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2001), and Ex parte Evans, 690 S.W.2d 274 (Tex.Crim.App. 1985),were incorrect. There are considerable distinctions betweenparole attainment and parole eligibility. Parole attainment ishighly speculative, due to various factors associated with anindividual’s parole application. The question of parole eligibility,however, elicits a straightforward answer because parole eligibilityis determined by the law in effect on the date of the offense.When a serious consequence is clear, counsel has a duty to givecorrect advice. Both failure to provide correct information andproviding incorrect information violate that duty.D sufficiently proved that his counsel was deficient. D’scounsel could have easily determined the parole-eligibility requirementsby reading the statute. Instead, counsel failed toinform D of changes in the parole-eligibility statutes that doubledthe time he must serve before becoming eligible for parole. Thefact that the amendments took effect only 11 days before theoffense is of no consequence. CCA also concluded, based onD’s 1997 affidavit, that D would not have pled guilty if he hadknown the actual time he would have to serve, and thus prejudiceis shown.D was entitled to a new trial on his Brady claim becauseundisclosed police reports contained favorable evidencematerial to D’s case and the State failed to disclose suchevidence. Ex parte Miles, Nos. 54687-S(B) & 54688-S(B)(Tex.Crim.App. Feb 15, 2012)Applicant inmate was convicted of murder and attemptedmurder. COA recommended that his subsequent application forhabeas corpus relief be granted. CCA granted the applicationand held that the inmate’s actual innocence and Brady claimsmet the requirements of Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07, § 4(c)because they relied on the new evidence of two undisclosed policereports, a witness’ recantation of his in-court identificationof the inmate as the shooter, the identification of the source ofa previously unknown fingerprint, and a second witness’ affidavitstating that her trial testimony was incorrect—none ofwhich was available or ascertainable on or before the date theinmate filed his first applications. The two undisclosed policereports contained favorable evidence material to D’s case, andthe State failed to disclose such evidence. The reports were exculpatoryand could have constituted impeachment evidencebecause they identified other potential suspects for the crime,and subsequent investigation of those allegations could haveled to other exculpatory evidence.A trial court has the authority to reopen a suppressionhearing, even mid-trial, to allow the State to presentadditional evidence in support of the trial court’s initial,interlocutory ruling to deny the motion. Black v. State,No. 1551-10 (Tex.Crim.App. Feb 15, 2012).D was convicted of possession with intent to deliver meth.The trial court had denied D’s motion to suppress. COA affirmed.CCA granted D’s PDR to decide whether the trial court erred inreopening the hearing on the motion to suppress. CCA affirmed.It was within the trial court’s discretion to reopen the suppressionhearing and to entertain new testimony. Furthermore,COA did not err in going beyond the face of the warrant andrelying on the new testimony to establish probable cause to issueD’s arrest warrant.In cases in which the trial court is never asked, or is askedbut declines, to exercise its discretionary authority to reopenthe suppression hearing, appellate review of its ruling on themotion to suppress is ordinarily limited to that evidence presentedat the pretrial hearing—the evidence that was before thecourt at the time of its decision. There is an exception: If theparties consensually broach the suppression issue again beforethe fact-finder at trial, the reviewing court should also considerthe evidence adduced before the fact-finder at trial in gaugingthe propriety of the trial court’s ruling on the motion to suppress.The corollary rule is that if the trial court should exerciseits authority to reopen the suppression hearing, the reviewingcourt should also consider whatever additional evidence maybe spread on the record bearing on the propriety of the trialcourt’s ruling on the motion to suppress.In the Tex. Health & Safety Code, “prescription form”refers to a pre-printed form designed to have prescriptioninformation written on it; the legislature intendedfor there to be a legal distinction between prescriptionforms and completed prescriptions. Avery v. State, No.0864-11 (Tex.Crim.App. Feb 29, 2012)Before attempting to fill a prescription for Lortab, D scribbledout “2.5” and made it look like “7.5.” D was convicted ofattempting to obtain a controlled substance through the useof a fraudulent prescription form, in violation of Tex. Health& Safety Code § 481.129(a)(5)(B). COA acquitted D becauseit found no evidence that she used a fraudulent prescriptionform. CCA affirmed COA’s judgment but disagreed with COA’sreasoning and interpretation of the record.The fact that subsections of Section 481.129 overlap somewhatdoes not change the State’s burden of proving the statutorymanner and means that it actually charged. While subsection(A) is broad enough to encompass most fraudulent attempts toobtain controlled substances, the other subsections allow theState to draft a more specific charge for a better jury instructionand to provide more notice to the defendant. An appellatecourt’s belief that a defendant’s actions more closely resemblean uncharged offense than the offense actually charged is not alegitimate basis for acquittal. Sufficiency of evidence is reviewedby comparing the evidence adduced at trial to the elements ofthe offense actually charged. Because D fraudulently alteredinformation that was handwritten on a legitimate prescriptionform, the evidence did not support a conviction for the offensecharged.