Articleschronological and topographicalframework. It cannot offer any morethan is in the accounts, it cannotanalyse those actions beyond statingwhether or not they were successful.However, with a thorough knowledgeof the full repertoire of militarypractices it is possible to considerwhether or not the best options werechosen in a given situation and toassess the skill with which the chosencourse of action was followed.Although, naturally, any assessmentwill be subjective, that is still aconsiderable advance on a simpleaccount of events.There is also a tendency amongstnarrative military historians to givecredit for the successful execution of abattle plan to the general who devisedit without consideration for the skillsof the troops who execute it. However,a military genius cannot make badtroops good, whereas good troops canmake a mediocre general look good. Aknowledge of military practices at alllevels, from private to general, allowsan assessment to be made of wherethe responsibility lies for the outcomeof an action, be it victory or defeat.For example, it has long beenmaintained that the defeat of theBritish force under Braddock on theMonongahela River in 1755 was theresult of the poor quality of theinfantry involved and the unsuitabilityto the circumstances of employingEuropean style tactics. StanleyPargellis, however, has argued that iswas the failure of Braddock and hisofficers to employ European tacticsproperly that lead to the defeat. Inmaking his argument Pargellis refersto the principle military manual of theperiod written by Humphrey Bland(Pargellis 1936: 253–<strong>26</strong>9).Practical military history can alsobe of assistance to historians takingthe new military history approach toarmies. They are studying armies asinstitutions and armies as institutionsare shaped by their function and thatfunction is to fight. The manner inwhich armies function, their practices,therefore have a direct bearing ontheir nature, on the form of theinstitution, on its requirements andculture.In addition to improving theunderstanding of academics ofmilitary history I believe that there areother benefits of Practical MilitaryHistory. As a result of my museumexperience I am only too aware thatthere is often a gulf between theacademic in a university and thesubject specialist curator in amuseum. The first is rarely concernedwith the material culture of war whilethe second often neglects the contextof that material. The nature of militarymaterial culture and the proceduresthat employ it are inextricably linked,each influences the other, thusPractical Military History can bridgethat divide between academic andcurator, university and museum to thebenefit of both.Military history today is a subjectthat is frequently seen as politicallyincorrect and is consequentlyneglected, yet it has thousands of fans,reenactors. Reenactors are almost bydefinition most interested in militaryprocedure, as well as military materialculture, but they lack academic rigourin their activities and are often nottaken seriously by academics. Yet theyare enthusiastic supporters andadvocates of military history who canprovide opportunities for practicalresearch as well as being enthusiasticcustomers for its products.Practical Military History is amissing field in the study of militaryhistory that could provide manybenefits. It is a vehicle through whichacademics, curators and reenactorscould be brought together to thebenefit of all parties and thestrengthening of the position ofmilitary history.In concrete terms PracticalMilitary History has two parts, firstlearning and understanding thepractices of an army in a given periodand secondly applying that knowledgeto the study of military history. For anexample of how this might work it isconvenient to consider the BritishArmy of the mid-18th century. Asstated above, James Wolfe consideredMilitary history today is asubject that is frequentlyseen as politicallyincorrect and isconsequently neglected,yet it has thousands offans, reenactors.Bland’s Military Discipline as a keywork for study by any new, juniorofficer. Hand in hand with this,however, went instruction from seniorNCOs and other officers. A study ofBland under the guidance of someonewho understands and is familiar withits contents would provide exactly thelevel of knowledge that Wolfe believedwas required. It would provide aworking knowledge of weapons, whichin turn would lead to an understandingof why they were deployed in the waythey were. This in turn would lead toknowledge of drill and tacticsincluding the correct contemporaryterminology. Such knowledge wouldenable the correct interpretation ofaccounts of battles and an analysis ofthe actions of participants rather thanthe more usual simple narrativeoutcome of a study. A knowledge ofweapons would also provide a goodlink into the material culture of theperiod.30 MAGAZINE ISSUE <strong>09</strong>
ArticlesIn doing this Practical MilitaryHistory would improve ‘old’ militaryhistory and be in a position to make acontribution to the relatively new fieldof battlefield archaeology andinterpretation. For example,something as simple as understandinghow the New Model Army was paidhas already lead to an accuratestatement of that army’s strength andthus its deployment at Naseby(Blackmore 2003: 3; Evans 2007: 30,58–61). It could also help theinterpretation of warfare and itsassociated material culture inmuseums.In addition to a combat orientatedknowledge this sort of study woulddeliver knowledge of what might betermed the non-combat practices ofthe army. This would result in aclearer understanding of the way oflife of soldiers, how and whycampaigns were conducted as theywere. This is where Practical MilitaryHistory could have a beneficial effecton ‘new’ military history. Mostobviously it would reveal practices thatwould impact on the local people,economy and landscape. A deeperunderstanding of a soldier’s way of lifewould lead to a greater level ofempathy. The social history aspect ofthe army would be more easilyunderstood.It would not be possible to do morethan introduce students to the conceptof Practical Military History, having, asit does, an application to any army inany period. However, an effectiveintroduction could be achieved throughthe study of one army in one or twoperiods where contemporary materialis readily available along with thenecessary expertise to explain it. Mostobviously, in the United Kingdom, theEnglish Civil Wars and the mid-18thcentury suggest themselves aspossibilities. Contemporary material isreadily available through Early EnglishBooks on Line and Eighteenth CenturyCollections Online. There are anumber of English Civil War sitesready for study, particularly Nasebyand although a little remote thebattlefields Culloden has been subjectWhether undertaken asa part of formaluniversity teaching or asadult education inmuseums PracticalMilitary History couldonly help to deepenunderstanding of pasteventsto considerable archaeological study inrecent years. Both sites are associatedwith contrasting museum projects. Inthe United Sates of America theAmerican War of Independence or theAmerican Civil War would provideopportunities for study. The 18thcentury would also provide richopportunities in Europe.Whether undertaken as a part offormal university teaching or as adulteducation in museums PracticalMilitary History could only help todeepen understanding of past events.It can bring together bring togetheracademics, curators and re-enactorsin an alliance that could only benefitall involved and the subject of militaryhistory. As an approach to history thatcould be applied in other fields itoffers military history the opportunityto be at the forefront of history ratherthen the poor relation that no onetalks about.ReferencesBlackmore D 2003 ‘Counting the NewModel Army’. Civil War Times: 58.Leigh on Sea.Bland H 1727 Treatise of MilitaryDiscipline. London.Chambers J W 1991 ConferenceReview Essay: The New MilitaryHistory: Myth and Reality. TheJournal of Military History: 55, 3(July).Chandler D 1990 The Art of Warfare inthe age of Marlborough.Staplehurst.Childs J 1991 The Nine Years’ War andthe British Army, 1688–1697.Manchester.Evans M M 2007 Naseby 1645, TheTriumph of the New Model Army.Oxford.Nosworthy B 1992 The Anatomy ofVictory, Battle Tactics 1689–1763.New York.Nosworthy B 1997 Battle Tactics ofNapoleon and his Enemies.London, paper back edition.Paret P 1991 ‘The New MilitaryHistory’. In Parameters, The USArmy’s Senior ProfessionalJournal.Pargellis S 1936 ‘Braddock’s Defeat’.The American Historical Review:41, 2 (January).Reid S 2000 Wolfe, The Career ofGeneral James Wolfe fromCulloden to Quebec. Staplehurst.Tatum W P 2007 ‘Challenging the NewMilitary History: The Case ofEighteenth-Century British ArmyStudies’. History Compass: 5, 1.ISSUE <strong>09</strong> MAGAZINE 31