klaym<strong>an</strong>, J. & Ha, Y.-W. (1987) Confirmation, disconfirmation <strong>an</strong>d in<strong>for</strong>mation inhypothesis testing. Psychological Review 94(2):211–28. [aHM, FHP]Klein, G. (1998) Sources of power: How people make decisions. MIT Press.[aHM]Koehler, J. J. (1993) The influence of prior beliefs on scientific judgments of evidencequality. Org<strong>an</strong>izational Behavior <strong>an</strong>d Hum<strong>an</strong> Decision Processes56(1):28–55. [aHM]Koenig, M. A., Clement, F. & Harris, P. L. (2004) Trust in testimony: Children’s useof true <strong>an</strong>d false statements. Psychological Science 15:694–98. [JEO]Kog<strong>an</strong>, N. & Wallach, M. A. (1966) Modification of a judgmental style throughgroup interaction. Journal of Personality <strong>an</strong>d Social Psychology 4(2):165–74.[aHM]Konrath, S., O’Brien, E. H. & Hsing, C. (in press) Ch<strong>an</strong>ges in dispositional empathyover time in college students: A meta-<strong>an</strong>alysis. Personality <strong>an</strong>d Social PsychologyReview. [DN]Koole, S. L., Dijksterhuis, A. & V<strong>an</strong> Knippenberg, A. (2001) What’s in a name:Implicit self-esteem <strong>an</strong>d the automatic self. Journal of Personality <strong>an</strong>d SocialPsychology 80(4):669–85. [aHM]Koriat, A., Lichtenstein, S. & Fischhoff, B. (1980) Reasons <strong>for</strong> confidence. Journalof Experimental Psychology: Hum<strong>an</strong> Learning <strong>an</strong>d Memory 6(2):107–18.[aHM]Kray, L. & Gonzalez, R. (1999) Differential weighting in choice versus advice: I’ll <strong>do</strong>this, you <strong>do</strong> that. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 12(3):207–17.[aHM]Krebs, J. R. & Dawkins, R. (1984) Animal signals: Mind-reading <strong>an</strong>d m<strong>an</strong>ipulation?In: Behavioural ecology: An evolutionary approach, 2nd ed., ed. J. R. Krebs &N. B. Davies, pp. 390–402. Basil Blackwell. [aHM]Kressel, L. (2010) Spont<strong>an</strong>eous trait inferences, <strong>an</strong>d explicit <strong>an</strong>d implicit theoriesabout traits causing behaviors. Unpublished m<strong>an</strong>uscript, New York University.[JSU]Kressel, L. & Ulem<strong>an</strong>, J. S. (2010) Personality traits function as causal concepts.Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 46:213–16. [JSU]Krugl<strong>an</strong>ski, A. W. & Freund, T. (1983) The freezing <strong>an</strong>d unfreezing of lay-inferences:Effects on impressional primacy, ethnic stereotyping, <strong>an</strong>d numerical<strong>an</strong>choring. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 19(5):448–68. [aHM]Kuhn, D. (1991) The skills of argument. Cambridge University Press. [DK, aHM]Kuhn, D. (1992) Thinking as argument. Harvard Educational Review 62(2):155–78. [aHM]Kuhn, D. (2001) How <strong>do</strong> people know? Psychological Sciences 12:1–8. [CRW]Kuhn, D. & Crowell, A. (in press) Argumentation as a path to the thinking developmentof young a<strong>do</strong>lescents. Psychological Science. [DK]Kuhn, D., Goh, W., Iord<strong>an</strong>ou, K. & Shaenfield, D. (2008) Arguing on the computer:A microgenetic study of developing argument skills in a computer-supportedenvironment. Child Development 79(5):1310–29. [DK, rHM]Kuhn, D. & Lao, J. (1996) Effects of evidence on attitudes: Is polarization thenorm? Psychological Science 7(2):115–20. [aHM]Kuhn, D., Shaw, V. F. & Felton, M. (1997) Effects of dyadic interaction on <strong>argumentative</strong><strong>reason</strong>ing. Cognition <strong>an</strong>d Instruction 15(3):287–315. [aHM]Kuhn, D., Weinstock, M. & Flaton, R. (1994) How well <strong>do</strong> jurors <strong>reason</strong>? Competencedimensions of individual variation in a juror <strong>reason</strong>ing task. PsychologicalScience 5(5):289–96. [aHM]Kuipers, B. (2000) The spatial sem<strong>an</strong>tic hierarchy. Artificial Intelligence 119(1–2):191–233. [JW]Kunda, Z. (1987) Motivation <strong>an</strong>d inference: Self-serving generation <strong>an</strong>d evaluationof evidence. Journal of Personality <strong>an</strong>d Social Psychology 53(4):636–47.[aHM]Kunda, Z. (1990) The case <strong>for</strong> motivated <strong>reason</strong>ing. Psychological Bulletin108(3):480–98. [aHM]Lambert, A. J., Cronen, S., Chasteen, A. L. & Lickel, B. (1996) Private vs publicexpressions of racial prejudice. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology32(5):437–59. [aHM]L<strong>an</strong>demore, H. (2007) Democratic <strong>reason</strong>: Politics, collective intelligence, <strong>an</strong>d therule of the m<strong>an</strong>y. Harvard University. [rHM]L<strong>an</strong>demore, H. (in press) Democratic <strong>reason</strong>: The mech<strong>an</strong>isms of collectiveintelligence in politics. In: Collective wis<strong>do</strong>m: Principles <strong>an</strong>d Mech<strong>an</strong>isms,ed. H. L<strong>an</strong>demore & J. Elster. Cambridge University Press [aHM]L<strong>an</strong>demore, H. & Mercier, H. (submitted) “Talking it out”: Deliberation withothers versus deliberation within. [rHM]L<strong>an</strong>ger, E. J., Bl<strong>an</strong>k, A. & Ch<strong>an</strong>owitz, B. (1978) The mindlessness of ostensiblythoughtful action: The role of “placebic” in<strong>for</strong>mation in interpersonal interaction.Journal of Personality <strong>an</strong>d Social Psychology 36(6):635–42. [rHM]Lao, J. & Kuhn, D. (2002) Cognitive engagement <strong>an</strong>d attitude development. CognitiveDevelopment 17(2):1203–17. [aHM]Larson, M., Britt, M. A. & Larson, A. A. (2004) Disfluencies in comprehending<strong>argumentative</strong> texts. Reading Psychology 25:205–24. [rHM, CRW]Lassiter, G. D., Lindberg, M. J., Gonzalez-Vallejo, C., Bellezza, F. S. & Phillips, N.D. (2009) The deliberation-without-attention effect: Evidence <strong>for</strong> <strong>an</strong> artifactualinterpretation. Psychological Science 20(6):671–75. [aHM]Laughlin, P. R., Bonner, B. L. & Miner, A. G. (2002) Groups per<strong>for</strong>m better th<strong>an</strong>the best individuals on letters-to-numbers problems. Org<strong>an</strong>izational Behavior<strong>an</strong>d Hum<strong>an</strong> Decision Processes 88(2):605–20. [aHM]Laughlin, P. R. & Ellis, A. L. (1986) Demonstrability <strong>an</strong>d social combination processeson mathematical intellective tasks. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology22(3):177–89. [aHM]Laughlin, P. R., Hatch, E. C., Silver, J. S. & Boh, L. (2006) Groups per<strong>for</strong>mbetter th<strong>an</strong> the best individuals on letters-to-numbers problems: Effects ofgroup size. Journal of Personality <strong>an</strong>d Social Psychology 90(4):644–51.[aHM]Laughlin, P. R., V<strong>an</strong>derStoep, S. W. & Hollingshead, A. B. (1991) Collective versusindividual induction: Recognition of truth, rejection of error, <strong>an</strong>d collectivein<strong>for</strong>mation processing. Journal of Personality <strong>an</strong>d Social Psychology61(1):50–67. [aHM]Laughlin, P. R., Z<strong>an</strong>der, M. L., Knievel, E. M. & T<strong>an</strong>, T. S. (2003) Groups per<strong>for</strong>mbetter th<strong>an</strong> the best individuals on letters-to-numbers problems: In<strong>for</strong>mativeequations <strong>an</strong>d effective <strong>reason</strong>ing. Journal of Personality <strong>an</strong>d Social Psychology85(4):684–94. [aHM]106 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2


