Vol 7 No 1 - Roger Williams University School of Law

demand access to the property or privileges of another, onpain of antitrust penalties and compulsion; thus thecourts have required anticompetitive action by amonopolist that is intended to “eliminate competition inthe downstream market.”225Ultimately, the court concluded this was not an essential facilityscenario as Intel and Intergraph were not competitors and thenmoved on to reject the notion that Intel had done something wrongin refusing to supply its informational products to Intergraph:Other than as a remedy for illegal acts, the antitrust lawsdo not compel a company to do business with anyone—customer, supplier, or competitor.. . . [I]t is well established that “in the absence of anypurpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the [Sherman]act does not restrict the long recognized right of a traderor manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business,freely to exercise his own independent discretion as toparties with whom he will deal.”. . . .A “refusal to deal” may raise antitrust concerns when therefusal is directed against competition and the purpose isto create, maintain, or . . . enlarge a monopoly. Forexample, in Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, the onlynewspaper in town refused to sell newspaper advertisingto persons who also advertised on a competing radiostation; this was held to be an attempt to . . . monopolizethe mass dissemination of all news and advertising, andto violate the Sherman Act.226Claims of leveraging (using monopoly power to gain a competitiveadvantage in another market through illegitimate conduct),coercive reciprocity and tying (based on the allegation that Intelwould supply the information if Intergraph settled the law suit)were also rejected by the court.227Finally, the court more closely considered the issue ofintellectual property rights. The court explained:225. Intergraph Corp., 195 F.3d at 1356-57 (citations omitted).226. Id. at 1357-58 (citations omitted).227. Id. at 1359-60.