Democratic Breakthroughs and Revolutions in Five Post-Communist ...

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6young people. In Slovakia and, to a lesser extent in Croatia, the EU directlyintervened by dangling the ‘carrot’ of future membership to encourage a democraticbreakthrough. The civic nationalism of the democratic opposition in Slovakia andCroatia competed with the regimes own brand of extreme right or populistnationalism. In Slovakia the Meciar regime had built an authoritarian-populist regimewhose nationalism was directed not at ‘returning to Europe’ but against Czech ruleand the country’s Hungarian minority. In Croatia, the Franjo Tudjman regime haddominated the country throughout the 1990s through a political regime built onextreme right nationalism that partially drew its inspiration from the World War IIUstacha Nazi puppet state. A central demand of the EU was for Croatia to cooperatewith the International War Crimes Tribunal that the democratic opposition, once inpower, to some degree fulfilled.In Serbia, the democratic opposition associated a break with the SlobodanMilosevic regime as returning Serbia to a European path, a path which Yugoslaviahad strong connections to as a communist state that had been outside the Sovietempire. Yugoslavs had long been able to travel, work and visit Europe and the outsideworld when this was impossible for those living in the Soviet empire. In Georgia andUkraine, ‘return to Europe’ civic nationalism built on a dream of integrating theircountries with Trans-Atlantic structures, of moving away from the vacuous,fluctuating and unclear multi-vector foreign policies of the Edward Shevardnadze andLeonid Kuchma eras. The EU did not though, dangle any ‘carrot’ of membership inboth countries. Opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko’s political platform supported apro-European orientation for Ukraine that built on a national identity that placedUkraine within ‘Europe’ and outside Eurasia. But, in Ukraine ‘return to Europe’ civicnationalism is not uniformly strong throughout the country, being weaker in eastern
7Ukraine where the Orange Revolution found little support. In Georgia, the ethnicGeorgian nationalism of the early 1990s, when the country was briefly ruled by ZviadGamsakhurdia, had been replaced by Georgian opposition leader MikhailSaakashvili’s civic nationalism. Saakashvili has worked to rebuild trust amongGeorgians in the state and its institutions, ‘to inject national pride without making itethnic pride’. 5 He has emphasised state symbols, the hymn and state seal and thenational flag has been changed.Different types of nationalism can be used to establish either a democraticregime and promote the country’s ‘return to Europe’ or to institutionalise anauthoritarian regime and turn the country’s back on ‘Europe’. Two other typesnationalism – Soviet and Great Power – are supportive of the establishment ofauthoritarian regimes with a disinterest in returning their countries to ‘Europe’. InBelarus the Soviet nationalism exhibited and institutionalised by AlaksandrLukashenkahas a stronger support base than that of ‘return to Europe’ civicnationalism promoted by the democratic opposition led by Alaksandr Milinkevich. 6 InRussia, Vladimir Putin has successfully marginalised the democratic opposition andpromoted a Great Power nationalism that combines Soviet, Tsarist and Eurasiansymbolism. 7 Belarus and Russia are ardent supporters of CIS integration, members ofthe CIS Collective Security Organization (CIS CSO) and do not seek EU (or NATO)membership. Georgia and Ukraine have reservations about CIS integration, havenever been members of the CIS CSO and seek NATO and EU membership.Preceding Political CrisisThe nature of competitive authoritarian regimes inevitably produces anunstable political environment that can tip towards democratic breakthrough or
Page 1 and 2: Democratic Breakthroughs and Revolu
Page 3 and 4: 3divided into four themes, the new
Page 5: 5The presence of competitive author
Page 9 and 10: 9Many of the activists from the Kuc
Page 11 and 12: 11seeking to concentrate power, sta
Page 13 and 14: 13The pro-Kuchma ruling elites divi
Page 15 and 16: 15break down fear. Yanukovych prove
Page 17 and 18: 17the oppositions attempts at creat
Page 19 and 20: 19democratic opposition promoted an
Page 21 and 22: 21break into eastern Ukraine. Ukrai
Page 23 and 24: 23Dealing with the previous regime
Page 25 and 26: 25Divisions in the Democratic Oppos
Page 27 and 28: 27popularity of former Prime Minist
Page 29 and 30: 29command popular support. The Radi
Page 31 and 32: 31greater sense of freedom and a st
Page 33 and 34: 33been cleaned up. Freedom House’
Page 35 and 36: 352000 democratic breakthrough that
Page 37 and 38: 37BibliographyButora, Martin, ‘Ok
Page 39: 392006.23 Paul D’Anieri, ‘Ethni

Democratic Breakthroughs and Revolutions in Five Post-Communist ...

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