Rebellion and Civil Disobedience in Islam The Need for a Paradigm ...

5) There are some scholars among various schools who deemed rebellion lawful andeven obligatory to remove injustice, and not just kufr (infidelity) 28 . Ibn Hazm went as faras declaring the ruler who ordered his soldiers to cause corruption on earth, as a muharib(bandit). To him, the baghi is not the one rising against the ruler; he is rather the one whotransgresses. The ruler himself can be a baghi or even a bandit under certaincircumstances 29 . The Hanafi scholar al-Simnani argued that if the ruler becomes unjust, itbecomes incumbent upon the jurists and Muslims to overthrow him 30 . Ibn Muflih 31(Hanbali) noted that the two Hanbali jurists, Ibn al-Jawzi and Ibn ‘Aqil, permittedrebellion against an unjust ruler. The Shafi‘i scholar Al-Juwayni argued that if a manpossesses enough power, it is legal for him to rebel for the sake of realizing justice and“may Allah aid him to victory.” 32 In another book 33 , he argued that if a ruler becomesoppressive, the possessors of power 34 in society may cooperate in resisting and correctinghim, even if it means that they would have to resort to the use of force and the waging ofwar against the ruler. Many Zaydi, Ibadi, and Mu`tazili scholars encouraged armedinsurrections to overthrow the unjust rulers. Some among them added the condition that ifsomeone wants to establish justice, enjoin the good, and forbid the evil, it is obligatory onhim to rebel if he believes he has the qualifications, material power and human supportthat guarantee him a reasonable chance of success. This condition is imposed to makesure that sincere men would not be quickly defeated and crushed and thus people wouldsuffer perpetual injustice and oppression. I personally espouse this position, that rebellionis lawful and even obligatory to eliminate tyranny, because I believe that the moralimperative should be given preference over the legal imperative for sustaining order andstability. Put differently: if we leave ourselves to be propelled by the legal imperative ofmaintaining order, the moral imperative which is based on absolute values will berelegated to a secondary role. Maintaining stability is good and required but not on theexpense of Jihad, establishing justice, and discharging the obligation of enjoining thegood and forbidding the evil.Back to the Juristic Culture:Now, I will shift emphasis to contemporary scholars. My point in this section is toshow how the juristic culture heavily depends on prior authority and how its inertia(discussed above) is affecting its views regarding rebellions. I must emphasize that many28 For a comprehensive account of the positions of the various jurisprudential and theological schools onrebellion, refer to Abou El Fadl’s book, ‘Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law.’ I vehemently disagreewith his analysis which, in many cases, casts doubt on the Sunnah. And with his insistence on describingthe juristic culture as both creative and selective, an assertion that doubts the sincerity and correct belief ofthe jurists.29 Ibn Hazm, ‘al-Muhalla.’30 Al-Simnani, ‘Rawdat al-Qudah wa Tariq al-Najah.’31 In his book, ‘Kitab al-Furu`.’ He, however, argued that rebellion is never permitted, and that impatienceand ignorance are the causes of all rebellions.32 See al-Juwayni, ‘Ghiyath al-Umam fi Iltiyath al-Qulam.’33 Al-Juwayni’s ‘Kitab al-Irshad ila Qawati` al-Adilla fi Usul al-I`tiqad.’34 Ahl al-hall wa al-‘aqd, literally, the people who loosen and bind.15