References/Mercier & Sperber: <strong>Why</strong> <strong>do</strong> <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> <strong>reason</strong>?Lea, R. B. (1995) On-line evidence <strong>for</strong> elaborative logical inferences in text. Journalof Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, <strong>an</strong>d Cognition 21:1469–82.[JSU]Lee, L., Amir, O. & Ariely, D. (2009) In search of Homo economicus: Preferenceconsistency, emotions, <strong>an</strong>d cognition. Journal of Consumer Research 36:173–87. [aHM]Lengwiler, M. (2008) Participatory approaches in science <strong>an</strong>d technology: Historicalorigins <strong>an</strong>d current practices in critical perspective. Science, Technology,& Hum<strong>an</strong> Values 33(2):186–200. [KC-CW]Lerner, J. S. & Tetlock, P. E. (1999) Accounting <strong>for</strong> the effects of accountability.Psychological Bulletin 125(2):255–75. [aHM]Leslie, A. M. (1987) Pretense <strong>an</strong>d representation: The origins of a “<strong>theory</strong> of mind.”Psychological Review 94(4):412–26. [aHM]Levin, I. & Druy<strong>an</strong>, S. (1993) When sociocognitive tr<strong>an</strong>saction among peers fails:The case of misconceptions in science. Child Development 64(5):1571–91.[rHM, JEO]Lewontin, R. C., Rose, S. & Kamin, L. J. (1987) Not in our genes: Biology, ideology,<strong>an</strong>d hum<strong>an</strong> nature. P<strong>an</strong>theon. [DN]Liberm<strong>an</strong>, A. & Chaiken, S. (1991) Value conflict <strong>an</strong>d thought-induced attitudech<strong>an</strong>ge. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 27(3):203–16. [aHM]Little, B. R. (1972) Psychological m<strong>an</strong> as scientist, hum<strong>an</strong>ist <strong>an</strong>d specialist. Journalof Experimental Research in Personality 6:95–118. [JAJ]Littlepage, G. E. & Mueller, A. L. (1997) Recognition <strong>an</strong>d utilization of expertise inproblem-solving groups: Expert characteristics <strong>an</strong>d behavior. Group Dynamics1(4):324–28. [aHM]Lombardelli, C., Proudm<strong>an</strong>, J. & Talbot, J. (2005) Committees versus individuals:An experimental <strong>an</strong>alysis of monetary policy decision-making. InternationalJournal of Central B<strong>an</strong>king 1(1):181–205. [aHM]Lord, C. G., Ross, L. & Lepper, M. R. (1979) Biased assimilation <strong>an</strong>d attitudepolarization: The effects of prior theories on subsequently considered evidence.Journal of Personality <strong>an</strong>d Social Psychology 37(11):2098–109.[aHM, JEO]Lucas, E. J. & Ball, L. J. (2005) Think-aloud protocols <strong>an</strong>d the selection task: Evidence<strong>for</strong> relev<strong>an</strong>ce effects <strong>an</strong>d rationalisation processes. Thinking <strong>an</strong>dReasoning 11(1):35–66. [aHM]Luna, B., Thulborn, K. R., Munoz, D. P., Merriam, E. P., Garver, K. E., Minshew,N.J., Keshav<strong>an</strong>, M. S., Genovese, C. R., Eddy, W. F. & Sweeney, J. A. (2001)Maturation of widely distributed brain function subserves cognitive development.NeuroImage 13(5):786–93. [DN]Maciejovsky, B. & Budescu, D. V. (2007) Collective induction without cooperation?Learning <strong>an</strong>d knowledge tr<strong>an</strong>sfer in cooperative groups <strong>an</strong>d competitive auctions.Journal of Personality <strong>an</strong>d Social Psychology 92(5):854–70. [aHM]Madsen, D. B. (1978) Issue import<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>an</strong>d group choice shifts: A persuasivearguments approach. Journal of Personality <strong>an</strong>d Social Psychology36(10):1118–27. [aHM]Mahoney, M. J. (1977) Publication prejudices: An experimental study of confirmatorybias in the peer review system. Cognitive Therapy <strong>an</strong>d Research1(2):161–75. [aHM]Mascaro, O. & Sperber, D. (2009) The moral, epistemic, <strong>an</strong>d mindreading componentsof children’s vigil<strong>an</strong>ce towards deception. Cognition 112(3):367–80.[arHM]Mathews, V. P., Kronenberger, W. G., W<strong>an</strong>g, Y., Lurito, J. T., Lowe, M. J. & Dunn,D. W. (2005) Media violence exposure <strong>an</strong>d frontal lobe activation measured byfunctional magnetic reson<strong>an</strong>ce imaging in aggressive <strong>an</strong>d nonaggressive a<strong>do</strong>lescents.Journal of Computer Assisted Tomography 29(3):287–92. [DN]Mazar, N., Amir, O. & Ariely, D. (2008) The dishonesty of honest people: A <strong>theory</strong>of self-concept mainten<strong>an</strong>ce. Journal of Marketing Research 45(6):633–44.[aHM]McGuire, T. W., Kiesler, S. & Siegel, J. (1987) Group <strong>an</strong>d computer-mediateddiscussion effects in risk decision making. Journal of Personality <strong>an</strong>d SocialPsychology 52(5):917–30. [aHM]McGuire, W. J. (1964) Inducing resist<strong>an</strong>ce to persuasion: Some contemporaryapproaches. In: Adv<strong>an</strong>ces in experimental social psychology, vol. 1, ed. L.Berkowitz. Academic Press. [aHM]McKenzie, C. R. M. (2004) Framing effects in inference tasks – <strong>an</strong>d why they’renormatively defensible. Memory & Cognition 32(6):874–85. [aHM]McKenzie, C. R. M. & Nelson, J. D. (2003) What a speaker’s choice of framereveals: Reference points, frame selection, <strong>an</strong>d framing effects. PsychonomicBulletin & Review 10(3):596–602. [aHM]McMackin, J. & Slovic, P. (2000) When <strong>do</strong>es explicit justification impair decisionmaking? Journal of Applied Cognitive Psychology 14(6):527–41. [aHM]Me<strong>an</strong>s, M. L. & Voss, J. F. (1996) Who <strong>reason</strong>s well? Two studies of in<strong>for</strong>mal<strong>reason</strong>ing among children of different grade, ability, <strong>an</strong>d knowledge levels.Cognition <strong>an</strong>d Instruction 14:139–78. [CRW]Mehl, M. R., Vazire, S., Ramírez-Esparza, N., Slatcher, R. B. & Pennebaker,J. W. (2007) Are women really more talkative th<strong>an</strong> men? Science 317:82.[J-LD]Mercier, H. (submitted a) Looking <strong>for</strong> arguments. [rHM]Mercier, H. (in press a) On the universality of <strong>argumentative</strong> <strong>reason</strong>ing. Journal ofCognition <strong>an</strong>d Culture. [arHM]Mercier, H. (in press b) Reasoning serves argumentation in children. CognitiveDevelopment. [rHM]Mercier, H. (in press c) What good is moral <strong>reason</strong>ing? Mind & Society. [rHM]Mercier, H. (submitted b) When experts argue: Explaining the best <strong>an</strong>d the worst of<strong>reason</strong>ing. [rHM]Mercier, H. & L<strong>an</strong>demore, H. (in press) Reasoning is <strong>for</strong> arguing: Underst<strong>an</strong>dingthe successes <strong>an</strong>d failures of deliberation. Political Psychology. [arHM]Mercier, H. & Sperber, D. (2009) Intuitive <strong>an</strong>d reflective inferences. In: In twominds: Dual processes <strong>an</strong>d beyond, ed. J. St. B. T. Ev<strong>an</strong>s & K. Fr<strong>an</strong>kish, pp.149–70. Ox<strong>for</strong>d University Press. [arHM]Michaelsen, L. K., Watson, W. E. & Black, R. H. (1989) A realistic test of individualversus group consensus decision making. Journal of Applied Psychology74(5):834–39. [aHM]Milch, K. F., Weber, E. U., Appelt, K. C., H<strong>an</strong>dgraaf, M. J. J. & Kr<strong>an</strong>tz, D. H.