Supermax Prisons and the Constitution: Liability ... - Supermaxed

8Supermax Prisons and the Constitution: LIABILITY CONCERNS IN THE EXTENDED CONTROL UNITLiving on theConstitutionalEdge: A Reviewof Case LawThe fact that an ECU’s extremelyrestrictive conditionsplace it at the very edge ofwhat is constitutionally permissiblesuggests that, withproperly developed policiesand procedures, it can functionin a constitutionally acceptablefashion. However, if courtscontinue recent trends, today’sECU may inherently step over the constitutionaledge with regard to mental health issues for someinmates.Early Litigation About Long-TermSegregated HousingBefore supermax prisons or extended controlunits were “invented,” long-term administrativesegregation units housed inmates who could notlive safely in less restrictive settings. Conditionsand practices in these units were the subject ofsome of the earliest “inmate rights” litigation.One of the first examples of court intervention inprison operations came more than 35 years ago ina California federal district court. The 1966 caseof Jordan v. Fitzharris arose from an inmate’sconfinement in a punitive segregation “strip cell”Regardless of thename given tolong-termsegregation units,inmates placed inthese units willchallenge the livingconditions and thelimitations onrights andprivileges.in California’s Soledad Prison. 6The court summarized the conditionsas being “of a shockingand debased nature [thatrequired court intervention] torestore the primal rules of acivilized community….” 7 Inthis case, officials concededthat they disliked confininginmates in the conditions thecourt found shocking but didnot know what else to do withinmates like the plaintiff.Inmate litigation related toadministrative segregation units continued in the1970s and 1980s. During this period, the courtsaddressed issues such as religious observance,due process requirements, mental health services,and conditions of confinement. 8 During the 1990s,as state prison systems began to introduce ECUs,evolving case law regarding inmate rights mayhave changed the legal tests that courts apply inevaluating prison conditions or practices. 9Regardless of the name given to long-term segregationunits, inmates placed in these units willchallenge the living conditions and the limitationson rights and privileges. As the following reviewof ECU-specific litigation shows, the courts willintervene when they find violations of inmates’rights.6Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966).7Id. at 679.8See Giampetruzzi v. Malcom, 406 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), requiring that inmates be allowed to hold weekly religiousservices; Wright v. Enomoto, 462 F. Supp. 397 (N.D. Cal. 1976), dealing with due process requirements for placement;Nelson v. Collins, 455 F. Supp. 727 (M.D. Md. 1978), relating to mental health services; Toussaint v. McCarthy,801 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1986), dealing with due process requirements for placement and periodic review and limiting theprison master’s role in overseeing placement decisions; and Davenport v. DeRobertis, 653 F. Supp. 649 (N.D. Ill. 1987),ordering that inmates be allowed three showers per week and 5 hours of exercise per week.9See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991), ending the “totality of conditions” approach to analyzing conditions of confinement;and Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), changing the method by which courts determine whether decisionsrelating to inmates are protected by due process.