Democratic Breakthroughs and Revolutions in Five Post-Communist ...

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4fraud in the face of a competitive authoritarian regime. 4 But, there are also threecrucial differences. First, the Slovak and Croatian regimes did not undertake massfraud and did not plan to refuse to recognise a victory by the democratic opposition.The absence of these two factors, in turn, meant there was no need for the oppositionand civil society to organise street protests which culminated in a revolution. InSerbia, Georgia and Ukraine these two factors (election fraud and an unwillingness toaccept an opposition victory) were present and instrumental in leading to democratic(or electoral) revolutions. Second, the Slovak and Croatian regimes were thoughtunlikely to use violence to suppress the opposition or crush street protests. In Slovakiaunder Vladimir Meciar the security forces were involved in illegal activities againstthe opposition and in Croatia some elements of the internal security forces may haveparticipated in the war of independence in 1991-1995 or in war crimes. In Serbia,Georgia and Ukraine the bloated internal security forces had, in the case of Serbia,committed war crimes in neighbouring territories and in Ukraine undertaken violenceagainst journalists and opposition leaders. In these three countries the interiorministries also had strong links to organised crime. In Ukraine, hard line elements inthe security forces may have received encouragement from Russia during a crisis.Third, external factors played a different role in all five cases, with the EU playing apositive role encouraging a democratic victory in Slovakia and Croatia by holding outthe ‘carrot’ of membership, a factor which was absent in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine.In Georgia and Ukraine the main external factor was Russia which played a negativerole in freezing two conflicts in the former and heavily intervening in the latter’s 2004election. The EU’s only positive role was in the convening of a round table to defusethe political crisis arising during the Orange Revolution.
5The presence of competitive authoritarian regimes has profound implicationsfor the likely success of the democratic opposition in elections in all five cases and ofthe success of democratic revolutions following fraudulent elections in Serbia,Georgia and Ukraine. Competitive authoritarian regimes provide space for theopposition, civil society, a limited number of media outlets, democratic opposition,the ability of the opposition to participate in state institutions (i.e. parliament and localgovernment) and the ability of international organisations to freely operate in thecountry. Competitive authoritarian regimes are vulnerable during elections andsuccession crises as it is then that the regime can either tip towards democraticbreakthrough, as in these five countries, or towards authoritarian consolidation (if thedemocratic opposition had failed). The democratic opposition will find it difficult toorganise a democratic breakthrough in a consolidated authoritarian regime, and whenthe regimes commits election fraud the democratic opposition will be thwarted in itsability to mobilise protests. Aside from Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, which theNew York-based Freedom House think tank classifies as ‘Transitional Governments’or ‘Hybrid Regimes’, the remaining nine CIS states are ‘Semi-ConsolidatedAuthoritarian’ or ‘Consolidated Authoritarian’ regimes. Attempts at launchingdemocratic revolutions in protest at election fraud in Belarus, Azerbaijan, Armenia,and Uzbekistan have failed due to weak democratic oppositions and the use ofviolence to repress the opposition, the most notorious case being in Andijon,Uzbekistan in May 2005.‘Return to Europe’ Civic Nationalism‘Return to Europe’, civic nationalism mobilised the democratic opposition andcivil society in Slovakia, Croatia, Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine, particularly among
Page 1 and 2: Democratic Breakthroughs and Revolu
Page 3: 3divided into four themes, the new
Page 7 and 8: 7Ukraine where the Orange Revolutio
Page 9 and 10: 9Many of the activists from the Kuc
Page 11 and 12: 11seeking to concentrate power, sta
Page 13 and 14: 13The pro-Kuchma ruling elites divi
Page 15 and 16: 15break down fear. Yanukovych prove
Page 17 and 18: 17the oppositions attempts at creat
Page 19 and 20: 19democratic opposition promoted an
Page 21 and 22: 21break into eastern Ukraine. Ukrai
Page 23 and 24: 23Dealing with the previous regime
Page 25 and 26: 25Divisions in the Democratic Oppos
Page 27 and 28: 27popularity of former Prime Minist
Page 29 and 30: 29command popular support. The Radi
Page 31 and 32: 31greater sense of freedom and a st
Page 33 and 34: 33been cleaned up. Freedom House’
Page 35 and 36: 352000 democratic breakthrough that
Page 37 and 38: 37BibliographyButora, Martin, ‘Ok
Page 39: 392006.23 Paul D’Anieri, ‘Ethni

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