(2009) From individual preference construction to group decisions: Framingeffects <strong>an</strong>d group processes. Org<strong>an</strong>izational Behavior <strong>an</strong>d Hum<strong>an</strong> DecisionProcesses. [aHM]Mil<strong>for</strong>d, M. (2008) Robot navigation from nature: Simult<strong>an</strong>eous localisation,mapping, <strong>an</strong>d path pl<strong>an</strong>ning based on hippocampal models. Springer-Verlag. [JW]Mil<strong>for</strong>d, M. & Wyeth, G. (2003) Hippocampal models <strong>for</strong> simult<strong>an</strong>eous localisation<strong>an</strong>d mapping on <strong>an</strong> autonomous robot. In: Proceedings of the Australasi<strong>an</strong>Conference on Robotics <strong>an</strong>d Automation, Brisb<strong>an</strong>e, Australia. Available at:http://www.araa.asn.au/acra/acra2003/papers/35.pdf. [JW]Millar, M. G. & Tesser, A. (1986) Thought-induced attitude ch<strong>an</strong>ge: The effects ofschema structure <strong>an</strong>d commitment. Journal of Personality <strong>an</strong>d Social Psychology51(2):259–69. [aHM]Millar, M. G. & Tesser, A. (1989) The effects of affective-cognitive consistency <strong>an</strong>dthought on the attitude-behavior relation. Journal of Experimental SocialPsychology 25(2):189–202. [aHM]Miller, A. G., Michoskey, J. W., B<strong>an</strong>e, C. M. & Dowd, T. G. (1993) The attitudepolarization phenomenon: Role of response measure, attitude extremity, <strong>an</strong>dbehavioral consequences of reported attitude ch<strong>an</strong>ge. Journal of Personality<strong>an</strong>d Social Psychology 64(4):561–74. [aHM]Misak, C. (2009) Truth <strong>an</strong>d democarcy: Pragmatism <strong>an</strong>d the deliberative virtues. In:Does truth matter? Democracy <strong>an</strong>d public space, ed. R. Geenens & R. Tinnevelt,pp. 29–39. Springer. [KC-CW]Molden, D. C. & Higgins, E. T. (2005) Motivated thinking. In: The Cambridgeh<strong>an</strong>dbook of thinking <strong>an</strong>d <strong>reason</strong>ing, ed. K. Holyoak & R. Morrison. CambridgeUniversity Press. [aHM]Moore, A. B., Clark, B. A. & K<strong>an</strong>e, M. J. (2008) Who shalt not kill? Individualdifferences in working memory capacity, executive control, <strong>an</strong>d moral judgment.Psychological Science 19(6):549–57. [aHM]Moorhead, G., Ference, R. & Neck, C. P. (1991) Group decision fiascoes continue:Space shuttle Challenger <strong>an</strong>d a revised groupthink framework. Hum<strong>an</strong>Relations 44(6):539–50. [aHM]Morg<strong>an</strong>-Olsen, B. (2010) Conceptual exclusion <strong>an</strong>d public <strong>reason</strong>. Philosophy of theSocial Sciences 40(2):213–43. [KC-CW]Morris, B. & Hasson, U. (2010) Multiple sources of competence underlying thecomprehension of inconsistencies: A developmental investigation. Journal ofExperimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, <strong>an</strong>d Cognition 36:277–87.[JEO]Mors<strong>an</strong>yi, K. & H<strong>an</strong>dley, S. J. (2008) How smart <strong>do</strong> you need to be to get it wrong?The role of cognitive capacity in the development of heuristic-based judgment.Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 99(1):18–36. [aHM]Moscovici, S. & Zavalloni, M. (1969) The group as a polarizer of attitudes. Journal ofPersonality <strong>an</strong>d Social Psychology 12:125–35. [RJS]Moser, E. I., Kropff, E. & Moser, M. B. (2008) Place cells, grid cells, <strong>an</strong>d the brain’sspatial representation system. Annual Review of Neuroscience 31:69–89.[JW]Moshm<strong>an</strong>, D. & Geil, M. (1998) Collaborative <strong>reason</strong>ing: Evidence <strong>for</strong> collectiverationality. Thinking <strong>an</strong>d Reasoning 4(3):231–48. [aHM]Narvaez, D. (2008) Triune ethics: The neurobiological roots of our multiple moralities.New Ideas in Psychology 26:95–119. [DN]Narvaez, D. (2010) Moral complexity: The fatal attraction of truthiness <strong>an</strong>d theimport<strong>an</strong>ce of mature moral functioning. Perspectives on Psychological Science5(2):163–81. [DN]Navarro, A. D. & F<strong>an</strong>tino, E. (2005) The sunk cost effect in pigeons <strong>an</strong>d <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong>.Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior 83(1):1–13. [aHM]Neum<strong>an</strong>, Y. (2003) Go ahead, prove that God <strong>do</strong>es not exist! On high school students’ability to deal with fallacious arguments. Learning <strong>an</strong>d Instruction13(4):367–80. [aHM]Neum<strong>an</strong>, Y., Weinstock, M. P. & Glasner, A. (2006) The effect of contextual factorson the judgment of in<strong>for</strong>mal <strong>reason</strong>ing fallacies. Quarterly Journal of ExperimentalPsychology, Section A: Hum<strong>an</strong> Experimental Psychology 59:411–25.[MH, arHM]BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2 107


References/Mercier & Sperber: <strong>Why</strong> <strong>do</strong> <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> <strong>reason</strong>?Newell, A. & Simon, H. A. (1956) The logic <strong>theory</strong> machine: A complex in<strong>for</strong>mationprocessing system. IRE Tr<strong>an</strong>sactions on In<strong>for</strong>mation Theory IT-2(3):61–79.[JW]Newell, B. R., Wong, K. Y., Cheung, J. C. H. & Rakow, T. (2009) Think, blink orsleep on it? The impact of modes of thought on complex decision making.Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 62(4):707–32. [aHM]Newstead, S. E., H<strong>an</strong>dley, S. J. & Buck, E. (1999) Falsifying mental models: Testingthe predictions of theories of syllogistic <strong>reason</strong>ing. Memory & Cognition27(2):344–54. [aHM]Nickerson, R. S. (1998) Confirmation bias: A ubiquitous phenomena in m<strong>an</strong>yguises. Review of General Psychology 2(2):175–220. [aHM, EJNS]Niv, Y. & Schoenbaum, G. (2008) Dialogues on prediction errors. Trends in CognitiveSciences 12(7):265–72. [aHM]Norenzay<strong>an</strong>, A., Smith, E. E., Kim, B. J. & Nisbett, R. E. (2002) Cultural preferences<strong>for</strong> <strong>for</strong>mal versus intuitive <strong>reason</strong>ing. Cognitive Science 26(5):653–84.[rHM]Novaes, C. D. (2005) Medieval obligationes as logical games of consistency mainten<strong>an</strong>ce.Synthese 145(3):371–95. [aHM]Nussbaum, E. M. (2008) Collaborative discourse, argumentation, <strong>an</strong>d learning:Preface <strong>an</strong>d literature review. Contemporary Educational Psychology33(3):345–59. [aHM]Nussbaum, E. M. & Sinatra, G. M. (2003) Argument <strong>an</strong>d conceptual engagement.Contemporary Educational Psychology 28(3):384–95. [aHM]O’Keefe, J. & Dostrovsky, J. (1971) The hippocampus as a spatial map: Preliminaryevidence from unit activity in the freely-moving rat. Brain Research 34(1):171–75. [JW]O’Keefe, J. & Nadel, L. (1978) The hippocampus as a cognitive map. Ox<strong>for</strong>d UniversityPress. [JW]Oaks<strong>for</strong>d, M. & Chater, N. (2007) Bayesi<strong>an</strong> rationality: The probabilistic approachto hum<strong>an</strong> <strong>reason</strong>ing. Ox<strong>for</strong>d University Press. [aHM, MO]Oaks<strong>for</strong>d, M. & Chater, N. (2009) The uncertain <strong>reason</strong>er: Bayes, logic, <strong>an</strong>drationality. Behavioral <strong>an</strong>d Brain Sciences 32:105–20. [JF]Oaks<strong>for</strong>d, M., Chater, N. & Grainger, R. (1999) Probabilistic effects in data selection.Thinking & Reasoning 5(3):193–243. [aHM]Oaks<strong>for</strong>d, M., Chater, N. & Larkin, J. (2000) Probabilities <strong>an</strong>d polarity biases inconditional inference. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory<strong>an</strong>d Cognition 26:883–99. [MO]Oaks<strong>for</strong>d, M. & Hahn, U. (2004) A Bayesi<strong>an</strong> approach to the argument fromignor<strong>an</strong>ce. C<strong>an</strong>adi<strong>an</strong> Journal of Experimental Psychology 58(2):75–85.