evaluation of general food distribution in northern uganda: gulu ...

List of Contents1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY..................................................................................... 11.1 Project Relevance & Appropriateness .................................................................... 11.2 Project Efficiency & Coverage................................................................................. 21.3 Project Effectiveness & Impact ............................................................................... 31.4 Coordination............................................................................................................. 61.5 Connectedness – Relief & Recovery....................................................................... 61.6 Phasing Out Food Aid.............................................................................................. 72 INTRODUCTION................................................................................................. 82.1 Objectives & Methodology of the Evaluation ......................................................... 82.2 Structure of the Evaluation Report ......................................................................... 93 NORTHERN UGANDA – A CHALLENGING CONTEXT.................................. 103.1 Poverty & Conflict in Northern Uganda ................................................................ 103.2 Peace Process & Returns ...................................................................................... 103.3 Government Policies, Plans & Services ............................................................... 113.4 Global Food Politics & Local Prices ..................................................................... 124 PROTECTING THE RIGHT TO FOOD - THE GFD PROJECT......................... 154.1 GFD Project Objectives.......................................................................................... 154.2 Alignment to NRC’s Policies ................................................................................. 155 PROJECT RELEVANCE & APPROPRIATENESS .......................................... 175.1 Being There at the Right Time............................................................................... 175.2 Appropriateness of Food Aid in Protracted Conflicts ......................................... 175.3 Lesson Learned...................................................................................................... 195.4 Recommendations ................................................................................................. 196 PROJECT EFFICIENCY & COVERAGE .......................................................... 20iii

6.1 Dealing with Logistics, Security & Delays ............................................................ 206.2 The Value of Building a Dedicated & Flexible Organisation ................................ 216.3 Beneficiaries Help Distributing Food .................................................................... 216.4 But Does Everybody Get a Share – Getting the Numbers Right? ....................... 226.5 Lesson Learned...................................................................................................... 236.6 Recommendations ................................................................................................. 237 PROJECT EFFECTIVENESS ........................................................................... 257.1 Project Objective 1 ................................................................................................. 257.1.1 Traditional Nutrition & Diet in Northern Uganda .......................................... 257.1.2 Nutrition & Diet Provided During the Conflict .............................................. 257.1.3 Employing the Fair Share ‘Family Size Model’ ............................................. 267.1.4 Have Beneficiary Needs & Demands been met? .......................................... 267.1.5 Responding to Complaints ............................................................................ 277.1.6 But People Have Been Kept Alive ................................................................. 287.1.7 Lesson Learned .............................................................................................. 297.1.8 Recommendations ......................................................................................... 297.2 Project Objective 2 ................................................................................................. 307.2.1 The Evidence Base for Ration Reductions ................................................... 307.2.2 Covering the Net Food Gap – How do People Cope? .................................. 337.2.3 Stimulating Other Options ............................................................................. 367.2.4 Lesson Learned .............................................................................................. 367.2.5 Recommendations ......................................................................................... 367.3 Project Objective 3:................................................................................................ 377.3.1 Targeting Food Aid......................................................................................... 377.3.2 Categorising People ....................................................................................... 377.3.3 Empowering Women in a Disempowered Situation ..................................... 387.3.4 A Future Strategy for EVIs? ........................................................................... 397.3.5 Lesson Learned .............................................................................................. 397.3.6 Recommendations ......................................................................................... 408 COORDINATION .............................................................................................. 418.1 A Co-ordinated Response in the Field.................................................................. 418.2 WFP – NRC: A Mutual Partnership........................................................................ 438.3 Lessons .................................................................................................................. 438.4 Recommendations ................................................................................................. 439 RELIEF AND RECOVERY – CONNECTEDNESS............................................ 459.1 From Relief to Recovery – The Linkages.............................................................. 459.2 From Relief to Recovery – The Gaps .................................................................... 45iv

9.3 NRC’s Efforts Towards Connectedness ............................................................... 479.4 Lessons Learnt....................................................................................................... 499.5 Recommendations ................................................................................................. 4910 YEARS OF FOOD AID - IMPACT ................................................................. 5010.1 Women’s Empowerment/Crisis of Masculinity .................................................... 5010.2 Skills Transfer/Employment .................................................................................. 5010.3 Dependency Syndrome.......................................................................................... 5010.4 Creation of Parallel Structures .............................................................................. 5111 PHASING OFF FOOD AID – A DISCUSSION .............................................. 5211.1 Phase Out Strategy on its Way.............................................................................. 5211.2 Piloting the Phase Out in 20 Districts ................................................................... 5211.3 Comments to the Phase Out Efforts ..................................................................... 5311.4 Recommendations for Phase Out ......................................................................... 54ANNEXES1. TOR for the Evaluation2. Evaluation Programme3. List of Documents Consulted4. List of People Met5. Example of a Typical Acholi Menu (pre-IDP)6. Question Guide/Evaluation Toolv

1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARYThis report presents the outcome of an Evaluation of the General Food Distribution project(GFD) in Northern Uganda, commissioned by Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC).The Acholi Sub region in Northern Uganda has been at the centre of a conflict between theGovernment of Uganda (GOU) and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) for more than 22years. The protracted conflict resulted in massive internal population displacements inNorthern Uganda.At the height of the insurgency (2002 -2004) nearly 2 million people were forced to live incrowded camps. The war had a direct impact on people’s lives and ability for survival. Over20.000 children were abducted by the LRA and forced into the rebel forces as chil d soldiers.Abducted girls and young women were subjected to sexual enslavement and forced to serveas wives to LRA rebels. In addition to repeated gross human rights violations, countless liveshave been lost and assets, social infrastructure and liveliho ods destroyed.Health indicators during many years reflected discouraging trends. Between 1995 and 2000infant mortality increased from 81 to 88 deaths per 1000 live births. Mortality amongstchildren under the age of five increased from 147 to 152 per 1 ,000 deaths and by early 2000the global acute malnutrition rates reached an alarming 20% in many parts of the North.From being a farming community once supplying the rest of Uganda with food, people of theNorth became largely dependent on humanitarian a ssistance for their survival.In 1997, the UN World Food Programme (WFP) with NRC as its cooperating partner starteddistributing food to the affected population in Gulu 1 and Kitgum districts. At that time therewas an average of 450,000 Internally Displaced People (IDPs). The number of people todayreceiving monthly food assistance is nearly 755,000 IDPs - located in the camps as well as intransit sites.Having distributed food to IDPs for 10 years NRC decided in 2008 to conduct an evaluationof the GFD project, to obtain a systematic and objective assessment of performance andalso to identify lessons learned which can inform recommendations for future projectdirection. To narrow down the scope and increase relevance for future NRC programming,the evaluation period was defined from 2005 to 2008. The Evaluation was completed in June2008. The main findings and recommendations are summarised below:1.1 Project Relevance & AppropriatenessBeing one of the few NGOs on the ground for nearly a decade and duri ng the peak of theconflict in Northern Uganda, NRC was able to make a timely response to the emergency.Taking on the task as implementing partner for WFP’s food distribution programme wasrelevant viz. the palpable humanitarian needs. Bringing the Countr y Office to the field wasessential to cut costs, bureaucracy, and time and thereby essential for fast decision -makingand eventually quick response. Moreover, having a clear and undisputed humanitarianobjective and policy, measured in simple terms (quantitative indicators) gave NRC a focuseddirection and mandate of work in times of complex emergency and insecurity.Nevertheless, when a conflict develops signs of a protracted situation, it can be beneficial todesign and implement alternative/complementa ry solutions to the humanitarian food aidresponse. This may in some cases require more complex and multi -faceted analysis and1 Gulu district was divided to two administrative districts, Gulu and Amuru in 2007.1

tools; however it ensures food security for the beneficiaries, which ultimately is thehumanitarian obligation of NRC.For future food aid operations, the Evaluation therefore recommends:♦♦♦♦In future humanitarian operations that involve continued food distribution during anextended period of time and on a massive scale NRC’s should continue to prioritise beingclose to the field and implement its undisputed humanitarian objective of serving peoplein need.In protracted situations, NRC should – as now also obliged by its Emergency FoodSecurity and Distribution Policy - as early as possible, explore the possibility of combininggeneral food distribution with alternative strategies. If the situation calls for it and allowsfor it, topping up/complimenting WFP food supplies for a period of time should beconsidered. Alternative strategies should also include livelihoods initiatives, incomegeneration activities, cash programmes or voucher programmes possibly earmarked forfood.Given that this combination of approaches might be new to NRC, some investmentsshould be made in analysis/research, which could lead to developing a toolbox or a kitthat combines cash and in-kind programmes and also considers the options for toppingup/complimenting food supplies. Striking a balance between various approaches ischallenging and should be researched 2 .NRC’s Emergency Food Security and Distri bution Policy should give more concreteguidance on different options and alternative/complimentary solutions that can becombined with the general food distribution activities.1.2 Project Efficiency & CoverageFor approximately USD 1.8 million per year, NR C has organised, arranged, distributed andmonitored food assistance to some 755,000 people on a monthly basis during insecure andrestrictive times. This means on average a cost of USD 2.3 per IDP per year. This cost isover and above the expenditures for food itself and WFP’s own costs. In view of the efficientfield operation, use of local resource base and the number of beneficiaries reached costefficiency may be argued to be similar to other operations of this magnitude.NRC has distributed food without major delays or failures, despite WFP pipeline breakages,storage shortages, low trucking capacity or funding delays etc. This has indeed beenpossible because of a flexible work force of experienced and disciplined people who havegrown with the organisation and possesses detailed local knowledge. The investment incapacity building of 200 volunteers has proven worthwhile. In addition, m anagement andground supervision of the operation with constant communication and dialogue withbeneficiaries and camp/community networks provides smooth distribution of aid and anopportunity to solve conflicts and problems that may arise along the way. When beneficiariesare involved as much as possible a fair and dignified distribution of food aid may be ensuredand hence also a mitigation of potential conflicts amongst beneficiaries.However, revalidation and verification exercises for food registration take a lot of time andrequire close supervision and management. When data collection, entry and verification areoutsourced to different organisations it leads to many errors and beneficiaries losing out on2In order not to invent the wheel, reference may be made to findings from many safety net programmes, voucher for workprogrammes or cash for work programmes. NRC is at present joining hands with other cluster stakeholders in making jointassessments and the findings of these assessments may inform future alternative strategies.2

food. Rather, one organisation with close contact and overview of the beneficiaries should doit. Verifying the print list before entering the data into the database is a fundamental ‘checkpoint’if errors are to be captured before they make their way into the final list, from whichWFP allocates its metric tonnes.Hence it is recommended that:♦♦♦♦For future food aid operations, NRC should learn from the orga nisational set-up andhuman resource pool in Uganda and build well equipped operations based on localknowledge and capacities.The terms and conditions of the current volunteer work force should be assessed toprovide people with a more competitive package. Also, the capacity of the volunteersshould be assessed in view of possible future expansion of their scope of work into otherprogramme areas that may maximise and benefit from the operational, organisational ortechnical skills of these people.In future food aid projects NRC or WFP should consider delegating/outsourcing the entireverification exercise to one single actor (firm or NGO) to ensure consistency in datacollection, data entry and printing of lists and cards. This way the process is s treamlinedand errors due to many ‘managers’ is minimised. If NRC has the capacity, it should infuture operations offer to take on this task, in view of efficiency, costs and its knowledgeon the ground.Time and resources should be invested in verifying the data on the print list, before it isfinalised and approved by WFP. It will minimize errors and problems at a later stage.Print out of the data base list is in the hands of WFP, however if possible this task couldbe delegated to the implementing agency who has eyes and ears on the ground.1.3 Project Effectiveness & ImpactProject Objective 1: To contribute to household food security and maintain theminimum nutritional and dietary standard by providing food assistance to IDPs inGulu, Amuru and Kitgum districts.Food aid has been vital to fighting (acute) malnutrition and saving peoples lives during theprotracted crisis in Northern Uganda. Composing a food basket with the correct amount andtype is essential to meeting the minimum nutritional dietary standards. But with rationreductions, cuts in the food basket and few alternative options, the maintenance of minimumstandards of 2,100 kcal per person per day is seriously challenged.Moreover, food aid has not been provided according to preferred die tary needs and demandsof the Acholi people and has in several cases also been of inferior quality. The traditionalAcholi diet is rich and diverse. The uniform food basket given over many years has changeddiet habits and nutrition of the IDPs. Being awar e of needs and involving beneficiaries infinding alternative or complimentary solutions to food aid can boost the diet and nutrition andrespond to some of their preferences. In general, changes in food rations, problems withquality, missing food items etc may require more intensive and repeated explanation to theIDPs so as to fully answer complaints.Nevertheless, adjusting distribution mechanisms to the family size system with an emphasisof beneficiary involvement can prove effective in as much as re aching the target populationswith food in a fair way and controlling crowds into an orderly distribution.The Evaluation recommends the following:3

♦♦♦♦With the ration reduction, changes in food basket and inconsistencies in supplies, NRCshould as recommended in Section 1.1 incorporate alternative strategies to food aidprogrammes in a protracted situation. IDPs, with a wealth of dietary knowledge, can bebrought more actively on board to identify ideas or solutions to meet thei r own needs.Based on this, NRC should source for the most feasible operational solution (e.g. toppingup food aid, implementing small scale livelihood activities, initiating cash programmesand stimulate market forces).NRC should include qualitative indicators in the project design to compliment the existingquantitative health indicators, which may not always provide a complete picture.Qualitative indicators could be defined around ‘beneficiary satisfaction’, which NRC hasalready been reporting on in Post Distribution Monitoring Reports.Taking IDPs complaints seriously through actions and recourse increases the feeling of adignified process. In this connection NRC and WFP should reassess the functions andpurpose of the complaint desk with a vie w to improve the use of them and reach a moreeffective complaint handling process.NRC should take other/alternative measures to push for actions and recourse in someareas with persisting complaints (rations cards, verification/print list failures/pipe lineshortages etc). For example more direct communication/advocacy can be made to WFPmanagement.Project Objective 2: To protect lives by providing humanitarian food assistance toIDPs to meet the assessed average net food gap.IDPs have in general not been able to meet their net food gap as quickly as assumed fromthe beginning of the project period. Meeting the net food gap as well as nutritional standardsis challenging if food ration reductions do not go hand in hand with livelihood and foodsecurity expansion, particularly for more vulnerable groups and in the transit sites, wherebasic services are lacking and markets for purchase/sale are far. With the food rationreductions and no immediate livelihood opportunities, IDPs are forced into various c opingstrategies, some more encouraging than others. In worst cases the coping strategies are of adegrading nature, challenging the protection of some of the IDPs.As evidence base for reductions of rations, net food gap coverage etc., the Emergency FoodSecurity Assessments (EFSA) and nutritional surveys are faced with a series ofmethodological limitations, delays and lack of nuances, which question their credibility. Yetthese surveys comprise the sole basis for crucial decision-making on food aid policy inNorthern Uganda. Enhanced corroboration, triangulation of data, comprehensiveness andindependence of the surveys will increase the credibility of the evidence base for decision -making.Therefore the Evaluation recommends:♦To address the reported problems regarding the EFSAs’ methodology and credibility andprovide a more confident basis for decision making and policy development at this time inNorthern Uganda, an EFSA cum nutrition survey, independent, and of a higher qualityshould be conducted to establish a more comprehensive and varied assessment of foodsecurity, coping strategies, ability to meet the net food gap etc. The research should beconducted by food aid experts, some of whom may be drawn from current experiencedfood actors on the ground. An independent EFSA need not necessarily replace currentlyplanned EFSAs, but be additional to it. NRC should advocate for and contribute to the4

ealisation of this. (See also recommendations for the Food Phase Out strategy, Section1.6).♦NRC should invest in more specific research of various alternatives to food aid duringand after emergency settings, with a view to strengthen peoples’ coping strategies asquickly as possible (ref. recommendations in Section 1.1).Project Objective 3: To safeguard the fundamental right to food for targeted IDPs withspecial emphasis on women and children, EVIs, and the long -term effect ofinsufficient access to food.When women are actively engaged in food distribution it increases their empowerment andauthority and it also affects traditional household dynamics. As the registered recipients offood aid and involvement in food management committees etc. women have acquiredgreater decision-making power in the household over how and when food utilized and havebecome the de facto breadwinners – a position that was prior to the conflict held by the men.When the extremely vulnerable individuals (EVI) lose out of the food distribution system theybecome even more vulnerable. Discussions have as of recent been devoted to the topic ofEVIs and their future, however, there seems to be little concerted planning made or actionstaken by the actors on the ground. The categorisation of EVIs – still maintained - maybecome counterproductive if efforts are not put into defining and designing a transitionalresponse. This requires thinking ‘out of the box’ and borrowing tools and experience from forexample traditional development programmes that have worked with the ‘m ainstreaming’agenda for years (e.g. mainstreaming gender, HIV/AIDS, human rights etc). In fact,assuming that EVIS will automatically be taken care of by families and friends may not be thecase. Family structures and dynamics have changed and NGOs and ag encies as well asdistricts should be careful in automatically assuming that upon return to the villages‘everything will be normalised’.In view of this, the Evaluation recommends that:♦♦♦NRC should in future food aid projects include a mainstreaming as well as an exitstrategy – in good time - especially for targeted vulnerable groups, so as not to leavethem in a vacuum, once the assistance is phased out.NRC should in the current situation in Northern Uganda be very careful to follow theassumption that EVIs will automatically be taken care of by families and friends as thereturn process picks up and IDPs move back to their villages. NRC should stronglyadvocate for simple and targeted mainstreaming interventions for EVIs, for examplethrough a multi-pronged approach involving 1) strengthening family and community socialsystems 2) strengthening relevant district social sectors to provide services and 3)targeting EVIs with tailor made livelihoods activities.It may be beyond NRC’s mandate/policy to engage fully in the reintegration andmainstreaming of EVIs into society. However, as a preparatory step, there is a need forresearch and documentation in the area of EVIs, through a household survey, which canmore specifically determine the targeted need of people. NRC (together with other NGOsand district authorities) should take the lead on such a survey, which can incorporateseveral household issues, including gender related issues: i.e. assessing changes in thehousehold and community dynamics wh ich food aid brings about on gender roles,changes in traditional practices, social protection and safety nets. This will prepare actorsfor a more realistic and strategic recovery response.5

1.4 CoordinationNRC’s approach to coordination through openness, transparent dialogue and sharing ofinformation with humanitarian organizations, agencies, beneficiaries as well as Governmenthas been imperative to efficient coordination during food distribution. However, lack of activecoordination on behalf of all stakeholders (perhaps due to lack of clear understanding ofroles and responsibilities) is having a negative effect on the current recovery response,leaving IDPs in a void.Therefore the Evaluation recommends the following:♦♦♦NRC should push/advocate for an articulation of roles and responsibilities as well strongcoordination amongst humanitarian actors through the recovery phase.NRC should capitalise on its longstanding good partnership with WFP to push andadvocate more strongly for the solution of long standing problems like e.g. answeringIDPs complaints.NRC is also urged to make its own strategic objectives, buffer budget and contingencyplan, so as not be contingent upon WFP delays and bureaucracy.1.5 Connectedness – Relief & RecoveryStrong and effective leadership is critical for articulating the link between relief and recoveryand for galvanizing early recovery efforts. Lack of leadership in a post emergency situationcreates a sense of paralysis amongst actors. Indeed also co-operation between the differentactors, government/donors/humanitarian agencies/NGOs, is critical for successful recoveryefforts. At present stakeholders do not seem clear of their roles and responsibilities and thishampers a smooth transition into recovery.In a complex situation such as that in northern Uganda, the beneficiaries’ perspectives andneeds of the communities should be the driving force to avoid pushing people into furtherdestitution. Needs’ assessments should be the basis for decision-making in humanitariansituations.Humanitarian organisations working on the ground have sound knowledge of the realitiesand needs of the ground and if properly packaged can be used to influence programmes andpolicy. However, there seems to be few and disperse funds av ailable for the much neededrecovery activities. Availability of funds in a predictable, timely (more than 6 months) andcoherent fashion can improve planning for recovery and assist in implementation of usefullivelihoods programmes.Therefore it is recommended:♦♦With the resources, capacity and goodwill NRC has in Uganda, the organisation shouldtake a lead in advocating for concerted recovery efforts. The current lack of leadershipfrom GoU as well as the humanitarian community should not prohibit NRC fromexercising its mandate and leverage as an independent, capable and important NGO tomove forward and set examples for the recovery process.NRC should advocate for targeted and needs based interventions. This will imply carryingout research and studies (of which some recommendations have been made in thisreport) so as to have a credible evidence base for future programming. Time is not inanybody’s favour. For every delay a farming season for the IDPs may be missed.6

2 INTRODUCTION“…The right to adequate food is realised when every man, woman and child, alone or incommunity with others has physical and economic access at all times to adequate foo d ormeans for its procurement…” 3For the last 22 years, the population in the Acholi region in Northern Uganda, has beenaffected by a violent conflict between the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the Governmentof Uganda (GoU). In 1995-1996, the GoU decreed that all residents of areas affected by theconflict had to move into “protected villages”. These were de facto camps with limited spaceand extremely poor living conditions, creating an unbearable humanitarian situation forthousands of people, which in time triggered a humanitarian response. In 1997, the UNWorld Food Programme (WFP) with the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) as itscooperating partner started distributing food to the affected population in Gulu 4 and Kitgumdistricts. At that time there was an average of 450,000 Internally Displaced People (IDPs).The number of people today receiving monthly food assistance amounts to 755,000 IDPs 5 -located in the camps as well as in transit sites. In 2007 NRC distributed food to 458,000 IDPsin 65 camps and 27 transit sites in Gulu and Amuru districts, and 297,000 IDPs in 26 campsand 13 transit sites in Kitgum district. 6The objectives of the General Food Distribution Project have been to:1. To contribute to household food security and maintain the minimum nutritional anddietary standard by providing food assistance to people affected by displacement incamps in Gulu, Amuru and Kitgum districts.2. To protect lives by providing humanitarian food assistance to IDPs to meet the assessedaverage net food gap.3. To safeguard the fundamental right to food for targeted IDPs with special emphasis onwomen and children, EVIs, and the long-term effect of insufficient access to food.After distributing food to IDPs for 10 years NRC decided in 2008 to conduct an evaluation ofthe GFD project. The purpose being to obtain a systematic and objective assessment of theachievements and performance of the GFD project viz the realisation of the three objective,and subsequently also to identify lessons learned which can inform recommendations forfuture project direction. To narrow down the scope and increase relevance for future NRCprogramming, the evaluation period was defined from 2005 to 2008.2.1 Objectives & Methodology of the EvaluationIn order to assess the performance and achievements of the GFD project the followingOECD DAC evaluation criteria has been used: Relevance/Appropriateness; ProjectEfficiency and Coverage, Project Effectiveness, Coordination, Impact andLinkages/Connectedness.The GFD evaluation methodology comprised three phases: i) an inception/desk phase tomake necessary logistical arrangements, review relevant documents and develop anevaluation tool/question guide; ii) a field phase to collect qualitative data throughobservations and interviews/consultations with stakeholders; and (iii) a synthesis phasebringing together the results of the field and desk phases.3The UN charter on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights4Gulu was divided in two administrative districts in 2007, Gulu and Amuru5 The NRC Food distribution program as cooperating partner to WFP covers the districts of Gulu, Amuru and Kitgum. Paderdistrict is covered by World Vision.6 The following part is summarised from NRC Evaluation TOR8

