V. PRINCIPLES ESTABLISHED 43majority representative. The Board has treated this problem andthese possibilities in a number of cases cited in the margin. 84C. COLLECTIVE BARGAININGSection 8 (5) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer—to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees,subject to the provisions of section 9 (a).By section 9 (a) the representative designated by the majority ofthe employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit is theexclusive representative of all the employees in such unit "for thepurposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages,hours of employment, or other conditions of employment.' Accordingly,the Board has held it to be an unfair labor practice withinsection 8 (5) for an employer to refuse to negotiate with the statutoryrepresentative concerning conditions of employment. Thus inMatter of Singer Manufacturing Co. and Electrical, Radio & MachineWorkers of America, etc., 86 the Board held that the employer's refusalto negotiate concerning paid holidays, vacations and bonuses, constitutedan infraction of section 8 (5). And in Matter of Wash,ougalWoolen Mills and Local 137, etc.,66 the Board held that the employerwas obligated to negotiate with the statutory representative concerningthe reinstatement and demands of certain strikers :The respondent took the position * * * that it was not obligated tobargain with respect to the employees who had walked out since they were nolonger in its employment * * * These employees * * were engagedIn a current labor dispute and were, accordingly, employees within section 2(3) of the act. The respondent was, therefore, obligated to bargain withrespect to them upon request of the union. Moreover, without regard to thestatus of these persons within section 2 (3) of the act the union demands ofNovember 18 and December 12 that the respondent reinstate the employeeswho had left work and submit the matter in dispute to arbitration were legitimatesubjects of bargaining within section 9 (a) of the act, and therefore therespondent was obligated to negotiate with the union with respect to thosedemands.In Matter of Aladdin Industries, Inc., and United Automobile Workersof America, etc.," the Board held that a union demand upon anemployer to discharge a supervisor was a demand with respect toconditions of employment and stated :The type of supervisor under whom an employee works is of direct concernto the employee and may be of vital importance to him. The conduct of asupervisor may affect an employee's well-being as much as low pay, long hours,or other unsatisfactory conditions of work. A dispute involving the dischargeor demotion of a supervisor objectionable to the employees is, we think, adispute concerning a condition of employment * * *Various forms through which the employer's unlawful refusal to"Matter of Ansley Radio Corporation and Local LUZ etc., 18 N. L. R. B., No. 108;Matter of J. E. Pearce Contracting and Stevedoring Co., Inc. and International Longahoremen'sand Warehousemen's Union, etc., 20 N. L. R. B., No. 102; Matter of Pacific GreyhoundLinea and Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 22 N. L. R. B., No. 12, reopenedJuly 27, 1940. Cf. Matter of M and M Woodworking Co. and Plywood it Veneer Workers'Union, etc., 6 N. L. R. B. 372, set aside in M and M Woodworking Company v. N. L. R. B..101 F. (2d) 938 (C. C. A. 9) ; Matter of Smith Wood Products, Inc. and Plywood andVeneer Workers' Union, etc., 7 N. L. R. B. 950.as 24 N. L. R. B., No. 41.6.3 23 N. L. R. B., No. 1.6T 22 N. L. R. B., No. 101.275987-41-4
44 FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT OF <strong>NATIONAL</strong> <strong>LAB</strong>OR <strong>RELATIONS</strong> <strong>BOARD</strong>negotiate may be manifested are set forth in previous annualreports."The Board has held to be inadequate a number of excuses offeredby the employer in an effort to prove that he has been relieved of hisduty to bargain collectively." Thus, during the past fiscal period theBoard rejected the following defenses offered in attempted justificationof a refusal to negotiate with the exclusive representative : Theemployer refused to enter into any contract or make any counterproposalwhile the Wages and Hours Bill was pending ; T° the employerrelied upon a prior sit-down strike as a reason for refusing to bargain;71 the employer relied on the exclusive representative's refusal toaccept as a condition precedent to bargaining that it secure