evaluation of general food distribution in northern uganda: gulu ...

Targeting of food aid should be followed by questions such as when, how long, how muchand by what means, as emergency food aid is not designed for a long-standingintervention 40 . Thoughts about reducing dependency and increasing self -reliance, alternativeor complimentary strategies to the food aid should therefore most preferably be built into theproject interventions at an early stage.While in the more recent years maintaining a broad portfolio of other activities 41 , NRC did notconsider exploring alternative or complementary solutions to the monthly food rationdistribution, except for also distributing the rations for WFP’s school feeding programme (seealso Section 9.3 in Chapter 9 for NRC’s efforts to link relief and recovery). Given the securitysituation, which has been a restricting factor, this is to some degree understandable. Butconsidering the time span of the conflict as well as persisting needs of the people combinedwith an inconsistent supply of food or reduction in rations and food basket – steps might havebeen taken to explore alternative strategies to food distribution, going beyond merely keepingpeople alive. As mentioned in the previous chapter, NRC acknowledges the possibilities andobligations in a protracted situation in its recently finalised Core Activity Policy on EmergencyFood Security and Distribution.Several key informants to this Evaluation 42 have said that in as much as NRC has been theimplementing partner for WFP, NRC – in its capacity as an independent NGO - could havetried out alternative options for food aid, notwithstanding the security situation, whereby formany years only 2-5 km periphery land was accessible around most camps or othercircumstantial challenges. One option could have been sourcing of extra/differe nt food inUganda to top up the WFP supplies or fill in when there is a gap (missing food items, delaysdue to logistical challenges and bureaucracy, identification of new groups that are waiting tobe registered). It can assist in fulfilling the main obje ctive of the programme: ensuring foodsecurity/protecting peoples’ right to food. In a protracted situation, where the needs are direand the existing food sources and channels may be challenged and even delaying thehumanitarian response, some thought should be given to this option in order to complimentongoing activities and overcome challenges and in turn – and most importantly - fulfil andNRC’s obligation to the beneficiaries.There have also been ‘pockets of periods’ where the security situation ha s beenmanageable, particularly from 2005, where other options could have been tried out 43 . Thesecould have involved livelihood activities, cash programmes or other market or communitystimulating interventions that could have contributed to household (food) security. 44 Somestudies 45 show that – contingent upon the context - cash inputs are a more effective meansof helping vulnerable households, and this stems from the somewhat evident fact thatvulnerable households have (food) needs beyond the food, which they are given 46 .40Global Trends in Food Aid, Daniel Maxwell 2006.41 Information, Communication and Legal Assistance Programme, Youth Education Pack, Food Security and LivelihoodsProgramme.42 Interviews and discussions with donors, IDPs, NRC GFD staff and other project staff, and other humanitarian organisations.43During 2005 more space was available to IDPs through GoUs initiative of ‘decongesting’ camps.44Interviews with food aid donors as well as UN agencies in Gulu and Kitgum, NRC staff + Food security surveys of 2005.NRCs own livelihood activities did not pick pace until late 2006.45This point was also discussed with several key informants and donor agencies in Kampala. The Norwegian Embassy inKampala has commissioned a study on cash programmes in resettlement areas, with an aim to support people as they moveback. The findings of the study may be of use to NRC.46Global Trends in Food Aid, Daniel Maxwell, p. 518