NRC coincided the field phase of the evaluation with their monthly food distribution activitiesin order to provide the Evaluation Team an opportunity to follow ‘activities on the ground’.Subsequently the Evaluation Team spent two weeks in Gulu, Amuru and Kitgum from 14 th -25 th April. During the field phase several meetings and discussions were held with the NRCGFD team and other NRC programme staff as well as management (Gulu and Kitgum). Aseries of consultations and interviews were carried out with district officials (DDMCs, LCVsand RDCs) in the three districts. In addition interviews were conducted with humanitarianactors and implementing agencies in the food security, nutrition and coordination clusters(WFP, FAO, UNOCHA, UNHCR etc). In Kampala interviews were held with donor agenciesand WFP Country Office. A full list of people consulted is attached in Annex 4.In order to obtain detailed information from the IDPs a series of focus group discussions(FGDs) and individual interviews were held in a number of camps and transit sites. SomeFGDs were held exclusively with extremely vulnerable individuals or men or women. Othergroups were mixed. The camps and transit sites visited are presented in table 1 below:Table 1: Camps and Transit Sites VisitedDistrict Date Location ActivityKitgum 17 th April Amida IDP Camp Observation of Food DistributionFGD with 10 IDPs (male a nd female)Key Information Interviews with 2 women (NEVI)17 th April Lukwor Transit site FGD with 15 people (EVI and NEVI)18 th April Pawidi Transit site FGD with 15 people – and later plenary discussion with 37IDPs (female and male (EVI and NEVI)18 th April Omiya Anyima IDP Observation of Food DistributionCampGulu 15 th April Opit IDP Camp FGD with 20 Food Management Committee membersKey informant Interviews with selected EVIs22 nd April Orafwoyo TransitsiteFGD with 15 IDPs – later deve loped into plenary sessionswith 30 IDPs (women and men)22 nd April Acet IDP camp Observation of Food DistributionKey Information Interview with 2 female beneficiaries(EVIs)Amuru 21 st April Amuru IDP Camp FGD with 21 IDPs (men and women)FGD 16 Food Management Committee membersThe combination of all these actors ensured, that a balanced approach was made to coverstakeholders from all levels and as many voices as possible have been heard.The Evaluation Team consisted of Rekha Das and Anne Nkutu of Nordic Consulting Group,Uganda. The Evaluation Team would like to extend its thanks to all the stakeholders whopatiently participated in this evaluation exercise. Your views and opinions have been ofimportance to the input to the report. Special thanks are also extended to the NRC GFDteam who played an important role in facilitating the logistics and contacts and a smooth fieldvisit.2.2 Structure of the Evaluation ReportAfter a brief context description and an introduction to the GFD project, the fo llowing pageswill analyse and discuss the performance, achievements and challenges, which the NRCimplemented GFD project has faced. The chapters are sequenced as follows: Relevance &Appropriateness; Efficiency &Coverage; Project Effectiveness (analysing the fulfilments ofthe three GFD objectives); Coordination; Connectedness (between relief and recovery);Impact and finally a discussion of the scenario of Phasing off food aid in Northern Uganda.Each chapter discusses findings/achievements/concerns and wraps up with lessons learnedand recommendations.9

3 NORTHERN UGANDA – A CHALLENGING CONTEXT3.1 Poverty & Conflict in Northern UgandaThe districts of Amuru, Gulu, Kitgum and Pader in the Acholi Sub region in Northern Ugandahave been at the centre of a conflict between the Government of Uganda (GOU) and theLord’s Resistance Army (LRA) for more than 22 years. The protracted conflict has lead tomassive internal population displacements in Northern Uganda. At the height of theinsurgency (2002 -2004) nearly 2 million people were forced to live in crowded camps. In theAcholi region alone, more than a million people were living in 112 camps. Insecurityhampered free movement, to the effect that people were confined in camps for years 7 . Thiscontributed to making North Uganda the third, among the 10 worst internal displacementsituations in the world 8 .The war had a direct impact on people’s lives and ability for survival. Over 20.000 childrenhave been abducted by the LRA and forced into the rebel forces as child soldiers. Abductedgirls and young women were subjected to sexual enslavement and forced to serve as wivesto LRA rebels 9 . In addition to repeated gross human rights violations 10 , countless lives havebeen lost and assets, social infrastructure and livelihoods destroyed. Health indicators duringmany years reflected discouraging trends. Between 1995 and 2000 infant mortality increasedfrom 81 to 88 deaths per 1000 live births. Mortality amongst children under the age of fiveincreased from 147 to 152 per 1,000 deaths 11 , stunting reached the level of 39% and by early2000 the global acute malnutrition rates reached an alarming 20% in many parts of theNorth. 12Northern Uganda accounts for over 20% of Uganda’s arable land. Traditionally this area wasknown as the breadbasket of Uganda as it produced a food surplus that was sold in otherparts of the country. However, the impact of the conflict changed this favourable situation,and from being farmers and livestock herders, people became largely dependent onhumanitarian assistance for their survival. The conflict has contributed to high poverty levels,which range between 61 – 70% and are more than double the national average of 31% 13 .The war widened the poverty gap between the North and the rest of the country from 17% in1992 to 30% in 2005/06. Today, almost half (44.3%) of the poorest 20% in Uganda live inNorthern Uganda, many of whom are extremely vulnerable individuals 14 .With time the humanitarian crisis has drawn international attention. Resourc es channelledtowards emergency assistance have grown substantially from USD 42 million in 2002, USD204 million in 2006 and close to USD 300 million in 2007. 15 Although the regularity of thehumanitarian assistance varied due to the security situation, provision of basic socialservices, food, medicine and other support services have been extended to the IDPs.3.2 Peace Process & ReturnsThe security situation in Northern Uganda has improved significantly since the signing of acessation of hostilities agreement in August 2006 and the peace talks in Juba. The respiteimproved mobility, access for humanitarian assistance, increased movement, access to land,and sparked the re-emergence of economic life in parts of the region. However, while the7EU, 2007: Northern Uganda Agricultural Recovery Programme: Identification Mission Report8IDMC/NRC: Internal Displacement - Global Overview of Trends and Developments in 20059Feinstein International Center: Movement on the Margins: Livelihoods and Security in Kitgum District, Northern Uganda10Abductions, conscription, mutilations, rape and other forms of sexual violence,11A UNICEF situation analysis report of 2005 states that the dire situation resulted in over 400 children under the age of fivewould die each week from easily preventable diseases including malaria, diarrhoea, anaemia and malnutrition.12WFP PRRO 2005-2008132005/06 Uganda National Household Survey14Orphans, widows, children heading households and the elderly15UNIRIN, November 200710

Juba talks have been perceived as the best chance for peace so far, they have been facedby many challenges and a long drawn process. It was initially anticipated that acomprehensive peace agreement would have been signed between the GOU and the LRA inthe first quarter of 2008. The process has however been delayed by sticking points aroundthe issues of justice, accountability and reconciliation for the LRA – all of which are critical forlasting peace and stability. The impasse around the indictments of the Internatio nal CriminalCourt of the LRA leadership and the application of alternative justice mechanisms remainsone of the bigger challenges.Originally the IDP population of the Acholi sub region (Gulu, Amuru, Kitgum and Pader) was1.102.438. The Gulu/Amuru and Kitgum population alone comprise 763.499 IDPs. While theGOU has declared the period of active conflict as effectively over, the delays in the signing ofthe peace deal have tapered the optimism and return movements of the IDP communities inthe worst affected Acholi sub region. For example, it was expected that 70 % of thepopulation would have returned to their villages of origin by December 2007. However,statistics as of March 2008 16 show that approximately 50% of the population (534.380people 17 ) in the Acholi sub region had moved away from the main camps. Many Acholis(36%) who have left the camps have returned not to their villages, but have settled inspontaneous transit sites from which they have better access to the own land 18 and alsosocial services. Studies show that many may – contrary to initially anticipated – never returnto original homes. 19 The number of transit sites in the Acholi sub region today amounts to1062. The most recent figures also show that only 12% of the IDPs in Acholi have retur ned totheir villages of origin.The return patterns indicate that many IDPs still maintain some presence in the originalcamps first and foremost, as a security blanket in the event of fresh outbreaks of insecurity.Security concerns aside, return patterns are also affected by among others – the absence ofbasic services in some of the return areas, fear of unexploded ordinances (UXOs), lack ofconstruction materials for shelter, lack of adequate agricultural inputs and the continuedthreats of the Karimojong in certain areas. The return process has also increased pressureon the already overstretched humanitarian resources as humanitarian agencies providingfood assistance, health, water and sanitation services struggle to meet the needs ofcommunities in the camps, transit and in the villages of origin. Although GOU has listedcriteria to assess sites for resettlement – few services are in place and this has slowed theresettlement process.3.3 Government Policies, Plans & ServicesThe Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) – GOU’s overarching development frameworkrecognises that, while economic growth is a necessary condition for poverty reduction,poverty is a multi-dimensional problem. Over the years, the PEAP has been revised tocapture and reflect emerging issues pertinent to poverty reduction. In the last revision, thePEAP introduced a third pillar on security and conflict resolution as a direct recognition of thepoverty implications of conflict and hence the need for a coherent approach to r ecovery anddevelopment. Priority areas under this pillar include: ending rebel insurgency, by peacefulmeans if possible; ending cattle rustling; and enhancing disaster management specifically inrelation to issues of internal displacement.Government has also developed an IDP policy aimed at mitigating the IDP crisis. GoU hencecommits to:16UNHCR matrix on estimated IDP population movements, March 2008 (It should be noted that during population movementsaccurate figures are difficult to ascertain)17Gulu, Amuru, Kitgum and Pader18CAP, OCHA 200819Waiting for Godot in Gulu, OCHA 200711

Box 1: National IDP Policy 2004• Protect its citizens against arbitrary displacement;• Minimize the effects of internal displacement byproviding an enabling enviro nment for upholdingthe rights & entitlements of IDPs;• Promote integrated and co -ordinated responsemechanisms to address the causes and effects ofinternal displacements;• Assist in the safe and voluntary return;resettlement, integration and re -integration of IDP• Ensure that every person, internally displacedor otherwise, receives information about itsprovisions.• To guide the development of sectoralprograms for recovery through rehabilitationand reconstruction of social and economicinfrastructure in support of the return andresettlement of IDPs.Whereas it covers crucial areas, the policy has been criticised for its failure to adequatelyaddress equally important issues such as land/property issues. Moreover, key challenges inthe implementation of the policy have included the weak institutional capacity of localgovernments at the sub county/ district level; absence of law & order agencies as well asservice providers to ensure the rights of returnees.In 2007 GoU launched the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP) – whichprovides the framework for stability, recovery and development in the North. The PRDP hasfour strategic objectives:1. Consolidation of State Authority,2. Rebuilding and Empowering Communities3. Revitalisation of the Economy4. Peace Building and Reconciliation.The humanitarian and development community is looking closely to the steps taken by GoUto lead the efforts in the North. The total PRDP budget currently stands at US$ 606 millionand its implementation is expected to officially begin in the FY 2008/ 2009. There is howeverstill unclarity amongst central as well as local governments, not to mentionhumanitarian/development stakeholders with regards to its funding and implementationmechanisms. To date most of the North (outside camps) suffers from a lack of basic socialservices.3.4 Global Food Politics & Local PricesGlobally the international community has committed itself to the MDGs 20 – the first of which iscutting by half the number of food insecure people in the worl d. Food aid is considered astep on the path to meet this goal. The table below gives an overview of the main donors andrecipients of food aid and some of the numbers involved 21 .20Millennium Development Goals21Global Trends in Food Aid, Daniel Maxwell, 200612

Table 2: 2004 Global Food Aid Deliveries 22Recipient RegionDonorCategoryCommodityProcurementCategory Million metric tones Share of TotalSub Saharan Africa 3.8 51%Asia 2.0 27%Latin America 0.7 9%Other regions 1.0 13%US 4.2 55%EC and other members 1.5 20%Japan 0.6 8%Other 1.2 17%Emergency 4.4 59%Project 2.1 28%Program 1.0 13%Cereals 6.5 87%Non Cereals 1.0 13%Local purchase 1.1 15%Triangular purchase 0.9 12%Direct transfers 5.5 73%Given the big numbers and big players involved in global food aid, its political and financialconnotations cannot be ignored. There are a couple of trends, which influence food aidpolicies and decisions at various levels.Declining resource levels/ priority for emergency programming: The global levels offood aid have been declining steadily from an average of 12-15 million metric tons in the late1980s and early 90s to 7.5 MMT in 2004. The trends show an increased focus onemergencies and a marked decline in longer-term programme food aid including recoveryassistance. However since 2005, even the funding for emergency food aid has been on thedecline, especially to conflicts that have developed into a protracted crisis. The preferencefor ‘emergency’ food aid has also resulted in a reduction of food aid in post conflict situations,even during the critical phase of transition from emergency to recovery when as communitiesgradually rebuild their livelihoods 23 .Local/regional purchase: Procurement modalities are also changing. There is a growingtendency towards cash resources for local/regional purcha se. With the exception of the US’‘tied food’, 45% of food aid is now purchased in local/regional markets. The mainadvantages of this approach are the reduced shipping costs and the ability for a quickerresponse to emergencies. Rather than cause trade distortions as has been argued, localpurchases, if managed properly, would support market development in developing countries.Although the current US government has expressed the need for untying food aid, theproposition is being heavily opposed on the domestic front by those with interests in agribusinessand shipping 24 .Politics around food aid: The debate over the form in which food aid is provided hasextended to the WTO in relation to farm/export subsidies and their effects on trade.European countries argue that “tied” US food aid exports amount to an export subsidy indisguise and is trade distorting. The view of the US is that any attempt to ‘untie’ US aidcontributions may result in the loss of political support of powerful American businessinterests and ultimately lead to a reduction of US contributions of food aid. So whilehumanitarian NGOs support regional purchases - the political trade–off remain to be seen.The US remains the largest food aid donor and the outcome of the debate will grea tlyinfluence the future of food aid 25 .22Modified from Global Trends in Food Aid, Daniel Maxwell 200623 Global Trends in Food Aid, Daniel Maxwell, 200624 Global Trends in Food Aid, Daniel Maxwell, 200625Ibid13

Food prices on the rise: Over the past years food prices in many parts of the world havesteadily increased, leading politicians, experts and news media to conclude that we are in themidst of a global food crisis. The increase in food prices is mainly blamed on increaseddemand (from China and India), slow-growing supplies, high energy prices, biofuelproduction and climatic changes arising from global warming 26 . The immediate effect of thefood crisis is already observed in several places. For example the increasing food prices arealready felt in households in local communities in Uganda. Food items have nearly doubledsince the beginning of 2008, particularly in urban areas, as reflected in the table below.Table 3: Cost of Food Items in Kampala Markets in Uganda 27Item November 2007 (Ushs) May 2008 (Ushs)1 kilo Rice 1300 21001 kilo Beans 1200 17001 kilo Peas 1200 17001 kilo Simsim 1500 25001 kilo Millet flour 1200 25001 kilo Cassava flour 400 8001 kilo Groundnuts 1500 25001 litre Cooking Oil 3500 50001 kilo Meat 3000 5000Although some economists may argue that increases in food prices have a positive impacton economies in the long run since higher prices will stimulate higher production and th uslonger term food security, the short term impact – particularly in less robust/more sensitivemarkets, like conflict affected markets – is a heavy burden.The surge in the global price of crops has created a budget shortfall for major donors andfood agencies, who may be forced to scale back emergency operations 28 . The WFP hasannounced that it is currently facing a $755m shortfall in its budget. This could result into thereduction of the number of recipient nations or the amount of food aid served.26Daily Monitor 5 th May 2008, Farmers face climate challenges amidst world food shortage27Daily Monitor, April 30, 2008/ New Vision May 7, 200828Washington Post: March 1, 2008: Soaring Food Pric es Putting U.S. Emergency Aid in Peril14

4 PROTECTING THE RIGHT TO FOOD - THE GFD PROJECT4.1 GFD Project ObjectivesNRC has signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 29 with WFP as a cooperatingpartner to the General Food Distribution (GFD) Programme in Northern Uganda. With thisMoU NRC commits itself to distribute WFP’s food aid to Gulu, Amuru and Kitgum Districts ona monthly basis. NRC has defined more specific objectives of the GFD project in NorthernUganda 30 :1. To contribute to household food security and maintain the minimum nutritional anddietary standard by providing food assistance to people affected by displacement incamps in Gulu, Amuru and Kitgum districts.2. To protect lives by providing humanitarian food assistance to IDPs to meet the assessedaverage net food gap.3. To safeguard the fundamental right to food for targeted IDPs with special emphasis onwomen and children, EVIs, and the long-term effect of insufficient access to food.The outputs, to be achieved are concrete and quantifiable: increased access to food to theIDPs in Kitgum, Gulu and Amuru and the percentage of the average assessed net food gapmet by IDPs 31 .Box 2: The success indicators from NRC’s logical framework 06/07 32 :♦ Reduction in the number of malnourished IDPs receiving food aid to less than 10%♦ The correct number of people receives regular food assistance and the correct quantity of food.♦ Increased level of participation from the IDP themselves in food distribution♦ Reduction in the incidences of death due to hunger♦ Prevalence of acute malnutrition among IDPs and children under 5 to be under 5%♦ Crude mortality and morbidity rates at acceptable level among IDPs (i.e. < 1:10.000 per day)♦ % of children < 5 years who are malnourished to be less than 10% without aggravating factors4.2 Alignment to NRC’s PoliciesTaking a rights based approach to food aid, NRC’s Core Activity Policy Document onEmergency Food Security and Distribution states 33 its overall objective as follows: ”… topromote and protect the right to food 34 to refugees and internally displaced persons”. Rootedin the UN charter for social and economic rights, the more specific objectives of this overallNRC food aid policy are:- to fulfil the immediate food needs of refugees and IDPs and maintain their adequatenutritional status in emergency situations,- to promote self reliance, and support durable solutions as soon as the context allows;- to contribute to food security, livelihoods and recovery in various phases of displacementand;- to promote education, alleviate short-term hunger and improve cognitive learning.29 NRC-WFP Annual Memorandum of Understanding30From NRC Project Proposal budget year 2006/0731From NRC Project Proposal budget year 2006/0732From NRC Project Proposal, budget year 2006/0733Finalised in April 200834 In accordance with the UN charter on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights - that the right to adequate food is realised whenevery man, woman and child, alone or in community with others has physical and economic access at all times to adequatefood or means for its procurement.15

The target groups of NRC embrace refugees, IDPs and returnees and priority is given tovulnerable individuals and households, including women and children 35 .NRC would, according to its policies, like to design projects that are culturally andcontextually appropriate and acceptable. NRC emphasises the importance of appropriatetiming of food aid (also taking into account the local agricultural calendar) as well as a longer -term view by promoting sustainable livelihoods through agricultural pro duction and incomegeneration. Participatory and community based approaches through involvement, direct andactive participation, training and capacity building of local competencies as well as advocacyand sensitisation on food security issues (the right to food, land rights, food crisis etc) play animportant role. Moreover NRC policy prescribes for concerted interventions in conflicts orhumanitarian crisis of protracted nature.Box 3: If security allows in protracted situations 36 :NRC will implement a complementary approach between direct distributions and food security and livelihoodrecovery. Rations distributed will then not fulfil the entire beneficiary daily food requirements (2100kcal/day/person) while other food security and livelihood interve ntions will be defined according to the context;refine targeting from general distribution to a more targeted system.In return and recovery phases, food assistance may still be necessary for a period of time. Return kits may bedistributed and food secu rity and livelihood programs aiming at securing food needs of returnees in the longerterm may be implemented. Programs will be planned and phased out in accordance with NRC Exit Strategies.At the Ugandan level, the Core Activity Strategy Document on Fo od Security and Distributionfor Uganda (2008-2010) 37 states its strategic objective as: contributing to household securityand livelihoods of people affected by displacement with emphasis on IDPs and returnees inNorthern Uganda. The strategy emphasises that the focus may shift gradually from generalfood distribution to interventions that ‘encourage self-reliance of households depending onthe positive development in Northern Uganda”.NRC’s global policy to emergency food security and distribution as wel l as a ‘Core ActivityStrategy’ for Food Security and Distribution in Uganda are in turn supported andsupplemented by NRC policies on protection, gender equity, camp management, shelter andinformation, counselling, legal assistance and education 38 .35Core Activity Policy Document, Emergency Food Security and Distribution, NRC36Ibid, p. 237Still a draft version38All availed to the Evaluation Team16

5 PROJECT RELEVANCE & APPROPRIATENESSAs a result of the conflict in the North, food assistance has been given to Uganda since 1996.Although the WFP protracted relief and recovery operation (PRRO) assumed that IDPswould return home in large numbers in 2001, IDPs continued to stay in camps for securityreasons as the conflict escalated. Uganda was facing the worst humanitarian crisis in years.During the peak of the crisis nearly 2 million IDPs were confined in 188 camps in the Northand East and as outlined in Chapter 3, their situation continued to deteriorate. Surveysdocumented alarming malnutrition rates (in some cases 18 -20%) and the need for reliablehumanitarian support was palpable.Against this backdrop and with the cl ear objective of safeguarding rights, protecting lives andcontributing to house hold food security, the NRC’s project design is found timely and mostrelevant: to distribute food aid based on needs to a targeted population including the mostvulnerable in Gulu, Amuru and Kitgum.5.1 Being There at the Right TimeAs an implementing partner for WFP since 1997, NRC is one of the oldest humanitarianactors on the ground in Northern Uganda – with a presence throughout the most challengingtimes of the conflict.In order to respond appropriately and maintain efficient communication on the ground, NRC– unlike most other humanitarian organisations - established its Country Office in Gulu andhas over the years geared up its resource base to over 500 staff including 200 volunteers tofacilitate timely response of food aid and several other activities. As one appreciative districtofficial in Kitgum noted: “they brought their head quarters to the heart of the conflict, at a timewhen not many others were around”. This strategic move to the ‘field’ allowed NRC toshorten the distance to decision-making and cutting back layers of management andbureaucracy, which may otherwise hamper quick and efficient emergency response.Logistical arrangements for the food distribu tion through the peak of the crisis were quitechallenging. NRC has however accommodated itself by risking lives and being flexible whenthe security situation was not conducive and also by travelling to distribution points witharmed escorts.Today NRC’s interventions in food distribution follow ‘a most likely scenario’ – that “securityremains relatively stable. The uncertainty of the outcome of the peace talks, as well as theinfrastructural and social challenges of protracted displacement lead to a le ngthy process ofreturn and reintegration” 39 This means that NRC – in line with its policy - continues tocontribute to household food security – not only in camps but also to transit sites, wheresome people have resettled.5.2 Appropriateness of Food Aid in Protracted ConflictsEmergency food assistance composes a food basket, which is supposed to help keepingpeople alive in an emergency period. The composition of food items is designed to maintaina minimum nutritional and dietary standard (Section 7.1 provides details). The fact that theconflict in Northern Uganda has been protracted has meant that thousands of women, menand children, old and young, have nourished themselves with a daily emergency ration forlonger than what was anticipated. In a protracted situation, like Uganda, one may argue thatemergency food assistance for ten years is a contradiction in itself.39From NRC Project Proposal budget year 2008/0917

