V. PRIN ICAPLES ESTABLISHED 47As we regard the entire record the conclusion is inescapable that the respondentsneither bargained nor intended to bargain collectively with the union. Theyshrewdly recognized the union for what it claimed to be and accorded it thecourtesy of interviews. They listened with respectful attention to the union'sdemands and pretended to weigh and trade advantage against disadvantage asmight be expected of persons genuinely engaged in a bargaining effort. Theyaffected some semblance of an endeavor to reach a mutunl understanding buton scrutinizing the verbiage to which they resorted we find that this effort waspalpably insincere.It is also well established that the employer is not complying withthe terms of section 8 (5) unless he accords to the statutory representativeexclusive recognition.88 The Board has held that there is includedin the employer's obligation under section 8 (5) as a reasonablyappropriate method of precluding an employer from making itnugatory a duty, upon request of the union, to incorporate into awritten contract which the parties are negotiating full recognition ofthe union in express terms as exclusive bargaining agent. Similarly,the Board held it to be an unfair labor practice within section 8 (5)for the employer to insist that the collective bargaining contractrecognize the statutory representative as exclusive representative onlyso long as it continued to represent a majority of the employees andempower the employer to call an election whenever the employer desiredto determine whether the union still represented a majority."The employer's duty to accept the procedure of collective bargainingas historically practiced also requires a willingness to meet theexclusive representative in personal conferences and negotiations.The Board so held in the Lorillard cases :Bargaining in the field of labor relations is customarily carried on over theconference table at which the representatives of both parties confront each otherand exercise that personal and oral persuasion of which they are capable.While it may be that negotiations through the mails or by other indirect methodsfulfills the statutory requirement when both parties accept that procedure, wethink it clear that the act contemplates that under ordinary circumstances personalconferences should be held if requested by either party.In these cases, the Board also held "that the procedure of collectivebargaining requires that the employer make his representatives availablefor conferences at reasonable times and places and in such amanner that personal negotiations are practicable" and that "thequestion of whether the employer has furnished reasonable facilitiesfor collective bargaining is a question of fact in each case." TheBoard found on the facts of those cases that the employer by its refusalto engage in face-to-face conferences with the statutory representativein the cities where the plants were located, and by its insistencethat conferences be held only in New York City which wasdistant from the location of the plants in question, had not furnishedreasonable facilities for collective bargaining and consequently hadnot fulfilled its obligation to bargain collectively under section 8 (5)of the act.to Third Annual Report. pp. 100-102.a Matter of Mc Quay-Norris Manufacturing Co. and United Automobile Workers ofAmerica, Local 226, 21 N. L. R. B., No. 72, citing, inter' alia, Art Metals Construction CO. V.N. L. R. B., 110 F. (2d) 148 (C. C. A. 2).° Matter of Woodside Cotton Mills and Textile Workers Organizing Committee, 21N. L. R. B • No. 7.91 Matter of P. Lorillard Company, Middletown, Ohio, and Pioneer Tobacco Workers Localetc., 18 N. L. R. B. 483; Matter of P. Lorillard Company, Louisville, Kentucky, and LocalUnion No. 201, etc., 16 N. L. R. B. 703.
48 FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT OF <strong>NATIONAL</strong> <strong>LAB</strong>OR <strong>RELATIONS</strong> <strong>BOARD</strong>The Board has also taken the position in a number of cases thatan employer's unilateral determination of a term of employment withrespect to which a statutory representative is attempting to bargainconstitutes a refusal to bargain collectively within the meaning ofsection 8 (5)."In a long line of cases, starting with Matter of St. Joseph StockyardsCompany," the Board has explained the employer's duties,inhering in its obligation to accept the procedure of collective bargainingas historically practiced? to embody understandings reachedwith the statutory representative in a binding agreement and normallyto place such contract in writing, upon request of the union. 94 Matterof Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Co., etc., and UnitedElectrical Radio & Machine Workers of America, ete., 95 decidedduring the last fiscal year, is a leading case in this series. There, thecompanies conferred with the statutory representatives, stated thatthey recognized the statutory representatives as exclusive bargainingrepresentatives, negotiated with them concerning terms of employment,and posted written statements of policy signed by the companies,summarizing the position of the companies on the mattersdiscussed. These statements of policy stated that the companiesrecognized the statutory representatives as exclusive bargaining representatives,that the position of the companies therein set forth hadbeen reached after negotiations and discussions with the statutoryrepresentatives, and would be in effect until further notice. Thecompanies reserved to themselves the right to decide what constitutedreasonable notice of changes, refused to permit the statutory rep-02 Matter of Whittier Mills Co., etc. and Textile Workers Organizing Committee, 15N. L. R. B. 457, enf'd N. L. R. B. v. Whittier Mills Co., 111 F. (2d) 474 (C. C. A. 5;Matter of Brown Shoe Co., etc. and <strong>National</strong> Leather Workers Association, etc., 22 N. L. R. B.,No. 93 ; Matter of John J. Oughton, etc. and Textile Workers Organizing Committee, etc.,20 N. L. R. B No. 31; Matter of 'Wilson and Co., Inc. and United Packinghouse Workers,etc., 19 N. L. If. B., No. 99 • Matter of Dallas Cartage Co. and Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters,Chauffeurs, Stablemen, and Helpers of America, etc., 14 N. L. R. B., No. 411. In the lastcited case the Board said :"That the respondents themselves recognized no sense of their responsibility to bargaincollectively is betrayed by the wage-cut action of the respondent Dallas. While the allegedprocess of bargaining was going forward and the union awaited financial statements bywhich to guide the fixing of scales, the respondent took drastic unilateral action withoutconsultation with or previous notice to the very party with which it was presumably dealingon that topic in good faith • • • It seemed not to occur to the respondents or theirattorneys that it was of the essence of collective bargaining that no rupture be created intheir dealings by forcing upon the union n fait accompli in a matter then under negotiation"Cf. Matter or The Emerson Electric Manufacturing Co., etc. and Local No. 1102, etc., 13N. L. R. B. 448. There the employer had a collective bargaining contract covering "all theterms and conditions of employment" for the contract period and forbidding during thatperiod "change or additions by either of the parties." The company for a long numberof years had been issuing a booklet of rules and information. During the period of thecontract, the company issued a revised edition of the booklet which was more full and completethan any previous issue. The booklet provided for the signature of the employeefollowing a clause which read, "I • • • agree to abide by the rules and informationcontained therein." The union denounced the booklet as unlawful and demanded that theemployer withdraw it and consult the union on all rules or regulations concerning workingconditions prior to the issuance of any booklet on any subject. The union also claimedthat an employee, by signing the booklet, in effect executed an individual contract. Theemployer agreed not to require signatures to copies of the booklet but refused to withdrawit from circulation. The Board in holding that the issuance of the booklet did not infringesection 8 (1), stated : "We are convinced, however, that it was not the Intention of therespondent in issuing the booklet to modify or in any way affect the operation of the contract* * • We are satisfied that any question which might arise concerning any specificobjectionable rule or statement in the booklet can be settled through the grievance procedureset forth in the contract. The respondent has demonstrated its good faith in that respectby notifying the union, after the latter voiced its objection to the flyleaf, that no employeewould be asked to sign the flyleaf"99 Matte?! of St. Joseph Stockyards Company and Antal. Meat Cutters d Butcher Workmenof N. Amer., etc., 2 N. L. R. B. 39.91 See Second Annual Report, p. 81; Third Annual Report, pp. 102-104; Fourth AnnualReport., pp. 60-68.95 22 N. L. R. B., No 13.