Air Force System Safety Handbook - System Safety Society

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ACAT Acquistion Category ACO Administrative Contracting Officer AE Architecture and Engineering AHMH Acquisition Management of Haz Materials ALC Air Logistics Center AFMC Air Force Materiel Command AFOSH Air Force Occupational Safety & Health AFSC Air Force Safety Center AFOTEC Air Force Test & Evaluation Center ANSI American National Standards Institute CCB Configuration Control Board CDR Critical Design Review CDRL Contract Data Requirements List CI Configuration Item CLA Code Level Analysis CSHA Combined Software Hazard Analysis COTS Commercial Off The Shelf CPCI Computer Program Configuration Item CSSM Center System Safety Manager DID Data Item Description DOT Department of Transportation DT&E Development Test and Evaluation ECP Engineering Change Proposal EED Electro-Explosive device EMD Engineering and Manufacturing Development EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal EPA Environmental Protection Agency FAR Federal Acquisition Regulation FCA Final Configuration Audit FHA Fault Hazard Analysis FMEA Failure Mode and Effect Analysis FMECA Failure Mode and Effect Criticality Analysis FOT&E Follow-on Operational Test and Evaluation FSD Full-Scale Development FTA Fault Tree Analysis GFE Government Furnished Equipment GFP Government-Furnished Property HRI Hazard Risk Index IFB Invitation for Bid ILS Integrated Logistics Support IOT&E Initial Operational Test and Evaluation ISSPP Integrated System Safety Program Plan MA Management Activity MSDS Material Specifications Data Sheet NDI Nondevelopmental Item NNMSB Nonnuclear Munitions Safety Board NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission ABBREVIATIONS v NWSSG Nuclear Weapons System Safety Group O&SHA Operating and Support Hazard Analysis OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration OT&E Operational Test and Evaluation PC Product Center PCA Preliminary Configuration Audit PCO Principle Contracting Officer PD Product Division (now Product Center) PDR Preliminary Design Review PEO Program Executive Officer PHA Preliminary Hazard Analysis PHL Preliminary Hazard List PM Program Manager PMD Program Management Document PMP Program Management Plan PO Program Office QD Quantity-Distance RDT&E Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation RFP Request for Proposal RFQ Request for Quotation RHA Requirements Hazard Analysis RHI Real Hazard Index RSP Render Safe Procedures RTO Responsible Testing Organization SAR Safety Assessment Report SAS Safety Analysis Summary SCA Sneak Circuit Analysis SCCSC Safety Critical Computer Software Component SCCSU Safety Critical Computer Software Unit SCF Software Critical Function SCN Software Change Notice SDHA Software Design Hazard Analysis SHA System Hazard Analysis SON Statement of Need SOW Statement of Work SPO System Program Office SSE System Safety Engineer SSG System Safety Group SSHA Subsystem Hazard Analysis SSM System Safety Manager SSMP System Safety Management Plan SSPP System Safety Program Plan SSWG System Safety Working Group TEMP Test Evaluation Master Plan TNSE Technical Nuclear Safety Evaluation TNSA Technical Nuclear Safety Analysis TO Technical Order USACE US Army Corps of Engineers WBS Work Breakdown Structure
Acceptable Risk. That part of identified risk which is allowed by the managing activity to persist without further engineering or management action. Boilerplate. System safety contract requirements derived by copying requirements from previously written contracts without regard to their validity; i.e., using a "standard" list of requirements. * Commercial Off-the-Shelf Item. An existing item determined by a material acquisition decision process review (DOD, military component, or subordinate organization, as appropriate) to be available for acquisition to satisfy an approved materiel requirement with no expenditure of funds for development, modification, or improvement (e.g., commercial products, or materiel developed by other countries). This item may be procured by the contractor or furnished to the contractor as government- furnished equipment or government-furnished property. * Condition. An existing or potential state such as exposure to harm, toxicity, energy source, procedure, etc. * Contractor. A private sector enterprise or the organizational element of DOD or any other government agency engaged to provide services or products within agreed limits specified by the MA. Cut-Up Tailoring. Disjointed, fragmented system safety requirements that result when deleting, without SSM coordination, significant numbers of safety requirements for a "revised" shorter and cheaper safety contract. * Damage. The partial or total loss of hardware caused by component failure; exposure of hardware to heat, fire, or other environments; human errors; or other inadvertent events or conditions. Deductive Analysis. An analysis that reasons from the general to the specific to determine HOW a system may fail or meet a given set of conditions (example: Fault Tree Analysis). External Interface. Information exchange between system program office personnel and those outside the program office. * Fail Safe. A design feature that ensures that the system remains safe or will cause the system to revert to a state which will not cause a mishap. * Hazard. Any real or potential condition that can cause injury, illness, or death to personnel; damage to or loss of a system, equipment or property; or damage to the environment. * Hazardous Material. A material that due to its chemical, physical, or biological nature causes safety, public health, or environmental concerns that elevate efforts to manage. DEFINITIONS (30:2-4) vi Identified Risk. That risk which has been determined through various analysis techniques. Inductive Analysis. An analysis that reasons from the specific to the general to determine WHAT failed states or other outcomes are possible given certain conditions (example: FMEA). Internal Interface. Information exchange between various members of the system program office. Major Defense Acquisition Program. An acquisition program that is not a highly sensitive classified program (as determined by the Secretary of Defense) and that is: (1) designated by the USD (A&T) as an MDAP, or (2) estimated by the Under Secretary of Defense (USD) for Acquisition and Technologies (A&T) to require an eventual total expenditure for research, development, test and evaluation of more than 355 million in FY 1996 constant dollars or, for procurement, of more than 2.135 billion in FY 1996 constant dollars. * Managing Activity. The original element of DOD assigned acquisition management responsibility for the system, or prime or associate contractors or subcontractors who wish to impose system safety tasks on their suppliers. * Mishap. An unplanned event or series of events resulting in death, injury, occupational illness, or damage to or loss of equipment or property, or damage to the environment. Mishap Risk. An expression of the impact and possibility of a mishap in terms of potential mishap severity and probability of occurrence. Mishap Risk Assessment. The process of characterizing hazards within risk areas and critical technical processes, analyzing them for their potential mishap severity and probabilities of occurrence, and prioritizing them for risk mitigation actions. * Mishap Probability. The aggregate probability of occurrence of the individual events/hazards that create a specific hazard. * Mishap Severity. An assessment of the consequences of the worst credible mishap that could be caused by a specific hazard. Nondevelopmental Items. Items that have already been developed and used by any government agency, including armed forces.