Targeting of food aid should be followed by questions such as when, how long, how muchand by what means, as emergency food aid is not designed for a long-standingintervention 40 . Thoughts about reducing dependency and increasing self -reliance, alternativeor complimentary strategies to the food aid should therefore most preferably be built into theproject interventions at an early stage.While in the more recent years maintaining a broad portfolio of other activities 41 , NRC did notconsider exploring alternative or complementary solutions to the monthly food rationdistribution, except for also distributing the rations for WFP’s school feeding programme (seealso Section 9.3 in Chapter 9 for NRC’s efforts to link relief and recovery). Given the securitysituation, which has been a restricting factor, this is to some degree understandable. Butconsidering the time span of the conflict as well as persisting needs of the people combinedwith an inconsistent supply of food or reduction in rations and food basket – steps might havebeen taken to explore alternative strategies to food distribution, going beyond merely keepingpeople alive. As mentioned in the previous chapter, NRC acknowledges the possibilities andobligations in a protracted situation in its recently finalised Core Activity Policy on EmergencyFood Security and Distribution.Several key informants to this Evaluation 42 have said that in as much as NRC has been theimplementing partner for WFP, NRC – in its capacity as an independent NGO - could havetried out alternative options for food aid, notwithstanding the security situation, whereby formany years only 2-5 km periphery land was accessible around most camps or othercircumstantial challenges. One option could have been sourcing of extra/differe nt food inUganda to top up the WFP supplies or fill in when there is a gap (missing food items, delaysdue to logistical challenges and bureaucracy, identification of new groups that are waiting tobe registered). It can assist in fulfilling the main obje ctive of the programme: ensuring foodsecurity/protecting peoples’ right to food. In a protracted situation, where the needs are direand the existing food sources and channels may be challenged and even delaying thehumanitarian response, some thought should be given to this option in order to complimentongoing activities and overcome challenges and in turn – and most importantly - fulfil andNRC’s obligation to the beneficiaries.There have also been ‘pockets of periods’ where the security situation ha s beenmanageable, particularly from 2005, where other options could have been tried out 43 . Thesecould have involved livelihood activities, cash programmes or other market or communitystimulating interventions that could have contributed to household (food) security. 44 Somestudies 45 show that – contingent upon the context - cash inputs are a more effective meansof helping vulnerable households, and this stems from the somewhat evident fact thatvulnerable households have (food) needs beyond the food, which they are given 46 .40Global Trends in Food Aid, Daniel Maxwell 2006.41 Information, Communication and Legal Assistance Programme, Youth Education Pack, Food Security and LivelihoodsProgramme.42 Interviews and discussions with donors, IDPs, NRC GFD staff and other project staff, and other humanitarian organisations.43During 2005 more space was available to IDPs through GoUs initiative of ‘decongesting’ camps.44Interviews with food aid donors as well as UN agencies in Gulu and Kitgum, NRC staff + Food security surveys of 2005.NRCs own livelihood activities did not pick pace until late 2006.45This point was also discussed with several key informants and donor agencies in Kampala. The Norwegian Embassy inKampala has commissioned a study on cash programmes in resettlement areas, with an aim to support people as they moveback. The findings of the study may be of use to NRC.46Global Trends in Food Aid, Daniel Maxwell, p. 518

5.3 Lesson Learned♦♦♦‘Being there at the right time’ and bringing the Country Office to the field is essential tocut costs, bureaucracy and time and thereby essential for fast decision -making andeventually quick response.Having a clear and undisputed humanitarian objective and policy, measured in simpleterms (quantitative indicators) gives an organisation a focused direction and mandate ofwork in times of complex emergency and insecurity.Nevertheless, when a conflict develops signs of a protracted situation, it can be beneficialto design and implement alternative/complementary solutions to the humanitarian foodaid response. This may in some cases require more complex and multi -faceted analysisand tools, however it ensures food security for the beneficiaries, which ultimately is thehumanitarian obligation of NRC.5.4 Recommendations♦♦♦♦In future humanitarian operations that involve continued food distribution during anextended period of time and on a massive scale NRC’s should conti nue to prioritise beingclose to the field and implement its undisputed humanitarian objective of serving peoplein need.In protracted situations, NRC should – as now also obliged by its Emergency FoodSecurity and Distribution Policy - as early as possible, explore the possibility of combininggeneral food distribution with alternative strategies. If the situation calls for it and allowsfor it, topping up/complimenting WFP food supplies for a period of time should beconsidered. Alternative strategies should also include livelihoods initiatives, incomegeneration activities, cash programmes or voucher programmes possibly earmarked forfood. Research shows that where markets are functioning or market forces are stillthriving, food aid may be alternated with cash programmes, giving people the freedom ofchoice to buy their own food items or items beyond food. Even in contexts where marketsare restricted and may not function optimally, other alternative solutions to the generalfood distribution could be tried to ensure that beneficiaries are assisted in maintaining acomprehensive food basket or support their livelihoods in other ways. 47Given that this combination of approaches might be new to NRC, some investmentsshould be made in analysis/research, wh ich could lead to developing a toolbox or a kitthat combines cash and in-kind programmes and also considers the options for toppingup/complimenting food supplies. Striking a balance between various approaches ischallenging and should be researched 48.NRC’s Emergency Food Security and Distribution Policy should give more concreteguidance on different options and alternative/complimentary solutions that can becombined with the general food distribution activities.47 Global Trends in Food Aid, Maxwell 2006, www.fao.org, Rethinking Food Security in Humanitarian Response, Maxwell, et al,2008 + Interview with key informants.48In order not to invent the wheel, reference may be made to findings from many safety net programmes, voucher for workprogrammes or cash for work programmes. NRC is at present joining hands with other cluster stakeholders in making jointassessments and the findings of these assessments may inform future alternative strategies.19

6 PROJECT EFFICIENCY & COVERAGENRC’s yearly budget for the food distribution project has on average been USD 1,8 million 49 .This figure combines the funding from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) aswell as WFP. MFAs contribution makes up most of the NRC’s budget with an average annualinput of roughly USD 1 million 50 .The budget has funded the organisation, logistics, manpower, distribution and monitoring offood assistance to some 755.000 people on a monthly basis from 2005 -2008. In 2007 51 NRCdistributed food to 458,000 IDPs in 65 camps and 27 transit sites in Gulu and Amuru districts,and 297,000 IDPs in 26 camps and 13 transit sites in Kitgum district 52 . This roughly amountsto distribution costs of USD 2,3 per person per year. This cost is over and above the foodexpense itself and other WFP costs 53 .The Evaluation Team lacks comprehensive data to gather a picture of the exact unit cost forcomparison with other food aid operations and thereby estimate accurate cost efficiency.However, in view of the efficient field operati on, extensive use of local resource base (seethis chapter) viz. the number of beneficiaries reached cost efficiency may be argued to besimilar to other operations of this magnitude 54 .The current funding from MFA and WFP runs until March 2009. Food aid is globallyexperiencing funding cuts and Uganda is no exception. As IDPs continue to return to theirhomes or resettled areas and food distribution continues to these new points, NRC needs tosecure more funds to cover this temporarily ‘expanded’ programme.6.1 Dealing with Logistics, Security & DelaysThe distribution of food to a great number of people is always a logistical challenge, and intimes of insecurity even more so. Nevertheless, NRC has been commended, by manycolleagues, for tackling precisely this challenge in a comprehensive way with limitedmismanagement and learning from mistakes along the way 55 . NRC has applied strict securitymeasures. This is crucial in emergency operations, where staff, volunteers and truck driversare subjected to threats, ambush and direct fire – while still keeping the food distribution‘pipeline’ flowing.WFP’s delays have on the whole been managed fairly well, with distributions not beingpostponed for more than three weeks 56 , except for the heavy rainy season in 2 007, wheredelays were longer. The delays in food delivery can mainly be ascribed to WFP’s pipelinebreakages, storage shortages, low trucking capacity or funding delays but also to impassableroads, severe rainfall and other logistical/circumstantial chal lenges. In addition thespontaneous movements of IDPs to new settlements have also been a challenge as havelack of military escorts used to ensure security of the food convoys. However NRC hasmaintained a flexible approach to this: Changing locations at short notice, adjusting time49Budget, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway, April 2007 to March 2008 and WFP-NRC MoU April 2007 to March 2008.50 2006/07 MFA grant = NOK 7,6 million. 2007/08 MFA grant = NOK 6,6 million. 2008/09 MFA grant = NOK 7 million.Conversion into USD varies according to exchange rates.51 Figures vary over the years due to population increase, movements, registry etc. For the sake of consistency this report willuse the population and distribution figures from 2007 as an average as they represent the situation half way through the projectperiod under evaluation.52 Initially NRC was also distributing food to Pader and Lira, however this was scaled down in order to maximise human andfinancial resources more efficiently.53The total WFP food cost for the PRRO 2005-2008 is USD 118,736,570 (equivalent to 452,508 mt).54Interviews with food aid donors also confirmed this.55Interview with WFP Kampala, Gulu, Kitgum, district officials in Gulu and Kitgum, OCHA Gulu and Kitgum as well as food aiddonors.56 NRC GFD Programme Coordinator, Gulu.20

schedules and working long hours to accommodate ‘disruptions’ have meant that IDPs onthe whole have received their monthly rations of food in the three year period 57 .6.2 The Value of Building a Dedicated & Flexible OrganisationNRC has built an organisation around experienced and qualified staff and 200 well trainedvolunteers, who all have clear roles, responsibilities and reporting structures. The staff aswell as volunteers – who mainly originate from the Acholi region – have in depth localknowledge and seem to be motivated to carry out a humanitarian deed for ‘their people’. Thenational staff has been with NRC for many years, some started with NRC when it firstestablished itself in Northern Uganda. Therefore the organisation has a substantial amount ofinstitutional memory and long-term experiences to build on and learn from.The staff employed in the GFD section have a good understanding of the objectives of theGFD project and the needs and fundamental rights of the be neficiaries that it serves. Thestaff are given the opportunity to work themselves up through the organisation and NRCsupports advancement initiatives with training and courses. NRC is trying to implement itshuman resource policy of promoting more national staff to managerial posts, and this isslowly taking place. Both GFD project coordinators in Gulu and Kitgum are Ugandan 58 .The volunteers are hired 59 to assist the food distribution process and are given substantialamount of responsibilities to organise and oversee the process at each distribution points. Avolunteers training manual has been developed and it provides guidance on conduct andoperation. With the employment of such a large group of people, management andsupervision is crucial. WFP, amongst others, emphasised, that when human resourceproblems have arisen, NRC management has showed the will to address and rectify theproblem 60 .Several key informants have described the 200 volunteers, as an efficient means of ’gettingthe work done’. Generally, NRC is complimented by many fellow humanitarian stakeholdersfor having a work force that genuinely “understand field challenges and dynamics” 61 . Onestakeholder described it as NRC getting “very sleek at doing it”, indicating the organisationscapacity, flexibility and professionalism.The volunteers are hired on a daily basis with remunerations between Ushs 8.500 to10.000 62 . Although they only have ‘volunteer status’ they are employed most of the year.Most of the volunteers are students from the area, who try to pursue studies and family life atthe same time. NRC trains volunteers and builds their capacity in the area of fooddistribution, nutrition, crowd control and beneficiary communication 63 . Some of the volunteershave advanced in the hierarchy and are now employed as regular staff in some of the NRCprogramme components. The work of the volunteers although expressed as rewarding is attimes also tedious and tiring. Some times the volunteers have to spend the night in the fieldafter a food distribution, if security or time does not allow them to return to their duty stations.6.3 Beneficiaries Help Distributing FoodAnother significant factor for NRC’s efficiency in food distribution is the high degree ofbeneficiary participation. With the implementation of the family size distribution model (seechapter 7.1) IDPs have actively been involved in distribution and organisation of work,57 WFP Gulu.58NRC in Uganda employs 13 international staff.59Recruited by NRC but paid by WFP – amounting roughly USD 300.000 per year.60WFP Gulu.61WFP Gulu.62Ushs 1,660 = USD 163NRC Training Manual for Volunteers.21

through off loading of food from trucks, maintaining distribution grounds tidy and scoopingfood rations from bags. NRC has facilitated the organisation of Food ManagementCommittees (FMCs). FMCs compose village leaders and camp management who spearhead communication with NRC, undertake conflict resolution and manage complaints inrelation to the food distribution. The FMCs have in some cases developed into powerfulcommunity organisations and advocates of food and camp related issues, and IDPs have aspace to voice their concerns in a concerted effort. Working closely with the FMCs,delegating responsibility and entrusting them with authority has also given NRC a platform toact with the necessary leverage. This approach has been fundamental to increasingefficiency in distribution of food and minimizing conflicts. Wit h substantial organisedparticipation, as well as supervision of volunteers, spillage and wastage is low. Moreessentially it has increased ownership of what could otherwise be perceived as anundignified process 64 .6.4 But Does Everybody Get a Share – Getting the Numbers Right?Where the main and most frustrating concerns and challenges appear in terms of efficientand well-covered food assistance however is in establishing the correct number ofbeneficiaries and thereby requesting for the equivalent amounts of food from WFP storages.The revalidation and verification exercise, which is supposed to register and confirm thenumber of people entitled to food has by all stakeholders including all NRC staff, volunteersand not least IDPs been highlighted as the most troublesome activity to date.IDPs are eligible to food rations upon registration and receipt of a ration card. Without agenuine card, food will not be provided. However, due to technical and methodologicaldeficiencies in the registration and verification process as well as some degree ofmanipulation and squandering by IDPs the situation looks like this: (1) There areunregistered IDPs who need food (2) There are registered IDPs who do not appear on theWFP registry (3) There are IDPs who are registered and on the registry, but without food andfinally (4) there are unregistered IDPs with ration cards 65 .In sum it means that thousands of eligible IDPs have in long periods of time not beenreceiving their entitled food aid. NRC has put much effort i nto capturing some of the missedtargets through a home grown ‘coupon’ intervention, where many of those left out werepicked up in a second registry and are now back onto the WFP list. The problem in Kitgumwas reported down sized to 2-4% missed targets.One of the main problems in the verification process has been the outsourcing of the datacollection and data entry process to different organisations. Hence in Gulu and Kitgum,whereas NRC has been in charge of organising, grouping and distributing food and ‘tickingoff’ people on the print lists from WFP, other organisations have been involved in making thehousehold/family head counts through door-to-door visits and even other organisations havebeen tasked with the data entry into the WFP registry, whi ch eventually makes up the list ofeligible beneficiaries. Many ‘managers’ involved in a single process has resulted ininconsistencies, errors and missed targets. Particularly the data entry was highlighted as notbeing meticulous enough, leaving out seve ral members of a household, although they hadinitially been identified as recipients of food.64NRC also highlights their aptness to respond quickly and flexibly to the floods in Northern Uganda in August and September2007, where WFP decided to use airdrop of food in four camps in Amuru and five camps in Kitgum as a result of impassableroads and bridges. Although this airdrop operation has been criticised by some stakeholders/donors for being too expensive andunnecessary considering the scope of people reached and the limited effects of the floods in the Acholi sub-region, NRCthrough its mobilisation of FMCs on the ground to some degree controlled an otherwise chaotic situation at the drop grounds.65 From NRC Advocacy Strategy for GFD.22

The complaints about the failed verification process and the missed targets have beennumerous. Most often the IDPs are fed back with the explanation that the print list from theWFP computer did not capture their names. This is most dissatisfying for many IDPs, and asan older woman from a transit site in Kitgum said: “How does a computer know how manyfamily members I have at home?”Apart from trying to rectify the problem through the ‘coupon’ intervention NRC hasconsistently brought forward the complaints of the IDPs in monthly and quarterly monitoringreports submitted to WFP, seeking help to re -include the missed targets on the registrationlists. However, action on behalf of WFP is slow. Getting onto the list, once you have beenknocked off is not an easy process and can take up to several months, where one is leftwithout food.6.5 Lesson Learned♦♦♦♦♦For approximately USD 1,8 million per year, NRC has organised, arranged, distributedand monitored food assistance to some 755.000 people on a monthly basis duringinsecure and restrictive times. This means on average a cost of USD 2,3 per IDP peryear. This cost is over and above the expenditures for food itself a nd WFP’s own costs.In view of the efficient field operation, use of local resource base and the number ofbeneficiaries reached cost efficiency may be argued to be similar to other operations ofthis magnitude.NRC has distributed food without major delays or failures, despite WFP pipelinebreakages, storage shortages, low trucking capacity or funding delays etc. This hasindeed been possible because of a flexible work force of experienced and disciplinedpeople who have grown with the organisation a nd possesses detailed local knowledge.This has been imperative to delivering swift food aid. The investment in capacity buildingof 200 volunteers has proven worthwhile.Management and ground supervision of the operation with constant communication anddialogue with beneficiaries and camp/community networks (FMCs) provides smoothdistribution of aid and an opportunity to solve conflicts and problems that may arise alongthe way.A distribution approach where beneficiaries are involved as much as possi ble is importantto ensure fair and dignified distribution of food aid and hence also a mitigation of potentialconflicts amongst beneficiaries.Revalidation and verification exercises take a lot of time and require close supervisionand management. When data collection, entry and verification is outsourced to differentorganisations its leads to many errors. Rather, one organisation with close contact andoverview of the beneficiaries should do it. Verifying the print list before entering the datainto the database is a fundamental ‘check-point’ if errors are to be captured before theymake their way into the final list, from which WFP allocates its metric tonnes.6.6 Recommendations♦♦For future food aid operations, NRC should learn from the organisational set-up andhuman resource pool in Uganda and build well equipped operations based on localknowledge and capacities.The terms and conditions of the current volunteer work force should be assessed toprovide people with a more competitive package. Also , the capacity of the volunteers23

should be assessed in view of possible future expansion of their scope of work into otherprogramme areas that may maximise and benefit from the operational, organisational ortechnical skills of these people.♦♦In future food aid projects NRC or WFP should consider delegating/outsourcing the entireverification exercise to one single actor (firm or NGO) to ensure consistency in datacollection, data entry and printing of lists and cards. This way the process is streamlinedand errors due to many ‘managers’ is minimised. If NRC has the capacity, it should infuture operations offer to take on this task, in view of efficiency, costs and its knowledgeon the ground.Time and resources should be invested in verifying the data o n the print list, before it isfinalised and approved by WFP. It will minimize errors and problems at a later stage.Print out of the data base list is in the hands of WFP, however if possible this task couldbe delegated to the implementing agency who has eyes and ears on the ground.24

7 PROJECT EFFECTIVENESSHaving assessed the performance and challenges in terms of Relevance/Appropriateness inproject design and response as well as project Efficiency/Coverage this chapter, deals withproject Effectiveness, i.e. fulfilment of the three GFD objectives. The objectives will beanalysed in turn, and at the end of each section lessons learned and recommendations willbe drawn up.7.1 Project Objective 1To Contribute to HH food security and maintain the minimum nutritional anddietary standard by providing food assistance to people affected bydisplacement in camps in Gulu, Amuru, and Kitgum.7.1.1 Traditional Nutrition & Diet in Northern UgandaThe traditional (pre IDP camps) nutrition and dietary system in No rthern Uganda consisted ofa variety of grains, cereals, vegetables, fruits, meats as well as seasonal delicacies. Apartfrom nutritional values, some food elements were culturally favoured for the growth ofchildren and help increase breast milk for nursing mothers 66 . The box below gives an idea:Box 4: Traditional Acholi FoodAround each homestead, there were plots of land for growing vegetables like Malakwang (a bitter-sour butdelicious and nutritious vegetable) , Boo (the staple vegetable of the Acho li) Akeyo, Oyado (Green vegetables)pumpkin, tomatoes, cabbages, beans and Irish Potatoes. The homestead plots were also used to grow cassava,sweet potatoes, maize (for cob consumption as opposed to producing flour) and fruits like mangoes, pawpaw,oranges, lemon, guavas and tangerines. A mile or two from the homesteads were the main family gardens ofsmall farms where millet and simsim (the main staple food of the Acholi), were grown. Other main food cropsgrown here included Lapena (Chick peas), groundnu ts, sorghum for brewing beer. Each family had a minimum oftwo granaries ( dero) to store millet and simsim. The food stored would always last past the next harvest. Othergranaries were built to store peas and groundnuts. Nearly every family kept poultry, a few goats and sheep, whichwere reared in and around the homestead and many families kept cattle reared within the village.The fruits consumed included the Shea nut (Yaa) from which –Shea butter ( Moo Yaa) was extracted. Moo Yaawas mainly used in sauce s, but also served as a body lotion for women and children. Other fruit trees includeTugu (palm tree), Cwaa (Tamarind), Langoo, Ocoga, Oywelo . People had Beehives ( Bong) in communal grazingareas or forests for honey.Grasshoppers ‘Nsenene’ ( Ocene) or fungi like mushrooms ( Obwol) were also popular seasonal delicacies. Duringthe dry season (November to February), there were joint hunting sessions in the forests (Buffalo, Antelopes, fieldrats). The average family also set traps for small animals like rab bits and birds like Guinea Fowls (Aweno) in andaround their gardens.7.1.2 Nutrition & Diet Provided During the ConflictWith the increasing insurgency and large parts of the population in IDP camps andsubsequent introduction of the WFP food distribution the Acholi diet changed dramatically.From a rich and diverse diet, IDPs were now given carefully calculated food rations withselected items to compose the food basket. The rations normally include cereals (maize orsorghum), pulses (beans or yellow split peas) and vegetable oil enriched with Vitamin A.During the 10 years of food distribution there has been little variation in the food basket.66Detailed research provided by Jane Oryem. An example of a typical Acholi menu is found in Annex 5.25

