The Essential Debate: Combined Arms and the ... - Australian Army

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Tactics Lieutenant Colonel David KilcullenThe Jenin battle showed the adaptability of the IDF in being able to change itstactics in the middle of the operation. After initially employing unsupported infantrythat manoeuvred through an urban maze and suffered casualties, the Israeli militaryassembled combined arms teams, which, although larger than the teams that havebeen considered in this article, worked relatively autonomously. These combinedarms teams centred on the D9 bulldozer, which was used in the role of an assaultdetachment, with infantry and tanks providing suppression and support. While thebattle of Jenin was inconclusive in terms of the overall Israeli campaign, the actionrepresented a tactical success for the IDF.The British Experience in Iraq: the Battle of BasraIn April 2003, British forces attacked the southern Iraqi city of Basra as part of theUS-led Coalition advance into Iraq. The original operational plan did not envisagethe occupation of Basra, and as a result, the city was never fully invested by invadingCoalition forces. The British Army initially broke into the urban area by securing thetown of As Zubayr and the airport on the city outskirts. As British forces penetratedthe city, they relied on suppression from organic direct-fire weapons, aviationsupport and precision air weapons rather than blanket indirect fires. British troopsoperated in small groups, with armoured vehicles grouped down to platoon andsometimes section level. Special Forces worked closely with intelligence personnel togenerate situational awareness, although most units still needed to ‘fight for information’.British artillery pieces never entered Basra, although mortars were employed.Once enemy Iraqi centres of resistancewere identified and suppressed, Britishforces attacked from three directions,… the close battle in complexneutralising the Ba’ath party headquartersterrain is a decentralisedand then beginning a transition towardssecurity operations. 5phenomenon: a subaltern’sParticipants in the battle for Basra war that is built around small,have highlighted the small-team approachmobile teams that needadopted by the British Army. A battalionheadquarters became a ‘clearing house’ all-arms representation …for fires, support and information, whilethe fight itself was largely a company andplatoon commander’s battle. A typical British Army section organisation includedtwo dismounted fire teams, each consisting of four men; a Warrior Infantry FightingVehicle, possibly a tank; and some indirect-fire observers and engineers. Within theinfantry fire teams, the weapons mix favoured an ‘attack by fire’ tactical approach. Inat least one battalion, dismounted fire teams included no riflemen. Rather, the fireteams consisted of a gunner with a 7.62 mm MAG 58 General Purpose Machine-page 76 Volume I, Number 2 Australian Army Journal
The Essential Debategun, two Minimi gunners with 5.56 mm Light Support Weapons, and one grenadierwith a 40 mm grenade launcher. During the fighting, the British made extensive useof snipers armed with 7.62 mm and .50-calibre weapons.The British tactical approach at Basra proved extremely expensive in ammunition,and the Warrior fighting vehicle was used as a mobile ammunition resupply point.However, the invulnerability of both the Warrior and the Challenger tank to portableanti-armour weapons proved to be a critical factor in British military success. 6 Thebattle at Basra was one of the most successful actions of the entire Coalition campaignin Iraq. The operation resulted in the successful capture of Basra against significantopposition, but with minimalloss of life and limited damage to theinfrastructure of the city. The successof British tactics reportedly influencedthe American military’s approach to thesubsequent battle for Baghdad. 7The above examples from recentIsraeli and British military operationsdemonstrate that several armies haveadopted a combined arms organisationfor close combat in complex terrain.The Israeli and British methodsThe infantry battalion needs tobecome an organisation gearedto providing task-organisedgroups for dismountedclose combat as part of acombined-arms team.resemble the techniques proposed earlier in this article—that is, non-linear infiltrationby small, semi-autonomous combined-arms teams, moving from point topoint, applying firepower to win the suppression battle. The success of this tacticalapproach in contemporary military operations suggests that it is worth consideringwithin the Australian Army and the ADF.Future Combined–arms Tactics: Implicationsfor the Australian ArmyThe central implication that stems from the analysis advanced in this article is that theAustralian Army force elements must operate as combined arms teams. While sucha conclusion may be self-evident, there are organisational and doctrinal features thatrequire close attention. The Army should expect combined arms teams to be smaller infuture, leading to increased reliance on the initiative, professional judgment and technicalskill of our junior commanders. The Army should also expect smaller combinedarmsteams to include a mixture of traditional and non-traditional elements—not simplycombat-arms elements, but also specialist detachments that may be joint service orinter-agency in composition. A key requirement in our doctrine will be the need to trainand rehearse as we intend to fight: in small, semi-autonomous combined-arms teams.Australian Army Journal Volume I, Number 2 page 77
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