The Essential Debate: Combined Arms and the ... - Australian Army

Tactics Lieutenant Colonel David Kilcullencurrent doctrine suggests the application of fire in order to support movement.Hence, we have developed the notion of ‘fire support’ for manoeuvre in order toenable victory in battle. In short, we fire in order to support manoeuvre, then wemanoeuvre in order to win. In practice, however, infantry using such tactics incomplex terrain (such as villages, towns, and mountainous or heavily forested areas)tend to lack firepower within the assigned ‘fire support group’. This inadequacy oforganic firepower often compels an attacking infantry force into a series of timeconsuming,limited assaults that may be costlyin terms of casualties, collateral damage andfighting power. Traditional tactics continue toapply linear concepts, such as axes of advance,limits of exploitation and lines of departure.In complex terrain, however, points ratherthan lines seem to be more important factorsin the calculus of combat. For example, troopsengaged in close combat seldom advance in neatlinear movements, or in set formations alongIn the close fight, soldierstend to operate in small,semi-autonomous teamsthat ‘flock’ or ‘swarm’ …pre-planned lines of exploitation. Instead, as operational experience and trainingsimulation demonstrate, troops move from point to point, establishing a series ofpositions from which they can observe, suppress and attack the enemy by deliveringfire. Soldiers in close combat engagements tend to move using covered approachesthat are often non-linear in character while fighting in a cycle of ‘observe–suppress–move–clear–observe’. In the close fight, soldiers tend to operate in small, semi-autonomousteams that ‘flock’ or ‘swarm’, rather than move forward in large linear-basedgroups. Because of the reality of close combat, it probably makes more sense toconsider terrain in terms of representing a network of points and nodes, rather thanas a sequence of lines. Under a point or nodal model of attack, manoeuvre supportsfire. In other words, troops manoeuvre in order to generate effective fire, and thenapply this fire in order to neutralise the enemy and achieve victory.In traditional doctrinal tactics, it is normal to regard the reserve force as a bodyof troops held under the commander’s immediate control and committed whenrequired to consolidate military success. However, the development of high-fidelitysimulation through the use of the individual weapons effects simulation system(IWESS), combined with recent operational experience, now provides us with abody of empirical evidence that may help to change the way in which we viewthe role of the reserve. Evidence from both IWESS and recent operations tends toconfirm what most combat-experienced leaders have been warning about for manyyears, namely that the act of committing more troops seldom guarantees tacticalsuccess in complex terrain. On the contrary, the use of greater numbers of infantryin an assault often simply means that the attacking force will suffer higher casualties.page 68 Volume I, Number 2 Australian Army Journal