Up until 2005 most people received a 74% or 98-100% rations depending upon the capabilityto compliment the distributed food aid with food items from own sources. In 2006 the rationswere reduced. In Gulu and Amuru the reduction was 40%, 50% and 60% of the full ration forNon Extremely Vulnerable Individuals (NEVIs) and for the Extremely Vulnerable Individuals(EVIs) 98%. In Kitgum the rations were reduced to 60% for NEVIs and maintained at 100%for the EVIs.Table 4: Food rations and ValuesFoodrationCerealkg/person/monthPulseskg/person/monthVeg. Oilkg/person/monthCSBkg/person/monthFoodValue/day100% 12,5 2,1 0,6 2,1 2100 kcal98% 12,45 2,1 0,6 1,5 2054 kcal74% 8,4 1,8 0,37 1,8 1554 kcal60% 7,2 1,2 0,45 - 1259 kcal50% 4,5 1,8 0,36 - 1050 kcal40% 4,5 0,9 0,3 - 828 kcalAs shown in the table with the exception of EVIs, most allocated food ration s do not amountto the minimum nutritional and dietary standard of 2.100 kcal per person per day, theassumption being that IDPs will manage to secure the remaining food -gap themselves.Furthermore it is argued that IDPs compliment their diet with other fo od aid interventionsfrom WFP such as Food for Education (school feeding), Therapeutic Feeding Centres (foodfor babies and lactating mothers) and Food for Work (food in exchange for manual labour).7.1.3 Employing the Fair Share ‘Family Size Model’In order to ensure that each household was secured equally with food, NRC employed a newmethodology of food distribution in 2003, described as the ‘family size model’. Until thenNRC had been using a model, where individuals with a ration card would receive the sam erations regardless of their family size. This resulted in an unfair distribution of rations, wherea family of one person would receive the same amount of food, as a family of 12 persons.With the ‘family size model’ food rations are given according to the number of people in eachhousehold, which eventually leads to all individuals receiving the same amount. It took sometime before the new model was understood and the organisation of the distribution performedas intended. Once this was in place the results were clear: households were receiving theirfair share of food in an organised way 67 . Moreover, NRC handed over the physicaldistribution activity of scooping to the beneficiaries themselves and the FMCs. In groupsbeneficiaries carry their sacks and divide scoops of the different items between them. IDPsappreciate being actively involved because as one women said: “its our food, why should weleave it to somebody else to serve for us” 68 . In order to ensure that NEVIs do not disturb theEVIs this group is served separately.7.1.4 Have Beneficiary Needs & Demands been met?NRC monitors its contribution to household security and the maintenance of nutritional anddietary standards (‘Objective 1’) through daily, monthly and quarterly reports, post distributio nmonitoring reports and participation in food security and nutritional surveys. Some of theconsistent findings on the quantity and quality of food during the past three years include 69 :Regarding the food basket composition, its usage and quality: Beneficiaries expressedgeneral satisfaction with the food basket as a temporary intervention – particularly when itwas complete, i.e. with all the intended food items. This food basket combined with thesupplementary feeding programmes in feeding centres and in schools was appreciated by67Key informants from Kitgum and Gulu Districts, WFP Gulu and OCHA Kitgum.68Focus group discussion with IDPs in Amida camp.69 NRC monthly and quarterly monitoring reports + Post Distribution Monitoring Reports from 2005 to 2008 + interviews/focusgroup discussions with male and female IDPs (EVIs and NEVIs) in Amida camp, Pawidi Transit site, Opit camp, OrafwoyoTransit site, Lukwor Transit site, Acet IDP camp, Amuru IDP camp.26

most and mothers observed the nutritional standards of their children gradually improving.Nevertheless the uniform and unchanged diet during so many years was expressed asinsufficient to maintain a healthy nutrition. Considering their traditional staple food and varieddiet IDPs explained that their needs included a more diverse food basket including suchnutritious items like sweet potato, vegetables and meat. It took them some time to get usedto new food items such as sorghum, cooking oil and split peas (the latter two not used in atraditional Acholi diet). As mentioned, the Acholi diet usually uses sim sim for cooking, whichcontains a more nutritious fat. The IDPs tried to supplement their food basket in various ways– amongst others by growing cassava in their gardens, but due to the tall size of the plant themilitary prohibited the production of cassava, which provided for camouflage for the LRArebels. These kinds of constraints have lead many IDPs to rely on the food supplies as amain part of their diet through the most difficult times in the conflict.Several IDPs have experienced receiving extremely poor quality food, including rotten maizeand uneatable beans 70 through the GFD programme. IDPs did however find the Corn SoyaBlend (CSB) useful. Mothers prioritised the CSB for the children as a substitute for thetraditional nutrients, which the Acholi diet prescribes for small children. CSB was howevereliminated from the food basket with the ration reduction. The sa me applies to cooking oil.Most IDPs use their food for household consumption (more than 95%). Only a ‘negligiblelevel’ (between 1-3%) is used for sale to acquire other necessities such as salt, lighting fueletc.Regarding food rations and food quantity: Across the board IDPs expressed dissatisfactionwith the reductions in food rations. In most cases the reduced rations, delays in delivery aswell as missing items from the food basket leave IDPs with food for less than two weeks andin the majority of cases one meal or less than a meal per day (see also Section 7.2. for moredetails). The 98% and 100% rations given to EVIs have suffered from reductions in cookingoil and CSB particularly since June 2007. Most frustrating to many IDPs is being left off theWFP registry after the verification process (discussed in Section 6.4).Apart from monitoring beneficiary satisfaction, reactions and complaints, NRC has during th eproject period not taken initiatives to supplement the diets or provide alternative nutritionalsolutions.7.1.5 Responding to ComplaintsIDPs complaints regarding food aid are regularly compiled in NRC reports and filed to WFPfor action and recourse. However the problems and demands of the IDPs remain. Althoughseveral stakeholders claim that IDPs have received multiple explanations and justifications toissues such as WFP print list problems, rotten food, the lack of cooking oil and the rationreductions, the Evaluation Team found that these had not been sufficiently internalised bythe IDPs.A complaint desk is set up after each food distribution. It is manned by volunteers, whoreceive and forward complaints from the IDPs, but otherwise have no autho rity to take anyother action. The normal use – one would think - of a complaint desk is that the complaintsreceived at the desk are handled or addressed and that IDPs get a satisfactory feed back.Nevertheless observing and visiting the complaint desks set up after the food distributionsand speaking to several IDPs as well as staff/volunteers in charge of the desks, theEvaluation Team found that the value of these desks to some degree seems to havewithered away. Complaints have been filed to WFP for ye ars without any major action orrecourse. The frustration or apathy of no response is showing amongst both IDPs andvolunteers, questioning the use/seriousness of these desks.70 In several NRC monitoring reports the expression about the poor quality food is ‘that it is not fit for human consumption’.27

It is recognized that numerous recipients of food aid will complain about food . One districtofficial from Gulu claimed that: “food is like money, and however much you provide IDPs withfood there will never be enough”. Nevertheless some key stakeholders criticise WFP as wellas NRC for not providing the IDPs with thorough, targeted and repeated explanations as towhy food baskets are composed in a certain way, and why rations have been reduced, andwhat the expectations are from the IDPs to do in return. Many IDPs deny that they have beenthoroughly involved in the dietary composition of the food basket or even the food reductions,and that these decisions were in most cases ‘just presented to them’ through radioannouncements or by the camp leaders 71 . More involvement could perhaps have reducedcomplaints. NRC acknowledges this in so me of its monitoring reports.7.1.6 But People Have Been Kept AliveDespite the reductions in rations and food basket, pipeline breakages, uniform diet andmissing food items health indicators 72 from the past three years show that malnutrition rateshave been kept relatively manageable, under the emergency threshold of 10%. The GlobalAcute Malnutrition (GAM) rates of 2005 showed: 4,7% in Gulu and 11,8% in Kitgum 73 . In2008 these figures have reduced even further to 3,1% in Gulu and approximately 8% inKitgum. It is argued that the number of admissions to therapeutic feeding centres in thisperiod has reduced. The incidences of deaths due to hunger in camps have reduced bringingthe crude mortality and the under 5 mortality rate down to or less than 1/10.00 0 persons perday 74 .Many IDPs interviewed did express their appreciation and satisfaction with food aid, qualifiedwith statements such as: “it sustained our lives”… or more literally “it kept us breathing”… orin terms of nourishment “it kept our children healthy”. Or as a group of people in Pawiditransit site in Kitgum district said: “we ran from our villages, and moved with nothing… atleast we found food in the camps”. This was followed by a more sad consideration: “wewished we could dig, but security didn’t allow us… so we depended on the food”. 75 . Severalmothers appreciatively also added that food aid had kept their children in school. The factthat food distribution in camps had lead to a safer life without the threat of or reality ofabductions and killings, which all IDPs had faced in the home gardens was humblyacknowledged. However had there been alternative options and possibilities of fending foroneself, most IDPs would have opted for these.In sum, the quantitative indicators show that the GFD project through difficult times hascontributed to household food security and the maintenance of minimum nutritional anddietary standards, and brought down high GAM rates and saved lives.However, research, beneficiaries’ voices, observations on the ground, opinions ofhumanitarian actors and donors paint a more cloudy picture of the fulfilment of the objective.Multiple factors contribute to positive nutritional rates, not only food, but also good sanitation,clean drinking water and proper hygiene practices and a clean environment. Hence, thepositive developments in the quantitative indicators are not just a reflection of food aid.Moreover, the reality – and maybe the more qualitative signs - is that pipeline breakages,delays, shortages in food items, reduced rations and few alternative food options, littlediversity in food supplies and weak coping strategies on behalf of the IDPs (also in newtransit sites where supporting services are not available) have meant that IDPs havestruggled to maintain their minimum nutritional dietary standards of 2.100 kcal per person perday and according to several stakeholders, many have not managed at all. A closer look atsome of the issues is taken in the following chapter.71Focus group discussions with IDPs in camps and transit sites.72NRC Quarterly reports, EFSA of 2007, WFP PRRO, ACF nutritional report 200773GAM rates before this period were even higher, close to 20%74 Nutritional Surveys for Gulu district in 2005 and 2006, WFP75Interviews and focus group discussions in Camps and transit sites in Gulu and Kitgum28

7.1.7 Lesson Learned♦ Food aid has been vital to fighting (acute) malnutrition and saving peoples lives duringthe protracted crisis in Northern Uganda. Composing a food basket with the correctamount and type is essential to meeting the minimum nutritional dietary standards. Butwith ration reductions, cuts in the food basket and few alternative options themaintenance of minimum standards of 2.100 kcal per person per day is seriouslychallenged.♦♦♦The food aid has not been provided according to preferred dietary needs and demands ofthe Acholi people and has in several cases also been of inferior quality. The traditionalAcholi diet is rich and diverse. The uniform food basket given over many years haschanged diet habits and nutrition of the IDPs. Being aware of needs and involvingbeneficiaries in finding alternative or complimentary solutions to food aid can boost thediet and nutrition and respond to some of their preferences.Changes in food rations, problems with quality, missing food items etc may require moreintensive and repeated explanation to the IDPs so as to fully answer complaints.Adjusting distribution mechanisms to the family size system with an emphasis ofbeneficiary involvement can prove effective in as much as reaching the target populationswith food in a fair way and controlling crowds into an orderly distribution.7.1.8 Recommendations♦ With the ration reduction, changes in food basket and inconsistencies in supplies, NRCshould incorporate alternative strategies to food aid programmes in a protracted situation.IDPs, with a wealth of dietary knowledge, can be brought more actively on board toidentify ideas or solutions to meet their own needs. Based on this, NRC should source forthe most feasible operational solution (e.g. topping up food aid, implementing small scalelivelihood activities, initiating cash programmes and stimulate market forces). See alsorecommendations and qualifications under Section 5.4.♦♦♦NRC should include qualitative indicators in the project design to compl iment the existingquantitative health indicators, which may not always provide a complete picture.Qualitative indicators could be defined around ‘beneficiary satisfaction’, which NRC hasalready been reporting on in Post Distribution Monitoring Reports.Taking IDPs complaints seriously through actions and recourse increases the feeling of adignified process. In this connection NRC and WFP should reassess the functions andpurpose of the complaint desk with a view to improve the use of them and reach a moreeffective complaint handling process.NRC should take other/alternative measures to push for actions and recourse in someareas with persisting complaints (rations cards, verification/print list failures/pipelineshortages etc). For example more direct communication/advocacy can be made to WFPmanagement.29

7.2 Project Objective 2To protect lives by providing humanitarian food assistance to IDPs to meet theassessed average net food gapBased on improving indicators, the assumption made by WFP to reduce the food rations forNorthern Uganda in 2005 has been that ‘the IDP population will be able to contributesignificantly to their food needs with improvements in security and access to land’ 76 . WFPanticipated that with the improved security the IDP population of 1,6 million people woulddecrease by 321.500 in 2005, 643.000 in 2006 and 275.000 in 2007. ‘The residual caseloadof 45.900 will not be targeted with relief assistance because it is assumed that most of themwill have access to land for cultivation’ 77 .However today we know that the process was different, especially in the Acholi region. Withthe delay in the peace talks and signing of the peace agreement, the continued threat ofKaramojong raiders from the east, seasonal floods and general trauma and fear of movinghome immediately, the return movement of IDPs and their ability to cultivate their land hastaken longer than anticipated. Although movements out of the camps have been pickingpace (50% of IDPs left camps in Acholi sub region by Ma rch 2008) as described in Section3.2 on peace process and return, statistics show that many out of the original 1.102.438 IDPsin Acholi are still in camps or have otherwise settled in transit sites, and may never moveback to their original homesteads. Agricultural production is still taking a slow pace, as labourand farm inputs are few. Moreover, markets are not that easily accessible and other incomegeneration activities are few.Nevertheless changes in the food supply were made to all camps in late 2005. The rationalebehind the reduction in food rations was that IDPs from 2005 and onwards would be in abetter position to cover their net food gap 78 .7.2.1 The Evidence Base for Ration ReductionsIt is said that “food aid has historically been resource driven, not analysis driven” 79 . Onlyrecently has it been common that information systems for food aid capture morecomprehensive pictures of the context in which the actors are working 80 . In the case ofNorthern Uganda, Emergency Food Security Assessments (EFSA) and nutritional surveysprovide the context analysis and a broader basis for guidance and decision -making for foodration reductions as well as indications of peoples’ ability to cover their net food gap.NRC commonly participates together with WFP, other food security actors and the DistrictDisaster Management Committees (DDMC) in the Emergency Food Security Assessment.This section summarises the key findings of the EFSA of 2005 and 2007 81 .76 WFP, PRRO, 2005-200877 Ibid78 Net food gap is the difference between what IDPs and refugees can produce or access through market channels and theminimum recommended daily allowance (RDA) of 2100 kcal per person per day (WFP PRRO, 2005-2008)79 “Global Trends in Food Aid”, Daniel Maxwell, 2006, p. 680“Rethinking Food Security in Humanitarian Response”, Maxwell et al, 200881 The level of food assistance is determined through assessments. WFP piloted an emergency food need methodology in2000 including both primary and secondary data from HH levels. Between 2000 and 2003 the EFNA was used to determinefood aid needs. Today the EFNA has changed to the Emergency Food Security Assessment, EFSA, which employs a processof random sampling and more comprehensive data sources and variety. The plan has been to carry out an EFSA twice a year,however this does not always materialise. In stead a rapid food security review takes place. Source: EFSA 200530

By 2005 the profile of the crisis in the North had changed slightly. In the camps humanitarianactors were getting a grip of the situation and were coming to terms with soaring malnutritionrates and diseases, epidemics and security. IDPs now had access to more land around thecamps – the perimeter was extended to a limited 3-5 km 82 .Box 5: Findings from EFSA 2005Access to land, various food sources and income strategies has increased consumption at household level andthe average food gap has declined. Nevertheless the EFSA i s at the same time careful to recognize that landutilisation amongst IDPs is still low and there are limited opportunities for other economic employment83 , with theopportunities in Kitgum more restricted than in Gulu.Based on calculations of RDA, avera ge household kcal intake, own production, possibilities for market purchase,income generation etc – the EFSA concludes for Gulu 84 : that given the improving circumstances in Gulu and theincreasing access to land and markets, the levels of food intake from own production and market purchase is‘very expandable’ – indicating that IDPs should be in a relatively easy position covering their net food gap.Nevertheless it proceeds to state that: “given the fluidity of the current situation a drastic cut back of f ood aid to38% of RDA may result in untoward consequences”.For Kitgum 85 the conclusion is: “potential for expandability is limited to own food production and food aid given,that market purchase is almost at its ceiling. Improving land access would imply that own food will provide about20% of RDA. Provisioning from purchase cannot be expanded and remains at about 35% of RDA.Acknowledging the complex and challenging situation, but assuming that IDPs will benefitfrom the potential opportunities and return to their villages of origin, WFP hence reducedfood rations for NEVIs in Gulu, Amuru and Kitgum to 40%/50% and 60%. EVIs maintained98-100% of their rations Two years later the EFSA found the situation had improvedconsiderably, assuming this would convince more IDPs to cover their net food gap.Box 6: Findings from EFSA 2007As the food security status continue to improve through more accessible land, better purchasing opportunities,market access, crop production and sale a “significantly higher pro portion of the households food basket isacquired from their own production.” Although there is absence of an updated and informative market study, theEFSA finds that the net gap is covered from market and own production contributing between 20 -40% to the foodbasket (and higher during harvest season), ‘and the remainder of the households food basket is acquired fromgathering and borrowing’.Despite these positive trends, the 2007 EFSA 86 cites that 68% of the household sample isclassified food insecure or moderately food insecure and only 10% of the households haveaccess to more than five acres of land. Moreover the EFSA found that 82% of thehouseholds had difficulties in securing enough food to feed their family in the rainy season ofMay, June, July and August 87 . The ration reductions, which WFP decided upon in 2005 aremaintained today, with the assumption that IDPs ability to cover their net food gap is evengreater.Although the EFSA’s and nutritional surveys do provide contextual analysis and back ground,the studies have methodological limitations. Stakeholders argue that the methodologicallimitations challenge EFSA’s from being used as a tool for evidence based decision -82In effect this did not mean more than a few acres per household, if at all any.83 EFSA, 2005, p. 22-2984EFSA 2005, p. 2985EFSA 2005, p. 3086EFSA 2007 covers mother camps and transit camps in: Gulu, Kitgum, Pader, Apac & Oyam, Amuria & Katakwi and Lira, withGulu and Kitgum being better off than the rest.87EFSA 2007, p. 1031

making 88 . The box below gives a summary of some of the main limitations highli ghted to theEvaluation Team 89 .Box 7: Limitations to EFSA’s and Other Surveys♦♦♦♦♦♦The sample size does not appear representative and as expressed by one stakeholder – sizes may be sosmall that they ‘don’t always show reality’. 90 The EFSA of 2005 is based on 10 camps per district andinterviews with 10 households in each camp to give a total of grand total of 400 households for the entirestudy. In 2007 the EFSA, which includes a larger area than the 2005 EFSA, was based on 220 households incamps and transit sites totalling 1760 households.Determination of the ration level is based on the analysis of household consumption from a 7 -day recallperiod. This limited amount of time may bring about inaccuracies in data quality.EFSA as well as WFP Nutritional S urveys are supposed to cover both mother camps and transit sites,however key informants note that in particular the WFP Nutritional Surveys cover mainly the original camps,where access to services is much more convenient than for example in the transit s ites 91 . Nutritional Surveyscarried out by independent NGOs, seem to capture a more diverse picture covering both camps and transitsites. 92Although the EFSA is often combined with the Nutritional Survey, the process of data triangulation is notclear.The EFSAs are supposed to be carried out twice a year and provide a comprehensive picture of the situationon the ground. However in 2005 and 2007 there has only been one EFSA per year.The publication of the EFSAs is often several months delayed and hen ceforth the picture which the EFSAreveals on the day of publication may be far from the evolving challenges and changes on the ground93 andagain doubtful as a decision -making tool.In summary – as can be seen from above - stakeholders in Northern Uganda and Kampalaexpress dissatisfaction with the quality, lack of nuance, timeliness and comprehensiveness ofthe EFSA. Their concern in particular stems from the fact that EFSAs are the sole basis forthe development of food aid policy and subsequent decisio n making in Northern Uganda.A critical and thought provoking point highlighted by a number of stakeholders is that in asmuch as the EFSAs are carried out by food security actors spear headed by WFP and aWFP composed research team, the credibility of the EFSAs is challenged. The argumentmade by stakeholders is that the situation in Northern Uganda is changing and complex (insome areas changing for the better quickly, in some areas changing for the better not soquickly) but the inability to capture nuances and methodological limitations challenge theoutcomes of the EFSA. Some stakeholders argue that there may be a conflict of interestwhen WFP, who is responsible for the EFSAs, and subsequently, also determines therations, at the same time is also the ‘service provider’ of the food aid 94 whether it regardsincreasing or decreasing food aid.88Interview with NRC and DFID.89Summarised from interviews with NRC GFD staff, DFID, Selected humanitarian actors, WFP-phase off workshop in Kitgum +the EFSA of 2007.90 Interview with key informants in Gulu and Kampala.91 Nutrition and Health Assessments in IDP camps in Gulu, November 2006 and February 2008,92 ACF Nutritional Survey, May 200793 This was the case with the EFSA carried out in April 2007. It was released in August 2007, by which the rainy season had hitUganda and later developed into floods. The 2005 EFSA was also prepared in April but only released by WFP in September2005.94Interviews with humanitarian actors, independent humanitarian experts and food aid donors.32

Recent studies 95 on global food security and emergency needs assessments support theabove findings by arguing that linking ‘analysis to decision making’ in food s ecurity is facedwith numerous challenges. The criticisms amongst others centre around: “analytical capacity(assessments of needs, cost-effectiveness and impact), the ability to allocate resourcesimpartially, the ability to link analysis or early warning to a timely and appropriateresponse…” 96 . Studies also highlight that while food security assessments may be useful forfood agencies’ own programming, they “are not as useful for donors or other partners infacilitating decision making… they continue to be narrowly focused on an a priori assumptionof food aid programming, rather than providing a basis on which to inform the broader rangeof response options” 97 .To address the problems regarding the EFSAs and provide a more confident basis for foodaid policy development in Northern Uganda, an EFSA conducted independent of those with avested interest would be timely and relevant (see also Chapter 11 on Food Phase Off). Ofcourse the research should be conducted by food aid experts, some of whom may be drawnfrom current experienced food actors on the ground. Moreover, an independent EFSA neednot necessarily replace currently planned EFSAs, but be additional to it.Given stakeholders’ and donors’ concerns for t he direction of food aid policy, the EvaluationTeam finds that there is opportunity to present an independent EFSA and persuade donorsof its added value. What they stand to gain from a quality EFSA would most likely dwarf thecost.7.2.2 Covering the Net Food Gap – How do People Cope?Despite the noted improvements in security, increased access to land and possibilities formarket use, NRC’s monitoring reports and post distribution reports as well as severalinterviews 98 with humanitarian actors and donors still show that meeting the net food gap is achallenge to many IDPs. IDPs asked during the field visits in mother camps as well as intransit sites confirmed that they had access to land (average 2 -5 acres) and some access tomarkets. Some IDPs said the land was their own, while others said they had to rent land.Many were farming this season and hoped for a good harvest (due to heavy seasonal rainslast year their crops were destroyed). Nevertheless most of the IDPs interviewed explainedthat they were not able to meet their food gap largely because:95ODI study of 2007: “A Review of the links between needs assessments and decision making in response to food crisis:WFP/Emergency Needs Assessment” + “Rethinking Food Security in Humanitarian Response”, Maxwell et. al, 2008 in adiscussion paper for CARE, Oxfam, Tufts University and Feinstein International Centre. A conference on food security and howto ‘rethink it’ was held in Rome in April 2008. Earlier papers on this subject amongst others include: Simon Levine and ClaireChastre et al: “Missing the point: An analysis of food security in the Great Lakes”, Network Paper 47, Humanitarian PracticeNetwork London, ODI, 200496“Rethinking Food Security in Humanitarian Response”, Maxwell et al, 2008, p. 23.97ODI study of 2007: “A Review of the links between needs assessments and decision making in response to food crisis:WFP/Emergency Needs Assessment”. Referenced in “Rethinking Food Security in Humanitarian Response”, Maxwell et. al,2008, p. 32-3398 Interview with OCHA Gulu/Kitgum, DFID Kampala, FAO Kitgum, NRC staff and volunteers Gulu/Kitgum, IDPs (incl. FMCmembers, camp commandants) in several camps and transit sites visited, WFP Kitgum33