[aHM]Oaks<strong>for</strong>d, M. & Hahn, U. (2007) Induction, deduction <strong>an</strong>d argument strength inhum<strong>an</strong> <strong>reason</strong>ing <strong>an</strong>d argumentation. In Inductive <strong>reason</strong>ing, ed. A. Feeney &E. Heit, pp. 269–301. Cambridge University Press. [MO]Okada, E. M. (2005) Justification effects on consumer choice of he<strong>do</strong>nic <strong>an</strong>d utilitari<strong>an</strong>goods. Journal of Marketing Research 42(1):43–53. [aHM]Okada, T. & Simon, H. A. (1997) Collaboration discovery in a scientific <strong>do</strong>main.Cognitive Science 21(2):109–46. [aHM]OpenClinical. (2001–2006) PRO<strong>for</strong>ma: Formal knowledge representation method<strong>for</strong> the development <strong>an</strong>d execution of clinical guidelines. Available at: http://www.openclinical.org/gmm_pro<strong>for</strong>ma.html. [JF]Ormerod, P. (2005) <strong>Why</strong> most things fail: Evolution, extinction <strong>an</strong>d economics.Faber & Faber. [aHM]Paese, P. W., Bieser, M. & Tubbs, M. E. (1993) Framing effects <strong>an</strong>d choice shifts ingroup decision making. Org<strong>an</strong>izational Behavior <strong>an</strong>d Hum<strong>an</strong> Decision Processes56(1):149–56. [aHM]Peirce, C. S. (1931–35) Collected papers of Charles S<strong>an</strong>ders Peirce. Harvard UniversityPress. [JW]Pennington, N. & Hastie, R. (1993) Reasoning in expl<strong>an</strong>ation-based decisionmaking.Cognition 49(1–2):123–63. [aHM]Perelm<strong>an</strong>, C. & Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1969) The new rhetoric: A treatise on argumentation.University of Notre Dame Press. [aHM, MO]Perkins, D. N. (1985) Postprimary education has little impact on in<strong>for</strong>mal <strong>reason</strong>ing.Journal of Educational Psychology 77(5):562–71. [aHM]Perkins, D. N., Allen, R. & Hafner, J. (1983) Difficulties in everyday <strong>reason</strong>ing. In:Thinking: The exp<strong>an</strong>ding frontier, ed. W. Maxwell, pp. 177–89. Fr<strong>an</strong>klinInstitute Press. [CRW]Perkins, D. N., Farady, M. & Bushey, B. (1991) Everyday <strong>reason</strong>ing <strong>an</strong>d the roots ofintelligence. In In<strong>for</strong>mal <strong>reason</strong>ing, ed. J. Voss, D. N. Perkins & J. Segal, pp.83–105. Erlbaum. [CRW]Petersen, M. B., Sell, A., Tooby, J. & Cosmides, L. (2010) Evolutionary psychology<strong>an</strong>d criminal justice: A recalibrational <strong>theory</strong> of punishment <strong>an</strong>d reconciliation.In: Hum<strong>an</strong> Morality <strong>an</strong>d Sociality, ed. H. Høgh-Olesen, pp. 72–131. PalgraveMacmill<strong>an</strong>. [DP]Petty, R. E. & Cacioppo, J. T. (1979) Issue involvement c<strong>an</strong> increase or decreasepersuasion by enh<strong>an</strong>cing message-relev<strong>an</strong>t cognitive responses. Journal ofPersonality <strong>an</strong>d Social Psychology 37(10):1915–26. [arHM, JSU]Petty, R. E. & Cacioppo, J. T. (1996) Attitudes <strong>an</strong>d persuasion: Classic <strong>an</strong>d contemporaryapproaches. Westview Press. [JEO]Petty, R., Cacioppo, J. & Goldm<strong>an</strong>, R. (1981) Personal involvement as a determin<strong>an</strong>tof argument-based persuasion. Journal of Personality <strong>an</strong>d Social Psychology41(5):847–55. [rHM]Petty, R. E. & Wegener, D. T. (1998) Attitude ch<strong>an</strong>ge: Multiple roles <strong>for</strong> persuasionvariables. In: The h<strong>an</strong>dbook of social psychology, vol. 1, ed. D. Gilbert, S. Fiske& G. Lindzey, pp. 323–90. McGraw-Hill. [aHM]Pietraszewski, D., Curry, O, Petersen, M. B. & Tooby, J. (in preparation) Politicserases race but not sex: Evidence that signals of political party support engagecoalitional psychology. [DP]Pinker, S. & Bloom, P. (1990) Natural l<strong>an</strong>guage <strong>an</strong>d natural selection. Behavioral<strong>an</strong>d Brain Sciences 13(4):707–84. [rHM]Poletiek, F. H. (1996) Para<strong>do</strong>xes of falsification. Quarterly Journal of ExperimentalPsychology, Section A: Hum<strong>an</strong> Experimental Psychology 49(2):447–62.[aHM, FHP]Poletiek, F. H. (2001) Hypothesis-testing behavior. Essays in Cognitive PsychologySeries. Psychology Press. [FHP]Poletiek, F. H. & Berndsen, M. (2000) Hypothesis testing as risk behavior withregard to beliefs. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 13:107–23. [FHP]Pomer<strong>an</strong>tz, E. M., Chaiken, S. & Tordesillas, R. S. (1995) Attitude strength <strong>an</strong>dresist<strong>an</strong>ce processes. Journal of Personality <strong>an</strong>d Social Psychology 69(3):408–19. [aHM]Powell, C. (2003) The Delphi technique: Myths <strong>an</strong>d realities. Journal of Adv<strong>an</strong>cedNursing 41(4):376–82. [aHM]Prasad, M., Perrin, A. J., Bezila, K., Hoffm<strong>an</strong>, S. G., Kindleberger, K., M<strong>an</strong>turuk, K.& Powers, A. (2009) “There must be a <strong>reason</strong>”: Osama, Saddam, <strong>an</strong>d inferredjustification. Sociological Inquiry 79(2):142–62. [aHM]Premack, D. & Woodruff, G. (1978) Does the chimp<strong>an</strong>zee have a <strong>theory</strong> of mind?Behavioral <strong>an</strong>d Brain Sciences 1(4):515–26. [aHM]Pritchard, D. (2005) Epistemic luck. Claren<strong>do</strong>n Press. [aHM]Pyszczynski, T. & Greenberg, J. (1987) Toward <strong>an</strong>d integration of cognitive <strong>an</strong>dmotivational perspectives on social inference: A biased hypothesis-testingmodel. In: Adv<strong>an</strong>ces in experimental social psychology, vol. 20, ed. L. Berkowitz,pp. 297–340. Academic Press. [aHM]Quayle, J. D. & Ball, L. J. (2000) Working memory, metacognitive uncertainty, <strong>an</strong>dbelief bias in syllogistic <strong>reason</strong>ing. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology,Section A: Hum<strong>an</strong> Experimental Psychology 53:1202–223. [EJNS]Rader, A. W. & Sloutsky, V. M. (2002) Processing of logically valid <strong>an</strong>d logicallyinvalid conditional inferences in discourse comprehension. Journal of ExperimentalPsychology: Learning, Memory, <strong>an</strong>d Cognition 28:59–68. [JSU]Ratneshwar, S., Shocker, A. D. & Stewart, D. W. (1987) Toward underst<strong>an</strong>ding theattraction effect: The implications of product stimulus me<strong>an</strong>ingfulness <strong>an</strong>dfamiliarity. Journal of Consumer Research 13(4):520–33. [aHM]Reb, J. (2005) The role of regret aversion in decision making. Unpublished <strong>do</strong>ctoraldissertation, University of Arizona, Tucson. [TC]Reb, J. (2008) Regret aversion <strong>an</strong>d decision process quality: Effects of regret salienceon decision process carefulness. Org<strong>an</strong>izational Behavior <strong>an</strong>d Hum<strong>an</strong>Decision Processes 105:169–82. [TC]Reb, J. & Connolly, T. (2010) The effects of action, normality, <strong>an</strong>d decision carefulnesson <strong>an</strong>ticipated regret: Evidence <strong>for</strong> a broad meditating role of decisionjustifiability. Cognition & Emotion 24:1405–20. [TC]Reb, J. & Connolly, T. (2009) Myopic regret avoid<strong>an</strong>ce in repeated decision making.Org<strong>an</strong>izational Behavior <strong>an</strong>d Hum<strong>an</strong> Decision Processes 109:182–89. [TC]Rec<strong>an</strong>ati, F. (2000) Oratio obliqua, oratio recta. MIT Press. [aHM]Redlawsk, D. P. (2002) Hot cognition or cool consideration? Testing the effects ofmotivated <strong>reason</strong>ing on political decision making. Journal of Politics64(4):1021–44. [aHM]Resnick, L. B., Salmon, M., Zeitz, C. M., Wathen, S. H. & Holowchak, M. (1993)Reasoning in conversation. Cognition <strong>an</strong>d Instruction 11(3–4):347–64. [aHM]Ricco, R. B. (2003) The macrostructure of in<strong>for</strong>mal arguments: A proposed model<strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>alysis. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, Section A: Hum<strong>an</strong>Experimental Psychology 56(6):1021–51. [aHM, MH]Rim, S., Min, K. E., Ulem<strong>an</strong>, J. S. & Chartr<strong>an</strong>d, T. L. (2010) A functional <strong>an</strong>alysis ofstages of spont<strong>an</strong>eous impression <strong>for</strong>mation, serving nonconscious affiliationgoals. Unpublished m<strong>an</strong>uscript. [JSU]Rim, S., Ulem<strong>an</strong>, J. S. & Trope, Y. (2009) Spont<strong>an</strong>eous trait inference <strong>an</strong>d construallevel <strong>theory</strong>: Psychological dist<strong>an</strong>ce increases nonconscious trait thinking.Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 45:1088–97. [JSU]Rips, L. J. (1994) The psychology of proof: Deductive <strong>reason</strong>ing in hum<strong>an</strong> thinking.MIT Press. [arHM]Rips, L. J. (1998) Reasoning <strong>an</strong>d conversation. Psychological Review 105(3):411–41. [aHM]Rips, L. J. (2002) Circular <strong>reason</strong>ing. Cognitive Science 26(6):767–95. [MH, arHM]Ritchart, R. & Perkins, D. N. (2005) Learning to think: The challenges of teachingthinking. In: The Cambridge h<strong>an</strong>dbook of thinking <strong>an</strong>d <strong>reason</strong>ing, ed.K. Holyoak & R. Morrison. Cambridge University Press. [aHM]Roberts, M. J. & Newton, E. J. (2001) Inspection times, the ch<strong>an</strong>ge task, <strong>an</strong>d therapid response selection task. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology,Section A: Hum<strong>an</strong> Experimental Psychology 54(4):1031–48. [aHM]108 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2


