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legal attack on the Interim Rule, but the Third Circuit rejectedhis argument without reaching the merits, concluding that theAct’s registration requirements applied to pre-Act offenderseven in the absence of a rule by the AG.The U.S. Supreme Court held that the Act did not require Dto register before the AG validly specified that the Act’s registrationprovisions applied to pre-Act offenders. SORNA defines“sex offender” to include offenders who were convicted beforethe Act’s effective date. SORNA also states, however, that theAG has the authority to specify the applicability of SORNA withrespect to sex offenders convicted prior to SORNA’s enactment.The Court noted Congress’ use of the word “applicability” asopposed to “nonapplicability,” inferring that Congress wantedto give the AG discretion to apply SORNA to pre-Act offenders,not the authority to make exceptions to SORNA. The Courttherefore reversed the Third Circuit and remanded the case todetermine if the AG’s Interim Rule is valid.Undisclosed notations on a police activity sheet wereambiguous and not exculpatory or impeaching so asto warrant retrial. Wetzel v. Lambert, 132 S. Ct. 1195(2012)Pennsylvania death row inmate sought habeas relief under28 U.S.C.S. § 2254 on a Brady claim, arguing that the State failedto disclose a police activity sheet noting a co-defendant hadidentified a fourth person as a co-defendant and bearing otherinformation associating the sheet with the robbery and murdercharges. COA reversed the denial of relief. The Supreme Courtvacated COA’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings.COA improperly rejected the state courts’ reasonable conclusion about the contents of the document. Section 2254 precludesa federal court from granting a writ of habeas corpusto a state prisoner unless the adjudication of his claim by statecourts involved an unreasonable application of federal law. COAoverlooked the determination of the state courts that the documentswere entirely ambiguous; COA focused solely on the statecourts’ statements on the impeachment value of the evidence.The state court ruling might have been reasonable, since (1) theactivity sheet did not explicitly link the fourth person to themurder-robbery, (2) the co-defendant had committed a dozenother such robberies, (3) he was being held on several chargeswhen the activity sheet was prepared, (4) the fourth person’sname appeared nowhere else in the files, and (5) two witnesseswho were shown the fourth person’s photo did not identify himas involved in that crime. The daunting difficulties for the prosecutionin a retrial 30 years later were not to be imposed unlesseach ground supporting the state court decision was examinedand found unreasonable under § 2254(d)(1).The Court has expressly declined to adopt a bright-linerule for the applicability of Miranda in prisons; the determinationdepends upon whether incarceration exertsthe danger of coercion that results from the interactionof custody and official interrogation. Howes v. Fields,132 S. Ct. 1181 (2012)COA affirmed the grant of habeas relief under 28 U.S.C.S.§ 2254(d)(1), holding that respondent inmate’s interrogation wasa “custodial interrogation” under Miranda because removal to aprison conference room and questioning about conduct occurringoutside the prison made any such interrogation custodialper se.The Supreme Court reversed COA. Standard prison conditionsand restrictions did not necessarily implicate the same interestsMiranda sought to protect. Thus, being in prison, withoutmore, was not enough to constitute Miranda custody. Taking theinmate to a conference room, as opposed to questioning himin the presence of fellow inmates, did not necessarily convert anoncustodial situation to one in which Miranda applied. Factorsthat leaned toward finding the inmate’s questioning was custodialwere offset by others: He was told at the outset, and remindedthereafter, that he could leave and go back to his cell wheneverhe wanted, he was not physically restrained or threatened andwas not uncomfortable, was offered food and water, and the doorto the conference room was sometimes left open. Those objectivefacts were consistent with an interrogation environmentin which a reasonable person would have felt free to terminatethe interview and leave. Being told if he did not cooperate hewould be returned to his cell was not coercion by threateningharsher conditions.Fifth CircuitDistrict court did not err in denying D’s motion to suppressbased upon the warrantless insertion of a GPS deviceon the undercarriage of D’s brother’s truck. UnitedStates v. Hernandez, 647 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2011)D did not have “standing” to challenge the placement of theGPS device on his brother’s truck, as he failed to demonstrate thathe had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place;he did have “standing” to challenge the use of the GPS device tofollow the truck’s path, since he had his brother’s permission todrive the truck. On the merits, however, the Fifth Circuit foundthat the use of the hidden GPS was not an unconstitutional warrantlesssearch; this one-off use of GPS monitoring was not asearch governed by the Fourth Amendment. The Fifth Circuitput off for another day the more troubling question of whetherextensive GPS monitoring over a lengthier course of time mightrise to the level of a Fourth Amendment search. NOTE: Thislatter issue was affirmed in United States v. Jones, No. 10-1259(U.S. Jan 23, 2012). See above.There was no basis for D’s federal habeas corpus relieffrom his conviction for sexual abuse of a child—althoughthe victim, as an adult, approached the DA andvoluntarily recanted her testimony under oath—