The Essential Debate: Combined Arms and the ... - Australian Army

Tactics Lieutenant Colonel David Kilcullenexactly the kind of environment that we can expect to confront in close combat incomplex terrain. In such conditions, semi-autonomous teams fighting mini-battlesin a disaggregated battlespace would effectively become miniature battlegroups.A point made strongly by readers of the author’s original article in the June 2003AAJ was the critical importance of adopting a combined arms organisation in closecombat. Such an approach is critical, and no sensible commander would commitforces to battle without first organising available troops into a balanced combinedarmsteam. It is important, however, to emphasise that what a combined arms teamrepresents is a tailored, mission-specific, agile task-grouping that can rapidly reorganiseto deal with a changing situation and exploit fleeting tactical opportunities. Amodern army fighting in complex terrain will usually incorporate tanks, dismountedinfantry, mechanised infantry, engineers, artillery, reconnaissance and aviation.However, these traditional military assets may be task-organised at a much lower levelthan contemplated in current Australian doctrine. The combined arms team is alsolikely to include more novel elements such as electronic warfare, human intelligenceassets, civil–military operations teams, deployable logistics and networked communications.These are ‘non-traditional’ assets in the sense that they have usually been heldat the higher-force level, rather than be allocated to fulfilling the task of small-teammanoeuvre. Yet modern armies are increasinglyrealising that, for military effectiveness, these veryassets must be present at the small-group level aswell as at the higher-force level.Close combat in complex terrain requiressmall, networked, mutually supporting semiautonomousteams. As a result, the principles ofbattle grouping and task organisation to createcombined arms teams need to be applied at amuch lower tactical level in the future. Frequently,we have battle grouped at battalion–regimentClose combat in complexterrain requires small,networked, mutuallysupporting semiautonomousteams.and company–squadron levels. Yet in a disaggregated battlespace, such high-levelbattle grouping is of little assistance in maximising combat power. Irrespective ofhow comprehensive a battalion commander’s situational awareness may be, or howeffective his supporting assets are, if these advantages cannot be brought to bear atthe critical time and place, they cannot be considered to be combat multipliers. Inthe complex conflict environment outlined in this article, the critical time may belittle more than a fleeting opportunity while the critical place may be a ‘mini-battle’that occurs at the fire team or section level. These new combat conditions mean thatwe must begin to consider battle-grouping troops at a much lower tactical level,possibly at intra-platoon or even intra-section level.page 74 Volume I, Number 2 Australian Army Journal