agreementsfrom the employer's competitors; 72 the employer relied on possiblereprisals from a labor organization competing with the statutoryrepresentative if it bargained with such representative ; 73 the employerrefused to negotiate with the statutory representative because it hadsigned a closed-shop contract with a competing union under conditionswhich the Board found not to bar an investigation of representatives;74 the employer relied on the exclusive representative's refusalto withdraw charges pending before the Board; 75 the employerrefused to negotiate on the ground that its labor relations were(I8 See for example, Third Annual Report, pp. 90-92; Fourth Annual Report, p. 65.ea See for example, Third Annual Report, pp. 92-96; Fourth Annual Report, pp. 65-66.TOmatter of P. Lorillard Company, Louisville, Ky. and Local Union No. 201, etc., 16N. L. R. B. 703. The Board said :"Clearly, any contract would have been governed by legislation which was passed andany counterproposal could have been made subject to any changes later required by suchlegislation."/1 Matter of Universal Film Exchange, Inc. and United Office & Professional Workersof America, Local No. 2, 13 N. L. R. B. 484. The Board said :"The respondent, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in the Fansteel case [306U. S. 240], contended that the respondent had the right to discharge the striking employees,and was therefore under no obligation to bargain with them under section 8 (5)of the act. While the respondent may have stood absolved by the conduct of those engagedin the 'sit down' from any duty to reemploy them, the respondent was nevertheless freeto offer them reemployment if it chose. By reinstating these workers to their formerpositions, the respondent accepted them as employees with all the rights of employeesunder the act. To sustain the contentions of the respondent would involve recognitionof its right forever in the future to disregard with impunity wage and hour, safety, andsanitation legislation as to these employees merely because they had on a previous occasionengaged in a 'sit down' strike. The argument of the respondent is obviously without merit."Matter of Samuel You/in, et al. and International Ladies Garment Workers Union,0. I. 0., 22 N. L. R. B., No. 65; cf. Matter of Mc Quay-Norris Manufacturing Co. andUnited Automobile Workers Union of America, Local No. 226, 21 N. L. R. B., No. 72, wherethe Board stated :"The respondent relies also on the fact that U. A. W. A. the parent organization ofLocal 226, has entered into contracts with competitors of the respondent which do notinclude an exclusive recognition clause. The record does not reveal, however, that thelocals of U. A. W. A. were entitled to exclusive recognition under the Act at these plants,or, if they were so entitled, that they did not strive to gain exclusive recognition fromthese other companies. The mere fact that a labor organization has not obtained exclusiverecognition from other employers does not justify the instant employer in withholdingthat to which the labor organization is entitled under the act. If any competitive disadvantagewould accrue to the respondent by accepting the exclusive recognition clause,such disadvantage would not excuse its failure to grant Local 226 the recognition to whichit is entitled since the act 'permits no immunity because the employer may think thatthe exigencies of the moment require infraction of the statute' [citing N. L. R. B. v. StarPublishing Co., 97 F. (2d) 465 (C C. A. 9)1."IT Matter of MeQuay-Norris cited ' In the previous note : "This argument is not differentIn kind from the one overruled by the Circuit Court of Appeals In <strong>National</strong> <strong>Labor</strong> <strong>Relations</strong>Board v. Star Publishing Co. [cited in previous note]." Cf. Matter of Westingd Manufacturing Co. and United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of-house ElectricAmerica, et al. 22 N. L. R. B., No. 18.74 matter of 'Pacific Greyhound Lines and Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 22 N. LR. B.. No. 12., reopened July 27, 1940.Ti Matter of Hartsell Mills Co. and Textile Workers Organizing Committee, 18 N. L. R. B.,No. 43, mod. & enf'd Hartsell Mills Co. v. N. L. R. B., 111 F. (26) 291 (C. C. A. 4). Thecourt in sustaining the Board's position said"* • * it is clear that petitioner could not thus make its compliance with theact dependent upon dismissal of charges that it had been guilty of violating it."