evaluation of general food distribution in northern uganda: gulu ...

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through off loading of food from trucks, maintaining distribution grounds tidy and scoopingfood rations from bags. NRC has facilitated the organisation of Food ManagementCommittees (FMCs). FMCs compose village leaders and camp management who spearhead communication with NRC, undertake conflict resolution and manage complaints inrelation to the food distribution. The FMCs have in some cases developed into powerfulcommunity organisations and advocates of food and camp related issues, and IDPs have aspace to voice their concerns in a concerted effort. Working closely with the FMCs,delegating responsibility and entrusting them with authority has also given NRC a platform toact with the necessary leverage. This approach has been fundamental to increasingefficiency in distribution of food and minimizing conflicts. Wit h substantial organisedparticipation, as well as supervision of volunteers, spillage and wastage is low. Moreessentially it has increased ownership of what could otherwise be perceived as anundignified process 64 .6.4 But Does Everybody Get a Share – Getting the Numbers Right?Where the main and most frustrating concerns and challenges appear in terms of efficientand well-covered food assistance however is in establishing the correct number ofbeneficiaries and thereby requesting for the equivalent amounts of food from WFP storages.The revalidation and verification exercise, which is supposed to register and confirm thenumber of people entitled to food has by all stakeholders including all NRC staff, volunteersand not least IDPs been highlighted as the most troublesome activity to date.IDPs are eligible to food rations upon registration and receipt of a ration card. Without agenuine card, food will not be provided. However, due to technical and methodologicaldeficiencies in the registration and verification process as well as some degree ofmanipulation and squandering by IDPs the situation looks like this: (1) There areunregistered IDPs who need food (2) There are registered IDPs who do not appear on theWFP registry (3) There are IDPs who are registered and on the registry, but without food andfinally (4) there are unregistered IDPs with ration cards 65 .In sum it means that thousands of eligible IDPs have in long periods of time not beenreceiving their entitled food aid. NRC has put much effort i nto capturing some of the missedtargets through a home grown ‘coupon’ intervention, where many of those left out werepicked up in a second registry and are now back onto the WFP list. The problem in Kitgumwas reported down sized to 2-4% missed targets.One of the main problems in the verification process has been the outsourcing of the datacollection and data entry process to different organisations. Hence in Gulu and Kitgum,whereas NRC has been in charge of organising, grouping and distributing food and ‘tickingoff’ people on the print lists from WFP, other organisations have been involved in making thehousehold/family head counts through door-to-door visits and even other organisations havebeen tasked with the data entry into the WFP registry, whi ch eventually makes up the list ofeligible beneficiaries. Many ‘managers’ involved in a single process has resulted ininconsistencies, errors and missed targets. Particularly the data entry was highlighted as notbeing meticulous enough, leaving out seve ral members of a household, although they hadinitially been identified as recipients of food.64NRC also highlights their aptness to respond quickly and flexibly to the floods in Northern Uganda in August and September2007, where WFP decided to use airdrop of food in four camps in Amuru and five camps in Kitgum as a result of impassableroads and bridges. Although this airdrop operation has been criticised by some stakeholders/donors for being too expensive andunnecessary considering the scope of people reached and the limited effects of the floods in the Acholi sub-region, NRCthrough its mobilisation of FMCs on the ground to some degree controlled an otherwise chaotic situation at the drop grounds.65 From NRC Advocacy Strategy for GFD.22
