Air Force System Safety Handbook - System Safety Society

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• Covers off-the-shelf acquisitions 882A 4. Inherent safety comes from the basic system design • System safety is an inherent part of system’s design • Improvements to inherent safety are best achieved early 5. Program manager (SPO) provides management of system safety effort • Managerial and technical procedures to be used are submitted for procuring authority approval • Resolves conflicts between safety and other design requirements 6. Design safety preferences • Design to minimum hazard • Safety devices • Warning devices • Special procedures 7. System safety requirements must be consistent with other program requirements • Design requirements can have priority over safety design 8. System analyses are basic tools for systematically developing design specifications • Ultimate measure of safety is not the scope of analysis but in satisfied safety requirements • Analyses are performed to : • Identify hazards and corrective actions • Review safety considerations in tradeoffs • Determine/evaluate safety design requirements • Determine/evaluate operational, test, logistics requirements • Validate qualitative/quantitative requirements have been met • Analyses are hazard vs. safety analyses 7 6241 “ “ 6241 “ 38130 6241 “ “ “ “ 6241 “ 6241 “ 882 “ “ “ “ “ “
9. Nature and severity of hazards used to change design requirements • Called risk assessment (with categories and probability levels) • Hazard categories: • Safe: No functional damage/personnel injury • Marginal: Degrade system/no major damage or injury • Critical: Substantial system damage or injury • Catastrophic: Severe degradation/extensive damage/multiple injuries or deaths • Class I - IV defined for safe-catastrophic, respectively • Categories reversed for catastrophic (I) to negligible (V) • Hazard probability: • Prediction is part of the safety analysis • Probability levels added to severity categories: A (frequent/likely to occur) to F (impossible/can’t occur) • Remote (level D probability level defined as “unlikely, but possible to occur in the life of an item” • Level E renamed “improbable” and is defined as level D - 882A was defined: “so unlikely it can be assumed occurrence may not be experienced.” • Risk Management: • Catastrophic hazards will be eliminated • Safety specs have priority over design specs • Critical hazards will be minimized • Safety specs have priority consistent with ops/mission objectives • Level of risk assumption and criteria are introduced 10. System safety management • Defines function, authority, and inter-relationships • Exercises appropriate controls • Assures optimum safety • Precludes degradation of inherent safety 11. Degree of safety directly dependent upon management emphasis by government and contractors 882 12. Results of safety effort depend on procurement agency clearly stating objectives/requirements 882 13. Managing activity responsibilities • Plan, organize, and implement system safety program • Establish safety requirements for system design • State safety specifications in contract • Requirement for activities in contract • Contractually applicable safety data • Ensure complete SSPP • Review implementation of SSPP • Supply historical data • Review contractor system safety effort/data • Ensure specifications are updated with test analyses results • Review adequacy of all mil standards • Establish system safety groups 8 6241 882A 6241 “ “ “ “ 38130A 882A 38130 882A 882B “ 38130 38130A 38130 38130A 882B 38130A 14. Software hazard analyses: 882B “ “ “ “ 882A “ “ “ “ “ “ “ “ “ “ “ “
Page 1 and 2: “designing the safest possible sy
Page 3 and 4: Chapter Page Forward ..............
Page 5 and 6: Fig # Title Page 1-1 System Safety
Page 7 and 8: Acceptable Risk. That part of ident
Page 9 and 10: Articles/Papers REFERENCES 1. Cleme
Page 11 and 12: 1.3 Need for System Safety. Why is
Page 13 and 14: integrated with other factors that
Page 15: Figure 1-4 SYSTEM SAFETY OBJECTIVES
Page 19 and 20: CONCEPT EXPLORATION • Evaluate sy
Page 21 and 22: CONSTRUCTION (facilities) • Ensur
Page 23 and 24: existing levels of system safety an
Page 25 and 26: (a) Provides risk assessments to SA
Page 27 and 28: Block 5--Increased Safety Awareness
Page 29 and 30: 3.1 Definitions. System safety is a
Page 31 and 32: 3.4 Mishap Severity Categories and
Page 33 and 34: FREQUENCY OF OCCURRENCE Figure 3-5
Page 35 and 36: j. To point out to a designer how h
Page 37 and 38: g. Ensure that the appropriate syst
Page 39 and 40: Figure 4-1 FUNCTIONS OF SAFETY ORGA
Page 41 and 42: An explosive safety program encompa
Page 43 and 44: Quality assurance establishes polic
Page 45 and 46: safety requirements have been impos
Page 47 and 48: instead uses the tailoring process
Page 49 and 50: 5.1 SSPP--Task 102. (Note: Task num
Page 51 and 52: This section of the plan contains t
Page 53 and 54: program tasking should be sufficien
Page 55 and 56: h. Develop a method of exchanging s
Page 57 and 58: 7.1 Analyses. (28:39-40) Role of An
Page 59 and 60: d. Any other events, that considera
Page 61 and 62: CONCEPT STUDIES (PHL) SYSTEM SAFETY
Page 63 and 64: design specifications. In addition,
Page 65 and 66: a. Of the modes of failure, includi
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. Potential material substitutions
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are identified, monitored, and comp
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9.1 Fault Hazard Analysis. (33:47-4
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The SCA of military systems has inc
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doors, sunglasses, machine guards,
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Checklists)? There are others, such
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not directly provide useful informa
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c. Procedures, manuals, etc. These
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shutdown. This is a relatively smal
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c. Perform or update the PHA done d
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(2) Adequate safety provisions are
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11.1 Program Office Description. A
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management officer (DMO) is usually
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Once the details of these tasks are
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arrangements, an assessment of the
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f. Assist the contractors in making
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12.1 Contracting Principles. (34:6-
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A SOO is attached to an RFP to spec
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Type E - Material Specifications Ty
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Type A--System/Segment Specificatio
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13.1 Process. CHAPTER 13 EVALUATING
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ascertain if the safety requirement
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Develop and prepare program plans a
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The contractor SSPP will be updated
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Facility safety design criteria is
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10. Skill in written and oral commu
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eflect the local concern for operat
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c. Review equipment installation, o
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15.1 Acceptable/Unacceptable Risk.
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FACILITIES SYSTEM SAFETY INDUSTRIAL
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15.3 Biomedical Safety. (37:Chapter
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• Mishap Class/system identificat
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c. A Nuclear Safety Cross-check Ana
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17.1 General. There are many variat
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characteristics are under configura
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The AFMC supplement to AFI-91-202 p
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TRB DEFICIENCY REPORTS MISHAP REPOR
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these elements should be investigat
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The modification risk-assessment su
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20.1 General. Test and Evaluation (
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Development of these scenarios crea
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isk, or to stop the test until the
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Figure A-1. Mission Requirements/El
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• Capability (task loading) • O
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preliminary hazard list. The major
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• System Hazard Analysis • Oper
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sensitivity analysis. Here, an asse
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(5) Revising Maintenance Requiremen
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Air Force System Safety Handbook - System Safety Society

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