Box 8: IDPs reasons for not meeting their net food gap 99Regarding access to landRegarding cultivation of land♦♦For several years accessing a few km of landin the periphery of the camps has not beenenough to sustain the food gap (graduallyexpanded from 1 -5km).Not everybody has access to land.♦ Some have to rent land and it is costly 100 .♦♦With their manual efforts they were only in aposition to cultivate and weed 1 -2 acres.In Eastern parts of Kitg um there is fear ofKaramojong raiders, who raid peoples homes– this fear restricts many IDPs to their campsor transit sites.♦♦♦♦Inadequate farming tools and seeds despitesome blanket distribution;‘Opening up’ the uncultivated land is difficultand needs more than just manpower (when ittakes long to open up land, they miss afarming season);The lack of oxen ploughs/tractors or moreintensive machinery to open up land.IDPs ‘don’t feel strong enough to dig, as theydon’t get enough food’Regarding alternative income opportunitiesRegarding saving and investment♦♦♦Income generating activities and employmentopportunities in camps, in town or in transitsites are few.The youth no longer help parents in the farms– they have little experience of far ming anddream of urban lifestyles and jobs.Older women who have lost their family butstill have land are not able to get help tocultivate it.♦♦No granaries to store food (some IDPs inAmuru said that their produce in farms lastyear resulted in a sur plus, which they cannotsave)Lack of money to rent an oxen and a plough♦ Prices on food have increased in towns. 101Several key informants (government officials, humanitarian organisations and donors)admitted that along side the ration reductions in most cases the IDPs have not been able tomeet their net food gap. As one UN agency in Kitgum phrased it: ”people are not yet wherewe thought they would be”. A confirmation of this statement is found in some of the copingstrategies, which several of the IDPs, interviewed have claimed to apply 102 :Box 9: Coping strategies 2005 to 2008 1031. Reduction in number of meals per day2. Borrowing food3. Reduced the sizes of meals4. Purchasing food on credit5. Skipped food consumption for an entire day6. Restriction of adult consu mption at home7. Consumption of wild food8. Consumption of immature foods9. Consuming less preferred food10. Eating seed stocks11. Engaging in degrading jobs99Naturally this is only a snap shot, as the IDPs interviewed are not representative of the entire IDP population. Themethodological sensitivity of any survey regarding food aid, which invariably prompts biased or rhetoric answers is taken intoconsideration: Sources are multiple, answers have been cross checked and corroborated with surveys, monitoring reports andinterviews with other stakeholders.100 Price mentioned: ushs 15.000/acre/year.101 Prices from Kitgum Town Sorghum 2007: Ushs 30/mug and in 2008: Ushs 100/mug. Sweet potato 2007: Ushs 100/heapand in 2008: Ushs 200/heap. Source: FAO, Kitgum102 The EFSA 2005 summarises that the interpretation of the above is difficult and attributes the coping strategies to the factthat the crisis is protracted to such an extent “that some of the strategies may have been adapted”. This is seen in conjunctionwith the fact that global malnutrition rates as well as severe malnutrition rates declined in all districts.103This is only a snap shot, as the IDPs interviewed for the Evaluation are not representative of the entire IDP population.Nevertheless the answers – which were repeated in the majority of FDGs give an indication. Moreover, they were confirmed inseveral of NRCs own monitoring reports from 2005-2008.34

From the 2007 EFSA 104 it transpired that adults in 52% of the households had only one meala day and the figure was higher in transit sites (60%) 105 Even for children the figures werenoticeable, with 36% reporting only 1 meal and 3% reporting no meals the previous daybefore the EFSA survey. 47% could manage to feed their children twice a day, but only 14%were in a position to give their children more than 3 meals a day. The EFSA does indicatethat Gulu, Amuru and Kitgum seem to be faring better than the remaining sample sites forthe EFSA 2007. Although not commonly adopted, some of the more disturbing anddamaging coping strategies that the Evaluation Team discovered through some focus groupdiscussions with IDPs were:Box 10: Other coping strategies 2005 -2008 106♦♦♦♦♦♦Begging or sending your younger family members to begTheft (crime rates in camps are in general high)Prostitution (also by young mothers)Child labour by sending children of young age to workGamblingExploiting natural resources for selling (charcoal burning)The Evaluation Team found that despite having more access to land and having left behi ndthe strains of camp-life, the coping strategies in transit sites in Gulu and Kitgum 107 seemmore challenging than in the mother camps. The lack of basic services such as health,access roads, clean water and sanitation in particular puts people in a vulne rable situation.The Evaluation Team’s observations show (and were confirmed by several NRC staff andvolunteers) that the malnutrition levels amongst lactating mothers and the vast number ofchildren who have not yet reached the school going age was relat ively high. As mentionedearlier nutritional surveys conducted by WFP concentrate their research mainly in mothercamps 108 .In spite of these observations, several interviews and findings documented in monitoringreports from amongst others NRC, the common understanding that IDPs are not meetingtheir net food gap is still disputed. For example district officials in Gulu emphasised to theEvaluation Team that as documented in the Nutrition Surveys, Northern Uganda is “out of thedanger zone…. people today are okay… and…they produce enough to supply the Sudanmarket”. 109 If there are reasons for the Acholi people not meeting their net food gap, it isaccording to some officials because they ‘by nature are lazy’ 110 and that food aid over thepast 10 years has brought about a highly inconvenient ‘dependency syndrome’ 111 .One UN agency was strongly of another view: “IDPs do not want the food rations any longerand they can grow the food. The problem is only that the yield is not high enough andtherefore they are not meeting their net food gap…they need tractors…If they had the option,they would go for something else than food aid. The option is still not there. Food is no longerconsidered a push or a pull factor…” 112 .104 The EFSA 2007 covers mother camps and transit camps in: Gulu, Kitgum, Pader, Apac & Oyam, Amuria & Katakwi andLira – i.e. figures include Acholi, Lango and Teso regions.105 EFSA 2007, p.12106IDPs interviewed for the Evaluation are not representative of the entire IDP population, and as stated these coping strategiesare not commonly adopted amongst all IDPs interviewed. Some answers are also confirmed in NRCs own monitoring reportsfrom 2005-2008.107 Pawidi in Kitgum, Lukwor in Kitgum and Oraphoyo in Gulu108WFP Nutritional Surveys of 2006 and 2007 conducted in 53 mother camps in Gulu109 Interview with DDMC, Gulu.110 District Official, Gulu111 District Official Gulu112Interview with UNHCR Gulu.35

7.2.3 Stimulating Other OptionsLike the statement made above the 2005 and 2007 EFSAs note that there is a strongrelationship between household food security and contribution of own production to the foodbasket. However, apart from blanket distributions 113 of seeds and tools to a number of IDPs itseems that little has been done by GoU, humanitarian agencies or donors to 114 1) stimulateown production 2) facilitate the market 3) create employment opportunities 4) createinvestment prospects 5) help farmers save their produce or seeds 6) open up for incomegenerating activities and 7) revive animal husbandry … all of which are fundamentallynecessary for the IDPs to cover their net food gap (regular and seasonal) 115 .It is clear to humanitarian and recovery actors on the Ugandan scene that between relief andrecovery/development there is a gap without adequate interventions and actors. While someshut down and phase out their operations others are supposed to open up, increase andexpand. But interventions in the area of food security, livelihoods, durable solution s, socialprotection and safety nets are still slow in taking off. Some of the reasons given are lack ofdonor funding, lack of leadership from GoU to steer the process and lack of a consolidatedand coordinated approach from recovery/development actors. C hapter 9 will discuss some ofthese challenges and dilemmas.7.2.4 Lesson Learned♦ IDPs have in general not been able to meet their net food gap as quickly as assumedfrom the beginning of the project period. Meeting the net food gap as well as nutritionalstandards is challenging if food ration reductions do not go hand in hand with livelihoodand food security expansion, particularly for more vulnerable groups and in the transitsites, where basic services are lacking and markets for purchase/sale are far.♦♦With the ration reductions and no immediate livelihood opportunities, IDPs are forced intovarious coping strategies, some more encouraging than others. In worst cases the copingstrategies are of a degrading nature, challenging the protection of some of the IDPs.EFSA’s and nutritional surveys are faced by a series of methodological limitations, delaysand lack of nuances, which question their credibility. Yet these surveys comprise the solebasis for crucial decision-making on food aid policy in Northern Uganda. Enhancedcorroboration, triangulation of data, comprehensiveness and independence of thesurveys will increase the credibility of the evidence base for decision -making.7.2.5 Recommendations♦ To address the reported problems regarding the EFSAs’ methodology and credibility andprovide a more confident basis for decision making and policy development at this time inNorthern Uganda, an EFSA cum nutrition survey, independent, and of a higher qualityshould be conducted to establish a more comprehensive and varied assessment of foodsecurity, coping strategies, ability to meet the net food gap etc. The research should beconducted by food aid experts, some of whom may be drawn from current experiencedfood actors on the ground. An independent EFSA need not necessarily replace currentlyplanned EFSAs, but be additional to it. (This is also recommended in Chapter 11 on FoodPhase Out strategy). NRC should advocate for and contribute to the realisation of this.♦NRC should invest in more specific research of various alternatives to food aid duringand after emergency settings, with a view to strengthen peoples’ coping strategies asquickly as possible (ref. recommendations in Sections 5.4 and 7.1).113 Amongst others undertaken by GoU, ICRC and selected other NGOs114 Key informant interviews with District officials in Gulu, Kitgum and Amuru, WFP Gulu and Kitgum, OCHA Gulu and Kitgum,NRC, AVSI as well as selected food aid donors, Kampala.115All of which is also mentioned in the EFSA’s36

7.3 Project Objective 3:To safeguard the fundamental right to food for targeted IDPs with specialemphasis on women, children and EVIs and the long-term effect of insufficientaccess to food.7.3.1 Targeting Food AidFood aid is targeted to two groups of people: The non extremely vulnerable (NEVI) and theextremely vulnerable individuals (EVIs). The WFP Protracted Relief and Recovery Operatio n(PRRO) defines the extremely vulnerable group as: the disabled people, orphans, widowswithout direct family support and households headed by children and returning abductedchildren. Rough estimations show that EVI households make up 5 -8% of the target group inKitgum. 15-20% of the households are EVIs in Gulu and Amuru 116 . Estimates fluctuateaccording to the number of people served each month.Judging that their capacity to obtain their own food is minimal, WFP provides this group withfull food rations 117 . Over the past three years EVIs have been given 98% and 100% foodrations. It is assumed that the remaining 2% is acquired through other means (borrowingfrom friends or relatives and receiving gifts).NRC has distributed the agreed amount through its f amily size distribution methodology tothe EVIs since 2005. EVIs are – like NEVIs – involved in scooping their own food anddistributing it according to household sizes. Those who are not in a position to carry out thistask, due to their physical condition, are helped by other family members.As the Evaluation Team observed at the various food distributions, there seemed generallyto be a good understanding from NEVIs why EVIs are given higher food rations. TheEvaluation Team was told that on occasion NEVIs steal from the EVIs or try to cheat them toget their share of the food, however on whole this seemed not to be a serious problem.EVIs have also suffered from pipeline breakages and delays. Moreover this group seemsmore increasingly also to be suffering from a reduced food basket, as some items in periodscontinue to be left out. During some of the food distributions observed by the EvaluationTeam, vegetable oil was missing from the EVI food basket. Complaints seemed to be filedinstantaneously to NRC, who regularly reports this in monthly and quarterly reports.The EVIs – despite their higher food rations – are struggling to cover their net food gap,perhaps even more critically than the NEVIs. The coping strategies left for an older woman ora physically disabled person are limited. Most often they engage in begging. Young mothersare known to venture into prostitution.7.3.2 Categorising PeopleA categorisation of people ensures that funds and items are ‘earmarked’ to this group inparticular and thereby protecting their rights. Nevertheless, in the case of food distribution thecategory for EVIs has by some stakeholders been found to be too restrictive. Severalindividuals, who do not necessarily represent any of the above EVI titles could be s aid to be116 Kitgum 2007: 51051 HH - 3980 EVI HH. Kitgum 2008: 59031 HH - 2504 EVI HH. Gulu/Amuru 2007: 75257 HH - 10966 EVIHH. Gulu 2008: 72108HH - 14768 EVI. Source: Sample of distribution figures from Quarterly Monitoring Reports Oct-Dec2007and Jan-March 2008, NRC117In addition, nutritional interventions will target malnourished children, pregnant and lactating women and people infected andaffected by HIV/AIDS, however these interventions are now being scaled down due to funding cuts.37

extremely vulnerable, simply by being extremely poor or for other reasons excluded fromsociety. NRC, WFP and other stakeholders agree that several cases of extremely vulnerableindividuals are left out of the group to receive 98% simply because they do not fit the presentcategory.Many EVIs have not been captured in the last verification exercise due to problems in thementioned data collection and date entry process. In effect this means that they are not onthe WFP print-list and no longer eligible for food. Although EVIs have complained about thisWFP has not rectified the problem and as described by some of the NRC volunteers: “Whenan EVI loses out it puts the person in an even more vulnerable position”.NRC has discussed the above problems frequently with WFP sub-offices in Gulu andKitgum. WFP sub offices have expressed willingness to support NRC in developing asolution that can capture the missed targets of the extremely vulnerable and has also arguedthat more food will be sourced for those cases where needs are extreme and should behandled swiftly 118 .7.3.3 Empowering Women in a Disempowered SituationMany years of food aid has pushed women in the forefront of decision-making andmanagement at household level and in communities. Half of the representatives and half ofthe executive-level members (vice chair person, secretary etc) on the food distributioncommittees are women. The election is carried out in the respective camps and theelectorate is composed by the Chairperson and the bene ficiaries. NRC has provided trainingin community participation and leadership skills to women who take part in food distributioncommittees. NRC has monitored the developments in monthly and quarterly reports 119 andsome of the positive findings are:♦♦♦♦A positive attitude amongst people towards women embracing leadership positions;Women participate not only in the distribution activities, but also in administrativemanagement of the camp;Women’s participation in food management committees gradually exceeds that of men,both in terms of membership as well as active participation (in 75 -85% of the camps theVC of the GMC is a women and 35-45% of the FMCs is constituted by women;Women participating in the scooping exercise at each point of distribution made i t easierfor volunteers and staff to monitor and manage the distribution.Women have been encouraged to get actively involved in food distribution, since they are theones preparing the food at home. Being in control of the food rations will assist in red ucingthe complaints that men collect food and sell or trade it in return for alcohol or money forgambling. Some reports say that more than 60% of the people who collect food rations arewomen. During the food distributions observed by the Evaluation Team this figure seemedcloser to 80%.Despite regular reporting on participation and collection of food, however, the NRCmonitoring efforts do not capture some of the more in depth effects of household dynamicswhich food distribution brings about by giving women a more powerful role in the family. SeeChapter 10 for assessment of impact on household level.118As an example: A group of some 9000 extremely needy IDPs were discovered late 2007 in Nakwanya Village in Orom Sub-County in Kitgum. They had fled from Sudan, through Kabong in Karamoja and had been displaced since 1986. Th ey arrived inKitgum with no food stocks and were surviving on wild fruits and dirty water when found and were ‘quite vulnerable’. Due tobureaucracy and procedures an assessment of this vulnerable population was only made in March 2008, upon which they wereincluded in the WFP print list and served as late as April 2008.119NRC Monthly and Quarterly Reports from 2005-2008 (some are more elaborate and analytical on the issues of femaleparticipation than others) + Post Distribution Monitoring reports from 2008.38

7.3.4 A Future Strategy for EVIs?Separating the most vulnerable individuals in a group by itself has its advantages anddisadvantages. It helps targeting and directing the reserved rations to the ones in need in acontrolled way ensuring that, their right to food is exclusively protected. In a time of crisis andchaos where thousands are fighting for food this may be the only sensible approach.However at the same time the separation of individuals also changes the dynamics ofcommunities and families. Those individuals, who perhaps previously (before the conflict)were taken care of by family members (elderly, orphans, disabled etc) have been ‘taken careof’ for 10 years. The problem may arise, when reductions in food aid continue and EVIscease to be an eligible ‘category’. Acknowledging that Government plans are consideringattention to this group in the recovery efforts 120 , the Evaluation Team posed questions tovarious stakeholders to find out what the interventions on the ground would be.Some maintained the position that the IDPs of Northern Uganda are a resilient people. Socialstructures may have changed, but perhaps not so much as expected, and are to some extentstill intact 121 . Reviving and supporting social structures that might have weakened after yearsof displacement in camps was one idea: “lets revitalise the traditional mechanisms of healingand taking care of the people” 122 . This was also emphasised by some concerned districtofficials. 123 To some, the revitalisation of the social structures was seen as a ‘hands off’strategy for the humanitarian and development community, leaving the development t o occurnaturally as communities find their roots, justified by the hope that “EVIs will automatically behelped as NEVIs become stronger” 124 .Although more careful, a basis for strategising was expressed by a stakeholder encouragingthe conduct of a large scale household survey that looks exclusively at household dynamics,including targeted needs for EVIs and also other groups in society: the youth, the childrenetc, with the aim of creating interventions that ‘build on the existing strengths and structure sin society 125 . Others also confirmed that: “there is a need to think out of the box… targetingwith different activities” 126 . Acknowledging that EVI households are very insecure and needprotection, but not incapable of taking care of themselves in a dignif ied way one respondentsaid: “Most of them cannot get involved in very heavy work…. You have to target them withincome generating activities such as beekeeping, grinding mills or give them boar goats” 127 .Despite being told that the challenges regarding EVIs has been discussed extensively byfood security stakeholders, the Evaluation Team did not find a clear or coherent strategyamongst the current actors in the ground to address the multiple needs of thousands of EVIsas food rations continue to be subject to funding cuts and recovery interventions are slow topick up.7.3.5 Lesson Learned♦ When EVIs lose out of the food distribution system they become even more vulnerable.♦Discussions have as of recent been devoted to the topic of EVIs and their future,however, there seems to be little concerted planning made or actions taken by the actorson the ground. The categorisation of EVIs – still maintained - may becomecounterproductive if efforts are not put into defining and designing a transitional120The PRDP under its Strategic Objective 2 should cover assistance to extremely vulnerable individuals in the North.121 Interview AVSI, Kampala122Interview with OCHA Kitgum123Interviews with district official Amuru and Gulu124Interview with OCHA Gulu125Interview with AVSI, Kampala126UNHCR Gulu127Interview with NRC FSL PC, Gulu. It should be noted however that some EVIs have said that even grinding mills and goats istoo heavy work for them.39

esponse. This requires thinking ‘out of the box’ and borrowing tools and experience fromfor example traditional development programmes that have worked with the‘mainstreaming’ agenda for years (e.g. mainstreaming gender, HIV/AIDS, human rightsetc).♦♦Assuming that EVIS will automatically be taken care of by families and friends may not bethe case. Family structures and dynamics have changed and NGOs and agencies as wellas districts should be careful in automatically assuming that upon return to the villages‘everything will be normalised’.When women are actively engaged in food distribution it increases their empowermentand authority and it also affects traditional household dynamics.7.3.6 Recommendations♦ NRC should in future food aid projects include a mainstreaming as well as an exitstrategy – in good time - especially for targeted vulnerable groups, so as not to leavethem in a vacuum, once the assistance is phased out.♦♦NRC should in the current situation in Northern Uganda be very careful to follow theassumption that EVIs will automatically be taken care of by families and friends as thereturn process picks up and IDPs move back to their villages. NRC should stronglyadvocate for simple and targeted mainstreaming interventions for EVIs, for examplethrough a multi-pronged approach involving (1) strengthening family and communitysocial systems (2) strengthening relevant district social sectors to provide services and(3) targeting EVIs with tailor made livelihoods activities.It may be beyond NRC’s mandate/policy to engage fully in the reintegration andmainstreaming of EVIs into society. However, as a preparatory step, there is a need forresearch and documentation in the area of EVIs, through a household survey, which canmore specifically determine the targeted need of people. NRC (together with other NGOsand district authorities) should take the lead on such a survey, which can also incorporateseveral household issues, including gender related issues: i.e. assessing changes in thehousehold and community dynamics which food aid brings about on gender roles,changes in traditional practices, social protection and safety nets. This will prepare actorsfor a more realistic and strategic recovery response.Having assessed and analysed the performance/effectiveness viz. the three main GFDobjectives the report turns to the remaining evaluation criteria: Coordination; Connectedness;and Impact. Each subject will be evaluated and lessons learned and recommendations willbe listed.40