References/Mercier & Sperber: <strong>Why</strong> <strong>do</strong> <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> <strong>reason</strong>?Ross, L., Lepper, M. R. & Hubbard, M. (1975) Persever<strong>an</strong>ce in self-perception <strong>an</strong>dsocial perception: Biased attributional processes in the debriefing paradigm.Journal of Personality <strong>an</strong>d Social Psychology 32(5):880–92. [aHM]Ross, M., McFarl<strong>an</strong>d, C. & Fletcher, G. J. (1981) The effect of attitude on the recallof personal histories. Journal of Personality <strong>an</strong>d Social Psychology 40(4):627–34. [aHM]Rowe, G. & Wright, G. (1999) The Delphi technique as a <strong>for</strong>ecasting tool: Issues<strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>alysis. International Journal of Forecasting 15(4):353–75. [aHM]Rozin, P., Millm<strong>an</strong>, L. & Nemeroff, C. (1986) Operation of the laws of sympatheticmagic in disgust <strong>an</strong>d other <strong>do</strong>mains. Journal of Personality <strong>an</strong>d Social Psychology50(4):703–12. [aHM]Russo, J. E., Carlson, K. A. & Meloy, M. G. (2006) Choosing <strong>an</strong> inferior alternative.Psychological Science 17(10):899–904. [aHM]Ry<strong>an</strong>, W. (1971) Blaming the victim. P<strong>an</strong>theon. [aHM]Ryfe, D. M. (2005) Does deliberative democracy work? Annual Review of PoliticalScience 8:49–71. [KC-CW]Sá, W. C., Kelley, C. N., Ho, C. & St<strong>an</strong>ovich, K. E. (2005) Thinking about personaltheories: Individual differences in the coordination of <strong>theory</strong> <strong>an</strong>d evidence.Personality <strong>an</strong>d Individual Differences 38(5):1149–61. [MH, arHM]Sacco, K. & Bucciarelli, M. (2008) The role of cognitive <strong>an</strong>d socio-cognitive conflictin learning to <strong>reason</strong>. Mind & Society 7(1):1–19. [aHM]Sadler, O. & Tesser, A. (1973) Some effects of salience <strong>an</strong>d time upon interpersonalhostility <strong>an</strong>d attraction during social isolation. Sociometry 36(1):99–112.[aHM]Sahlins, M. (2008) The Western illusion of hum<strong>an</strong> nature. Prickly Paradigm Press.[DN]S<strong>an</strong>itioso, R., Kunda, Z. & Fong, G. T. (1990) Motivated recruitment of autobiographicalmemories. Journal of Personality <strong>an</strong>d Social Psychology 59(2):229–41. [aHM]Savage, L. J. (1954) The foundations of statistics. Wiley. [aHM]Schaie, K. W. & Willis, S. L. (2010) H<strong>an</strong>dbook of the psychology of aging, 7thedition. Academic Press. [DN]Scheibehenne, B., Greifeneder, R. & Todd, P. M. (2009) What moderates the toomuch-choiceeffect? Psychology & Marketing 26(3):229–53. [aHM]Schulz-Hardt, S., Brodbeck, F. C., Mojzisch, A., Kerschreiter, R. & Frey, D. (2006)Group decision making in hidden profile situations: Dissent as a facilitator <strong>for</strong>decision quality. Journal of Personality <strong>an</strong>d Social Psychology 91(6):1080–93. [aHM]Schweitzer, M. E. & Hsee, C. K. (2002) Stretching the truth: Elastic justification<strong>an</strong>d motivated communication of uncertain in<strong>for</strong>mation. Journal of Risk <strong>an</strong>dUncertainty 25(2):185–201. [aHM]Sela, A., Berger, J. & Liu, W. (2009) Variety, vice, <strong>an</strong>d virtue: How assortment sizeinfluences option choice. Journal of Consumer Research. 35(6): 941–51.[aHM]Sell, A. (2006) Regulating welfare tradeoff ratios: Three tests of <strong>an</strong> evolutionarycomputationalmodel of hum<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>ger. Dissertation Abstracts International:Section B: The Sciences <strong>an</strong>d Engineering 66(8-B):4516. [rHM, DP]Sengupta, J. & Fitzsimons, G. J. (2000) The effects of <strong>an</strong>alyzing <strong>reason</strong>s <strong>for</strong> br<strong>an</strong>dpreferences: Disruption or rein<strong>for</strong>cement? Journal of Marketing Research37(3):318–30. [aHM]Sengupta, J. & Fitzsimons, G. J. (2004) The effect of <strong>an</strong>alyzing <strong>reason</strong>s on thestability of br<strong>an</strong>d attitudes: A reconciliation of opposing predictions. Journal ofConsumer Research 31(3):705–11. [aHM]Shafir, E. & Tversky, A. (1992) Thinking through uncertainty: Nonconsequential<strong>reason</strong>ing <strong>an</strong>d choice. Cognitive Psychology 24(4):449–74. [TC, aHM]Shafir, E., Simonson, I. & Tversky, A. (1993) Reason-based choice. Cognition 49(1–2):11–36. [aHM]Shaw, V. F. (1996) The cognitive processes in in<strong>for</strong>mal <strong>reason</strong>ing. Thinking &Reasoning 2:51–80. [MH, aHM]Simon, H. A. (1955) A behavioral model of rational choice. Quarterly Journal ofEconomics 69(1):99–118. [aHM]Simonson, I. (1989) Choice based on <strong>reason</strong>s: The case of attraction <strong>an</strong>dcompromise effects. Journal of Consumer Research 16(2):158–74.[TC, aHM]Simonson, I. (1990) The effect of purchase qu<strong>an</strong>tity <strong>an</strong>d timing on variety-seekingbehavior. Journal of Marketing Research 27(2):150–62. [aHM]Simonson, I., Carmon, Z. & O’Curry, S. (1994) Experimental evidence on thenegative effect of product features <strong>an</strong>d sales promotions on br<strong>an</strong>d choice.Marketing Science 13(1):23–40. [aHM]Simonson, I. & Nowlis, S. M. (2000) The role of expl<strong>an</strong>ations <strong>an</strong>d need <strong>for</strong>uniqueness in consumer decision making: Unconventional choices based on<strong>reason</strong>s. Journal of Consumer Research 27(1):49–68. [aHM]Simonson, I., Nowlis, S. M. & Simonson, Y. (1993) The effect of irrelev<strong>an</strong>t preferencearguments on consumer choice. Journal of Consumer Psychology2(3):287–306. [aHM]Simonson, I. & Nye, P. (1992) The effect of accountability on susceptibility todecision errors. Org<strong>an</strong>izational Behavior <strong>an</strong>d Hum<strong>an</strong> Decision Processes51:416–46. [TC, aHM]Skowronski, J. J., Carlston, D. E., Mae, L. & Craw<strong>for</strong>d, M. T. (1998) Spont<strong>an</strong>eoustrait tr<strong>an</strong>sference: Communicators take on the qualities they describe inothers. Journal of Personality <strong>an</strong>d Social Psychology 74:837–48. [JSU]Slaughter, J. E., Bagger, J. & Li, A. (2006) Context effects on group-based employeeselection decisions. Org<strong>an</strong>izational Behavior <strong>an</strong>d Hum<strong>an</strong> Decision Processes100: 47–59. [TC]Slavin, R. E. (1995) Cooperative learning: Theory, research <strong>an</strong>d practice, 2nd ed.Allyn & Bacon. [aHM]Slom<strong>an</strong>, S. A. (1996) The empirical case <strong>for</strong> two systems of <strong>reason</strong>ing. PsychologicalBulletin 119(1):3–22. [aHM]Slovic, P. (1975) Choice between equally valued alternatives. Journal of ExperimentalPsychology: Hum<strong>an</strong> Perception <strong>an</strong>d Per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce 1:280–87.