The complaints about the failed verification process and the missed targets have beennumerous. Most often the IDPs are fed back with the explanation that the print list from theWFP computer did not capture their names. This is most dissatisfying for many IDPs, and asan older woman from a transit site in Kitgum said: “How does a computer know how manyfamily members I have at home?”Apart from trying to rectify the problem through the ‘coupon’ intervention NRC hasconsistently brought forward the complaints of the IDPs in monthly and quarterly monitoringreports submitted to WFP, seeking help to re -include the missed targets on the registrationlists. However, action on behalf of WFP is slow. Getting onto the list, once you have beenknocked off is not an easy process and can take up to several months, where one is leftwithout food.6.5 Lesson Learned♦♦♦♦♦For approximately USD 1,8 million per year, NRC has organised, arranged, distributedand monitored food assistance to some 755.000 people on a monthly basis duringinsecure and restrictive times. This means on average a cost of USD 2,3 per IDP peryear. This cost is over and above the expenditures for food itself a nd WFP’s own costs.In view of the efficient field operation, use of local resource base and the number ofbeneficiaries reached cost efficiency may be argued to be similar to other operations ofthis magnitude.NRC has distributed food without major delays or failures, despite WFP pipelinebreakages, storage shortages, low trucking capacity or funding delays etc. This hasindeed been possible because of a flexible work force of experienced and disciplinedpeople who have grown with the organisation a nd possesses detailed local knowledge.This has been imperative to delivering swift food aid. The investment in capacity buildingof 200 volunteers has proven worthwhile.Management and ground supervision of the operation with constant communication anddialogue with beneficiaries and camp/community networks (FMCs) provides smoothdistribution of aid and an opportunity to solve conflicts and problems that may arise alongthe way.A distribution approach where beneficiaries are involved as much as possi ble is importantto ensure fair and dignified distribution of food aid and hence also a mitigation of potentialconflicts amongst beneficiaries.Revalidation and verification exercises take a lot of time and require close supervisionand management. When data collection, entry and verification is outsourced to differentorganisations its leads to many errors. Rather, one organisation with close contact andoverview of the beneficiaries should do it. Verifying the print list before entering the datainto the database is a fundamental ‘check-point’ if errors are to be captured before theymake their way into the final list, from which WFP allocates its metric tonnes.6.6 Recommendations♦♦For future food aid operations, NRC should learn from the organisational set-up andhuman resource pool in Uganda and build well equipped operations based on localknowledge and capacities.The terms and conditions of the current volunteer work force should be assessed toprovide people with a more competitive package. Also , the capacity of the volunteers23
Page 4 and 5: List of Contents1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Page 6 and 7: 9.3 NRC’s Efforts Towards Connect
Page 8 and 9: tools; however it ensures food secu
Page 10 and 11: ♦♦♦♦With the ration reducti
Page 12: 1.4 CoordinationNRC’s approach to
Page 15 and 16: NRC coincided the field phase of th
Page 17 and 18: Juba talks have been perceived as t
Page 19 and 20: Table 2: 2004 Global Food Aid Deliv
Page 21 and 22: 4 PROTECTING THE RIGHT TO FOOD - TH
Page 23 and 24: 5 PROJECT RELEVANCE & APPROPRIATENE
Page 25 and 26: 5.3 Lesson Learned♦♦♦‘Being
Page 27: schedules and working long hours to
Page 31 and 32: 7 PROJECT EFFECTIVENESSHaving asses
Page 33 and 34: most and mothers observed the nutri
Page 35 and 36: 7.1.7 Lesson Learned♦ Food aid ha
Page 37 and 38: By 2005 the profile of the crisis i
Page 39 and 40: Recent studies 95 on global food se
Page 41 and 42: From the 2007 EFSA 104 it transpire
Page 43 and 44: 7.3 Project Objective 3:To safeguar
Page 45 and 46: 7.3.4 A Future Strategy for EVIs?Se
Page 47 and 48: 8 COORDINATION8.1 A Co-ordinated Re
Page 49 and 50: some extent also GoU through distri
Page 51 and 52: 9 RELIEF AND RECOVERY - CONNECTEDNE
Page 53 and 54: expected of them. From their perspe
Page 55 and 56: 9.4 Lessons Learnt♦♦♦♦♦St
Page 57 and 58: dependency among the IDPs and unwil
Page 59 and 60: establish the food security situati
Page 61 and 62: ANNEX 1: Terms of Reference for the
Page 63 and 64: • Desk studies. As a general back
Page 65 and 66: F. Time frame and budget considerat
Page 67 and 68: Annex 2: Evaluation Programme - inc
Page 69 and 70: Annex 3: List of Documents Consulte
Page 71 and 72: Expert OpinionsMr. Joe OloyaMr. Gra
Page 73 and 74: Typical Menu:BREAKFAST:• Millet p
Page 75 and 76: NRC objectives andTOR objectivesTo

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