8 COORDINATION8.1 A Co-ordinated Response in the FieldThe nature of the intervention and especially the overriding need to deliver food to the rightpeople at the right time has necessitated the involvement of several of humanitarian actorsincluding GoU. The table below is not exhaustive and only attempts to capture some of themost critical partners, their roles and responsibilities in NRC’s operations with a view tohighlight the areas of co-operation and co-ordination.Table 5: Stakeholders and Their RolesVerification Assessmentof of foodbeneficiaries securityNRCWFPUNOCHADDMCFood security clusterMilitary /securityCamp Managm entFMCsBeneficiaries (IDPs)Delivery ofcommoditiesCommunityMobilisationDistributionofcommoditiesCoordination between the different actors takes place through different mechanisms:Monitoring/feedbackDistrict Disaster Management committee (DDMC) 128 : is the overall coordinating body forall emergency interventions in different sectors in the district and is chaired by the ChiefAdministrative Officer 129 . The DDMC includes representatives from all relevant governmentdepartments, humanitarian agencies and IDPs. The DDMC meets monthly and is expectedto advise, support and monitor implementation of the different interventions 130 .Food Security Cluster 131 : is co-chaired by FAO the lead UN agency and the districtproduction officer as the government counterpart. The cluster is composed of representativesof different agencies/ NGOs engaged in food security interventions.Food Aid sub-committee 132 : is a sub committee of the Food Security cluster and is chairedby WFP and composed of agencies and other actors engaged in food aid. Mainly focuses onissues related to food distribution (verification of beneficiaries, food assessment,transportation issues, security, etc).Food Management Committees (FMC) 133 : established in each and every distribution pointand includes representatives of the beneficiaries (IDPs) and camp leaders. FMCs mee tmonthly but may meet more frequently depending on the needs. FMCs are responsible forliaison with NRC, mobilization of beneficiaries, disseminating information, coordinating andmanaging the food distribution process.In addition to the above, NRC frequently attends meetings, workshops and shares reportswith the different actors depending on the issues at hand. Feed back from many of theactors 134 reveals that the understanding of roles and responsibilities and the subsequent co -ordination effort which has improved over the years has resulted in: the increased128Interviews with RDC/LCV/ Deputy CAO Kitgum.129This is mandated by the National IDP Policy.130Several stakeholders said that there had been problems in keeping the meetings regular and fully attended.131Interview with FAO, UNOCHA.132Interview with WFP, UNOCHA.133Interview with FMCs, Opit and Amuru IDP camps.134Interviews with WFP, DDMC, RDC, UNOCHA,FAO, FMCs, Vice LCV.41

involvement of stakeholders; sharing of information, greater leverage of resources;identification of needs; increased accessibility to all camps; quality assurance and ultimately,the timely, efficient and safe distribution of food aid to the intended beneficiaries.Examples of some of the areas where the co-ordination efforts with some of the actors e.g.DDMC have been useful include: provision of military personnel 135 to escort the food trucksand provide security protection during distribution in particularly insecure areas. The DDMCCoordinator has at times also been involved in dissemination of information to thecommunities on food distribution issues (reductions in rations) 136 .At the level of the beneficiaries, co-ordination efforts have resulted into increased beneficiaryinvolvement, better identification and representation of the communities’ needs andproblems; orderly distribution and crowd control. Coordination with other agencies/NGOsinvolved in camp management has provided NRC with important information on IDPpopulations, return movements and figures as well as information on protection concerns e.g.level of gender based violence 137 .There have been challenges arising from the limited capacity (personnel, finances,equipment) of some agencies, organisations and government institutions to participateactively 138 and effectively respond to problems within their ambit. For example the poorcondition of some roads during the rainy season has from time to time caused delays indelivery of food aid to some IDP camps. NRC frequently experiences problems intransporting food to some camps e.g. Pabbo in Amuru and the Eastern Chwa region inKitgum. Food trucks occasionally get stuck, delaying the di stribution process andnecessitating the volunteer teams to spend nights in the camps. Kitgum district expects torepair at least 5 bridges 139 having submitted a request for funds from the Ministry of Worksand Housing for funds; as well as repair some of th e feeder roads through funds fromDanida. In the interim, NRC has demanded for stronger trucks from its transporters and hasalso arranged to distribute at least two months rations to some of the hard to reach areasahead of the rain season 140 .Frequent movements of IDPs and the absence of uniform data on camp populations andreturn figures have also been a challenge to proper planning. UNHCR (in liaison withorganisations responsible for camp management) compiles figures of the IDP populations incamps and transit sites and updates a matrix sent out to all other stakeholders.Communication with the beneficiaries is not always timely. It was found that beneficiarieswere not always fully aware of the reasons behind the ration reduction and/or absence ofcertain food items. The beneficiaries also complained about the slow response to theproblems that they have raised. Participation of IDPs in DDMCs is not as regular due tofunding constraints 141 . Although NRC as an organization has ensured that food related an dother problems of IDPs are captured in its reports, non response (as highlighted in earlierchapters) to the problems has partly been a result of the co -ordination challenges of thedifferent sectors as discussed below.The GFD is only a part of the humanitarian response to the conflict in northern Uganda.There are many other inter-related activities. Although not indicated on the table, there are anumber of other players 142 – UN agencies, INGOs, NGOs, CBOs, NRC’s programmes and to135Interview with District Official, Gulu136Interview with DDMC Coordinator, Gulu137Interviews with UNHCR and Camp Management NRC138Often district sector officials have not attended meetings.139Interview with Vice Chair, LCV Kitgum140Quarterly report FFL/FFE: Jan – March 2008141FGD with IDPs in Opit and Pawidi142UNICEF, WHO, MSF, ICRC, AVSI, IRC, OXFAM just to mention a few.42

some extent also GoU through district departments, that have provided services that haveincreased the effectiveness of NRC’s GFD e.g. provision of water & sanitation, health,education and some food security interventions.With the security improvements in the North and the ongoing return process, the nature ofthe roles and responsibilities by actors on the ground is also subject to change. Thisconcerns humanitarian actors, NGOs, UN, Donors and in particular Government actors atcentral and district levels. All are now supp osed to change gears from the emergencyapproach to the recovery. However it has been noted that coordination between the differentsectors and capacity of Government in particular to pick up where humanitarian agencies areleaving is neither effective nor adequate. Coordination of this process falls within the remit ofthe DDMCs and the various sector/cluster groups. For example the absence of certain socialservices in the transit sites has forced a number of IDP households to move back and forthand has caused some disruption in GFD’s distribution programme 143 . These are some of thechallenges facing a coordinated response to the transition from relief to recovery, more ofwhich will be discussed in Chapter 9.8.2 WFP – NRC: A Mutual PartnershipWFP has the overall mandate of providing emergency food aid to the IDPs in NorthernUganda and NRC is one of and also its biggest cooperating partner in Uganda. As spelt outin the MOUs that are renewed annually, NRC is re sponsible for logistical operations anddistribution of commodities in addition to being WFP’s ‘eyes and ears’ on the ground. NRCand WFP employ a number of channels including regular meetings and monthly postdistribution monitoring reports through which information is shared and delivery anddistribution activities are co-ordinated. Effective co-ordination between the two partners hascontributed to the improved assessment of beneficiary needs and hence adjustments ofrations 144 , improved targeting (at least 97% of planned beneficiaries reached), preparednessand delivery of food in response to changing circumstances e.g. floods and impassableroads. WFP has highlighted NRC’s openness and transparency in discussion of difficultissues as being one of the main reasons for effective coordination. NRC is credited for itsefficiency, flexibility and ability to quickly adjust its distribution plans in sync with WFP’smodalities. However, despite this very conducive environment there have been a number ofcoordination challenges incl. verification and registration of beneficiaries, slow handling ofcomplaints and slow responses to problems, which have caused frustration amongst all –also in the absence of contingency measures (See details Section 6.4).8.3 Lessons♦♦NRC’s approach to coordination through openness, transparent dialogue and sharing ofinformation with humanitarian organizations, agencies, beneficiaries as well asGovernment has been imperative to efficient coordination.Lack of active coordination on behalf of all stakeholders (perhaps due to lack of clearunderstanding of roles and responsibilities) is having a negative effect on the recoveryresponse, leaving IDPs in a void.8.4 Recommendations♦NRC should push/advocate for an articulation of roles and responsibilities as well strongcoordination amongst humanitarian actors through the recovery phase.143Interview with NRC, Kitgum144Interview with WFP Gulu43

♦♦NRC should capitalise on its longstanding good partnership with WFP to push andadvocate more strongly for the solution of long standing problems like e.g. answeringIDPs complaints.NRC is also urged to make its own strategic objectives, buffer budget and contingencyplan, so as not be contingent upon WFP delays and bureaucracy (see alsorecommendations on alternative solutions in Chapter 5 Section 5.4)44

9 RELIEF AND RECOVERY – CONNECTEDNESS9.1 From Relief to Recovery – The LinkagesFollowing the improved security situation, Northern Uganda is currently transitioning from thehumanitarian phase to the recovery phase. The goal of the UN and the humanitarianorganisations in terms of food security for the North is clearly stated in the CAP of 2008: “Tosupport, stabilise and improve the food security and livelihoods of households affected byand recovering from conflict …”. And for the Acholi region more specifically: “…to provide a“soft landing” for returning households while not neglecting the needs of continuingIDPs…” 145 .On the GoU side the PRDP was launched to guide the recovery efforts in the North andensure coherence and coordination amongst the various actors. Under Strategic Objective 2of the PRDP (rebuilding and empowering of communities) cognizance is taken of thechallenges that IDPs are likely to experience during the transition period. This StrategicObjective is geared towards providing social service and livelihoods support, to assisthouseholds to achieve a level of normalization beyond mere survival levels .Box 11: PRDP Strategic Objective 2Rebuilding and empowering of communities♦♦♦♦improving the conditions and quality of life of the displaced personsreturn and reintegration of displaced populationsinitiating community rehabilitation and recovery activit ies in all communitiesprovision of services and protection of vulnerable peopleOfficial implementation of the PRDP is expected to start in the FY 2008/ 2009. In the interim,government has through the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) distributed seed s and toolsto some IDPs to support agricultural production; and intends to distribute iron sheets to eachIDP household later this year 146 . Plans are also underway to identify model farmers to besupported under the NAADs programme 147 .Having declared the emergency phase over government, donors and humanitarianorganisations/agencies are keen to see the return process in full gear. Although thecomprehensive peace deal is still to be finalised, the government is confident that peace willprevail and is urging the communities to leave the camps and return to their villages oforigin 148 There are those who hold the view that food assistance to IDPs in the camps is‘delaying’ the return process 149 and would rather that it was shifted to the return areas to actas a pull factor. As we shall see in the following chapters experiences from 20 camps inGulu have not entirely confirmed this argument. Nevertheless, the tone on food assistancehas ignited a discussion on a Food Aid Phase Out strategy (see chapter 11) in tandem withthe changing context and shift to recovery and development.9.2 From Relief to Recovery – The GapsThe relatively stable security environment has triggered movements of IDPs from the maincamps to the transit sites. However the pace has been slower than anticipated. As of March2008, approximately 50% of the 1.102.438 IDPs in Acholi are said to have left the main145CAP OCHA 2008, p. 31146It should be noted that Kitgum has more than 70.000 households, but has so far been given only 33.000 iron sheets147Interview RDC, Kitgum148Interview with district leaders, Gulu149Interview with WFP, Gulu45

camps 150 , but mainly moved to transit sites, bringing the number of transit sites in Acholi upto 1062. In Gulu and Amuru districts, which count 453.359 IDPs, 57% are estimated still tobe in camps, while 30% have moved to transit sites and only 13% are said to have movedhome. Gulu and Amuru are considered the most fertile districts in the Acholi su b region. InKitgum, which comprises 310.140 IDPs, 67% are still in camps, whereas 25% of them havemoved to transit sites, but only 9% have moved all the way back to their villages of origin 151 .The reasons for these trends are varied, but security concerns rank high. IDPs haverepeatedly said “we will only feel safe to return to our homes when Kony puts his hand on thepeace agreement” 152 . Even some leaders agree as one said “let there be peace and peoplewill walk away from the camps by themselves” 153 . But IDPs have also cited the lack ofproductive assets and the absence of social services in return areas as some of the overallimpediments to their resettlement and the reason why some of them continue to maintain apresence in the main camps and move back and forth.Indeed as the communities return, there is increasing pressure on the humanitariancommunity to meet the needs of those people remaining in the camps, those on the move,and those who have settled in new areas 154 . Conversely, there is a reduction in fundsavailable for humanitarian work, now that the emergency is over. As one agency put it “whenthe cameras stop rolling, so does the money”! 155Presently, on-going activities to support the recovery process, particularly with regards tosocial services and livelihood support, remain somewhat ad hoc and fairly fragmented 156 .Albeit there has been a blanket distribution of seeds and tools to most IDP camps 157 manystill lack substantial livelihood support activities 158 , technical support, income generatingactivities, market development and access etc.By the end of 2007 attempts were made to establish an early recovery cluster, now namedthe GIL cluster (Governance, Infrastructure and Livelihoods), which would be responsible forthe overall coordination of activities, including supporting local government to strengthenstructures to provide social services and plan for, implement and monitor recovery efforts.The GIL cluster would also have responsibility for supporting the livelihoods (non –agricultural) of returned communities. To date the effective operationalisation of this clusterremains to be seen.The late and not so visible arrival of the lead agency (UNDP) to head the recovery tasks plusthe uncertainty of the PRDP and the lack of guidance and leadership from Office of the PrimeMinister (GOU’s co-ordination point for the PRDP) have been mentioned as some of thereasons for creating a gap that has affected coherence in understanding as well as fundingof early recovery and recovery 159 . Moreover, it also seems to have affected the strongconcerted articulation of the importance of the recovery phase, if the situation in NorthernUganda should not suffer from a relapse.While humanitarian agencies are being encouraged to integrate recovery activities in to theirwork, they are constrained by technical limitations, lack of leadership and funding limitation.As a result NGOs such as AVSI that have been active in this region have stopped their foodsecurity activities because the funding available (6 months) is inadequate for the tasks150UNHCR IDP Population Movement Matrix, March 2008151Figures are from UNHCR matrix on IDP population movements from March 2008. It should be noted again that these figuresare estimates.152Focus Group with IDPs, Opit Camp, Gulu. Ref. to Joseph Kony, the leader of the LRA.153Interview with district leader, Amuru154European Union, 2007: Northern Uganda Agricultural Recovery Programme (NUARP) – An Identification Study, Volume 2155Interview with WFP, Kitgum156Interview with UNHCR, Gulu157Seeds and tools distribution carried out by ICRC – source: OCHA158Interview with UNOCHA, Gulu159Interviews with Country Director & Protection and Advocacy Advisor, NRC46

expected of them. From their perspective, ”supporting livelihoods during this transition periodis more complicated and requires more resources and expertise particularly given theweakened capacity of the district production department” 160 .While stakeholders (GOU, donors, UN agencies, NGOs) are in agreement on the need forthe concurrent implementation of relief and recovery activities to mitigate the impact of asudden withdrawal, the link between the two (transition) has become a ‘grey’ area affectedby the absence/slow release of funds. Attempts were made to include recovery activities inthe Consolidated Appeals Process, but as of May 2008, only 22% out of USD 400 millionrequested for has been realized (the Food security cl uster – excluding food aid - in particularappears to have attracted the least funds 161 ). It would appear that funding agencies, thattraditionally support either relief or development activities are struggling with this ‘transitionidea’ in terms of policy, programming and funding. This situation is a classical example of thecompartmentalisation between humanitarian and development work 162 . It is also worth notingthat hesitation to fund the transition could also be linked to the delayed signing of the peaceprocess and hence uncertainty on what is going to happen 163 .As mentioned earlier, the link between relief and recovery has also been affected by thedelayed and unclear implementation of the PRDP – which is supposed to establish thefoundation for the process i.e. through the various objectives. The total PRDP budgetcurrently stands at US$ 606,519,297, which has both created anticipation and someconfusion. Some of the common questions asked are: is this new money and how soon is itgoing to be available? And to whom is it going to be allocated, NGOs or districts? What isthe absorptive capacity of districts to handle this money? How exactly the PRDP will befunded is still being discussed, but it could involve either of these mechanisms 164 : i) reallocationof national expenditures; ii) international co-financing through budget support; iii)international co-financing through allocations at the district level by way of block grants; iv)establishment of a multi-donor trust fund; and v) parallel stand alone projects. This alsocreates uncertainty about the implementation mechanisms 165 , which will be determined bythe different modes of funding. The situation has put stakeholders in a ‘waiting position’ tosee GoUs next move. Consolidation of state authority an d specifically that of localgovernments appears particularly crucial to the recovery process and yet the formaladministrative structures are a long way off in terms of capacity to manage the recovery anddevelopment processes” 166 .9.3 NRC’s Efforts Towards ConnectednessAdvocacy on Recovery: The GFD programme is developing an advocacy strategy thatrevolves around the issues under Strategic Objective 2 of the PRDP. GFD’s advocacy effortsare aimed at drawing the attention of other actors to the needs of the IDPs in the camps andthose in the return areas and thereby guiding recovery efforts. From its experiences in theprocess of food distribution as well as camp management, NRC has been able to identify anumber of issues affecting the communities and particularly during the resettlement process.Some of the advocacy messages that NRC is focusing on: the basic needs of the population;voluntary return; the security and protection concerns, particularly of vulnerable persons e.g.children left in the main camps. NRC is also particularly concerned about the articulation andthe lack of institutional clarity of the early recovery cluster 167 , and is considering various160Interview with Country Director, AVSI161Interview with UNOCHA, Kitgum162Interview with Advocacy Advisor, NRC163Interview with humanitarian stakeholder164PRDP 2007 – 2010: Funding165European Union, 2007: Northern Uganda Agricultural Recovery Programme (NUARP) – An Identification Study, Volume 1166Interview with UNHCR167Interview with Protection and Advocacy Advisor, NRC47

approaches through which it can stimulate a debate on transitional issues among therelevant actors in Uganda in order to bring some coherence to the process .Strengthening Local Capacities: At an operational level, GFD is building the capacity oflocal structures (albeit on a limited scale) that are expected to direct future developmentefforts within the community. Whereas it created its own distribution structures (the FMCs)which have been accused of undermining the authority of local structures, NRC isincreasingly working with local officials at the parish level in the transit sites and return a reas.Parish chiefs and local council officials are more involved in the food distribution processesand have been trained and equipped with community mobilization and leadership skills 168 .During the first quarter of 2008, a training programme was conducted in all sub counties forFMCs, sub-county leaders and some LC members. The training tackled topics on the roles ofFMC/LCs, distribution processes, role of food aid during return and recovery, hygienepromotion and domestic violence 169 .Linkages with Other NRC Programmes: NRC has a portfolio of programmes includingsupport to food security & livelihoods (FSL); support to Information Communication andLegal Aid (ICLA); support to Food For Education (FFE), support to Education, in particularthe Youth Education Pack (YEP) and support to Shelter and Camp Management. All theseprogrammes have a longer-term perspective that would complement the GFD programme.Interestingly GFD is credited for creating a special status for NRC, which has offered somelevel of protection for the other programmes 170 and yet until recently, there have been noefforts to strengthen the linkages between these programmes and GFD and maximise on this‘good will’.The FSL project which offers a variety of livelihood options through agricultu ral production;income generating activities (IGAs); and environmental conservation, was initiated towardsthe end of 2005 with the aim of increasing IDPs’ self sufficiency, following reductions of WFPfood rations 171 . The programme picked pace in 2006. The FSL project targets both NEVIsand EVIs and is today (2008) working with a total of 7613 households in Gulu, Amuru andKitgum districts, but would like to expand its target group, as the needs are great. Support tofarmer groups has so far included input provision (seeds, oxen, ploughs) and training toincrease appropriate knowledge and skills. By creating knowledge on, strengthening anddeveloping sources of food and sources of cash, the project assists IDPs and returnees tocope with their current situation in the short term as well as to gain skills that will benefit themwhile returning to their places of origin 172 . The FSL project in its current scope is fully fundeduntil April 2009.The number of households so far reached by the FSL project appear rela tively small in lightof the high unmet need for livelihoods support in the three districts, and hence the need toexpand these interventions. As noted in earlier sections, NRC’s GFD and FSL componentscould complement each others’ efforts more than has be en the case, given their commoninterest in food security. Apart from a few occasions, the two have to some degree beenworking in parallel. While their approaches to food security are somewhat different with theFSL component requiring more technical back stopping and close monitoring, GFD bringscertain strengths to the table (logistics, mobilization skills, a broad network, regular contactwith, and knowledge of communities in all sub-counties) some of which could be harnessedto inform and/ or support expansion of the livelihoods’ interventions.168FFL/FFE Quarterly report, April 2008169Ibid170Interview with ICLA, NRC171Based on recommendations from a WFP EFSA conducted in March 2005172NRC: Food Security & Livelihoods leaflet48

9.4 Lessons Learnt♦♦♦♦♦Strong and effective leadership is critical for articulating the link between relief andrecovery and for galvanizing early recovery efforts. Lack of leadership in a postemergency situation creates a sense of paralysis amongst actors.In a complex situation such as that in northern Uganda, the beneficiaries’ perspectivesand needs of the communities should be the driving force to avoid pushing people intofurther destitution. Needs’ assessments should be the basis for decision-making inhumanitarian situations.There seems to be few and disperse funds available for the much needed recoveryactivities. Availability of funds in a predictable, timely (more than 6 months) and coherentfashion can improve planning for recovery and assist in implementation of usefullivelihoods programmes.Co-operation and close collaboration between the different actors: government/donors/humanitarian agencies/NGOs is critical for successful recovery efforts. At presentstakeholders do not seem clear of their roles and responsibilities and this hampers asmooth gear-shift into recovery.Humanitarian organisations working on the ground have sound knowledge of the realitiesand needs of the ground and which if pr operly packaged can be used to influenceprogrammes and policy.9.5 Recommendations♦Strong leadership is needed to facilitate the recovery process. As time passes IDPs areleft in a vacuum and the consequences may be difficult to handle. With the resources,capacity and goodwill NRC has in Uganda, the organisation should take a lead inadvocating for concerted recovery efforts. The current lack of leadership from GoU aswell as the humanitarian community should not prohibit NRC from exercising its mandateand leverage as an independent, capable and important NGO to move forward and setexamples for the recovery process.♦♦♦NRC should advocate for targeted and needs based interventions. This will imply carryingout research and studies (of which some recommendati ons have been made in thisreport) so as to have a credible evidence base for future programming. Time is not inanybody’s favour. For every delay a farming season for the IDPs may be missed.In the current transition from the humanitarian to the recovery phase, NRC should alongside GFD activities engage more widely and strategically in Food Security and Livelihoodactivities. During the coming months it should be explored how to maximise the synergiesbetween the GFD team/structure and the FSL programme objectives.If there is limited and unsustainable funding for livelihoods/self reliance activities NRCshould request advocacy support from the food security cluster lead or higher up in theUN humanitarian system.49