[TC, aHM]Smith, J. A., Weber, E. U., Appelt, K. C. & Milch, K. F. (2009) Querying the groupmind: Applying query <strong>theory</strong> to group discussions. Poster presented at theAnnual Meeting of the Society <strong>for</strong> Judgment <strong>an</strong>d Decision Making, Boston.[EUW]Smith, M. K., Wood, W. B., Adams, W. K., Wiem<strong>an</strong>, C., Knight, J. K., Guild, N. &Su, T. T. (2009) <strong>Why</strong> peer discussion improves student per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce on inclassconcept questions. Science 323(5910):122–24. [aHM]Smith, S. M., Fabrigar, L. R. & Norris, M. E. (2008) Reflecting on six decades ofselective exposure research: Progress, challenges, <strong>an</strong>d opportunities. Social<strong>an</strong>d Personality Psychology Compass 2(1):464–93. [aHM]Sniezek, J. A. & Henry, R. A. (1989) Accuracy <strong>an</strong>d confidence in group judgment.Org<strong>an</strong>izational Behavior <strong>an</strong>d Hum<strong>an</strong> Decision Processes 43(1):1–28. [aHM]Snyder, M., Kleck, R. E., Strenta, A. & Mentzer, S. J. (1979) Avoid<strong>an</strong>ce of theh<strong>an</strong>dicapped: An attributional ambiguity <strong>an</strong>alysis. Journal of Personality <strong>an</strong>dSocial Psychology 37(12):2297–306. [aHM]Som<strong>an</strong>, D. & Cheema, A. (2001) The effect of windfall gains on the sunk-cost effect.Marketing Letters 12(1):51–62. [aHM]Spelke, E. S. & Kinzler, K. D. (2007) Core knowledge. Developmental Science10(1):89–96. [aHM]Sperber, D. (1997) Intuitive <strong>an</strong>d reflective beliefs. Mind <strong>an</strong>d L<strong>an</strong>guage 12(1):67–83. [aHM]Sperber, D. (2000a) Metarepresentations in <strong>an</strong> evolutionary perspective. In:Metarepresentations: A multidisciplinary perspective, ed. D. Sperber, pp.117–37. Ox<strong>for</strong>d University Press. [aHM]Sperber, D., ed. (2000b) Metarepresentations: A multidisciplinary perspective.Ox<strong>for</strong>d University Press. [aHM]Sperber, D. (2001) An evolutionary perspective on testimony <strong>an</strong>d argumentation.Philosophical Topics 29:401–13. [aHM]Sperber, D. (2009) L’effet gourou. L’autre côté 1:17–23. [rHM]Sperber, D., Cara, F. & Girotto, V. (1995) Relev<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>theory</strong> explains the selectiontask. Cognition 57(1):31–95. [aHM]Sperber, D., Clément, F., Heintz, C., Mascaro, O., Mercier, H., Origgi, G. &Wilson, D. (2010) Epistemic vigil<strong>an</strong>ce. Mind & L<strong>an</strong>guage 25(4):359–93.[arHM]Sperber, D. & Wilson, D. (1995) Relev<strong>an</strong>ce: Communication <strong>an</strong>d cognition, 2nd ed.Blackwell. [rHM]Sperber, D. & Wilson, D. (2002) Pragmatics, modularity <strong>an</strong>d mind-reading. Mind<strong>an</strong>d L<strong>an</strong>guage 17(1–2):3–23. [aHM]St<strong>an</strong>ovich, K. E. (1993) Dysrationalia: A new specific learning disability. Journal ofLearning Disabilities 26(8):501–15. [RJS]St<strong>an</strong>ovich, K. E. (1999) Who is rational? Studies of individual differences in<strong>reason</strong>ing. Erlbaum. [JStBTE, KF]St<strong>an</strong>ovich, K. E. (2004) The robot’s rebellion: Finding me<strong>an</strong>ing the age of Darwin.Chicago University Press. [JStBTE, aHM]St<strong>an</strong>ovich, K. E. (2009) What intelligence tests miss: The psychology of rationalthought. Yale University Press. [JStBTE, RJS]St<strong>an</strong>ovich, K. E. (2010) Rationality <strong>an</strong>d the reflective mind. Ox<strong>for</strong>d UniversityPress. [JStBTE]St<strong>an</strong>ovich, K. E. & West, R. F. (1998) Individual differences in rational thought.Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 127(2):161–88. [aHM]St<strong>an</strong>ovich, K. E. & West, R. F. (2000) Individual differences in <strong>reason</strong>ing: Implications<strong>for</strong> the rationality debate? Behavioral <strong>an</strong>d Brain Sciences 23:645–65.[EJNS]St<strong>an</strong>ovich, K. E. & West, R. F. (2003) Evolutionary versus instrumental goals: Howevolutionary psychology misconceives hum<strong>an</strong> rationality. In: Evolution <strong>an</strong>d thepsychology of thinking, ed. D. E. Over, pp. 171–230. Psychology Press.[JStBTE]St<strong>an</strong>ovich, K. E. & West, R. F. (2007) Natural myside bias is independent of cognitiveability. Thinking & Reasoning 13(3):225–47. [aHM]St<strong>an</strong>ovich, K. E. & West, R. F. (2008a) On the failure of cognitive ability to predictmyside <strong>an</strong>d one-sided thinking biases. Thinking & Reasoning 14(2):129–67.[aHM]St<strong>an</strong>ovich, K. E. & West, R. F. (2008b) On the relative independence of thinkingbiases <strong>an</strong>d cognitive ability. Journal of Personality <strong>an</strong>d Social Psychology94(4):672–95. [aHM]BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2 109


References/Mercier & Sperber: <strong>Why</strong> <strong>do</strong> <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> <strong>reason</strong>?Stasson, M. F., Kameda, T., Parks, C. D., Zimmerm<strong>an</strong>, S. K. & Davis, J. H. (1991)Effects of assigned group consensus requirement on group problem solving<strong>an</strong>d group members’ learning. Social Psychology Quarterly 54(1):25–35.[aHM]Staw, B. M. (1981) The escalation of commitment to a course of action. Academy ofM<strong>an</strong>agement Review 6(4):577–87. [aHM]Stein, N. L. Bernas, R. S. & Calicchia, D. J. (1997) Conflict talk: Underst<strong>an</strong>ding <strong>an</strong>dresolving arguments. In: Conversation: Cognitive, communicative, <strong>an</strong>d socialperspectives, ed. T. Givon, pp. 233–68. John Benjamins. [aHM]Stein, N. L., Bernas, R. S., Calicchia, D. J. & Wright, A. (1996) Underst<strong>an</strong>ding <strong>an</strong>dresolving arguments: The dynamics of negotiation. In: Models of underst<strong>an</strong>dingtext, ed. B. Britton & A. G. Graesser, pp. 257–88. Erlbaum. [aHM]Steiner, I. D. (1972) Group processes <strong>an</strong>d productivity. Academic Press. [aHM]Sterelny, K. (in press) The evolved apprentice. MIT Press. [aHM]Sternberg, R. J., ed. (2002) <strong>Why</strong> smart people c<strong>an</strong> be so stupid. Yale UniversityPress. [RJS]Sternberg, R. J., Reznitskaya, A. & Jarvin, L. (2007) Teaching <strong>for</strong> wis<strong>do</strong>m: Whatmatters is not just what students know, but how they use it. Lon<strong>do</strong>n Review ofEducation 5(2):143–58. [RJS]Stupple, E. J. N. & Ball, L. J. (2008) Belief-logic conflict resolution in syllogistic<strong>reason</strong>ing: Inspection-time evidence <strong>for</strong> a parallel-process model. Thinking &Reasoning 14:168–81. [EJNS]Sunstein, C. R. (2002) The law of group polarization. Journal of Political Philosophy10(2):175–95. [aHM]Swinney, D. (1979) Lexical access during sentence comprehension: (Re)considerationof context effects. Journal of Verbal Learning <strong>an</strong>d Verbal Behavior18:645–60. [JSU]Taber, C. S. & Lodge, M. (2006) Motivated skepticism in the evaluation of politicalbeliefs. Americ<strong>an</strong> Journal of Political Science 50(3):755–69. [aHM]Taleb, N. N. (2007) The black sw<strong>an</strong>: The impact of the highly improbable. R<strong>an</strong><strong>do</strong>mHouse. [aHM]Talisse, R. B. (2009) Folk epistemology <strong>an</strong>d the justification of democracy. In: Doestruth matter? Democracy <strong>an</strong>d public space, ed. R. Geenens & R. Tinnevelt, pp.41–54. Springer. [KC-CW]Taube, J. S., Muller, R. U. & R<strong>an</strong>ck, J. B., Jr. (1990) Head-direction cells recordedfrom the postsubiculum in freely moving rats. I. Description <strong>an</strong>d qu<strong>an</strong>titative<strong>an</strong>alysis. Journal of Neuroscience 10(2):420–35. [JW]Tesser, A. (1976) Attitude polarization as a function of thought <strong>an</strong>d reality constraints.Journal of Research in Personality 10(2):183–94. [aHM]Tesser, A. & Conlee, M. C. (1975) Some effects of time <strong>an</strong>d thought on attitudepolarization. Journal of Personality <strong>an</strong>d Social Psychology 31(2):262–70.