Page 1 and 2: “designing the safest possible sy
Page 3 and 4: Chapter Page Forward ..............
Page 5: Fig # Title Page 1-1 System Safety
Page 9 and 10: Articles/Papers REFERENCES 1. Cleme
Page 11 and 12: 1.3 Need for System Safety. Why is
Page 13 and 14: integrated with other factors that
Page 15 and 16: Figure 1-4 SYSTEM SAFETY OBJECTIVES
Page 17 and 18: 9. Nature and severity of hazards u
Page 19 and 20: CONCEPT EXPLORATION • Evaluate sy
Page 21 and 22: CONSTRUCTION (facilities) • Ensur
Page 23 and 24: existing levels of system safety an
Page 25 and 26: (a) Provides risk assessments to SA
Page 27 and 28: Block 5--Increased Safety Awareness
Page 29 and 30: 3.1 Definitions. System safety is a
Page 31 and 32: 3.4 Mishap Severity Categories and
Page 33 and 34: FREQUENCY OF OCCURRENCE Figure 3-5
Page 35 and 36: j. To point out to a designer how h
Page 37 and 38: g. Ensure that the appropriate syst
Page 39 and 40: Figure 4-1 FUNCTIONS OF SAFETY ORGA
Page 41 and 42: An explosive safety program encompa
Page 43 and 44: Quality assurance establishes polic
Page 45 and 46: safety requirements have been impos
Page 47 and 48: instead uses the tailoring process
Page 49 and 50: 5.1 SSPP--Task 102. (Note: Task num
Page 51 and 52: This section of the plan contains t
Page 53 and 54: program tasking should be sufficien
Page 55 and 56: h. Develop a method of exchanging s
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7.1 Analyses. (28:39-40) Role of An
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d. Any other events, that considera
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CONCEPT STUDIES (PHL) SYSTEM SAFETY
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design specifications. In addition,
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a. Of the modes of failure, includi
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. Potential material substitutions
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are identified, monitored, and comp
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9.1 Fault Hazard Analysis. (33:47-4
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The SCA of military systems has inc
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doors, sunglasses, machine guards,
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Checklists)? There are others, such
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not directly provide useful informa
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c. Procedures, manuals, etc. These
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shutdown. This is a relatively smal
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c. Perform or update the PHA done d
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(2) Adequate safety provisions are
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11.1 Program Office Description. A
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management officer (DMO) is usually
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Once the details of these tasks are
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arrangements, an assessment of the
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f. Assist the contractors in making
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12.1 Contracting Principles. (34:6-
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A SOO is attached to an RFP to spec
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Type E - Material Specifications Ty
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Type A--System/Segment Specificatio
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13.1 Process. CHAPTER 13 EVALUATING
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ascertain if the safety requirement
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Develop and prepare program plans a
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The contractor SSPP will be updated
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Facility safety design criteria is
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10. Skill in written and oral commu
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eflect the local concern for operat
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c. Review equipment installation, o
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15.1 Acceptable/Unacceptable Risk.
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FACILITIES SYSTEM SAFETY INDUSTRIAL
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15.3 Biomedical Safety. (37:Chapter
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• Mishap Class/system identificat
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c. A Nuclear Safety Cross-check Ana
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17.1 General. There are many variat
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characteristics are under configura
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The AFMC supplement to AFI-91-202 p
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TRB DEFICIENCY REPORTS MISHAP REPOR
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these elements should be investigat
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The modification risk-assessment su
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20.1 General. Test and Evaluation (
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Development of these scenarios crea
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isk, or to stop the test until the
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Figure A-1. Mission Requirements/El
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• Capability (task loading) • O
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preliminary hazard list. The major
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• System Hazard Analysis • Oper
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sensitivity analysis. Here, an asse
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(5) Revising Maintenance Requiremen
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Air Force System Safety Handbook - System Safety Society

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