10 YEARS OF FOOD AID - IMPACTTen years since it was started, NRC‘s GFD has had considerable impact on the conflict -affected communities in the Acholi sub region, some more positive than others. Asmentioned in chapter 4.1., the GFD project has identified indicators to measure thequantitative impact of its activities. Weekly, monthly and quarterly monitoring as well as postdistribution monitoring is carried out. In as much as having acknowledged the effectivenessof the GFD project and concluded that it has contributed to keeping roughly half of the IDPpopulation alive in Northern Uganda, the GFD project has had other significant effects.10.1 Women’s Empowerment/Crisis of MasculinityThe methods employed during the distribution of food aid have not only given the IDPs somelevel of autonomy through their increased participation in the distribution process, it has alsocontributed to women’s empowerment. Half of the member of the food distribution committeemust be women and this has created leade rship opportunities for women in a society whereleadership positions were traditionally held by men. This has led to a positive change in theattitude of the people towards women embracing leadership 173 . According to some FMCmembers, the presence of the women on the committee has infused gender sensitivity andparticularly in the resolution of domestic conflicts arising from food. The partner with custodyof the children (mostly women) manages food issues. 174 The reverse side of the story hasbeen the increased workload for women. More than 60% of people who come to pick therations are women, as men have tended to keep away altogether.As the registered recipients of food aid – women have acquired greater decision-makingpower in the household over how and when food utilized 175 and have become the de factobreadwinners – a position that was prior to the conflict held by the men. “Men have nothingunlike in the past when they had food”. 176 Dealing with these changes and the frustrationsthat come with confinement in the camps has not been easy for the men, a good number ofwhom have resorted to alcohol triggering a cycle of social problems - domestic violence,alcoholism and family break ups 177 . See, also recommendations for household survey ofchanges in gender dynamics in Section 7.3.10.2 Skills Transfer/EmploymentTo facilitate the distribution of food commodities, NRC has recruited over 200 volunteers whohave been trained and equipped with a variety of skills inclu ding (leadership, management,mobilization etc). Moreover, others have been employed by the organization to manage thefood distribution programme. Community members serving on the FMCs have also beenequipped with basic management skills. In addition to creating employment, income andleadership opportunities for the individuals involved, the programme has created a pool ofdedicated and skilled personnel in the Acholi sub -region: a resource for future developmentsin the region. See recommendations on utilising this resource base in Section 6.6 and inSection 9.5.10.3 Dependency SyndromeIt is debatable to what extent food aid has created dependency among the IDP commu nitiesin northern Uganda. There are those who hold the view that food aid has created173Quarterly Report Jan – March 2008, FFL/FFE174FGD with FMCs in Amuru IDP camp175Quarterly Report Jan – March 2008, FFL/FFE176Male IDP, Amuru IDP camp177FGDs with IDPs in Pawidi and Amuru50

dependency among the IDPs and unwillingness to return home . 178 With the exception ofsome extremely vulnerable households, it appears as if many households have adopteddifferent livelihood strategies to meet their food needs. As such food aid becomes only apart of their coping mechanism and not the whole picture. It is the view of the EvaluationTeam that it is other factors such as limited access to land, limited produ ctive assets andpublic services, which have suppressed the productive capacities of the IDP communities.Nevertheless for some groups of the IDP community and particularly the (male) youth foodaid might be a disincentive to agricultural production. Fur thermore, after years of confinementin the camps young men have no experience, skills or know how of working the land andsome of the young men have succumbed to ‘urban evils’ – gambling and alcoholism and arenot interested in returning to the villages. Also, as discussed in Section 7.3, thecategorization of the community into EVIs and NEVIs might in the short/medium term reflectan erosion of the traditional support mechanisms. “The war has made everybody selfish.Nobody is willing to share anything because they are not sure of how long their food stockswill last. Although they get more food, some of the elderly EVIs have become very selfisheven with their own relatives. As such people no longer have that mu ch pity for them” 179 .10.4 Creation of Parallel StructuresThe need to ensure that food gets to the right people in an orderly fashion necessitated thecreation of FMCS and close co-ordination with camp leaders. Unfortunately, the creation ofparallel structures may have inadvertently undermined the role/authority of local governmentstructure. The FMCs and Camp Management in several cases today wield more authoritythan the LCs. This has brought about some friction from the established structures nowfearing that: “Camp leaders are more influential than LC officials” 180 .178Interview with district leader, Gulu179FGD with NRC volunteers.180Interview with district leader, Amuru51

11 PHASING OFF FOOD AID – A DISCUSSION11.1 Phase Out Strategy on its WayWFP is at present finalising a ‘Food Assistance Phase Out Strategy for the North” 181 . Thepurpose of the strategy is to guide – through a clear and agreed process - the exit of foodassistance to IDPs and returnees in Kitgum, Gulu, Amuru and Pader districts.The principle of the strategy is that the Phase Out/exit of general food distribution should bedetermined by: 1) the need of IDPs and not the location 2) voluntary movement of IDPs and3) humanitarian principles. It is emphasised that in spite of the political and economic contextwithin which food assistance is operating in Uganda today, food should not be used ‘as anincentive to get people to leave camps – or to stay in them’.WFP so far has proposed that the food Phase Out decisions are going to be determined by1) EFSA 2) nutrition surveys 3) the WFP run food security monitoring system (FSMS).Stakeholders involved in the decision-making include: WFP, district authorities and the foodsecurity cluster.Stakeholders have discussed the Phase Out Strategy. The Evaluation Team had theopportunity to participate in a WFP facilitated workshop where this Phase Out was discuss edamongst GoU and an array of food security stakeholders 182 . Some of the pertinent areas ofdiscussion included the evidence-base for decision-making, i.e. the use of EFSA’s andnutritional surveys to determine the phase-off. Moreover the classification and categorisationof communities was discussed. The Phase Out strategy emphasises ‘cost efficient’ and easydata collection. An efficient classification of communities will ‘reduce the number of peoplethat need to be sampled overall’. By categorising of IDP s into red (constant GFD required),yellow (seasonal GFD required), green (no GFD required) and white (no food assistancerequired) groups a more visual and simple overview/map may be made of who needs thefood assistance and for how long and who can live without.How to capture the EVIs has apparently also been discussed extensively. The Food PhaseOut strategy states that: ‘it is expected that when a broader community no longer requiresfood assistance (i.e. it is classified as ‘White’), it will be able to care for its EVIs.’ And it goeson to explain the burden sharing once GFD has been phased off: ‘If there are someindividuals who still require special attention once the humanitarian response has ended, thegovernment of development partners would address their need with welfare-basedinterventions’.NRC, like other stakeholders, has participated in the discussions around the Phase Outstrategy and has also provided a series of comments strategy. Amongst others, NRC hasflagged the idea of a consequence analysis to be included in the process of phasing out, soas to prompt thinking and alternative strategies in case it is needed.11.2 Piloting the Phase Out in 20 DistrictsA phase-off pilot test has been made in 20 camps in Gulu. The target was 20 IDP cam psclose to town centres and those in the return sites with a three months food ration provided inJuly 2007 to facilitate return to villages of origin. The selected camps had better access toland and economic opportunities to support livelihoods based on their proximity to areas ofreturn and the urban centres. A rapid assessment carried out by WFP (Kampala and Gulu),the DDMC, NRC and members of the food security cluster was carried out in January to181Food Assistance Phase Off Strategy for the North, (draft) WFP182Phase Off workshop in Kitgum, April 200852

establish the food security situation in the selected camps and whether IDPs had or werereturning to their places of origin. 183 .Box 12: The Main Conclusion from This Rapid EFSA is:‘It was generally established that 14.69% of the IDPs in the selected camps were food insecure, 43.13% werefound to be mode rately food secure while 42.18% were food secure.…at least more than 48% of households faced difficulties in feeding their households between September andDecember 2007.…at least 50% of the households were affected by excessive rainfalls during the second season of 2007 whichactually affected food crops in the field.However it was also established that among the selected camps, some were better off than others. Six (6) campswere established not to be having households who were food insecure, nine (9) camps had at least 13% of foodinsecure households while five (5) camps had over 33% of food insecure households.’The most commonly cited coping strategy amongst the IDPs after the rations ran out was:‘reduction in consumption patterns’. The pilot test to some degree shows that many peopleare not yet in a position to meet their net food gap and they are still food insecure and not‘shock resistant’ as their food stocks are not stable enough.11.3 Comments to the Phase Out EffortsThe Phase Out strategy is not explicitly or strategically linked to a livelihoods or self -reliancestrategy. The transition, i.e. the ‘how’ and ‘when’ IDPs should move from receiving ‘handouts’ to ‘self-reliance’ is not spelled out in the Phase Out strategy. By only describing thePhase Out and not mentioning what is fundamentally supposed to ‘phase in’ and by whothere is a risk that stakeholders (Government, donors, humanitarian actors) committhemselves to one intervention without considering the other. For the IDPs it ma y result inbeing lost in a vacuum.Considering the several limitations of the EFSA (discussed in Section 7.2), it is of someconcern that mainly this tool – notably with a cost efficient aim - is going to be used as basisfor the Phase Out. The classification and categorisation exercise – intended to ease datacollection – may prove counter productive in as much as not providing a comprehensivepicture of the situation on the ground.The assumption in the Phase Out Strategy that EVIs will be taken care of may not hold. Thishas not been the case in Lira, where IDPs have returned to their villages. Research shouldbe made to support this assumption before it is used for decision -making otherwise EVIs willloose out.The results from the pilot Phase Out in 20 camps in Gulu should more expressively provideguidance on the consequences and pitfalls of a Phase Out process.The politics around food aid in Uganda with WFP subject to funding cuts coupled with thestrong message from GoU to IDPs of having to return to their homes and no longer bedependent on the food aid should be kept in mind. The IDPs are well aware of thepoliticization on food aid. A group of beneficiaries in a mother camp in Gulu, advised donors,WFP and others not to be bamboozled by the politics around food aid, and the GoUmessage that it is not needed anymore because the crisis in Northern Uganda is consideredover. During focus group discussions many strong statements came about. As on e woman of183Rapid Emergency Food Security Assessment, In 20 IDP camps in Gulu and Amuru Districts, January 200853

Pawidi Transit Site firmly stated: “I don’t even want to talk about the possibility of reducingfood aid as long as that man, Kony, has not signed.”11.4 Recommendations for Phase Out♦♦♦♦♦♦A credible basis for a food Phase Out decision would be - similar to the recommendationsin Section 7.2 - to conduct an EFSA cum nutrition survey independent and of higherquality to establish a more comprehensive and varied assessment of food security,coping strategies, ability to meet the net food gap and phase out etc.Acknowledging that a more comprehensive EFSA may require more resources, NRCshould advocate directly to humanitarian donors for funding for such an EFSA. Given theconcern of some donors for the direction of food aid policy, there is currently anopportunity to present and to persuade its rationale.In addition NRC should pursue the inclusion of a consequence analysis for each areasubject to the Phase Out.NRC should assist in developing a ‘main streaming approach’ for EVIs, which should beincluded in the Phase Out strategy, so they are not left to the assumption that NEVIs willtake care of them.Based on a new EFSA, NRC together with other food security stakeholders should beguided in the Phase Out of food aid.While Phase Out is being discussed and determined, NRC and other actors should scaleup its FSL activities to cover more households.54

ANNEX 1: Terms of Reference for the EvaluationNRC EvaluationsTERMS OF REFERENCEProject/Program: General Food Distribution in Gulu, Amuru and Kitgum districts 1997 -2008Country:UgandaPeriod: April 2005 - April 2008Date final version: 20 th FebruaryA. Project BackgroundFor the last 20 years, t he population in the Acholi region in Northern Uganda, has been affected by a violentconflict between the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the Government of Uganda (GoU). In 1995 -1996, theGoU decreed that all residents of areas affected by the conflict h ad to move into “protected villages”, whichtriggered humanitarian response. In 1997, the UN World Food Programme (WFP) with the Norwegian RefugeeCouncil (NRC) as its cooperating partner started distributing food to the affected population in Gulu184 and Kitgumdistricts. An average of 450,000 Internally Displaced People (IDPs) was registered in camps.In late 2001, the GoU declared the LRA a terrorist organisation which led the LRA to infiltrate the northern regionfurther and to intensify their commitment of violent and atrocious acts against the civil population. This resulted ina second massive wave of displacement. By October 2003, the total population of displaced persons had grownto 885,800 persons in the Acholi region. The IDP population increased, and in 2006 the number of IDPs in Acholiwas 1,111,780.In August 2006 a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement was signed between the GoU and LRA. This Agreement haslargely held over the last year, and resulted in reducing violence in the region. Peace tal ks are ongoing in Juba,South Sudan. Most notably, the parties must develop a mechanism to implement the Accountability andReconciliation Agreement reached in June 2007, and the Annex to this Agreement reached in February 2008.Justice and reconciliation and the role of ICC remain challenges.The relative improvement in security situation has enabled IDPs to cultivate land further away from the campsthan before 2007, and transit sites 185 have been established adjacent to parishes of origin. In the Acholi r egion,(Gulu, Amuru, Kitgum and Pader districts) it is estimated that out of 1.1 million IDPs, 300,000 are graduallyresettling in their sub -counties/parishes of origin. Still, many of these IDPs maintain a strong link to the camp, anddo not feel secure t o return to their homes of origin until the peace agreement is signed. By June 2007 onaverage an estimated 63% of the IDP population in Acholi region remained in the camps while 34% had moved totransit sites and 3% settled home 186 .Project context and rat ionale:The Norwegian Refugee Council has provided food assistance to IDPs in Gulu, Amuru and Kitgum districts in theAcholi sub -region in partnership with the UN World Food Programme since 1997. During 2007, 755,000 IDPs 187received a monthly ration in the camps and transit sites through the General Food Distribution/Food for Lifeproject (GFD/FFL 188 ). In 2007 NRC distributed food to 458,000 IDPs in 65 camps and 27 transit sites in Gulu andAmuru districts, and 297,000 IDPs in 26 camps and 13 transit sites in Kitgum district.The food rations provided to the IDPs and the composition of the food basket are based on biannualcomprehensive EFSA led by the WFP Vulnerability and Assessment Monitoring unit. One nutritionist and onemonitoring officer from the NRC FFL project and food security officers from NRC’s Food Security and Livelihoodsproject participate in the EFSA. The food rations to be distributed are calculated based on the assessment results184Gulu was divided in two administrative districts in 2007, Gulu and Amuru.185In Gulu and Amuru districts, IDPs in 27 transit sites have received food assistance since July, and IDPs in 13 transit siteshave received food assistance in Kitgum district.186Pader district contributed most to these figures and that especially movement in Gulu, Amuru and Kitgum district has be enlimited (respectively 19 and 25 % at transit sites).187The NRC Food distribution program as cooperating partner to WFP covers the districts of Gulu, Amuru and Kitgum. WorldVision provides food assistance to IDPs in Pader in partnership with WFP.188The name of the WFP and NRC General Food Distribution Programme was changed to Food for Life in 2007 in accordancewith WFP HQ policies.55

which include access to land by IDPs. The rations are expecte d to cover the net food gap which the IDPs can notmeet through their own agricultural production.The food rations have been maintained since January 2006 when the food rations were reduced from 74% to60%, 50% and 40% for Non Extremely Vulnerable Indiv iduals (NEVIs) and to 98% for Extremely VulnerableIndividuals (EVIs) in Gulu and Amuru districts. For Kitgum district the food rations are 60% for NEVIs and 100%for EVIs. The food rations normally include cereals (maize or sorghum), pulses (beans or yell ow split peas) andvegetable oil enriched with Vitamin A.The last EFSA of April 2007 showed that the food security situation has improved slightly but not enough toreduce the food ration any further. Up to 70% of the households are moderate food inse cure while around 14%are severely food insecure, even when food aid is included. Therefore, there is still a food gap in most householdsresulting in a maximum of two meals per day.Project objectivesWithin the NRC Distribution core activity there are two project activities, Food Distribution (FFL project) and FoodSecurity and Livelihoods (FSL). While the FFL project provides food assistance to IDPs in the camps and transitsites on a monthly basis to cover the food net gap, the Food Security and Live lihoods provides support to IDPsagricultural production to enable them to sustain themselves and assist them in the transition phase when theymove to transit sites and eventually their homes of origin.The objectives of the two project activities are r espectively:Food for Life/FFL:- To contribute to household food security and maintain the minimum nutritional and dietary standard byproviding food assistance to people affected by displacement in camps in Gulu, Amuru and Kitgumdistricts.- To protect lives by providing humanitarian food assistance to IDPs to meet the assessed average netfood gap- To safeguard the fundamental right to food for targeted IDPs with special emphasis on women andchildren, EVIs, and the long -term effect of insufficient a ccess to food.Food Security and Livelihoods project:1. To enhance productive capacity and self -reliance of displaced households.In this context the Distribution core activity aims at developing a more comprehensive approach towards foodsecurity, and contributes to durable solutions for the affected population.B. Purpose and phase for the evaluation and intended useNRC’s Food for Life (FFL) project has been operating in Gulu and Kitgum districts since 1997 and untildate no evaluation has been carried out of the program activity. The main purpose of the evaluation is toprovide a systematic and objective assessment of the achievements and performance of the FFL projectover the last three years and identify lessons learned and recommendations fo r future project direction.Emphasis will be placed on evaluating NRC’s ability to provide assistance in a relevant, efficient, effectiveand coordinated manner, as well as coverage and an analysis of impact and connectedness.The intended use of the eval uation is two-fold:• The results of the evaluation will be used by the FFL program manager to re -direct, if necessary,the project design and implementation of the FFL project.• To consider lessons learned from FFL in Uganda in design and implementation of d istributionprojects in similar IDP contexts.C. Scope of work and methodEven though the FFL project has been carried out in Uganda for more than ten years, since 1997, thetimeframe for the evaluation will mainly be limited to the last three years . This coincides with the currentWFP Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO) from April 2005 to March 2008. In April 2008 a newPRRO will begin, and the evaluation team will assess how the FFL project has been operating over thelast three years, str engths, weaknesses and lessons learned of the project will be evaluated, andrecommendations for the way forward for the following PRRO period will be given.The methodology will include:56

• Desk studies. As a general background, the evaluation team should s tudy relevant material in NRC,such as NRC policy paper, country information, the NRC country strategy for Uganda, the NRCdistribution policy, action plans, project applications, agreements, reports and correspondence.• Field visits. A two-week field mission to Uganda; Kampala and the three districts where the FFL projectis currently implemented; Gulu, Amuru and Kitgum. These visits should include meeting and interviewswith NRC staff, WFP staff in Kampala, Gulu and Kitgum, district authorities in Gulu an d Kitgum,beneficiaries, Food Management Committee members in the camps, donor representatives and otherstakeholders• Interviews with stakeholders . Interviews with NRC HQ staff (i.e. program coordinator, head of Africasection, Distribution advisor). Cons ultations in the field will be held with all relevant stakeholders: NRCstaff, FFL staff, WFP staff, local authorities, beneficiaries, donor representatives and other stakeholders.Evaluation principles:The evaluation will be guided by the following ethi cal rules/considerations:• Openness – of information given, to the highest possible degree to all involved parties, where there are notspecial considerations against this• Publicity/public access – to the results when there are not special consideration aga inst this• Broad participation – the interest parties should be involved when relevant/ /possible• Reliability and independence – the evaluation should be conducted so that findings and conclusions arecorrect and trustworthyD. Issues to be coveredThe evaluation team will assess the performance of the FFL project in Uganda by applying the following criteria,based on the OECD/DAC evaluation criteria and defined in NRC’s Evaluation Policy. The question under eachcriterion is meant to guide the eva luation team in focusing on key issues for NRC.Relevance/ Appropriateness• Is the current project design consistent with the humanitarian needs of NRC’s populations of concern,IDPs?• To what extent does the FFL project provide the right response to the ne eds of NRC’s population ofconcern, IDPs?• How have beneficiaries been engaged in the project development and implementation?• Are the objectives of the FFL project in line with NRC’s Distribution policy?• Has NRC the required capacity in terms of staffing, local knowledge and expertise in the country toconduct relevant and appropriate response?• What are the alternatives to the current design of the FFL project? Is the FFL project the best alternativein the current IDP context, and why?• Are there mechanisms in place to monitor whether the FFL project has adapted to changes in thecontext and needs?Efficiency• To what extent has the FFL project utilised its resources and time efficiently?• Could the results have been achieved with fewer inputs?• Were appropriate and adequate resources (material, human, financial) available, in the right place and atthe right time?EffectivenessThe envisaged outcome of the FFL project in Uganda is to contribute to household food security and maintain theminimum nutritional and dietary standard by providing food assistance to people affected by displacement incamps in Gulu, Amuru and Kitgum districts. It works towards that goal through concrete objectives (see page 2 ofthis ToR).• Are objectives and activities sufficiently and clearly defined? Are they relevant to the context and theenvisaged outcome of the project?• Was the application of the criteria for selection of beneficiaries (i.e. EVIs) applied consistently?• Is there an internal monitoring mechanism and objectively verifiable indicators in place to assesswhether or not objectives are achieved? To what extent did the beneficiaries actually benefit from theFFL project?• How do the beneficiaries and others view the value, quality and quantity of the FFL project?• What knowledge, about the project objectives, does the national NRC FFL staff have?Coordination• To what extent has there been coordination with NRC; WFP and other relevant agencies/national/localauthorities?• Which parties were included in the FFL project an d in what manner? Why?57

• Where NRC, WFP, district authorities and other stakeholders coherent in their understanding andimplementation of the FFL project?Coverage• Were the intervention criteria chosen appropriately at different stages of the project?Impact• Has the FFL project identified quantitative and qualitative indicators to measure the impacts of itsactivities? Are monitoring and analysis mechanisms in place?• What intended and unintended, positive and negative effects are produced by the FFL proj ect, both onthe population of concern and others who are affected?• Does the FFL project produce the most appropriate impact, given the situation and recourses available?• What can be done to avoid any negative impact or to enhance any positive impact?Connectedness• Have linkages between relief and recovery phases been established?• To what extent has national and local capacity been supported?• To what extent are the GoU and the districts able to ensure that the IDPs minimum nutritional needs arecovered after end of the FFL project?Cross cutting issues:• Gender – how has the FFL project adopted a gender sensitive approach?• Protection – how has the FFL project ensured that protection concerns have been incorporated andrights based approach adopted?Specific issues for consideration:Possible consequences if the FFL operation is scaled down too rapidlyDue to a relatively stable security period over the last year, the GoU, various international and nationalorganizations and donors are preparing a transitio n from emergency phase to recovery and development phase.This has its basis in the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP), launched by the GoU in October 2007.In this situation the pressure for IDPs to move to transit sites and their homes of orig in is increasing.Simultaneously there is a pressure for international organizations to reduce humanitarian assistance anddevelopment organizations to gradually take over.In accordance to this, there will be a reduction of IDPs receiving food rations i n 2009. The question is the rate ofwhich the reduction of food assistance or a scale down will take place. Monitoring of the food security situation forthe IDPs is a key factor, and climatic changes resulting in natural disasters i.e. in 2007 prolonged h eavy rain andfloods during the rainy season affected the harvest in August and September. WFP and NRC have includedcontingency planning for the worst case scenario in their strategy for the upcoming PRRO period (2008 -2010).Consequences of a rapid scale down need to be taken into account in an assessment of the remaining projectperiod.Conclusions and results from the evaluation should culminate in recommendations for the NRC FFLproject and gradual phase -out over the next 2 -3 year period (2008 – 2009/2010).E. Evaluation teamThe evaluation team will be composed of two persons. The team leader will lead the work of the team and beresponsible for completing the report. The team leader should have skills and proven background in evaluationsof humanitarian assistance projects in emergency/relief/recovery phases, preferably with food assistance andexperience with situation of forced displacement. The regional/national team member should have knowledge andexpertise in humanitarian assistance and goo d knowledge of the culture and conflict in the region. The teammembers should be gender aware.An Evaluation Steering Committee will be established, with the following members: Advisor for Evaluation, NRCHQ; Advisor for Distribution, NRC HQ; Programme Director, NRC CO, Uganda;, Project Manager, GFD/FFL,NRC CO, Uganda; and Program Coordinator for Uganda, NRC HQ. The evaluation manager is Advisor forEvaluation, NRC HQ,The main function of the Steering Committee will be to select the external evaluato rs, review preliminary findingsand recommendations and establish a dissemination and utilisation strategy. The main function of the EvaluationManager will be preparing the terms of reference (in close collaboration with the stakeholder and members of thesteering committee), administration and over all co -ordination, including monitoring progress.58