[aHM]Tesser, A. & Leone, C. (1977) Cognitive schemas <strong>an</strong>d thought as determin<strong>an</strong>ts ofattitude ch<strong>an</strong>ge. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 13(4):340–56.[aHM]Tetlock, P. E. (1998) Close-call counterfactuals <strong>an</strong>d belief-system defenses: I wasnot almost wrong but I was almost right. Journal of Personality <strong>an</strong>d SocialPsychology 75(3):639–52. [aHM]Tetlock, P. E. & Boettger, R. (1989) Accountability: A social magnifier of thedilution effect. Journal of Personality <strong>an</strong>d Social Psychology 57(3):388–98.[aHM]Tetlock, P. E., Lerner, J. S. & Boettger, R. (1996) The dilution effect: Judgmentalbias, conversational convention, or a bit of both? Europe<strong>an</strong> Journal of SocialPsychology 26(6):915–34. [aHM]Tetlock, P. E., Skitka, L. & Boettger, R. (1989) Social <strong>an</strong>d cognitive strategies <strong>for</strong>coping with accountability: Con<strong>for</strong>mity, complexity, <strong>an</strong>d bolstering. Journal ofPersonality <strong>an</strong>d Social Psychology 57(4):632–40. [aHM]Thoma, S. J. & Bebeau, M. (2008) Moral Judgment competency is declining overtime: Evidence from 20 years of defining issues test data. Paper presented tothe Americ<strong>an</strong> Educational Research Association, New York. [DN]Thompson, D. F. (2008) Deliberative democratic <strong>theory</strong> <strong>an</strong>d empirical politicalscience. Annual Review of Political Science 11:497–520. [KC-CW]Thompson, D. V., Hamilton, R. W. & Rust, R. T. (2005a) Feature fatigue: Whenproduct capabilities become too much of a good thing. Journal of MarketingResearch 42(4):431–42. [aHM]Thompson, D. V. & Norton, M. I. (2008) The social utility of feature creep. In:Adv<strong>an</strong>ces in consumer research, vol. 35, ed. A. Lee & D. Som<strong>an</strong>, pp. 181–84.Association <strong>for</strong> Consumer Research. [aHM]Thompson, V. A., Ev<strong>an</strong>s, J. St. B. T. & H<strong>an</strong>dley, S. J. (2005b) Persuading <strong>an</strong>d dissuadingby conditional argument. Journal of Memory <strong>an</strong>d L<strong>an</strong>guage53(2):238–57. [MH, arHM]Thompson, V. A., Newstead, S. E. & Morley, N. J. (2010) Metho<strong>do</strong>logical <strong>an</strong>dtheoretical issues in belief-bias: Implications <strong>for</strong> dual process theories. In: Thescience of <strong>reason</strong>: A festschrift <strong>for</strong> Jonath<strong>an</strong> St. B. T. Ev<strong>an</strong>s, ed. K. I. M<strong>an</strong>ktelow,D. E. Over & S. Elqayam, pp. 309–37. Psychology Press. [EJNS]Thompson, V. A., Striemer, C. L., Reikoff, R., Gunter, R. W. & Campbell, J. I. D.(2003) Syllogistic <strong>reason</strong>ing time: Disconfirmation disconfirmed. PsychonomicBulletin & Review 10(1):184–89. [aHM, EJNS]Thorsteinson, T. J. & Withrow, S. (2009) Does unconscious thought outper<strong>for</strong>mconscious thought on complex decisions? A further examination. Judgment <strong>an</strong>dDecision Making 4(3):235–47. [aHM]Thrun, S. (2003) Robotic mapping: A survey. In: Exploring artificial intelligence inthe new millennium, ed. G. Lakemeyer & B. Nebel, pp. 1–36. Morg<strong>an</strong> Kaufm<strong>an</strong>n.[JW]Tichy, G. (2004) The over-optimism among experts in assessment <strong>an</strong>d <strong>for</strong>esight.Technological Forecasting & Social Ch<strong>an</strong>ge 71(4):341–63. [aHM]Tindale, R. S. & Sheffey, S. (2002) Shared in<strong>for</strong>mation, cognitive load, <strong>an</strong>d groupmemory. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 5(1):5–18. [aHM]To<strong>do</strong>rov, A. & Ulem<strong>an</strong>, J. S. (2002) Spont<strong>an</strong>eous trait inferences are bound toactors: Evidence from false recognition. Journal of Personality <strong>an</strong>d SocialPsychology 83:1051–65. [JSU]Tolm<strong>an</strong>, E. C. (1948) Cognitive maps in rats <strong>an</strong>d men. Psychological Review55(4):189–208. [JW]Tolmie, A., Howe, C., Mackenzie, M. & Greer, K. (1993) Task design as <strong>an</strong> influenceon dialogue <strong>an</strong>d learning: Primary school group work with object flotation.Social Development 2(3):183–201. [aHM]Tomasello, M., Carpenter, M., Call, J., Behne, T. & Moll, H. (2005) Underst<strong>an</strong>ding<strong>an</strong>d sharing intentions: The origins of cultural cognition. Behavioral <strong>an</strong>d BrainSciences 28(5):675–91. [aHM]Tomkins, S. S. (1965) Affect <strong>an</strong>d the psychology of knowledge. In: Affect, cognition,<strong>an</strong>d personality: Empirical studies, ed. S. S. Tomkins & C. E. Izard, pp. 72–97.Springer. [JAJ]Tooby, J., Cosmides, L., Sell, A., Lieberm<strong>an</strong>, D. & Sznycer, D. (2008) Internalregulatory variables <strong>an</strong>d the design of hum<strong>an</strong> motivation: A computational <strong>an</strong>devolutionary approach. In: H<strong>an</strong>dbook of approach <strong>an</strong>d avoid<strong>an</strong>ce motivation,ed. A. Elliot, pp. 251–71. Psychology Press. [DP]Toplak, M. E. & St<strong>an</strong>ovich, K. E. (2003) Associations between myside bias on <strong>an</strong>in<strong>for</strong>mal <strong>reason</strong>ing task <strong>an</strong>d amount of post-secondary education. AppliedCognitive Psychology 17:851–60. [CRW]Trognon, A. (1993) How <strong>do</strong>es the process of interaction work when two interlocutorstry to resolve a logical problem? Cognition <strong>an</strong>d Instruction 11(3–4):325–45. [aHM]Tversky, A. & Kahnem<strong>an</strong>, D. (1981) The framing of decisions <strong>an</strong>d the psychology ofchoice. Science 211(4481):453–58. [aHM]Tversky, A. & Kahnem<strong>an</strong>, D. (1983) Extensional versus intuitive <strong>reason</strong>ing: Theconjunction fallacy in probability judgment. Psychological Review 90(4):293–315. [aHM]Tversky, A. & Shafir, E. (1992) The disjunction effect in choice under uncertainty.Psychological Science 3(5):305–309. [aHM]Tversky, A., Sattath, S. & Slovic, P. (1988) Contingent weighting in judgment <strong>an</strong>dchoice. Psychological Review 95(3):371–84. [aHM]Twardy, C. R. (2004) Argument maps improve critical thinking. Teaching Philosophy27:95–116. [MH]Tweney, R. D., Doherty, M. E., Worner, W. J., Pliske, D. B., Mynatt, C. R., Gross,K. A. & Arkkelin, D. L. (1980) Strategies of rule discovery in <strong>an</strong> inference task.Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 32(1):109–23. [aHM]Twenge, J. & Campbell, R. (2009) The narcissism epidemic: Living in the age ofentitlement. Free Press. [DN]Ulem<strong>an</strong>, J. S. (2005) On the inherent ambiguity of traits <strong>an</strong>d other mental concepts.In: Other minds: How <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> bridge the divide between self <strong>an</strong>d others, ed. B.F. Malle & S. D. Hodges, pp. 253–67. Guil<strong>for</strong>d. [JSU]Ulem<strong>an</strong>, J. S., Newm<strong>an</strong>, L. S. & Moskowitz, G. B. (1996) People as flexibleinterpreters: evidence <strong>an</strong>d issues from spont<strong>an</strong>eous trait inference. In:Adv<strong>an</strong>ces in experimental social psychology, vol. 28, ed. M. P. Z<strong>an</strong>na, pp. 211–79. Academic Press. [JSU]Ulem<strong>an</strong>, J. S., Saribay, S. A. & Gonzalez, C. (2008) Spont<strong>an</strong>eous inferences, implicitimpressions, <strong>an</strong>d implicit theories. Annual Review of Psychology 59:329–60.[JSU]Valdesolo, P. & DeSteno, D. (2008) The duality of virtue: Deconstructing the moralhypocrite. