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Chapman Law Review - Chapman University

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Do Not Delete 12/7/2011 2:17 PM<br />

38 <strong>Chapman</strong> <strong>Law</strong> <strong>Review</strong> [Vol. 15:1<br />

draw: information obtained directly from fringe banking firms<br />

through the Bureau‘s supervision powers.<br />

B. Monitoring and Supervision<br />

Fringe banking will also be affected in a second innovation<br />

found in the Act: the Act empowers the Bureau to monitor and<br />

supervise nondepositories. 78 These powers have the potential to<br />

dramatically increase the amount of data available about fringe<br />

banking firms, but also to impose costs on firms operating in<br />

these markets.<br />

First, the Act mandates that the Bureau ―monitor for risks to<br />

consumers in the offering or provision of consumer financial<br />

products or services.‖ 79 As in other contexts, the fringe economy<br />

should play an important role in this monitoring because the Act<br />

instructs the Bureau to allocate its resources for monitoring in<br />

light of ―the extent, if any, to which the risks of a consumer<br />

financial product or service may disproportionately affect<br />

traditionally underserved consumers . . . .‖ 80<br />

This monitoring power has the potential to supply the<br />

Bureau with substantial information about the fringe economy<br />

because the Bureau can require covered entities to file special or<br />

annual reports or to submit answers to questions from the<br />

Bureau. 81 This power to obtain information even extends to<br />

entities that are not determined to be covered by the Act; the<br />

Bureau can require firms to file annual reports so that the<br />

Bureau can assess whether they are covered by the Act. 82<br />

In addition to requiring reports, the Bureau can also require<br />

fringe banking firms to register with the federal government. 83<br />

Registration requirements in some cases will be duplicative of<br />

the extensive state registration rules, 84 so the Act requires the<br />

Bureau to consult with state agencies when promulgating its<br />

rules. 85<br />

78 Dodd-Frank § 1024(b).<br />

79 Dodd-Frank § 1022(c)(1).<br />

80 Dodd-Frank § 1022(c)(2)(E).<br />

81 Dodd-Frank § 1022(c)(4)(B)(ii).<br />

82 Dodd-Frank § 1022(c)(5) (―In order to assess whether a nondepository is a covered<br />

person, as defined in section 1002, the Bureau may require such nondepository to file with<br />

the Bureau, under oath or otherwise, in such form and within such reasonable period of<br />

time as the Bureau may prescribe by rule or order, annual or special reports, or answers<br />

in writing to specific questions.‖).<br />

83 Dodd-Frank § 1022(c)(7)(A).<br />

84 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 2202 (2010) (requiring title lenders to obtain<br />

licenses from the state); FLA. STAT. § 537.007 (2010) (same); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-46-<br />

503 (2010) (same).<br />

85 Dodd-Frank § 1022(c)(7)(C).

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