F. Time frame and budget considerationsThe whole process of evaluation will have a time frame of six weeks starting in April 2008 and ending in May 302008.thThe evaluation is scheduled to start its work early -April initiating field visits to Uganda no later than April 21 st .Theteam leader should alter the evaluations manager at NRC immediately if serious problems or delays areencountered. Approval of any significant changes to the evaluation time table will be referred to the SteeringCommittee.Total Budget frame USD 50,000. ( Fees for consultants USD 37,500 (not including VAT, travel expenses, DSAand printing og report).Expression of interest should be forwarded to Advisor for Evaluation, NRC HQ Kine Brox Brodtkorb not later thanMarch 24 th , 2008. The final decision on selected candidates for the evaluation will be taken by March 28th. Forfurther information please contact: Advisor for Evaluation, NR C HQ Kine Brox Brodtkorb: kine.brodtkorb@nrc.noG. ReportingAt the end of the field research, the evaluation team will hold a workshop with the NRC Uganda team, mainstakeholders (representatives from th e UN World Food Programme, the District Disaster ManagementCommittee) and other relevant staff of the NRC office identified by the Steering Committee to discuss thepreliminary findings of the evaluation exercise.A draft report should be submitted not l ater than May 20th. The completion date for the Final Evaluation report willbe May 30 th with the consultant having addressed NRC’s comments as appropriate. Difference of opinionbetween team members regarding conclusions/ recommendations should be reflect ed in the report.The size of the report should be approximately 40 pages (appendices not included), clearly written in English,using Arial 11 point.The evaluation report should consist of:• Executive summary and recommendations not more than 5 pages• Main text, to include index, context, NRC mandate, evaluation methodology, commentary andanalysis addressing evaluation purpose and outputs to include a section dedicated to the issueof particular lessons -learning focus, conclusion (not more than 35 pages )• Appendences, to include evaluation terms of reference, maps, sample framework andbibliography.•All material collected in the undertaking of the evaluation process should be lodged with the Evaluation managerprior to the termination of the contract.H. Follow upThe final evaluation report will make the basis for a management response and an action plan to follow up on therecommendations provided by the evaluation team. The final report and action plan will also be part of theplanning for p roject activities for the remaining period of the FFL project, and integrated as part of the NRCUganda Country Strategy to be revised in September 2008.For the follow up of the evaluation the Project Manager, GFD/FFL, NRC CO, Uganda is the main respo nsible withthe Distribution Advisor as the focal point at NRC HQ. A management response, responding to therecommendations, including an action plan should be prepared by the Project Manager, GFD/FFL, NRC CO,Uganda by June 16th, 2008. It is the responsib ility of the Programme Director, NRC CO, Uganda to ensure thatthe realisation of these plans are monitored and documented.The final evaluation report will be shared with all stakeholders of the FFL project, other Country Officeswhere distribution is pa rt of the core activities and donors. The final report will be shared with otherrelevant partners of NRC, and be available for all NRC staff via NRC’s intranet web pages.March 10 th, 2008---------------------------59

NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCILKine Brox BrodtkorbAdvisor Quality Assurance and Evaluation /Head of Strategic Management Support (SMS)+ 47 23 10 98 00+ 47 99 03 89 66www.nrc.no60

Annex 2: Evaluation Programme – including field trip to Gulu, Amuru and Kitgum (14 thto 25 th April)Date Activity CommentTuesday 8 th - Prepare Planning field trip and logistics AT to confirm- Working on questions for field and Kampalameetingsmeetings withDFID, ECHO,- Read documentsUSAid and Nor.Wednesday 9 th - Working on questions for field and Kampalameetings- Read documents- Meeting donors?Thursday 10 th - 11:00 Meeting with WFP, Alix Loriston, PaulHowe and Amos MwesigyeFriday 11 th - Read documentsSaturday 12 th Write up of Inception Note: Question guideready/issues to be addressed + overview ofmethodology + list of people to meetSunday 13 thMonday 14 th - Depart for Gulu by car from Kampala at 09.00- Introduction meeting with Nin a Birkeland,Programme Director, and Anne- Meeting with AnneTuesday 15 th - 08.00 Meeting with Bai Mankay Sankoh,WFP HoO, Gulu and Amuru- Meeting with Anne and Boniface- 10:00 Field visit to Opit, GuluWednesday 16 th - 08.45 Travel to Kitgum- 11:00 Meeting with RDC, Kitgum- 12.30 Meeting with Moi, PC FFL- 13.00 – Lunch with Astrid Van Rooij,Project Manager, Food Security andLivelihoods project, Moi and Anne- 14.30 Meeting with Assistant CAO, Kitgum- 16.00 Meeting with Keton Sankei, HoO WFP,KitgumThursday 17 th - 09.00 Meeting with Deputy LCV, Kitgum- 10.00 Attend FFL Phase -Off Strategy Workshoporganized by WFP- 12.30 Field visit to Amida- Field visit to trans it siteFriday 18 th - 08.30 Meeting with HoO UNOCHA,Kitgum- 10:00 Field visit to Pawidi transit site- 13.00 Field visit to Omiya Anyima (Camp, FFLDistribution)Saturday 19 th - 09:00 -11:30 Meeting with NRC GFD/FFL staff- 11.45 Meeting with HoO FAO, Kitgum- 12:45 Lunch- 13.45 Return to GuluSunday 20 th - Consolidate findings from Kitgum- Write up of field notes/preliminary findingsMonday 21 st - 09.30 Meeting with Harry Leefe, HoO UNHCRand PO, Sisse Kristensen- 11:00 Meeting with Joseph PC FSL- 11.45 Travel to Amuru with RDC Amuru- 13:30 Meeting with RDC, CAO andLCV, Amuru- 15:00 Field visit to Amuru camp, AmuruTuesday 22 nd - 09:00 Meeting with Lamin Manjang/Claire, PM/PC, Camp Management- 10:00 Field visit to Ora -PwoyoEmbassyDocuments to bereceived fromNRCAT to arrangetransport (flight)andaccommodation(Boma or AcholiInn)61

- 11:00 Field visit t o Acet, Gulu district- 16.30/17.00 Meeting with Mohammed Siryon, HoOUNOCHA, GuluWednesday 23 rd - 08.15 Meeting with DDMC, Gulu- 09.15 Meeting with Deputy LCV, Gulu- 10:00 Meeting with RDC, Gulu- 11:00 Meeting with CAO, Gulu- 12:00 Meeting with Lotte Grauball e, CD- 13.00 Lunch- 14.00 Meeting with Craig, PM ICLA- 15.30 Meeting with Christine Gottsch. USAID,Gulu TBC/Meeting with AnneThursday 24 th - 08:30 Preparations for prese ntation of preliminaryfindings- 13.00 Lunch- 14:00 -17.00 Meeting at NRC – Presentation ofpreliminary findings from the evaluationFriday 25 th - 08.00 Meeting with the Volunteers- 09.00/09.30 Meeting with Jessica Huber, PAA,NRC- 10.30 Finalization with Ann e- 12.00 Lunch- 14.00 Departure from Gulu with flight to EntebbeSaturday 26 thSunday 27 thMonday 28 th - 11.00 Meeting w/ Gerald Owachi, DFID.Tuesday 29 th - 11.00 Meeting with DFID, Graham C.- 14.00 Meeting with USAID, Douglas Balko andJason xx Food for Peace- 16.00 Meeting with AVSI, Dr. Filippo Ciantia,Country Representative at AVSIWednesday 30 thChristine’s leaveextended,Meeting with DavidMutazindwa inGulu or Kamp.ThursdayWednesday1 st- to14 thMay14thMayWrite up of Evaluation reportMeeting with Gjermund Sæther, Norwegian Embassy.Embassy moved tonew premises:Plot 18B,Akii Bua RoadNakasero,Despite many attempts not able to meet ECHO – no staff was available for interview at any point62

Annex 3: List of Documents ConsultedTitle Author YearBudget Proposal: Food for Life Distribution, Gulu, Norwegian Refugee 2008Amuru and Kitgum, Food for Education, Kitgum,Northern Uganda for 01.04.2008 -31.03.2009CouncilConsolidated Appeal, Uganda, 2008 UN OCHA, Uganda 2008Core Activity Policy Document, EducationNorwegian Refu geeCouncilCore Activity Policy Document, Emergency FoodSecurity and DistributionNorwegian RefugeeCouncilCore Activity Policy Document, Protection Norwegian RefugeeCouncil,Core Activity Policy Document, ShelterNorwegian RefugeeCouncil,Emergency Food Security Assessment WFP, Uganda 2005Emergency Food Security Assessment of IDPCamps and Settled Areas in The Northern andNorth Eastern Conflict Affected Regions, March -WFP, Uganda August 2007April 2007Evaluation Report: Uganda WFP PRRO 10121.1,Targeted Food Assistance for Relief and Recoveryof Refugees, Displaced Persons and VulnerableGroups in UgandaWorld FoodProgrammeFAO Working Paper: Assessing the Impact of Titus O. Avokuse September 2006Food Aid on Recipient Countries: A SurveyFAO Working Paper: Food Aid in Response to Christopher B. Barrett September 2006Acute Food InsecurityFood Assistance Phase -Off Strategy for the North WFP Uganda 2008Food for Life Programme and Food for Education Norwegian Refugee Copies availed from theProgramme, Monthly Report, Gu lu and Kitgum Council, Uganda period 2005-2008Food for Life Programme and Food for Education Norwegian Refugee January-March 2008Programme, Quarterly Report, Gulu and Kitgum Council, UgandaFood Security and D istribution, Core Activity Norwegian Refugee 2008Strategy, Uganda 2008 -2010 (Draft, InternalDocument)CouncilGender PolicyNorwegian RefugeeCouncilKhartoum Food Aid Forum, Global Trends in Food Daniel Maxwell June 2006Aid, Expert OpinionNational Peace, Recovery and Development Planfor Northern UgandaGovernment ofUganda20082007Northern Uganda Agricultural RecoveryProgramme, Identification Mission ReportNutrition and Health Assessment in InternallyDisplaced Peo ple’s Camps in Gulu and AmuruDistrictsNutrition and Health Assessment in InternallyDisplaced People’s Camps, Gulu DistrictNutritional Anthropometric Survey, Final Report,IDP Camps and Resttle ment Areas of Gulu &Amuru Districts, Northern UgandaPost Distribution Monitoring ReportPoverty Eradication Action PlanProtracted Relief and Recovery Operation Uganda10121.1, Targeted Food Assistance for Relief andRecovery of Refugees, Displaced Persons andVulnerable Groups in UgandaRapid Assessment Report, Food Secur ity,Nakwanya Village Orom Sub County KitgumDistrictEuropean2007CommissionWFP Uganda/GoU February 2008WFP Uganda/GoU November 2006Action AgainstHunger, UgandaNorwegian RefugeeCouncil, UgandaGovernment ofUgandaWorld FoodProgrammeMay 2007December 2007, January,February 20082004 – 2007February, 2005WFP Kitgum March 200863

Rapid Emergency Food Security Assessment in20 IDP Camps in Gulu and Amuru districtsRethinking Food Security in HumanitarianResponseWFP Uganda January 2008Daniel Maxwell et. Al.Tufts University,Friedman School ofNutrition Science andPolicy and FeinsteinInternational CentreApril 2008Situation Analysis of Northern Uganda UNICEF, Uganda 2005The Sphere Project, Humanitarian Charter and The Sphere Project 2004Minimum Standards in Disaster Respo nseUganda National Household Survey 2005/06 Government of 2006UgandaUS Food Aid, Time to Get It RightInstitute forAgriculture and TradePolicy2005Waiting for Godot in Gulu UN OCHA, Uganda 2007Annex 4: List of persons/ organisations metInstitution/Agency Name TitleGovernment of Uganda Col. Walter OchoraRDC, GuluMr. Omwony OgabaRDC, KitgumMr. KomakechRDC AmuruVice LCV Chair, GuluVice LCV Chair, KitgumMr. SylvesterDISO, KitgumMr. BarnabasDeputy CAO, KitgumMr. CharlesDDMC Coordinator, GuluWorld Food Programme Mr. Alix LorristonDeputy Country DirectorMr. Paul HoweEmergency CoordinatorMr. Amos MwesigyiMr. Bai Mankay Sankoh Head of Office, GuluMr. Kenton SankeiHead of Of fice, KitgumMr. Joseph Okellowange Programme Manager, KitgumUNOCHAMr. Mohammed Siryon Head of Office, GuluMr. KomakechKitgum OfficeUNHCRMr. Harry LeefeHead of Office, GuluMs. Sisse Kristensen Community Services OfficerFAO Ms. Brenda Pilo yo Programme Officer, KitgumDFID Mr. Gerald Owachi Conflict and Humanitarian AdvisorUSAIDMr. David MutazindwaMr. Douglas BalkoMr. JasonFood for PeaceAVSI Mr. Filippo Ciantia Country RepresentativeNorwegian Embassy, Kampala Mr. Gjermund Sæ ther Deputy AmbassadorNorwegian Refugee CouncilMs. Lotte GrauballeMs. Nina BirkelandMs. Anne Mette TeigenMr. Philip MoiMr. Simon BonifaceMs. Astrid Van RooijMs. ClaireMs. Jessica HuberMr. JosephMr. CraigMr. Lamex OdonkyeroMr. Gabriel OchanMr. Hoska AkiaMr. Rashid BugaMr. EzraCountry DirectorProgramme DirectorProgramme Manager GFDProgramme Coordinator KitgumProgramme Co ordinator,GuluProgramme Manager FSLCamp ManagementAdvisorFSL, GuluICLA, GuluData clerk, KitgumMonitoring Assistant, KitgumFocal Person, FFE, KitgumField Assistant, KitgumMonitoring Officer64

Expert OpinionsMr. Joe OloyaMr. Graham CarringtonMonitoring Officer, Kitgum2

Annex 5: Traditional nutrition and diet in Northern Uganda – By Jane OryemThe traditional (pre IDP camps) nutrition and dietary system in Northern Uganda (Acholi sub -region comprisingthe districts of Kitgum, Pader, Amuru and Gulu) consisted of the staples such as Millet and Sim -Sim, fruits,vegetables, poult ry, meat (fresh and Game) and seasonal delicacies. The Acholi had a variety of foods accessibleto every family. Apart from nutritional values there some food elements culturally favoured for the growth ofchildren, to help increase breast milk for nursin g mothers ,some to increase vitality in young men.Sources of Food• Practically every family kept poultry, a few goats and sheep, which were reared, in and around thehomestead. Many families kept cattle reared within the village (with the help of the B alaloo People whokept most of the milk for sale). The wealthy families had large farms with hundreds of herds.• Around each homestead, there were plots of land for growing vegetables like Malakwang (a bitter-sourbut delicious and nutritious vegetable) , Boo (the staple vegetable of the Acholi) Akeyo, Oyado (Greenvegetables) pumpkin, tomatoes, cabbages, beans and Irish Potatoes. The homestead plots were alsoused to grow cassava, sweet potatoes, maize (for cob consumption as opposed to producing flour) andfruits like mangoes, pawpaw, oranges, lemon, guavas and tangerines.• A mile or two from the homesteads were the main family gardens of small farms where millet andsimsim (the main staple food of the Acholi), were grown. Other main food crops grown here inc ludedLapena (Chick peas), groundnuts, sorghum for brewing beer (sometimes sorghum was mixed withcassava flour in times of a poor millet harvest).• Each family had a minimum of two granaries ( dero) to store millet and simsim. The size and number ofthe granaries depended on the size of the family and wealth. The food stored would always last past thenext harvest. Other granaries were built to store peas and groundnuts.• Around the family gardens, in the communal grazing fields, by the rivers and in the fore sts there werelots of fruit trees and anyone could collect these fruits. Among these were Shea nut trees (Yaa) whosefruits contain the seeds from which –Shea butter (Moo Yaa) was extracted. Moo Yaa was mainly used insauces, but also served as a body lot ion for women and children. Other fruit trees include Tugu (palmtree), Cwaa (Tamarind), Langoo, Ocoga, Oywelo, and many others.• People had Bee hives ( Bong) in communal grazing areas or forests for honey. Some individuals werealso known to lay claim on ho ney troves found in some hollow trees, those claims were accepted andrespected by the rest in the village. They would then periodically extract honey from that tree. Thesesorts of claims also applied to fresh anthills in the communal land (but not in som eone’s garden). Theowner of the anthill would then trap White Ants ( Ngwen) from the anthill every season.• Grasshoppers ‘ Nsenene’ ( Ocene) or fungi like mushrooms Obwol) were also popular seasonaldelicacies.• During the Dry Season (November to February), there were joint hunting sessions in the forests in whichthe entire village was involved. Most of the hunting was, however carried out by lone hunters (Oken) withtheir dogs around the bushes and forests in the area. The hunters are mostly very successful (Buffalo,Antelopes, field rats) and they sold most of their game and fish (either fresh or smoked) to the people.The average family also set traps for small animals like rabbits and birds like Guinea Fowls (Aweno) inand around their gardens.It should also be noted that, throughout Acholi land, Saturdays and or Wednesdays are “Market days”. Peoplebrought their produce to the central market (in each village) and used the money to buy other produce orsupplement their income. These two days are normally when cows are slaughtered and people could buy and eatfresh meat. Those who could not afford to buy fresh meat or game on a Saturday used chicken as a substitute.Goats and sheep were slaughtered when there were special family functions or occasions of c ultural importance.3

Typical Menu:BREAKFAST:• Millet porridge prepared with tamarind to make it a bit sour. ( Mostly for men after digging hard in thegardens and vitality)• Sour milk or yoghurt mixed with mashed sweet potatoes ( mostly for kids and the ir mothers).• Tea with milk, boiled cassava and simsim/groundnuts paste (peanut butter).• Pawpaw, mangoes and shea nuts ( Odur Yaa)• Cake of boiled peas ( Lapena) mixed with simsim paste and served the size of a tennis ball (a ll timefavourite for children ).• Fried white ants.• Left Over ( millet bread and sauce normally from previous evening mainly for kids or those leaving homeat dawn to go the farms)MAIN MEAL:• Millet bread or sweet potatoes or maize meal or rice ( collectively called Kwon) accompanied by t hefollowing sauces ( collectively called Dek).• Malakwang or Boo vegetables• Lapena (peas) or beans• Dry or smoked meat, game or fish.• Chicken or Guinea fowl• All the above served in a Sim Sim or groundnut sauce• Fresh meat or game or chicken or fish fried an d boiled Irish potatoes added.SNACKS: (Normally eaten between meals)• Fruits• Dry or fried groundnuts.• Simsim paste mixed with honey• White ants paste mixed with honey or shea butter ( eaten with millet bread )• Boiled cassava with simsim or groundnuts paste .• Cakes of boiled peas mixed with simsim paste• Fried grasshoppers or white ants.4

Annex 6: Evaluation Tool/Question GuideNRC objectives andTOR objectivesRelevance andAppropriatenessTo contribute to household food security andmaintain the minimum nutritional and dietarystandards through food assistance to peopleaffected by displacementTo what extent has NRC food assistance contributedto sustain nutritional and dietary standards of IDPs -in response to their needs and demands and contextTo protect lives by providinghumanitarian food assistance to meetthe net food gapTO what extent have beneficiariesdemands and needs been addressed interms of meeting their net food gap?To safeguard fundamental rights to food forIDPs incl. Women, children, EVIsHow have beneficiaries been engaged in projectdevelopment and implementation – in order toensure everybody’s right to food?CoverageIs NRC’s approach to HOUSEHOLDS foodassistance in line with populations concerns?Is the FFL project in line with NRC’s distributionpolicy? (do no harm, timing, participation, culturalsensitivity, gender sensitivity, quality)NRC’s capacity (staffing and resources) to distributethe appropriate responseHow does NRC’s structure and organisationa l set upassist in providing relevant and appropriateassistanceIn view of the vast geographical context – how hasNRC’s efforts contributed to the total coverage andoutreach to people affected by displacementWhich standards have been followed tomeet the net food gap – have they beenappropriate?Is the FFL project the best solution toensure that the net food gap is met in thecurrent IDP situation?Participation of women in food managementcommittees, capacity building, training etc?How has NRC in its design and implementationclearly spelled out its concern and address ofissues regarding women, children and EVIsNRC’s capacity (staffing and resources ) todistribute the appropriate response to selectedtarget groupsTo what extent has NRC’s gender policy beenadhered to in implementation of the project?What percentage do women, children and EVIsmake up of the total target group and the extent towhich their needs have been addressed.EfficiencyHas NRC adjusted its focus, scope and coverage atdifferent stages of the project?NRC’s experience and capacity (material, human,financial) to distribute in the right place at the righttimeDeliveries, pipeline and local procurement – how hasit worked?Has the net food gap been met in the timeand with the resources available to NRCduring the project period?If not – why?How were the target groups defined and selectedHow would you describe NRC’s capacity (material,human, financial) to address the conditions ofwomen, children a nd EVIs in the right place at theright timeLessons learned?Timeliness?Effectiveness How has NRC defined objectives and activities for Has the net food gap been met? What are the concrete achievements and1

NRC objectives andTOR objectivesTo contribute to household food security andmaintain the minimum nutritional and dietarystandards through food assistance to peopleaffected by displacementthe food assistance? Are they clear and relevant?To what extent have activities been carried out asper plan?To what extent have objectives for household foodassistance been achieved?Challenges?Lessons learned?To protect lives by providinghumanitarian food assistance to meetthe net food gapTo what extent has the concrete objectivesbeen achieved ?Are beneficiaries satisfied with theassistance?Challenges?Lessons learned?To safeguard fundamental rights to food forIDPs incl. Women, children, EVIsoutcomes regarding ensuring the food rights ofwomen, children and EVIs?Female participation and leadership positions?Challenges?Success stories/Best practices?Lessons learned?CoordinationHow has the coordination between NRC and otherstakeholders (district, communities UN, NGOs) takenplace?Relevance of coordination (examples)?Do districts and other stakeholdersunderstand the approach and interventionsmade by NRC in addressing the net foodgap?Connectedness torelief and recoveryand Uganda’snational plansStrengths and weaknesses?To what extent has a linkage between relief andrecovery in terms of household food security beenmade?To what extent are the GoU and the district s able toensure that the IDPs minimum nutritional need arecovered after end of the FFL project?How does the NRC approach to providinghumanitarian food assistance link to thenational recovery plans (PRDP)SustainabilityImpactWhat has NRC done to ensu re sustainability(enhance productive capacity and self reliance ofpeople affected by displacement)?Impact according to indicators: distribution,malnutrition (gam), participation … vis a vis target?How has NRC planned for not onlyHOUSEHOLDS, but also vulnerable groupsin scaling up food security and livelihoodsinterventions to meet gradual reductio n infood distribution?Impact?2

NRC objectives andTOR objectivesTo contribute to household food security andmaintain the minimum nutritional and dietarystandards through food assistance to peopleaffected by displacementWhat effects can be seen from FFL – at house holdlevelTo protect lives by providinghumanitarian food assistance to meetthe net food gapTo safeguard fundamental rights to food forIDPs incl. Women, children, EVIsCross cuttingissuesIntended and unintended?How has t he FFL project adopted a gender sensitiveapproach?How has the FFL project ensured thatprotection concerns have beenincorporated ?What are the best practices and lessons learnedfrom working to safeguard peop le fundamentalright to food?MonitoringAre there mechanisms in place for monitoring FFLand the way it has adapted appropriately to changesin context and needs?Has a rights based approach beenadopted?Has post distribution monitoring beencarried out?Are there mechani sms in place to monitor women’sparticipation in food distribution?How have they worked?3