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 44(5):1334–38. [aHM]v<strong>an</strong> Boxtel, C., v<strong>an</strong> der Linden, J. & K<strong>an</strong>selaar, G. (2000) Collaborative learningtasks <strong>an</strong>d the elaboration of conceptual knowledge. Learning <strong>an</strong>d Instruction10(4):311–30. [aHM]V<strong>an</strong> Gelder, T. (2005) Teaching critical thinking: Some lessons from cognitivescience. College Teaching 53:41–46. [MH]V<strong>an</strong> Gelder, T., Bissett, M. & Cumming, G. (2004) Cultivating expertise in in<strong>for</strong>mal<strong>reason</strong>ing. C<strong>an</strong>adi<strong>an</strong> Journal of Experimental Psychology 58:142–52. [MH]Vinokur, A. (1971) Review <strong>an</strong>d theoretical <strong>an</strong>alysis of the effects of group processesupon individual <strong>an</strong>d group decisions involving risk. Psychological Bulletin76(4):231–50. [aHM]Vinokur, A. & Burnstein, E. (1978) Depolarization of attitudes in groups. Journal ofPersonality <strong>an</strong>d Social Psychology 36(8):872–85. [aHM]Voss, J. F. & V<strong>an</strong> Dyke, J. A. (2001) Argumentation in psychology: Backgroundcomments. Discourse Processes 32:89–111. [CRW]Vygotsky, L. (1978) Mind in society: The development of higher psychologicalprocesses. Harvard University Press. [DK]110 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2


References/Mercier & Sperber: <strong>Why</strong> <strong>do</strong> <strong>hum<strong>an</strong>s</strong> <strong>reason</strong>?Vygotsky, L. (1986) Thought <strong>an</strong>d l<strong>an</strong>guage. Tr<strong>an</strong>s. A. Kozulin. MIT Press. (Originalwork published 1934.) [PG-S]Wason, P. C. (1960) On the failure to eliminate hypotheses in a conceptual task.Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, Section A: Hum<strong>an</strong> ExperimentalPsychology 12(3):129–37. [aHM, FHP]Wason, P. C. (1966) Reasoning. In: New horizons in psychology: I, ed. B. M. Foss,pp. 106–37. Penguin. [aHM]Wason, P. C. & Ev<strong>an</strong>s, J. St. B. T. (1975) Dual processes in <strong>reason</strong>ing? Cognition3:141–54. [JStBTE, aHM]Webb, N. M. & Palinscar, A. S. (1996) Group processes in the classroom. In:H<strong>an</strong>dbook of educational psychology, ed. D. C. Berliner & R. C. Calfee, pp.841–73. Prentice-Hall. [aHM]Weber, E. U. & Johnson, E. J. (2006) Constructing preferences from memory. In:The construction of preference, ed. S. Lichtenstein & P. Slovic, pp. 397–410.Cambridge University Press. [EUW]Weber, E. U. & Johnson, E. J. (2009) Mindful judgment <strong>an</strong>d decision making.Annual Review of Psychology 60:53–86. [EUW]Weber, E. U., Johnson, E. J., Milch, K. F., Ch<strong>an</strong>g, H., Brodscholl, J. & Goldstein,D. G. (2007) Asymmetric discounting in intertemporal choice: A query <strong>theory</strong>account. Psychological Science 18(6):516–23. [aHM, EUW]Weinstock, M., Neum<strong>an</strong>, Y. & Tabak, I. (2004) Missing the point or missing the norms?Epistemological norms as predictors of students’ ability to identify fallaciousarguments. Contemporary Educational Psychology 29(1):77–94. [MH, aHM]Wetherick, N. E. (1962) Eliminative <strong>an</strong>d enumerative behavior in a conceptual task.Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, Section A: Hum<strong>an</strong> ExperimentalPsychology 14:246–49. [FHP]Whiten, A. & Byrne, R. W., eds. (1997) Machiavelli<strong>an</strong> intelligence II: Extensions<strong>an</strong>d evaluations. Cambridge University Press. [aHM]Willingham, D. T. (2008) Critical thinking: <strong>Why</strong> is it so hard to teach? Arts EducationPolicy Review 109(4):21–32. [aHM]Wilson, T. D., Dunn, D. S., Bybee, J. A., Hym<strong>an</strong>, D. B. & Roton<strong>do</strong>, J. A. (1984)Effects of <strong>an</strong>alyzing <strong>reason</strong>s on attitude-behavior consistency. Journal of Personality<strong>an</strong>d Social Psychology 47(1):5–16. [aHM]Wilson, T. D., Dunn, D. S., Kraft, D. & Lisle, D. J. (1989a) Introspection, attitudech<strong>an</strong>ge, <strong>an</strong>d attitude-behavior consistency: The disruptive effects of explainingwhy we feel the way we <strong>do</strong>. In: Adv<strong>an</strong>ces in experimental social psychology, vol.19, ed. L. Berkowitz, pp. 123–205. Academic Press. [aHM]Wilson, T. D., Kraft, D. & Dunn, D. S. (1989b) The disruptive effects of explainingattitudes: The moderating effect of knowledge about the attitude object.Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 25(5):379–400. [aHM]Wilson, T. D. & LaFleur, S. J. (1995) Knowing what you’ll <strong>do</strong>: Effects of <strong>an</strong>alyzing<strong>reason</strong>s on self-prediction. Journal of Personality <strong>an</strong>d Social Psychology68(1):21–35. [aHM]Wilson, T. D., Lisle, D. J., Schooler, J. W., Hodges, S. D., Klaaren, K. J. & LaFleur,S. J. (1993) Introspecting about <strong>reason</strong>s c<strong>an</strong> reduce post-choicesatisfaction. Personality <strong>an</strong>d Social Psychology Bulletin 19(3):331–39.[aHM]Wilson, T. D. & Schooler, J. W. (1991) Thinking too much: Introspection c<strong>an</strong>reduce the quality of preferences <strong>an</strong>d decisions. Thinking 60(2):181–92.[aHM]Wolfe, C. R., Albrecht, M. J. & Britt, M. A. (2007) Any <strong>reason</strong> is better th<strong>an</strong> none:Implausible <strong>reason</strong>s in argumentation. Paper presented at the 48th AnnualMeeting of the Psychonomic Society, Long Beach, CA. [CRW]Wolfe, C. R. & Boone, W. J. (under review) Individual differences in the “MySidebias” in <strong>reason</strong>ing <strong>an</strong>d argumentation. [CRW]Wolfe, C. R. & Britt, M. A. (2005) The use of other side in<strong>for</strong>mation: Explaining themyside bias in argumentation. Paper presented at the 46th Annual Meeting ofthe Psychonomic Society, Toronto, C<strong>an</strong>ada. [CRW]Wolfe, C. R. & Britt, M. A. (2008) Locus of the my-side bias in written argumentation.Thinking & Reasoning 14(1):1–27. [rHM, CRW]Wolfe, C. R. & Britt, M. A. (2009) Individual differences in the “myside bias” in<strong>reason</strong>ing <strong>an</strong>d argumentation. Paper presented at the 50th Annual Meeting ofthe Psychonomic Society, Boston, MA. [CRW]Wolfe, C. R., Britt, M. A. & Butler, J. A. (2009a) Argumentation schema <strong>an</strong>d themyside bias in written argumentation. Written Communication 26:183–209.[CRW]Wolfe, C. R., Britt, M. A., Petrovic, M., Albrecht, M. & Kopp, K. (2009b) Theefficacy of a Web-based counterargument tutor. Behavior Research Methods41:691–98. [CRW]Wolpert, D. M. & Kawato, M. (1998) Multiple paired <strong>for</strong>ward <strong>an</strong>d inverse models<strong>for</strong> motor control. Neural Networks 11(7–8):1317–29. [aHM]Wu, K. C.-C. (2008) Exp<strong>an</strong>ding the vision of visual bioethics. Americ<strong>an</strong> Journal ofBioethics 8(12):63–64. [KC-CW]Wynne, B. (1996) May the sheep safely graze? A reflexive view of the expert–layknowledge divide. In: Risk, environment & modernity: Towards <strong>an</strong>ew ecology, ed. S. Lash, B. Szerszynski & B. Wynne, pp. 44–83. Sage.[KC-CW]Xu, J. & Schwarz, N. (2009) Do we really need a <strong>reason</strong> to indulge? Journal ofMarketing Research 46(1):25–36. [aHM]Yates, J. F., Lee, J.-W. & Shinotsuka, H. (1992) Cross-national variation in probabilityjudgment. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the PsychonomicSociety, St. Louis. [aHM]Yegnash<strong>an</strong>kar<strong>an</strong>, K. (2010) Reasoning as action. Unpublished <strong>do</strong>ctoral dissertation,Harvard University. [PG-S]Zahavi, A. & Zahavi, A. (1997) The h<strong>an</strong>dicap principle: A missing piece of Darwin’spuzzle. Ox<strong>for</strong>d University Press. [aHM]BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2 111

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!